AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF STUDIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A000300270018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 1, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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AN HISTORICAL RE V IE`Y_ O_F
STUDIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE CO1U\AUNITY
FOR THE
COMMI TION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
POLICY
December 1974
MORKIDIF ages.,1 -61?
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This report is a review of a number of major studies of the
intelligence community. made since the Joist Study Group Report of
1960. This report was selected as the sta.rtin` point, because it had
a major impact on the evolution of the in ellicence comilT..-unity. One
of its more significant results was the c_-eation of the decline in the
power and independence of the indi-vidual Service intelligence agencies.
Moreover, institutions, relationships and distributions of responsibility
of the pre-1960 period bear little resemblance to those that have evolved
since that time.
The intelligence community is almost continuously under
review or examination. Hardly a year has passed since 1960 without
a major study of some aspect of intelligence activities being undertaken.
Sixteen such reports have been selected for this review as being sub-
stantively significant, or particularly effective in bringing about
improvement or advancing organizational evolution. The observations
and recommendations of these sixteen reports have been assembled
around .a number of recurring topics and concerns. In this regard,
one cautionary note seems appropriate: The cumulative impact of this
review is necessarily more negative than the intelligence cornsnunity's
record of. achievement would warrnt, because the source materials
used naturally tend to address what is wrong rather than what is right
with. intelligence activities.
The individual reports themselves have been condensed, but
with all major points and recommendations preserved, and these are
attached as annexes to this study.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A. The Direction of the Intelligence Community A-1
The Basic Authority A-1
The Director of Central intelligence as Community
Leader ._A-3
The Separation of the DCI from CIA A-5
The DCI's Community Staff A-7
The Role of the United States Intelligence Board A-9-
The Role of the Executive Committee A-10
Summary
B. Selected Intra-Community Relationships B-I
A Single Defense Intelligence Authority B-1
A Single Defense Intelligence Agency B-3
The Authority of NSA versus the Military B-4
The State Department, the Foreign Service Intelligence
-- B-6
A Single Photo Interpretation Center B-7
C. Resource Planning and Management C-1
The Authority of the DCI over Resources C-1
A Community Resource Management Body C-2
A Single,Defense Resource 'anager C-4
Long-Range Planning C-6
Cross-Program Reviews C-7
Control of R & D C-9
Tactical Intelligence Resources C-10
D. Req,tire:aents
E. Collection E-1
Evaluating Collection E-1
Relations with Foreign Services E-2
Expansion of Overt Collection E--3
F. Production
The Information Explosion
Improving the Product
Basic Substantive Research
F-i
-3
F-5.
Strategic Warning and the National In-di cations .Cen-ter
Compartmentation and its -Effects
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G.- Consume-,: Feedback
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C-1
H. The Clandestine Services and Covert Action H-1
Coordination and Direction H-1
Military Clandestine Operations H-3
Cover 11-4
Counterintelligence. H--4-
Glossary of Abbreviations
Annexes - Summaries of Original Source Materials
A.
The.
Joint Study Group Report - December 1960
B.
The
Sprague Report - December 1960
C.
The
Kirkpatrick-Schuyler-Coyne Report - April 1962
D.
The
Cuban Missile Crisis Post Morten - December 1962
E.
The
CIA Long Range. Plan - August 1965 -
F.
The
Cunningham Report - December 1966
G.
The
Shute Report - February 1967
ti.
The
Katzenbach Report - March 1967
1.
The
HACIT Report March 1968
J.
The Eaton Report - August 1968
K.
The
Lindsay Report - December 1968
L.
The
Bross Report - January 1969
M.
The
Froehlke Report - July 1969
N.
The
Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel Report - July 1970
0.
The
Schlesinger Report - March 1971
P.
The
President's'Directive - November 1971
Q.
The
Ford Letter - October 1974
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The basic authority for the intelligence community is the
National Security Act of 1947, which has itself been elaborated upon
seven times since by National Security Council intelligence Directives
(NSCID's). The most con prLnensive is NSCID-1, which delineates the
Director of Central Intelligc__ce's Basic D ,,ties and Responsibilities.
i 1' revised in tTr
The hates' version or ~:SCL7-1, ~~hic.Tn _ was accorda ._ce with
the Presidentts Directive of 1\-,o-,,-,em ber 1971, lays the groundwork for
the DCI to assume a greater role as leader of the intelligence com-
munity, a development reccrnimended by all major classified reviews
of the corn- .unity organization since 1960. These reports are virtually
unanimous in stating that the DCI should not be physically separated
from CIA in performing his community duties. An intelligence com-
munity staff drawn from all the intelligence agencies has been consistently
recommended over the years, but little was done along this line until
it was unequivocally directed by the President in 1971.
