THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UK AND FRG CONCERNING MILITARY ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/12/01 CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4 /qG
p
r
AJO:) r
;OaJ xy
t 1 JO J. I
c ar :1 ita ry Tans U
,
Ai
OaJX:
Cu?ut s~ i tXo With the
3.0 lr 1owln our y -ata v"tt ! you Lie last weeek,
I a;*k 1 K rd tho D'x zd of National L-ati-
, ta: to vrit rr a . r r V:bie; is don In more ee ,-
i :e? o o. v?, .yxrr c nz,, of the imu O which use.
a iacusu ;d. x a-e you k x, not only t a* been
c A erU ith these oattcr' over a period: or year a., but
Plea rr a. nta the Z= rd in the In IJt Z ti n of the
: i to vizich vt r4 (-::sv :1y' sut ittzd to you entitled.,
" r o i n Beaetiox to C- r t -in Cour3 :s of Aa tioa 1 ' o avd-
ing " s a es in B u x a o ; x:" ( I 1 66)4
ether or itot oar ogre 4ith eyea7tt4ug in
.1 rte:: sa du , I think you will cone that
with whichyou are c.onoex , . It is for this ,~,h a3c that
I i'om rd to you a ,%t is er acnt3:AUy a. c omcnt vritton
Tor edifi ti. tt
liberty sending c 4es Of
this tt etr
boUave they
and secretary 144Nq=x Since
C~ it as helpful a$ I d*V
Richme Reins
DI m- etor
Cm,"r ,
Gehly,lil~; il~1
ioa--jx
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060010-4
SECRET
8 November 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT. The Current Negotiations With the UK and FRG
Concerning Military Issues
Problems of equitable burden sharing which arose between the UK and
FRG and the US and FRG have now led, in the current tripartite negotiations,
to a broad review of allied strategy and force requirements. The scope
and importance of this agenda suggest that in fact what these talks are
about is the future American role in Europe. The central questions
raised are whether the post-1945 pattern of our involvement with Western
Europe's security would be, and should be, changed by a. reduction in
American forces stationed there.
This paper does not deal directly with the immediate technical issues,
on which much staff work is already being done. Instead, it is an attempt
to see this episode in inter-allied relations in some historical perspec-
tive, to define political forces at work which will affect the future
conduct of our allies and of the Soviet Bloc, and to suggest how our
interests might be affected by a move at this time to redefine the
American military role in Europe.
SE CRE T
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006 1 9R00904A001200060010-4
Europe-Today.- Soviet Policy, and the American Interest
The goals which American policy set itself in Europe in the early
postwar period have been achieved in large measure. Western Europe has
not been attacked, and in recent years even the veiled threats of Soviet
attack faced earlier have ceased. Internal. Communist forces have declined
greatly in potency. The crippled societies of 195 recovered confidence
behind the American shield, with the result that disintegrating forces
were contained and moderate and constructive elements were able to
dominate the politics of the recovery period. Rapid economic growth
followed, and for the first time in Europe ? s history the benefits began
to be more widely shared. In addition, American influence helped to
foster the European unity movement, and this, together with NATO,, provided
a framework for reintegrating West Germany into Europe as a respectable
and responsible state.
It was foreseen that the recovery of strength and pride in Europe
would produce some resentment of the vastly disproportionate power of
the US and of its predominant weight in the Alliance. Not only has
this happened, but in recent years many Europeans have had an increasing
sense of not being master in their own house. This feeling has been
sharpened by fears of an American investment invasion fueled with vast
resources and technological supremacy, by American pressures for greater
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2001 0 I RDP79ROO904AO01200060010-4
military effort under American revisions of strategic doctrine, and by
appeals for active support of American policy in other areas, notably
in Asia. American "leadership," once called for to heal Europe's sick-
ness, has often, when it was actually provided, been received as unpalatable
medicine. De Gaulle, in the French manner, has elevated such discontents
into a, general. theory and made them the basis of a policy which categor-
ically repudiates the present American role in Europe. This policy has
produced an organizational crisis in the Alliance.
The voices of discontent have found some echo in West Germany, always
hitherto the "staunchest" of American partners in Europe. There, economic
strains, American pressure for offset payments, and concern that Allied
policy was moving toward acceptance of an indefinitely divided Germany
have combined with weak leadership to produce some political disarray.
