THE ROLE OF AIRSTRIKES IN ATTAINING US OBJECTIVES IN NORTH VIETNAM FNDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01095A001000020006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Findings
1. The bombing of North Vietnam under the ground rules and at the
force levels which applied in 1965 made little contribution toward the
attainment of its major objectives -- reduction of the flow of supplies
to the insurgent forces in the South and the forcing of Hanoi to enter
into negotiations. Although the movement of men and supplies into
North Vietnam has been hampered and made somewhat more costly, the Com-
munists have been able to increase the flow of supplies and manpower
to South Vietnam. The attacks, moreover, have had no discernible
impact on Hanoi's determination to continue its policy of supporting
the insurgency'in the South. As a manifestation of US support and
positive action in behalf of South Vietnam, the Rolling Thunder program
has successfully attained its third objective -- bolstering the confi-
dence.and morale of the South Vietnamese and demonstrating to other
friendly Southeast Asian countries the reliability of US commitments.
2. Even if the weight of attack were to be substantially increased,
it is estimated that a continuation of the bombing under the ground
rules which applied in 1965, and which are currently being followed,
would result in a virtually ineffective program.
3. Air attacks almost certainly cannot bring about a meaningful
reduction in the current level at which essential supplies and men
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flow into South Vietnam. Air attacks can, however, increase signifi-
cantly the costs and difficulties associated with North Vietnam's sup-
port of the Communist forces in the South, complicate greatly the
problem of maintaining essential economic activity in the North, and
thereby bring meaningful pressures on the Hanoi regime. Therefore,
it is concluded that, under drastically revised ground rules, particu-
larly through the removal of limitations on geographic areas which can
be taken under attack, and with a significant revision of the target
systems selected and the manner in which they are attacked, airstrikes
against North Vietnam could play an important role in achieving US
objectives.
4. The effectiveness of air attacks in reducing the flow of sup-
plies to a critical point is in large measure dependent on the course
of ground combat in the South.. Military action in South Vietnam against
the Viet Cong and the regular units of the North Vietnamese army on the
one hand and the neutralization of their support facilities in North
Vietnam on the other are complementary measures. Therefore, escalat-
ing the level of combat in South Vietnam is of major importance. The
result would be substantially increased requirements for supplies from
external sources to sustain the insurgency. If the Communist forces
could be deprived of access to sources of supply within South Vietnar_,
these requirements could be increased to the point where the capacity
of Communist overland supply routes would be tested and the costs of
furnishing' logistic support to the insurgent forces could be sharply
boosted.
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5. The choice of alternative target systems which might be attacked
is limited. Neutralizations of many of the target choices would have
no direct impact on the course of the war since few of North Vietnam's
military and economic resources are directly committed to the effort.
An additional and fairly severe limitation on the choice of target
systems results from the early stage of escalation in the present con-
flict. Without a declaration of war or a much higher degree of escala-
tion,' resort to unrestricted aerial warfare, including mass attacks on
populated areas, does not appear to be a possible course of action at
this time.
Recommendations
1. The US ground rules under which the air campaign against North
Vietnam is waged should undergo drastic revision in order to enable
conventional airstrikes to make a meaningful contribution to the achieve-
ment of the major US objectives.
2. The emphasis in air attacks should be diverted away from the
current low yield targets in the southern regions of North Vietnam and
toward neutralization of military-related targets in the northern part
of the country. However, continued harassment of traffic movements
in the southern regions on a more limited scale would contribute to the
achievement of the overall objectives.
3. The recommended program of air attacks designed to optimize the
furthering of these objectives at this stage of the war in South Viet-
nam would include the following targets. In combination, these attacks
are clearly identified as against military or militarily related targets.
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They are neither directed at nor expected to bring about the collapse
of the regime.
a. First, the neutralization of petroleum storage (POL)
facilities and the Haiphong cement;plant. This should be
done as quickly as possible to maximize effectiveness and
prevent the North Vietnamese from taking countermeasures.
The result would be to present the Communists with a major
problem of military and. economic supply, to complicate
essential reconstruction, and to increase import require-
ments significantly.
b. The neutralization of selected military barracks and
supply facilities if reconnaissance shows them to be in
active use. Again, the attack should be carried out as
quickly as possible since these facilities will probably
be abandoned after the first strike.
c. Following neutralization of these facilities, the
interdiction of the ports by mining, to throw the burden
of military and economic supply primarily onto the rail
lines, which probably would be able to handle all import
requirements. Increased use of coastal and inland water-
ways and highways would be forced to help cope with the
,supply problem, and would in themselves begin to present
more lucrative traffic targets.
d. Following the mining of the ports, the concentra-
tion of bombing attacks on the China-North Vietnam LOC's,
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particularly the key rail targets. This effort, including
24-hour armed reconnaissance against rail, highway, and
coastal and inland water traffic, should begin to bite into
the essential traffic flows needed to keep the economy
functioning normally. The cost of maintaining a flow of
military-economic supplies would be very greatly raised
over current levels.
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THE ROLE OFAIRSTRIKES
IN ATTAINING US OBJECTIVES
IN NORTH VIETNAM
Summary Text
This report presents an analysis of the Rolling Thunder air offensive
against North Vietnam, estimates the physical damage and human casualties
resulting from the air campaign,and analyzes the US/GVN air operations
employed to obtain these effects. Finally, the report evaluates the
potential of air attacks as a weapon to achieve the stated objectives
of the Rolling Thunder program, and recommends alternative courses of
action which we believe to be more promising ways of achieving the
Rolling Thunder objectives. For comparison purposes, we also present
some capsule evaluations of US experience gained from the air wars against
Japan, Germany, and North Korea..
