AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM THROUGH DECEMBER 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01629R000300080012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 105
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
An Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program
Through December 1967
JCS review completed
NGA Review Completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
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CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. General Trends . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
A. Damage to the Economy . . . . . . 6
1. Transportation . . . . . . . 6
a. Railroads . . . . . . . . 8
b. Highways . . . . . . . 9
c. Waterways . . . . . . . . 10
d. Railroad Yards and 11
Shops . . . . . . . .
e. Maritime Ports and 12
Shipyards . .
f. Transport Equipment . . . 13
g. Bridges . . . . . . . . . 14
2. Other Economic Targets . . . 16
a. Electric Power . . . . . 16
b. Manufacturing 18
Facilities . . . . . . .
c. Petroleum Storage
Facilities . . . ... . . 20
3. Indirect Effects .
A Agriculture and
Fishing . . . . . . . . 21
b. Export Losses . . . . . . 22
4. Miscellaneous Economic
Damage by Armed
Reconnaissance . . . . . . . 23
B. Military Damage . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Air Defense . . . . . . . . . 24
a. Aircraft . . . . . . . . . 24
b. Airfields . . . . . . . . 25
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Page
C. SAM Sites . . . . . . . . 26
d. Radar . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. Naval . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
a. Craft . . . . . . . . . . 27
b. Bases . . . . . . . . . . 28
3. Support Facilities . . . . . 28
a. Barracks . . . . . . . . 28
b. Supply and Ordnance
Depots . . . . . . . . 29
c. Ammunition Depots . . . . 30
d. Communiations . . . . . . 31
4. Miscellaneous Military
Damage by Armed
Reconnaissance . . . . . . . 31
C. Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . 32
II. Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A. Scale of Attack . . . . . . . 53
B. Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
C. Distribution of Attacks Against
North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . 56
D. Cost of Air Operations Against
North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . 58
III. Air Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . 63
B. Air Losses in Southeast Asia . . 63
C. Rolling Thunder Losses . . . . . 64
1. Loss Trends . . . . . . . . . 64
2. Aircraft Losses . . . . . . . 67
a. By Geographic Area . . . 67
b. By Type of Target . . . . 68
3. Personnel Losses . . . . . . 69
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Appendixes
Page
Appendix A. Transportation in the Hanoi 71
and Haiphong Areas . . . .
Appendix B. Inventories of Transport 77
Equipment . . . . . . . . .
Appendix C. Restoration of the Electric
Power Industry and
Alternative Power Supply 85
1. Value of Economic and Military Damage, 34
Cumulative 1965-67 . . . . . . . . .
2. Major Railroad Yards and Shops 35
Attacked, 1965-67 . . . . . . . . .
3. Maritime Ports and Shipyards 36
Attacked, 1965-67 . . . . . . . . .
4. Destruction and Damage of Transport 38
Equipment, 1965-67 . . . . . . . . .
5. Strikes Against JCS-Targeted 39
Bridges, 1965-67 . . . . . . . . . .
6. Bomb Damage Assessment of Bridges
in North Vietnam, Cumulative 39
1965-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Electric Power Facilities Attacked, 40
1965-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Manufacturing Facilities Attacked, 43
1965-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
9. Petroleum Storage Facilities
Attacked, 1965-67 . . . .
45
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Page
10. Airfields Attacked, 1965-67 . . . . . 48
11. Naval Bases Attacked, 1965-67 . . . . 51
12. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by
Mission and Nationality, 1965-67 . . 60
13. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by
Program and by Service, 1965-67 . . 61
14. Ordnance Delivered by Air on North
Vietnam, by Program, 1965-67 . . . . 61
15. Distribution of Attack Sorties over
North Vietnam, by Route Package,
1966 and 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . 62
16. Sorties, Losses, and Loss Rates of
US Fixed Wing Aircraft over North
Vietnam, 1965-67 . . . . . . . . . . 66
17. Interdiction of Major Railroad/
Highway Bridges in Hanoi and
Haiphong Areas, 1967 - February
1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
18. North Vietnam: Rolling Stock, by
Rail Line Observed on Photo ra hic
Missions, 82
19. North Vietnam: Estimated Truck
Inventories, Imports, and
Effective Losses, 1965-67
20. North Vietnam: Estimated Motor
Vehicle Imports, 1965-67 . . . . . . 84
21. Status of North Vietnamese Power
Facilities at the end of 1967 . . . 90
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Following Page
Illustrations
North Vietnam Frontispiece
Figure 1. Value of Economic Damage
in North Vietnam, by
Sector, 1965, 1966,
and 1967 . . . . . . .
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage
in North Vietnam, by
Sector, 1965, 1966,
and 1967 . . . . . . .
Figure 3. Sorties Flown Against
Targets in Southeast
Asia, 1965, 1966,
and 1967 . . . . . . .
Figure 4. Ordnance Delivered
Against Targets in
Southeast Asia, 1965,
1966, and 1967 . . .
Figure 5. North Vietnam: Value
of Economic and
Military Damage, by
Quarter, 1965-67 . . . 6
Figure 6. Hanoi Transport System
and Bypasses . . . . .
Figure 7. North Vietnam: Electric
Power Capacity,
1965-67 . . . . . . .
Figure 8. US Aircraft Loss Rates
in North Vietnam, by
Target Category,
1967 . . . . . . . . .
Figure 9. US Aircraft Loss Rates
in North Vietnam, by
Route Package, July-
December 1967 . . . .
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1?\ong Tho
J) 1
tb Binh Lu
THAILAND
North Vietnam
Road
Railroad (meter gauge)
Major inland waterway
o 25 50 75 Miles
o 25 5Q 75 Kilome(ers
am Rang
hanh Hoa
Hal
Duong
Dinh La
13u
-o~
inh Linh
'~?. o"' pPO DEMARCATION LINE
ong Ha
one Khe Quang Tri
Sanh
p-0Q ry SOUTH
Under
construction
Ha Giang)
Hoa
Binh
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1968
An Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program
Through December 1967
Summary
During 1967 a sustained and intensive interdic-
tion campaign was carried out against almost every
significant military and economic target in North
Vietnam. The activity level was well above that
of any previous year of the Rolling Thunder program.
The physical damage inflicted on North Vietnam
during 1967 exceeded that achieved during 1965 and
1966 combined. Most of modern industry was effec-
tively neutralized; the disruption of agriculture,
trade, and transportation reached new heights; and
the lot of the average citizen became more trying.
None of these results, however, has produced any
significant weakening of North Vietnam's military
capabilities, the apparent resolution with which
the regime carries on the war, or the popular sup-
port of the regime.
The cumulative pounding by the Rolling Thunder
program for almost three years has caused formidable
physical damage to North Vietnam. The cost of damage
to military and economic targets through 1967 is
valued at nearly $420 million. Economic targets
accounted for nearly $290 million of the damage
(almost 70 percent of total damage), and military
targets accounted for the remaining $130 million
(see Figures 1 and 2). The cost of all damage
inflicted during 1967 was more than one-half of
the total for the three years and was more than
double that in 1966.
Note: This memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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The estimated number of casualties resulting
from the Rolling Thunder program continues to be
remarkably low -- less than 76,000 after almost
three years of bombing. Indeed, preliminary esti-
mates indicate that the casualties during 1967 were
at a much lower rate than in previous years, de-
spite the marked increase in sorties against targets
in heavily populated areas.
Air attacks in 1967 increased significantly
in terms of number of sorties flown and ordnance
dropped. The 191,000 sorties flown over North
Vietnam in 1967 were almost as many as the total
flown during the two preceding years of the air
war, and ordnance dropped during 1967-was half
again as much as was dropped in 1965 and 1966
combined (see Figures 3 and 4).
Many key industrial and transport targets in
the Northeast were struck for the first time in
1967. Normal traffic movements in the Hanoi area
are hindered by damage to the Doumer Bridge over
the Red River and in the Haiphong.area by the
damaged railroad/highway bridge, although large
numbers of bypasses have insured a continuous
movement of traffic. By the end of 1967, electric
power generating capacity was about 35 percent of
the pre-bombing national capacity compared with a
low of 20 percent during June through October 1967.
The major manufacturing plants, including the Thai
Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex and the Haiphong
Cement Plant, were inoperable at the end of the
year, but a few manufacturing facilities had been
put back into partial operation as a result of
the increase in electric power.
Despite serious disruptions to the transport
system in 1967, the bombing has not put a relevant
ceiling on the Communist force structure or levels
of combat in the South. The flow of materials to
support the war in South Vietnam has been stepped
up and by the end of the year reached record levels.
During the bombing campaign, ad
rolling stock inventories have increased despite
heavy losses. Repairs to highways, railroads,
and bridges are being made in record time. The
North Vietnamese still have sufficient resources
to undertake the construction and repair of rail-
roads and highways that are not directly related
to the present movement of supplies to South
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Vietnam. These programs have required the diver-
sion of large amounts of North Vietnamese manpower
and assistance from Communist China. The overall
result, however, is that the transport system
presently has more capacity to move supplies than
at any time since the bombing began.
The air defense system received most of the
damage to military. targets in 1967, with heavy
losses of fighter aircraft accounting for almost
one-half of all costs of military damage. Large
amounts of military aid were supplied by Communist
China and the USSR, and by the end of 1967 the air
defense system was increasingly effective. Attacks
on military target systems other than air defense
probably have had little impact on the overall
effectiveness of North Vietnam's military forces.
Despite the damage inflicted on North Vietnam's
air defense system, the air war, has taken an in-
creasingly heavy toll of US aircraft. In 1967,
366 planes were lost over North Vietnam, an
increase of 16 percent from 1966. Moreover, the
ratio of US air losses to the number of sorties,
which had declined each year since 1965, increased
during the second, third, and fourth quarters of
1967. One reason was the heavy losses incurred
in the large number of attacks against heavily
defended industrial and military targets in the
Hanoi and Haiphong areas. Loss rates in attacks
against these targets are as much as nine times
the overall average rates. Another reason was
the increasingly effective and aggressive North
Vietnamese air defense, as reflected by the con-
tinued increase in the loss rate during the fourth
quarter of 1967, despite a slackening of attacks
on targets in Hanoi and Haiphong.
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,THER 1.b PETROLEUM
x:.1.4 - 0.1 RAILROAD YARDS
'0 Z
V Og
ORT EQUIPMENT
MFG. I
FAC. ~!~BRIDGES
0.4 11,2
LOSSES
3ricult re, Fishing, & Ex
9.4
(MILLION US DOLLARS)
TOTAL 287.6
1966 13.5
93.3
f i,Y
5.6 PETROLEUM
1.2 RAILROAD YARDS
0.8 MARITIME PORTS & SHIPYARDS
1.2 MISC ARMED RECCE
0.2 PETROLEUM
4.9 RAILROAD YARDS
1.3 MARITIME PORTS
& SHIPYARDS
1.0 MISC. ARMED RECCE
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 1965,
32.7
-NEGL.-AIRFIELDS
NAVAL CRAFT
1.8 / 0.4 NAVAL BASES
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MILITAR DAMAGE
0.1 RADAR &
COMMO SITES
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AIRFIELDS
NNAVAL CRAFT
II2 NAVAL BASES
0.7 MISC. ARMED RECCE
SUPPLY DEPOTS
SAM SITES
NAVAL BASES
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SORTIES AGAINST TARGETS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
SOUTH VIETNAM
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
I
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ORDNANCE AGAINST TARGETS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
890,150
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I. General Trends
After reaching new peaks of intensity in the
second and third quarters of 1967 the Rolling
Thunder program slackened in the last quarter as
flying weather deteriorated in the Northeast and
intermittent bombing restrictions were imposed.
Attacks against the transport system increased the
disruption to transport and took a heavy toll in
transport equipment. However, expansion of the
bypass system in the Hanoi' and Haiphong areas
insured a more than adequate capacity for moving
vital import goods. There were no significant air-
strikes against industrial facilities during the
last quarter. Damage to military facilities was
limited primarily to aircraft and airfields.
The cumulative value of measurable damage
inflicted by the air campaign through
1967
is
estimated at about $420 million (see
Table
1).
Nearly 45 percent resulted from direct damage to
economic facilities and equipment, 25 percent from
indirect economic losses, and slightly more than
30 percent from damage to military facilities and
equipment. A comparison of the cost of damage by
year is as follows:
Million US $
1965
1966
Economic
36.2
93.3
Military
32.7
20.3
Total
68.9
113.6
1967
158.1
78.1
236.2
The value of damage inflicted in 1967 was 56
percent of the total. During the first half of the
year, damage increased sharply, reaching a peak
in the second quarter. Although there was a sig-
nificant' decline in the cost of damage during the
last half of the year, it remained well above
comparable periods in 1965 and 1966 (see Figure 5).
The only significant increase in damage during the
final quarter of 1967 resulted from a heavy loss of
MIG fighters.
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A. Damage to the Economy
The measurable cost of damage to the North
Vietnamese economy during,the fourth quarter of
1967 dropped to $32 million, the lowest level for
the year. Direct losses of transport equipment,
rail and highway bridges, and indirect losses of
crops and exports accounted for most of the cost.
Losses of transport equipment were more than 50
percent below those in the preceding quarter because
of the poor flying weather in the Northeast.
More than 60 percent of the direct economic
damage during 1967 occurred during the first half
of the year, when major industrial plants and trans-
port targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas were
struck for the first time. By the end of 1967,
because of the longer periods free from bombing,
some electric power and manufacturing facilities
were put back into partial operation.
The cumulative cost of-damage to the
economy through 1967 is estimated at about $288
million. Direct damage to economic facilities and
equipment accounted for more than 60 percent, and
the remainder was from indirect losses in output
of agriculture, fishing, and export products.
Direct damage increased sharply in 1967, as shown
in the following tabulation:
Year
Million US $
1965
26.8
1966
56.5
1967
97.6
1. Transportation
The high levels of damage to the trans-
port network and equipment during the second and
third quarters of 1967 declined in the final quarter
of the year as poor flying weather and other re-
strictions limited strikes in the Northeast.
Although repeated interdiction of key bridges in
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NORTH VIETNAM,:
VALUE OF ECONO1v AND MILITARY DAMAGE
BY QUARTER
49.7
JR
3011
(MILLION US DOLLARS)
QUARTERLY QUARTERLY
AVERAGE AVERAGE I ST QTR 2 ND QTR 3 RD QTR 4 TH QTR
1965 1966 1967 1967 1967 1967
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the Hanoi and Haiphong areas during the fourth
quarter increased the cost of maintaining logistic
movements and forced the use of less efficient
alternates, supplies and equipment continued to
flow into Laos, South Vietnam, and the DMZ at
increased rates.
The value of damage to transport equip-
ment and facilities during 1967 reached nearly $60
million, about 38 percent of all economic losses
during the year and about half of the total damage
to the transport system for the three years of the
Rolling Thunder program. Although heavy damage
was inflicted on the transport system, it has been
able to withstand the bombings because of extensive
and rapid repair work, substantial foreign assist-
ance, and the construction of new and improved
transport routes and bypasses. Despite numerous
interdictions in the last half,of 1967, for example,
the key Doumer and Canal des Rapides Bridges were
open to rail and truck traffic at least half the
time. At the end of 1967, North Vietnam probably
had more transport capacity and was better able
to counter air attacks against transportation than
at any previous time.
Requirements for transportation in
1967 decreased substantially below those of pre-
vious years because the shutdown of much of modern
industry eliminated transport requirements for
coal and other raw materials. The gross decline
in the tonnage to be transported was partly offset
by an increase in the volume of goods imported
through Haiphong, but the net decline during 1967
amounted to about 4 million tons, an amount equal
to about 20 percent of the tons carried in 1966.
