INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SEMI-ANNUAL STATUS REPORT FOR THE NSC ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000300010030-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: February 24, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Semi-Annual Status Report
for the NSC on the Foreign
Intelligence Program
The attached report, prepared by the IAC representatives,
has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting to be held on
Tuesday, 1 March. (See IAC-D-55/8, Revised Draft, 4 February
1955; IAC-D-55/8. 1, 9 February 1955; IAC-M-184, 15 February
1955; IAC-M-185, 23 February 1955).
Secretary
NSC Review Completed.
DIA review(s)
USAF review(s)
NAVY review(s)
State Dept. review
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMIT TEE
Semi-Annual Status Report
for the NSC on the Foreign Intelligence Program
Paragraph 10a of NSC 162/2* sets forth the primary missions
of the US intelligence system in support of basic national security
requirements. This report presents a statement and evaluation of
capabilities to carry out these objectives as' of 31 December 1954.
Section I of the report is addressed primarily to the first of these
three objectives (warning of aggression) and Section II to the other
two (capabilities and intentions of foreign countries). Section III
deals with problems of collection related to all three objectives.
Superseded by NSC 5501, dated 6 January 1955. The missions
of the US intelligence system are reaffirmed in the same words
(para. 56).
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1. WARNING OF AGGRESSION
"Collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions
that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression
or subversion in any area of the world. " NSC 1 2/2, para. 10a(1)
1. National Intelligence Objectives. Pursuant to NSCID #4 the
IAC on 14 December 1954 approved a new statement of "Priority National
Intelligence Objectives" (DCID 4/4) which was prepared in the light
of NSC 162/2. This basic revision of priority national intelligence
objectives, which will be reviewed semi-annually, provides improved
guidance to research and collection throughout the intelligence
community and focuses attention upon those intelligence areas of
greatest security concern.
2. Watch Committee of the IAC. For the purpose of supporting
the mission of the IAC Watch Committee "to provide earliest possible
warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the
USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States"
there has now been established, under the direction of the committee,
an Indications Center.. This center is staffed by representatives of
the intelligence agencies who, in coordination with their parent
agencies, analyze information from all sources and select and
collate indications of Soviet /Communist hostile action or intentions
affecting US national security for the consideration of the Watch
Committee. This function is in counterdistinction to the warning
For further
support,o a mission oi e w aec , LUC e was issued
on 30 November 1954 NSC Directive 5438 "Transmittal of Information
to the I.AC Watch Committee, " which authorizes and directs appropriate
departments and agencies of the Government to make fully available
to the LAC Watch Committee all information and intelligence
pertinent to its mission and- functions. "
3. Evaluation of US Warning Capabilities.
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Our advance warning largely depends on sifting a large quantity
of material to discover those indications of enemy activity which
suggest that measures are being taken to. implement a decision to
attack. The enemy's choice of the type of attack greatly affects our
advance warning capability. We are largely dependent on radar
and forward observation stations for early warning of air attack, in
the event that our intelligence fails to discover indications of preparations
therefor and if the USSR should risk launching such an attack without
prior mobilization.
Reports of troop movements and logistical activity are usua y
reported too late or are too inconclusive to give adequate early
warning in such an event. We are exploiting all available sources of
information and constantly striving to develop new and improved
means of detection of attack.
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II. ESTIMATING THE CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF
FOREIGN COUNTRIES
in Asia Through 1957," and "Probable Developments in the European
"Accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries,
friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military,
political, economic, and subversive courses of action
affecting US security. " NSC 162/2, para. 10a(2)
"Forecasting potential foreign developments having a bearing
on US national security. " NSC 162/2, para. 10a(3)
1. National Intelligence Objectives. DCID 4/3 and 4/4 set up,
respectively, comprehensive objectives for all countries and areas,
and priority objectives for specific countries and subjects. DCID 4/4
particularly delineates more precisely than has been done heretofore
the specific aspects of capabilities and intentions of certain countries
that deserve priority attention.
2. National Intelligence Estimates. Since the last report, several
major estimates have been produced dealing with Soviet Bloc
capabilities, and probable courses of action. Included in this group
were three basic annual reviews: "Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action Through Mid-1959, " "Communist Courses of Action
Satellites Through Mid-1956. "
or policy decisions.
Continuing evaluation is taking place on means for improving the
quality of National Intelligence Estimates. The entire production of
1953, and more recently, the production of the first six months of 1954
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(IAC-D- 57/2) have been reviewed in order to identify and correct
intelligence deficiencies.