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I. Objectives of the Rolling Thunder Program
The Rolling Thunder program, a systematic but restrained air offen-
sive against selected economic and military targets in North Vietnam,
was begun on 2 March 1965. The basic objectives of the air attacks on
North Vietnam have been made clear in public statements by the President
and other high officials of the US government. These objectives are
(a) to reduce the ability of North Vietnam to support the Communist
insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos; (b) to increase progressively
the pressure on North Vietnam to the point where the regime would decide
it was too costly to continue directing and supporting the insurgency in
the South; and (c) to bolster the confidence and morale of the South
Vietnamese.
II. The Logistics Target System*
North Vietnam's major contribution to the war in the South is its
function as control center for the insurgency and the logistic funnel
through which men and material are infiltrated into South Vietnam.
Consequently the attainment of the first objective of Rolling Thunder
hinges almost exclusively on our ability to impede or to stop the flow
of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, or to exact an
increasingly high price for sustaining the logistic effort. The
* See Appendix A.
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logistic target system which must be attacked to meet this objective is
of such a rudimentary nature, and the volume of traffic so small that
conventional air attack, particularly at the levels of 1965, is most
unlikely to be an adequate weapon.
Under present combat conditions the VC/PAVN forces are estimated to
be dependent on external sources for only about 12 tons a day or less
than 20 percent of their total daily logistic requirement. This move-
ment from North Vietnam requires the use of less than 5 percent of the
capacity of the supply corridor through Laos alone. Indeed, the capacity
of this single route can provide the tonnage required from external
sources even if the level of these forces increases by nearly --0 percent
and the intensity of combat reaches a scale more than 10 times its present
level.* Although the capacity of the Communist supply routes could be
severely tested by heavy attacks with air weapons currently available,
we believe the land corridor could supply all logistic requirements even
if the expanded VC/PAVN forces were made completely dependent on foreign
sources. To do so, however, would require a heavy commitment of manpower
and materials to repair damage to lines of communication.
Even if the land route through Laos were successfully interdicted,
* These figures pertain to current projections attributing VC/PAVN main
forces with a capability to build up by the end of 1966 to a level of
155 battalion equivalents fighting once in every 3 days.
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to South Vietnam by sea or from Cambodia. These routes would be adequate
to enable the Communists to maintain their present level of activity,
and to step up the firepower of their forces. These routes would also
support an increase of present forces by as much as 40 percent, provided
the level of fighting remained approximately at its present level.
III. The Rolling Thunder Attack*
A. Factors Conditioning the Nature and Scale of Attacks
The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North Vietnam
has been the most restricted and voluntarily limited air war ever con-
ducted by a major air power. It has been used as a carefully controlled
means of gradual escalation to achieve strictly limited objectives.
Consequently, the program has operated under a set of rigorously defined
ground rules.
Self-imposed restrictions have limited both the choice of targets
and the areas to be bombed. The existence of large restricted areas has
effectively insulated almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's limited modern
industrial economy from air attack; these areas contain 75 percent of
the nation's population.
In addition to area restrictions which limit armed reconnaissance
attacks, there are specific sanctuary areas which are exempt from air
* See Appendix B.
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attack. These areas include a 30-nautical-mile buffer zone along the
Chinese border, a 30-mile radius around the city of Hanoi, and a 10-mile
radius around the city of Haiphong.
Attacks on specific fixed targets are now limited to those
approved in each Rolling Thunder program. These authorizations often
provide additional restrictions limiting the number of strikes against
approved targets or exempting some types of targets from attack. There
is, however, more flexibility in the type of targets for armed reconnais-
sance. A major restriction is the policy decision to avoid civilian
casualties to the extent possible, which has resulted in many targets
outside of the sanctuary areas not being approved for attack.
The overall effect of these area and operational restrictions
has been to grant a critical measure of immunity to the military,
political, and economic assets used in Hanoi's support of the war in the
South. The restrictions also insure an ample flow of military supplies
from North Vietnam's allies. The preconditions established for the num-
ber of strikes and sorties, the methods of attack and the avoidance of
civilian casualties, result in an operational disregard of basic principles
of target selection. Among North Vietnam's target systems not one has
been attacked either intensively or extensively enough to provide a
critical reduction in national capacity. No target system can be
reduced to its critical point under existing rules.
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Finally, the voluntary choice of ground rules which result in
an ineffective air campaign may well give the Hanoi regime an unwarranted
impression of divided counsel within the US government. The even more
limited nature of the US air attacks after the bombing pause may rein-
force Hanoi's possible judgment that this restraint reflects a divisive-
ness and lack of US determination to get on with the war.
B. Analysis of Rolling Thunder Operations
The Rolling Thunder attack on North Vietnam from 2 March 1965
through 19 February 1966 delivered a total of 37,000 tons of ordnance
on more than 140 fixed targets and numerous targets of opportunity. A
total of 42,597 sorties were flown -- approximately 57 percent by the
US Navy, 41 percent by the US Air Force, and 2 percent by the Vietnamese
Air Force. Attack sorties -- strike and flak suppression -- accounted
for over 60 percent of total sorties. In terms of ordnance expended
the Navy-Air Force relationship was reversed with the Air Force account-
ing for 62 percent of the total. This reflects the fact that the average
ordnance load of sorties flown by the Air Force is slightly more than
twice the average load for sorties flown by the Navy. Or stated differ-
ently, the Navy must fly twice as many sorties to deliver a given weight
of ordnance in the target area.
A total of 181 aircraft and 154 men were lost. The estimated
cost of ordnance expended, aircraft lost, and sorties overhead comes
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470 million. The assessable return from this
3 million in damage to economic and military facilities in
All but 30 of the current JCS Target List targets that are
outside sanctuary areas exempt from attack, have been struck. Thus, the
opportunities for striking, within existing restrictions, new and
important fixed targets are extremely limited. Due to the lack of
fresh fixed targets, armed reconnaissance is constituting an increasing
share of the total Rolling Thunder attack. Armed reconnaissance has
accounted for over 72 percent of total sorties flown and has delivered
68 percent of the ordnance expended. by Rolling Thunder, but has accounted
for only 21 percent of the estimated cost of damage to North Vietnam.
