NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 6, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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op Secret
r2
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
State Dept. review completed
N2 662
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June( 1975
CONTI NTS
AZORES-PORTUGAL: Separatists may
capitalize on demonstrations today
LAOS: Communists moving to
consolidate control of cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIETNAM: Hanoi interested in UN
membership for both North and South . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
. .
4
5
AUSTRALIA: Cabinet shuffle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
7
PERU: Plans announced that
affect government subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 11
ANGOLA: Conflict spreading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 6,1975
Azorean separatists may seek to capitalise on a demonstration planned for this
afternoon in Ponta Delgada to protest Portuguese agricultural policy in the Azores.
The demonstration will coincide with the visit of five NATO ships-including the
USS McDonell.
Most local civilian and, military authorities plan to be absent from Ponta
Delgada during the demonstration, which is planned for mid-afternoon. The district
civil governor, who is appointed by Lisbon, is the immediate target of the
demonstration. No violence is expected, but local merchants are expected to close
their shops in solidarity with 'the demonstrators.
Farmers are angry because price ceilings on their products set by Lisbon
average 20 percent below -those in Portugal, but their costs are continuing to
increase. Seventy percent ol: the Azorean population derives some income from
cattle raising and dairying.
The farmers' protest is a further demonstration of Azorean irritation over
Lisbon's economic policies. Azoreans believe the islands' underdevelopment and
economic imbalance are a result of Lisbon's exploitation and discriminatory policies.
This resentment, coupled with great concern over Portugal's drift to the left, has
given the separatist cause a boost. The Azorean Liberation Front believes these
developments will be translated into popular support for a coup to separate the
Azores from the Portuguese mainland.
There have been rumors that leftists will demonstrate at the same time to
protest the visit of the NATO ships, but local authorities discount the possibility of
any significant leftist activity. The farmers' demonstration is not expected to be
directed at either NATO or the US, but inadequate control of large numbers of
demonstrators could lead to an incident.
There is no reporting to suggest that the separatists intend to take advantage of
the demonstration and the absence of high government officials to attempt a coup.
'The Liberation Front might, however, see the fortuitous set of circumstances as too
good an opportunity to pass up.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 6, 1975
The communists are following up their recent ouster of all important rightists
from the Laotian cabinet by moving quickly to consolidate total control over that
body. The Pathet Lao still pay lip service to the coalition concept, but it is clear the
coalition is now nothing more than a convenient facade for a complete communist
take-over of all of Laos.
The cabinet did not directly discuss Assistant Secretary of State Habib's recent
two-day visit to Vientiane. Phoumi, however, did note that no decisions had been
reached on the continuation of US aid to Laos under a new bilateral assistance
agreement. He added that if Washington cut off all aid, it would be a "childish"
action in retaliation for recent anti-American demonstrations. Cessation of US aid
was really of little importance in any case, according to Phoumi, since Laos would
"merely" have to look elsewhere for assistance.
Despite his reassuring rhetoric, however, Phoumi still appears to attach some
value to the continuation of US aid and to the maintenance of relations with
Washington. This was the line he took in private discussions with Habib earlier this
week.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 6, 1975
Hanoi is expressing interest in United Nations membership for both North and
South Vietnam and is using the USSR to gauge the US reaction to such an
application at the General Assembly session next fall.
In discussions at the Department of State on June 3, the Soviet charge said
both Vietnamese states desired admission to the UN as separate entities and had
consulted Moscow on this basis. In response to a suggestion that the admission of
both Vietnams might be linked to the granting of UN membership to North and
South Korea, the Soviet charge pointed to Pyongyang's strong objections to
membership for both Koreas and predictably argued against drawing any linkage
between the two questions.
In the past, North Vietnam's position on UN membership has been that
national reunification must be completed prior-to entry into the UN. Hanoi's
decision to move away from this long-standing policy is the clearest evidence to date
that the Vietnamese communist leadership has opted for an ostensibly independent
southern regime of indefinite duration.
Foreign journalists in South Vietnam have been reporting the recent presence
in Saigon of high-ranking North Vietnamese officials for "discussions" with
Provisional Revolutionary Government leaders. According to these unconfirmed
reports, a new southern government mi ht be announced as early as today-the sixth
anniversary of the PRG.
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 6, 1975
AUSTRALIA
The most prominent casualty of the cabinet shuffle announced yesterday by
Prime Minister Whitlam is Deputy Prime Minister Cairns. Cairns was removed as
federal treasurer and assigned to the considerably less prestigious post of minister of
environment. William Hayden, a young comer who until now has been social
security minister, will replace Cairns as treasurer.
