THE EXPULSION FROM EGYPT - SOME CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOVIETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 29, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
1
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
The Expulsion from Egypt - Some Consequences for the Soviets
Secret
29 August 1972
Copy No.
,7x-
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
29 August 1972
SUBJECT: The Expulsion from Egypt -- Some Consequences
for the Soviets
For years, the picture of the Soviet role in the
Middle East has been one of spreading influence, increasing
presence, and ever more ambitious aims. The Soviets met
occasional setbacks and proceeded opportunistically, by
fits and starts, but the trend was unmistakably in their
favor. Events in Egypt during the past few weeks have
checked this trend in sharp and dramatic fashion and --
though it is too early to be confident in such a judgment --
may have reversed it. The Soviets have also been encounter-
ing difficulties elsewhere in the region. These developments
must be raising serious questions in Moscow about the
premises on which Soviet policy has rested. A recent ONE
Memorandum ("The Russian Ouster -- Causes and Consequences",
22 August 1972) analyzed the situation from the Egyptian
point of view. This assessment does the same thing
from the Soviet standpoint -- both in terms of the Soviet
experience in Egypt and its broader implications.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates
and discussed with other components of the CIA, who are in
general agreement with its judgments.
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1. It now seems clear that when the withdrawal of Soviet
military personnel from Egypt has been completed only a remnant
of the Soviet presence will remain; in both size and scope it
will have been drastically reduced. The overall relationship, in
which military ties have played such a central part, has obviously
also been greatly affected, though this is in flux and it may be
some time before the character of what Sadat has called a "new
stage" in Soviet-Egyptian relations is apparent. Both sides have
an interest in seeing that the former relationship is not totally
destroyed, yet there is room for further deterioration. In any
event, the Russians have a long way to come back in Egypt and their
prospects there and in the Middle East as a whole no longer look
nearly as bullish as they once did.
How the Russians Hurt Themselves
2. The Soviets did their share to bring about this result.
The pervasiveness of the Soviet military presence was an affront
to Egyptian national pride, and the Soviet military were frequently
clumsy and overbearing toward their Egyptian counterparts. Much
of the Soviet activity at Egyptian ports and air bases served
Soviet, not Egyptian, interests; the Soviets were increasingly
exercising local control over those installations and turning them
into exclusive enclaves. The Russians constantly reminded the
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Egyptians that they were far from ready for another round of
fighting with the Israelis and made it plain to the Egyptians
that this was one of the last things they, the Russians, wanted
to see happen. The Egyptians concluded, no doubt rightly, that
Moscow was regulating the flow of military supplies with this in
mind and was thus robbing the Egyptians of the ultimate right to
decide whether to fight or seek peace.
3. There were other sources of Egyptian resentment. One
was the substantial and much-publicized spurt in the migration
of Jews from the USSR to Israel. The USSR's growing closeness to
Iraq, signified by the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship (April
1972), and Moscow's unsuccessful attempts to secure a similar
arrangement with Syria, also bothered Cairo. It saw in these
developments an erosion of Egypt's special relationship with
Moscow and probably evidence of the broad scope of Soviet aims
in the Middle East.
4. To some extent, such frictions and suspicions were an
inevitable, even normal, feature of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship.
With someone more secure domestically and less erratic than Sadat
they might have counted less heavily against the Russians. Never-
theless, the Soviet dilemma was real and in the end insoluble:
Soviet and Egyptian interests overlapped but were not identical.
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The Egyptians saw the US-Soviet summit meeting as emphatic confirma-
tion of this fact and as final proof that the USSR could and would
do very little to help them recover their lost lands. The Russians
had not built a strong enough foundation in Cairo to bear the
weight of this failure.
5. The Soviets have never felt secure in a relationship
which depended so heavily on military support and the exigencies
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They have wanted a less tenuous
and less hazardous basis for their presence in Egypt. At the same
time, they have been trying to reinsure and to build for the future
by strengthening their influence in other radical Arab states. They
have also seen enough of Sadat to know that he is not their man.
