NIE-49: SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT (THIRD DRAFT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001500020024-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 8, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
8 February 1952
SUBJECT: NIE.49t SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
(Third draft)
THE PROBLEM
To assess: (a) Sweden's strategic importance; (b) its
present policy in the Fast-West conflict; (o) the possibilities
of a change in this policy; and (d) the advantages and die-
advantages of Sweden'd position to the NATO powers and the
USSR.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Sweden's geographic locations sizeable economic
resources, and considerable military potential give it substan-
tial strategic importance to both NATO and the USSR. Until
49*.
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the NO forces are adequate to defend at least Norway, Sweden's
active participation might well be the key to the successful
defense of important Norwegian base areao against a Soviet attack.
2. Despite its pro41estern and anti-Communist outlook,
Sweden is unlikely to join NATO in peacetime and will probably
cling. to its "alliance-free" policy as long as possible, even
in event of war.
3. However, there is an even chance. that Sweden would
join the NATO powers in event of a Soviet attack on Norwaya
provided that the NATO forces could come quickly to its defense
Sweden would certainly fight if itself attacked.
4. Until NATO is strong enough to defend Norway and
Denmark, Sweden's ono-alliance" policy will hamper the develop-.
ment of adequate Scandinavian defenssaand thus be disadvantageous
to the West.
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5. Moreover, if Sweden were isolated by wartime Soviet
occupation of Norway, its valuable trade with the West would
be cut off and it woad be forced, under Soviet pressure, to
. make an important economic cOntribution.to the Soviet bloc.
6. Should NATO defense capabilities grow to the point
the USSR no longer considered that a Scandinavian campaign was
feasible it would still find Nadi& neutrality advantageous
as a protection for the Soviet Baltic flank.
DISCUSSION
I. SWEDEN $5 STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
0 Geoarathic. Sweden, comprising over half of the
Scandinavian peninsula, lies across the most direct air routes
between the northern and western USSR and Norway, the UK,
Greenland, Iceland, and North America? ,and could provide
offensive and defensive air facilities to either the USSR or
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the Western allies.- It is also a major factor in the control
of the Baltic and it western entrance. Moreover, Pweden pro-
vides, with Finland, a buffer between the USSR and the valuable
air and naval base sites along the Norwegian coast, the most
logistically feasible approach to which lies through Sweden
itself. Finally, the Scandinavian peninsula, including Sweden,
overhangs the North German plain, the chief military route
across Western Europe and if held securely by the NATO powers,
could go used as a baso.from T,ihieh to threaten Soviet lines
of communication across. Germany.
2. Political -- Economic andSelgatlgie. Sweden is a
stable, politically mature democracy of about seven million
people. Its present Social Democratic-Agrarian coalition govern-
ment enjoys solid popular support. Sweden has only a small
Communist party, numbering only an estimated 35,000.
3. As one of the most highly industrialized nations in
the world, Sweden is an important producer of Ships, tell and
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roller bearings, industrial machinery, engines and turbines,
electrical apparatus, steel, and numerous other manufactures,
as well as high quality iron ore. The Swedish Bofors firm designs
and produces excellent naval and anti-aircraft guns. Swedenls
aircraft industry is capable of producing limited numbers of
modern jet fighters. Its marine engineering and aeronautical
installations are capable of extensive research and develoment
work. Sweden's basic scientific and technological research
is excellent in a number of fields. Its scientists rank with
the world's best in physical chemistry ahd medicine, for example,
and it expects to have an underground atomic pile operating
in 1953.
4.. Some 92-93% of Swedish trade is with the West, the
UK and West Germany being Sweden's largest customers. Sweden's
large exports of iron ore luMber? pulp and paper, bearings,
machinery and ships, etc., make an important contribution to
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to Western European economic strength. For euamples about 11%
of the free world's iron is derived from Swedish ore.
5. Although fteden is slightly more dependent on trade
with the Soviet Bloc than most other Western European countries,
this accounts for only 74% of Swedish trade. It consists
chiefly of an exthange of iron ore, ball and roller bearings,
and machinery for Polish coal and some mineral ores. This trade
has been declining steadily over recent years, and under Western
measure, Pweden has adopted Eastialest trade controls comparable
to those of the European NATO countries1 It sells no munitions
to the Soviet Bloc and only surrenders strategic goods where
essential to obtain such essential imports as Polish coal.
