NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010028-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 17, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National 1 noel 1 igence
Bulletin
~ DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
D
N?_ 662
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 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 17, 1975
CONTENTS
ITALY: Election returns show
marked shift to the left 1
PORTUGAL: Republica
dispute re-emerges 3
TURKEY: National Security Council recommends
reciprocal measures to arms embargo 5
ARGENTINA: Confrontation between
government and labor defused 1 1
PORTUGAL: Military
discipline poor 12
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 17, 1975
With 95 percent of the votes counted, the Italian regional elections have
revealed a decisive shift to the left, marked by unprecedented gains for the
Communist Party. The Christian Democrats remain number one, but just barely.
Only sketchy returns are available from provincial and municipal contests but
they point in the same direction.
The parties of the left, the Communists, Socialists, and a small party to the left
of the Communists obtained over 47 percent of the vote, a gain of approximately 6
percent over the 1972 parliamentary election and the regional elections of 1970.
The lion's share went to the Communists, who achieved an all time high of 33.7
percent, more than 5 percent over their 1972 performance and nearly 6 percent
above their vote in 1970. Yesterday's advances by the Communists exceed any they
have registered since World War II. Even in their most optimistic projections, the
Communists had not expected to win more than 30 percent, a figure that assumed
immense symbolic importance for them, because they never had achieved it in local
elections since 1951.
In addition to their regional gains, early municipal returns suggest that the
Communists have become the plurality party in some major cities including Rome,
Milan, and Turin.
Unless the remaining returns increase the Christian Democrat's tally a notch,
the party's total of 35.2 percent will have matched its postwar low in the 1946
constituent assembly election. Although the Christian Democratic losses-close to 3
percent compared with 1970 and over 3 percent against 1972-are a major blow,
they are not in the range expected by pessimists in the party who feared a loss of
around 5 percent.
The fact that the Communists appear to be drawing almost as many votes as
the Christian Democrats, However, will overshadow that.
The Socialist Party, at 12 percent, picked up about 2 percent over their 1972
and 1970 totals. The impact of the Socialist's .increase will be magnified by the fact
that they are the only party in the center-left governing majority that advanced.
The losers were the parties of the right, with the Conservative Liberals (2.5
percent) continuing their steady decline and the fVeo-Fascists (6.4 percent) dropping
back closer to their postwar average of about 5 percent.
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 17,1975
The left will interpret the vote as a call for change; that was the common
thread in the Socialist and Communist campaigns. At the minimum, the outcome is
likely to:
--Build more pressure behind Communist chief Berlinguer's proposal for an
"historic compromise" designed to k~ring his party into the government.
--Give -the Socialists a si:rong hand to play in their push for treatment as
political equals by the Christian Democrats in the center-left coalition. The
Socialists will now appear more than ever to be the only barrier to entry into
the government by the Communists. Moreover, the Socialists appear to be in a
position to determine whether one or possibly two additional regions, Liguria
and Marche, join the red knelt or remain in the center-left column.
Both the Communists an~i Socialists have until now opposed an early national
election. Pressures will probably increase in both parties to try to bring about such
an election, however, in the hope of transplanting the regional gains to parliament.
The immediate problem for party leaders is whether to leave the two-party
Moro government in place until next fall, when the Christian Democrats and
Socialists have scheduled party congresses. Just prior to the balloting there seemed
to be a consensus in favor of avoiding a government crisis now.
Party leaders, particularl~,r the Socialists, now will be rethinking the matter.
When the government crisis does come, it could be among the most difficult and
protracted of the postwar period.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 17, 1975
The dispute has been renewed over the Socialist Party newspaper Republica,
which was closed by the government after Communist printers took it over nearly
four weeks ago.
Republica was to have been turned back to the Socialists yesterday..
Last-minute conditions levied by the Socialists to head off more trouble from the
printers, according to press reports, prompted the internal security officer in charge
of the building to hand the keys over to representatives of aCommunist-dominated
workers' committee. He also gave keys to Republica's Socialist editor, who has
refused to reenter the building as long as Socialist control of the paper remains in
doubt. Giving keys to both sides does not appear to fit with the decision of the press
council, which is responsible for enforcing the press law, that the printers were at
fau It.