For the first time in the postwar period, the barometer of German American
relations has tended to register heavy weather.
Some of the distemper in European American relations arises from a
revised view of Soviet policy which has gained wide credence in recent
years. Since 1962, when the Soviets allowed the Berlin "crisis" to fade
away in the aftermath of the Cuban confrontation, the USSR has refrained
from crude pressures under military threat. The main theme of its policy
has been European security, that?is, settlement and stabilization on the
SE CRE T
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-R?P79R00904AO01200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/ /01 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
,S'2E CRE T
basis of the status quo in Germany. There is a: strong desire in Western
Europe to believe that stable and increasingly constructive relations with
the East are possible, and no great desire to allow this vision to be
aborted by claims of the Germans to the unity of their country. A mood
that looks forward to enjoying the fruits of Western Europe's growing
productivity, without further intrusion of the alarms, excursions, and
costs of cold war, inevitably makes the burdens of NATO, a military
alliance built on the assumption that there was a real threat of Soviet
attack, harder to bear.
It is natural that by now questions should also begin to be raised
in this country about the American role in Europe. Do we really need
large military forces there more than two decades after the end of
World War II? Are the costs acceptable in view of Europe's prosperity
and American burdens elsewhere? Are there not persuasive indications
that the USSR no longer poses a "threat" to Western Europe? The answers
to these questions naturally give some difficulty in the context of
domestic politics. They are easier if sought in terms of the long-
range interests of the United States as a world power.
It is a cliche, but still valid, to declare that the alignment of
Western Europe in world politics remains vital for us. There is some
tendency nowadays to think of that area as parochial, withdrawn in
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 200 / 79R00904A001200060010-4
%-01 6APT 1%0
weariness from the balance of power game, and there is much in the
European mood that supports this. But this area is still the most power-
ful concentration of productive forces outside the US and USSR. Historically,
its political dynamism has been formidable. To consign it to the backwaters
of world politics, to assume a quiet Europe at peace with itself and with-
drawn from struggles that proceed elsewhere, would probably not be a sound
wager on the future.
The USSR clearly does not think that all power struggles in Europe
are over, despite its relative passivity on European issues in recent
years. The Soviets desisted from gross pressures after 1962 because
they understood at last the great risks Involved, and because they
realized finally that pressures would not rupture but only consolidate
the Western Alliance and the American presence in Europe. They have
seen in recent frictions in European American relations an opportunity
to pursue by other means their main objective of excluding American
power and influence from that area. The emphasis on detente in Europe,
on an all-European security settlement made without American participation,
aims at disrupting the Atlantic connection and at moving Western Europe
toward a more neutral position in world politics. The Federal Republic
would continue to be treated as a pariah, held in contemptuous isolation
until it produced politicians who say the light and were willing to come
to terms with Soviet power. Thus a Soviet "threat" continues to exist in
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006 I 179R00904AO01200060010-4
NOV liff1
the sense that, even though the USSR does not for the present menace
Western Europe with armed attack, its basic strategy is still to
separate Western Europe from America, and thereby greatly to diminish
both as power factors.
It would be absurd to suggest that this Soviet vision of a vast
shift in the world balance of power is, because of current frictions
within the Western Alliance, even remotely near realization. The
dominant political forces in Western Europe today are still, despite
concern over some American policies, generally committed to the v
that an Atlantic coalition under American leadership is essential to
their interests. De Gaulle's doctrines have for the most part been
taken as too much an expression of personal idiosyncrasy and French
particularism. His nomination of himself to lead a, third-force European
coalition has not won general acclaim; the division in NATO is still
l4? to 1.
On a long v .e r, however, American policy cannot afford to be com-
placent about Europe. This country has a role to play as a world power,
while Western European states now define their interests largely in
regional terms;; this difference in angle of vision will inevitably strain
relations from time to time. After two world wars, moreover, Europeans
incline to stand aside from ideological struggles on a world scale, and
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-R?P79R00904AO01200060010-4
 Approved For Release 200
I 79R00904A001200060010-4
1AE'T ~wr
to confront no power challenge unless it is visibly at their own gates.