Consequently, transport performance dropped off
for the first year since the bombing began, falling
13 percent below the 1964 pre-bombing level, as
shown in the tabulation below:
Million Tons Carried
1964
1965
1966
1967
Railroad
4.13
3.7
3.3
2.9
Highway
7.18
7.9
7.9
7.6
Inland water
7.01
7.7
8.5
5.3
Coastal water
0.37
0.4
0.5
0.4
Total
18.69
19.7
20.2
16.2
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The railroad system of North Viet-
nam has been under heavy attack throughout the
Rolling Thunder program, particularly during the
summer of 1967. During 1965 and 1966 the principal
emphasis was on the line leading south of Hanoi.
In June 1967 the bombing program was enlarged to
include intensive attacks against multiple targets
on the important railroad lines in the north and
against railroad targets in previously restricted
areas such as Hanoi, Haiphong, and the Buffer Zone
along the Chinese border. During the last quarter
of 1967, attacks against rail targets declined
from the peak levels of the past summer as poor
weather began to hinder air operations, particu-
larly in the northern regions.
Air attacks during 1967 have re-
sulted in formidable disruptions to the North
Vietnamese rail network. Direct rail transport
into Hanoi has been hampered by airstrikes in the
latter half of 1967 on the Hanoi Railroad/Highway
(Doumer) Bridge over the Red River, and the Hanoi
Railroad/Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides
(see Figure 6).* Strikes during December destroyed
about 800 feet of the Doumer Bridge, and repair
activities have not yet been noted. Rail transport
to and from the port of Haiphong was cut in late
September 1967 by strikes on the Haiphong Railroad/
Highway Bridge, and although rail service has been
resumed using the bypass, the bridge has yet to be
restored. Traffic on the Haiphong and Dong Dang
lines has been temporarily disrupted several times.
The cumulative effects of the bombings have rendered
much of the Hanoi-Vinh line inoperable except for
shuttling operations between interdicted points.
North Vietnam's diligent application
of countermeasures such as bypasses, efficient
repairs, and transshipments to trucks and watercraft
continues to permit an extensive use of the rail
system. There are more freight cars in North Viet-
nam now than before the bombings, and photography
* For a detailed discussion of the current trans-
port situation in Hanoi and Haiphong, see Appendix A.
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HANOI TRANSPORT SYSTEM AND BYPASSES
PONTOON BRIDGE (HIGHWAY)
RAIL FERRY
HIGHWAY FERRY
-----??-- OTHER TYPE OF CROSSING
AS OF 4 MARCH-1968
CURRENTLY
IN OPERATION
RAPIDES
BRIDGE ,// f ~ ERR YON
(UNSERVICEABLE AS
OF 4 MARCH 1968)
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provides adequate evidence that they are in use.
Throughout the period of intensified attacks in
the summer and fall of 1967, most bridges had at
least one serviceable bypass available immediately
following strikes. Railroad yards usually had at
least one through track available for service soon
after a strike. The heavily attacked Hanoi-Vinh
line has been repeatedly repaired, and most bridges
have elaborate bypass systems.
Railroad construction in 1967
further offset the disruptive effects of air
attacks. The Hanoi - Dong Dang rail line north
of Kep and the Hanoi - Thai Nguyen line were dual
gauged.* The Hanoi - Dong Dang line south of Kep
is being dual gauged. The new Kep - Thai Nguyen
standard-gauge rail line also provides a high-
capacity alternate for part of the rail route be-
tween China and Hanoi. The work currently under
way directed at the construction of a railroad line
from Kep to Hon Gai indicates that the North Viet-
namese have ample capability to construct and repair
rail lines, admittedly with some Chinese help.
b. Highways
The majority of attacks against
the North Vietnamese highway system have been
concentrated on targets south of Thanh Hoa, with
primary Routes 1A and 15 receiving the heaviest
damage. Intensive armed reconnaissance has also
been maintained against routes which lead into the
DMZ and Laotian border areas. As with the rail
system, the campaign against the road network has
been expanded to include highway targets, principally
key bridges, in previously restricted areas near
Haiphong, Hanoi, and the Chinese border.
The air attacks have had no sus-
tained effects on truck operations because of
effective North Vietnamese countermeasures. In
response to the interdiction of the permanent
* The term "dual-gauge" refers to the use of three
or four rails on the same roadbed, making possible
the use of both meter-gauge and standard-gauge
rolling stock. It is not to be confused with
"double tracking" -- two separate tracks on two
roadbeds with a total of four rails.
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bridges within Hanoi and Haiphong, the North Viet-
namese have constructed numerous substitute, and
less vulnerable, pontoon and ferry facilities which
offer greater total throughput capacity than the
original structures. In addition, the North Viet-
namese have been able to offset the large losses
of vehicles of the three-year bombing campaign by
importing large numbers of trucks from Communist
countries.*
The North Vietnamese
continue to improve and expand the highway
system. A new all-weather, high-capacity road
linking the Ning-ming area of China with Haiphong
and Cam Pha is now in the advanced stages of con-
struction. This route will increase the existing
China/North Vietnam transborder highway capacity
by almost 1,000 tons per day. The North Vietnamese
have even had sufficient resources to build and
improve roads that are not strategically signifi-
cant to the war in the south or the movement of
supplies from China; Route 191 from Lai Chau to
Dien Bien Phu has recently been improved and many
side roads were constructed for probable use as
truck parks. Numerous concrete culverts have been
constructed in the Northwest across water barriers
in lieu of more vulnerable bridges; the culverts
consist chiefly of loose earth and concrete poured
on top of steel tubes or concrete arches through
which water can flow.
The North Vietnamese took advantage
of the recent holiday truce periods to move large
amounts of supplies by highway into North Vietnam's
Panhandle region. Unlike similar periods last
year, emphasis was placed on trucks rather than
watercraft to move supplies. Although poor weather
limited aerial reconnaissance efforts during all
three truce periods (Christmas, New Year's, and
Tet), about an eightfold increase in vehicle
traffic above the 1967 daily average was observed
on the major coastal routes south of Thanh Hoa.
C. Waterways
The heavy campaign against North
Vietnam's waterways throughout the Rolling Thunder
program has not appreciably affected inland or
* For additional information on the North Viet-
namese inventory of transport equipment, see
Appendix B.
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coastal water transportation. The main attacks
against the water transport system have consisted
of armed reconnaissance strikes against waterborne
logistic craft;, and during the last half of 1967,
the seeding of 12,000 MK-36 destructors along im-
portant water routes and at transshipment areas.
Since the bombing began, pilots. have reported
destroying 8,000 waterborne logistic craft and
damaging 14,000. Despite these attacks, both
inland and coastal water transport continue to
meet requirements. There is no apparent shortage
of watercraft, and an inventory estimated to be in
excess of 30,000 inland and coastal craft has been
maintained through repairs, construction, and
imports from other Communist countries.
The performance of the MK-36 is
uneven. There is evidence that the MK-36 de-
structors have in a few instances disrupted water-
borne traffic. For example, photographs indicate
that the MK-36 denied use of a ferry site at Ben
Thuy for a period of almost two months, although
over-the-beach transshipment operations were noted
in the area. Press reports from Hanoi have implied
that the mining of inland waterways has hampered
rescue and repair work and disrupted traffic. The
MK-36's have been much less effective at Haiphong
and at the Quang Khe transshipment facility.
Watercraft activity has increased noticeably at
Haiphong in recent months despite mines around the
port area. More MK-36 devices have been dropped
at Quang Khe than at any other single mining target -
a total of 845 between 15 December 1967 and 31 Jan-
uary of this year. Despite the presence of these
mines, large concentrations of watercraft were noted
operating at the facility during the Christmas and
New Year's standdowns and to a lesser degree during
Tet. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the
use of the MK-36, even at future planned rates of
seeding, will not cripple the North Vietnamese trans-
port system.
d. Railroad Yards and Shops
Airstrikes against railroad yards
and shops have increased dramatically since 1965.
During 1967, 23 major yards were attacked 591 times,
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compared with 16 attacks in 1965 against six major
yards. The heaviest concentration of strikes in
1967 was against facilities on the Hanoi - Dong Dang
and Hanoi-Vinh lines. By the end of 1967, 23 of
the 27 targeted major yards had been attacked; the
yards at Hanoi, Haiphong, Dong Dang, and Lao Cai
have not yet been authorized for attack. In addi-
tion to the major yards, at least 30 secondary
yards and numerous railroad sidings have been
attacked. The estimated total cost of repairs
for damage resulting from these attacks from 1965
through 1967 is $6.2 million (see Table 2).
Although these attacks have disrupted activity,
destroyed large numbers of rolling stock, and
temporarily halted rail traffic, most yards have
had at least one serviceable track available most
of the time, and train operations have continued.
e. Maritime Ports and Shipyards
Four of the six JCS-targeted ports
in North Vietnam and four shipyards in Haiphong
had been attacked through 1967, inflicting damage
estimated at $2.7 million (see Table 3). The
facilities at Ham Rong and Ben Thuy, two minor
ports, have been heavily damaged; Ben Thuy is
unable to berth ships. The coal treatment facili-
ties at Cam Pha were struck in 1966 and the port
area was hit in September 1967. Following the
September strike, coal exports dropped sharply.
The port facilities at Hon Gai, another coal load-
ing port, were attacked in April and May 1967.
Four small shipyards in Haiphong -- Haiphong Ship-
yard No. 2, Thuong, West, and Lach Tray -- were
rendered unserviceable between October and November
1967, with damage estimated at $900,000. Haiphong
Shipyard No. 4, North Vietnam's largest and best
equipped ship repair facility, was accidentally
damaged in January 1968 during a strike against
the nearby Haiphong Highway Bridge; the damage
incurred is estimated at $200,000.
Damage to these ports and ship-
yards has had little effect on North Vietnam's
maritime capabilities. The two major ports of
Hanoi and Haiphong remained untouched until late
February 1968 when Hanoi port was attacked. Ham
Rong and Ben Thuy represented only 1 and 4 percent
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of national prestrike capacity, respectively. The
damage sustained at Cam Pha and Hon Gai apparently
has been repaired because coal shipments have
increased. Haiphong Shipyard No. 4 could be returned
to pre-strike capacity in about two weeks. Damage
to the other Haiphong shipyards did not reduce
the North Vietnamese capacity to repair and con-
struct steel barges and other watercraft, because
the North Vietnamese can perform these functions
at other yards.
f. Transport Equipment
Damage inflicted on transport equip-
ment by airstrikes during 1967 increased signifi-
cantly compared with 1965 and 1966. Reported
destruction and damage of motor vehicles reached
record highs in August 1967, and losses of water-
craft reached new highs in May 1967. Reported
monthly losses of railroad rolling stock in 1967,
however, were below the record level set in Sep-
tember 1966. (Damage and destruction of equipment
is shown on Table 4.) The total cost of replacing
and repairing transport equipment destroyed or
damaged through 1967 is about $76 million. The
cost of damage inflicted during 1967 was $40 mil-
lion, compared with about $30 million in 1966 and
$6 million in 1965. An all-time monthly high in
cost of damage to transport equipment was achieved
in June 1967.
North Vietnam had no serious
shortages of transport equipment in 1967.* Imports
of trucks have been sufficient to maintain the
truck inventory at re-bombing levels.
nown impor s o rai roa ro ing s oc ave not
equalled reported damage, but problems in rail
transportation related to shortages of equipment
have not been identified. Counts made from photog-
raphy indicate that there is more rolling stock in
the country now than was estimated to be in the
* For a discussion of present inventories of trans-
port equipment, see Appendix B.
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pre-bombing inventory. In addition, Chinese rail-
road equipment can be made available to compensate
for any shortages in the North Vietnamese inventory.
More than 22,000 watercraft have been reported
destroyed or damaged since the beginning of the
bombing, but again there are no apparent shortages.
g. Bridges
Airstrikes against bridges were
increased markedly in 1967; 326 attacks were
carried out against 52 JCS-targeted bridges, com-
pared with 144 attacks against 44 bridges in 1965
and 18.6 attacks against 39 bridges in 1966 (see
Table 5). The total number of bridges (both JCS-
targeted and non-targeted) confirmed by photography
to have been damaged or destroyed by the Rolling
Thunder program now stands at 507. In this total,
which includes both original and bypass bridges,
there are 362 highway, 97 railroad, and 48 combina-
tion railroad/highway structures. These figures
understate somewhat the number of small bridges
(primarily highway) that actually have been damaged
or destroyed because photography may not be avail-
able for some of these bridges.
A s of 07
showed that 455 bridgesyhavethad5onedoramorrebridges
"serious damage occurrences" (SDO's).* There have
been a total of 759 SDO's since the beginning of
the bombings in February 1965 (see Table 6). The
number of SDO's by year and the average number of
times each of the 455 bridges was interdicted are
as follows:
* A _"serious damage occurrence" consists of
initial hits and re-hits and is defined as damage
sufficiently severe that a crossing is denied to
users until a significant amount of repairs has
been performed -- requiring considerable time,
materials, and labor. For example, serious damage
would include a dropped span(s), a destroyed
pier(s), or a destroyed abutment(s). Holes in
a deck, cratered approaches, twisted superstructure,
or a slight shifting of spans is not considered
serious damage.
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 The North Vietnamese have effectively
countered the bomb damage to JCS-targeted bridges by
building a variety of bypasses in the vicinity of
each target. The average number of bypasses per
bridge increased from 2.2 through May to 3.2
through December 1967, as shown in the following
tabulation:
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Year
SDO's
Number of
Bridges with
SDO's
Average Number
of Interdictions
Per Damaged Bridge
1965
218
177
1.23
1966
334
185
1.81
1967
207
93
2.23
While a specific bridge may be interdicted an
increasing number of times, in most cases the cross-
ing is bypassed in a variety of ways. Of the 258
bypass bridges observed in aerial photography, 73
have sustained 110 SDO's.
The estimated cumulative cost of
completely restoring the confirmed damaged or
destroyed bridges to their original condition through
1967 would be $28.8 million -- an increase of more
than 50 percent during 1967 and almost three times
the estimate of 1965.* It is estimated that a total
of at least $7.0 million has been spent on temporary
repairs to bridges through December 1967, of which
an estimated $3.7 million was spent during 1967.
The estimated cost of temporary repairs to the
number of unrepaired bridges at the end of December
1967 is $1.6 million.
* The estimated costs for restoring bridges to
their original condition as of the end of 1965 and
1966 were $10.1 million and $19.0 million, respec-
tively.
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Type of Bypass
Through
May 1967
Through
September
1967
Through
December
1967
Total number of damaged
JCS-targeted bridges
(confirmed by photog-
raphy)
46
52
Total number of
bypasses
99
157
175
Fords (including
causeways
culverts)
and
18
22
22
Alternate
bridges
26
36
38
Cable bridges
9
14
15
Ferries and pontoon
bridges
46
85
100
Average bypass
per bridge 2.2 3.0 3.2
The upward trend in bypass construction
for JCS-targeted bridges continued during the last
quarter of 1967, but at a slower rate than previously
because additional bypasses are no longer needed at
most of them. Available photography indicates that
at least one bypass is almost always serviceable at:
a crossing, and instead of building new bypasses the
North Vietnamese are concentrating on repairing
existing bypasses to use in tandem service. Near
such important crossings as the Doumer Bridge, how-
ever, the North Vietnamese continue to add bypasses
and they now have 16 pontoon/ferry crossings at this
location compared with 12 in early October.
