WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 21, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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21 March 1966
OCI No. 1191/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
WEEKLY REPORT
PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY
FOR THE
SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
State Dept. review completed
~ aeaassimca ton
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No. 1191/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
21 March 1966
MEMORANDUM: Weekly Report for the Senior Interde-
partmental Group
C O N T E N T S
Page
1. CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.
3. EASTERN EUROPE - STALIN . . . . . . . . . 4
4. INDONESIA . . .... . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. NATIONALIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. THAILAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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1. CONGO: The Congo is making little progress with
its multiple problems. Any easing of both short- and
long-range difficulties will depend heavily on out-
side assistance, much of which the US will be asked
to supply.
The most tangible and pressing problem is the
campaign against the rebellion. With minimal direc-
tion from Leopoldville, government forces are pushing
the rebels back. Progress is slow; however, west of
Lake Tanganyika it is glacially slow. In the north-
east the rebels can still move freely over wide areas;
near Lake Tanganyika they even retain a limited of-
fensive capability. The US Embassy in Leopoldville
observes that the Congolese Army (ANC) "performs with
relative effectiveness only when provided air cover,
preceded by mercenary spearheads, and goaded by Bel-
gian military advisers." With only about 800 merce-
naries and a handful of Belgians in the field, and
with much of the civilian population hostile to cen-
tral authority, the government often can do little
except garrison the towns and push the rebels back
from the roads and railroads. In the Lake Tanganyika
area government forces are not attaining even these
objectives. Neither the ANC nor the mercenaries have
shown much interest in the rehabilitation of the
areas they have liberated. Since the central govern-
ment lacks the resources to exert pressure, progress
in this field will also depend on non-Congolese ini-
tiative.
In other areas, General Mobutu's main accomplish-
ment since seizing power last November has been clamp-
ing down on Leopoldville's freewheeling politicos. He
is trying, without much success, to control the net-
~work of personal and tribal ties which since independ-
ence has served the Congo in lieu of an administrative
structure. Mobutu is also attempting to rehabilitate
the economy, but his efforts are vitiated by a grad-
ual decay in the country's infrastructure, by contin-
uing rebel activity, and more generally by a complete
inability at all levels to administer a country as
large and diverse as the Congo.
Belgium is likely to be less forthcoming under
its new conservative-oriented government than in the
past two years. The present program involves princi-
pally some 2,500 Belgians in administrative, technical,
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and military assistance and some $2 million annually
in materiel for the armed forces. Spaak's departure
from the Foreign Ministry and strong pressures for
fiscal economy are expected to militate against
greater Belgian activity in the Congo. The level
might decline in the absence of pressure from the US
and the Belgian business community, which is rela-
tively optimistic about its prospects for survival
and profits.
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2. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: The possibility that Bosch
may boycott The June elections has serious long-
range political implications. Such a boycott would
undercut the willingness of many Dominicans to ac-
cept his rival, Balaguer, as the country's legit-
imate leader. If Bosch or some other suitable
"constitutionalist" does not run ?extreme leftists
will find allies among the non-Communist left for
expected efforts at insurgency against any moderate
or conservative regime. Even if elections are suc-
cessfully held, they will not ensure stability in
view of the bitter divisions remaining from the
revolution.
Bosch will probably postpone his decision as
long as possible and will keep open a line of
withdrawal to the end of the campaign as he did
in 1962. He has charged that terrOrism.and vio-
lence make a campaign impossible and privately has
threatened that his Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD) will abstain. In a conversation with Am-
bassadors Bunker and Bennett on 16 March and in
a speech on the 18th Bosch kept open his option
to withdraw.
Bosch probably hopes these threats will per-
suade the provisional regime and the OAS to nego-
tiate with him. From them he hopes to secure cam-
paign guarantees for the PRD and protection for
any government he may head. In the meantime,
Bosch is preparing the PRD for a campaign.
Even if Bosch's demands were satisfied, it
is not certain he would run. His decision will
take into account his judgment on whether he can
win and then remain in office. At this reading he
appears pessimistic on both counts. With patronage
in mind, PRD politicians will press for a chance
to win at the polls. If Bosch does sideline him-
self he is likely to lose his influence over the
"constitutionalist" movement to someone like
Caamano. Therefore, rather than boycott the elec-
tions, Bosch may seek to delay them.
It is uncertain which candidate a postponement
would favor. Postponement, however, would mean'-that
the OAS would have to continue backing a provisional
regime that has little support of its own and has
pursued some unsatisfactory policies. It would cer-
tainly lead to charges that Garcia Godoy was again
giving into the left.
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3. EASTERN EUROPE - STALIN:
An important conse-
quence of the for coming Soviet Party Congress
may be its disruptive effect in Eastern Europe,
if, as seems likely, for domestic political rea-
sons in the USSR, there is a partial rehabilita-
tion of Stalin and by implication a further den-
igration of Khrushchev.