At the same time, the European unity movement appears to have stagnated,
and the Gaullist impulse to a, revival of nationalism makes it impossible
to preclude a reversion to intra-E rogean quarreling. And there can be
no doubt that the Soviets stand ready still to exploit whatever divisions
may develop within Europe, and between Europe and the US,
Altogether, while the condition of Europe and of Atlantic relations
today do not give grounds for alarm, there is reason for attentive concern.
Because any untoward developments on this front have such a vital bearing
on world power relations, and ultimately on American security, there is
always reason for special sensitivity. It will be in the American interest
for a. long time to come to give highest priority to Europe, to its security
and internal order, and to the preservation of our influence there, however
heavy the burdens and intense the preoccupations elsewhere.
Force Reductions as an Issue in the Alliance
e question posed in connection with the tripartite negotiations
is whether the American stake in Europe and in good Atlantic relations
would be prejudiced by a significant reduction in American forces. Or,
given the condition of Europe described above, is this the moment when
some partial military disengagement can be undertaken with tolerable risk?
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 200x1 79R00904A001200060010-4
There is no way of defining exactly what amount of cut in American
forces would now be viewed as "6ignificant`r by the allies. Clearly there
is some degree of further modest draltd rn which would be understood,
even if not with full sympathy, as owing to the demands of the Vietnam
war and to the balance of payments problem; such a cut would not be
construed as a turning point in US policy toward Europe which confronted
the allies with a new situation. Equally there is some larger scale of
cutback which would be so construed. Very likely this would be true of
any cut large enough to effect really meaningful savings for the US
It is also possible, perhaps likely, that a lesser cut would. be taken
as a portent of a larger one to follow. In any case, what is worth
discussing is a cut, whatever its magnitude, which did lead the Europeans,
and perhaps the Soviets as well, to conclude that American policy toward
Europe was changing direction and that we intended to lessen our involve-
ment there. It is not necessary to discuss reactions to a belief that
we Intended simply to abandon our European interest and commitment
entirely, since nobody would be likely to infer that.
It should also be said that, whatever meaning Europeans might attach
to a reduction they took to be significant, their views would probably
be little affected by reasons the US might give or by public relations
manipulation. European opinion-makers are notoriously skeptical of
official truth, and most sophistcated people would prefer to believe
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2001 0 I'79R00904A001200060010-4
*"V (~ T vo~
the "real reasons" which would surely be 'rovided by numerous articulate
commentators. At present, when many people find in the Vietnam war a
welcome pretext for disenchantment with American policy and for dis-
trusting the credibility of American official utterances, even very
sound and defensible explanations would be likely to encounter heavy
going. The various liabilities of American policy in Europe described
above are a political-psychological reality of the present moment.
Since, as will be argued below, the political effects of a force cutback
provide the main ground of concern, it would be well to recognize that
at present our ability to influence the can traction which EEaropear
opinion puts on our policies is less than it has been.
Security Implications
The most obvious question raised by a proposal to reduce US forces
is whether Western Europe would be exposed to significantly increased
risk of Soviet attack. It is also the easiest to answer.
It is extremely doubtful that the Soviets at any time'in the
postwar period seriously entertained the idea of achieving their objectives
in Western Europe by actual military attack. At various times they
threatened war if certain limited demands were not met, primarily con-
cerning Berlin. In the early postwar years they probably believed that
such threats against a weakly defended Western Europe, together with the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 200 0 I 79R00904AO01200060010-4
considerable subversive potential they then had there, might cause Western
will to fail, and that such a demonstration of Soviet power might, as new
demands were added, lead on to a general collapse. In the late 50's,
under a carefully-fostered impression that they had achieved a decisive
power advantage in nuclear-rocket weapons, they revived the same technique
of assault by intimidation, and again they failed. The Soviets have
evidently learned that it is not possible to advance in Western Europe on
the cheap, that is, by a mere show of intimidating power,
The Soviets pulled back from actual attack primarily, no doubt,
because they could not foresee the consequences and judged the likely
costs of a major war to be unacceptable. There is another reason that
ought not to be underestimated. Soviet history shows that under this
regime there are serious political-ideological inhibitions against resort
to naked aggression. Advances for Communist power are supposed to be
won by indigenous revolutionary action. Even if the Soviet leadership
might in some circumstances bring itself to overlook this nicety, it %
would have to be concerned about the reactions of the Soviet people in
a major war brought on at Soviet initiative.
