NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010016-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 9, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 9, 1975
CONTENTS
LEBANON: Army commandos in Beirut . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SPAIN: Government plays
into hands of Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PANAMA: Ambassador Bunker's
speech praised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ICELAND: NATO to hear
Icelandic complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FRANCE: Support withdrawn for ACF plane . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FRANCE: Government moves
against military unionizers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
GUATEMALA-BELIZE: Guerrilla
operations planned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CHILE: Relations with US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
GREECE: Fortification of Aegean islands . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
LAOS - NORTH VIETNAM: Airlift
into Vientiane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
NORTH YEMEN - USSR - SAUDI ARABIA:
Implications of arms deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
BANGLADESH-INDIA: Lessening of tensions . . . . . . . . . . 18
POLAND: Party congress opens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Army commandos moved into Beirut's commercial district last night to protect
government buildings and financial institutions, after heavy fighting between
Christian and Muslim militiamen spread from suburban troublespots to central
Beirut and the city's hotel district.
Army spokesmen sought to limit Muslim and Palestinian reaction by claiming
that the 100-man army force is intended to create a "security belt" in the city, not
to enter into the fighting. The leftists have already charged that the government
move is directed at them, because the heavily armed unit was dispatched after leftist
and Muslim forces had attacked positions occupied by militia of the Christian
Phalanges Party.
Even this limited use of the army in central Beirut is the most forceful action
by the government so far this year to end civil unrest. It represents a compromise
between Interior Minister Shamun, who has long favored calling in the 18,000-man
army, and Prime Minister Karami, who has not wanted to alienate his Muslim
supporters by involving the army which is led largely by Christian officers.
Karami late yesterday took pains to explain to newsmen that the government
had not yet declared a state of emergency. In the past, such a step has always been
taken before large army units were called in.
The Prime Minister did announce, however, that President Franjiyah will meet
today with leaders of all political factions. Karami presumably hopes that even the
prospect that the President might declare martial law and bring in additional army
units will prompt political leaders to agree on measures to end the renewed fighting.
The current surge of armed clashes has grown out of Phalangist efforts over the
weekend to avenge the killing of four of their militiamen last Friday. Widespread
kidnapings and murders by Phalangist militiamen-apparently acting without
instructions from their leader, Pierre Jumayyil, who was in Damascus on a peace
mission-gave radical Lebanese leftists and rejectionist Palestinians an excuse to
retaliate heavily and cause hostilities to spread.
According to one press report from Beirut, Palestinian guerrillas yesterday were
leading some leftist bands. Fedayeen from the large commando groups fought with
the Lebanese leftists for a brief period in late October.
The resumption of heavy fighting has come at a time when prospects for
progress in the political negotiations were good and when conservative Muslim
politicians had begun a cautious effort to isolate the far left politically. Radicals
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 9, 1975
both outside and inside the major Christian and Muslim militias were fearful that
Jumayyil might strike a bargain with Syrian President Asad, and therefore were
eager to undermine his mission with a return to violence.
A Muslim delegation that included three former Lebanese prime ministers
traveled to Damascus on Sunday, presumably to affirm that Asad had not promised
Jumayyil any concessions that would threaten the interests of Lebanese Muslims.
They may also have urged that Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam visit Beirut again
to mediate the Lebanese dispute.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 9, 1975
The violent dispersal by riot police of two Socialist rallies in Madrid yesterday
will further strengthen the hand of those who seek to discredit King Juan Carlos'
attempts to liberalize the political system and could generate additional support for
the series of strikes planned for this week.
The government's harsh response to demonstrations over the past few days
appears to be playing into the hands of the Communists, who apparently hope to
provoke an overreaction from the police in an effort to demonstrate that
Franco-type repression did not die with the Generalissimo. The Communist-inspired
demonstrations that were broken up over the weekend may well have been intended
to set the stage for confrontation, which the party apparently hopes will bring leftist
democratic opposition groups into a united front against the government.
The Communist-dominated Workers' Commissions have called for strikes by
construction and metal workers in -the Madrid area on December 10 and 11. If
successful, these will spread to Barcelona and various Basque cities on December 11
and 12. The Communist-controlled leftist coalition, the Democratic Junta, has
issued an appeal to its supporters to demonstrate for "a democratic rupture with the
political laws of the dictatorship" from December 10 to 16.