Nevertheless, the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship (May 1971)
must have seemed to the Russians to have brought some order and
control into the relationship. Economic links had been growing,
too. Prickly and unpredictable as Sadat might be, it must have
seemed to the Soviets that he needed them more than they needed
him. They were uneasy -- perhaps increasingly so -- but they could
not have expected to be hit as hard as they were.
The Immediate Impact in the Area
6. The Soviets have managed to ride out previous setbacks
in Egypt and elsewhere in the Third World. And their position has
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not collapsed as it did in Indonesia, Ghana, and more recently,
in the Sudan. Yet Egypt has meant more to them than these other
states. They extended themselves much further there in terms of
aid given and military risks taken and in return had gained, or
at least hoped they had gained, commensurately in international
power and prestige.
7. The Soviet withdrawal will have an adverse impact on
Soviet naval -- particularly naval air -- capabilities, present
and potential, in the Mediterranean. The full extent of this
impact is not yet measurable. But there is little likelihood in
present circumstances that any of the other Arab littoral states
will provide the Soviets with substitutes for the full array of
facilities in Egypt
upport
of the Soviet Mediterranean naval force. The Soviets apparently
still have access to repair and resupply facilities in Egyptian
ports which permits them to extend the patrol life of their ships
and submarines in the Mediterranean. They will, however, certainly
be using these facilities on a more restricted basis (and it is
doubtful that a fuller use of Syrian facilities would do more than
take up some of the slack, even if the Syrians were willing to
offer them). The Soviets will, in any case, recognize (as the
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influential Heikal of aZ Ahram has reminded them) that the
remaining facilities in Egypt can also be withdrawn and cannot
be confidently counted on for military-planning purposes.
8. Neither Syria nor Iraq seems disposed at the moment to
follow Egypt's lead by cutting back ties with Moscow. They might,
in fact, now see fewer dangers to themselves in doing business
with the Russians simply because it has been shown that they can
be gotten rid of. They might also reason that they are now in a
position to obtain additional favors from Moscow on the cheap. But
to the extent that the Egyptian experience is seen as a.demonstra-
tion of the limits of Soviet power, the Soviets must look less
awesome to the other Arab states as a factor in the area.
9. Whether the setback in Egypt will produce political
recriminations within the Soviet leadership is a point on which,
at this stage, not much can usefully be ventured. That it has
caused bitterness and even anxiety in Moscow there can be little
doubt. Some in positions of influence may see it as one of the
prices paid for the current policy of detente and ask whether the
price is worth paying. Certainly, by any reckoning, the Egyptian
misadventure, coming on top of the embarrassing agricultural
shortages which have developed, must count as one of the most
serious present liabilities for Brezhnev and his political allies.
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But this might be partly offset by relief at the prospect of an
easing of an arms burden and a military commitment which have
been questioned at lower party levels. At the same time, the
credit which Moscow is likely to win abroad for having shown good
sense and military restraint in the Arab-Israeli context should
do it some good, particularly in its relations with the US and
the Europeans, and thereby help the leadership's domestic
position.
Soviet Policy Options in the Middle East
10. The status quo ante July 18 in Soviet-Egyptian
relations is not likely to be restored soon, if ever. How the
Russians proceed from here will depend to some extent on what the
Egyptians do and say, for the Russians are not without their own
sensitivities. Already, by continuing to expose their grievances
against the Russians openly, the Egyptians have begun to produce
some cracks in the stolid public front Moscow had adopted after the
expulsion order,and the Soviets are now beginning to respond with
some heat. Once launched, a process of verbal give-and-take could,
whatever the intent of the two sides, make it more difficult for
them to control their next moves.
11. But the Soviets would seem to have three general courses
open to them. The first of these would be for Moscow to distance
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itself from Cairo, letting its military and economic ties with
Egypt wither over time, and giving reduced priority to its
position in the Middle East generally. Seeing itself treated as
a whipping-boy by the Egyptians and much of the effort and
expenditure of the last fifteen years gone to waste, Moscow must
experience some urge to do this. But Moscow's commitment to
playing a global role and its belief in the high strategic
importance of the Middle East is unlikely to lead it in this
direction.
12. A second course would be a punitive policy aimed at
forcing the Sadat regime to heel or even ousting it. Moscow might
severely curtail or end the flow of military and economic assistance
and actively work against Cairo politically and diplomatically.