The targets struck on armed reconnaissance usually involve lower restora-
tion costs than do fixed targets, so the effectiveness of the program
must be measured primarily in military, political, and psychological
terms, rather than economic.
The analysis of the air effort against North Vietnam in relation
to total air activities in the Vietnamese war shows rather strong fluctua-
tions in the weekly level of activity. This analysis suggests that
fluctuations in the level of activity against the North may reflect a
need to temporarily shift aircraft from attack on North Vietnam to sup-
port ground operations in South Vietnam or to attack targets in Laos.
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There is a direct connection between losses and numbers of
sorties flown, but the ratio of loss to sorties is higher for fixed
target strike sorties than for armed reconnaissance strike sorties.
The air attack capability in the Southeast Asian area, as
indicated by performance in December 1965, stands at about 630 sorties
per day, or more than 26,000 tons of ordnance per month. This capa-
bility is directed against the three principal target areas -- South
Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos -- as military and political require-
ments dictate. During the latter part of 1965 approximately 20 percent
of the total air attack on the three areas was directed against North
Vietnam.
IV. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program
A. Physical Effects
The estimated dollar cost for the restoration of economic and
military targets attacked in the Rolling Thunder campaign is less than
10 percent of the value of the economic aid given to North Vietnam in
recent years by Communist countries.
* See Appendix C.
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Restoration Costs of Facilities
Attacked by the Rolling Thunder Program
Economic Military Total
Attacks on
fixed targets 23.6 26.4 50
Armed. reconnais-
sance missions 12.8 0.7 13
Total 361
21
L
Each month there has been a decreasing return in terms of bomb
damage as fewer fixed targets outside the restricted area are available
for attack and armed reconnaissance accounts for a greater share of the
total air effort. The return has been particularly small since the
resumption of-bombing due to confining the effort to the low value
target system in the southernmost parts of North Vietnam.
About 57 percent of the total damage -- $36 million -- is attribut-
able to the destruction of economic targets. This cost has been broadly
distributed throughout the economic sector and no one sector has been
forced to bear unacceptably high levels of damage. In terms of national
capacity the greatest damage was inflicted on electric power and petroleum
storage facilities. These target systems lost 27 percent and 17 percent,
respectively, of their national capacity. In each case, however, the
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target system had adquate cushion in the form of excess capacity to
withstand these attacks and to maintain economic activity at almost
normal levels .
The damage to military facilities is just over $27 million.
Almost 60 percent of this damage was to military barracks. The effect
of this damage has been negligible. The damage to military targets has
shown a definite downward trend since the peak month of July 1965.
Other than losses of equipment the damage to military facilities
has prompted the abandonment of installations such as air fields and the
dispersal of equipment and supplies normally stored in ammunition and
supply depots.
B. Casualties
The United States has placed restrictions on the air offensive
against North Vietnam in order to minimize civilian casualties. It has
been to North Vietnam's interest to assert otherwise, however, and
propaganda media attempt to give the impression that the air offensive
has been a vicious and unrestrained. assault on the civilian population,
hospitals, schools and other non-military objectives. Nevertheless,
in only one instance have Hanoi officials presumed to provide a total
for 'the number of casualties. In September, Egyptian journalists were
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told that total casualties were 75,000, including 40,000 killed and
35,000 wounded. No procedures devised in this report for the purpose
of estimating casualties can support a figure of this magnitude.
Although the Rolling Thunder program has flown many thousands
of attack sorties against targets in North Vietnam, the toll in human
casualties has been light. Through the end of 1965 North Vietnamese
casualties -- both civilian and military -- ranged. from 11,700 to 14,800
divided about equally between killed and wounded.
About 55 percent of these casualties were military personnel.
The strikes against JCS-designated fixed targets produced about two
military for each civilian casualty, whereas the armed reconnaissance
missions produced proportionately greater civilian casualties.
Casualties Resulting from Rolling Thunder
Military Civilian
Total
Attacks on
fixed targets 3,900 to 4,700 1,700 to 2,400
5,600 to 7,100
Armed reconnais-
sance missions 2,600 to 3,200 3,500 to 4,500
6,100 to 7,700
Total 6,500 to 7,900 5,200 to 6,900 1
1,700 to 14800
The civilians killed or injured by armed reconnaissance attacks
were for the most part truck drivers or transport and construction
workers rather directly engaged in maintaining the logistic pipeline
to South Vietnam.
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Approximately 3,000 civilian deaths (one-half of total civilian
casualties) as a result of military action against North Vietnam is a
small number. The impact of 3,000 civilian casualties is slight in a
country where over 350,000 persons died in 1965 from other causes and where
the accidental deaths alone produced casualties some three to five times
greater than those resulting from the Rolling Thunder program.
C. North Vietnamese Countermeasures
The economic and military damage sustained has presented an
increasing but still moderate bill to Hanoi, which in large measure can
be (and has been) passed along to Moscow and Peiping.
The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam has been to
force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic activity, particu-
larly in transportation and distribution. Reconstruction efforts have
been hampered by difficulties in allocating manpower. The regime has
relocated large elements of its urban population. Problems in the dis-
tribution of food have appeared, although these problems are not yet
pressing. The major effect of the bombing has been in the effort re-
quired to keep roads and railroads open and sustain the flow of supplies
to the South. The regime has been singularly successful in effecting
countermeasures against US interdiction efforts.
Much of the damage has been to installations which the North
Vietnamese do not need to sustain the military effort. No attempt to
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restore petroleum storage facilities has taken place and only recently
have there been indications of intent to repair some of the damaged
electric power stations. In both cases the failure to restore or
repair is explained by the existence of adequate excess capacity and
the fact that the major and vital facilities have not been attacked.
A similar phenomenon is noted in the absence of repair of
military facilities. The military have chosen not only the outright
labandonment of facilities such as barracks, but also the dispersal of
the material usually stored in ammunition and supply depots.