So far, the non-Communist left has seemed disposed to let Juan Carlos show his
hand before condemning him. There was relatively little support for the attempted
strike of construction workers in Madrid last week, and the Socialist-dominated
Platform of Democratic Convergence has apparently refused to endorse the Junta's
call for a week of demonstrations. Following the breakup of the Socialist rallies
yesterday, however, a spokesman called for a strike tomorrow to protest police
brutality.
The far right may also be able to benefit from the Communist tactics. Prime
Minister Arias reportedly is trying to form a new cabinet that would be more
receptive to an opening of the political system. Ultrarightists striving to prevent
liberalization of the cabinet will be able to point to the frequent clashes between
securit forces and leftist demonstrators as an example of the dangers of such a
move.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 9, 1975
The speech last week by treaty negotiator Ellsworth Bunker highlighting the
US need to conclude a canal treaty recognizing Panamanian aspirations received
favorable coverage in Panama. Top Panamanian officials, nonetheless, will probably
press for more tangible evidence of US commitment to a treaty.
Ambassador Bunker's explanatory remarks on the scope of present US rights in
the canal zone and his criticism of opposition in the US to a more generous canal
treaty came in for extensive praise in the local press. His warnings that failure to
arrive at a new treaty would make anti-US violence and sabotage attempts against
the canal likely were also commended as a realistic portrayal of what would happen.
Panamanian warnings of violence and "another Vietnam" have continued
intermittently for the last several years. The violence theme is popular in nationalist
circles, and its continued reiteration by Panamanian officials increases the likelihood
of anti-US disturbances in the event of a serious breakdown in negotiations.
While the ambassador's remarks helped ease tensions, General Torrijos is said
still to be displeased with the slowness of progress in the talks, as evidenced by his
recent "ultimatum" to the US on canal talks, the temporary absence of key
Panamanian negotiators during the last visit by US officials, and the press play given
Torrijos' planned trip to Cuba on January 10. As the time for his departure
approaches, and as the anniversary on January 9 of the 1964 anti-US riots comes
closer, demarches seeking more tangible evidence of US good faith in the
negotiations can be anticipated.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 9, 1975
Iceland intends to bring up the subject of its fishing dispute with the UK at the
NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels later this week. The cabinet decided to
defer raising the issue at the UN General Assembly, pending the outcome of the
NATO meeting.
Prime Minister Hallgrimsson told the US ambassador on December 5 that the
opportunity to air Iceland's grievances had been "the only real argument" deflecting
pressures in the cabinet earlier last week to boycott the Brussels. meeting.
Hallgrimsson did not indicate what steps by NATO would satisfy the Icelandic
government. The ambassador gained the impression, however, that Hallgrimsson
would settle for expressions of concern by the other foreign ministers over the
dispute between the two alliance partners, and for Secretary General Luns' offer to
mediate.
Icelandic officials claim that the government is under domestic pressure to take
its case to the UN. Hallgrimsson said Reykjavik is contemplating "some sort of
communication" to the Security Council, although deferring an approach to the
General Assembly. He did not indicate whether this would occur before the NATO
meeting.
The cabinet's decision to defer action in the General Assembly is contingent
upon there being no escalation in the dispute. On December 6, a British tug rammed
an Icelandic coast guard patrol, the first such incident in the current dispute.
Although this incident will increase tension in Iceland once it is publicized, the
absence of bodily injury should enable government leaders to hold the line on their
current strategy.
In London, a Foreign Office official expressed hope that Foreign Secretary
Callaghan would be able to agree with Iceland's Foreign Minister Agustsson in
Brussels to reopen negotiations on a fishing agreement. The talks broke off last
month. He said that Britain is willing to withdraw its frigates from Icelandic waters
if Reykjavik will refrain from harassing British trawlers during negotiations. Iceland
has rejected this position from the beginning of the dispute.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 9, 1975
The French government reportedly has decided to withdraw its support for
aircraft designer Marcel Dassault's proposed next-generation multipurpose fighter.
The controversial plane, dubbed the ACF (Avion de Combat du Futur), has been
under growing domestic criticism because of its high cost and the concern that it will
do nothing to reduce the growing French aerospace technology lag with the US.
I the US defense attache in Paris reports that Dassault
now will turn to developing a new aircraft called the Mirage 2000-an improved
version of his highly successful Mirage III multipurpose fighter-that will be powered
by the new SNECMA M-53 engine. Both decisions may be announced following a
meeting of the Defense Council on December 18.
