THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA (REPORT #54--AS OF 4:00 PM EST)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001500040053-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: November 7, 1965
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Rase 2007/Af0'6'qt'RDP79T004721500040053-4
OCI No. 2917/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
7 November 1965
The Situation in Indonesia
(Report #54--As of 4:00 PM EST)
1. More detailed reporting on Sukarno's 6
November cabinet speech indicates that the address
was rambling and theatrical and showed the considerable
pressure under which he is operating. The pattern of
his remarks, however, remains one of continued resis-
tance to the army's political and military effort
against the Communist Party (PKI) and its allies.
2. His verbatim statement on a possible ban
of the PKI, as reported by the US Embassy, is: "I
am urged to ban the PKI. I am considering this. But
I will ban the PNI, Partindo, PSII, NU and any other
party which does not help create a calm atmosphere.
I will ban all parties, not just the PKI." Should
Sukarno proscribe the PKI, he would probably try to
insure its survival in some other form.
3. On Subandrio, First Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, Sukarno's statements were: "I tell
you that I will not throw Subandrio and Oei Tjoe Tat
(a crypto-Communist minister of state assigned to the
cabinet presidium) out of the cabinet. Subandrio and
Oei stay at my side..... This is my cabinet! Subandrio
stays. Indonesia has never had such a great foreign
minister as Subandrio." Later in his speech Sukarno
disclosed that he has "sent" Oei Tjoe Tat to Macao on
an undisclosed mission.
1640
25X1
one of the most difficult aspects of the current situation
State Dept. review completed
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Disaffected
is that of identifying friends and enemies.
army units are still at large
of nationalistsandnMoslem
are still within the ranf?rces are deploying in an effort
youth, Loyal military tors
to prevent the consolidation oonsc tiered rebel elements,
but weak and uncertain areas
5. Surabaya, East Java, although an area of
Communist strength, is said to be calm. Local army
officials, however, continue tobeaconcerned over
future PKI tactics and the army's with terrorism and political subversion.
6. An East Javanese battalion, after 16 months'.
returned to Surabaya on 3 November.
16
service in Celebes,
Over half of East Java'beas~illeserv3.nggoutsideethe
battalions--is said to officials
province. As in other areas of the country,
.are worried about possible PKI action on 1OiNo a cbiersia's
Heroes' Day which, after independence day,
most significant national holiday.
7. The Surabaya garrison commander, Lt. Col.
was installed as city mayor on 4 November. He
Sukot~o,
replaces the Communist mayor who has been under arrest
since early October. As municipal administrator, of.tbe
ext ensive
Sukotjo faces a difficult task iunder two successive
Communist PKI infiltration mayors of cityThfirty-gfive government of 37 district heads and,
.
Communist
many key departmental chiefs are Communists or
sympathizers, and without their services, is faced
ment could be severely curtailed. The army
with the question of whether or not to retain some of
this Communist expertise.
8. In Medan, an army staff officer on 5 November
gave the American consul a generally optimistic picture
of the current security situation throughout the island
of Sumatra. His one exception was West SA tra whnkeng a
he thought serious fighting might occur.
police officer with whom the consul checked dangerous*
North Sumatra was also possibly
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9. The army staff officer admitted uncertainty
about PKI potential. He'observed that although army
intelligence indicates the Communists cannot mount
a serious uprising, "anything could happen.". Later
he said that the "worst the PKI can do" is to launch
sporadic guerrilla style attacks.
10. Commenting on the future political situa-
tion, the officer said the army's biggest headache
is the political and economic followup with which
it must proceed after is has destroyed the PKI. He
said it would be difficult to "fill the vacuum. in
the social forces" which would exist in the absence of
the Communist Party.
11. The island of Bali, slow to respond to the
army's anti-Communist program, on 3 November announced
the suspension of the PKI and its affiliated organiza-
tions. As in several other areas, leaders of the
Communist organizations are required to report daily
to the nearest military post. Both the governor and
the local army commander in Bali are reputedly pro-
Communist, a fact which probably explains their delayed
response.
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