There is every reason to believe that the grounds the Soviets had
for refraining from direct attack in the past still apply, and would
apply even if American forces in Europe were considerably reduced, prob-
ably even if they were withdrawn entirely. The Soviets know that the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 200 0 I 79R00904A001200060010-4
US considers it vital to its own security that Communist power not engulf
Western Europe. They would understand that overt aggression by them would
unleash a train of events carrying the highest risk of general nuclear war.
Their conduct over the last two decades proves that they intend to stand
well back from that contingency.
Soviet Policy
the Wake of a Force Cut
It is possible, of course, that the Soviets would think that a US
force withdrawal meant that Atlantic links were weakening, that if they
pushed once again with tactics of intirnids;,:;ic. the Western Alliance would
prove fragile, and that they could then register some demonstrative gain,
sa.y, finally at Berlin, which would prove to all the world that the
relations of power had shifted. This seems extremely unlikely. Any
American force cutback would no doubt be accompanied by elaborate mutual
pledges of continued firmness within the Western Alliance. More important,
the Soviets would know that the US would be highly sensitive to any new
Soviet moves to exploit the situation. They would probably expect, in
fact, that the American response to any opening gambit by them would be
so vigorous as to preclude the nicely modulated development of a "crisis"
situation tinder their control.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
NW
SECRET
This is not to say that at some later time the Soviets might not
come to think that a reduced American posture in Europe invited a renewal
of pressure tactics. But this would not arise from the altered force
equation as such. It would result from their reading of the general
drift of B.opean-American relations; they might infer that a really
divisive loss of mutual confidence among the Allies made effective re-
sistance to new demands unlikely. Since the Soviet style is somewhat
heavy-handed, there could be no guarantee that they would not act in
this manner at some stage.
The scenario they would at, first consider more promising would be
entirely different. They would activate their diplomacy and propaganda
to persuade Western Europe that, with the US beginning to disengage,
new' possibilities for detente on a European basis were opening up. Some
withdrawal of Soviet forces would occur to document this trend. Cultural
exchanges and economic relations would be expanded wherever-possible to
provide symbolism. Plausible security undertakings would be offered,
and these would, of course, at least imply recognition of the status quo
in Germany. Efforts would be made to give the communiques issuing from
the meetings of statesmen an anti-American nuance. The object of all this
would be to commit influential political elements in Western Europe to the
view that American power was no longer needed there, and that its final
departure could be viewed with equanimity. The Soviets would also hope
SE t" D Approved For Release 2 06/112 CA RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 200r 0 79R00904A001200060010-4
that discreet cultivation of European American dissensions that might
arise would help to accelerate a process of political-military disengage-
ment.
The Soviets are not fools enough to believe that such a, campaign
could achieve quick or easy success. But they would grind away at it
so long as the auspices were favorable. The assets they could bring
to bear would include their political-subversive apparatus in the West.
In the political climate the Soviets would be trying to engender, the
Communist parties would have greatly improved chances of escaping from
their chronic isolation, and united front tactics might work to con-
siderably better effect than heretofore. Success would obviously depend
on bringing a fairly wide spectrum of non-Communist opinion to the view
that the situation in Europe was changing in a fundamental way which
called for new departures in both internal and external policy.
All this is a very large order and the Soviets would have their
work cut out for them., even if European American relations deteriorated
markedly in the wake of force reductions. It would be the extent of
deterioration over some considerable period which would determine the
measure of their opportunity.
- 13 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
SECRET vm'
epercussions in the Alliance
Thus, the eventual reaction of the European allies to what they saw
as a significant change in American military policy would be crucial. It
is unlikely that there would be any immediate general alai about the
security of the area. Fear of actual Soviet attack is now minimal.
Sophisticated opinion would realize that the full weight of US power
remained committed by the forces which remained, and would believe also
that the US,a,ich has borne the burdens of global struggle in other less
vital areas, could not in its own interest be indifferent to the fate of
Europe. Some recriminatory voices would no doubt be loud, and De Gaulle
would help to magnify then, but they world probably not be determining for
the attitudes of .Allied governments. There might be some initial confusion,
but it would probably be manageable.