2. Other Economic Targets
a. Electric Power
The main electric power network, centered
on Hanoi and Haiphong, received the brunt of attacks
against electric power facilities in 1967, a shift
of emphasis from the 1965-66 campaign against small
power systems in the southern part of the country
(see Table 7). About 85 percent of attacks against
the electric power industry in 1967 were against
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facilities in the main network. Air attacks against
power stations reached their peak during the second
and third quarters; no strikes were carried out from
early November 1967 to mid-January 1968. The cumu-
lative cost of damage inflicted on power facilities
is about $33 million.
Airstrikes against elecric power facili-
ties during the first half of 1967 and restrikes in
the third quarter reduced the availability of electric
power to about 20 percent of the pre-strike national
generating capacity of 187,000 kilowatts (see Figure 7).
The respite from attacks since early November permitted
a small improvement in power supply, so that by the
end of 1967 an estimated 35 percent (67,000 kilowatts)
was operational. Additional diesel-generating capacity
of 30,000 kilowatts makes available about 50 percent
of the country's pre-bombing capacity.
By the end of the year, six powerplants
in the main Hanoi/Haiphong network -- Hanoi, Viet
Tri, Bac Giang, Nam Dinh, Uong Bi, and Hon Gai --
were in partial operation, capable of supplying almost
30 percent of the pre-strike capacity.of the network,
compared with about 10 percent in the third quarter.
In addition, repairs were in progress on a seventh
plant at Thai Nguyen. Strikes against power facili-
ties during January and February 1968 are believed to
have caused little additional damage, but cannot be
assessed finally because of a lack of post-strike
photography.
The repair of damaged facilities has been
accomplished by salvaging equipment that escaped
heavy damage. Earlier attempts at extensive recon-
struction of power facilities apparently have been
abandoned. Damage to central powerplants during 1967
was so severe that complete restoration of most
plants would require from one to.two years, but
restoration to one-half of capacity could be made by
mid-1968 if the plants remained unattacked.* During
the third quarter of 1967 the North Vietnamese under-
took measures to safeguard transformers at network
* For a discussion of restoration attempts and
alternative power sources provided by imported dieseZ-
driven generators, see Appendix C.
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I I
substations. Recent photography shows that a number
of these transformers have been relocated in deep
revetments, away from substations. This program
provides an added measure of protection for equip-
ment that will be needed to connect a powerplant into
the network when salvaged generating equipment is
ready for operation.
Loss of central generating plants has
caused major shortages of power and heavy reliance
on diesel-driven generating equipment. The cities
of Hanoi and Haiphong ration power and experience
intermittent power outages. Hanoi currently relies
on one local powerplant, a number of diesel stations,
and a small amount of power available from the main
network. Haiphong is dependent on power from diesels
and from the network. The inventory of diesel equip-
ment appears adequate to provide minimal power
supplies for high-priority consumers and for essen-
tial services, but it falls far short of the capac-
ity necessary to cover total demands of heavy industry
and residential-commercial users. The number of
diesels available probably could offset only about 25
percent of present losses in the central generating
plants at the end of 1967.
b. Manufacturing Facilities
North Vietnam's small modern manufactur-
ing sector was severely damaged by airstrikes during
1967. Most of the larger industrial plants have been
put out of operation by either direct bomb damage or
a shortage of electric power. The greater part of
the damage was inflicted in the first half of 1967;
only one strike was carried out against a manufac-
turing facility -- the Hanoi Concrete Products Plant --
between August and the end of the year. Restoration
of damaged industrial facilities has been observed
only at the Phu Tho Phosphate Fertilizer Plant and
the coal processing plants in Hon Gai and Cam Pha.
The total cost of damage to manufacturing facilities
is about $18 million, of which over 90 percent occurred
during 1967 (see Table 8):
More than 70 percent of the cost of damage
is attributed to strikes against the Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel Complex and the Haiphong Cement Plant. Both
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NORTH VIETNAM: ELECT C =1 O E
PERCENT OF NATIONAL POWERP ANT CAPACITY AVAILABLE FCC OPERATION
DEC
1964
69488 &68 OA
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of these industrial installations have been inactive
since the spring of 1967, and there is no evidence of
reconstruction or production at either plant since
that time. Results of a strike against the Thai
Nguyen Complex in January 1968 are not yet known.
Production at North Vietnam's major
chemicals plants was seriously disrupted in 1967.
Bomb damage stopped production at the Bac Giang
Chemical Fertilizer Plant, the Phu Tho Phosphate
Fertilizer Plant, the Lang Chi Explosives Plant,
and the Hon Gai Calcium Carbide Plant. Repair of
minor damage to the Phu Tho Fertilizer Plant permitted
a resumption of production during the last quarter.
The Viet Tri Complex was inoperative for a large part
of the year probably as a result of a shortage of
power. The sugar refinery and alcohol plant of this
complex, however, are believed to have resumed pro-
duction late in the year. Output of fertilizer at
the Haiphong Fertilizer Plant was disrupted in mid-
1967, when equipment was dismantled and moved, appar-
ently in anticipation of attacks on important nearby
bridges. There is no information on the relocation
of this plant.
Partial operation has been restored at
other industrial facilities. The high level of
activity at the coal processing and port facilities
at Hon Gai and Cam Pha observed in recent photography
indicates that most of the damage has been repaired.
The Nam Dinh Textile Mill received heavy damage in
1967, but some parts of the bleaching, dyeing, and
finishing shops are believed to be operating.
The small machine building industry with
two major plants in Hanoi and one in Haiphong has
remained relatively undamaged by US airstrikes. The
capacity for machine building and, metal processing
probably has been enlarged since the beginning of
the air war through substantial imports of machinery
and equipment. Most machine tools imported in 1966
were appropriate for repair work and were probably
intended for installation in small shops being set
up throughout the country. Lathes now being imported
were formerly produced domestically, indicating that
North Vietnam's machine tool industry, which has not
been damaged by bombing and remains in production,
has probably been charged with the output of other
products. Some machine tools now being imported are
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high-output types, suggesting that the three machine
building plants are probably engaged in the produc-
tion of significant quantities of small agricultural
pumps, generators, and diesel engines. The models
of machine tools being imported do not suggest mili-
tary output. The major tasks of the machine building
shops appear to be maintaining transport equipment
and producing simple agricultural equipment.
c. Petroleum Storage Facilities
During 1967, 13 airstrikes were mounted
against JCS-targeted petroleum storage facilities.
Identified damage was inflicted only at Do Son where
about 1 percent of North Vietnam's original storage
capacity was destroyed. One of the original sites --
Can Thon -- that had been partly destroyed in attacks
at the end of 1966 was abandoned during 1967. The
buried tanks that survived the attacks were exhumed
and presumably have been relocated at an unidentified
dispersed storage site. Airstrikes during 1967
against dispersed storage, including both tanks and
55-gallon drums, resulted in the destruction of an
estimated 3,000 tons of petroleum, with a value of
about $300,000.
The cumulative value of destruction
inflicted on petroleum storage facilities through
1967 was between $7.5 million and $8.2 million. Of
this, the total value of the tankage, contents, and
related facilities destroyed at the JCS-targeted
sites is estimated to be between $6.7 million and
$7.4 million. The value of similar destruction at
the dispersed storage sites is estimated to have
been $0.5 million (5,000 tons) in 1966 and $0.3
million (3,000 tons) in 1967.
By the end of 1967, an estimated 86
percent of the 128,000 tons of petroleum storage
capacity that existed at the beginning of 1965 had
been destroyed. About 75 percent of this destruc-
tion occurred during the last half of 1966 (see
Table 9). Only four of the original 13 targeted
sites were in operation at the end of 1967. No
attempts have been made to restore any of the
damaged sites.
Despite the damage to petroleum facilities,
North Vietnam has re-established satisfactory petro-
leum supply and distribution procedures. At the end
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of 1967 there was storage capacity of between 40,000
and 50,000 tons at more than 120 dispersed tank sites.
In addition, North Vietnam had accumulated about
300,000 petroleum drums, equivalent to about 50,000
tons of capacity. The remaining JCS-targeted sites,
therefore, are of decreasing importance. North
Vietnam was able to import about 260,000 tons of
petroleum in 1967, the highest level in its history.
About 90 percent of this was imported by tankers
that discharged their cargoes into barges and other
lighters in Haiphong harbor without serious delays
in unloading. An apparent accommodation between
the USSR, Communist China, and North Vietnam
permits the delivery and interim storage of petroleum
in Communist China when high inventories and storage
limitations would otherwise cause delays in the dis-
charge of the tankers at Haiphong. At the end of 1967,
there probably were about 65,000 tons of petroleum on
hand in North Vietnam, equal to about 100 days of supply
at the rate of consumption estimated for 1967 and repre-
senting an increase of about 13,000 tons over the
stocks on hand at the end of 1966.
3. Indirect Effects
In addition to the direct costs of restoring
damage caused by bombings, North Vietnam has incurred
significant indirect losses caused by damage to
industrial facilities, the dispersal of industry,
diversions of manpower to war-related tasks, disrup-
tions of normal work routines, forced evacuation of
cities, separation of families, personal injuries,
and loss of property and life. Indirect losses that
can be quantified -- decreases in the rice crop, the
fish catch, and exports -- are estimated at about
$107 million through 1967, or more than one-third of
total economic damage. Additional unquantified losses
would amount to tens of millions of dollars.
a. Agriculture and Fishing
Agriculture and fishing have been affected
by bombing attacks even though they have never been
targeted and suffered only minor accidental bomb
damage. Output has been adversely affected by manage-
ment problems, disruption of work routines, inter-
ruptions in the supply and distribution of fertilizer,
and the threat of air attack against watercraft and
the seeding of mines in waterways. The cumulative
loss of rice production (which includes substantial
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but unknown losses due to adverse weather) and of the
fish catch from early 1965 through 1967 is estimated
to be about $72 million, as tabulated below:
Million US $
1965
1966
1967
Total
Rice production
3.5
22.0
35.0
60.5
Fishing
1.7
3.3
6.0
11.0
Total
5.2
25.3
41.0
71.5
Both rice crops during 1967 are believed
to have been below the average, but the shortfalls
are not likely to have caused more than localized
food shortages. The fifth-month crop, which accounts
for one-third of the annual harvest, was estimated
to be 200,000 tons of paddy below average. The
shortfall in the tenth-month rice crop may have been
as high as 300,000 tons of paddy. Some of the re-
duction in output of rice has been offset by in-
creased production of less palatable subsidiary
crops. Moreover, imports of food during 1967 reached
a record high level of 450,000 tons, more than off-
setting the estimated loss of rice.
b. Export Losses
The cumulative measurable loss in North
Vietnam's seaborne exports attributable to the
bombing reached about $35 million at the end of
1967, but these losses had little effect on the
economy. Export losses for 1967 totaled about
$19 million, nearly 70 percent greater than in 1966
and more than four and one-half times the 1965
total. The significant increase in the loss of
exports in 1967 resulted from the stepped-up attacks
on industrial facilities during the first half of
the year. Since May, exports of pig iron and cement
have not been observed, and exports of coal were
well below normal levels. Only 10,000 tons of
apatite has been exported by North Vietnam by ship
since the first week of August 1965, although it
is possible that apatite has been shipped by rail
to China. Coal shipments, which averaged about
78,000 tons per month in 1966, decreased to only
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21,000 tons per month in the second half of 1967.
The value of losses of identified seaborne exports
during 1965, 1966, and 1967 is shown in the follow-
ing tabulation:
Million US $
Year
Apatite
Pig Iron
Cement
Coal
Total
1965
3.3
0
0.9
0
4.2
1966
6.1
0
0.7
4.7
11.6
1967
6.2
1.3
1.7
10.2
19.4
Total
15.6
1.3
3.3
14.9
35.2
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to
the totals shown.
The measurable export losses of
$19.4 million in 1967 represent less than 20
percent of North Vietnam's annual exports before
the initiation of the bombing program and only a
small fraction of the estimated $340 million of
economic aid contributed by the Communist countries
in 1967.
4. Miscellaneous Economic Damage
by Armed Reconnaissance
A number of miscellaneous economic
facilities not included in the major target cate-
gories -- principally targets associated with
lines of communication such as rail lines and
sidings and highways -- are reported by pilots as
destroyed or damaged under the armed reconnaissance
programs. The total cost of damage to these targets
through 1967 is estimated to be $2.2 million, of
which about $1.0 million was inflicted in 1967.
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B. Military Damage
The cost of damage to military facilities
and equipment during the fourth quarter of 1967
was about $20 million, almost one-third more than
in the previous quarter. The high level was pri-
marily the result of the destruction of fighter
aircraft -- 5 MIG-21's and 12 MIG-17's. The cumu-
lative cost of military damage through 1967 was
about $131 million, or about 30 percent of the
total measurable cost of bomb damage. Nearly 60
percent of the damage resulted from destruction
of aircraft and of military barracks. The cost
of damage in 1967 was nearly 50 percent greater
than the combined total for 1965 and 1966.
The 1967 campaign against military targets
has not brought about any serious degradation of
North Vietnam's military capabilities. Inventories
of military equipment have been maintained or
improved through increased imports from the USSR
and Communist China. North Vietnamese fighter
operations have become increasingly effective.
The capability of the radar system has been in-
creased through new infusions of more sophisticated
equipment and improved operator proficiency, and
the number of SAM sites has been expanded. Dis-
persed storage sites have largely compensated for
the loss of damaged supply depots. Moreover, the
military logistics system has been able to support
an expansion of military activity in South Vietnam.
1. Air Defense
a. Aircraft
Losses of North Vietnamese fighter
aircraft from attacks by US aircraft during the
fourth quarter of 1967 were significantly higher
than in the third quarter, but below the high level
achieved during April through June (see the tabu-
lation below). Total cumulative losses of Forth
Vietnamese fighter aircraft included 29 MIG-21's
and 82 MIG-17's,* valued at $44 million. Slightly
.* Including destruction on the ground of an esti-
mated two MIG-21's and eight MIG-17's in US attacks
on airfields at Phuc Yen, Kep, and Hoa Lac during
1967.
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more than $35 million of the total damage occurred
in 1967.*
Quarter of 1967
1965
1966
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Total
MIG-21's
0
9
6
7
2
5
29
MIG-17's
5
13
5
42
5
12
82
Total
5
22
11
49
7
17
111
Replacements of MIG-21's from the
USSR and MIG-17's from China have been sufficient
to maintain North Vietnam's MIG inventory at a
relatively constant level since 1965. At the end
of 1967 the inventory included 25 MIG-21's and 72
MIG-15/17's, most of which are held in reserve in
China. A small effective fighter force of 10 to
20 MIG's continues to stage out of North Vietnamese
airfields. North Vietnamese fighter defenses have
generally improved their capabilities since 1965.
Their operations have been expanded from defensive
patrols around the Hanoi-Haiphong area to areas as
far west as the Laos border and as far south as
Vinh, suggesting the possibility of offensive opera-
tions in the DMZ. In addition, new types of radar
equipment being introduced are improving and expand-
ing the ground-control intercept network.
Airstrikes against North Vietnam's
primary airfields were intensified during the
fourth quarter, as strikes were flown for the
first time against Phuc Yen and Haiphong/Cat Bi
airfields. The Hanoi/Gia Lam airfield, the
international commercial airport as well as a
military airfield, is the only major airfield not
yet struck. The cost of damage during the fourth
quarter is estimated to be $0.7 million, and the
cumulative cost of damage to airfields through 1967
is $1.9 million (see Table 10).
