THE GREEK ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100110004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 5, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: The Greek Elections
5 November 1974
Principal Conclusions ,
9
Prime Minister Karamanlis will win this month's election; the size
of his victory will determine how flexible he can be on Cyprus, NATO, and
in relations with the US.
If he does not gain an outright majority in parliament, he will form
a coalition government with the Center Union-New Forces led by George
Mavros. Such a coalition government would be much like that which took
over this summer when the military stepped down.
Popular discontent with seven years of military rule, plus anti-
American sentiment over. Cyprus, provide the left wing with promising terrain
to exploit; but the left is split between Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic
Socialist movement and the United Left. They nonetheless may take up to
one third of the national vote, with 20 percent going to Papandreou and
10-12 percent to the United Left. The left therefore will be a vocal factor
in the new parliament.
Right wing forces seem unlikely to win more than 10 percent of the
vote. Although pro-junta forces cannot be discounted as potential perpetrators
of a coup against Karamanlis, they probably lack sufficient support in the
army to bring Karamanlis down. This could change should the army eventually
conclude that the government was drifting too far left or that there was a
danger of Papandreou gaining power.
The Greek economy, although still troubled by a combination of
inflationary pressures and balance of payments problems, does not pose
immediate problems for Athens; to a certain extent, the Karamanlis govern-
ment will continue to benefit from the effects.of the austerity program
instituted by the junta in 1973.
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A Karamanlis-led government will not accept a solution on Cyprus
that does not include some satisfactory resolution of the Greek Cypriot
refugee problem; failing that, it would rather have no solution at all.
Athens is in an ambiguous holding action as far as military partici-
pation in NATO is concerned. Given progress on Cyprus, Karamanlis would
probably eventually rejoin the military side of NATO. In the absence of
a settlement, he might move further away, but not irrevocably.
Although Karamanlis can be expected to try to improve relations with
the US, the public relationship will remain correct and businesslike in
the absence of a Cyprus settlement. The Greek-Turkish dispute over
sovereignty in the Aegean may also influence the Greek attitude toward
the US and NATO, and Karamanlis probably would hope for backing from the
US and other NATO countries should the going get very rough with Turkey on
this question. In any case, Athens will continue its attempts to expand
economic and political relations with Western Europe as insurance against
further deterioration in Greek relations with the US.
1. Greek voters go to the polls on November 17 in the first
parliamentary election in 10 years. No one knows for sure what effect
seven and a half years of military dictatorship will have on the electorate,
nor to what extent the trouble on Cyprus and in relations with Turkey will
rally the voters around the commanding figure of Prime Minister Karamanlis.
The old political parties are in disarray and the new ones are just staking
out their territory. The election is taking place under such unique circum-
stances that the traditional patterns of voting -- heavily influenced by
patronage and family ties -- may not apply. Estimates of the outcome are
necessarily tentative, particularly in the absence of scientific polling.
2. The new parliament is empowered to revise the constitution. If
Prime Minister Kara.manl:is gets an absolute majority of seats, he will be
able to tailor the constitution to his needs -- setting up either a strong
presidency or a strong prime ministership. If Karamanlis does not do
sufficiently well in the election, there will be much political infighting
over the form of the constitution and the nature of the governing coalition.
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3. The election is to be followed within 45 days by a referendum on
the monarchy. The parties of the center and left oppose a return to the
monarchy. Karamanlis has avoided taking a stand on the issue and without
his support, the vote is not likely to re-establish the monarchy.
The Probable Outcome
4. Karamanlis' conservative New Democracy party is expected to win
at least a plurality of votes in the elections. It may win a majority,
but despite public statements to the contrary, Karamanlis and his aides
are not confident at this point that they will be able to do so.*
5. A majority government under Karamanlis would be more flexible
on Cyprus and more favorable to US and NATO interests than would a coalition,
which would be forced to strike a compromise between differing personalities
and policy views. The chances of Greece re-entering the military side of
NATO would be best under a strong Karamanlis government.
6. Should Karamanlis fail to gain control of parliament, he will
probably forrv a coalition government with the Center Union-New Forces
led by former foreign minister George Mavros. Such a government would be
similar in orientation to the one that took office last July when the
military stepped down. There are few major ideological differences between
Karamanlis and Mavros. They used to differ on the monarchy, with Mavros
favoring a republic and Karamanlis, the King. The Prime Minister has
changed his mind on the issue, however, and is taking a neutral stand on
the return of the King. Mavros also favors harsher measures against
individuals who collaborated with the military regimes than does Karamanlis.