Perhaps Moscow could try to organize Sadat's overthrow from within,
but this would be a gamble for the Russians, on the kind of long
odds they usually do not care for, since the means available to
them for this purpose are probably scarce at best. In general,
the chances that the Russians could succeed in a policy of
pressures and covert manipulation would appear to be slight and
the cost of failure high.
13. A third course, one which would be more in character
for Moscow and more in accord with the reflexes of its
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policy-making bureaucracy, would be to attempt to ride out the
present difficult period. Moscow might believe that at this
delicate juncture a hard line on its part would merely serve to
deepen the estrangement and encourage Egypt to move further to
the right in its domestic policies and in the direction of firm
non-alignment in its international position; it could also hurt
the Russians with the other radical Arab states. At the same
time, the Soviets might suppose that if they remain patient, the
natural political and social trends within Egypt, their substantial
involvement in Egypt's economic development and trade, and the
intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict will sooner or later
force Egypt back toward the USSR. In pursuing such a policy, the
Russians would probably continue to deliver new military equipment
already contracted for by the Egyptians and spare parts for that
already in Egyptian hands. They would avoid a conspicuous decrease
in economic assistance, though Cairo might very well find the
Russians turning stingier in terms of assistance given and repay-
ment terms demanded.
14. Even if this course, the most likely one, is chosen,
it is hard to believe that the Soviet relationship with Sadat can
ever be the same again or that the Russians will soon again be in
a mood to bestow lavish military or economic assistance -- on the
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scale of the past five years -- on the Egyptians. To do so would
be to reward them for their abuse and perhaps to encourage others
to behave similarly. The Soviets will not wish Sadat well, if
they ever did, nor will they want to give him aid and comfort in
his domestic difficulties. And while, as has been said, they would
probably not want to risk failure in an attempt to bring about his
downfall, it is entirely believable that they would be willing to
give him an extra push if he seemed to be slipping.
15. For the same reasons that they are not likely to go
back entirely on their other commitments to the Egyptians, the
Russians can be expected to remain strong advocates of the Arab
position vis-a-vis Israel. They no doubt believe that their
international stature and the influence that remains to them in
the Arab world assures them a significant voice in the affairs of
the area. They may, in addition, now feel less inhibited about
opening up channels of communication with the Israelis. They
will, in any event, continue to claim a prominent role in dis-
cussions with respect to an Arab-Israeli dispute. They could
suppose that influence lost in Cairo, in some part because of the
detente in US-Soviet relations, is offset by influence gained in
Washington.
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16. It is possible that,in the setting of a changing
relationship with both Egypt and the US, the prospect of playing
a constructive role in an Arab-Israeli settlement would have
greater attraction for the Soviets than before. It seems at least
as likely, however, that the Soviet position will remain unconstruc-
tive: though the Soviets have long considered an Arab-Israeli
modus vivendi to be preferable to a new war, the immediate military
danger to themselves is now greatly reduced, and they might see in
a continuing political stalemate the best promise of regaining
influence in Cairo. In any case, the obstacles to progress toward
a settlement remain great, and it is hard to see what the Soviets
could or would be willing to do to surmount them.
Broader Implications for the Soviets in the Third World
17. The particular circumstances which led to the great
increase in Soviet political and military strength in Egypt, and
which have now contributed to their sharp decrease, have been in
many ways unique. Nevertheless, Moscow has viewed Egypt as crucial
to its position in the Middle East and has regarded the special
relationship with Cairo as the crowning success of its policy in
the area. While this was intact, other Soviet disappointments and
setbacks were less noticeable. But the doubt which now hangs over
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the Soviet-Egyptian relationship serves as a reminder that much
has gone against the Russians in the Arab world in recent years.
18. The hopes which Moscow had for Algeria and, later,
Libya have not been fulfilled; the former continues to keep the
Soviets at arm's length and the latter is militantly anti-Soviet.
The Sudan has turned into something like a dead loss. The Syrians
have managed to keep Soviet aid coming without accepting Soviet
tutelage. Soviet influence in Yemen, which grew dramatically in
1967 and 1968, has more recently declined precipitously. And in
Somalia, though pro-Soviet elements are at present dominant, there
are signs of underlying discontent with the Soviet connection.
