THE POLITICS OF UNCERTAINTY: SPAIN PREPARES FOR THE POST-FRANCO ERA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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 ~vniiaenitial
Intelligence l~Iemoran~.um
The Politus of Uncertainty:
Spain Prepares for the Port Franco Era
Confidentiai
OPR 303
February 1;75
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CENT?AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
THE POLI ~ ICS OF UNCERTAINTY:
SPAIN PREPARES FOR THE POST-FRANCO ERA
25X1A9A
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CONTENTS
I:EI' JUDGMENTS
Pa~c
1
DISCUSSION ...
I. SPAIN AND THE PORTUGt?ESE MODEL
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II. ECONO\IIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE
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III. SPAIN UNDER FRANCO
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IV. THE CONSTITUTION
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V. THE POLITICAL ELITE
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VI. THE ~VURI:ING CLASSES AND COAI~fUNIST OPPOSITION
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~'II. TIIE ROLL OF THE ~iILITART
VIII. STRESSES AND STRAINS
7
I\. TIIE FUTURE
If Franco lingers on
If the Caudillo dies soon
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Francisco Franco is dying. While doctors within and without
Spain disag, ~. :, to just when the Caudillo will pass from the scene,
all agree th4 t his physical decline has begun, and that there is a general
incapacitat;~~n ahead. At the moment, political figures of the extreme
right have {.ie greatest influence upon Franco, and continue to frustrate
Prime Mi~tister Arias Navarro's attempts to add more flexibility to
the politi~~al system. The current dominance of this extreme right
dampene?_ the hopes of moderate politicians and groups who sup-
ported ~! : ias' proposal to permit independent pot.?tical associations in
Spain. r'.oderates are now biding their time.
Ur.:1ce Portugal before the revolution, Spain has a larger number
of leac? ors and groups with governing experience, and these could
grow i-~to .ledgling political pariies. If these groups are allowed to
move r:?ut of their present quasi-legal stahis, they could assume an
active and important role in guiding Spain toward a more pluralistic
form :.f government. The outcome of the post-Franco succession will
depe ~d, however, on how long the dictator lives and his current in-
timacy with the extreme right wing-to the almost total exclusion
of moderate politicians-continues:
- Prospects are bleaker if Franco lingers on. The extreme right
is likely to come to monopolize the political process, and prove
to be inflexible in the face of growing unrest and demands for
reform. As public order decays, the military might feel impelled
to take over the reins of government to restore social i ^ace.
With the assumption of civilian roles, the officer corps will
become politicized, and significant numbers of 1. ,~ior officers
might turn radical as Spain's major economic and social prob-
lems remain unsolved.
-Prospects are better if Franco dies soon. It would still be pos-
sible for moderate individuals and groups to rally around Prime
Minister Arias Navarro, and support his mildly reformist pro-
gram. Co-operating i~iformally with the military, an Arias
government might accommodate restrained political de-
mands, make some gestures to appease labor and regional
protests, and attain some political stability through a plural
authoritarianism.
Whatever the eventual outcome, the immediate future for Spain
will be characterized by unrest and uncertainty, and politicians' dis-
trust of each other.
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DISCUSSION
I. SPAIN AND THE PORTUGUESE MODEL
Francisco Franco has ruled Spain for nearly forty
years, and the political structure designed to per-
petuate his rule has few real roots in the population.
As Franco's heal!h declines his decisions are re-
flecting amore rigid conservatism, and moderate
groups are coming to think the reforms promised
by Premier ~.rias Navarro are being betrayed. In
the absence of widely based political parties, the
military remains Spain's single most powe,ful or-
ganization. Important groups both in and out of
Spain are beginning to ?.+?onder if the recent Portu-
guese revolution has any implications for Spain. Is
the same scenario likely to unfold in Spain as re-
cently occurred in Portugal?
The forty-year old Portuguese dictatorship re-
cently fell q,~ickly, easily and unexpectedly. Politi-
cal institutions disappeared almost overnight. Con-
ser+?ative elements associated with the old regime
were enable to regroup and organize. Exhilarated
by a sense of release, the once repressed population
kent escalating its political demands, and laborers
engaged in a series of wildcat strikes. The only dis-
ciplined pulitical force to emerge vas the Com-
munist party, ar_d its leaders were able to inflc.encc
a new military government that is slo+vly drifting
leftward.
in retrospect the reasons for the downfall of the
Gaetano regime seem obvious. Gaetano did not
have the personal authority of Salazar; yet he as-
sumed office in 1968 with promises of limited re-
form and a flexible African policy. Over time these
appeared to be empty gestures as th:; Prime I1tin-
ister backed down, and came to rely solely on in-
transigent, right-wing support. ::odcrates felt that
options in the political are,~a were denied them.
Finally in 1974, a group of career military officers,
resenting their long assignments in Africa and the
rapid promotion of reservists, politicized their dis-
content and executed a coup dctat. 1'Vithout the
presence of Salazar or a figure of comparable
stature, the political system toppled completely.
