INDIVIDUALS AND CLIQUES IN SOUTH VIETMAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400100014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: February 25, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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OC I No. 0775 '6 5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
25 February 1965
Individuals and Cliques in South Vietnam
1. The abortive coup of 19 February and the success-
ful counteraction, which nevertheless accomplished the
coup's major purpose of removing General Khanh, have left
serious scars on the South Vietnamese body politic. The
anti-Buddhist, pro-Catholic, and even pro-Diem overtones
of the coup group have probably sharpened religious div'-
sions, with the Catholics more desperate because of the
coup's failure, and the Buddhists more wary that Khanh's
ouster by itself reflects military, and even US, hostility
toward them. Moreover. Khanh's departure with no specific
heir to the leadership of the military, merely opens up
new opportunities for numerous aspirants to the role of
military strongman. The prospects of achieving even a
reasonably stabl.e or effective government in the near fu-
ture remain exceedingly slim.
2. The unfilled power vacuum left by Diem's over-
throw has encouraged shifting alliances and temporary
marriages of convenience in the scramble of long-time
"outs" to bring about conditions favoring their own
fortunes. Any prospect that Khanh's departure from the
Saigon scene will permit the armed forces to unite under
more stable leac'-ershin. seems unlikely without further
power strug-l es Some probable contenders are discussed
below.
a. General 'T'-an Van "Little" Minh. his appoint-
ment as "acti.ii commanc er in c ief ' '-'ls o- n the surface pro-
officer or clique feels ready to bid for power Minh
lacks any strong support among his colleagues. He was
loosely identified in the past with generals of Minh's
junta. His Catholicism is a further drawback . His
private distaste for the more flamboyant of the "young
Turks"--Generals Nguyen Can Ky and Nguyen Chanh Thi--would
probably bring him into conflict with them even if these
two were not already pushing their own political ambitions
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b, General Nguyen Chanh Thi, Commander of politi-
cally turbulent Corps since last X11, and additionally
titled "Commander of the Capital Liberation Forces`" since
the quashing of the 19 February coup attempt, Thi has
been increasingly asserting his influence since the mili-
tary decision to remove Khanh. Thi took over last-minute
leadership of the abortive paratroop coup against Diem in
November 1960 and fled with 18 of the coup group into
exile until Diem's overthrow three years later. Some of
the group ultimately cast in their lot with the Viet Cong,
but Thi is not known to have done so. He is, however, an
erratic and unpredictable officer of some political talent.
He is widely distrusted because of his obvious efforts to
link himself with Buddhist power in the northern provinces
which I Corps controls and because of his opportunism. Thi,
who now appears to be spokesman for the Armed Forces Council,
is rapidly building himself a base of national power by
pressing a purge of Khanh supporters and installing his
own followers in key police and military posts.
c. General Nguyen Cao Ky. Ky, still in his early
30s, became comman er of e air force after Khanh ousted
the Minh junta. His prominence stems from the considerable
loyalty he commands from combat pilots, among whom he is
one of the most experienced and most "gong ho." Ky's com-
mand of the air force made him instrumental in rescuing
Khanh from the abortive 13 September coup, and, until Ky
changed his mind, from that of 1.9-20 February. Before these
events, however, Ky had become one of the most prominent
of the so-called "young Turks" who emerged in the wake of
Khanh's clumsy attempt to acquire dictatorial powers last
August. Tying their fortunes at least momentarily to Khanh,
and cognizant of the Buddhist clamor for a sweep of Diemist
remnants, the young Turks--including Thi and other aspirants
to senior rank--styled themselves as revolutionaries, bent
on purging the military Old Guard. In this they included
"Big" Minh and company, as well as Catholic, Dai Viet, and
Can Lao officers then gaining prominence. Ky, like Thi, is
flamboyant and probably overconfident of his political skill,
but he appears somewhat more wary of the Buddhist leader-
ship. Although currently cooperating with This power moves,
Ky may eventually be at loggerheads with Thi or any other
figure who attempts to pick up Khanh's mantle, if only
because he sees himself in this role.