An examination of destroyed and damaged facilities shows that
only a small number were truly essential to the war effort. The major
essential restoration has consisted of measures to keep traffic moving,
to keep the railroad yards operating, to maintain communications, and to
replace transport equipment and equipment for radar and SAM sites. These
measures have probably been effected at a cost of between $4 million and
$5 million or between 5 and 10 percent of the total economic and military
damage sustained in North Vietnam to date.
The increasing Soviet and Chinese commitments to sustain the
flow of military and economic aid to North Vietnam imply an obligation
to underwrite the economic restoration of the country on a grant basis
or on favorable terms. This assurance is almost certainly a controlling
determinant in Hanoi's attitude toward the loss of its economic facilities.
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In the Korean War, similar economic losses did not deter P'yongyang
during the conflict, and restoration assistance was provided by both
China and the USSR.
Support of the insurgency in the South has been only indirectly
affected by the bomb damage. North Vietnam's major inputs to the conflict
in the South are its provision of military leadership and manpower and its
function as the control center and logistic base for the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese force. North Vietnam serves essentially as the logistic
funnel through which the flow of military supplies, particularly weapons
and ammunition from the USSR and China, is maintained.
Despite the concentration of Allied attacks in the South and
in Laos and the resumption of bombing in the North, the movement of
trucks during the current dry season along the infiltration routes
through Laos is twice the level of a year ago, and the North Vietnamese
are using larger trucks with heavier loads. If this movement is sustained,
the volume of supplies available for onward movement to South Vietnam --
some 50 to 70 tons a day -- will be at least three times the level sus-
tained in 1965. The North Vietnamese through intensive efforts have
increased the capacity of the lines of communication and made them less
vulnerable to air attack. New bypasses and ferries now circumvent bombed
bridges, old roads and trails have been improved, and new roads have been
been constructed. In several instances roads previously limited to dry
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season operation now have an all-weather capability. The current and
projected. dry season capacity of the route through Laos is adequate to
accommodate a buildup of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main force
of at least 40 percent and. an intensity of combat more than 10 times
the present level.
This ability to react and to offset the effects of the air
attacks has not been without its costs. It is estimated that the diver-
sion of manpower to tasks associated with dispersal programs and emergency
repair and maintenance of lines of communication throughout North Vietnam
may require the full time services of 200,000 workers (equivalent to
about 10 percent of the nonagricultural labor force). An additional
150,000 people are also obligated, on a part-time basis, to serve in
various aspects of civil defense which take them away from their normal
pursuits. Thus a significant share of the labor force is diverted in
varying degrees to supporting the war in the South.
D. Effect on North Vietnam's Allies
In response to the intensified US and Vietnamese air offensive
in 1965, all countries of the Communist camp have extended economic
assistance as proof of their support. The response on the part of North
Vietnam's allies, however, has been more unstinting in political and
economic support and much more restrained in the military field. The
major economic and military aid programs have been undertaken by the
USSR and Communist China. The Eastern European Communist countries
have generally extended only token amounts of assistance.
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Total assistance extended by China and the USSR in 1965 is in
the order of $250 million to $400 million, of which military aid
accounted for $150 million to $200 million. This aid is a relatively
insignificant drain on the capabilities of both countries. In 1965, for
example, the value of military equipment and of economic aid provided to
less developed countries of the Free World by the USSR was more than
twice that supplied to North Vietnam in the same period.
The USSR is by far the major source of military equipment for
North Vietnam, supplying 70 to 95 percent, or $142 million, of the
total provided in 1965. The major components of Soviet military aid
were SAM sites (15 to 20), antiaircraft guns (1,000 to 1,200), planes
(44), motor vehicles (2,600), and radar and jet fuel. China's identified
military aid, totaling only $11 million, consisted principally of planes
(8) and trucks (1,400). Military aid from the Eastern European Communist
countries -- consisting principally,of small arms and ammunition, medicines
and medical equipment, and some trucks -- is valued at only a few million
dollars.
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V. The Potential of Air Attacks Against North Vietnam*
The Rolling Thunder Program has been relatively ineffective because
of three basic factors: (1) the negligible contribution of the economic
plant in North Vietnam to the military effort in the South; (2) the
highly restrictive (and militarily irrational) ground rules under which
the program must operate; and (3) the fragmentation of the air attack
on a variety of military and economic target systems, with the greatest
weight of bombing being expended in a comparatively invulnerable rudi-
mentary transport network in the southern part of North Vietnam.
If the effectiveness of the campaign is to be raised significantly,
two fundamental changes must be made. The first is a basic change in
ground rules to remove area and target limitations. The second is a
more rational use of basic principles of target selection.
A. Some Principles of Target Selection
The following principles of target selection apply to the analysis
of any industry or service that is being considered as a potential target
system because of its contribution to military output or to the sustaining
of military operations.
1. Use Pattern
This factor covers the extent to which a particular system really
contributes to military output or to military operations, to civilian uses,
* See Appendix D.
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to export, and so forth. Certain of these uses are essential and others
are nonessential. The more detail in which a use pattern can be analyzed
the more illuminating the process becomes.
2. Depth
This factor covers the travel time of a product from the
point of manufacture to the front line strength of the enemy. The travel
time or lead time on the steel industry, for example, to the front line
is probably on the order of a year or more, whereas the aircraft assembly
can be measured in terms of a few months.
3. Cushion
This factor includes a variety of considerations such as the
extent to which pre-attack consumption must be cut back before essential
requirements are affected, the extent to which, the enemy can employ a
substitute, the size of stocks, goods in the pipeline, and the like. The
most important factor with respect to cushion is the determination of the
so-called "critical point," which is the point to which the output of the
target industry or service may be reduced without serious effect. Below
the critical point the effects begin to be felt with increasing impact.
ii. Target Vulnerability
This factor covers the appraisal of the physical vulnerability
of a potential target system to attack by existing military means. The
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size of weaponry available and needed, the level.of bombing accuracy
which is achievable, the physical hardness of the target, and other
pertinent considerations enter into this calculation.