The United States Intelligence Board's functions and member-
ship have been commented on frequently and usually not too favorably
in terms of enchan_ced-management of the community. USIB's expertise
in substantive matters is effectively recognized in the President's 1971
Directive, which establishes the Board as one of two advisory bodies
to the DCI, with the Intelligence Resources Advisory Corr ni.ttee (IR_4C)
being created to assume the responsibility for resource management.
he concentration under the Secretary of Defense of about
80 per cent of all intelligence resources made the establishment of the
DCI's role in resource management for the community rather problematical.
Despite the President's Directive charging the DCI with preparing a
consolidated intelligence program budget for all intelligence activities,
including tactical, he is not yet fully in control of the situation. A
community resource management body was recommended in several
reports, particularly as resources became more limited and hard
choices as to program direction had to'be made. A number of proposals
were made over the years and the establishment of IRAC was intended
to give the DCI the ability to carry out his community management
respon_si ilities.
A single Defense intelligence authority has been sought since
the Joint Study Group Report of 1960. Successive reports have variously
proposed this role for the JCS, DIA and in the late 1960's fora new
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official with a close relationship with the Secretary of Defense--first
as a Special Assistant, then as a part-tine task for the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Ad_ninistration, and finally for the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. A single Defense intelligence
agency has also been repeatedly proposed, first as a function of the
JCS, then as DIA, and then (after DIA ssemed unable to assume all
intelligence tasks and the Service intelligence agencies regained many
of their prerogatives) as a new and powerful Director of Defense
Intelligence or other new institutional creations. The President=s
Directive of 1971, however, retained DLz as the prime Defense
intelligence agency.
Fragmented Defense resource mai agement.received frequent
mention and several suggestions aimed at curing the situationwere made.
Nevertheless, centralized reviews of Defense resource allocations
did not begin until 1970, and only began to be done effectively when the
office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was created
in 1972.
Long-range resource planning was advocated repeatedly in
many reports. It is still in the earliest stages of development and
was not singled out as a specific task for the DCI by the President's
Directive of.1971. Cross-program review of resources, also frequently
referred to, has fared somewhat better, but it also is at an early
stage of implementation as far as cost/effectiveness techniques for
cross-program evaluation are concerned. At present, the review-
.process centers on specific resource issues; true comparative
evaluation across several programs is yet to be achieved.
Central management and control of tactical intelligence
resources has been hampered by continuing disagreements over criteria
for determining what is tactical intelligence, what is national intelli-
gence and what is force support intelligence, and thus properly organic
to the commands. Tactical intelligence resources have been estimated
at about one-third of.the budget of national intelligence resources.
The President's Directive clearly charges the DCI with responsibility
to include these resources in his consolidated intelligence budget,
but the means to do so are yet to be worked out.
The contest between the National Security Agency (NSA) on
-one hand and the JCS bolstered by tactical forces on the other for con-
trol of certain Sigint resources, primarily in the electronic intelligence
field, attracted attention of several review groups, particularly during
the Vietnam War. Most of the reports recorru-Wended that NSA retain.-
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control over such Sigint resources and that it such resources t/ere
t: e
needed by tactical corn man'ders, they be budgeted for as part of
tactical force budget, but nevertheless not lie denied to national
intelligence users.
intelligence activities of the Department of State have
.figured relatively little in t??e reports reviewed. Concern over the
need for a national photo-intelligence center, found in reports in the
early lo, 631 s, has disaa .eared ;;,ith the establishment of 1`P_C. 1'Y orrv
then t .reed to tiPIC's ability to handle the workload as imagery
satellites became more effective and the "stake" increasingly abundant.
The disarray of community intelligence requirements is
mentioned a number of times, notably in the Cunningham Report of
1966. In the absence of consumer guidance as to the most important
matters, analysts tend to corer all bets by issuing requirements.
for-much =---ore information than was likely to be needed, or in fact
could ever be used. The President's Directive gave the DCI, as
one of his four major responsibilities, that of reconciling require-
ments and priorities within-budgetary contraints and charged the
USIB to advise him in this regard.
Relatively little space in this report is devoted to collection
questions- Reviews and inquiries into various collection systems
have been numerous, but are generally too specialized and narrow
in scope to qualify for consideration by the Commission. The
important matter of evaluating the effectiveness of collection as a
whole is noted, but the difficulty of tying good information to the
sources that produced it has apparently made any systematic approach
to this process uncertain and imperfect.