'f Including five helicopters destroyed on the
ground in the fourth quarter of 1967,
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There has been little change in the
operational capability of North Vietnam's major
airfields since 1965. At the end of 1967, all six
primary airfields were capable of sustaining at
least limited fighter operations as the North
Vietnamese continued to repair damaged airfields
in relatively short periods of time. At Phuc Yen,
for example, following heavy strikes in October,
the runway was sufficiently repaired to allow at
least limited MIG operations within three days.
Furthermore, the basic airfield
and control system is being expanded. An airfield
under construction at Bai Thuong will soon be able
to accommodate MIG's, and Chinese engineering
troops are constructing another airfield capable
of accommodating MIG's at Yen Bai. The airfield
at Vinh may also be capable of supporting limited
MIG operations, as ground controllers are currently
operating in the area and MIG-21's have recently
flown near Vinh.
c. SAM Sites
Approximately 1,600 attack sorties
have been directed against SAM facilities in North
Vietnam from July 1965 through 1967. Assessment
of the damage caused by these airstrikes has been
severely limited by a lack of post-strike photog-
raphy. Estimates of the minimum value of damage
to sites and support facilities are shown in the
following tabulation:
Thousand US $
Firing sites
500
Support facilities
1,600
Total
2,100
2,100
3,700
6,300
200
300
2,100
2,300
4,000
8,400
Attacks on SAM sites apparently
have not reduced either the total number of active
SAM battalions or the available firing sites, but
the attacks may have succeeded in reducing SAM
effectiveness. There are now up to 30 active
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battalions, the same number estimated for the
third quarter of 1967. These battalions can use
about 230 prepared or pre-surveyed sites, a net
increase of about 10 sites over the number avail-
able in September. The airstrikes have necessitated
frequent redeployment of equipment, however, which
probably has reduced the efficiency of firing units
and complicated logistics.
d. Radar*
Airstrikes were conducted against
two of the five targeted radar sites in the fourth
quarter of 1967. Damage resulting from these
strikes, however, is believed to be insignificant.
The cumulative cost of damage to JCS-targeted
radar facilities through 1967 is estimated at $2.6
million. A sizable amount of additional damage
has been reported by pilots flying miscellaneous
armed reconnaissance missions.**
Airstrikes have not prevented the
North Vietnamese radar net from becoming increas-
ingly formidable and sophisticated. There were
195 operational early-warning and ground-control-
intercept radars at 62 sites at the end of 1967,
an increase from 149 radars at 50 sites at the
end of 1966. Modern equipment for the system has
been provided by both the USSR and Communist China
in abundant quantities. The proficiency of the
personnel operating the system has been improved
by experience gained during the air war.
2. Naval
a. Craft
The cost of damage to naval craft
during 1967 was about $1.0 million, all of it
occurring in the third quarter. Total damage
through 1967 is estimated at $4.8 million. Twelve
North Vietnamese naval craft*** have been confirmed
* Excluding radar associated with SAM sites.
See 4, p. 31, below.
*** Excluding the eight to ten naval craft destroyed
by the Pierce Arrow attacks in August 1964 follow-
ing the Gulf of Tonkin incidents.
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destroyed by air attack: four Swatow-class gun-
boats in 1965, three PT boats and one SO-1 sub-
chaser in 1966, and one Shanghai-class patrol boat
and three PT boats in 1967. The small North Viet-
namese navy currently is estimated to include 19
Swatow-class gunboats, 13 to 16 PT boats and two
SO-1 subchasers. Naval activity to date has been
confined largely to the Hanoi and Haiphong areas
to bolster the air defense system and to occasional
training exercises in the Cat Ba Island area near
Haiphong.
Airstrikes against the naval
facilities at Port Wallut in August accounted for
the only major attack in 1967. The cumulative
value of damage inflicted on naval bases is esti-
mated to be $1.9 million (see Table 11). About
30 percent of North Vietnam's naval base support
facilities were destroyed or inactive at the end
of the year, compared with an estimated 15 percent
at the end of 1965. Because of the modest needs
of the small North Vietnamese navy and the deploy-
ment of naval craft to Hanoi and Haiphong, attacks
on fixed facilities have probably had a minimal
effect on naval operations.
3. Support Facilities
The most significant airstrikes
against military barracks in the last quarter of
1967 were against the important barracks complex
at Haiphong/Cat Bi, not a JCS-numbered target.
The total number of airstrikes against JCS-targeted
barracks during the year was about equal to the
high level in 1965, and more than three times the
number in 1966. Thirty targeted barracks were
struck during 1967, eleven for the first time.
Most of the 1967 damage occurred during the second
quarter of the year. By the end of 1967, all but
five of the active JCS-targeted barracks had been
struck, four in the Hanoi area. The cumulative
cost of restoration of damage inflicted since 1965
is $31.2 million; $12.6 million of this total was
incurred in 1967, as shown in the following tabu-
lation:
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Cost of
Number Restoration
Year of Strikes (Million US $)
1965 166 16.00
1966 52 2.54
1967 173 12.64
Total 391
The damage to barracks caused by
the airstrikes has been substantial, but it has
had little effect on the North Vietnamese war
effort. Sixty-five percent of the 65 JCS-targeted
barracks have been abandoned. The loss of capacity
through destruction and abandonment represents
housing for about 119,000 men, or 27 percent of
the pre-strike national capacity. This loss is
undoubtedly causing some inconvenience outside
the urban areas. Two-thirds of the lost capacity
had occurred by the end of 1965, however, and
there is no evidence that the North Vietnamese
have had any serious difficulty in adjusting to
the loss.
b. Supply and Ordnance Depots
Only three strikes were flown
against JCS-targeted supply and ordnance depots
in the fourth quarter of 1967, and each had been
hit earlier in the year. In addition, four
important storage areas which are not JCS-targeted -?
Hanoi/Bac Mai, Hanoi/Gia Thuong, Haiphong South-
east, and the Kinh No Vehicle Repair Depot -- were
struck during October-December. About one-half of
the 29 JCS-targeted supply depots were attacked
during 1967, six for the first time. By the end
of the year, all but three of the JCS-targeted
depots had been attacked, and one of the three
was abandoned. The two active, unstruck depots
represent 10 percent of total national capacity
and are both within two nautical miles of the center
of Hanoi.
The cost of damage during the
fourth quarter was slightly more than $1.0 mil-
lion. The total cost of damage for 1967 is
estimated at $7.0 million, compared with $1.0
million in 1966 and $3.0 million in 1965. Most
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of the damage in 1967 occurred during the second
and third quarters. The attacks have also de-
stroyed a significant amount of valuable supplies
and equipment, the value of which cannot be
quantified.
Damage to supply areas has dis-
rupted the flow of supplies and increased the
requirement to operate from a dispersed logistics
base, but it has not seriously limited the storage
and distribution of supplies. The loss in capacity
of targeted depots, either destroyed or inactive,
represents only about 19 percent of the total
pre-strike national capacity. Nearly one-half
of the targeted depots were inactive at the end
of 1967, but most of the larger depots continued
to function at more than 50 percent of their pre-
strike capacity. In addition, there has been a
significant expansion of dispersed storage along
the Hanoi - Dong Dang rail line and in the North-
west as well as in the southern part of the country.
c. Ammunition Depots
Relatively little damage was
inflicted on ammunition storage depots in the last
two quarters of 1967. Ten JCS-targeted depots
were attacked during the year, five for the first
time. All 18 JCS-targeted depots had been
attacked by the end of April 1967. The total
cost of restoration of facilities damaged during
the year is estimated at about $600,000, compared
with $200,000 in 1966 and $4.5 million in 1965.
Damage to the depots has been ex-
tensive but probably has not significantly affected
the North Vietnamese ability to store ammunition.
Eleven of the JCS-targeted depots were abandoned
at the end of 1967. More than three-fourths of
the total pre-bombing capacity, or about 87,000
tons of storage, had been lost through destruction
or abandonment. Continuing airstrikes and the
forced dispersal of facilities undoubtedly have
caused temporary delays in the distribution of
ammunition. Most ammunition, however, apparently
has been stored in dispersed storage areas since
the end of 1965.
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Known physical damage to North
Vietnam's telecommunications system since the
initiation of the Rolling Thunder program has
been relatively modest. Reported damage to radio
centers at Xom Trung Hoa, Phuc Yen, and Kim Quan
Dong during the last quarter of 1967 raised esti-
mated monetary losses to North Vietnam's tele-
communications system to approximately $300,000:
$100,000 during 1965, $80,000 during 1966, and
$120,000 during 1967.
The communications system remains
fully capable of providing essential services to
Party, military, and government users. Damage
to physical facilities has been confined to two
of approximately 50 telephone exchanges, to eight
of about 30 of North Vietnam's fixed radio centers,
and to se ments of the nationwide open wireline
network.
4. Miscellaneous Military Damage
by Armed Reconnaissance
A variety of miscellaneous military
facilities not included in the major target
categories are reported by pilots as destroyed or
damaged during armed reconnaissance missions.
These include movable and temporary targets such
as mobile radar units, dispersed storage areas,
and defensive weapons positions. Because of the
limitations inherent in this type of air opera-
tion -- double counting by pilots, impreciseness
of targets struck, and inflated damage estimates
the value of damage can be based only on an
assumed level of damage to a typical target in
each category.
The total cost of replacement or
restoration of the targets reported destroyed
or damaged by miscellaneous armed reconnaissance
strikes is estimated at about $19.4 million
through 1967. A substantial portion of the
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increase in the level of reported damage during
1967 is a reflection of increased attacks on
non-targeted radar units ($8.2 million) and on
dispersed storage areas and supply depots ($5.9
million).
C. Casualties
Preliminary estimates indicate that civilian
and military casualties in North Vietnam from US
air attacks in 1967 totaled 36,000, one-third
greater than in 1966. Civilian casualties accounted
for about two-thirds of the total. Total casualties
resulting from the Rolling Thunder program are esti-
mated as follows:
1965
1966
1967 a
Total
Fixed targets
2,000
900
2,000
4,900
Armed recon-
naissance
4,000
18,100
21,000
43,100
Subtotal
6,000
19,000
23,000
48,000
Military
Fixed targets
4,300
400
6,000
10,700
Armed recon-
naissance
2,900
7,300
7,000
17,200
Subtotal
7,200
7,700
13,000
27,900
Total
13,200
26,700
36,000
75,900
a.
Preliminary.
Despite the intensified bombing in 1967 and
the heavier concentration of attacks against the
northern, more heavily populated areas, casualties
in terms of attack sorties flown and ordnance
dropped apparently have been running at a lower
rate than that observed in previous years. An
analysis of North Vietnamese propaganda statements
providing casualty information also shows that there
has been a decline in the number killed as a per-
centage of total casualties from 40 percent in 1966
/
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I I
to about 30 percent in 1967. These developments
are due in large part to the increasing effective-
ness of North Vietnamese civil defense programs as
well as the continued restraint of the US attack.
The construction of air raid shelters which has
been under way since early 1966 and the evacuation
of cities which began in mid-1966 and was intensi-
fied in early 1967 have been important factors in
reducing hazards to the population during air
attacks.
Hanoi's propaganda continues to allege that
the US bombing is a ruthless attempt at mass exter-
mination of old people and children. At the same
time, however, Hanoi claims that despite the inten-
sity of the bombing, total casualties are minimal
because of the efficiency of the government's
countermeasures.*
Although estimates of casualties resulting
from the bombing are subject to fairly wide margins
of error, the available evidence indicates that
they are in the right magnitude./
In view of the intensity of the Rolling
Thunder program, total casualties have been remark-
ably low. Although civilians sustain the greater
number of casualties, a large proportion of them
are actively engaged in air and civil defense, truck
driving, transport repair, and other war-related
activities.
* Civilian casualties for 1967 as announced by
the North Vietnamese and compiled from individual
propaganda reports total 4,4004
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Value of Economic and Military Damage
Cumulative 1965-67
Military
US'
Million
US
Direct losses
180.9
Direct losses a/
131.1
Transportation
Aircraft
44.2
equipment
75.6
Barracks
31.2
Railroad and highway
bridges
35.8
Supply areas and depots
11.0
Electric powerplants
84
Manufacturing
Ammunition depots
5,3
facilities
Petroleum and
facilities
Railroad yards and
Naval craft
Naval bases
1.9
shops
Airfields
1.9
Maritime ports and
shipyards
2.7
Communications sites
0.3
Miscellaneous armed
Miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance
2.2
reconnaissance
19.4
Indirect losses
106 7
Agriculture
6o.5
Fishing
11.0
H;xports
35.2
Total, direct.and
indirect losses
287.6
Total economic and military 418.7
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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Major Railroad Yards and Shops Attacked
1965-67
Cost of Restorati
on
Number of Yards Attacked
Number of Attacks {Thousand US
Location
1965
1966
1967
1965
1966
1967 1965 1966 1967
Total
Hanoi area
2
2
1+
31 820 3,105
3,925
Hanoi - Dong Dang line
3
7
12.; .;.'-
218 Negl. 370
370
Hanoi - Haiphong line
120
120
Hanoi - Thai Nguyen - Kep line
1
2
6
61 4oo 770
1,170
Hanoi - Lao Cal line
3
4
5
5
11
87
N. A. 500
500
70
Hanoi - Vinh line
3
5
5
11
67
176
N.A. N.A.
70
Total
6
15
23
16
loo
591 70 1,220 4,865
6,155
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 JCS Target
Number
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Maritime Ports and Shipyards Attacked
1965-67
Percent of Total
Maritime Cargo
Handling or Shipyard
Name Repair Capacity J
Cam Pha
Subtotal: 1966
Hon Gai J
Percent of Percent of Cost of
Target Capacity Total Capacity Restoration
Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US S)
5,6,8 Jun 61 2.4 470
9,10,11,17,19,21 Jul UNCODED
14,16,18 Jul 15 0.2 190
660
1 Feb
8 Mar
30,31 Oct
419 Nov
6 Dec
24 Apr
8 Nov
7,9,14,23 Jan 85 3.4 '.A.
24 (initial strike), 22 3.9 ::.A?
25,26 Apr, 24,25,26 may
Cam Pha 16 10 Sep 30 4.8
Sep (In-Mal s~rike}, 23 1.6
16 Nov
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 Table 3
Maritime Ports and Shipyards Attacked
1965-67
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number
3 18 Oct (initial
strike)
N. A. 76
N. A. 213
N.A. N.A.
1,270
a. All the shipyards struck to date perform minor repairs and construct or fabricate barges and small watercraft. All are 2,680
Category III shipyards, i.e. dry dock capacity of less than 1,700 short tons and 250 feet in length.
p. Strikes were not conducted against port facilities but against related areas such as support facilities and coal-treatment facilities
facilities.
which affected port operations and resulted in export losses. The estimated cost at Cam Pha in 1966 is the cost of damage to support
c. Not JCS-targeted.
d. Represents 10 percent of the national barge construction capacity.