5. Recuperation
This factor covers both the time and size of effort needed to
repair or replace the essential parts of a damaged target system. The
enemy's existing production of standard machine tools, for example, may
be so large that a few day's output would provide all the equipment
needed to retool a target industry.
6. The Principle of Concentration
This factor is of overriding importance in attacks on either
tactical or strategic target systems. The principle of concentration
fixes attention on two primary factors:
a. The essentiality of taking on all or the major part of
any target system under attack, in order to cut through the cushion.
b. The essentiality of concentrating the attack in point
of time to overwhelm the ability to reconstruct or repair.
B. Fragmentation of Attacks
The spreading of bomb tonnage over a great variety of military
and economic target systems but attacking no one of these in depth has
been characteristic of the Rolling Thunder Program. The unattacked
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targets represent, for any one system, more than adequate capacity to
meet all essential requirements. The attacks on major target systems
in some cases have been phased over such long periods of time that
adequate readjustments to meet the disruption had been effected.
C. The Military Significance of North Vietnam
The military significance of North Vietnam is measurable in terms
of three basic functions which it carries on in support of the conduct
of military activities in South Vietnam: (1) a logistic funnel for the
stockage and movement of supplies into South Vietnam; (2) a source of
manpower; and (3) a control center for the direction of insurgency.
1. The Logistic Funnel
The North Vietnamese economy, which is basically one of sub-
sistence agriculture, has only a small modern industrial center concen-
trated in a few urban centers, including Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh,
Viet Tri, and Thai Nguyen. The country imports little food even in poor
agricultural years and depends largely on domestic production to feed its
population. Agriculture in 1964 accounted for almost one-half of the
gross national product (GNP). North Vietnam produces only minor items
of military equipment -- grenades, mines, mortars, and ammunition for
small arms -- and must import all of its heavy military equipment and
most of its small arms, ammunition, and medical supplies from Communist
countries.
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2. Manpower
A major aspect of North Vietnam's military significance is
its capacity both to train and to supply insurgent Viet Cong personnel
for later infiltration into South Vietnam and to provide substantial
increments of its own population, to serve in South Vietnam or in
indirect support functions.
North Vietnam has a population of over 18 million. Since
80 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture and is greatly
underemployed, this primitive economy has basically large reserves. A
large-scale mobilization of manpower has reportedly been underway in
North Vietnam during 1965.
The country has about 4 million draft-age males, almost
all of whom have been put in the regular armed force, paramilitary organi-
zations, or labor repair and maintenance battalions. In addition to these
manpower resources, an estimated 175,000 males reach draft age each year,
of which at least 100,000 will be physically fit for military duty.
It is estimated that North Vietnam has the capacity to train
and infiltrate the equivalent of nine North Vietnamese battalions each
month during 1966, or a total of approximately 54,000 men. This estimate
of North Vietnamese capability to infiltrate forces into South Vietnam
is a gross rate only. The net additions to be made to the Communist
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forces in South Vietnam will depend, in addition to decisions on the rate
of North Vietnamese infiltration, on the capability of the Viet Cong to
train new and replacement troops and the casualty rates inflicted upon
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces during the year.
North Vietnam has also demonstrated a capacity to mobilize
large numbers of personnel for activities involved in supporting the
insurgency in the south. The diversion of manpower to tasks associated
with dispersal programs, emergency repair, construction and maintenance
of lines of communication throughout North Vietnam may require the full-
time services of 200,000 workers (equivalent to about 10 percent of the
nonagricultural labor force) and the part-time impressment of another
100,000. An additional 150,000 persons are also obligated, on a part-
time basis, to serve in various aspects of civil defense which take them
away from their normal pursuits. These levies represent a significant
share of the labor force and an admitted cost to North Vietnam in support-
ing the war in the South. This problem does not yet seem to have reached
a critical point.
3. Control Center for Insurgency
The function of North Vietnam as the control center for
Viet Cong insurgency is well documented in intelligence materials.
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The major instrument of political control and direction of
the Viet Cong insurgency is the Lao Dong Party, specifically the Committee
for the Supervision of the South, which is attached to the Party's Central
Committee. The Communist Party of North Vietnam has in effect as its
southern branch, the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese Communist party and government linkage
with the National Liberation Front (NLF) is close and clear. Hanoi main-
tains control over the NLF through the Communist leaders in South Vietnam
to whom the North Vietnamese issue over-all guidance.
The infiltration routes through Laos and into the three
northernmost provinces of South Vietnam apparently are under North Viet-
namese military control and direction. However, Viet Cong Military
Region V headquarters in,South Vietnam shares in the control of infiltra-
tion routes in the Northern province and is probably the major controlling
authority throughout the rest of Military Region V. In Laos the control
of porters and infiltrators is under the 70th Transportation Group, which
is under direct control of the PAVN High Command in Hanoi. At least two
other Transportation groups have been identified in activities to main- 25X1
tain the transport corridors through Laos and in the northern part of
South Vietnam.
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D. The Logistics Target System
1.. Results of the 1965 Campaign
During 1965, more than 4,600 strike and flak suppression
sorties carrying more than 3,400 tons of ordnance were flown against
fixed targets on lines of communication (LOC's) in North Vietnam. Few
of these targets were located on the railroads and roads north and east
of Hanoi. Armed reconnaissance played a very significant additional role
in the program to interdict LOC's, but again concentrated for the most
part in the southern parts of North Vietnam.