Many reports, particularly in the mid-1960's, referred to
the information explosion as a major problem. Technical collection
advances were creating floods of information with no proportional
increase in the analytical capacity to exploit it. The Schlesinger
Report is 1971 pointed to the great increase in information collected
by technical means, but noted that there had been little progress in
developing human sources with.access to foreign intentions, doctrines
or politica processes. Improvement of the analytical functions and
the overall relevancy of the intelligence product was likewise of
considerable concern, and many reports addressed it. The President's
Directive described the need for product improvement as urgent and
established the NSC intelligence Community (NSCIC) as a consumer..
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forum to give direction and guirls.r:ce on production and to evaluate
:he usefulness of intelligence report.;. Both this directive and
President Fol'd's letter of October 197-t placed specific responsibility
on the DC! to assure that national intelligence is of the highest quality
to support foreign policy and Tli'_i'_tary Operations.
red attention in the Few topics received as .. a:,?_he reports as the
:?eed for consumer guidance' to inc. ease the pertinence and effective-
ness of community activities. Several reports pointed to the fact
that, in the absence of this guidance, the community was talking to
itself, producing against its own requirements and operating with
scant reference to what policy makers really needed. Bot'_a the
Schlesinger Report and the President's Directive called for better
consumer representation in comm-,jnity deliberations, and the NSCIC
was set up to bring this about.
As to the Clandestine Services and covert action, the general
finding of the reports that dealt with these subjects was that existing
control and supervision over covert operations was adequate and that
the imposition of further outside review authorities only carried. the
additional risk of disclosure without adding any important safeguards.
The reports were also strongly opposed to separating the Clandestine
Services from CIA or to spliting off the covert action function.
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A. Te Drect_en of t'ie Int~__igenc?,. Con-1-unity-
-_;
The organic law of the intelligence community is coiZ-
tained in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
Section 101 established the National Security Council to advise
the President with res?ect to the integration of domestic,
foreign and militarti 3olicies roia:.i.nn, to the national security.
Section 102 established the Central Intelligence Agency
under the `y Council (NSC) to be headed by y the
-National ` ~ion a1 Sac-:r _i:.
Director of Central Intel igen_ce (DCI), with a Deputy Director
of Central intelligence to act for the DCI in his absence or
dis ability.
Section 102 furt _er stipulates that it shall be the duty.of
the Agency (the Central Intelligence Agency), for the purpose
of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several depart-
ments and agencies and under the direction of the `:SC, to:
--advise the NSC concerning such intelligence
activities as relate to national security;
--make recommendations to the NSC for the
coordination of such intelligence activities;
--correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to
"the national security and provide for the
dissemination within the government, provided
that the departments and other agencies shall
continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and
disseminate departmental intelligence, and
provided that the DCI shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure;
--perform for existing intelligence agencies such
additional services of common concern as the
NSC determines can be more efficientl accom-
plished centrally.
To the extent recommended by the NSC and approved by
the President, intelligence of the departments and agencies
shall be open to inspection by the DCI and shall be made avail-
able to the DCI for correlation, evaluation and dissemination.
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The _ ~cogn_ ion Section lUZ(d)(3) of the Act of depart-
mental intelli once as continuing to be provided by the several
existing departments an' agencies has had lasting imoact on the
role of the DCI in coordinating the intelligence activities of the
government. At the very least, the acknowledged responsibility
for departmental intelligence has permitted the various intelli-
gence services and agencies to continue to operate collection,
processing and production systems for their own needs, leading
to duplication, contrasting views on situations, and a continuing
.resistance to any central authority.
The provision that the DCI may inspect intelligence of
the departments and agencies, though limited by implication
to substantive matters, has tended over the years to be e_, ended
beyond substance to management and lately to resource matters,
and in effect constitutes the basis for the DCI's survey power.
The National Security Council, in order to regulate and
direct the intelligence activities of the government, has issued
National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's)
establishing basic policy for certain classes of intelligence
activities. The number of NSCID's and their provisions have
changed from time to time, but the present list of them is as
follows:
NSCID -1 Basic Duties and Responsibilities
NSCID-2 Coordination of Overt Collection Activities
NSCID-3. Coordination of Intelligence Production
NSCID-4 The Defector Program
NSCID-5 U. S. Espionage and Counter Intelligence
Activities Abroad
NSCID -6 Signals Intelligence
NSCID-7 Critical Intelligence Corn.u- ications
NSCID-8 Photographic Interpretation
The NSCID's are further particularized and interpreted in
a series of Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's),
related by number to the NSCID's from which they derive, which
form the basic documentary means of coordinating the intelligence
community, covering as they do in aggregate the greater part of
1.7 the community's varied activities. Most of the current NSCID's
and.DCID`s were last revised in 1972, so they are relevant to
present-day organizations and functions. Efforts are under way
to develop a single omnibus NSCID to incorporate the provisions
of existing directives.