It would be the long pull which would matter. Politicians, like
investors, discount the future. However the force cuts were justified,
there would be some sense that American resources were overstrained, or
that some shift of priorities in American policy, presumably toward Asia
and away from Europe, was taking place. Over time this could mean still
less inclination to support American policy in other areas or to accept
American leadership on matters that did not immediately involve the
security of Europe.
- 14 -
,SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
SECRET NOO'
A military alliance almost never collapses all at once; it dies
away by degrees as the participants sense that the original premises
that bound them have lost validity. Ultimately, and this would be
especially true if US policy encountered reverses elsewhere and the
general view held of the relations of power should become less advan-
tageous to the US than at present, the basic alignment of Western Europe
could be affected. A gradual shift of perspective might at some critical
juncture lead Western European states to adopt the view that the USSR
was after all the only first class power relevant to Europe's arrange-
ments, and to begin to accommodate t ?.c^ r E ~.-: accordingly. The Soviets
would, if they followed the policy described above, make this seem easy
and without risk. Appropriate shifts in the internal balance of political
forces would occur in Western European countries, and the end result would
be a perceptible move to a middle, perhaps even a neutralist position
between the US and USSR.
This kind of outcome seems very far down the road at present, even
far-fetched. To suggest that it would flow inevitably from any specific
amount of reduction of American forces in Europe would be very misleading.
Nevertheless, the agreed military dispositions give the Alliance concrete
expression and symbolize its meaning. When they are changed in some
significant way, especially at the initiative of the dominant member, it
may eventually appear to other members that a trend is developing which
- 15 -
Approved For Release 267217 1-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
NMW
SECRET IwF
will finally invalidate the original rationale. An alliance is sustained
by men's belief that it reflects power relations which can be relied on
to serve their long-term as well as their immediate national security
interest.
Thus, while it cannot be plausibly argued that a significant force
cut now would necessarily do irreparable damage to the prospects of the
Alliance, it can be said that such a move runs the risk of storing up
trouble for the future. The disarray already existing in NATO is not
a good omen, and means at least that whatever unfavorable trend was set
in motion would be intensified in the pres ut context.
The Federal Republic
Generalizations which can be made with some justice for the Alliance
as a whole would almost certainly not apply in West Germany. The German
reaction to a significant force cutback would be serious, possibly traumatic.
This would not be the case because the Germans have a very much
greater fear than others of the imminence of Soviet attack, though
obviously their front-line position plays a psychological, role. On the
whol..e, they have come to accept the view generally held in Europe that
the Soviets are effectively deterred. Since they believe this is owing
primarily to US nuclear power, the withdrawal of a part of the ground
forces would not in itself seem immediately critical to their security.
- 16 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/ff~Wff 9ROO AO01200060010-4
The Germans are, however, far more sensitive than others to what changes
in US military dispositions might signify for the general direction of US
policy. The large US military presence has meant, not merely that the US
was committed to the defense of West German territory, but also to up-
holding the German national interest in the still unresolved struggle over
the division of the country. A significant cutback in that presence would
imply for Germans that the US was finally abandoning its sponsorship of
the national claim to unity and was accepting the status quo for the
indefinite future. Since there is no confidence whatever that unity
can be won without American backing, there would inevitably be cries of
betrayal.
It has been argued that the Germans know-anyway that there is no
present prospect of achieving unity, and that they are resigned to this
fact. This is almost certainly a superficial reading for the long term.
During the postwar period the Germans have been in desperate need of
recovering their self-respect and the respect of others. They are bound
to think that they will never achieve this if they resign themselves
weakly to the brutal injustice of partition. With confidence reawakened
by their postwar achievements, with a sense of guilt over the comparative
lot of a fourth of the nation, with their once great capital still held as
a dreary hostage, it seems more likely that they will increasingly find the
present outcome of their history unacceptable. This mood will be sustained
SE CRE T
Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
SECRET
by politicians who, to avoid being outflanked by other politicians., will
need to reaffirm the goal of reunification. It would be prudent to think
that this issue will still, stir the cauldron of politics in Germany in
ways that cannot now be foreseen.
