THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: IMPACT ON YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030019-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 9, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Re*ase 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AW 200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
9 October 1968
SUBJECT: The Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Impact on Yugoslavia
1. Nowhere outside the borders of the victimized country
did the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia evoke greater
indignation and disiaay than in Yugoslavia. Both the fact and
the purpose of the violation of Czech sovereignty by the mili-
tary forces of the Soviet Union and four of its Warsaw Pact
allies were anathema to Belgrade. Moscow's move against
Dubeek's new path of socialist development constituted a
brutal and direct assault on the basic principles underlying
Yugoslav theory and practice with respect to both internal
and foreign affairs. As a result, the Czech crisis is likely
to have a profound and long term impact on Soviet-Yugoslavia
relations, on Yugoslav foreign policy and even on Yugoslavia's
internal scene.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030019-6
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79R00967A1200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
2. Belgrade views the Czech developments as more analagous
to the events of itd d-19118 than to the situation which arose from
the Hungarian revolt. In the fall of 1956, the Yugoslavs de-
nounced the first Soviet intervention in Hungary and blamed the
conditions which led to a popular uprising on the policies
purused by the Soviet Union and by the Rakosi-Gero regimes.
Tito conceded, however, that the second Soviet intervention --
while undesirable 12e r se -- had been justified by the fact that
the alternative was abandonment of the country to reactionary
forces. Belgrade firmly denies that such extenuating circum-
stances existed with respect to Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
President Tito cautioned the Soviets against military interven-
tion as early as April. When the Soviets chose to ignore this
advice, Belgrade made its position clear in Government and Party
pronouncements. Socialism had been gravely compromised through
the actions of the forces of "bureaucratic statism." There
will be "far-reaching and very negative effects on the whole
revolutionary movement in the world."
Yugoslav Relations with the Soviet Bloc
3. Since the signing of the Moscow Agreement, there have
been fluctuations in the level of Soviet-Yugoslav polemics.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A` W 200030019-6
For the present, both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have reasons
for attempting to avoid an abrupt worsening of their already
strained relations. The Yugoslavs, among other considerations,
no doubt hope to postpone and minimize the impact of the dispute
on their economic relations with the USSR. The Soviets may well
consider it best to let the dust of the Czech events settle
further before launching a more vigorous campaign against
Belgrade.
4. Signs of restraint on either side, however, should
not be interpreted as evidence that Soviet-Yugoslav rapport will
gradually be restored to a relatively warm level. The issues at
stake for both parties are far too fundamental to permit the
graceful retirement of their dispute into the background. The
Yugoslavs are crusaders, firmly convinced of the universal
validity of their views on socialist development and interna-
tional relations. They may be expected to continue to defend
their position vigorously against Soviet and Soviet-inspired
criticism and actively to seek support within the Communist
movement and among sympathetically-inclined states throughout the
world. Their actions at home, at the United Nations and in the
conduct of their bilateral relations are sure to keep the pot
-3-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79R00967AIM200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
simmering, no matter how mildly and diplomatically speeches,
communiques, or resolutions may be phrased. On the other
hand, not only does Moscow deem Yugoslav "revisionist" theory
and practice to be dangerous and heretical, but the entire
Soviet leadership collective has been tarred by Belgrade's
interpretation and condemnation of the Czech invasion. Rela-
tions between Yugoslavia are likely to deteriorate further and
to remain strained for some time to come.
If the Soviets succeed in convening a world conference
of Communist parties within the next several months, they are
likely to attempt to use it as a sounding board for political-
ideological attacks on the Yugoslav Party. Similar attacks at
the 1957 Moscow Conference were a major factor contributing to
the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to sign the Declaration
of Twelve Ruling P-:rties issued at the close of that meeting.
Shortly thereafter, Belgrade foniialized its "revisionist" doctrine
in the Party Program adopted at the Seventh Congress of the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Punishment was swift in
coming. The Soviets virtually excommunicated the Yugoslavs from
the Communist movement for a second time, applied severe economic
sanctions, and permitted (or persuaded) the Hungarians to execute
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A9e1200030019-6
Irnre Nagy and to openly implicate Belgrade in the Hungarian
revolt. The events of a decade ago may well repeat themselves,
at least in part, for the Yugoslavs are once again preparing
to hold a significant and controversial Party Congress.
6. The date of the Ninth Congress of the LCY has yet to
be definitely set, but the election of delegates Will take place
in late Noverlber. The Congress is expectdd to approve and give
further impetus to the program of Party reforms initiated since
the Rankovic ouster, reforms resembling and going beyond those
which the Soviets felt compelled to block in Prague. The Soviet
Union's heavy-handed actions in Czechoslovakia have done nothing
to weaken the resolve or the arguments of the forces favoring
liberalization in Yugoslavia, and the results of the LCY Congress
(whether it is held before or after the projected Moscow Conference)
are most unlikely to be pleasing to Moscow. Unless difficulties
at (or in connection with) the Moscow Conference or shifts in
Soviet leadership lead the Kremlin to adopt a more tolerant
stance,this is the point at trhich Soviet-Yugoslav relations
could well take a further turn for the worse.