But Spain is not Portugal. Portugal is the least
alanco in December 1973, the
now retired chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-General
:lianuel Dicz-Alegria, and his successor, General
Fernandez Vallespin, formed a crisis managcrnent
group to curb the excesses of military rightists.
They were aided by a younger bencration of officers
~vho had attended the staff school urd:r Dicz-
Alegria's principalship. To the left, a miniscule
group of junior officers was impressed by the
changes wrought by the new military govern-
ment in Portugal immediately after the April coup.
In any event, concern among military leaders about
officers joining any future political associations has
grown enough for the three service ministers (army,
navy, and air force) to warn all officers against
personal involvement in politics. Without Fri nco to
protect the officer corps' interests, its response
during a period of transition still remains an un-
known quantit}? in Spanish politics.'
VIII. STRESSES AND STRAINS
Franco's heirs will have to deal v?ith a new set
of pressures upon the political system. '; he economic
'Arias sensed this, and his first major defense policy
speech contained a promise to upgrade the nay's equip-
ment.
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boom is apparently over. Spain is almost totally de-
pendent upon external energy supplies, and the cost
of importing them has more than tripled to nearly
four billion dollars in 1974. Real GNP growth
has fallen from eight to four percent, and infla-
tion has reached seventeen percent-the worst
since the civi: war. Income from tourism and
emigrant remittances is stagnating at four and one-
half billion dollars, and no longer covers the gap
behveen export earnings and import costs; Spain's
current account deficit in 1974 was three and one-
half billion dollars. The government is trying to
keep unemployment levels low?, but should produc-
tion continue to fall and emigrant laborers be
forced to return from western Europe, unemploy-
ment is likely to climb far above the officially ad-
mitted 1.8 percent. On the bright side, Spain's
foreign reserve position and credit rating remain
good, and if emigrants do not return in large
numbers, problems will be manages-~Ie for the next
hvo or three years.
But should the economic downturn become
severe, a successor regime will have fewer oppor-
tunities to satisfy diverging interests. The new
middle-class, fearful of losing its recently .von
possessions, would become suspicious of any
changes that might seem to reduce its share of the
economic pie. At the same time, the working class
would demand more, and there would be fewer
monetary and job benefits to give them. Industrial
unrest would increase. In such conditions, politi-
cal leaders might have too little time in which to
learn the skills of accommodation, compromise and
party-building needed for a stable transition.
Perhaps, too, the externally motivated incentive
to acquire these political skills may be diminishing.
In tiic past, an important factor contributing to
the support for reform among Spanish politicians
was the desire to gain respe~: bility for their
nation in western Europe, along wi!h admission
into the Common Market and NATO. But the ap-
peal of Europe may be foundering; European
economies have been weakened and made vulner-
able by the energy crisis, and constitutional govern-
ments seem less able to contain the threats of mass
strikes, domestic Communism and separatist tcrror-
isrr: in Spanish eyes. The post-Franco leadership-
especially arightist one-might feel less impelled to
redeem Spain's reputation among the trouble-
plag~ied European democracies.
Most significantly, attitudes towards the future
may become less flexible as a result of the Portu-
guese revolution. The extreme right-with large
demonstrations and new organizations-has al-
ready indicated its unwillingness to accept any
basic political reforms lest a similar revolution
occur in Spain. In contrast, moderate elements
arc insistent that changes be enacted quickly to
prevent such a revolution. Arias was in the latter
camp when he attempted to add more bite to the
associations la~v after the April coup in Portugal.
The right thwarted his effort, as well as his plans
to alter the electoral and syndical systems.
IX. THE FUTURE
For as long as r ranco lives, uncertainty and
stalemate will prevail. The ailing dictator remains
the arbiter of Spanish politics. Right-wing friends
and family arc monopolizing his attention, while
moderates arc biding their time and waiting for
the end. Neither group expects to see Franco
again demonstrate his old flexibility of favoring
one faction and then another to create political
balance.
If Franco lingers on .
The loner Franco lives-whether he formalh?
relinquishes prnver or not-the less easy and
obvious the outcome of the transition is likely to
bc. As it continues to inllucnce Franco's thinking,
the cxtrcmc right will grow more confident about
the future. Some of its members arc even now pre-
paring to take advantage of the nc~v association
law. 1lfoderates arc divided and wavering; men
like Fraga Iribarne are willing to try their hands
at forminr' organizations while others arc hesi!ant
and fear that any connection to the \'ational :~lovc-
ment will hurt their chances of winning support
from the electr,ratc. The cxtrcmc right will gain
an edge in organization-building, and seek to rally
the support of a middle-class afraid of losing its
economic position. Through Franco, the right will
continue to bring pressure upon the Arias govern-
ment, and probably will cause the prime minister
to tighten press laws and to halt any significant
syndical and municipal electoral informs; the:
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prince has no clout with which to counter such
moves, and his reputation, already shaky, is apt
to dimir::sh. Rightist elements are almost c..rtain
to exert even mo-e pressure on the government in
hopes of bringing about Arias' resignation.