? 12 Oct (initial
strike)
Haiphong Shipyard West
10 14 Oct (initial
strike)
1 l1 [ i? ' IN U. --
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Percent of Total
Maritime Cargo
Handling or Shipyard Percent of Percent of
Target Capacity soot tf
a
Repair Capacity a7 Dates of Attack Total Capacity Restoration
Destroyed
Destroyed Thousand US
Haiphong Shipyard Lach
Tray
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Table 4
Destruction and Damage of Transport Equipment
1965-67
Railroad
Locomotives Cars Trucks
Ferries
B
arges
Other
Watercraft
1965
Destroyed
6
227
318
53
;:263
144
Damaged
6
592
487
56
487
210
1966
Destroyed
10
1,101
1,935
67
2,520
867
Damaged
14
935
1,801
131
4,289
1,372
1967
Destroyed
15
894
2,935
13
3,946
162
Damaged
Total
31
1,527
1,928
13
7,520
320
Destroyed
31
2,222
5,188
133
6,729
1,173
Damaged
51
3,054
4,216
200
1
2 2 6
1,902
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Table 5
Strikes Against JCS-Targeted Bridges
1965-67
1965 1966
1967
Strikes Bridges Strikes Bridges Strikes Bridges
Railroad and combination
railroad and highway 67 l4+ 110 16 170 23
Highway 77 30 76 23 156 29
Total 14+4 44 186 39 326 52
Bomb Damage Assessment of Bridges in North Vietnam a/
Cumulative 1965-67
Total Serious Damage
Occurrences
(Including Initial Hits
and Re-hits)
Bridges Damaged
Type of Bridge
Total
Seriously
Moderately
Total
Original
Bridge
Bypass
Brid
e
g
Highway
362
323
39
1+96
452
44
Railroad
97
90
7
176
138
38
Combination railroad/
highway
i.8
42
6
87
59
28
Total
507
455
52
759
649
110
a. Damage to bridges confirmed by available photography.
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Electric Power Facilities Attacked
1965-67
JCS Target
Number Name
Pre-Strike Target
Capacity Percent of T9tal
(Kilowatts) Capacity J Dates of Attack
Thanh Hoa 5,000 3 4 Apr
27,29,30,31 Jul
4 Aug
Co Dinh 1,500 1 8,10 Jun
Nam Dinh 7,500 4 28,29 Jun
2,3 Aug
Ban Thach 1,000 0.5 21,22,23 Aug
Uong Bi 24,000 14 15,20,22,22 Dec
Subtotal: 1965
13 18,28 Apr
11,14,17 Aug
Thai Nguyen 24,000 13 6-8 Jul
Viet Tri 16,000 9 Prior to 19 Jul
Ben Thuy 8,000 4 13,15 Mar
Cost of Restoratign
(Million US $) c
0.5
1.5
0.3
1.5
6.3
0.1
4.3
0.8
23,26,26,27,28,29 Oct 0.2
Thanh Hoa 5,000 3 22,23,23,23 Sep 0.4
Trinh Xu/en N.A. N.A. 1 Nov
substation
I
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Electric Power Facilities Attacked a
1965-67
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number Name
Pre-Strike Target
Capacity Percent of TT9tal
(Kilowatts) Capacity L/ Dates of Attack
Hon Gai 15,000 8 24 (initial strike), 25 Feb
2,10 Mar
20,22 Apr
3 Oct
Bac Giang 12,000 6 24 (initial strike), 26 Feb
11,16,24 Mar
5 Apr
10,20,22 May
16,19 Jun
1 Aug
Haiphong West
Haiphong East
Nam Dinh
16,000
24,000
19,23,24 Mar
28 Jun
6,7,13,22 Jul
2 Aug
Cost of Restoratign
(Million US $) c
6.2
1.5
0.1
0.5
0.7
10,000 5 20 (initial strike), 25 Apr 1.1
10,20,26 May 0.5
7,000 4 20 (initial strike), 21 Apr
10 May
7,500 4 22,26 Jun
22 Aug
9 Sep
6 Oct
1.0
0.3
0.7
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Electric Power Facilities Attacked
1965-67
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number Name
Dong Anh Substation N.A. N.A. 25 (initial strike), 26,30 Apr 0.2
4,22 May 0.1
6 Nov 0.4
Pre-Strike Target
Capacity Percent of Total Cost of Restoration
(Kilowatts) Capacity J Dates of Attack (Million US $) :J
8,000 4 29,30 Jun
2,23,24,25,31 Jul
5,15,18,19 Aug
0.4
0.1
Hanoi 25X5 32,500 17 19 (initial strike), 21 May o.8
10 Jun
21 Aug o.6
26 Oct 0.5
Uong Bi 24,000 13 26 May
8,11,11 Jun 2.3
21,25 Aug
2,9,13,30 Sep 0.4
5,8,9,12,26,27,30 Oct o.8
11 Nov
Thank Hoa
Subtotal: 1967
Total
0.7
20.4
32.9
a. Electric generating capacity out of operation in North Vietnam was 27 percent in 1965, 32 percent in !966, and about 5 percent
at the end of 1967.
b. Based on national installed capacity of 175,000 kw in 1965 and on 187,000 kw in 1966 and 1967.
Lack of an entry indicates either no damage or no information available or which to rake an estimate.
A"i
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Manufacturing Facilities Attacked
1965-67
JCS Target
Number
7, 8 Aug
Cotton weaving: 28 Jul
50
Percent of
Total Capacity
Percent of
Percent of Total Capacity Cost of
Target Capacity Destroyed Restoration
Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
J Nam Dinh Textile Mill Cotton spinning:
70 to 75
J Cam Pha Coal Treatment N.A. 24 Apr
Plant 8 Nov
? Viet Tri Paper Mill 80 Mid-Jul
? Nam Dinh Textile Mill N.A. Oct-Dec
Thai Nguyen Iron and
Steel Complex
71 (inactive) 100 370
Spinning inactive:
60
5 Weaving inactive: 800
40
N.A. 100
N.A. J 250
N.A.
N.A. J
Haiphong Cement Plant 95 20, 25 Apr 70 (inactive)
7, 27 May
Lang Chi Explosives Plant 100 16, 23, 29 Jun 80 (inactive)
6, 8, 18, 20 Jul
1, 3, 18, 19, 20 Aug
Nam Dinh Textile Mill N.A. Max, Jun, Jul
Can Pha Coal Treatment N.A. Feb
Plant
95 J 10, 11, 18, 21, 25, 26, N.A. (inactive) 95 J 10,000
30 Mar
7, l0, 18, 23 Apr
1, 4, 10, 27 May
21, 27 Jun
N.A.
N.A.
3,050
45
N.A. c/ 1,330
N.A. Negl.
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Manufacturing Facilities Attacked
1965-67
(Continued)
JCS Target
Percent of
Percent of
Target Capacity
Percent of
Total Capacity
Destroyed
ti
Cost of
Restoration
(Thousand US $)
it
t
l C
T
Date of Attack Destroyed
ve
or Inac
Number
Name
y
apac
o
a
Phu Tho Phosphate
3
N.A.
200
Fertilizer Plant
56 J
Jul
N.A.
200
Hon Gal Calcium Carbide
N.A.
9, 12, 13 Mar 75
Plant
16, 17 Apr
N
A
360
/
Enamelware Plant
hon
i
H
N.A.
Apr 35
.
.
395
a
g
p
a
Bac Giang Chemical
37 j
24 2 Feb 3 (inactive)
, 5
37
Fertilizer Plant
11, 16 Mar
10, 20, 22 May
16, 19 Jun
)
ti
(i
80
675
Viet Tri Paper Mill
80
ve
nac
Mar 20
A
210
Hanoi Concrete Products
N.A.
19 Nov N.A.
N.
.
Plant
16.x+65
18.060
a. Not JCS-targeted-
b. Two strikes within the period.
c. Relocation of much of the mill's equipment is believed to have permitted restoration of perhaps a significant share of national capacity.
d. Pig iron only. It is not possible to determine the plant's relative share of fabrication work.
e. Percent of chemical fertilizer capacity (excluding apatite and phosphate rock).
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 I ^I .'r i 'I II ..., ..I
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Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked
1965-67
JCS Target
Number Name
Percent of
Percent of Percent of Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Total Targeted Target Capacity Capacity Restoration Destroyed
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
Negl. 6 May 100 Negl. 40 20
6 24, 26 May 34 2 120 70
11, 15 Sep 34 2 120 70
6 Oct 17 1 60 30
Nam Dinh 9 2, 4 Jul
Phu Qui 6 18 May
Subtotal: 1965
9 500 270
6 340 0
20 1,180 460
Haiphong 32 29 Jun 46 14 840 300 to 460
7 Jul 32 10 600 190 to 310
2 Aug 21 7 380 80 to 150
Hanoi 24 29 Jun 100 24 1,380 490 to 760
Vinh 6 30 Jul
7, 8 Aug
6 Sep
8, 11, 13, 27, 28,
29 Oct
Nguyen Khe 6 30 Jun 10
19 Jul
17, 18, 22 Aug 22
4 Sep
8 Oct
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 Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked
1965-67
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number Name
30 Jun
31 Jul
11 Aug 31 1 32 11 to 17
14 Sep
Do Son 2 29 Jun
3 Jul
5, 8, 10, 14, 15, 50 1 64 16 to 35
17, 22 Aug
12, 22 Oct
1 Nov
Duong N:^_am
Ha Gia
Can Thor_
Phu Dui c/
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Percent of
Percent of Percent of Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Total Targeted Target Capacity Capacity Restoration Destroyed
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US 3) (Thousand US $)
1 30 Jun 0 0
19 Jul 97 1 2 1 to 2
14 Aug 0 0
5 Sep 0 0
22 Nov
2, 3, 4, 5, 19,
30 Dec
23 Nov
2 Dec
3 Dec
5 8Aug
11 Oct
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 11 I .. iI I
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Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked
1965-67
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number
Ha Gia
Do Son e/
Haiphong J
Phu Qui c/
Nam Dinh J
Subtotal: 1967
Total
Percent of Percent
Total Targeted Target Capacity
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed
6 7 Feb
13, 14, 15, 16 Apr
8 15 Feb
2 5 Mar
32 26 Apr, 2 May
6 20 May, 12 Jun
9 22 Aug, 9 Sep
Percent of
Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Capacity Restoration Destroyed
Destroyed (Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
1 64
86 4,975 1,682 to 2,384
a. The facility at Vinh was attacked in August 1964, prior to the Rolling Thunder program. Vinh was attacked ten times in 1966 and five times in 1967,
but no destruction of storage capacity has been identified since 1965.
b. Undamaged tanks have been exhumed and removed and the site is considered to have been abandoned as of 31 December 1967.
c. This facility was 100 percent destroyed in 1965 and apparently has been abandoned.
d. Ha Gia had been attacked in 1966; available photography indicates that the destroyed tankage did not contain petroleum at the time of the 1966 attack.
e. Do Son had been attacked in 1966; the facility is now 100 percent destroyed.
f. The facility at Haiphong had not been attacked since 2 August 1966. Photography of early 1967 revealed that storage tanks previously considered to
be serviceable were being dismantled. For purposes of this table, the dismantled tanks and their contents are considered to have been destroyed in the
attack of 2 August 1966. No damage to storage was observed after the attacks in 1966.
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Airfields Attacked
1965-67
Target Percent
JCS as a Percent of Target
Target of National Utility
Number Name Targeted Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed
Na San 4 25 Jun; 23 Sep; 45
24 Oct (inactive)
Dien Bien Phu 3 2, 8 Jul 94
(inactive)
Dong Hoi 6 30 Mar; 6 Jun; 53
1 Jul; 17, 22, (inactive)
23 Sep
Vinh 6 8 May; 30 Jun; 10
1 Jul (inactive)
Dien Bien Phu 3 6, 11 Feb 94
(inactive)
53
(inactive)
Dong Hoi 6
Cumulative Percent
of National
Targeted Capacity Cost of
Destroyed or Restoration
Inactive (Thousand US $)
4 144
3 143
6 50
19 a/
67
29 Mar (inactive)
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 I
a _. is ._M -ii ' ble ' n- - -- II a I
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Alri ieias AT.Tiac-Zeu
1965-67
(Continued)
Cumulative Percent
Target Percent of National
JCS as a Percent of Target Targeted Capacity Cost of
Target of National Utility Destroyed or Restoration
Number Name Targeted Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Inactive (Thousand US $)
Apr-Jun
1967
J Hoa lac 24 Apr (initial
N.A.
b/
306
strike); 28 Apr;
1, 3, 8, 19, 21,
26, 30 May;
29 Jun
Dong Hoi 6
16 May
67
6
Negl.
Haiphong/Kien An 7
10 May (initial
(inactive)
N.A.
N.A.
4
Kep 10
strike); 14, 25
May
24 Apr (initial
40
4
248
strike); 1, 7,
21
26
31 May;
Subtotal: Apr-Jun 1967
,
,
29 Jun
23
Z8
Jul-Sep
1967
J Hoa Lac J
12 Jul; 30 Aug
N.A.
b/
229
Na San 4
22 Jul
4
t
4
Negl.
Vinh 6
31 Aug; 1 Sep
ive)
(inac
10
6
Negl.
Haiphong/Kien An 7
Kep 10
12 Aug
4, 7 Jul; 3,
(inactive)
N.A.
45
N.A.
4
9, 30 Sep
Kep Ha 3
21 Aug (initial
17
3
33
strike); 24 Aug
(inactive)
25X5
26 /
227
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Airfields Attacked
1965-67
(Continued)
Target
JCS as a Percent
Target of National
Number Name Targeted Capacity
Oct-Dec
1967
Haiphong/Cat Bi
Haiphong/Kiev An
Kep
Kep Ha
Subtotal: Oct-Dec 1967
17 8 Oct (initial 38 7
strike); 10, 12,
29 Oct; 20, 28
Phuc Yen 25 24 Oct (initial 3 1
strike); 25, 26
Oct; 5 Nov;
17 Dec
Hanoi/Bac Mai 2 17 Nov (initial N.A. N.A.
strike)
35 / 710
35 1,942
a. Including that capacity destroyed or inactive at airfields not attacked during the time period.
b. Not JCS-targeted.
Cumulative Percent
Percent of National
of Target Targeted Capacity Cost of
Utility Destroyed or Restoration
Dates of Attack Destroyed Inactive (Thousand US $)
7 1, 4, 8, 14, 17, 18 1
30 Oct; 16, 19,
21, 27 Nov; 4,
10, 16 Dec
10 1, 2, 13, 14, 45 4
24, 30 Oct; 6,
15 Nov; 17, 22,
31 Dec
3 30 Oct; 27 Nov 17 3 N.A.
(inactive)
I
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'laDle 11
Naval Bases Attacked
1965-67
JCS
Target
Number Name
Quang Khe, Cuu Dinh
Subtotal: 1965
Hon Gai/Bai Chay Port
Naval Complex
Phuc Loi
Quang Khe, Cuu Dinh
Subtotal: 1966
Target Cumulative Percent
as a Percent Percent of National
of National of Base Naval Base Support Cost of
Naval Base Dates Utility Capacity Destroyed Restoration
Support Capacity of Attack J Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
10 20 May 78 8
12 Sep
15 2 Mar; 28 47 7 400
May; 21, 24,
27, 28 Sep
17 6 Aug; 28 14 2
Oct; 4 Nov
(inactive)
15 26 Apr; 47 7
25 Nov
10
15 May; 8
Jun; 7 Sep
78
(inactive)
10
2
15
21 Aug
(initial
strike);
25 Aug
15
17, 28 Mar;
3 Apr; 22 Jun;
19 Aug
90
14
101
a. Dates of attack indicated only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been made against
a specific target than is indicated.
b. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
c. Including that capacity destroyed or inactive at naval base support facilities not attacked during the
time period.
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II. Air Operations
A. Scale of Attack
More than 191,000 sorties were flown over
North Vietnam during 1967, almost one-half of all
the sorties flown over North Vietnam since the air
war began. Sorties flown against targets in North
Vietnam accounted for more than one-third of all
sorties over Southeast Asia, a ratio that prevailed
in 1966 and 1967, as shown in the tabulation below.
More than 55 percent of all sorties over North
Vietnam in 1967 were attack sorties,* the same as
in 1966.