7. As in 1958, economic sanctions are available (including
cancellation of credits affecting the joint Yugoslav-Rumanian
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A M200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Iron Gates Project) and Belgrade can again be aceused of collab-
orating with counterrevolutionary elements in a fraternal
socialist country. In view of the relative ineffectiveness of
past economic sanctions against Yugoolavia and the potentially
adverse impact of such measures on Soviet influence and objectives
in the Third World, Moscow may move more subtly with respect
to economic pressures than it did in 1958, placing more emphasis
on measures in the Party arena. Nevertheless, given the hardening
view on ideological matters in the Kremlin and Belgrade's total
loss of confidence in the Soviet leadership, the resulting
deepended chill in Soviet-Yugoslavia relations is likely to last
much longer and to have greater side-effects than was the case
10 years ago.
8. Belgrade's criticism of the Warsaw Pact has become harder
and more explicit in the wake of the Czech events and will probably
remain so. This development will not lead the Yugoslavs to
abandon their negative appraisal of NATO, but some abatement of
Belgrade's previously fairly virulent anti-NATO campaign is to
be expected. Yugoslavia's bilateral relations With Warsaw Pact
stalwarts, Poland, the GDR and Bulgaria will, of course, be
affected by most of the considerations affecting the level of
tension between Belgrade and Moscow. While a change of leadership
- 6 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Re ase 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AQ 1200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
in Warsaw could result in a gradual improvement in the state
of Yugoslav-Polish ties, special problems -- the question of
relations with the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand
and the Macedonian issue on the other -- will continue to
aggravate matters with respect to Pankow and Sofia. In general,
Yugoslav relations with all three countries may be expected to
worsen significantly. Whether or not the USSR and its closest
collaborators eventually apply formal economic sanctions, the
Yugoslavs will have an incentive to try once again to shift
more of their trade to the West.
9. The Yugoslavs have openly stated their conviction that
the forces of bureaucratic statism in the Bloc have allied them-
selves with the forces of chauvinism and are exploiting old
national rivalries in the pursuit of their hegemonic goals.
The revival of Bulgarian claims concerning Macedonia is thus viewed
in a broad and sinister context, and cynical note was made of
the historical connection between various parts of Czechoslovakia
and the Warsaw Pact countries whose troops were assigned to
occupy them. Although the Czech territory occupied by Hungarian
troops has been cited in connection with the latter point, and
despite past difficulties with Budapest over territorial issues,
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Re#esse 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967ASQ+1200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Belgrade appears to feel that Hungarian motives and actions
with respect to the Czech events should be viewed with a degree
of sympathy and understanding for the "'special considerations"
which limited the options open to the Kadar regime. Relations
between Yugoslavia and Hungary may well remain on a relatively
cordial level, strengthening concern in Moscow over the con-
tinuing threat to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe posed by
Yugoslav ideas about sovereignty and liberalization.
10. Belgrade will, of course, retain its intense interest
in Czech political and economic developments, but the extent to
which plans for wide-ranging cooperation -- announced during Tito's
visit to Prague in early August -- can be implemented will depend
upon the limitations and changes imposed by the occupying forces.
For some time to come, both Belgrade and Prague are likely to be
cautious in reaching any cooperative arrangehients which would risk
exceeding the limits of Soviet tolerance.
YUgosla;r Relations with Rumania
11. Belgrade has long viewed Bucharoot'o efforts to assert
its independence from Moscow with sympathy and approval. Despite
sharply differing approaches to internal matters and to the Arab-
Israeli dispute, Yugoslav-Rumanian relations have grown steadily
warmer over the past four years. The Czech crisis, with its
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Reuse 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
threatening implications for the security and independence of
both countries, has pushed Yugoslavia and Rumania even closer
together. Despite this new "common danger," cooperation in
defense matters is likely to remain only the subject of tacit
understanding. A formal agreement would have little deterrent
value and would present both parties with serious problems.
Not the least of these would be the risks involved in an action
which would clearly involve a violation of the terms of the Warsaw
Pact by Ru iania.
12. The Rumanians, intimidated by the threat of possible
Soviet intervention, have recently begun to exhibit considerable
caution with respect to statements or actions which might further
aggravate its relations with its fraternal Warsaw Pact allies.