3. Basic Intelligence. The initial world coverage of the
National Intelligence Survey is essentially 45% completed, including
2400 individual sections, mainly on JCS high priority areas. Present
production is slightly below the scheduled rate of approximately
8 equivalent NIS per year. The over-all quality is being improved
by better collection in support of the program.
4. MiliLary Intelligence
a. General. At the present time,' military intelligence is
generally adequate to provide broad measurements of the military,
logistic, industrial, and governmental control strengths of the
USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites. However, significant
detailed information available is fragmentary and becoming
progressively more so. Unless means are developed to overcome
present deficiencies in the collection field, our intelligence may
eventually become inadequate for the support of US military plans,
programs, and operations.
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b. Target Materials Production. Approximately 80% of
the minimal requirements for air target materials, in the Air
Objectives Folder Program (AOFP), in support of joint war plans
were completed by the end of CY 1954. The remaining 20% of the
minimal requirements are scheduled for completion by the end of
CY 1955. Other air target materials, desired by the Services for
development of the optimum, opportunities for air action, were at the
end of CY 1954 approximately 50% satisfied. Production to satisfy
the remainder of these requirements continues to the maximum extent
practicable and consonant with priority emphasis on highest and
earliest readiness in support of joint war plans*
*The Director of Naval Intelligence notes that the rate of
production of air target materials for the highest priority (all-
weather) Navy targets continues to be a matter of concern. The
Target Area Analysis Radar (TAAR) is considered to be the most
significant piece of target material developed and produced for
all-weather, medium to high altitude operations. Between July 1952
and July 1954 the Navy nominated 632 all-weather targets for inclusion
in the Air Objectives Folder Program for production of TAAR's.
As of 1 December 1954 TAAR production had not been started for
52%. TAAR production was in process for 22%0, and TAAR. had
been completed for 26%.
The TAAR is seldom useful for low-level, all-weather mining
but charts can serve adequately where there are steep gradients
along the shore. In other cases the capability for conducting these
operations is greatly reduced. No intelligence solution appears feasible.
Low level high speed aircraft missions require special charts
for navigation and approach which are not now available. However,
such charts are under development.
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5. Political Intelligence
a. The Soviet Bloc and Communist China. Political intelligence
on the Soviet Orbit is built mainly upon the careful screening and
evaluation of overt materials from the Soviet and Chinese Communist
press, radio, and other information media. The flow of current
material, plus the accumulated body of evaluated data and the develop-
ment of a group of experienced analysts, make possible a reasonably
accurate interpretation of political developments in the Soviet/
Communist world.
Recent defections of fairly high level Soviet officials
have served to confirm important aspects of existing intelligence
analyses. Similarly, the observed course of events over the past year
has borne out in most substantial particulars the intelligence estimates
of probable post-Stalin developments in the USSR.
Our capability for assessing specific short-term intentions
of the USSR and Communist China is inherently limited by the closed
character of the Soviet and Communist Chinese decision-making
systems. Although the Soviet/ Communist regimes cannot mask their
general international aims and attitudes,
b. The Free World. As a part of a long term look at the
prospects in the cold war, special emphasis has been placed during
the past six months on the situation in the underdeveloped areas of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America; Communist capabilities in the Free
World; and attitudes and reactions in the Free World and in the
Soviet Bloc to nuclear weapons developments.
The revolution which overthrew a Communist regime in
Guatemala and the disclosure of the Tudeh ring in the Iranian army
have made available to US intelligence a new body of material on
Communist tactics of infiltration and control. Analysis of these
materials is expected to provide an improved understanding of
Communist subversive capabilities in underdeveloped countries.
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6. Economic Intelligence
a. General. Economic intelligence, like political intelligence,
is essentially the product of collation and analysis of data from primarily
overt sources. Economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc has improved
b. Communist China. Economic research effort and the
flow of intelligence materials on Communist China have increased,
resulting in a better appreciation of Chinese Communist productive
capabilities and of Sino-Soviet economic relationships. The output of
certain basic industries, such as electric power, and iron and steel,
is reasonably well-established. Further information and research
are required to determine agricultural and handicraft output, chemical
and munitions output, transportation capabilities, and overall per
capita consumption.
c. Economic Defense. In addition to a continuing review
of major commodity problems for East-West trade controls, in.telligencx:
support for economic defense includes an assessment of possible long
run economic developments within the Soviet Bloc as they relate to
economic defense policies. Intelligence support for enforcement of
economic defense measures has been maintained in spite of diminishing
d. Free World. Economic intelligence production on the
Free World has concentrated on analysis of (a) improved economic
conditions in Western Europe; (b)
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c) the problem of economic development in
underdevelope areas. The results of this effort have been satisfactory.
e. Coordination. The Economic Intelligence Committee
(EIC) has taken a more active part in guiding economic intelligence
production and has continued its surveys to uncover economic
research and collection deficiencies. In September, the EIC coordinated
a draft DCID 15/ 1, later approved by the IAC, which delineates IA.C
agency responsibilities for production and coordination of foreign
economic intelligence related to national security.