6. However, Sweden's dependence on foreign sources for
two-thirds of its raw materials and practically all of its coal,
coke, and petroleum products renders its economy critically
vulnerable to external pressures. Any major interference with
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the flow ofimports such as in wartime would inevitably have
serious disruptive effects on the Pwedieh economy.
7. Armed Forces. Sweden is modernizing and expanding
its 75,000 man armed forces, the largest and best in Scandinavia,
although far less than its resources would allow. The forth-
coming defense budget will probably be more than 40; above that
of the present fiscalyear, although Sweden will still only
be spending 5% of its national income for 4sfense. It is build-
ing' modern jet aircraft (and buying others from the UK), enlarging
and modernizing its fleet and expanding ground force training.
However, the armed forces suffer from serious weaknesses which
? sharply limit their capabilities in time of war. The quality ?
of Swedish manpower and basic training is excellent, but the
armed forces are lacking in combat experience and high level
staff and command training for Large operations. While serious
logistical deficiencies exist.
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8. Sweden's army of 50,000 comprises orAy 15,000 regulars,
although mcbilizable army manpower totals same 675,000 Men,
Most of them semi-trained. The 9-10 month conscription period
is inadequate by NATO standards, and there is a Shortage of
modern equipment.
9. Sweden's navy is a well-rounded force of high standards
designed for coast defense. Built around three cruisers, twelve
destroyers* and twenty-one submarines, it is weak in modern
equipment, though a new construction and modernization pregram?
is in progress. By the end of 1952, for example, all sabmarines
will be fitted with radar, sonar, and snorkels.
10. The Air Force, Western Europe's second best, is con-
sidered by Sweden to be its first line of defense. It has
1,688 aircraft (10095 of them in operational units), of which
366 are jets. Of Sweden's 62 airfields, six can now sustain
jet fighter or medium bomber operations, four more can sustain
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jet fighters and be developed for bombers, and a further ten
can support limited jet fighter operations. Sweden's air defenses
have been greatly 'improved
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experience, its equipment is unequal to that, of the USSR, and
it suffers from critical logistic deficiencies, particularly
fuel.
11. In the light of the above military wealmesses, the
Swedish forces are presently incapable of more than a delaying
action against a major Soviet attack. The duration of their
defensive effort would depend upon vbether thoy had sufficient
time to -mobilize and receive substantial outside support* On
the other hand, Sweden's already sizable .military potential
and resources provide a basis for a marked expansion in Swedish,
military capabilities, perhaps to the point where, together
with the ?LTO Northern Operand forces, they could successfully
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defend large areas of Scandinavia. such a build-up of Swedish
defenses however, would require outside assistance*
12. wSeslealtmle in Scandinavian derma. The ultimate
test of Sweden's strategic importance .to the USSR and the NATO
powers hoe in its potential role in the defense of the
Scandinavian peninsula in event of were Should uar cone the
USSR would probably consider an way occupation of at leaat
Norway and Denmark as second inimportance only to its nein
thrust across Western. Amapa. On the otherband, the NATO powers
are committed to defend both Norway and Denmarkaad their defenses
are being built up through MDAP aid. The chief objective of
both sideS would probably be to hold the valuable air and naval
bases and radar sites along the Norwegian coast. Until the
NATO powers are strong enough to defend .Denmark or at least
Norway, Sweden, because of its geographic location and sizable
armed forces, could make a valuable contribution to Norway's
defense (see,paragraph )..
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13, While Sweden's strategic importance to the NATO pawn*
is primarily defensive, once these powers uere strong enough
to defend the Scandinavian peninsula (and perhaps Nnmark)?
Sweden woUld have potential value 83 a base for offensive air
and Pethaps eventually naval and amphibious operationSogainst
the Soviet Baltic f11. Ouch operations uould be seriously
hampered,-however, by the difficulty ofachieving lecal air
and naval superiority over Soviet forces operatihg from heathy
bases, and by the logietical difficulties of supPlying the allied
forces in Nolen.
II. SWEDEN'S PRESENT FOLD"! In THE EAST41ErT CONFLICT
14. The nwedish people and goverment remain firmly attached
to their traditional policy of "freedom from military alliances",
the objective of which, together with the maintenance of adequate
defenses, is to avoid Involvement in a general ware To the
Swedish public, which overwhelmingly supports the neutrality
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policy, the most persuasive argument in its behalf is the peace
that the country has enjoyed for approximately 150 years.