7. Mavros, however, has been less pragmatic than Karamanlis regarding
Cyprus and more favorable to the return of Archbishop Makarios to the
Political manipulation of the electoral laws is an important part of
(reek politics. Under the present reinforced proportional rcpresent._ri-
tion law, drawn up in 1963 under a Karamanlis government, It is possible
to win an absolute majority of seats in the 300--member parliament without
a majority of the popular vote. The law favors large parties and works
against small parties and coalitions. To enter the second distribution
of seats, individual parties must win 17 percent of the votes, two-
party coalitions 25 percent and three-party coalitions 30 percent.
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island. He has also been more critical of the US and more insistent that
the Greek withdrawal from NATO is irrevocable. Mavros' policy statements
are often erratic, reflecting his personality, political ambitions, and
the need to make concessions to the left wing of his party.
8. Karamanlis was dissatisfied with
Mavros' performance as foreign minister and might replace him in a future
cabinet. Mavros, however, has told Ambassador Kubisch that he and Karamanlis
have already agreed on a post-electoral coalition irrespective of how well
New Democracy does in the elections. We suspect that the purported agree-
ment between the two is not so firm as Mavros portrays. Nonetheless,
although Mavros might be a little difficult for the US to live with, a
Center Union-New Democracy coalition would provide a stable and effective
government which would keep Greece on a pro-West course and act responsibly
on Cyprus and in the Aegean.
9. Such a government would try to avoid a Cyprus settlement which
required Greek acceptance of the fait accompli brought about by Turkish
military actions on Cyprus. If faced with such a prospect, it would prefer
no settlement at all. An honorable settlement for the Greeks would involve
some increase in the present distribution of land and wealth held by the
Greek Cypriots, some withdrawal of the Turkish army, and the return of a
significant number of Greek Cypriot refugees to the Turkish-controlled
area. A Karamanlis-Mavros government would probably accept that some form
of bi-regional federation is inevitable.
The Political Setting
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10. Greek politics have traditionally. been characterized by a multi-
licit of parties. These parties have usually been clusters around 25XO rather than parties based on programs, philosophies
or socio-economic sts. Of the 19 parties competing in next month's
elections, the most important are Karamanlis' New Democracy and Mavros'
Center Union-New Forces.* The nucleus of Karamanlis' party is the
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* The large number of parties is somewhat misleading. The election hinges
essentially on five political groupings:
-- New Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis' conservative group.
-- Center Union-New Forces: Georgios Mavros' centrist group.
-- United Left: a temporary alliance of three Communist groups.
-- Panhellenic Socialist Movement: Andreas Papandreou's radical left
group.
-- National. Democratic Union: Petros Garoufa.lios' right wing anti-
Communist group.
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conservative National Radical Union (ERE) which won a majority in
parliamentary elections in 1955, 1958 and 1961. This was the party of
the economic and political establishment until it was outpolled by the
centrist, more progressive Center Union in 1963 and 1964. The Center
Union won a clear majority of the vote in 1964 but was badly split a year
later when over half the deputies left to form another party. The Center
Union never became much more than a loose amalgamation of personally
oriented groups, organized to oppose the predominant influence of the military,
the Palace, and the political right. The "New Forces" group, which has joined
the Center Union for the election, is a collection of prominent personalities,
all relatively young and moderately liberal, who were associated with
resistance to the juntas. Many of them had been in the left wing of Center
Union prior to the military coup in 1967.
11. The parties that will compete in the elections are just beginning
to announce slates of candidates and stake out positions on the issues.
Because of the circumstances under which Karamanlis came to power, his prestige
and popularity are high. Many view him as a necessary transition figure
between military dictatorship and civilian rule and as the only leader who
can forge sufficient national unity to deal with such sensitive issues as
Cyprus and relations with Turkey. Karamanlis is also helped by the reinforced
proportional representation electoral law, which favors larger parties.
12. All parties except New Democracy have criticized the timing of
the elections, claiming that it does not allow them time to organize.
Leftist Andreas Papandreou has denounced the elections as an "electoral.
coup" designed to prevent the left from making a good showing by depriving
it of time to prepare. An early election works to Karamanlis' advantage
as he is still riding the crest of a wave of popularity caused by the return
to civilian rule.