Bucharest's campaign to demonstrate and strengthen popular support
for the Party and Government is, of course, intended to deter the
Soviets from attempting a "Czech solution" in Rumania, but it
also suggests that the Rumanian regime hopes to be able to resume
a relatively indeperndont stance once the inniediate external threat
to its survival subsides. Barring further Soviet moves to bring
Ceausescu to heel, Rumania will probably continue its active
cooperation with Yugoslavia in economic and (with respect to-the
uropean area) foreign policy matters. However, Bucharest is
-9-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Remise 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AQ 200030019-6
likely to be reluctant for some time to furnish the Soviets
with fresh and dramatic evidence of its questionable loyalty
to the Warsaw Pact. Belgrade has already indicated its be-
lief that Rumania should be extended an invitation to the
projected third siinmit conference of nonaligned countries.
In the face of almost certain Soviet opposition to active
Rumanian participation in such a meeting, Bucharest may attempt
to discourage any efforts aimed at inclusion of its name on the
invitation list.
Yugoslav Relations with Albania
13. Them are recent signs that, despite considerable
animosity between the two countries, stemming from both terri-
torial and ideological issues, Soviet action against Czechoslovakia
has induced Yugoslavia and Albania to bury the hatchet, at least
temporarily. A high official of the Yugoslav State Secretariat
for Foreign Affairs recently noted that Albania has completely
halted its anti-Yugoslav campaign in the wake of the Czech events.
He added that the Albanians had unofficially raised the question of
improving relations and that Belgrade had responded with an official
statement to the effect that the Yugoslav Government respects the
independence of Albania as essential to peace in the Ball ans.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Reese 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AQW200030019-6
S-E-C -R-E-T
Clearly, both'sides are interested in a normalization of relations
for understandable pragmatic reasons.
lea. There are a number of factors which will operate to
limit the extent of Yugoslav-Albanian rapprochement and perhaps
to erode the durability of any modus vivendi. These include
Albania's basically unchanged position on the evils of Yugoslav-
type revisionism, the influence Peking can exercise over Tirana
and the heritage of past animosity. Nevertheless, concrete but
relatively undramatic steps toward normalization of relations,
such as exchange of trade delegations,, negotiation of border traf-
fic agreements, and expansion of transport links, may be expected
to be taken by both sides in the coming months. The observation
of a Yugoslav official that such measures will have to precede
any negotiations for broader cooperation is probably a realistic
appraisal of the situation. Albania will probably continue to shun
direct attacks on Yugoslav political and economic practices for the
time being, but it will find it difficult to avoid tarring Bel-
grade indirectly in its persistent attacks on revisionism. In
the long run, the level and stability of Yugoslav Albanian
rapprochement is likely to depend largely on the degree of the
threat which, in the Judgment of Belgrade and Tirana, continues to
be posed to their political and economic interests by the Soviet
Union and its hard-line Warsaw Pact allies.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Re%ase 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AS (200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Yugoslav Relations with the Third World
15. After a period of about two years of relative inactivity,
Yugoslavia renewed its efforts to mobilize the badly-divided forces
of nonalignment in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Begun
within the framework of the United Nations, where it met with only
limited success, this activity soon led Belgrade to propose the
convening of a third nonaligned summit where the developing coun-
tries of three continents (plus a few sympathetic "independent"
European powers) could be rallied against the threat posed to
their sovereignty by the policies of force and intervention at-
tributed to members of an "imperialist conspiracy." Soviet action
against Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia's response subsequently
served to enhance Belgrade's prestige and influence in the Third
World,, to give renewed appeal to the often-maligned policy of
nonalignment, and to alter expectations concerning the course and
outcome of the projected nonaligned summit. Yugoslav resolve to
revitalize and expand the nonaligned grouping has been strength-
ened. Tito himself, speaking hard on the heels of the Czech
invasion, stated that the actions undertaken by the Warsaw Pact
Powers had added new urgency and significance to preparations for
the new nonaligned conference. Moscow recognizes that, given
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Redp,ase 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AQW200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Belgrade's influence and the widespread critical reaction to the
Czech invasions the proceedings and results of such a conference
could be most painful.
16. During the past three years, Yugoslavia has devoted an
increasingly larger share of its foreign policy effort to Europe
and North America. Pressing economic and political considerations
suggest that these areas will continue to receive high priority
and. that Belgrade will lose no opportunity to advance its campaign
to gain support for nonalignment and broad regional cooperation in
Europe. Nevertheless? within the limits of its resources, Yugo-
slavia will probably endeavor to expand its economic and political
relations with Afro-Asian and Latin American nations. Despite
relatively disappointing results in the field of economic coopera-
tion with these countries in recent years, the prospect of the
possible curtailment of Belgrade's trade with the East requires
that no opportunities for the development or expansion of markets
for Yugoslav exports elsewhere be overlooked. In addition, Bel-
grade has new cause to seek the widest possible international
support for its policies. While the Yugoslavs will continue to
-13 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Release 200710 /(6 t_Ch}ATRDP79R00967A 200030019-6
work to curtail Chinese influence in the Third World, they cannot
help but tread on Soviet toes as well by fanning distrust of
Moscow's motives, tactics, and doctrine. The Soviets can take
some consolation from the fact that in a number of cases pragmatic
considerations will outweigh the doubts raised by Belgrade and
that several of the Afro-Asian countries in which they have the
greatest strategic interest will probably continue to exhibit
respect for Moscow's sensitivities. Nonetheless, Belgrade's
activities among the nonaligned and underdeveloped nations are
likely to raise new problems for the Soviets in such international
forums as the United Nations as well as in their relations with
individual Third World countries.