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d. General Nguyen Van Thieu. Deputy premier and
defense minister, Thieu has a cape T field command record
and considerable military and civilian support for a more
prominent military or political role. His major, and self-
acknowledged, drawbacks are his Catholicism and his ties
with the Dai Viet Party, both of which could provoke seri-
ous Buddhist opposition. Thieu emerged as one of the key
military leaders after Diem's overthrow, and he may have
played an active role in the Khanh coup against "Big"
Minh's junta, through which the southern faction of the
Dai Viet Party hoped to gain real control. There have
been some indications that Thieu, although overtly unin-
volved in subsequent coup attempts, may have been tacitly
in sympathy with them. Thieu's recent remarks that '.'Little"
Minh's command is "provisional" and his statements that
Thi can probably be controlled, suggest that he may be
promoting the cause of officers such as General Khiem, am-
bassador to the US, or General Co of II Corps, if not his
own.
e. General Tran Thien Khiem. Kheim, who evi-
dently played as prominenT-"BeT n Iiie-scenes role in both
the overthrow of Diem and of the Minh junta increasingly
appeared to be trying to call the shots during Khanh's
premiership, when he was himself commander in chief'. Al-
though evidently ambitious and opportunistic, Khiem--who
with Khanh rescued Diem from the 1960 coup attempt---has
until now shied away from seeking power openly, but he
evidently is still in the wings. Khiem was exiled to his
present post as ambassador in Washington after serving
as one of the top triumvirate with Khanh and "Big" Minh
last summer. He has denied being a Dai Viet Party mem-
ber, but he has been close to Thieu and the September and
February coup groups, and may have instigated the latest
attempt. Although a Buddhist, Khiem is suspicious and
critical of the Buddhist hierarchy, and enjoys Catholic
support;
Although Khiem may be partially is-
credited for his open endorsement of last week's abortive
coup, he may hope that developments which could curb Bud-
dhist power would pave the way for his own take-over. He
is reported to have relied frequently on the political
judgments of Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, who apparently or-
ganized the coup attempt.
f. General Nguyen Huu Co. Co, as commander of
II Corps in central ie nam" ,mss now in charge of one of
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the most rapidly deteriorating areas in the country. Co is
a Buddhist, but has displayed marked suspicion of possible
Communist penetration of the Buddhist leadership, and is
more closely associated with the conservative military gen-
erals than with the "young Turk" element. Co has been fre-
quently mentioned as a possible choice for commander in
chief, although he has so far played a relatively neutral
political role and his political ties and supporters, if
any, are still unknown,
g. General Pham Van Dong. Dong, military governor
of the Saigon area since lasT__ TM, and reportedly just con-
currently named director of the Central Intelligence Organiza-
tion, has only indirectly hinted that he was interested in
leadership of the military. Although he is older than the
"young Turk" group, he has been frequently lumped with them
despite the fact that he displays little sympathy with them.
He may already be running into friction with Thi over author-
ity in the Saigon area. Dong, a tough officer who claims
Nung ancestry, is a nominal Buddhist, but is obviously close
to Catholic circles and was a strong supporter of the Huong
regime. Although he is unlikely to emerge as a strong man
in his own right, he could play a leading role in influenc-
ing future developments.
h. General Tran Van Don. In retirement as a re-
sult of "young Turk" pressures,on is the only member of
the former Minh junta who might be reinstated in some posi-
tion of responsibility. He was rumored to be a supporter
of the February coup attempt; if so, he was probably moti-
vated more by bitterness at Khanh.than by sympathy for the
coup leaders. In general, although "Big" Minh himself might
conceivably be restored to some honorific post, the future
of his ousted junta--including Don himself, Mai Huu Xuan,
and Le Van Kim--appears likely to be one of intrigue with
Ether factions. General Ton That Dinh, the only member still
on active duty, is politically ambitious but distrusted as
erratic and demagogic, and is likely to be kept on the shelf.
i. Leaders of the abortive September and February
coups. Officers suc as eneral Lam Vii a and o one
Pam Ngoc Thao have been stripped of command and are likely
to return to prominence only behind another figure such as
Kheim or Thieu. While they are still at large, however,they
may retain some support, particularly among Catholic and
southern Dai Viet elements, and could plot yet another coup.