Although cognizant of the Soviet threat to Swedish security,.
the Suedes are not convinced that they have no hopo of escaping
involvement in a future war. They are under no delusion that
they could withstand attack without 'bstern support, but they
.believe they can build up ti-eir armed forces and- spirit of
resiatance to a point that would make invasion not uorthwhile.
Moreover, they are camfidera;that, regardless of their non-
membership in NATO, ,the Western powers 'will come to their
assistance in event of Soviet attack..
15. While all four non-Communist parties support in
principle the non-alliance policy)/ the leaders of the Liberal
and Conservative opposition parties have criticized the implemen-
tation of the policy by the majority Social Democratic.4grarian
11 Sweden's small Communist party, While not objecting to nem..
trality as such, professes to regard it as a fraud, alleging that
Suedieh foreign policy is actUtiAy pra.4estern and nom-neutral.
?
3.2 OP
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Government as being too rigid, doctrinaire, and lacking in fore-
sight. They contend that at a minimum Sweden should undertake
technical military cooperation with Dennarl: and Ramey, lest
the absence of advance planning prejudice Western aid to Sweden
in event of war. They also profeac great concern over the im-
pact of Sweden's official neutrality policy on Western opinion.
A small but vocal minority led by some of the Liberal party
press, including Sweden's largest daily, has gone further and
attacked the neutrality policy, arguing that better security
would be found in affiliation uith NATO. A number of highwranking
Swedish military officers apparently share this view, but it
has not at this juncture gained any appreciable public or
political support.
16. Despite their official "non,ellianee" policy, both
the Swedish government and people arel=ern and anti-Communist.
The Swedish people have a deep-seated fear and mistrust of the
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USSR. Their mistrust is based largely on historical conflicts
with Tsarist Emmaus, which was Swedengs traditional enemy, but
it has been strengthened in the postwar period by the USSRos
aggressive international pollen incessant Soviet attacks on
Swedenos grants of asylum to political refugees, and the r vent
disclosure of Soviet espionage in Sweden. Swedish relations
with the Soviet bloc, especially with Poland, have worsened
over the past year.
170 Swedenes sympathies, as well as its major economic
interests, are with the iestern countries, particularly the
UK and US. Despite reservations over certain aspects of
American foreign policy, and some lingering anti.American
sentiment in Social Democratic circles against what they
regard as the home of aggressive capitalism there is a
friendly feeling for the American peopled Swedish domestic and
foreign policy has become more overtly Western in its emphasis
since the conflict in Kora., and particularly since NATO defensive
capabilities have begun to grow
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Illy POSSIBILITI2S OF A OHANGF.: IN 3WHDI5H POLICY
lee During the Cold Ware Despite its pro4lestern and anti,.
Communist outlook* Seeden is unlikely to change its formal "no-
allianceto policy during peacetime* and will resolutely resist any
. . .
Soviet or Western pressure in this direction? Neither the people
nor the ,government are readily susceptible to outside political
and psychological pressures* to which their history and spirit
of independence* comeined with a strong element of stubbornness*
make them strongly averse?
19? Sweden woad be particularly resistant to peacetime
Soviet threats* although it might be forced to make further
limited economic concessions to the Soviet bloc in response to such
econirde warfare masures as a threat to cieny it Polish coal?
Beyond this* however* it would net yield to peacetime Soviet
pressures to alter its foreign or military policies* although
Soviet threats might lead the Swedes to teko a more cautious
approach in their relations with the "lest?
2D0 On the other hand* there is little prospect that
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little Compensation through NATO meabership far that they believe would be
a definite increase in international tension, and possible Soviet retaliation
against Finland, should Sweden join the Western alliance, Nest Swedes,
satisfied with the state of their own deformes have not been greatly impressed
to date with NATO military assistance to Norway and Danmark,.