Sorties
Area of
Operation
1965
1966
1967
Total
Percent
of Total
North
Vietnam
55,560
147,840
191,250
394,650
34
Laos
16,050
77,370
88,570
181,990
16
South
Vietnam
110,980
203,600
260,180
574,760
50
Total South-
east Asia 182,590
428,810
540,000
1,151,400
100
The usual unfavorable weather restricted
the air war against North Vietnam during the last
quarter of the year, when an average of 7,540
attack sorties were flown per moth, compared with
monthly averages in excess of 10,000 during the
second and third quarters. The following tabula-
tion shows the average number of attack sorties
per month over North Vietnam by quarters for the
years 1965-67:
* Attack sorties carry out strike and flak sup-
pression missions. Support sorties make up the
remainder, which conduct photo and electronic
reconnaissance, combat air patrol, search and
rescue, electronic countermeasure, refueling,
and forward air control missions.
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Average Number
of Attack Sorties
per Month
Quarter 1965 1966 1967
First 280 2,480 6,850
Second 1,870 5,900 10,590
Third 3,560 11,450 10,700
Fourth 2,930 7,560 7,540
Average 2,160 6,850 8,920
The air war in North Vietnam, as in all
of Southeast Asia, continues to be almost totally
a US operation. During 1967, South Vietnamese
Air Force sorties over North Vietnam averaged
only about ten per month. During the three years
of the air war the South Vietnamese Air Force has
flown less than 1 percent of the sorties over
North Vietnam. Table 12 shows sorties over North
Vietnam by mission and nationality.
The share of sorties flown over North
Vietnam by each US military service has remained
relatively constant over the past two years of
the air war. The US Air Force has carried out
about one-half of all sorties, the US Navy about
45 percent, and the Marines about 5 percent.
Table 13 shows the number of sorties flown by each
service against targets in North Vietnam.
Ordnance delivered by US and South Viet-
namese Air Forces against North Vietnam during
1967 increased to about 243,000 tons, about 60
percent of all the ordnance delivered against
North Vietnam since 1965. The amounts of ordnance
delivered throughout Southeast Asia increased
substantially during the three years of the bomb-
ing, but the largest percentage increase occurred
in North Vietnam. The amounts and shares of
ordnance delivered against each country in South-
east Asia are shown in the following tabulation:
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I I
Tons
Area of Percent
Operation 1965 1966 1967 a/ Total of Total
North Vietnam 34,300 128,590 243,370 406,260 26
Laos 18,500 a/ 73,690 130,000 222,190 14
South Vietnam 149,000 a/ 281,250 516,780 947,030 60
Total South-
east Asia 201,800 483J530 890,150 1, 5753 480 100
a. Ordnance delivered in South Vietnam and Laos during 1965,
and in all three countries during December 1967, are estimated.
The increased tonnages delivered in North
Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia resulted
from increases in both the number of attack
sorties flown and substantial increases in the
tons delivered per attack sortie, as shown in
the following tabulation:
Tons per Attack Sortie
Area of
Operation 1965
1966
1967
North
Vietnam
1.3
1.6
2.3
Laos
1.7
1.5
2.8
South
Vietnam
1.5
1.8
2.5
Average South-
east Asia 1.5
1.7
2.4
The improved performance in ordnance
delivered over North Vietnam and the rest of
Southeast Asia curing 1967 resulted primarily
from large increases in the number of sorties
by B-52 aircraft. During 1967, B-52's flew
9,670 sorties over Southeast Asia, compared with
5,250 during 1966. These aircraft delivered an
average of about 24 tons per sortie, ten times
the overall average for 1967. As a share of
total attack sorties in Southeast Asia, sorties
by B-52's have only increased from less than 1
percent in 1965 to 3 percent in 1967, yet these
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strikes delivered 16 percent of all ordnance in 1.965
and 30 percent in 1967. B-52's delivered about 16
percent of all ordnance over North Vietnam during
1967, primarily near the DMZ.
During the last quarter of 1967 the average
ordnance delivered per month against targets in
North Vietnam declined as poor weather limited the
scale of attack. However, the average remained
well above that for the same period of 1966,
primarily because of the sharp increase in the
use of B-52 aircraft against targets in the Pan-
handle of North Vietnam. The following tabula-
tion shows the average number of tons delivered
per month against targets in North Vietnam by
quarter during 1965-67.
Average Tons of Ordnance
Delivered per Month
Quarter
1965
1966
1967
First
1,130
a/
4,260
12,600
Second
2,460
9,180
21,180
Third
4,550
17,140
26,010
Fourth
4,040
12,270
21,330
Average
3,430 b/
10,720
20,280
a. Ordnance delivered only in
March 1965.
b. Averaged over the ten months,
March-December.
C. Distribution of Attacks Against North
Vietnam
Armed reconnaissance sorties against
logistics and military targets continued to
dominate the Rolling Thunder program, despite
intensified attacks during 1967 against JCS-
numbered targets.* The number of sorties against
In the last half of 1967., previously unstruck
fixed targets have been attacked which are not
JCS-numbered but are treated operationaZZy as
JCS-numbered targets. These include such targets
as railroad and highway [footnote continued on p. 57
25X1
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JCS targets in 1967 was two and one-half times
that in 1966, whereas ordnance delivered was
more than three times the 1966 level. However,
only about 3.5 percent of all sorties in North
Vietnam in 1967 were flown against JCS targets,
and less than 5 percent of all ordnance was
dropped on JCS targets. Tables 13 and 14 show
number of sorties and ordnance against JCS and
armed reconnaissance targets during 1965-67.
The number and nature of JCS targets
attacked for the first time increased signifi-
cantly during 1967. Forty-four JCS targets were
attacked for the first time in 1967, compared
with 27 in 1966. Most of these targets were
struck during the second and third quarters.
The new targets were primarily industrial,
communications, and fixed military targets in
former sanctuary areas in the Northeast. Of
the 44 initial strikes, 12 were against targets
in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. The number of
initial strikes on JCS targets, by quarter in
1967, the number of attack sorties, and the
ordnance delivered on these targets are shown
in the following tabulation:
Number of
Initial Strikes
Quarter
Hanoi-Haiphong
Attack
ordnance
of 1967
Total
Area
Sorties
(Tons)
First
7
0
158
680
Second
17
11
381
1,170
Third
12
1
173
580
Fourth
8
0
197
400
Total
44
12
909
2,830
bridges, rai roa yards and sidings-,, shipyards,
and supply and storage areas in the Hanoi and
Haiphong areas and the Chinese Buffer Zone. The
inclusion of attacks against such targets with
attacks against JCS-numbered targets would in-
crease only slightly the proportion of JCS targets
as a percent of total targets.
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The share of attack sorties flown in Route
Packages I and VI was increased substantially dur-
ing 1967 as a result of intensified attacks against
industrial and LOC targets in the Northeast and
against military concentrations and infiltration
movements near the DMZ. In 1967, 47 percent of
all attack sorties were flown in Route Package I
and 19 percent in Route Package VI; during 1966
the corresponding shares were about 37 percent
and 7 percent. Table 15 shows the distribution
of attack sorties by Route Package for 1966 and
1967.
D. Cost of Air Operations Against
North Vietnam
The direct cost* to the United States of
air operations against North Vietnam during 1967
is estimated at about $1,665 million -- an
increase of one-third above that of 1966, as
shown in the following tabulation:
Million US $
Aircraft losses 605.6 739.0
Operational cost
of sorties flown 330.4 451.2
Ordnance 311.5 475.0 a/
Total 1 , 247. 5 1, 665. 2
a. Cost of ordnance is estimated for
December 1967.
The measurable costs to North Vietnam
for reconstruction and repair of bomb-damaged
facilities and for indirect losses attributed
during 1967 are estimated to be $236.2 million.
* Costs in this calculation include only produc-
tion costs of aircraft Zost, ordnance costs, and
those items which vary in proportion to number
of hours flown, such as POL and replacement
parts.
25X1
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The trend of the cost of inflicting one dollar's
worth of damage on North Vietnam is as follows:
Million US $
Year
Cost
of Damage
Operational Cost
Operational Cost
per Dollar
of Damage
1965
68.9
460.0
6.68
1966
113.6
1,247.5
10.98
1967
236.2
1,665.2
7.05
The increase in cost per dollar of damage
in 1966 was attributable primarily to the in-
creasing costs of the accelerated air interdic-
tion program that concentrated on low-yield target
systems. The improved ratio in 1967 reflects
the increased number of attacks against signifi-
cant economic targets in industry. Prospects
for further improvement in cost effectiveness
are dim, however, as the number of these signifi-
cant targets is decreasing, a fact pointed up by
the decline in cost of damage from $127.9 million
during the first half of 1967 to $108.2 million
in the second half.
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Sorties Against North Vietnam,by Mission and Nationality a/
1965-67
By US Services
By the South Vietnamese Air Force
Total
Year
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Total
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Total
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Total
Sorties
1965
25,270
29,570
54,840
610
110
720
25,880
29,680
55,560
1966
81,36o
65,660
147,020
810
10
820
82,170
65,670
147,840
1967
106,940
84,180
191,120
130
0
130
107,070
84,18o
191,250
Total
213,570
179,410
392,980
1,550
120
1,670
215
120
179
530
650
394
,
,
,
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Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program and by Service a/
1965-67
Year
Total on
Fixed Targets
By JOS Fixed
Target Strikes
By Armed
Reconnaissance Strikes
Armed Reconnaissance
Not on JCS Fixed Targets
Total on Armed
Reconnaissance
Target Strikes and
Armed Reconnaissance
Air Force
Navy
Marine
Vietnamese
Air Force
1965
13,890
11,060
2,830
41,670
44,500
55,560
24,620
29,220
1,000
720
1966
2,620
420
2,200
145,220
147,420
147,84o
78,580
62,550
5,890
820
1967
6,770
1,200
5,570
184,480
190,050
191,250
101,130
77,520
12,470
130
Total
280
23
680
12
10
600
371,370
83 1,970
394,650
2o4 ,33o
169,290
19,360
1,670
,
,
,
Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam, by Program
1965-67
Total by JCS Fixed
Total on By JCS Fixed By Armed Armed Reconnaissance Total on Armed Target Strikes and
Year Fixed Targets Target Strikes Reconnaissance Strikes Not on JCS Fixed Targets Reconnaissance Armed Reconnaissance
1965 12,800 11,960 84o 21,500 22,340 34,300
1966 3,560 440 3,120 125,030 128,150 128,590
1967 11,710 2,030 9,680 231,660 241,34o 243,370
Total 28,070 14,430 13,640 73 8,190 391,830 406,260
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Tables
Distribution of Attack Sorties over North Vietnam, by Route Package
1966 and 1967 a/
Year and Month '
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Buffer
Zone
1966 W
37
15
13
9
4
7
0
1967
January
44
6
15
21
4
10
0
February
63
7
9
12
3
6
0
March
59
9
12
8
4
8
0
April
49
11
14
7
5
14
0
May
39
13
18
11
3
16
0
June
36
13
17
11
4
19
July
38
9
7
9
4
33
August
48
7
10
8
2
22
September
58
8
6
3
16
October
)?3
4
6
10
3
32
2
November
52
5
7
11
5
20
Negl.
December
58
8
7
9
4
14
0
Average 1967
47
9
11
10
3
19
1
a. North Vietnam is divided, for operation, into six geographic
areas, known as Route Packages. Percentage data shown are
approximate because of the effects of multiple route package
sorties and coastal sorties.
b. Route Package destinations are unknown for 15 percent of the
attack sorties flown in 1966.
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III. Air Losses
A. Introduction
Aircraft losses over North Vietnam, as
over all of Southeast Asia, have mounted each year
with intensification of the air war. The ratio
of US air losses to the number of sorties, however,
has declined each year since 1965. Although the
annual loss rates for aircraft in the Rolling
Thunder program have declined, loss rates by
quarter increased during each of the last three
quarters in 1967. Increases in the second and
third quarter could be explained by the greater
number of sorties against heavily defended targets.
During the fourth quarter, however, air operations
in the Northeast were curtailed, and an improvement
in the loss rates might have been expected. The
increasing loss rate, therefore, appears to be
attributable to improved effectiveness of the
North Vietnamese air defenses.
B. Air Losses in Southeast Asia
About 2,880 helicopters and fixed wing air-
craft have been lost over Southeast Asia by the
US and South Vietnamese Air Forces during the three
years of the Rolling Thunder program. Total losses
in 1967 were almost 50 percent greater than in 1966,
primarily as a result of a near doubling in the
number of helicopters downed over South Vietnam.
About 90 losses were South Vietnamese Air Force
aircraft, and 282 of the 2,790 US losses were air-
craft flying training and other non-combat-associated
missions. Of the remaining 2,508 aircraft lost in
combat operations, about 60 percent of all losses
of fixed wing aircraft occurred over North Vietnam,
about 30 percent over South Vietnam, and about 10
percent over Laos. The following tabulation shows
US losses of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft,
by year.
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Year Fixed Wing Aircraft Helicopters Total
1965 311 170 481
1966 495 319 814
1967 583 630 1,213
Total 1,389 1,119 2,508
C. Rolling Thunder Losses
Combat and operational losses* over
North Vietnam totaled 867 fixed wing aircraft from
1965 through 1967. About 90 percent were combat
losses caused by antiaircraft artillery and small
arms fire, surface-to-air missiles, and MIG air-
craft. Almost three-fourths were by antiaircraft
artillery and small arms fire. In 1967 the number
of combat losses of fixed wing aircraft over North
Vietnam increased by 16 percent above those of
1966. The increase in 1967 resulted from a higher
toll exacted by surface-to-air missiles and MIG
aircraft. The number of fixed wing aircraft downed
by antiaircraft artillery and small arms fire in
1967 was only one greater than in 1966. The
following tabulation gives the numbers of US fixed
wing aircraft downed over North Vietnam, by cause,
during 1965, 1966, and 1967:
* Causes of aircraft Losses fall into two cate-
gories: operational Losses caused by equipment
failure and combat Losses resulting from damage
inflicted by the enemy's defenses. Aircraft downed
by either of these causes may be flying one of two
basic types of sorties -- attack sorties, which
carry out strike and flak-suppression missions,
and support sorties, which conduct photo and
electronic reconnaissance, combat air patrol, search
and rescue, electronic countermeasure, refueling,
and forward air control missions.
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Percent
Cause 1965 1966 1967 Total of Total
168 283 328 779 90
Combat
Antiaircraft/ 3
small arms 153 240 241 634 7 73
SAM 11 31 61 103 1
5
MIG 4 12 26
17 33 38 88 10
Operational
185 316 366 867 100
Total
The overall annual loss rate of US air-
craft has decreased each year since the Rolling
Thunder program began in 1965. During 1965, 185
US attack and support fixed wing aircraft were lost
because of both operational failure and
--
an while flying 54,840 Rolling Thunder
1,or
an overall loss rate of 3.4 aircraft per
sorties. During 1966 and 1967 these rates derly,
creased to 2.1 and 1.9, respectively.
combat losses of attack aircraft alone, which
comprised 70 percent of the total number of losses
during the three-year period, were sustainedlat5a
rate of 5.1 per 1,000 attack sorties during
and subsequently decreased to 2.8 in 1966 and 2.4
in 1967. Table
rates for the the
Thunder loss
However, a reversal of the declining
loss rates that started in mid-1966 has occurred
since the first quarter n combatlloss
for three successive q
rate by attack missions and the overall loss rate
by all missions rose in each of the tharree had
quarters of 1967, and by the end of reached levels about equal to those of the third
quarter of 1966. The following tabulation gives
the US combat
olossaraten'duringceahngaarteaof
and operational
1966 and 196.7:
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Table 16
Sorties, Losses, and Loss Rates of US Fixed Wing Aircraft over North Vietnam
1965-67
Combat losses
Combat Losses
per l,oooSorties
Attack missions
1965 25,270 129
1966 81,360 226
1967 106,940 252
213 60.7
5.1
2.8
2.4
Support missions
1965
2570
5
39
1966
1967
6
,66o
84
8
57
1.3
0.9
,1
o
76
0.9
1 410 17
2
1.0
All missions
1965
1
66
54,840 16
8
1
3
9
1
6
147,020 28
3
.