Dassault's previous successes have been based on developing good, relatively
inexpensive fighters. He has minimized financial risk and kept costs in line by
making only modest improvements to a proven fighter design in each new generation
of aircraft.
This strategy appears to have backfired, however, in his last two fighter designs.
The proposed F1/E fighter was no match for the advanced technology embodied in
General Dynamics' F-16, and the ACF would be no more than comparable to the
already operational US-built F-15.
In addition to a more powerful engine in the Mirage 2000, Dassault will
probably employ composite materials to reduce aircraft weight and use other
advanced techniques in aviation technology. It remains questionable, however,
whether these improvements to the Mirage Ill-a fighter designed for use in the past
decade-will give Dassault a plane capable of competing with advanced US combat
aircraft designed for the mid-1980s and beyond.
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The government has arrested a total of 25 soldiers and civilians for trying to
organize unions in army units and has been searching leftist labor union offices in
several areas.
Defense Minister Bourges reportedly told a French journalist that extreme
leftists, who were trained before they were drafted, had been aided by leftist union
members in encouraging unionization of units that have "very sophisticated
equipment." Bourges said the government believes the activity was designed not
only to disrupt army discipline but also to establish an espionage and sabotage
network. He mentioned in this context the presumed connection to Soviet espionage
services of a network uncovered in France last spring and the appearance in France
last month of left-wing Portuguese military elements.
The defense minister said there is a separate but related political aspect to the
affair. He said President Giscarcl ordered Prime Minister Chirac to denounce the
Socialists for their alleged involvement in the activity in the army. Two of the first
group of those arrested were Socialists, but they were in the process of being
expelled from the party when caught distributing pamphlets to soldiers.
According to Bourges, Giscard was concerned about the negative international
image of an army in disarray and of the French electorate disunited over the issue of
a draftee army. The President, who has been trying to drum up public support for
the military, wanted a show of national unity and anticipated that an attack on the
Socialists would provoke them into demonstrations of their patriotism and support
of the military. Other sources have suggested, however, that Giscard and Bourges
were not very concerned over the activity until the deputy defense minister and the
chief of General Staff threatened to resign in protest over the lack of official action
to halt unionization activities.
Giscard's effort to use the issue to drum up patriotic support is unlikely to be
effective, but the left will not gain much from it, either. The Socialists did proclaim
their support of military discipline, but their calls for reform of military life drew
wide sympathy. The Communist Party also took a moderate stand and expressed
opposition to military unions.
Chirac and Interior Minister Poniatowski may have lost the most in the affair.
Chirac's attack on the Socialists was so heavyhanded that many media
commentators criticized him for overreacting. The image of a ham-fisted government
response was reinforced when Poniatowski accused the Communists of inciting
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French draftees to learn to shoot so they could someday attack their commanders.
While some radical leftist splinter groups have in fact taken that line, the Communist
Party responded that Poniatowski, who has taken on the Communists before, is
himself a "menace to the nation."
Only about 50,000 marchers showed up on December 6 for a rally in Paris
called by the left to protest alleged government moves restricting civil liberties in the
army. The rally slogans steered clear of the controversy over unionization, however,
possibly because the Communists and Socialists, whose alliance has grown weaker
over the past year, could not agree on a common ap roach. The marchers
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Following the Guatemalan defeat at the UN and the recent visit of British
Under Secretary Rowlands, President Laugerud has authorized contingency planning
and training for guerrilla operations in Belize to appease hard-liners in his
government, according to Defense Minister Lucas. He will not authorize the
execution of such operations, however, until all avenues of settling the issue
peacefully have been exhausted.
Lucas, an extreme hawk on Belize, is reportedly critical of the Foreign
Ministry's handling of the problem and believes military action is the only solution.
Although negotiations with the UK are scheduled to resume in early 1976, the
defense minister believes they offer little hope. Lucas says his government will
reiterate demands for control of the southern fifth of Belize. The British have
rejected this position in previous negotiations.
Guatemalan-inspired insurgency within Belize itself would find little if any
popular support, and a planned propaganda campaign has slight chance of success. In
light of London's military presence and Guatemala's weaknesses, cross-border
guerrilla operations would be the least perilous form of military action if Laugerud
should decide to resort to force.
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Attitudes toward the US within the Chilean military are beginning to harden in
reaction to what is perceived as growing US government opposition to the junta.