The Swedes, however,
would be very sensitive to any hint of Western pressure in these negotiations,
which might only increase their stubbornness,
21. Although opposition leaders have contended that the diaappearence
of Finland as a buffer for Sweden would neceasitate reconelderation of Sweden O.
paipy, we do not believe that Sweden woad join NATO it the USSR occupied
Finland, A recent public opinion poll indicates that only 26% of the 'maple
would fever a.departure from neutrality in this event, The Swedish govern?
mentos reaction would prcbably not be determined so much by the actual invasion
. of Finland as by its asesent of what the next Soviet step would be, Only
if it were oonvineed that Finland was merely a springboard for a further Soviet
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move into the; Scandinavian area, including Sweden, would it prdbablY make
overtures to the rest for some form of military ties. On the other hand,
if it believed the USSR intended to move no .further than Finland there would
very. likely be no overt change in its policy. It would almost certainly
? expand it own defense preparations, however, and it might enter into
exploratory military talks with the West. The sympathetic 'attitude that
Sweden would certainly take toward Finnish refugees, together with the increased
procdmity of Soviet forces, would create a public opinion increasingly hostile
to the USSR. and therefore more willing to think of -sew form of Western military
cooperation to rectify the altered power balance in the Baltic,
. 22. In event of war. We believe that Sweden would still prefer to remain
neutral as long as possible, particularly if Norway were not :directly attacked,
As. long as Norway were not invaded, the Swedes would hope that the area might
not became an active theater of operations and that Sweden could keep open
some lines of communisation with the -'est. Even if Denmark were invaded, which
seems likely in the.initial stages or any European war, the Swedes probably still
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would not openly 3oin the NATO powers, although theorwould certainly mobilise
and might open exploratory conversations With the Weft,
230 Should. Norway be attacked, however, or should Sieden become convinced .
that an attack on Norway and/or itself was imminent, there is an even chance
that Sweden would abandon its neutral policy, especially if by that time NATO
was militarily strong enough to extend immediate large-scale assistance in case
of attack, A Soviet attack on Norway, even though it bypassed Sweden, would
face the government with the question of fighting then or being surrounded and
almost oompletely isolated from the West. Although government leaders have
been reserved on this 'mint, we believe that they might well regard an attack
on Norway as necessitating the entry of Sweden LAO the var. If, however, the
attack should come before NATO strength had been built up and the government
then believed that quick and adequate Western aid would not be forthcoming Sweden
might well decide to remain neutral regardl-sS of the risks,
240 If Sweden were attacked by the USSR while neutral, it would resist with
all it, resources. Public opinion polls have indicated that 75% of the Swedish
people are determined to resist Soviet attack, while only 7% favor non.resistanee,
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If Sweden mere invaded and occupied, remnanta of the Swedish forces would
flee to Allied territoryvand the.:Wedesiwodld attempt to conduct widespread..
guerrilla warfare) and sabotage operations,
I. THE CONIAUENCES OF =mos POSITION TO THP NATO PCrERS AND THR USSR.
25* Swedish adherence to NATO during peacetime. The inclusion in NATO
of Svpden s large and potentially strong military establishment would increase
-Ttf0 capabilities for the defense of Scandinavia and provide an additional
deterrent to Soviet attack* It would permit advance planning and coordination
with the -NATO Northern Command, facilitate 'Western Military advice and
assistance in building up Swedenes defenses, and give a sharp boost to
Norwegian and Danish morale. Given MDAP aid (which the Swedes could largely pay
for), Swedente defense capabilities, together with those of the NATO Northern
Command, might:be built up over an extended period to a point sufficient to
prevent a. puccessful Soviot assault (see paragraph 34).
26, Mile Swedish adherence to NATO mould increase international:tensions,
it almost certainly would not be considered as a cam belli by the.MSSR0
Waver, it might lead the USf4.R to occupy Finland or at least to secure further
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concessions from the Finns, Moreover, if the USSR launched a Scandinavian
campaign in event of war, Sweden Would certainly be attacked.
275. Covert Swedish ties with the Vest during peacetime.
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Although
by no means as beneficial as direct Swedish adherence to NATO, it would somewhat
increase Scandinavian defense capabilities and might, if kept secret frem the
USSR, avoid Soviet retaliation against Finland, The timing of such advance
planning or commitments would be of great importance, since the farther ahead
the MATO powers could be assured of 6wedenee positionl.the more effective their
advance preparations could beacon.