If the government permits the workers to assume control of Republica, the
Socialists may feel compelled to pull out of the government, as they had threatened
if the Armed Forces Movement did not give the paper back to them. Security forces
armed with tear gas formed a cordon around the Republica building last night, but
the predominantly Socialist crowd gave them no trouble. The security forces barred
both management and labor from the building overnight. It is to be opened at 8 a.m.
today.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 17, 1975
TURKEY
The Turkish National Security Council issued a brief communique following
yesterday's extraordinary session. It stated only that the council had made its
recommendation to the government concerning the "priorities for the necessary
reciprocal measures to be taken because of the US arms embargo. The Council
noted that it had reached the unanimous conclusion that, with the embargo, the US
had unilaterally abrogated bilateral agreements and made it necessary for Turkey to
review its commitments. Prime Minister Demirel, following a cabinet meeting last
night to review the security council's recommendations, said that Foreign Minister
Caglayangil would make an extensive announcement on the subject this morning.
One press report said that the security council had drawn up a timetable for phasing
out US military installations in Turkey.
Prime Minister Demirel has portrayed Turkish countermeasures as a result of
new indications that the arms embargo will not be lifted and as a response to
pressures in Turkey. In fact, we have no evidence of an increase in pressure on
Demirel, either from the general public or from the military. Even his political
opposition, led by former prime minister Ecevit, has refrained from inflammatory
statements.
Demirel, rather, appears to have seized the issue as a chance to strengthen his
own political position. He may well have reasoned that he could only gain from
bringing matters to a head. If the embargo were lifted, he would be credited with
forcing the US to back down; if the embargo were maintained, he would only have
anticipated the development and begun the steps he would have been forced to take
anyway.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 17, 1975
An agreement worked out on June 14 has defused the serious confrontation
between the government and organized labor.
The compromise should alleviate the immediate fears of military officers
concerned with public turmoil and should also put an end to the nearly two weeks
of work stoppages and demonstrations that had plagued several cities. The success in
overcoming the immediate problem, however, will not diminish the military's deep
concern with the general trend in the nation's politics and economy.
The agreement involved the issuance of a government decree that set- new
minimum wage levels, regulated the method of determining wage increases, and
arranged for an automatic wage readjustment system. The new wage system will be
rietermined within 30 days by a joint government-labor commission.
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National IntelligE~nce Bulletin June 17,1975
The problems exiperienced by Portugal in sending troops to the Azores and
Angola have clearly illrastratE~d the poor state of discipline in Lisbon's armed forces.
Earlier this month, two military police companies were alerted for movement
to the Azores. Most of the troops refused to obey orders, and only a small
detachment was eventually sent. The recalcitrant troops were detained for
questioning and "clarification of their mission," but went unpunished. On June 8,
an officer and 75 enlisted men balked when their rifle company was ordered to
Angola. According to the Lisbon press, the unit finally departed for the African
province after being detained in a military prison overnight.
Following increased fighting in Angola, a 1,000-man commando regiment was
placed on six-hour alert last Wednesday for airlifting to the province. The possible
movement of this elite Continental Operations Command unit-an estimated one
fourth of the only troops th~it can be counted on to act effectively in the event of
internal disorder-is another indication of the seriousness with which Lisbon views
the situation in Angola. More important, it reflects Portugal's recognition that
regular army troops cannot Ise relied upon to obey unpopular orders. The ruling
Armed Forces Movement apparently is trying to avoid further public disclosure of
declining morale in the military establishment.
The current unreliability of the military is an outgrowth of developments
within the armed forces since the over~thraw of the Caetano government in April
1974 and, especially, subsegraent to the abortive rightist coup on March 11. The
Movement has tried to democratize the services and instill leftist ideals among the
troops by creating numerous junior officer and enlisted men's councils. These
politically oriented groups, however, have nearly destroyed the traditional chain of
command and discipline. Any order that may originate from the Continental
Operations Command, the rrrilitary region headquarters, the service chief, or the
Council of Revolution callinla for a unit to move or act is frequently subject to
approval by the various Movement councils prior to execution.
Political reliability--adherence to the beliefs of the ruling leftists--rather than
professionalism has become tree principal criterion for promotion and assignment to
key command positions. Former air force chief of staff General Mendes Dias
reportedly was dismissed in /lay because he opposed this situation and wanted to
restore professionalism and the chain of command. Promotions, including the
selection of battalion and regimental commanders, are often determined in elections
by subordinate officers and enlisted men.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 17, 1975
Portugal's inability to deploy disciplined troops could have a major adverse
impact in the event of serious internal disorder or further reverses in Angola.
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