This worsening climate is not likely to portend a radical shift in relations, but it
is probably a significant factor adding to the Chilean government's sense of
insecurity and isolation at a time when Chile has come to realize that its
international image has reached its lowest point since the armed forces assumed
power.
Anti-US sentiment reportedly is evident among the middle and junior officer
ranks, and military leaders expect the gap to widen with the expected cut-off of US
military training and assistance. For the most part, the Chilean military is a
conservative institution and can be expected to compensate for this loss by
strengthening its ties with similar military establishments elsewhere in South
America, for example Brazil. Its ability to find alternate suppliers of arms assistance
and training, however, will continue to be limited.
The pariah status imposed on Chile by the outside world because of its human
rights stand may be reinforcing President Pinochet's harsh approach to other
sensitive domestic and international problems. Government apprehension over
reports alleging that leftists intended to turn an annual religious observation into
antigovernment demonstrations caused a sharp deterioration in church-state
relations. The presidential edict restricting the ceremony provoked church leaders
into canceling the event and caused some top army officials to question the wisdom
of Pinochet's decision. Although the church will probably speak out more forcefully
in the future, its relations with the government are not likely to be severed
completely, since that would not be in the interests of either party.
On yet another front, Pinochet has shown signs of taking a hard line in granting
safe conduct to leftists who have sought refuge in various embassies in Santiago. The
Pinochet government is taking this line because it insists that the asylees-who
include leaders of the major terrorist organization-are "common criminals" and
therefore do not fall under normal provisions regarding political asylum. There is a
good chance that this issue will worsen relations with some foreign governments and
stir new char es abroad that the junta is violating accepted international
conventions.
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Greece Plans Fortifications for Aegean Islands
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Athens reportedly approved funds in mid-November to build permanent
fortifications on key Aegean island
Fortification of Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos, and Rhodes would be
consistent with other Greek efforts to reinforce and improve Aegean defenses since
the Cyprus crisis in 1974. Because of the nearness of the islands to mainland Turkey,
Greek defenders would have to withstand Turkish air, naval gunfire, and even
artillery attacks in the event of hostilities. Permanent fortifications combined with
the rugged island terrain would strengthen the defensive posture as well as reduce or
eliminate the need for further reinforcement.
The type and extent of fortifications planned are not known. The Greeks have
extensive experience in reinforced concrete and underground structures gained from
construction of defenses along the Bulgarian and Yugoslav borders. Similar but less
extensive fortifications would therefore be likely on the islands.
The proposed construction will further strain relations with the Turks,
especially because of their concern that Athens is trying to solidify control over the
Aegean seabed. Although aware that the Greek efforts do not pose an offensive
threat to mainland Turkey, the Turks will undoubtedly protest, citing international
restrictions a ainst militarization of the islands such as the 1923 Lausanne
Convention.
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Hanoi has begun a small-scale airlift into Vientiane to help offset supply
shortages resulting from the closure of the Thai border.
The Lao communist newspaper in Vientiane revealed on December 8 that
North Vietnam had begun an airlift using two captured US C-130s to move milk,
sugar, and gasoline to the capital. The US defense attache on December 7 observed
one C-130 with Vietnamese markings unloading cargo at the Vientiane airport.
According to the newspaper, supplies will also be shipped in by truck. The initial air
phase is scheduled to last 20 days, but shipments will continue by road and air as
long as necessary.
The Thai closed the border late last month following a Lao attack on a Thai
patrol boat. The closure has led to the disappearance of some food items from
Vientiane markets as well as a dramatic increase in the price of most consumer
items. Gasoline is available only on the black market and at vastly inflated prices.
Unless major deliveries are made by road, the Vietnamese supply effort will not
compensate for the border closure. Hanoi probably intends, however, that the
supply of vitally needed supplies will serve as a gesture of support for their Lao allies
and will strengthen Vientiane's hand in dealing with Bangkok on the border
problem.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
NORTH YEMEN - USSR - SAUDI ARABIA
December 9, 1975
According to North Yemeni Foreign Minister Asnaj, implementation of the
arms deal that a Yemeni military delegation concluded in Moscow last month is
conditioned on a prior personal visit to the USSR by North Yemeni Command
Council Chairman Hamdi.
The foreign minister, who has said he is trying to abort the deal, gave no
indication whether Hamdi is contemplating an early trip to Moscow. In a
conversation with Ambassador Scotes last month, before the arms deal was reported,
Hamdi indicated that the Soviets had promised him a gift of arms if he came to the
USSR; he implied that he had purposely ducked the visit-and an arms deal-by
sending the delegation.
