BACKGROUND ON THE EXECUTION OF ABAKUMOV AND THE LENINGRAD CASE OF 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A005700820004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 14, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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.... CENmt-1-14 WGEP16fI?= ~.
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR
SUIJECT Background.ou the Execution of
Abakv ov and the Leningrad Case of
1949
This is UNEVALUATED
Information
This mmurm coae.m. Mawr""= a=aotthg thi Na-
Hari Di at of as i#INd 11M within the aeon-
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DATE DISTR. , ' 14 January 1955
NO. OF PAOE$ 4
NO. 25X1
TN[ IOU CR EVALUATIONS IN TINE 1,0. AN OI N ITINI.
TIK APPRAISAL OF x011/0 R TMATWI.
(FOR MV - RIND
Abakunov can in no way be held reeponalible for the fabrication or the sow
called "Leningrad case" of 1949, ie., the removal of Petr 8er$. Vick Popkov, 25X1
First Secretary of the LNaingrad Oblast party Com,Littee, and A3abey
Alek$androrrich :B etsow
, Secretary of the Central Committee of the VIP (b )p
or for direct participation in.the Beriya conspiracy.
V.S. Abakumor and. other former security-officers,
Contrary to recent Soviet press releases on the liquidation of Col 1 Oenwral
to make policy.or create intro-Sovernmsntal political situations.
especially after World War II and the eclipse of Army General V.X. Ksrhulav_
the )CB did not have the autonomy or the Jurisdiction
a real fear of the Party, and would never eoWoct an obvious-uPp such as 25X1
the PoOkov-rusaetaoy affair. The 'lattear two were important Party officials,
and any slip in making the sharps against than stick would rey*fterate with
too much force to m-h the risk worthwhile. Ahakunov had insuffteient courage
to attempt to buck the system of Party rule. In addition, thR Central Co^baittee
has a special section which grants final approval to all recalMslded appointments
of-directorate or section chiefs throe t all government m{nixtries. Thus,
Abakumor, being amare of this situitia could never have accumulated the
proper evidence, even if properly falaifLed, to convince the Central. Committee
of the alleged misdmeanors of Pokpv and ] metsov. 25X1
SECRET
(NOTE, we" W" l *4k bdIs ui M "r" f1uN ~ a by "*,Vi
n
25X1
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3. The Party organization of Leningrad, which is known as the cradle of the
October Revolution in the USER, has always hold a special place asmioamg other
Party organizatiom. - of the leaders of the Leningrad Party Organization
was S.M. Kirov, who had the quality of independence and the ability to protect
the interests of his organization. His was not afraid to argue with-Stalin
himself, who was at that time striving to gather the control of the government
in his hands and at the sane tree destroying his political oppaneYts. Thus,
Kirov's behaviour and position was naturally in opposition to Stalitfs personal
plans . Stalin saw in Kirov a dangerous rival, one who bad popularity and who
exerted influence on the Party. Thus, on 1 December 1934, Kirov was Hued
by one Nikolayev, wbo was, as the official press stated, one of the `Shabers of
an active anti-Soviet gist organization. By liquidating Kirov, and by
following up on other rivals such as Ka nsv, Rykov, Zinovyev, Bu)thezin, and
others, who, in addition to other charges of emeriminal acts. against the Party,
were also charged with the terroristic act laid to Kirov, Stalin very success-
fully liquidated the potential threat against his own dietatork1 powlttbn is the
Party and the 0averns.nt as a whole.
4. In 1934 A.Zhdanow, an unimnown member of the CC at that time, was sent rto Leningrad
as a replacement for Kirov. Such a selection is explained as follovi Stalin
needed an absolutly loyal man who would depend completely on Stalin, and who
would, without question, carry out all of Stalin's policies. It is uvder-
standable that Stalin did not risk appointing to this post a mare distinctive
and experienced Party member from amaamg the Politburo members for fear of a
recourrence of the Kirov affair.
5. Zhdanov, on whemr Stalin immediately showered Party rights and privileges, in a
"twinkling of an eye" became an old revolutionist. To the surprise of all who
knew him, lsdanov's )mono suddenly appeared .0m. the pages of the Shut Q of
the Riot o -of the VI (b 1 as one of the revolut iowry ectivititi inthe .
onanav cd it us erred the trust and hopes of Stalin, who nevertheless
necessary to transfer ?.hdanov to Moscow to the post of Secretary
of the Central Camittee, responsible for the theoretical problems of the Party.
6. In 1944, Kuznetsov replaced Zhdanov as Party boss in Leningrad. In 1948,
Kuznetsov was transferred on Stalin's orders to the CC as one of its secretaries,
and Popkov became head of the Leningrad Party organization on the reccumendation
of Kuznetsov. As Secretary of the CC, Kuznetsov had direct influence on the
external political matters of the Communist Party. Everything which was
received from the foreign r.zidentur of Soviet intelligence organizations
was sent in one copy to Ziasne soy's secretariat, as well as to Stalin, Molotov,
Beriya, and *.lenkov.
In 1949, as a result of the elections which took place in the Leningrad party
organization, Popkov was re-elected as Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party
Committee. After the secret balloting, the election results were read by the
Election Commission (Schetnaya Eammissiys), which stated that without exception
all members of the Party conference had voted .fen' Popkov. A few days later,
letters began to arrive at the Central Committee, directed specifically to
Stalin, from many members of the Party conference, who, it seemed, had voted
against Popkov and were very surprised at the peculiar results of the balloting.