Almost all the leaders of Eastern Europe
would prefer that these issues remain dormant.
Both Moscow and Eastern Europe are well aware
of the explosive content of the Stalin question,
and they can be expected to make a strenuous ef-
fort to contain the repercussions. But once the
Soviet party states a new position there will be
pressures for each Eastern European party to take
its own stand. In so doing there is the danger
of disturbing the delicate equilibrium of politi-
cal adjustments and policy compromises on which
these regimes have settled.
The issue would arise most sharply in Poland,
Hungary,;and Czechoslovakia. The relatively lib-
eral policies there could not be reversed without
risk of political instability. There is already
factionalism in these regimes and it would be dan-
gerously intensified by any rehabilitation of
Stalin in Moscow. Stalinists would take heart
and try to check any process of liberalization,
including trends toward better relations with the
West. Liberal elements, taking alarm, would seek
to strengthen themselves, possibly by forcing
the tempo of liberalization and by urging greater
independence from Moscow. In this event they
might look to the US for moral or material support.
In Bulgaria an element of "liberalization" has
lately crept into party leader Zhivkov's policies.
To fall in behind Moscow on the Stalin question
would imply a reversal of policy by him. Such
a change now would lose him prestige and authority
in his own party and thus impair the stability of
his regime and perhaps bring on another attempt
to overthrow, hire.
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The East German party has never fully abandoned
the policies and methods associated with the Stalin
period. Even though there'-inay be sympathy
within the party for a rehabilitation of Stalin
the matter would have to be handled carefully to
avoid untoward popular reaction.
The Rumanian party is guided almost solely by
considerations of national self-interest independ-
ent of the actions or policies of the CPSU. If
Moscow tried to force Bucharest to back its line
on Stalin, the Rumanians would resist vigorously.
Even if Moscow approaches the Eastern Euro-
pean states with caution and forbearance on this
delicate issue, there would still be a good chance
that political divergence and ideological disarray
within the Soviet bloc would increase. While the
US might find in these circumstances an oppor-
tunity to extend its influence in Eastern Europe,
it might also need to re-evaluate some of the as-
sumptions on which the present policy of "bridge
building" rests.
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. INDONESIA: The army's apparent assumption of power
in Indonesia will not automatically ease difficulties
with the US, some of which arise from deep-seated anti-
Western sentiments.
Indonesia's continuing confrontation with Malaysia
and the anti-Western context of Indonesian foreign -and
domestic policy--based in mistrust of the West and
fueled by Indonesian nationalism--are the most likely
sources of US-Indonesian difficulties. In addition,
army leaders apparently believe--as does Sukarno--that
an external focus assists in maintaining the country's
national unity and stability. Confrontation with Ma-
laysia, therefore, seems likely to continue even if on
a reduced scale. The virulent anti-Westernism in both
foreign and domestic policies promoted by Sukarno may
become more shadow than substance, but residual expres-
sions of it are likely to remain. Chief among them is
the possibility that Indonesia may take over American
oil properties in Sumatra.
Paralleling such expressions of anti-Westernism
are likely to be requests for "under-the-table" US eco-
nomic assistance. Only a few days ago moderate ele-
ments in both military and civilian circles who are
hypersensitive to any indications of US approbation,
were still claiming that the domestic situation pre-
cluded direct assistance from the United States. Ap-
parently these elements fear that they will be tagged
as US puppets not only by Sukarno, the banned Commu-
nist Party, and the leftist and extreme nationalist
elements that look to Sukarno for support, but also by
provincial xenophobic elements which are wary of any
possibility of US interference. Sukarno, who believes
the US is ultimately responsible for recent political
changes in Indonesia, will maneuver to retrieve the
initiative and will certainly claim US involvement as
one of his major themes.
Other problems--more irritants than difficulties--
include limitations on US films, books, and student
exchange, and discrimination against US official and
private aircraft. In addition, Indonesia's economic
situation has so deteriorated that Djakarta is at last
largely insolvent and can no longer meet medium- and
long-term debt payments to the US.
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IRAN: Dangers to the US position in Iran may
develop out of the Shah's policy of improving re-
lations with Communist countries and accepting aid
from them. He has taken pains to emphasize to US
officials that he does not intend to change Iran's
basically Western orientation. There is no reason
to doubt this statement, but he has gained a flex-
ibility in both international and domestic politics
which may cause us trouble.
The Shah probably attributes his successes
in the last few years primarily to tie correctness
of his assessment of Iran's leverage in world af-
fairs. He appears to believe that the White Rev-
olution he is guiding has made his regime more
widely accepted than ever before. The lack of in-
ternal opposition, due both to police suppression
and to inherent opposition weaknesses, has freed
him from the need to consider political suscep-
tibilities. An improved economic situation re-
quires less reliance on American grants and loans.