13. Karamanlis' New Democracy slate includes 288 candidates, 194
of which are political debutantes. The New Democracy candidates are drawn
from a broad spectrum of society, but the large number of political new-
comers and unknowns would probably be a drawback in an election not held
under crisis conditions. Breaking into Greek politics has always been
difficult and the Greek voter is usually more influenced by traditional and
patronage-related considerations than by programs or new faces. When the
names of the candidates are'published, however, it may well be that the
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list in each of the 56 electoral districts will in fact be headed by well
known figures with the new faces lower on the list. Karamanlis is an old
political pro, and it is probable that he knows what he is doing on this
score.
The Left
14. The left is likely to benefit in some ways through reaction to
seven years of military rule. Popular discontent with the military govern-
ments has coincided with an increase in interest in Marxism among many Greek
university students. Demography and political psychology suggest that the
electoral base for the left may have broadened in the past decade. The
cities now contain half the population, up from a third only a decade ago.
Unions are weak, but there are more industrial and blue collar workers who
are potential conscripts for the left. Anti-NATO, anti-American, pro-EC,
pro-neutralist, and pro-domestic reform slogans appear to evince considerable
popular response. Overall, the left has a promising terrain of national
sentiment to exploit.
15. The Communist left was electorally tested in 1949 when 12 percent
voted for the extreme left. During the subsequent two decades, when
communists were forced to merge politically with the communist-front EDA,
that party's vote ranged from 12 percent to 25 percent in national elections
(12 percent in the last elections held in 1964). The 25 percent vote in
1958 was an aberration and the traditional strength of the Communists --
still discredited for their role in the civil war -- has been between 10-15
percent.
16. The left is now split between Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic
Socialist movement and the United Left. The latter grouping embraces the
Moscow-backed Greek Communist Party (KKR-exterior), the dissident Communist
Party (KKE-interior), and the communist-front United Democratic Left (EDA).
The Moscow-backed party probably joined the alliance, which is not likely
to last beyond the elections, as a result of Soviet pressure and financial
inducement. The Soviets retorted have given that party, legalized for the
first time in more than a quarter of a century, more than $2 million for its
election campaign.* A unified campaign by the United Left alliance will
enable it to exploit the government's policy of giving equal time on national
radio and TV to all major political groups. The United Left expects to lose
votes to Andreas Papandreou, and by its own assessment -- with which local
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observers agree -- the United Left will probably not get more than 10-12
percent of the vote.
17. Andreas Papandreou, probably the most feared and controversial
figure on the Greek political scene, is trying to carve out a constituency
between the Communist left and the Center Union. But in many respects he
is more radical than the Communists, who are eager to appear respectable
and who thus have been circumspect in their behavior. Papandreou's
ideology -- intensely nationalist, militantly anti-American, anti-NATO,
neutralist and vaguely socialist with a large dose of expediency -- is
ambivalent enough to attract a diverse constituency. Because his views
are considered extreme, both the right and center think they must head
him off.
Much depends on his ability to attract support from t e e t
wing o t e enter Union, which he had so far not been able to do. His
campaign has gotten off to an unimpressive start.
The Army and the Extreme Right
18. Certain elements within the army are dissatisfied with the
policies of the Karamanlis government, especially the legalization of the
Communist Party and the ongoing purge of individuals who supported the
military juntas. Some of these elements will support the right-wing anti-
Communist National Democratic Union (EDE) led by Petros Garoufalios. Although
the party is unlikely to get even 10 percent of the vote, any votes it does
pick up will be drawn from Karamanlis' conservative constituency, the army,
and former supporters of the junta. Although monarchist, EDE has avoided
taking a stand on the return of the King.
19. Other discontented army elements will inevitably turn to coup-
plotting but, for the time being, they seem to have adopted a wait and see
attitude. The embassy's most recent estimate is that the junta forces,
although still a factor that cannot prudently be discounted, do not have
the necessary supporting base in the army to bring down Karamanlis. A
prolonged period of stable rule under Karamanlis could lead to increased
civilian control over the highly politicized army and a lessened threat of
military intervention. Should the army eventually conclude that Karamanlis
is being too lenient toward the Communists or allowing the kind of political
climate to develop which could lead to the assumption of power by a leader
like Andreas Papandreou, the danger of another military intervention would
increase.
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Economic Situation and Outlook
20. Under the junta, the Greek economy experienced six years of
extremely rapid real growth -- averaging 8.6 percent annually -- but it
overheated severely in 1973. Consumer prices shot up by 30 percent while
the chronic trade deficit almost doubled.to $2.4 billion.
21. Faced with these mounting problems, the government imposed an
austerity program late in 1973. The economy responded quickly, with
industrial production falling 11 percent from January to June. The rate of
inflation slackened at the same time, and in the second quarter some improve-
ment was observed in the balance of payments despite the impact of higher
oil costs.