7. Scientific and Technical Intelligence
a. General. Through intensified collection and research
our understanding of Soviet basic scientific capabilities, including
the quality and quantity of their scientific manpower, has improved.
In specific fields of science and technology, however, vast gaps in
our knowledge still exist. Substantial improvement will require
successful application of new collection techniques and improved
analytical processes now under development.
c. Guided Missiles. Preparation of the first national
intelligence estimate on guided missiles revealed critical gaps
in our knowledge.
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8. Intelligence Support for Foreign Information and Psychological
Warfare Programs
The survey of USIA's intelligence needs and assets
reported in IAC-D-55/7 was approved by the DCI, USIA, and the
Department of State, and pertinent recommendations, by the IAC.
The survey report defined the types of intelligence and intelligence
information required to meet USIA's essential needs which are in the
main also the needs of other agencies with related programs. Arrange-
ments have now been made to insure that USIA, to the maximum
extent possible, will receive the pertinent products of the existing
intelligence organizations. To strengthen existing facilities
increased funds have been allocated for the expansion and acceleration
of production of relevant parts of the NIS program. To meet the
specialized needs of USIA, utilizing the intelligence produced by
other agencies as required, an intelligence unit has been extablished
within USIA accompanied by the abolition of certain USIA offices.
It is'expected in the near future that certain intelligence assets of
USIA will be made available to the intelligence community.
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III. COLLECTION
1. The Foreign Service. Reporting from and collection by the
Foreign Service, a primary overt source of intelligence information,
continues for the most part to meet expectations.
a. Reporting from behind the Iron Curtain. Reporting
remains inadequate in the political and sociological fields, principally
because of restrictions on movement and the size of missions.
Generally speaking, reporting from and on the USSR from
Some improvement in reporting has been hoped for because of the
greater cordiality of Soviet Bloc officials in their contacts with
Western representatives, but little is yet evident. On the other hand,
a diminution in the flow of overtly collected materials is expected
as a result of probable retaliatory action by the governments of the
USSR and Satellites to recent and pending US travel and access
restrictions on Soviet diplomatic personnel.
b. Reporting outside the Bloc. The principal handicap to
improved Foreign Service reporting is reduced staff. However,
strengthened interagency coordination of collection and requirements
has contributed to improved reporting, especially in the economic
field.
c. Publications Procurement. The continued absence of
satisfactory publications procurement ? nd the Middle
East is having a cumulative effect and for some areas is beginning
to impair analysis in depth.
d. Map Procurement. Collection of maps from the Soviet
Bloc has been limited, by continued security restrictions, to atlases
and small scale maps. There has been a marked decrease in the
procurement of maps and map intelligence from Latin America and
from Northwest Europe, because of lack of specialized collectors
in these areas.
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2. Agricultural Reporting. Under recent legislation, agricultural
attaches will report directly to the Department of Agriculture. However,
by subsequent agreement between the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of State, the latter will continue to be responsible
for agricultural reporting from the Soviet Bloc.
3. Military Attache System. The attache system continues to
be a major source of military intelligence. It provides good coverage
outside the Soviet Bloc, but the capabilities of attaches in countries
within the Bloc continue to be drastically restricted by counter-
intelligence measures. In view, of these basic restrictions, active
consideration is being given to training of military attaches in special
observation techniques, Also, 25X1
an improved program of cc ec .ion guidance has been initiated to
relate attache activities more directly to urgent requirements.
However, these measures will still leave overt collection capabilities
far short of being able to meet military intelligence requirements in
Soviet Bloc areas. Substantial improvement in military intelligence
collection under present personnel, equipment and operating expense
limitations will depend upon improved coordination, guidance, and the
development of new collection techniques.
4. Overseas Commands. Overseas commands continue to be
important sources of information on Communist armed forces and
war potential within the limitations noted in Section II, 4, and
Section IV.
5. Aerial Reconnaissance. The trend toward exploiting aerial
reconnaissance opportunities continues together with improving
capabilities. Reconnaissance operations continue to be performed
within the framework of policy considerations of other than an
intelligence nature. Research and development are producing
promising results in equipment and techniques. Establishment
of an Army Photo Interpretation Center has been approved.
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12. Foreign Language Publications. Further progress has been
made in the coordination of foreign publications procurement,
particularly from Communist China, and a greater and speedier
flow of publications from that area is expected in 1955.
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