Relations with the West
17. Yugoslavia has long sought to maintain broad economic
and, where possible, political contacts and. cooperation with the
countries of Western Europe and North America. The deterioration
of Yugoslav-Bloc relations is likely to spur an intensification
of this effort, particularly in the economic field, and to move
Yugoslavia somewhat closer to the West. For example, Belgrade is
likely to step up its campaign to attract foreign private capital
into the country and to encourage joint projects in third countries
- 14 -
S-E-C-R. E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Re#Wse 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AQQ 200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
by Yugoslav and Western firms. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs
have given notice of their intention to adhere to their policy
of nonalignment, and unless the Soviet threat to Yugoslav security
becomes acute, Belgrade is unlikely to seek a revival of the full
range of formal and informal security arrangements which linked
it to the West in the early 1950's. Yugoslavia may be expected,
however, to take steps to improve its relations with Greece and to
seek ways to reduce its dependence on Soviet military equipment
and supplies.
18. Yugoslavia cannot be expected to abandon its public
criticism of the Vietnam War or its firm support of Nasser's cause
in the Middle East. Nonetheless, foreign policy pronouncements
emanating from Belgrade on these and other sensitive issues are
likely to have a more balanced ring. While unwilling to compromise
on "matters of principle," the Yugoslavs are genuinely interested
in strengthening their bridges to the West. Despite Belgrade's
fear that a revival of anticommunist feeling in Europe and the
United States in reaction to the Czech events may make this goal
more difficult to achieve, prospects for a further broadening and
improvement of Yugoslavia's relations with the West appear rela-
tively bright.
- 15 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Rels se 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79R00967AQW200030019-6
S-E-C-.R--E-T
Internal Impact
1_9. Yugoslavia's 1963 Constitution set the environment for
the country's latest round of economic, political and, after long
delay, Party reforms. Belgrade, true to its allegiance to the
principle of "separate roads to socialism," modestly denies that
the Yugoslav model is transferrable -- intact and in detail to other countries. The architects of the Yugoslav experiment
are convinced, however -- now more than ever -- that the general
direction in which they have been guiding the country represents
the wave of the future for socialism. Decentralization and
democratization of the political and economic decision-making
process is essential to socialist development. The role and
organization of the Party must be adjusted accordingly. These
facts will eventually be understood and accepted by all. As Tito
noted shortly after the Czech invasion, "it was not by accident"
that Czechoslovakia had embarked on a path similar to that already
being travelled by Yugoslavia.
20. General indignation over the fact and probable conse-
quences of the Warsaw Pact invasion is likely to have strengthened
the position of the "liberals" in the Yugoslav Party and Government
and to have increased the chances that Tito's successors will be
- 16 -
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Reuse 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79R00967AOW200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
able to assume control of the country and to continue his internal
policies without a major upheaval. Though conservative opposition
still exists, the unofficial guidelines recently issued concerning
the type of delegate who should be elected to the Ninth Party
Congress suggest that the process of political and. economic reform
may even be accelerated.
21. Yugoslavia's long-standing and troubling nationalities
problem is intertwined with the general and not too clearly defined
liberal-conservative division within the country. A number of
factors, principally economic issues, have led to a resurgence of
national rivalries in recent years. Understandably alarmed,
Belgrade has taken a number of steps both to satisfy regional
demands and to repress "chauvinist" tendencies. The Warsaw Pact
potrers which invaded Czechoslovakia have already attempted to
exploit these old national antagonisms to weaken support for
Tito's regime and policies. But the Czech invasion and its after-
math will probably result in the easing of Yugoslavia's nationality
problem for a while. First of all, the possibility that the Soviet
Union might attempt military intervention in Yugoslavia has prompted
most factions to close ranks behind Tito. This development has,
of course, been encouraged by the campaign Belgrade has mounted
-17-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6
 Approved For Refee to 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967ABU200030019-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
with respect to strengthening the country's defensive capability.
Secondly, Belgrade has drawn public attention to Soviet efforts
(real and alleged) to exploit chauvinist sentiments in the pursuit
of their great per objectives. This, plus the lessons learned
from Czech behavior in the face of armed invasion and. occupation,,
will probably serve to reinforce the feeling that regional dif-
ferences roust not be allowed to weaken national unity in these
dangerous times.
- 18-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030019-6