1
9
9
7
191,120 32
8
.
1.7
3 2 80 77
9
2.0
Combat and operational
losses
All missions
1965 54,84o 185
1966 147,020 316 3.4
.1
1967 191,120 366 2.1
1.9
12L L80 867 2.2
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Combat Losses
per 1,000 Combat and Operational
Sorties by Losses per 1,000 Sorties
Attack Missions by All Missions
Quarter
1966
1967
1966
First
3.2
1.8
2.0
Second
3.4
2.3
2.6
Third
2.9
2.4
2.4
Fourth
2.0
3.0
1.6
Average
2.8
2.4
2.1
1.6
1.8
1.9
2.3
2. Aircraft Losses
a. By Geographic Area
Attacks against the industrial
and transport targets in Route Package VI clearly
entail a higher risk than attacks against targets
in other Route Packages. During the last six
months of 1967, attack and support missions tar-
geted against Route Package VI carried out only
one-fourth of all Rolling Thunder sorties but
sustained more than one-half of the combat losses.
During this period the combat loss rate of attack
and support aircraft over Route Package VI was 4.5
per 1,000 attack and support sorties, almost three
and one-half times the average for all other
Route Packages. Figure 8 shows loss rates, by
Route Package, during attack and support missions.
The disproportionately high loss
rate in Route Package VI is attributable in large
measure to losses sustained while attacking heavily
defended targets within ten nautical miles of
Hanoi or Haiphong. During the last nine months
of 1967, 16 percent of all Rolling Thunder combat
losses of attack aircraft were sustained by the
2 percent of all Rolling Thunder attack sorties
targeted against the Hanoi and Haiphong areas --
a rate of 17.9 combat losses of attack aircraft
per 1,000 attack sorties. The following tabula-
tion gives sorties, losses, and loss rates recorded
by US aircraft during attacks within ten nautical
miles of Hanoi and Haiphong during the last three
quarters of 1967:
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of 1967 Attack Sorties Combat Losses Rate
Second 800 21 26.2
Third 685 8 11.7
Fourth 810 12 14.8
Total 2,295 41 17.9
a. Combat losses of attack aircraft per 1,000
attack sorties.
b. By T pe of Target
The combat loss rate varies sig-
nificantly with the type of target taken under
attack. Attacks against industrial facilities
in the heavily defended Hanoi-Haiphong area have
sustained the highest loss rates. During 1967,
for example, attacks against North Vietnam's
petroleum and electric power facilities and the
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex accounted for
only about 1 percent of the Rolling Thunder attack
sorties, but the combat loss rate during these
attacks averaged 21.4 attack aircraft per 1,000
attack sorties -- almost nine times the overall
average. Figure 9 shows loss rates, by target
category, on attack sorties. By contrast, more
than half of the total Rolling Thunder attack
sorties were flown against nine of North Vietnam's
primary roads on the infiltration routes to South
Vietnam, but the loss rate during these attacks
was 0.6 attack aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties,
one-fourth of the overall average. Strikes against
railroads accounted for one-eighth of the attack
sorties and almost one-fourth of the combat
losses -- a rate of 4.6 aircraft downed per 1,000
attack sorties. The following tabulation shows
the variations in combat loss rates sustained by
US attack aircraft against representative target
systems during 1967:
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 .I .l 1 .7 a i I 1 I
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NORTH VIETNAM: AIRCRAFT LOSS RATES , BY TARGET CATEGORY
1967
ATTACK AIRCRAFT LOST PER 1,000 ATTACK SORTIES
2
ATTACK
SORTIES
ROADS
'62,000
RAILROADS
13, 410
INDUSTRIAL
1,030
ALL OTHER
30,500
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NORTH VIETNAM: AIRCRAFT LOSS RATES, BY ROUTE PACKAGE
JUL - DEC' 1967,
AIRCRAFT LOST PER 1,000 ATTACK & SUPPORT SORTIES
5
16
IF
0
5,730
L 23,440
6,830 3,480,
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630 0.6 12 4.7 19.0
Electric power
Thai Nguyen Iron 280 0.3 8 3.2 28.6
and Steel Complex 120 0.1 2 0.8 16.7
POL
Attack Sorties Combat Losses
Target Category Number Percent Number Percent Rate
1,030 1.0 22 8.7 21.4
Industry
40.5 1.4
_r Land transport routes 75,410 70.5 102
Total 106,940 100 252 100 2.4
''1 777
a.- Combat losses of attack aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties.
Highways 62,000 58.0 40 15.9 0.6
13,410 12.5 62 24.6 4.6
Railroads
30,500 28.5 128 50.8 4.2
All other
3. Personnel Losses
During the period August 1964 through
1967, more than 1,100 US Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps personnel went down with aircraft disabled by
hostile action over North Vietnam. About one-third
of the downed personnel -- 360 men -- were rescued
by US search and rescue forces.
at least 0 percent
of the downed personnel have been captured and 10
percent killed. More than one-third are carried
as missing,
a large share of the missing have been captured.
The following tabulation shows the known status of
personnel in each service downed by hostile action
during August 1964 through 1967:
d
Rescued
Captured K
illed
Missin
Downe
Air Force
655
432
205
145
107
113
21
89
322
85
85
Navy
Marine Corps
28
12
5
0
11
Total
1,115
362
225
110
418
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Heavy defenses around Hanoi and Hai-
phong in Route Package VI severely limit search
and rescue efforts in these areas. Only 17 percent
of the 192 personnel downed by enemy action in
Route Package VI during 1967 were rescued, compared
with the overall share of 32 percent for the past
three years. Because of hostile surroundings, no
search and rescue efforts were initiated for more
than one-fourth of the 192 personnel downed by
defenses in Route Package Vi.
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Transportation in the Hanoi and Haiphong Areas
Despite the interdiction of the most important
railroad/highway bridges on the lines of communica-
tion (LOC's) serving the Hanoi and Haiphong areas,
the North Vietnamese, at the cost of large expendi-
tures of time and labor,, have maintained the
capacity of these LOC's at levels far greater than
estimated traffic demands. The judgment that
traffic continues to move in these areas at high
levels is supported by several factors. Imports
continue to flow into the port of Haiphong at
high levels, the large accumulations of stocks in
open storage areas in Haiphong continue to be
turned over, and high levels of truck traffic con-
tinue to be observed moving south from Hanoi.
Moreover, the reduced intensity of the bombing
in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas between mid-
December and mid-February has given North Vietnam
even greater opportunities to further improve the
capability and flexibility of its transport net-
work.
Airstrikes against the transportation system
in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas in 1967 have been
characterized by periodic surges in intensity.
The heaviest attacks in the Hanoi area were
carried out in August, October, and December.
In the Haiphong area, strikes were heaviest and
most frequent in late September and early October.
With the exception of these periods, land trans-
portation in the immediate Hanoi and Haiphong
areas has not been subjected to sustained air
attack. There have, on the other hand, been sus-
tained attacks against transportation targets in
the important Hai Duong area between Hanoi and
Haiphong throughout the last half of 1967. In
addition, an extensive mining program has been
carried out against water transport in the Hanoi,
Haiphong, and Hai Duong areas, particularly in
the last quarter of 1967.
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Traffic into and out of Hanoi apparently
continues at high levels despite damage to the
key Doumer Bridge. Route 1A, the major north-
south road in North Vietnam, remains serviceable.
A high level of trucking activity and extensive
use of highway bypasses was reported in mid-
February. Recent comparative photography of the
area also indicates that rail ferries and rail-to-
water transshipment facilities are operational.
In the last half of 1967, the Hanoi Railroad/
Highway Bridge (Doumer), the longest and strategi-,
cally most important bridge in North Vietnam, was
open to truck traffic more than 60 percent of the
time and to train traffic almost 50 percent of
this time. It has been closed since mid-December.
The Canal des Rapides Bridgeawas was open to through
truck and train traffic about 60 percent of the
time in the last half of 1967. This bridge is
now open to through rail and highway traffic.
The most important damage inflicted against
the Hanoi LOC's in recent months was against the
Doumer Bridge. Strikes on 14 and 18 December
destroyed 800 feet of the 5,500 foot bridge.
The extent of the damage indicates that it will
probabjly take more than the past average of one
month to restore truck traffic and more than two
months1to restore limited rail service. As of
4 March 1968, repair activity apparently had not
begun. This bridge previously was interdicted
in August and October 1967. The interdictions
and the times required for reopening the bridge
to traffic are shown in Table 17.
The capacity of the bypasses over the
Red River -- a rail ferry, seven highway ferries,
four highway pontoon bridges, and two highway/
pontoofi causeways -- within 20 kilometers of the
Doumer Bridge is more than adequate for North
Vietnam's needs in the area. Many of these by-
passes were installed in late 1967. In addition,
there are at least 34 high-way ferries between
Hanoi and Phu Tho, about 100 kilometers northwest
of Hanoi, which could be used as alternates to the
Doumer Bridge.
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The Canal des Rapides Bridge also has been
effectively backed up by a system of bypasses. In
October a new highway cable bridge was added to
the bypass system which already included a rail
ferry, a highway pontoon bridge, and a highway
ferry. A concrete and steel rail bypass bridge
was also constructed in 1967 but has not been
open to through traffic since it was interdicted
in August 1967. The Canal des Rapides Bridge
itself was serviceable for both rail and truck
traffic by early January, despite the destruction
of one span on 15 December 1967. The time re-
quired to repair this bridge has decreased
progressively after each of four interdictions,
the first of which occurred in April 1967.
Strikes on 14 February apparently did not succeed
in stopping traffic on the line. Earlier inter-
dictions of the bridge and the time required for
repair are shown in Table 17..
2. Haiphong Area
Traffic out of Haiphong apparently con-
tinues at hi h levels.
supplies may have been moved out of the port area
in quantities roughly equivalent to the record
volume of imports received in that month. The
flow of seaborne imports into Haiphong did not
abate even during the height of the bombing.
Photographic analysis shows a continued turnover
of the goods in the open storage areas of the
port,. The buildup in cargo seen in open storage
seems to be related more to the very high level
of imports during these months than it is to any
basic difficulty in moving the goods out of the
port. Moreover, the rate of accumulation of
cargo in storage areas has been much slower than
the rate of increase of seaborne imports.
Although direct rail transport to and
from Haiphong has been disrupted since the
interdiction of the Haiphong Railroad/Highway
Bridge in late September, rail shipments appar-
ently are again originating from the port.
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rail shipments may be
moving via a rail pontoon bypass bridge completed
by at least late December 1967 or by the periodic
emplacement of a removable span in the original
bridge. In addition, there are at least six
highway ferries and five highway pontoon bridges.
These bypasses have a combined capacity about
three times the uninterdicted capacity of the
Hanoi-Haiphong railroad line and about two and
one-half times the average daily volume of imports
into Haiphong during the peak that was reached
in January 1968. The damage resulting from strikes
against the Haiphong rail line west of the inter-
dicted Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge --
particularly against the railroad/highway bridges
at Hai Duong -- has also been alleviated by the
use of bypasses, and photography indicates that
rail and truck traffic is continuing.
The most important roads serving the
Haiphong area -- Route 5, which parallels the rail
line connecting Hanoi and Haiphong, and Route 10,
which serves the areas north and south of Haiphong --
remain operational. The destruction of three key
highway bridges on Routes 5-and 10 in Haiphong in
September 1967 was effectively circumvented by
the extensive system of bypasses mentioned above.
In addition, one of the three original bridges
has been reconstructed as a cable bridge capable
of handling truck traffic, and another has been
adapted as a cable bridge for pedestrian traffic.
A new highway -- Route 415 -- which will connect
the Ning-ming area of China with Haiphong is in
an advanced state of construction. This road
will add an additional 1,000 tons to the daily
capacity of North Vietnam's highway connections
with Communist China.
Watercraft were used during the last half
of 1967 to supplement the road and rail traffic
out of Haiphong and in lightering operations at
the main dock area and in the anchorages outside
the port.
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Interdiction of Major Railroad/Highway Bridges
in Hanoi and Haiphong Areas
1967 - February 1968
Approximate
Date of Restoration Number of Days Closed
Date of
Bridge Interdiction Truck Traffic
Hanoi Railroad/Highway
(Doumer) Bridge Over
the Red River
Hanoi Railroad/Highway
Bridge Over the Canal
des Rapides
Rail Traffic Truck Traffic Rail Traffic
11 Aug 67 9 Sep 67 4 Oct 67 29 5l
25 Oct 67 17 Nov 67 20 Nov 67 23 26
11+, 18 Dec 67 No repair activity as of 1+ Mar 68 About 80
26 Apr 67 10 Jun 67 10 Jun 67 1+5 1+5
12 Aug 67 17 Sep 67 17 Sep 67 36 36
26 Oct 67 17 Nov 67 17 Nov 67 22 22
15 Dec 67 1+ Jan 68 1+ Jan 68 20 20
11+ Feb 68 17 Feb 68 17 Feb 68 3 3
Haiphong Railroad/Highway 28 Sep 67 No repair activity as of 19 Feb 68 N.A.
Bridge
'A movable span may have been
periodically emplaced since
interdiction
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I I
Inventories of Transport Equipment
Inventories of transport equipment at present
are at satisfactory levels, and shortages have
apparently never been serious despite the increas-
ing levels of destruction and damage during the
three years of the Rolling Thunder program.
Pilots have reported the destruction and damage
of large numbers of railroad rolling stock, motor
vehicles, and watercraft in North Vietnam and
have reported heavy losses of trucks in Laos.
However, a continuous supply of transport equip-
ment provided by other Communist countries has
compensated for these heavy losses. Inventories
of railroad rolling stock and trucks have actually
increased above the pre-bombing levels. Domestic
construction of boats and imports of prefabricated
barges have probably replaced most of the heavy
watercraft losses, although the exact watercraft
inventory is not known.
1. Railroad Rolling Stock Inventory
In 1964, North Vietnam's inventory of
railroad rolling stock was estimated as 120 loco-
motives and 1,800 railroad freight cars. During
the three-year bombing campaign, about 2,200 rail
cars and 30 locomotives have been reported destroyed
and about 3,100 rail cars and 50 locomotives
damaged.* Imports, repairs of damaged equipment,
and the use of Chinese meter-gauge and standard-
gauge rail equipment have helped to increase the
rolling stock inventor above pre-bombing levels.
Photography revealed an estimated
2,000 to 2,300 freight cars in North Vietnam.
Several Black Shield missions since that date
indicate that the freight car inventory has
remained at about this level. Moreover, the
capacity of the rail inventory has been increased
significantly because at least a portion of the
Including a large number of small makeshift
cars used on the Vinh line, mostly south of Thanh
Hoa. These are not included in the inventory
estimates.
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present inventory is standard-gauge cars with
double the carrying capacity of meter-gauge cars.
Most of North Vietnam's rail equipment is
used in the northern areas, and patterns of dis-
persal revealed by photography indicate that
North Vietnam makes use of areas that have been
relatively free from bombing. Most rail cars
sighted were along the Dong Dang route, the prin-
cipal rail connection with Communist China and
the route that handles most of overland imports
by rail. The average of nearly 500 cars sighted
per photoaranhic mission
on
"
other northern rail lines (see Table - 18)
le 18)
M
a
.
