SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000500020003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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SING-SOVIET RELATIONS
I. The Sino-Soviet relationship has deteriorated to
such an .extent over the past ten years that we
can describe the present situation as one of
virtual divorce on grounds of incompatibility.
A. In fact, from its inception the alliance
between the USSR and China bore many of the
marks of a mere marriage of convenience.
1. There were many signs that the marriage
would be most unhappy.
2. The partners had different backgrounds,
they necessarily had different outlooks
on major problems, and, as has become
increasingly clear, their personal interests
were ultimately incompatible.
B. To be sure, the Soviets and the Chinese were
for a few years-on relatively intimate terms.
1. This was particularly so during the mid-1950's
when cooperation in nuclear and missile
technology was at its height.
C. The romance began to fade in the late 1950's.
1. The Soviet leaders soon demonstrated a
pronounced reluctance to assume?the high
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risks entailed in the aggressively bellig-
erent policies tailored to China's aims and
needs.
2, The Chinese, enraged by this unfaithfulness,
this "sell-out", retaliated with all the bit-
terness of a woman scorned.
3. They openly accused the Soviets of the most
treacherous and perverse kind of adultery,
and named the US as corespondent.
D. There is not much chance that memories of old
intimacies, or the prospect of new ones, will
retie the marriage bonds.
E. The two partners are now at odds on virtually
every matter of importance to Communist states.
F. Party, economic, military and even state relations
between them have dwindled to the smallest possible
minimum--and still be said to have relations at all.
II. The Two countries now can be regarded as engaged in
a head-on struggle for leadership of the entire
movement.
A. Because both regimes are headed by dedicated
Communists, the dispute has been co ~ hed in
doctrinal terms; each. attempts to prove the
heresy of the other by quoting from the scriptures
of Marxism-Leninism.
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B. This debate in dialectics has led some observers
to believe that the argument was merely an
"ideological" one, simply a matter of "counting
the number of angels--or devils--that would fit
on the head of a pin."
C. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The
dispute, fundamentally, is one of deep national
antagonisms, a power clash of opposing national
interests. This is recognized by both sides and
is expressed by their leaders in private.
D. Some examples:
1. Chou En-Lai told
that the dispute between
the Soviet Union and China was actually a
deep-rooted and permanent conflict of national
interests. Chou told that t~~ATINTL
Soviet Union wished to prevent China from
becoming a great power. He had a list
grievances--Soviet failure to help the Chinese
gain control of Manchuria at the end of World
War II, the withdrawal of Soviet scientists
and technicians from China in 1960, Moscow's
failure to give economic aid--particularly
food--in recent years during China's severe
shortages.
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STATI NTL
2. Another example, This one, Soviet Sergei
Mikoyan told
that the Soviet leaders,
among them his father Anastas Mikoyan, felt
that the dispute with China was irreconcilable,
and that the struggle would be a protracted
one.
STATI NTL
3. Another Soviet example. A high Soviet leader,
told his hearers
that the present dispute is not a matter of
theoretical argument. He said that it was a
struggle for power and influence in Communist
parties and governments worldwide. He said
that the Chinese had been meddling in the
affairs of other Communist countries.
III. I do not want to leave the impression that doctrinal
or ideological issues are not an important part of the
dispute. I do want to make the point that these
doctrinal quibbles have tended to obscure the real
argument--diametric differences over basic policies
and interests. Couching the dispute in doctrinal
terms has enabled the Chinese to pretend to be more
Communist than the Soviets, and at the same time to
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demand the right to lead the world movement. To give
an example; Computers use binary symbols in their
arguments--Communists use ideology,
A. You see, the Chinese made a real try--beginning
in 1950 shortly after Stalin's death--to get for
themselves an equal voice in the establishment
of bloc policies. They wanted this so that Sino-
Soviet bloc policies would support Chinese interests.
1. Actually, they never made it, But they created
so much fuss and distracted the attention of
the various Communist parties enough so that
they caused a real split in the Communist world.