22. Just before its ouster, the junta decided to begin easing restraints.
This policy was implemented by the new civilian government. The Cyprus
crisis diverted men into the armed forces, delaying a production comeback,
and disrupted the important tourist industry, but did not fundamentally
alter the economic situation.
23. Some further policy easing -- particularly of credit restraints -
is likely by year's end. Industrial production should begin a recovery,
if it has not already done so, but probably will not equal its previous
peak during the next six months. Real GNP growth this year will be close
to zero but should recover substantially in 1975. Inflation and the
external payments situation meanwhile have shown further improvement: a
10 percent inflation rate -- one-third that of 1973 -- is possible for the
year, while the current account deficit may be held slightly below last
year's $1.2 billion. Foreign loans needed to cover this deficit have already
been obtained..
24. In sum, the economic situation does not pose immediate problems
for Athens, and to a certain extent the Karamanlis government is benefiting
from the effect of the austerity program instituted by the junta.
The US and NATO
25. At the height of the recent wave of anti-US feeling caused by
what the Greeks perceived as Washington's failure to stop the Turks on
Cyprus and its support of the former juntas, Karamanlis wryly remarked to
an American official that he was the "last pro-American" in Greece. Given
a working majority in parliament he can be expected to try to improve
relations with the US, particularly if he can portray the US position on
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such issues as Cyprus in a positive light. Should the situation on
Cyprus worsen, he would try to put increased pressures on the US. In
the absence of a Cyprus settlement, public relations with the US will
probably remain correct and businesslike. Prior to the elections, Karamanlis
may make another gesture against NATO or US installations designed to show
his. independence but it is unlikely to be a significant one.
26. Greece is in an ambiguous holding action as far as its military
participation in NATO is concerned. It has announced its intention to
withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure but has done little to
implement it. While Greek representatives in Brussels do not attend meetings
of the Defense Planning Committee and the Defense Review Committee, they
do participate in meetings of the Military Committee and continue to discuss
infrastructure matters. Behind the scenes they keep themselves informed on
developments in meetings from which Greece has absented itself. Athens has
announced its intention to send a representative to the next Nuclear Planning
Group ministerial meeting. Greece has never threatened to leave the political
side of NATO, and George Mavros has indicated a desire to be honorary
president of the next spring's ministerial session of the North Atlantic
Council.
27. A Greek foreign ministry official has told the US embassy that --
at Karamanlis' request -- he is currently drawing up a list of possible
steps Greece might take to implement its withdrawal from NATO. Ile asked if
the US government had an input to add. From the suggestions that the
official made -- that the US might make a gesture by reducing its military
installations somewhat -- it appears that the Greeks are casting about for
a visible gesture that would mollify Greek public opinion without irrevocably
damaging its relations with the US.
28. Other officials have implied that decisions on NATO and ITS bases
will be deferred until after the elections. Defense Minister Averoff has
publicly hinted that, given satisfactory progress on Cyprus, Greece might
rejoin NATO. Failing such progress, Karamanlis might move further away
from NATO, but not irrevocably so since he needs the US and would continue
to hope that the US would promote a better outcome on Cyprus; he is more
likely to remain in the present holding action for some time.
29. The continuing Greek-Turkish dispute over sovereignty in the
Aegean may also influence the Greek attitude toward the US and NATO.
Karamanlis probably would hope for backing from the US and other NATO
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countries should the going get very rough with Turkey on this question.
Strong governments in Athens and Ankara might be able to resolve their
differences over the Aegean in the context of a Cyprus settlement, but
negotiations would be long and difficult in any case.
30. Whether or not relations improve with the US, Athens will
continue to strengthen its ties with France, Germany and the European
Community. Relations with Europe had been frozen in the seven years of
military rule, and with the return of a civilian government, a thaw was
to be expected. The bad turn in relations with the US made the "European
option" even more important to Athens as insurance in case relations with
the US do not improve significantly. For their part, France, West Germany,
and the other EC members hope to reciprocate Greek interest in a closer
relationship, both through bilateral and EC channels. The development of
the "European option" is limited, of course, by the requirement for the
EC members to maintain some balance between Greece and Turkey (both EC
associat:e members) and by the level of Greece's economic development which
precludes immediate full membership in the EC. The extent to which Greece
receives support from the European countries, however, will influence,
though it would not guarantee, the longer-term survivability of moderate
policies in Greece.
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