.
ajor
concentrations of equipment on the Dong Dang line
were in the Hanoi - Yen Vien area and in yards
near the Chinese border, especially at Dong Dang
which has never been attacked.
On the Haiphong line, major concentrations
were noted at the main,Haiphong rail yard until
late September, when the Haiphong Railroad/Highway
Bridge was interdicted and rail traffic serv'
the port was stopped.
c on
the remainder of the line,lwithfthe
HaiphongaRail
Yard West serving as a transshipment area for goods
moving by rail to and from Haiphong.
2. Motor Vehicle Inventory
Inventories of motor vehicles are currently
above the pre-bombing level. At the beginning of
1965, North Vietnam had an inventory of 9,000 motor
vehicles, including 3,000 military trucks. Effec-
tive losses* have been estimated at about 8,200
To arrive at an estimate of effective truck
losses in both North Vietnam and Laos, pilot re-
ports are first adjusted to eliminate double
counting. Then a deflation factor is applied to
adjust for inaccuracies in the data and for the
fact that the North Vietnamese have the ability to
repair dnd rebuild trucks. Inaccuracies are
caused by various operational restrictions, such
as the high speed of the aircraft, poor visibility
due to weather, smoke and dust after the attack,
night operations, and intense AAA fire. The formula
for computing effective losses as agreed to by CIA
and DIA is as follows: [footnote continued on p. 791
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Since 1965, however, North Vietnam
motor vehicles.
has imported about 13,000 trucks
inven-
vehicle inven-
allies. Table 19 shows past three years.
tory in North Vietnam during the p
A variety of trucks have been supplied
by the USSR, Communist China, and Eastern European
Communist countries in relatively equa shares, im-
ported shown in Table 20. The majority of
ported are general cargo trucks such as the Russian
GAZ 63, capable of carrying about two tons, and
Chinese "Liberation" model with a payload of about
three and one-half tons. Other imported equipment
trucks, construction equipment, jeeps,
includes dump ,
and specialized items such as POL trucks, crane
shops.
trucks, ambulances, and motor vehicle repair An unusually high number of vehicles, almost 1,300,
were sent from the USSR 1967eandEJanuaryu1968.
the two months of December period in which ef-
after
tha an known imports and
fective vehicles arrived
festive losses were greater declining.
the inventory was apparently
hose trucks reported destroyed and
25 percent of those reported damaged are cons red
7t5 to pbeerceffective ent of tLosses and are deducted from the
high
inventory. For 1966, however,
numbers of trucks reported destroyed adddfago
in Laos were further deflated by a factor 2
percent.
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An increasing number of motor vehicles are
being used to supplement rail transport in the
Hanoi and Haiphong areas since the 1967 interdic-
tions of the Hanoi and Haiphong Railroad/Highway
Bridges. At Haiphong, the use of large numbers
of trucks is common but fluctuates according to
the intensity of the bombing. The average number
of trucks sighted in the Haiphong area after the
interdiction of the rail/highway bridge could have
moved slightly more than 6,400 tons per day, the
record high daily volume of imports during January
1968.
3. Watercraft Inventor_
The number of watercraft in the North
Vietnamese inventory -- estimated to be in excess
of 30,000 inland and coastal craft -- is appar-
ently adequate for North Vietnam's needs. The
watercraft fleet is made up of barges with capaci-
ties from 50 to 800 tons, sma;; coasters, junks
of from 70 to 300 ton capacity, sampans having
capacities of from 4 to 10 tons, and tugs and
small river steamers. Although reported losses
of watercraft have been heavy since the bombing
began -- 8,000 de-stroyed and 14,000 damaged --
there is no indica-tion of serious shortages.
Domestic production and imports of watercraft
have apparently been sufficient to maintain the
operational capability of water transport.
Watercraft are used most extensively in
the Red River Delta. Navigable waterways connect
the urban centers of the Delta with two principal
water routes and a number of minor routes between
Haiphong and Hanoi. Besides moving goods through
the heavily populated Delta, watercraft have played
an important role in clearing imported cargoes
from the port of Haiphong. The use of barges and
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other lightering craft for off-loading vessels at
the main docks and in the anchorage outside the
Haiphong port has increased markedly during 1967.
In the Panhandle, watercraft are used to supple-
ment rail and road transport. When required,
large numbers of watercraft can be mustered to
carry military as well as economic goods.
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North Vietnam: lolling Stock, by Rail Line Observed on Photographic Vissions J
Hanoi- ~~ Hanoi- Hanoi- Kep- Hanoi- Hanoi- Total Total
Date of Mission Dong Dang .J Haiphong Thai Nguyen Thai Nguyen Lao Cai Thanh Hoa Serviceable Damaged
25X1 1967
408
264
31
77
397
213
1,390
39
Locomotives 10
8
0
0
15
1
34
Cars
331
47
128
16
280
186
1,088
54
Locomotives 10
2
0
0
10
1
23
Locomotiv
es 16
1
0
0
17
Cars
Locomotiv
es
Cars
750
205
315
1,270
35
Locomotives 33
1
14
48
Cars
233
184
417
74
Locomotives 1
0
1
Cars
837
368
325
163
1,693
297
Locomotives 33
18
11
3
65
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 I 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 Ti
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Table 18
North Vietnam: Rolling Stock, by Rail Line Observed in Photographic Missions J
Continued
Hanoi-
Date of Mission Dong Dang
Hanoi-
Haiphon
g
Hanoi-
Thai Nguyen
Kep-
Thai Nguyen
Hanoi-
Lao Cai
Hanoi-
Thanh Hoa
Total
Serviceable
Total
Damaged
1967
(Continued)
Cars 796
454
346
255
1,851
271
Locomotives 24
18
7
9
58
435
162
132
8
26
763
287
Locomotives 20
3
4
0
0
27
Cars
31
9
133
173
83
Locomotives 2
0
2
4
Cars
333
13
113
8
100
447
1,o14
462
Locomotives 11
1
4
0
1
6
23
Cars 490
199
203
191
282
Locomotives 16
6
4
6
3
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North Vietnam: Estimated Truck Inventories, Imports,
and Effective Losses
1965-67
25X1
am
Inventory a/
as of 1 Jantrary
Imports
Effective
Losses
_
1965
9,000
3,500
400
1966
11,000 to 12,000
4,700
3,0.00
1967
11,000 to 13,000
4,700
4,800
1968
11,000 to 13,000
13,000 8,200
a. Compute by ad ing imports and e ucting
effective Losses from airstrikes and retirements (6
percent annually).
b. Estimated minimum imports.
c. Including truck Losses in Laos.
Table 20
North Vietnam: Estimated Motor Vehicle Imports a/
1965-67
USSR
Eastern Europe Total
China
1965
1,300
1,000
1,200
3,500
1966
1,300
1,800
1,700
4,700
1967
1,200
1,800
1,700
4,700
Total
33800
4, 600
43500
13,000
a. Estimated minimum imports. Because of rounding,
components may not add to the totals shown.
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 Approved For Release 2009/02/05: CIA-RDP80T01629R000300080012-1
I I
Restoration of the Electric Power Industry
and Alternative Power Supply
North Vietnam?s electric power industry has
been one of the major targets in the US bombing
attacks against modern industry. The North
Vietnamese have demonstrated a high degree of
resourcefulness and persistence in restoring a
significant part of damaged capacity. The present
policy emphasizes dispersal and revetment of
power equipment, salvage and repair of equipment
that can be made readily serviceable, and the use
of diesel-driven generating equipment sufficient
to cover the demands of essential services. There
is no apparent intent to undertake major recon-
struction of heavily damaged plants or to build new
plants while the bombings continue.
I. Restoration of the Electric Power Industry
During the past three years, 125 strike missions
have been flown against 14 JCS-targeted electric
power installations. Each installation has been
struck at least three times, and the heavily
attacked Ben Thuy and Uong Bi Powerplants were
struck 21 and 27 times, respectively. Measurable
damage was inflicted by only 45 of the 125 missions.
About 30 of 35 radar system bombings produced no
discernible damage.
During June-October 1967, about 20 percent of
the pre-strike national capacity of 187,000 kilowatts
was operating. Serviceable capacity by the end of
the year was increased to around 35 percent and,
given a further respite from bombing, probably
could be increased to 50 percent within a few
months. Severe damage to about one-half of the
generating capacity will require major recon-
struction efforts over at least one to two years.
Damage at three, and possibly four, plants has
been so severe that repair attempts have been
abandoned. It appears likely that severely damaged
sections of four additional plants will not be
repaired and that these sections may be dismantled
for salvageable components (see Table 21).
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The effect of air attacks has been blunted by
the difficulty in accurately delivering ordnance
in the presence of formidable air defenses and by
North Vietnamese resourcefulness in countermeasures.
After the initial strikes on power facilities in
1965, North Vietnam rapidly began to safeguard
equipment. Transformers and some switching gear in
substations were revetted. Transformers at main
powerplants were relocated away from the powerplants
in deep revetments. As cumulative losses of
generating capacity reduced the capability of the
transmission networks, transformers were removed
from network substations for safekeeping or for use
as spares. Turbogenerators were individually pro-
tected from blast effects by steel plates and sand
bags.
Powerplants are inherently difficult to destroy
because of the massive independent foundations that
support generating equipment, and because design
features incorporating multiple boilers and turbo-
generators permit a high degree of flexibility in
operating generating units either singly or in
parallel. Little short of a direct hit on boilers
or turbogenerators will produce lasting damage.
Although near misses have a considerable effect on
building structures and auxiliary components, this
type of damage can be readily repaired. As the
incidence of direct hits is comparatively low,
long-term losses of generating capacity have de-
veloped by slow attrition.
North Vietnam has made a considerable effort to
restore severely damaged powerplants to partial
operation. Ten of the plants have been put back
into service a total of 21 times after suffering
severe damage. The Hanoi Thermal Powerplant was
in operation within a few days after airstrikes on
three separate occasions during 1967. The Nam Dinh
Powerplant required almost two years for restoration
to partial service after initial strikes in 1965,
but damage inflicted in the fall of 1967 was repaired
within one month. The Uong Bi Powerplant has been
restored to service after severe damage on four
separate occasions. The effort at recovery has in
many cases been nullified by restrikes designed to
thwart reconstruction programs.
25X1
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Restoration of existing power facilities apparently
has been accomplished by repair and innovation, rather
than by new replacement. Foreign technical assistance
has been substantial, but foreign material assistance
has been minimal. There are no known imports of heavy
power components such as steam-driven turbogenerators
or auxiliary equipment, althou h some of the latter
must have been received
Hungary's reluctance to ship a rep acemen s eam
turbine for the Thanh Hoa Powerplant probably is
typical of the attitude of foreign suppliers, who
evidently regard new installations as both futile
and expensive in a wartime environment. No attempt
to install heavy equipment components has been
observed in photography.
II. Alternative Power Supply
The North Vietnamese are relying heavily on
diesel-driven generators as substitutes for central
power facilities. Large orders for diesels placed
during 1965 indicate that contingency planning was
then well under way for an alternate power supply
even though attempts to perform major reconstruction
were made during the first year of airstrikes. A
policy to forgo new construction of central power
facilities apparently had evolved by mid-1966, when
construction was halted on the large Thac Ba Hydro-
electric Powerplant and most of the Russian tech-
nicians on that project returned to the USSR.
North Vietnam has a total inventory of some
3,000 diesel sets with a nominal generating capacity
of 50,000 kilowatts. Technical limitations and
dispersal practices, however, reduce effectiveness to
around 30,000 kilowatts of usable capacity. During
1965-67, North Vietnam imported an estimated 2,500
diesel generating sets that make up 44,000 kilowatts
of capacity. About 11 percent of this capacity was
imported in 1965, 52 percent in 1966, and 37 percent
in 1967. Additional unobserved imports and stocks
existing before airstrikes on the power industry are
estimated to make up the remainder.
North Vietnamese employment of the diesels varies
with the size of the sets. Most of the diesels are
small capacity sets used primarily to support trans-
portation and agriculture. In industry these sets
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are also well-suited for supplying power to production
activities that can be broken up into small power-
consuming units. Undoubtedly a number of diesels
are used for essential services such as hospitals
and communications centers. Thirty-six identified
large diesels with capacities ranging from 200 to
480 kilowatts each are large enough to use in the
main power network, particularly when operating in
parallel with larger steam-driven generators. Most
of the large sets probably are located near Hanoi
and Haiphong. Generating sets of 50 to 125 kilowatts
capacity most likely have been allocated to small
industry, machine building, fragmented manufacturing
operations, or small urban localities such as Ben
Thuy, where the central powerplant is out of operation.
Some of the sets are likely to be held strictly as
standby for emergencies. Groupings of diesel units
by size are shown in the following tabulation*:
Range of Capacity
f Sets
Total Capacity
(Kilowatts)
Estimated Usable
Capacity (Kilowatts)
(Kilowatts)
Number o
200-480
36
12,000
10,000
500
2
100-125
33
3,400
200
,
500
7
50-75
154
10,
,
000
5
20-48
286
8,100
,
000
5
0.6-19
1,979
10,400
,
The importance of the diesel inventory depends on
how much of the central generating capacity is out of
operation. At the end of 1967, diesels were capable
of offsetting about 25 percent of the 120,000 kilowatts
out of operation. It is estimated that the diesels
can effectively produce about 100 million to 120
million kilowatt-hours of electricity per year, some
20 percent of pre-strike production. Fuel consumption
requirements for this level of production would be
around 45,000 tons of diesel fuel.
Efforts to keep central powerplants in operation
clearly demonstrate that sustained reliance on
diesel: generators is unsatisfactory. The benefits
of mobility and easy concealment afforded by diesels
Including only those generating sets observed
in import data.
Oft
25X1
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are outweighed by problems of efficient distribution
of so many generating units. Difficulty in main-
taining former standards of reliability and voltage
stability and occasional logistics problems are
certain to arise. The need to satisfy demands that
exceed available capacity undoubtedly causes chronic
problems in determining priorities and allocating
power resources.
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Status of North Vietnamese Power Facilities at the End of 1967
Name of Faci
lity
Times
Struck
Times
Put Back
in Partial
Operation
Installed
Capacity
Kilowatts
In Operation
or Lightly
Damaged
(Kilowatts)
Severely Damaged
and Abandoned
(Kilowatts)
Thermal powerplant
Uong Bi
Hanoi
27
5
24 000
12,000
12,000
Viet Tri
3
3
32, ,
500
32,500
Thai
N
1
16,ooo
8
000
8
000
guyen
10
2
ooo
,
,
Bac Giang
12
1
2,
12,000
12,000
Haiphong West
5
0
1
0
00
,
12,000
Haiphong East
3
0
10,000
10,000
Hon Gai
7
2
7,000
7,000
Nam Dinh
2
15,000
3,000
12,000
Thank Hoa
11
3
7,500
2,500
5,000
Co Dinh
3
0
1 5,00 0
2,500
2,500
Ben Thuy
21
2
500
8
1,500
Hydroelectric powerplant
,000
8, 000
Ban Thach
3
1
1,000
1
000
,
Dung Anh substation
6
0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Total
La2
21
16 0o c
--~~-- J
00
8 5 , 5
78, 000
a. Capacity that either is currently in operation or that probably could be put back
into operation by mid-1968.
b. Capacity so severely damaged that restoration will require a period of one to two
years. Abandonment appears to be a likely prospect for all capacity listed with the
exception of Uong Bi and Thai Nguyen,
c. Total installed capacity including unstruck power facilities is 187,000 kilowatts.
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 Approved For Release 2009/02/05: CIA-RDP80TO1629R000300080012-1
i op secret
Top Secret
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