REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGIC WARNING (S)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100020015-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 2, 1967
• Content Type: MF

Approved For REWe 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP79R009671 1100020015-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
D E F E N S E I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
Washington D.C. 20301
0
P
Y
s-oo64/AP-4
2 Mar 1967
SUBJECT: Request for Preparation of Special National Intelligence
Estimate on Chinese Communist Strategic Warning (S)
TO: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
1. (S) CINCPAC has recommended a Special National Intelligence
Estimate on the likely extent of advance strategic warning in the
event of the introduction of large-scale Chinese Communist combat
forces into Southeast Asia. The recommended SNIE would deal only
with the introduction of large-scale Chinese combat forces into
Southeast Asia from the current posture but within a time frame
of the next year or two. CINCPAC looks for a SNIE similar in
scope to NIE 11-10-66 ("Warning of Soviet Intention to Attack"),
dated 18 August 1966.
2. (S) The question of strategic warning from the USSR has been
addressed in NIE 11-10-66. Peking's growing military capabilities,
coupled with recent developments, suggest the advisability of a
counterpart estimate on China, dealing with the possible move
suggested by CINCPAC. While estimates consistently attach little
likelihood to this eventuality, the possibility of an excursion
to divert attention from internal problems cannot be ruled out
during the current turmoil in China. With the introduction of
AAA and logistical support units and railroad troops into North
Vietnam during the past months, a foundation may have been laid
permitting a larger-scale move into Southeast Asia with little or
no warning.
3. (C) It is believed that a Special National Intelligence
Estimate -- as recommended by CINCPAC -- is the appropriate
vehicle for this consideration, since it would provide the considered
judgment of the intelligence community. The limitation of the
proposed estimate to operations in a specific area and to a rela-
tively short time frame would suggest, in this case, a SNIE rather
than a NIB,
4. (S) The-enclosure lists certain questions which are implied in
the CINCPAC recommendation and could be addressed in the SNIE. Other
questions would no doubt come to mind later.
~DL P Vieyy Completed ] /s/ 1 Enclosure
JOSEPH F. CARROLL Suggested Questions to be Addressed in
Lieutenant General, USAF a SNIE on Chinese Communist Strategic
Director Warning (S) 1 cy
S-E-C-R-E-T
Annrnved For Release 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP7 R00967A001100020015-2
 Approved For Rose 2007/05/15: CIA-RDP79R0096711 100020015-2
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN A SNIE
ON CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGIC WARNING
1. (S) Has the introduction of Chinese Communist units into North
Vietnam over the past months laid the foundation for introducing
large forces of combat troops with little or no warning?
2. (S) Do the China "indicators," considered over time, indicate
that China is in a high state of readiness? Or can they, viewed in
their entirety, be considered as logical developments or normal pre-
cautions that an alert nation would take in view of the Vietnam war?
3, (c) Should the current turmoil alter our previous judgments?
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
Encl 1 to S-0064/AP-4