Thus, for the first time, the Shah can do
something about his old complaints that the US
takes Iran too much for granted, that it treats
enemies better than friends,and that American
military aid does not meet real Iranian needs.
The Shah has accepted a steel mill from. the Soviet
Union after failing to secure one from Western
countries, has secured a $200,000,000 credit au-
thorization from parliament for arms procurement,
and has implied that if the US cannot meet his
military needs he will go elsewhere. He is also
pressing the international oil consortium greatly
to expand its exports of oil in order to produce
the foreign exchange needed for the steel mill,
and other ambitious projects.
Many Iranians interpret the increasing
closeness of contacts between Iran and the USSR
as a sign that the US is on the way out and that
advantage is to be gained by becoming anti-American.
As in past periods of rapprochement, activities
of the Iranian Communist Party are also likely
to find increasing popular acceptability, but
it will be hard to translate this into political
influence.
The Shah clearly retains the power to maintain
a balance in public opinion, However, if he chooses
not to do so energetically, this is likely to cause
additional difficulties for the US.
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NATIONALIST CHINA: Chinese Nationalist frustra-
tion, arising from recent diplomatic setbacks and
losses incurred in Straits incidents with mainland
forces, has put Taipei in a restless mood which
might lead to actions adversely affecting US inter-
ests.
Sporadic clashes with Communist forces in the
Straits continue, and at any time either party could
raise the tempo of the incidents. Nationalist re-
verses in the Straits during 1965 included the loss
of three patrol craft and one plane. Taipei is sensi-
tive to these setbacks
A
stepped-up rate of clashes could in time lead to a
Communist reaction against one or more of the off-
shore islands. This might in turn eventually jeop-
ardize the defending forces which constitute about 20
percent of the Nationalists' total ground forces. The
US thus would face the dilemma of keeping the lid on
without antagonizing Taipei or provoking Peking.
The problem of Chinese representation in the UN
has long unsettled Taipei. The Nationalists are plan-
ning steps to avoid an adverse vote in the next UNGA
session. Taipei will expect continued US diplomatic
support even should it lose its seat to Peking. Find-
ing a mutually acceptable formula for this support--
probably involving a choice between continued recogni-
tion of Taipei as the government of China, or merely
as the government of Taiwan--could strain our rela-
tions with Taipei, antagonize some friendly govern-
ments, and exacerbate US relations with Peking's sup-
porters.
Finally, the succession to President Chiang Kai-
shek is complicated by the tenuous state of health of
his son and heir apparent, Defense Minister Chiang
Ching-kuo. Since vice president designate Yen has
little political support, Ching-kuo's elimination as
a power center would create a vacuum resulting in a
possible struggle for leadership. Confrontations be-
tween army, security force; and Taiwanese elements could
result in rapid deterioration of Taiwan's internal
security and possible Communist involvement.
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7. THAILAND: Two broad problems pose the challenge
to US policy in Thailand. The first is the dramatic
growth of Communist subversion over the past 18 months.
The second problem, Thai-US relations, is subtly re-
lated to the rise of insurgency, but is more immediately
an aspect of the Vietnam problem. The burgeoning US
military presence in the countryside has produced in-
evitable strains, and the Vietnam situation will al-
most inevitably raise key questions of national inter-
est in Bangkok.
When the first warnings were received in late 1964
that the Communists were preparing to do more in
Thailand, Thai leaders expressed confidence in private
that they could handle the situation. In public,
Bangkok seized on the nascent insurgency to hedge
on promised political reforms and an end to martial
law. As the pace of Communist terrorism, recruiting,
and training turned upwards in the last half of 1965
and as Peking's involvement became clearer, complacency
gave way to concern in Bangkok. Plans were made to
meet the problem. These plans, emphasizing security
and economic aspects, may not go far enough. Although
the government has made important gains in recent months
in getting better intelligence on the insurgents and
acting on that intelligence, the indications are that
the insurgency is still growing. At the same time,
the military oligarchy has demonstrated a certain
insensitivity to the politics of insurgency and the
ways in which political measures can be used to meet
the political vacuum in the countryside.
Bangkok's political posture has been further
complicated by the increasing US military involvement
in South Vietnam. As Thailand's own indirect partic-
ipation in the war has grown, however, signs have ap-
peared that some Thai leaders are beginning to question
how far Thailand can go in accommodating US requests
without jeopardizing its own national interests. Peking's
"warnings" that an "armed struggle" will break out in
Thailand if the government continues to permit the US
to use Thai territory and reports that Communist propo-
ganda is, for the first time, receiving a sympathetic
hearing among students in Bangkok, can only feed
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