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3. Although there seems to be no immediate challenge
to the Quat government, its fortunes are to a considerable
degree dependent on what individual or faction holds mili-
tary power, as well as on the extent of Buddhist, and even
Catholic, cooperation. Quat's cabinet is composed of tech-
nicians and a group of civilian politicians. Many of the
latter have been closely associated in the past. The cabi-
net's status is discussed here in the light of those politi-
cal groupings which remain.
a. Northern faction of the Dai Viet Party. Phan
Huy Quat and some members of his cabinet such as Bui Diem
represent the northern faction of the Dai Viet Party, and have
no known ties with any military elements. Quat's personal
strength, and even his broader attitudes, are still some-
what untested and unknown, although he has been considered
over the years a prominent and moderate opposition figure.
He seems to enjoy at least temporary Buddhist acceptance,
possibly because his supporters have sought to win Bud-
dhist support since the Buddhists first moved openly
against Diem. Quat is a Buddhist, but he is not'known to
have strong ties with the Buddhist hierarchy. It is pos-
sible that both the Buddhists and the military have en-
dorsed him in the belief that he can be controlled.
b. Southern faction of the Dai Viet Party.
Nguyen Ton Hoan, leader of e sou ern ac on, is again
in exile, as he has been almost continuously since the
early 1950s. His attempts to build up his own party fol-
lowing as Khanh's Vice Premier and pacification minister
led to his latest eclipse, and it is no longer certain
that pro-Dai Viet officers such as General Thieu would
again call on Hoan to head a government if they came to
power. Hoan, considered a strong nationalist and anti-Com-
munist, was not effective while in office, but attributed
this to Kha.nh's efforts to bypass him.
c. Central faction of the Dai Viet Party. Ha
Thuc Ky, a leader of the cent r 'l faction, was an 's
first interior minister, but was quickly removed on
grounds of intriguing. Although closer to Hoan's than to
Quat's faction, Ky n,ow seems to have close ties with neither .
He recently denied any involvement in coup plotting, but
seems aware of the 19-20 February plans, and may have
been a supporter.
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d. Nationalist Party(VNQDD). Tran Van Tuyen, a
nominal leader o the , is a vie premier in the Quat
cabinet and represents the northern region where the party
strength lies, Tuyen, for a long period associated with
Quat and similar political opponents of Diem who were able
to remain in Saigon, probably exercises little real control
in the VNQDD, which is to some extent split among rival
provincial factions. Elements of the VNQDD have variously
been cooperating with and in conflict with the Buddhists in
the northern provinces. Nguyen Hoa Hiep, a leader of the
southern branch of the VNQDD, is:Quat's interior minister,
but is an elderly figure of almost no political strength.
4. More important than the political parties them-
selves are the Buddhist and Catholic communities. and toa
lesser extent the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects in the
delta. Although the religious organizations are ostensi-
bly nonpolitical, their leaders exert great influence on
political events. None of the religious groups, however,
is in itself monolithic.
a. Buddhists, Central Faction. Thich Tri Quang,
although s p i r i t u a l re ua e in the Buddhist
hierarchy, is the most powerful Buddhist figure, primarily
because he commands the militant Buddhists of central Viet-
nam (i.e.,the northern provinces of South Vietnam). He is
by far the most effective Buddhist political strategist, but
evidently prefers to exert his influence indirectly from be-
hind the scenes. He is a skilled tactician able to manipu-
late his followers to apply overt, mass pressure. Tri
Quang's views and aims are basically still unknown; his pos-
sible Viet Cong ties have been examined at length but never
established. At times, he has displayed greater restraint
and moderation than other Buddhist leaders. Quang's closest
cohort is Thich Thien Minh, director of Buddhist youth
programs and official Buddhist spokesman, Another leading
monk, Huyen Quang, is reported in Quang's camp. This group
appears to be moving toward an openly espoused neutralism
but still veils its goals in obscure language.