Meanwhile, Asnaj told Ambassador Scotes on Sunday that arrangements were
set for Hamdi to visit Saudi Arabia this week-probably beginning today-for talks
with Saudi leaders, who have reacted angrily to word of Sana's deal with the Soviets.
Hamdi is said to be responding to an invitation from King Khalid to perform the
Muslim pilgrimage and then to "consult on various important matters."
Hamdi reportedly planned to ask his conservative opponent Sheikh Abdallah
al-Ahmar, who receives Saudi financial and political support, to accompany him to
Saudi Arabia to reassure Riyadh that Hamdi's aim is to promote cooperation and
stability-not revolution-in North Yemen.
The Saudis, for their part, clearly intend to press Hamdi for clarification of his
reported deal with the Soviet Union. Crown Prince Fahd told Ambassador Akins
yesterday that Hamdi has erred if he has raised the issue of an arms accord with the
Soviets in order to press Riyadh into moving faster on Sana's request for financing
the purchase of Western arms. The Saudis, Fahd insisted, will not give in to such
pressure.
If, on the other hand, Hamdi is serious about the accord with Moscow, the
Saudis could then only conclude, said Fahd, that the North Yemeni leader was
attempting to deceive them all along as to his political leanings and relationship with
the Soviets.
Ambassador Scotes continues to believe that the reported accord with the
Soviets is genuine and will be implemented if Hamdi cannot obtain satisfactory
alternative commitments from the Saudis. Nevertheless, the ambassador does not
rule out the possibility that Hamdi is playing a tactical game aimed at getting the US
to pressure the Saudis into moving quickly to make their long-delayed decision to
provide North Yemen with $200 million in financial assistance to purchase US and
other Western arms.
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December 9, 1975
Discussions in New Delhi last weekend between Indian officials and a high-level
Bengalee delegation did not eliminate tensions between the two countries but appear
to have sustained the generally positive atmosphere evident at talks in Calcutta last
week between Indian and Bengalee border security officials.
I he Indians repeated to the
Bengalee delegation earlier assurances that they had no intention of intervening in
Bangladesh and were not aiding Bengalee dissidents. The delegation also received
assurances, albeit rather weak, that propaganda in the Indian media unfriendly to
the Dacca regime would decrease.
Prime Minister Gandhi, who received the visiting group, expressed concern over
the safety of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh and hope that the border would
remain quiet. The head of the Bangladesh delegation gave Gandhi a letter from
Bangladesh President Sayem that apparently contained reassurances of Dacca's
desire for good relations. Both sides reportedly agreed to continue the dialogue, but
no definite plans for further meetings have been announced.
Meanwhile, a rally last Sunday north of Dacca organized by a veteran radical
was poorly attended and did not have the strong anti-Indian pro-Muslim flavor that
was expected. The rally leader failed to mention India by name, and instead
emphasized communal harmony and the need for national unity.
The opposition leader may have yielded to pressure from the government to
avoid any provocative statements. The regime remains highly concerned over
internal security and has carried out several security raids in the Dacca area over the
past week. The government may be reacting to persistent rumors that dissident
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December 9, 1975
Edward Gierek opened the Polish party's seventh congress yesterday with a
recitation of Poland's economic and political progress since 1971.
The party leader emphasized that the people are now living better than ever
before and that the party will continue to seek further improvements in the living
standard. For the Polish consumer, Gierek had the welcome news that price
increases on basic food items will be delayed well into next year and that
overcoming difficulties in meat supplies is one of the party's most important goals.
Gierek said that the price policy for 1976-1980 would ensure increases in real wages.
On internal political matters, Gierek repeated the standard formulations on the
need to increase the militancy and effectiveness of ideological activity. He also
proposed that the period between party congresses be extended to five years and
said that several constitutional amendments were needed to reflect the socialist
nature of the state.
Gierek paid the requisite tribute to Moscow, saying that the Soviet Union is the
"leading force of the international Communist movement." He called for expansion
of cooperation within CEMA, claimed that "good conditions" are shaping up for a
European Communist party conference, and said the Polish party favors the idea of
a new world conference.
Soviet party leader Brezhnev is present along with most of the East European
party leaders; the notable exception is Romania's President Ceausescu. Brezhnev will
address the congress today.
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