These attacks made it more difficult and expensive for
North Vietnam to maintain normal economic activity and to support the
war in the South. Nevertheless overall performance by the modern trans-
port system was maintained at the levels of 1964, even though some impor-
tant export traffic movements -- for example, apatite -- were halted com-
pletely. The transport system directly involved in the movement of
men and materials to Laos and South Vietnam was able to sustain and to
increase the flow of this traffic. At the same time the number of routes
and bypasses was increased, thus making the network less vulnerable to
air attack. The results of the interdiction campaign show clearly that
the original expectation that it would reduce LOC capacity in the southern
part of the country by about two-thirds and even more in the north could
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not be realized. The North Vietnamese had sufficient recuperability
resources so that a two-thirds reduction in capacity was imposed for
only a very short period of time if at all. The most successful inter-
diction -- the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line -- apparently was effective because
of the relatively heavy level of traffic on this line and the fact that
it is one of the few major transport routes without alternative means of
transportation.
on 15 segments route capacity had been
maintained at the same level, on 2 segments capacity had increased, and
on 9 segments capacity had been reduced. Only on two of these nine
segments had capacity been reduced more than 25 percent.
Traffic volume on the major infiltration routes is at levels
substantially below -- only rarely over 25 percent -- even interdicted
route capacities. Bomb damage on these routes is invariably repaired
quickly and inexpensively.
In summary, the rudimentary nature of the logistic targets
in the South, the small volume of traffic moving over them in relation
to route capacities, the relative ease and speed with which they are
repaired, and the extremely high frequency with which they would have
to be restruck -- once every three days -- all combine to make the
logistics network in the South a relatively unattractive target system.
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A significant lesson from the Rolling Thunder program to
date is that the goal of sustained interdiction of the rudimentary road
and trail networks in southern North Vietnam and in Laos will be extremely
difficult and probably impossible to obtain in 1966, given the conventional
ordnance and strike capabilities likely to exist. The ease with which
bypass roads, river crossing, and ferries can be constructed and the
ability to resort to human transport when necessary make these extremely
unprofitable targets. This is borne out by experience in both the Korean
War and the present conflict. In Korea the interdiction program flew
sorties at three times the level of Rolling Thunder against a logistics
target system moving almost 250 times the amount of supplies moving into
South Vietnam. Yet the North Koreans were able to move in their daily
logistic requirement and make significant additions to stockpiles.
The recent effort; in Laos during the bombing pause also
points out the relative ineffectiveness of conventional interdiction
programs against simple high-.capacity logistic systems made up of highway
targets. During the five-week period of the bombing lull in December 1965-
January 1966, 9,000 sorties (8,000 of which were over the Panhandle) were
flown to drop about 18,000 tons of ordnance on the supply routes to
South Vietnam. Despite this effort, the level of truck traffic moving
south on these routes was twice the average of 15 trucks per day moving
south during the same period in 1965. For these reasons, the sortie
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and ordnance expenditure presently used against supply routes in the
South could probably be more effectively used against the more lucrative
LOC targets in the North.
2. A Recommended LOC Target System
The source of logistic supplies not obtainable in South Vietnam
for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces and for North Vietnam's de-
fense forces is the military aid being provided by the USSR and China.
Although the flow of supplies from these sources can not be cut off,
the movement could be made considerably more expensive and unreliable if
authorization is granted to attack intensively the rail connections to
Communist China and if the three major ports are effectively mined,
thereby closing off the movement of oceangoing ships. At the same time,
the flow of imports needed to sustain economic activity could almost
certainly be reduced.
About two-thirds of North Vietnam's imports are carried by
sea transport and the remainder move principally over the rail connection
with Communist China. Mining the entrances to the three major ports
would effectively transfer almost all imports to rail transport. The
rail connection to Communist China, which is currently used at only
about one-third of capacity, would then be forced to attempt to operate
at close to full capacity under interdiction conditions. If production
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in war supporting facilities in North Vietnam, particularly the cement
plant, were halted at the same time, an import requirement would be
generated which would be far in excess of rail capacity. The result
would in effect be the creation of a highly consolidated and concentrated
logistics target which when successfully attacked would yield signifi-
cantly greater results than those obtained by attacking the numerous
small logistic target systems in the southern parts of North Vietnam
and Laos. The logistic target system in the northern part of North
Vietnam would then be more like such a system in a developed economy
at war, and which is required to maintain high levels of both economic
and military traffic. The disruptive effect of interdiction of this
rail system would then be more immediately felt. Sustained inter-
diction of the line would force Hanoi to allocate considerable amounts
of manpower and materials to maintain the line and alternate highway
routes. The repair of major bridge structures would be measurably more
complex and expensive than the relatively simple expedients which keep
traffic moving in the southern provinces and in Laos. Sustained 24-hour
interdiction and destruction of locomotives and rolling stock by armed
reconnaissance would probably stop all daylight traffic and disrupt
night-time traffic, thus slowing down the movement of supplies and making
the logistic resupply of Communist forces considerably less reliable
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than at present. As a result, some economic requirements at least would
go unsatisfied.
The North Vietnamese would probably be forced to make greater
use of alternate means of transport such as coastal and inland waterways.
Although it would be extremely difficult to interdict these systems,
their greater use would increase the opportunities for harassment of
actual traffic movements.
The specific program recommended would include attacks on
29 major bridges and the four principal railroad yards and shops (see
Table 1). The initial strikes against these targets would require an
estimated 1,670 strike and support sorties and 1,560 tons of ordnance.
The restrike effort required to keep these targets interdicted has not
been calculated, but it would involve armed reconnaissance on a.24-hour
basis. An interdiction program only against the two rail connections
to China -- the Hanoi - Lao Cai and Hanoi - Dong Dang lines -- would
require an estimated 750 strike and support sorties monthly. Sustained
interdiction and armed reconnaissance of the land transport targets in
the north would probably require over 3,000 sorties monthly. This
program would stop through traffic on major routes, but more intensive
attacks would probably be necessary to deny the use of these routes for
shuttle service. Attacks on these 33 land transport targets, the major
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portion of which are located on the more heavily used transport routes
of the country, would be much more effective than attacking minor bridges
in the south and other outlying areas, and from the standpoint of identi-
fication would be more easily carried out than attacks on the more
obscured, smaller, and diverse transport targets in the south.