If Franco lingers on over the next two or three
years, Spain will become even more polarized: the
political right and petit-bourgeois interests will be
ascendent; moderate politicians will be alienated;
the working classes will be further radicalized, and
the Communists will grow stronger among them.
Under these conditions labor unrest is bound to
escalate, and the right-with or without Franco
by their-may not be able to control it. Either
called in by the government or on their own in-
itiative, the armed forces would then enter politics
to restore order. With the assumption of civilian
functions, groups of officers resenting the burden
of underwriting an isolated and ineffectual dictator-
ship in western Europe, might feel impelled to re-
form Spain fundamentally. Spain could then expe-
rience the abrupt and cataclysmic turn-about of
1974 Portugal.
If the Caudillo dies soon .. .
But if Franco dies within the next twelve to
eighteen months, the chances for a stable transition
are better. Barring the unlikely event of a last-
gasp right-wing c pup attempt-the military would
probably react .;gorously in the face of unconsti-
tutional actions from any quarter-Arias and Juan
Carlos will have the opportunity to solidify their
support among moderate and less intransigent polit-
ical groupings. During the lull provided by a period
of national mourning, bargaining and compromises
that would bring prominent figures into government
could be reached. And acting on his earlier policy
statements, Arias' new cabinet could present a
prc ;ram thai in the guise of a modern "Francoism"
we ald permit more electoral and party representa-
ti ,n in the Cartes, some syndical reform and a
d~?gree of regional autonomy. No politician or fac-
tio: ~ is as yet strong enough to replace Arias or
tota'ly Thwart such a program; the military will n~~t
be inc;iaed to interfere with civil affairs immediately
so long as public order is preserved, and the Com-
munists will try if they can to dilute workers' de-
mands in order to win political re;.pectability. But
the initial stages of the transition in the year or so
after Franco will be characterized by tension, muted
conflict and wary steps towards a new political
balance.
Even should Fra:~co die soon, difficulties will
emerge: will Spanish politicians be able to restrain
their personal ambition and competitiveness for
the sake of greater national good? Will they be
able to forego grandiloquent gestures and high-
flown rhetoric for the stolid work of daily political
compromise and the Witty-gritty of party-building?
Coming out of the shadow of F_anco, the skills of
prominent Spanish politicians are untried. In the
past individual ar:rbition and an instinct for behind-
the-scenes maneuvering sufficed, and at first many
will probably be content with the recognition
brought by cabinet positions. fs associations or
parties are formed, open politicking ~?rill mean
little more than collecting splintere3 votes from
a conservati~~e middle-class; real competition will
continue to be conducted out of public view among
prominent individuals and factions. But the politi-
cal system will be a more open, fluid form of
authoritarianism than under Franco.
The gap between the regime and the working
classes remains to be bridged, and political leaders
will have to see that it is in their own self-interest
to accommodate labor and linked regional demands.
The more thoughtful among them-including Arias
along with Fraga, Garrigues Walker, the younger
Diez-Alegria and a majority of the hierarchy-
have already advocated a kind of trade-unionism
that would allow workers to organize locally and
negotiate contracts at their factories; they are
gambling on proletarian energies becoming ab-
sorbed in legal activities, and so diminishing labor's
~vlnerability to Communist and other radical in-
fluence. It is a risky business, because the workers'
commissions are likely to increase their strikes
during the transition period, and politicians will
have to be persistent in the face of strong opposition
from the right-wing. While the extreme right nc
doubt will try to sway sympathetically inclined
old?time officers, the military will hesitate to inter-
vene in civilian politics so bong as the government
appears moderate in its views, capable, and main-
tains affirm grip over public protest.
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Even should appropriate labor legislation be
passed, the gap between the establishment and
the workers will still exist. However, labor is not
united enough to bring the nation to a total halt
as in France or Italy and thus raise the specter of
another civil waz. And if domestic peace is not
shattered completely, the military vtould continue
in its role as guazantor of the regime. Both officers
and civilians shaze a commitment to the general
outlines of Franco's state. The majority see room
for moderate, legally enacted reforms,8 and all aze
fi_mly anti-Communist-the party will be banned
as it is now. Relations between the military and
government are likely to be closer after Franco:
without the presence of a reassuring, mediating
figure, an informal consulting arrangement can be
e~cpected to grow up, and the prime minister and
prince would take the precaution of approaching
senior officers before making any major, unexpected
policy moves. Unless unforeseen political and eco-
nomic forces were to appear on the scene, Spain
would manage to achieve a loose, flabby sort of
stability.s
In any event, the leaders of post-Franco Spain
will for some time be pre-occupied with internal
political and economic problems; and while they
would welcome admission into NATO and the EC,
they will be prepazed to bargain hazd for concrete
security and commercial benefits. They will watch
events in Portugal with concern, continue to cul-
tivate relations with the Communist and Arab
worlds, and-perhaps as a symbol of Spanish in-
dependence-give voice to a loud but superficial
..nti-Americanism.
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