28, ......ContisiedSwshNeutedilitduieacetime. Continued Swedish
neutrality during peacetime, particularly so long as NATO weakness prevents
Norway and oenmark from being adequately defended, jeopardizes the development
of *Motive Scandinavian defenses, It prevents the full utilization of Swedenms
defense potential byt (a) making difficult if not impossible joint planning
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and 000rdination; (b) deny4.ng Sweden full access to NATO military advice and
assistance; and (e) hampering NATO efforts to induce Sweden to strengthen its
defenses*
29. On the other hand Swedenos continued adherence to a nno.alliancen
policy is not wholly disadvantageous to theTest, Sweden already cooperate.
as effeetively in Eust4leet trade controls as most restern European countries,
and is likely to continue to do so. Soviet policy toward F'nland is probably
somewhat restrained by a desire not to alienate Sweden, although this factor
seems overstressed by the Swedes, Moreover, Swedenge armed fortes and deter.
mination to resist already provide some deterrent to Soviet occupation of
Scandinavia in event of war.
30. Swedish Neutrality in Event of War. The consequences of Smedenee
neutrality during wartime would vary according to the military strength of the
NATO powers and the resultant willingnese of the USSR ti undertake a Scandinavian
.campaign, Should mar come during the period of NATO weaknese and before Norway
in particular could be adequately defended, the USSR would probably WPass
Sweden and laUnch an early invasion through Denmark on Norway. By observing
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Wedenva neutrality, the USSR would (a) avoid the necessity of diverting large
forces to cope with the Swedish forces; (b) avoid damage to the Swedish
industrial establishment as a result of the fighting and of a Swedisq 'scorched
? earth* calpaigng and (o) avoin Abe necessity of occupying Sweden and of coping
with'prohable guerrilla warfare, Moreover, once the USSR had occupied Norway
and Denmark, Sweden would be almost wildly isolated and its considerable exports
to Vestirn Europe would be cut off. The ussas through its control over Swedenvs
essential imports, could then force Sweden to re.orient its trade toward the
Soviet bloc and to contribute to the Soviet war econany.
31. On the otherhand, a neutral Sweden woad be of se value to the
Allies, The USSR would be deprived of the most direct line of communications
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to it. Norwegian bases;
25X6 it wed probably gigs refuge to fleeing Danish and Norwegian
farces) and it would probably become a base for resistance activities in these
countries and in Finland. Once the USSR had indiated Sweden, however, it would
probably Place increasing pressure on the Swedish government to halt these
activities, and Sweden would be compelled to at least partially con0170
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3.20 Dospite its neutrality, Sweden mead probably not actively resist
the overflight of Instern aircraft, although it would officially protest.
Partioularl:, if these overflights were at high altitude, the Swedes might
only go through the motion of interception and AA fire, and the strongly pro-
Western airforce might actually assist lost or disabled Western aircraft.
Sweden would more actively defend its neutrality against Soviet overflights,
although not to the point of creating serious complications with the USSR.
After Sweden had been isolated through Soviet occupation of Norway, however,
the government might feel compelled by Seviet pressure to protest more
strongly az d take more active measures against "Vesta= overflights. Even in
this case, the Swedish air force would be unlikely to carry out in practice
the more stringent measures ordered by the government itself.
33. 'Once NATO strength had grown sufficiently to hold in Western Europe,
and Denmark or at least Norway could be adequately defendelt Swedish neutrality
?
would no longer be so disadvantageous to the lest. The USSR might not be able
to divert the necessary forces for an early Scandinavian campaign, and Sweden,
which could no longer be whollY isolated by the USS'?? would be less vulnerable
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to Soviet economic pressures and could still conduct limited trade with the
lest. Elan under these circumstances the USSR would probably look upon Swedish
neutrality as extremely advantageous, as it would screen the Soviet Baltic
flankoand would prevent the NATO. powers from making offensive use of Swedish
besets0
declared war
34. SWedieh belligerency in event of war. If Sweden/Us a result of a Soviet
Attack on Norway, or if Sweden were itself attacked, the USSR would be compelled
to eaploy substantially larger forces and overall Scandinavian defense
capabilities mould be considerably increased. ''lether or not the NATO powers
would be thus enabled to had substantial areas in Scandinavia 'however, would
depend upon': (a) the strength of the: AUTO and Swedish forces at the time-war
camel (b) the time they had to mobilize; and (c) the outside assistance thioh
NATO could provide. Mile the Swedes would probably-be unable to contribute
materially to the defense of, Denmark, they might be able to make a valuable
contribution to Norwayls defense,.