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The most far-reacc,i_n o` the NSCID's is NSCiD-1, Basic
D; ties aril Respons.i),:i+t?es. The c_-. rent version, dated Feb-
ru__ y 17, 1972, directs t11 DC= .o coordinate the foreign. intelli-
ger1 ce activities of the Ljn _e:i ~.ates; esF ter, lisixes the National
Securi*_y Council Intelligence Committee to gi-re direction to
national substantive intelligence and provide consumer evalua-
tion of the products; an d directs _he.DCI to plan, reviean_d
evaluate all intelligence activities and the allocation of all
intelligence resources, to prod ace national intelligence, to
chair advisory boards and co= it-tees, and to establish and
reconcile requirements and prio_=ties within. budgetary con-
straints. The DCI is also coarged to prepare and submit a
consolidated intelligence program/budget, to issue DCID's as
appropriate, to formulate policy on arrangements with foreign
governments on intelligence matters, to review security stan-
dards and practices, and to make such surveys of departmental
intelligence activities as he may deem necessary to his responsi-
bilities to the NSC. The directive goes on to establish the
Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IP,A.C) to advise
the DCI on the intelligence budget and the allocation of resources;
to restructure the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and define
more explicitly than before its responsibilities to the DCI; to
define national, departmental and interdepartmental intelligence;
to stipulate roles in the protection of intelligence sources and
methods; and, for the first time, to define the corn_-nunity respon-
sibilities of the DCI.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence as Community Leader
As a result of the President's Directive of November 1971
and under the revised NSCID-l of February 1972, the DCI is
charged to seek the attainment of the following objectives as
essential to the efficient and effective functioning of the intelli-
community:
--continuing review of the responsiveness of the
U. S. intelligence effort to national requirements;
--assurance of authoritative and responsible leader-
ship of the community;
--achievement of more efficient use of intelligence
resources; .
--review and revision of intelligence functions and..
elimination of inefficient or outmoded activities;
--improvement in the quality, scope and timeliness
of the community product;
--enhancement of T.; . S. policy through the provision.
and use of national intelligence
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:SLID-l as e_... `' is a m-:t jot- e - a n sior_ and
definition of ~ `h.- , ,
_ role -':,2 LC_ =:~ s co:?~lrnur_~y-t__ Iea~ser_ A nt':rricr
of reviet:?s of t.e '.: n
S: ecr C v rri _ r? _ t
'_1 ?1i. v 1 L1S'v e cl
ddres. 4e!' tl~?
leacle-shi-) role of the DC 1 over the ; ears.
The Joint Study Croup Re ort of 1960 observed t' hat there
was no comet on understanding o;: how to achieve coordination,
that the _role the DC-_ and of CIA In coordination lacked clari v
and that theme was considerable confusion as to how the DCI was
to operate. The report noted that coordination could be construed
as either co n^. and or ersuasion and that it could be carried our
through leadC i 1 : e elli ,.
c . ship `?J 1--. yt~.,._..,. programs, identification
of new problem areas, in.-estigation of problems under the
right to survey intelligence activities, and the solution of prob-
lems by agreed cooperation under the leadership of the coordinator.
Even in 1960 the Joint Study Group was urging a stronger ma:i-
agement role on the DCI and recommended that he act to achieve
more effective community coordination through ''co.-nand
channels. 1' This recommendation was approved by the NSC.
In 1968 the Eaton Report urged the DCI to r_~ae authorita-
tive and consistent determinations as to t Erne validity of re qui r e-
meats in relation to the costs of meeti._-~g them and the effective-
ness of resources in satisfying intelligence needs. The broad
guidance needed from the DCi could be in the form of a proposed
National Intelligence Plan setting forth objectives, targets and
priorities for the Secretary of Defense, the Community and
program managers so that resources would be available to
respond to present and foreseeable requirements. - -
In 1969 the.Bross Report, addressing the community role
of the DCI, observed that both President Kennedy (January 16,
1962) and President Johnson (September 24, 1966) had characterized
the DCI as the "or-in_cipal intelligence officer of the government"
and had directed the DCI to act as the leader of the intelligence
conununity as his primary task.
The Schlesinger Report in March 1971 proposed three
options for the creation of a leader of the core-?nunity who would
control intelligence resources, manage most resources, and
coordinate resources appropriated e.lsevwhere. The first option
was a Director of National L?lt?_1.ligence who would control all
major intelligence resources, leaving the Defense Department
only the tactical. The second option was a Director of Central
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Ir_`elli=_ence ...io