Cairns' transfer, after less than six months as treasurer, reflects adversely on his
ability to ease Australia's economic problems. His reputation has also been tainted
by his controversial private secretary. Cairns, once Whitlam's heir apparent, is now
almost certainly out of the running.
William Morrison, a left-winger and critic of the US, has moved from the
Science Ministry to take over the Defense Ministry post vacated by the moderate
Lance Barnard, who resigned to take an ambassadorship. With the downgrading of
Cairns, Whitlam probably used the appointment of Morrison to maintain the relative
strength between leftists and moderates in the cabinet.
Whitlam probably hopes the cabinet changes will give the Labor government an
image of vigor that will help to offset its weak position in Parliament. The
Liberal-Country opposition no doubt sees Labor's need to reallocate its ministries as
a further sign of weakness. It will probably not push for early elections, however,
realizing it must first sharpen its own programs before challenging the government at
the polls.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 6, 1975
Prime Minister Morales Bermudez has announced plans to reduce or possibly to
abandon the present massive government subsidies on essential agricultural and
petroleum products that have kept prices artificially low. The action is sure to spark
a sharp response from urbanites and unions.
For some time, international lending institutions and technicians in the Finance
Ministry and Central Bank had recommended tough measures to combat a growing
budgetary deficit and consequent inflation. Direct and indirect subsidies accounted
for approximately half of the budget deficit in 1973 and 1974.
Morales Bermudez' announcement is a significant departure from President
Velasco's long-held policy of keeping the potentially volatile urban dwellers
quiescent through massive subsidies. The action appears to demonstrate the Prime
Minister's increasing policy-making role in the government and his growing influence
within the military.
Morales Bermudez will have his hands full trying to avoid becoming the
political victim of the new subsidy policy. Prices are sure to rise, and labor
dissatisfaction with the Velasco government, already high, will increase. There are
indications that the strong communist trade union confederation is under increasing
internal pressure to reduce or withdraw its support of the government. A reduction
in subsidies can only add to such pressures.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Forces of the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of
Angola have recently clashed
with troops of the National
Front for the Liberation of
Angola in a wide area north and
east of Luanda and in the
exclave of Cabinda. It was the
third round of major fighting in
two months between the two
nationalist groups and the first
outside Luanda.
The clashes in Angola
proper apparently resulted from
a coordinated offensive by the
Popular Movement aimed at
driving the National Front out of areas where the Movement's ethnic support
predominates and at disrupting the Front's supply routes from northern Angola into
Luanda. The Front is setting up a major base in northwestern Angola in an area
where it has strong tribal support. The base is to replace the extensive training and
support facilities long maintained by the Front in neighboring Zaire.
The fighting in Cabinda, which is administered as a district of Angola,
reportedly was restricted to the capital. The small Cabindan separatist group was not
involved. The operations of Gulf Oil, which produced 150,000 barrels a day in
Cabinda last year, were apparently not affected. The company has evacuated
dependents and support personnel.
The Popular Movement, which a few months ago appeared militarily weaker
than the Front, scored significant gains in the latest fighting; it had also come out on
top in the clashes that occurred in Luanda in late April. The group is now well
supplied with arms from the Soviet Union, its principal foreign patron, and its
troops are performing more effectively than those of the National Front. The Front,
however, is trying to even the score in areas where it has strong tribal support.
In the political arena, both groups have been courting the National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola, the smallest of the three liberation groups in the
transitional government. Union president Jonas Savimbi has refused to be drawn
into the conflict, seeking instead to convene a meeting of the leaders of all three
groups to discuss their political differences. Such a meeting reportedly has been set
for mid-June in Kenya.
June 6, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 6, 1975
Clearly, however, neither Holden Roberto, who heads the National Front, nor
Popular Movement leader Agostinho Neto is willing to share political power. Any
compromise they might agree to in the near future is likely to be only for the
purpose of buying time in preparation for a final showdown. The 24,000 Portuguese
troops-most of whom are stationed in and around Luanda-are spread thin in the
countryside and may not be able or willing to intervene between the two groups in
the event the fighting continues to spread.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
GUATEMALA-ISRAEL:
G uatemala has become the
sixth Latin American nation to
purchase the Israeli-produced Arava
201 short takeoff and landing
transport aircraft. The ten Aravas
purchased will cost $800,000 each,
and $2 million will be spent on
training and spare parts. This
represents Guatemala's largest
military purchase from a foreign
source. The Guatemalan minister of
defense has said the air force
commander would leave for Israel 53A02
on Saturday to make the final
June 6, 1975
arrangements; deliveries should be completed by the end of the year. Guatemala
reportedly plans to use the aircraft to support petroleum ex loration
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