This attack, to be effective, must be combined with the
mining of the three major ports. The mining program would require
initially 104 sorties and only 190 tons of ordnance. The closing of
the ports to oceangoing traffic would throw almost all of North Vietnam's
import traffic onto the rail connection to China. The Hanoi-Dong Dang
line would then be operating at or close to full capacity. If other
essential import requirements were generated by neutralization of
industrial facilities,.such as the Haiphong cement plant, import tl'affic
would then exceed the capacity of the rail line. With only limited high-
way capacity available interdiction of northern transport lines would
then have a more immediate and. direct impact. The flow of military
supplies into North Vietnam and onward to South Vietnam would be slowed
up and made more costly.. Some. economic imports would probably have to
be foregone. In-summary, the North Vietnamese regime would, by this
program, be brought under far stronger pressures from air attacks than
that obtained by the pattern of airstrikes in 1965. This program if
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carried out would place no real restraint on the level of Communist
activity in South Vietnam until their requirements for resupply become
much higher than now estimated.
3. Some Limits to Resupply
The upper limits on the level and cost of logistic support
which the Hanoi regime would be willing to sustain have not been
quantified at this time. Several factors are relevant to the determina-
tion of that level. One factor is the limit to which local labor can be
diverted to maintain the supply lines and support the logistic effort
without an unfavorable impact on essential industrial and/or agric-
ultural production. Substantial additional diversion of labor could
necessitate imports of food to make up for production lost because of a
shortage of farm labor. This could aggravate existing internal distribu-
tion and import programs, particularly if the major ports were closed and
the rail and highway connections to China were being subjected to heavy
interdiction.
A direct influence on logistic needs is the extent to which
allied offensive operations can force the Communists to use supplies at
a higher rate or deny them access to existing stockpiles. If, for example,
the build-up and level of combat projected for the end of 1966 also
involved a total dependence on external sources for supplies, the North
Vietnamese would have to supply about 250 tons a day to the South.
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E. The "Will of the Regime" asa Target System
In North Vietnam, three main factors appear to affect the
determination of the regime to continue to support the war in South
Vietnam: (1) the course of the war itself in the South; (2) the degree
of political and material support for the policy rendered the regime
by its two main allies, the USSR and Communist China; and (3) the
economic, social, and political consequences of supporting the war in
South Vietnam within North Vietnam itself. The effort required in sup-
porting the war in South Vietnam draws very little upon the physical
resources of North Vietnam. The neutralization of given target systems
within North Vietnam does, however, exact an increasing cost as the
price to be paid for supporting the insurgency.
If air attack is to be a significant factor in the attaining
of US objectives a substantial revision must be made in the self-imposed
ground rules. Air attack can increase significantly the price which
North Vietnam pays to continue the war and reduce the ease with which
it carries on its support of the war in the South.
A preliminary ranking has been made of the various possible
target systems with the exception of lines of communication (which is
discussed elsewhere) in a rough order of their importance to the military
effort. This section presents a judgment on the feasibility or desirability
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of subjecting them to air attack at the current stage of the campaign
and evaluates the probable impact of a postulated attack. Estimates
of the forces and ordnance required for attack are presented only for
those target systems which presently are recommended for inclusion in
a revised Rolling Thunder (see Tables 2 and 3). Six target systems
have been considered: (1) the military supply system, (2) the military/
economic system, (3) the modern industrial system, (4+) the command and
control system, (5) an agricultural system, and (6) the manpower system.
Extension of Rolling Thunder at this time is recommended only
to the first two target systems, in addition to the LOC system discussed
separately. The details of these attacks are shown in the tables
included.
1. Military-Supply Targets -- Twenty-six military barracksand/or supply
targets remain unattacked although they are on the JCS target list (see
Table 2). Since almost all of these are in the "sanctuary" areas, the
extent to which they are occupied is not known. If reconnaissance were
to reveal a significant level of activity at these facilities, they would
be valid military targets whose neutralization would impede the flow of
military supplies and disrupt military training programs in North Vietnam.
The barracks on the list are those believed to be associated with military
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training programs in support of the infiltration. The effect would be
increasingly disruptive if other attacks on military/economic and LOC
targets are carried out simultaneously, in order to obtain a maximum
disruption of the flow of essential military supplies into North Vietnam
and their eventual redistribution to military consumers. Virtually
simultaneous attack would be needed for effectiveness, particularly the
barracks attacks. Based on previous experience we can assume that these
barracks will be abandoned after the first strike.
2. Military/Economic Targets
The economic targets'in North Vietnam's modern industrial
base which have a direct bearing on the regime's ability to support the
war in the South are the major bulk petroleum storage facilities and the
Haiphong cement plant (see Table 3). The petroleum storage installations
sustain the supply and distribution activities within North Vietnam and
through Laos, and are vital to the mobility of North Vietnamese military
forces and to distribution and. transport services for the civilian economy.
The Haiphong cement plant as the sole producer'in North Vietnam provides
a major input to both normal construction activity and the intensive
reconstruction and repair programs necessitated by Rolling Thunder attacks.
The extension of a.irstrikes against eight major POL storage
terminals would deprive the regime of all but some 10,000 tons of storage
dispersed in a variety of untargeted locations and some 2,200 tons in
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small buried tanks at seven newly identified dispersed storage
facilities. The planned attacks would eliminate the principal bulk
petroleum terminals in North Vietnam and would preclude the delivery
of petroleum supplies in bulk by tankers.
A minimum of 440 sorties, comprising 280 strike aircraft and
160 support, will probably be required to destroy these facilities. The
ordnance requirement for these targets is estimated to be about 850 tons.