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b. Buddhists, Southern Faction. Thich Tam Chau, the
monk who heads the u is ecu.ar organization, is the most
prominent leader of Buddhists in the southern provinces, a
group which includes the mass of Buddhist refugees from North
Vietnam. Tam Chau has in the past been described as a moderate,
but has been more open than Tri Quang in attempting to dabble
in politics. Chau has at times sponsored movements to unite
the various religious factions, particularly in the southern
provinces; at times he has appeared in close alliance with
General Khanh. The extent to which his views and actions are
coordinated with Tri Quang is uncertain, but there is evident
rivalry between the two. Chau, like Quang, is reported re-
cently to have spoken of the need for ending the war, al-
though he speaks of keeping the South non-Communist. Although
he had also been accused of Communist ties, Chau is described
by most Vietnamese as anti-Communist. He may be close to Thich
Tam Giao, head of the Buddhist chaplain corps. Some of his
followers lower in the hierarchy have been erratic, troublesome
hotheads.
C. Southern Catholics. Archbishop Nguyen Van Binh,
leader of the Catholic community in Saigon, is a moderate and
is widely respected even among Buddhists. A quiet critic of
Diem, Binh has since Diem's downfall indicated some concern
over Buddhist intentions, and has been as reluctant to
cooperate openly with Quat's government as he was with Khanh's.
He remains, however, a generally constructive and unifying
figure, with considerable ability to influence events.
d, Northern Catholics. Father Hoang Quynh is the
best known represen a ive 5T T e Catholic militants, centered
around the nearly 800,000 Catholic refugees who fled Communist
North Vietnam. Although Quynh and other stanch militants such
as Father Mai Huu Khue do not speak for the refugees as a
bloc, they are often the most vocal and potentially trouble-
some Catholic element. Both men appear to have supported the
abortive February coup, the failure of which may make them
feel even more threatened and desperate. Quynh reportedly
has spoken of arming his followers in the past.
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e. Hoa Hao. Luong Trong Tuong, the politician
usually considered to speak for the Hoa Hao sect, refused
for reasons not now known to participate in the Quat govern-
ment. The sect's real power, however, is centered far from
Saigon in An Giang and Chau Doc provinces west of the Mekong,
and its real loyalty is given to local leaders in the area,
including the An Giang Province chief. To date, the Hoa Hao
have cooperated militarily with Diem's successor regimes,
and have exerted little influence on national political
events.
f. Cao Dai. The Cao Dai, like the Hoa Hao, have
given military support to Saigon since Diem's overthrow.
However, there are more signs of dissatisfaction among them
than among the Hoa Hao. Two of Quat's ministers, Tran Van
Tuyen and Le Van Hoach, are Cao Dai, as is titular Chief of
State Phan Khac Suu. None appears really to speak for the
sect membership, although Hoach, who has claimed in the past
to have made contacts and soundings among the Viet Cong,
may have such contacts among Cao Dai in Tay Ninh Province,
which is a stronghold of both the Cao Dai and the Viet Cong.
The Tay Ninh Province chief, General Le Van Tat, is prob-
ably in fact the most prominent Cao Dai leader. A Cao Dai
official,Tran Quang Vinh, has participated in the defunct
High National Council and its successor.
5. Labor. Tran Quoc Buu, president of the Vietnamese
Confederation of Labor (CTV), is a rather unique figure on
the labor scene. Buu, although he privately gave support
to the Huong regime, has been reluctant to assert himself
politically. He is under attack within the CTV, particu-
larly from its central Vietnam affiliates, and from Bud-
dhist militants on grounds of his early association with
Diem and of his alleged corruption. Although there are
some other capable labor leaders, including Vo Van Tai,
the CTV leader in Saigon, many of these are political un-
knowns. Several union leaders are unsavory opportunists.
The unions themselves are prime targets of Viet Cong pene-
tration. Most union members have remained politically
apathetic and have displayed almost no real support for
any government in Saigon to date.
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