.35. Luting 1952 at least it seems unlikely that the Sredish and NATO Paves
would be able to conduct a-mmore than a proloniftd delaying action, although
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CONFIDENTIADI
maks difficult adequate an timely NATO assistanoe to the Swodish forces, but
? Swedish delaying action might gain valuable time for NATO reinforcement of
Norway at least? Moreover, thoac Swedish forces which could retreat into
Norway would be able to assist in its defense. Finally, even if Sweden were
overrun, the consequent destruction of Swedish factories, transport lines,
etc., as well as continued guerrilla warfare might seriously reduce Soviet
ability to utilise Swedish facilities and resources after Sweden had been
occupied.
36. On the other hand, if genera war 01 not occur for several years,
Swedish and NATO defense capabilities might be developed to the point *tore
the addition of Swedent's forces-to those of NATO, particularly if they were
given time to mobilize, might enable a successful defense of large areas of
Sweden or at least Norway from Soviet attack. Should the combined NATO-Swedish
ideces 1701 sad Igi? this time to held large areas of Scandinavia, bases would be .
a:Venable for eventual air and perhaps naval and aiphibious operations against
the Soviet Baltic flank, The logistical difficulties .of Supplying NATO forces
in Sweden in the face of probable Soviet local air superiority in the altic
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with the lest. Even if Dennark were invaded, which seams likely
in the initial stages of any European war, the Swedes still
night not openly join the NATO powers, although they certainly
mobilize and might open exploratory conversations with the 7bst0
or
21, Should Norway be attacked, however,/should Sweden become
convinced that an attack on Norway and/Or itself was imminent, Sweden
would more likely than not abandon its neutral policy, especially if
by that time NATO was militarily strong enough to extend immediate
largo-eoale assistance in case of attack, A Soviet attack on
Norway, even though it bypassed Sueden mould face the government with
the question of fighting then or being surrounded and almost completely
isolated frau the Vest, Although government leaders have been reserved on
on this point, we believe there is a better than even chance that they
would regard an attack on Norway as necessitating the entry of Sweden
into the war, If, however, the attack should coma before NATO
strength had been built up and the government then believed that quidk
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a springboard for a further Soviet nmve into the Scandinavian area,
including Sweden, mould it probably make overtures to thereat for
military aid. On the other hand, if it believed the USSR intended
to mows no further than Finland there would very likely be no overt
change in its policy. It mould almost certainly expand its own
defense preparations, howevev, and it might enter into exploratory
military talks with the Vest. The sympathetic attitude that Sweden
mould certainly take toward Finnish refugees together with the
increased prombatty of Soviet forces, would create a public opinion
increasingly hostile to the USSR and therefore MOTO Willing to
think of same form of Western military cooperation to rectify the
altered power balance in the Baltic.
TOO In event of war, We believe that Sweden mould still prefer
to remain neutral as long as possible, particularly if Norway were
not directly attacked, As long as Scandinavia mere not invaded, the
Swedes mould hope that this area might not become a theater of
operations and that Sweden could keep open its lines of communication.
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18. Cn the other hand, there is little prospect that Sweden
would join NATO in peacetime. From the Swedish standpoint there
appears to be little oompensation through NATO membership far
what they believe would be a definite increase in international
tension, and possible Soviet retaliation against Finland, should
Sweden join the l'estern alliance. Most Swedes, satisfied with the
state of their own defenses, have not been greatly impressed to
date with NATO military assistance to Norway and Denmark.
19. Although opposition leaders have contended that the
disappearance of Finland as a buffer for Sweden would necessitate
reconsideration of Swedenes policy, we do not believe that Sweden
would join NATO if the USSR ocoupied Finland. A recent public
opinion poll indicates that only 26% of the people would favor
a departure from neutrality in this event. The Swedish governmentes
reaction would probably not be determined so much by the actual
? invasion of Finland as by its aseessmen, of what the next Soviet
step would be. Only if it were convinced that Finland lais merely
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would doubtless limit NATO use of bases in Sweden itself, but the valuable
Norwegian coastal bases would be protected.and.Soviet egress frau the -Baltic
made more hazardous,
26
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