Only in Iraq have the Soviets made some headway of late, but
further progress there might very soon begin to cause problems
for the Russians in their relations with Iran.
19. The Soviets can and will tell themselves that time is
on their side in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World,
but this is an ideological conviction, not a practical political
precept. The hopes once vested in so-called "revolutionary
democratic" leaders, who as the Soviets rationalized, could be
counted on to develop domestic and foreign policies favorable to
Soviet interests, have been frequently and severely disappointed.
The appeal to self-interest through the medium of military and
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economic assistance, has produced mixed results. Reliance on
Third World Communist parties holds little promise for Moscow.
Its support for these parties has often resulted in grave damage
to the Soviet position, as in the Sudan. In certain cases, e.g.,
Syria and Iraq, the Soviets have continued to work for greater
participation of Communists in government. Nevertheless, it is
evident that Moscow does not look for most local Communist parties
to contribute much, if anything, to the growth of Soviet influence
in the Third World in the near term.
20. Thus, neither ideological affinity nor material
assistance has provided a sure channel of influence for the
Soviets within the so-called "national liberation movement". They
have all along underrated the national element in the slogan, and
they have shown themselves lacking in sensitivity to the cultural
peculiarities of Third World societies greatly different from their
own. Moreover, they have expected their friends in the under-
developed world to adopt a gradualist approach to domestic develop-
ment and to be patient about their regional conflicts and aspira-
tions. They have also expected these states to understand that,
because the USSR is conducting a broad, global policy, it must
from time to time give second place to more parochial issues. Their
friends in the Third World have quite naturally not seen matters the
same way.
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21. This is not to suggest either that the Soviets have
a policy which embraces the entire Third World (as Khrushchev, in
his salad days, supposed he had) or that their involvement there
is likely to recede sharply. Moscow has in recent years inclined
more and more to a differentiated approach to the widely scattered
and diverse states covered by the term Third World. The trend has
also been toward a more selective approach to economic assistance
to developing states. At the same time, the Soviets have been
quick to come forward with arms and other forms of military
assistance, seeking in this way to gain wide political influence
locally and to extend their capabilities for world-wide military
operations. The bases established by the Soviets in Egypt repre-
sented a signal success for these efforts. This progress has been
dramatically interrupted. We would not expect the Soviets to dis-
continue their efforts in this direction. But the political and
military complications which face them must be more evident than
before. Moscow will probably now, on this account, begin to give
greater emphasis in its military planning to arrangements (e.g.,
afloat support) which are less dependent on the sufferance of
unpredictable and uncontrolled regional states.
22. We have noted (in "The Uses of Soviet Military Power
in Distant Areas", NIE 11-10-71, 15 December 1971) the impressive
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progress the USSR has made in the last decade in developing
political influence in the Third World; that it is anxious to
demonstrate that, as a world power, it has legitimate interests
everywhere; and that Moscow now has the ability to support
policies in distant areas and a greater capability than in earlier
years to extend its military presence. Recent developments suggest,
however, that stronger emphasis ought now be given to some further
observations made in that Estimate, viz., that Soviet activities
in remote areas have not met with unqualified success and there
are a variety of circumstances which impose constraints on Soviet
policies, among them the complexities of the Third World itself
and the inhibitions imposed on Moscow by its broader objectives.
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30 August 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
John Huizenga
SUBJECT : Additional Distribution for MEMORANDUM:
The Expulsion from Egypt -- Some Consequences
for the Soviets
Subject to your approval, we would like the following to re-
ceive this Memorandum:
White House
;,I P, v,L.
State Department
Dr. Ray S. Cline
Director
Intelligence and Research
Room 6531
Mr. William Hyland
Mr. Harold Sanders
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Pentagon
DIA - SC - 1
Room 2C231
1.11 . vuJCpui v. J 1 Jlsv
Assistant Di'ree sr
Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Room 6242
Mr. Richard T. Davies
Deputy Assistant
Bureau of European Affairs
)7v~ld
Director Matlock.
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10'101
J01 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 AUG 5A
J HN HUIZENGA
Director ates
National Estim
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