As a result, two centers of doctrinal truth
emerged and an opening was made for a multiplicity
of interpretations by Communist parties and
governments. No longer one monolithic way.
B, This has campaunded the problem that has haunted
Saviet leaders ever since Stalin's death.
1. Soviet policy makers, and the Chinese as well,
now must take into account the interests of
their satellites when they try to impose
political and economic policies. The sheep
no longer follow the commands of the shepherd
blindly.
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2. There are recent, and well publicized,
examples: Rumania--refusal to subordinate
its overall economic development CEMA planning.
Also, its subsequent independent behavior;
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Cuba--refusal to soften its militant
revolutionary plans for Latin America and
its attempts to gain regional control of
Communist parties there (remember Cuba's total
economic dependence on the Soviet Union),
North, Vietnam--talking out of both sides of
its mouth as it trys to get military and
economic support from both China and the
Soviet Union.
IV. We have now seen ten years of bitter history in the
Sino-Soviet dispute. In the time that is available
this morning it would be impossible for me--and
probably boring for you--to cover this in detail.
Instead, within the broad framework I have just
sketched out, I will try to explore the depth of the
dispute by looking carefully at three or four of the
key areas in the conflict. After that, I will offer
a brief appreciation of the current situation, and
follow that with a short discussion of some of the
a
implications of the break-up of the Sino-Soviet
partnership,
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V. One of the areas in which an early Soviet action
vitally affected Chinese interests was the drastic
Soviet cutback in 1960 of military aid and technical
assistance. This left deep wounds which are still
open.
A. In the summer of 1959, Khrushchev decided to make
his now famous visit to the United States and to
Camp David. This was his "peaceful coexistence"
phase; you remember Chinese leaders correctly
viewed this as an imminent danger to their
interests. They responded by spilling out some
of their simmering differences with the Soviet
Union. They began a whispering campaign among
Bloc parties with the aim of bringing pressure on
the Soviet Union for a change of course.
1. The Soviets chose to strike back. At a meeting
of all the ruling Communist parties at Bucharest
in June 1960, the Soviet leaders organized a
"surprise assault." They charged the Chinese
with failure to follow the Soviet lead and
urged the other delegates to tell the Chinese
to fall in line. This whole operation was a
flop. The Chinese refused to be cowed and they
refused to knuckle under.
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2. Khrushchev saw that stronger steps were
needed. He knew that the Chinese needed
Soviet aid badly. He thought that all he
would have to do would be to suspend aid
and the Chinese would fall right into line.
(Like suspending your wifers allowance.)
In August 1960, without warning, he pulled
out the Soviet technicians then in China--
about 1300 of them, At the same time, he
canceled about 150 contracts for heavy
industrial and military projects.
a. The Soviets made no effort to soften the
effects of the abrupt withdrawal and many
technicians walked off with project
blueprints.
b. At one major hydro-electric project, for
example, only one Soviet generator was
ever delivered, and it was so seriously
damaged when the Chinese attempted to
install it themselves that one Chinese
official later commented that the whole
dam might as well be blown up.
c. This treatment did not get the desired
results, however. The Chinese acted like
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Chinese on this occasion--not like
chastised Communist cadres. They merely
got more grim and determined about facing
the Soviets down.
B, What Khrushchev did accomplish, however, was to
give the Chinese a nasty setback on their industrial
and military development programs. China's economic
plans had assumed continuing Soviet technical help
and the pullout therefore collapsed Peking's entire
timetable for industrialization.
1. The full extent of this planned-for aid program
has never been revealed by the Chinese or the
Soviets. We know, however, that it was a
comprehensive and significant program.
2. It aimed at giving China the capability of
producing a broad range of modern weapons,
including nuclear weapons; deliveryvehicles
such as jet bombers and guided missile sub-
marines; and air defense weapons, such as
surf ace-to-air missiles and supersonic fighters.
3. China probably would have been producing all
these items, in the early 1960's, if the Soviet
Union had not renounced its commitments.
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