If the attack is to obtain optimum effect, it is imperative
that it be carried out almost simultaneously on all petroleum storage
targets. Simultaneous attack insures the most certain way of eliminating
the cushion represented by excess storage capacity and stocks and thus
reaching the critical point in meeting essential requirements. The loss
of petroleum storage facilities -- and their contents -- would have an
immediate effect on the economy. The effect on normal industrial pro-
duction activities would be slight because most of the industrial enter-
prises in North Vietnam rely on coal or electricity for energy. The
major effect in the civilian economy would be in transportation and
distribution.
A sustained loss of petroleum storage facilities coupled with
an inability to import even minimum operating requirements would have
its greatest effect on military operations. North Vietnamese military
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forces account for about 60 percent of total petroleum consumption, or a
monthly average of about 8,500 tons. North Vietnam with Chinese coopera-
tion would probably be able after an. initial period of disruption to
maintain petroleum imports at almost normal levels even after the
intensified attacks discussed in this report. Therefore, the supply of
essential imports of petroleum for military requirements would appear
to be almost certain.
Nevertheless the attack would compound the difficulties of
maintaining the flow of imports and military aid on the land transport
connections to Communist China. The difficulties would be increased
as attacks on other target systems increased the traffic flows in these
land and coastal water transport routes.
An-attack on the Haiphong cement plant would, by meutralizing
North Vietnam's only producer of cement, create a major impediment to
reconstruction and repair programs at least in the short run. Over the
longer term, cement could be imported from China. The import requirement
could be in the order of 700,000 to 800,000 tons a year to meet all mili-
tary and economic needs, a volume that would require a doubling of the
present tonnage of all seaborne imports. If the cement and all seaborne
imports had to be carried on the rail line from China, the total traffic
volume would be in excess of the normal capacities of the Hanoi - Dong Dang
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rail line and the highway connections to China, and far in excess of
their capacity udder conditions of interdiction.
3. Industrial Targets
North Vietnam's small modern industrial sector contains a
few highly prized and nominally lucrative industrial targets. Principal
among these are the Hanoi machine building plant, the iron and steel
plant at Thai Nguyen, and the Viet Tri chemical combine.
These plants and an additional 11 smaller plants constitute
almost all of the modern industrial targets. They could be taken under
attack by airstrikes involving about 500 sorties and the expenditure
of slightly over 500 tons of ordnance. Alternatively a successful
attack on the main electric power facilities could effectively put almost
all of these plants out of operation.
Such an attack is often postulated as one which by depriving
Hanoi of almost all of its modern economy and the major hallmarks of
its economic progress will persuade the regime to enter into negotiations
to end the war. This outcome is uncertain and probably unlikely. North
Vietnam's modern industrial economy makes almost no direct or significant
contribution to the war effort, which is sustained materially almost
exclusively by supplies from other Communist countries. Since North
Vietnam is.essentially a subsistence economy the modern industrial sector
makes only a limited contribution to economic activity. The loss of
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industrial production would have almost no impact on the great mass of
this agrarian society. The small element of the population directly
affected would hardly be sufficient, or disposed, to persuade the regime
to stop the war. For these reasons an attack on the modern industrial
base of itself would not be likely to attain US objectives.
The experience of the Korean War also supports this judgment.
Korea in 1950 was a country with a population considerably smaller and an
industrial base much larger than that of North Vietnam in 1965. Almost
all of Korea's modern industry was destroyed in the first three months
of the war as part of a program to punish Korea and to force the North
Koreans and Chinese to accept UN truce proposals. Nevertheless this
attack failed to impede seriously the North Korean military or to dissuade
the Chinese from entering the war. In both North Korea and North Vietnam
it is clear that the modern industrial base is too small to serve as a
testing ground for the "hostage" concept of industrial destruction as a
means of deterring aggression.
This potential target system does serve to provide a list
of optional targets for possible use when other air attacks or activities
in'South Vietnam might produce indications of a weakening of Hanoi's
determination to carry on with the war. At such a point, attacks on indus-
trial targets could provide additional psychological pressure on the regime
and the morale of its people.
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is. The Command and Control, Agricultural, and Manpower Targets
The attacks on these targets are not recommended at this time.
In each case the effects of the attacks are debatable and are likely to
provoke hostile reaction in world capitals.
The breaching of the agricultural levees would be extremely
difficult to do successfully and, moreover, would probably be rejected
on humanitarian grounds. Even. if carried out, any resultant loss of food
supplies would fall on the lowest priority groups in the population.
The command and control system consists essentially of
major communications facilities and the national headquarters of the
Ministry of National Defense, and the Party-Government Building Complex
at Hanoi. All of these targets are located in the Hanoi sanctuary. An
attack on them would require about 360 sorties and an estimated 445 tons
of ordnance. The effect of these attacks is debatable. North Vietnam's
reliance on high-frequency radio facilities means that essentially the
communications system for command and control purposes is invulnerable
to air attack. Moreover, known changes in North Vietnam's command and
control system, plans for decentralization and the establishment of
alternate control centers would, if in operation at the time of attacks,
tend to reduce their impact on Hanoi's ability to maintain order and
control. Mass attacks on the major control and command centers which are
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located in densely populated urban areas would provoke a hostile reaction
in other world capitals. For this reason and since the outcome of these
attacks is debatable, this course of action is not recommended at this
time.
The highest price to be imposed in North Vietnam would be
represented by large-scale attacks on cities in order to maximize the
number of casualties among skilled workers, thereby reducing their con-
tribution to mobilization potential and to the maintenance of a viable
economy. No calculations of the numbers of sorties, the volume of ord-
nance, or the probable number of casualties to be achieved by mass attacks
on the eight urban cities have been made. To the extent that the attacks
produce mass casualties and have a sufficiently harmful effect on civilian
morale, the regime might find it increasingly-difficult to continue with
the war and might become more receptive to negotiations. However,
attacks designed solely to produce mass casualties among a civilian popu-
lation would be most difficult to support or justify at this stage of the
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