A special caemmissioc,, appointed by the Central Cammittee, was sent to Leningrad
to investigate the situation. The commission found that the results of the
election had been shuffled with Popkov's knowledge, and that there were all
kinds of discrepancies in the work of the Oblast Party Committee. Following
this, Popkov and same of his responsible assistants who had close relations
with him vanished without leaving a trace. Eftnetsov also disappeared at
this time. The whole operation of removing the so-called "Leningrad group" was
carried out in complete secrecy and was known only to a select number or Party
functionaries. By a special decision of the Central Committee,, the file on the
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"Leningrad group" contains , in addition to the charge of criminal shuffling of
ballots, the major charge that the Popkov-MWznetsov group had attempted to
set up the Leni ad Party r ani ation in opposition to the Central Ctamaittee
of the IM (b). it. is doubtful' that the shuffling of the 25X1
election results actually take p3Ameo and that the charge against Popkov
of anti-Party activity are utterly fantastic..
8. By accusing the Leningrad Part group of political anti-Party sins; Stalin
evidently pursued two aims: a) to remind his hidden Party enemies-std potential
rivals, which he saw in each one of his subordinates., what fate awaited them
should they attempt to undertake any steps to undermine the dictstaarial position
of Stalin; and b) by this repressive measures he sought to re-establish himself
in the eyes of the Party for the error of appointing Popkov to such a responsible
position, and to mobilize other Party.organizations to seek out all types of violators
of Party discipline and.other traitors within the Party. It was characteristic
of Stalin to use such tactics, from time to time, in order to instil fear in
his major and minor Party leathers in order to insure unquestionable obedience
of his will.
9.
Thus, Stalin ruthlessly punished the guilty, regardless of their position or rank
in the Party. Other examples of such victims during this period are: G.M. Popov,
Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committosy and Lt. Gen. I.V. Xovalev, Minister of
Communications (sic; Transportation), who like Popov was charged with moral
degeneration, is., used Party funds to build dachy for his mistresses, and finally
went as far as ordering a spur-line for his villa on the Black Sea. For the
same type of sins, Stalin's personal favorite, Rear Admiral I.D. Papsnin, Chairman
of the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route, was removed from his post.
Papanin soon acquired a taste for the pleasures of social life and built a home,
also not with his own money, which,in size, surpassed the estates of great pre-
Revolutionary landowners. He had for his own use about ten automoblies, including
an amphibious vehicle which had been received from the US under Lend-Lease and
which he used for duck hunting. To top it all, he ordered the peasants from the
nearby collectives to construct a pond for his white swans, for which his wife
had a weakness.
10. N.A. Voznesenskiy, Chairman of the Gosplan, his brother, who held a post in the Ministry
of [Highe.JFducation, and some of their associ
s were arrested at the time of
the Leningrad affair.
L though Voznesenakiy actually 25X1
had no connection with tue Leningrad case, may have been accused of car,
with the Leningrad group to justify the barbaric repressive stieas s taken
against hid and his associates. jl& 25X1
was arrested because he made major errors economic planning and disagreeded
with Stalin's opinions on some of the economic and political problas of the
Soviet Government. Voznesenskiy may soon appear on 25X1
the horizon, aey another victim of Beriya and Abakumov rescued by Mfel+enkov.
11. Early during World War II, Abakumov became chief of the Counterintelligence
Directorate '(Ss+ersh) and was in constant contact with Stalin. During this period,
his a enturs disclosed a network of speculative operations in the Mttatstry of Aviation
Industry, which included the Minister himself, Col.Gen. A.I. Sbakku riII, who was
later dismissed and arrested. This disclosure reflected directly on 'toe position
of Malenkov,who was responsible for this ministry during the war as 'member of
the State Committee of Defense. In addition, this also undermined the authority
of one of Beriya's closest friends.. Army General V.N. Merkulov, Mftister of
Defense, who was removed from his position an orders of the Central Committee.
In 1946, on the basis of Smersh docueentsy.many leading generals in the Soviet
Army and Air Force, including Marshal A.A. M[ovikov, were arrested, decommissioned,
and sent to concentration camps for detention for various lengths of time,, which
were specified by a direct order from Stalin. Thus, Stalin, pursuing his goal
of keeping Beriya under control, appointed ADakvmtov Minister of the )CB in 1946,
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cad felt that since Abahao noa was directly responslble for this atririsaal of
lterlmlov 10 Paid cart have the asportyaity to ma1ataia class rem with
Beriys.
vas arr.stod in 1952, chiefly
ror moral Ii s - ca, mixtWiss is Lis work, and for using his VMttion for
his persaasl 1atorost6. Abslawsov's cooefiseiatsd personal propaty, Mhieh was
looted for t1w most pwt in Out a7 . amsegls4 to between foss and five million
rubles. ptrooiehasako also eauf1rued coo (3,95)) rmsars. in the 'Vi'a
1~G~ ~s that Bsrlys, with vbom AbsAaaow had very eloee relatiow during
the rears before his arrest, lilt ? direst band in looting.
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