For the present the Germans surely have no place to go, but this may
not always be time. Political changes which could come eventually in both
the FRG and the USSR might revise the options. Or, resignation might
finally end in political demoralization and the West would then have
another kind of problem; without a strong and stable Germany the Alliance
would be dangerously weakened. Thus, the political condition of Germany
will remain a key factor for the security of the West.
A political shakeout is now going on in Bonn, and this development had
not a little connection with recent frictions in German American relations.
it is impossible to say what further tremors would result from a cutback
in US forces which was viewed as a. serious reversal for German policy.
Probably it would become more difficult to find a stable majority. A
prolonged process of political regrouping might ensue, accompanied by
much agonizing soul-searching over national goals and policies. In any
case, it is certain that the profoundest effect of force cutbacks would
be in Germany, and that at this time nobody can say with assurance what
'would be the effect on politics end policy in the Federal Republic. As a
18 _
Approved For Release 2006112 M-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/ 16*ff 9R00904AO01200060010-4
nation, the post-195 Germans have not yet found an identity and a role.
They are unlikely to be able again to menace their neighbors militarily;
but it remains to be proved whether in a political sense and over the long
term they will be an asset or a liability to European stability. Thus, a
move by the US which disoriented the Germans seriously would carry some
unknown, and possibly high degree of risk.
If Not Now, When?
The conclusion implicit in the foregoing discussion is that, while a
significant cutback in US forces at this time would probably not have any
immediately disastrous consequences, the whole context is unfavorable and
risks setting in train a process of deterioration in the Alliance which
would be ominous for the future. To take this view is not the same as
arguing that a. change in the US military post-Lure in Europe can never be
undertaken without excessive risk, It is possible to describe circumstances
which might be more favorable and to suggest criteria which should govern
so sensitive a decision.
In principle, such a decision should be taken in some positive policy
framework and on calculations aimed at advancing Western interests. The
move proposed at present has nothing of that. We did not choose the time
for an advantageous act of policy; instead, the impression is given that
we are acting under the pressure of considerations, mainly financial,
19
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-R?P79ROO904AO01200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/01: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4
SECRET Nw'
which compel the move even at some political risk. The psychological
effect is therefore negative and defensive.
A period in which such a move could be turned to policy advantage
would be one in which American credit generally and regard for American
leadership in the Alliance were high. It would be a period when general
detente in Soviet American relations was recognized to exist, and seen
to be the consequence mainly of Soviet regard for American strength and
Western solidarity. This kind of setting would lend positive virtue to
the argument that the prolonged presence of large American forces was
unwholesome for the Europeans and for -us. It would make it feasible to
offset political risks and simultaneously to shore up the Alliance by
giving greater emphasis to the political content of Atlantic relations,
that is, to common political objectives both within Europe and in the
world at large. Finally, and of greatest importance, the kind of context
described would make it possible to link force withdrawals with a new
initiative to the Soviets for movement on the German problem. They might
not respond, but they would be placed under some pressure and it would be
they and not we who would be on the defensive on'the German issue. At
least, the cutback would then be associated in the German mind with a
positive political strategy.
SE CR.
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 IIRDP79R00904AO01200060010-4
 Approved For Release 2006Sf~iffkRl 9R00904A001200060010-4
It could be argued that the international setting in the year following
the Cuban missile crisis had some features corresponding to the general
prescription given above. While it is fatuous to reel back history, that
period illustrates circumstances in which conceivably a US force cutback
in Europe could have been undertaken with greater advantage. Similarly,
it is possible that in the wake of a settlement of the Vietnam war another
more propitious phase will emerge. In any case, it is evident that other
contexts are conceivable which would be more promising and less hazardous
than the present one.
Whatever the time, we ought to choose it deliberately and for positive
reasons of policy, unless, of course, we are simply compelled by circum-
stances. The case for force cuts in Europe is apparently not argued on
the basis of such necessity, only on the ground of marginal advantage to
the balance of payments. The argument of this paper is that the political
risks at this time carry far greater weight. If we make blunders of
political judgment in our relations with our European Allies, we cannot
count on the Soviets to overlook mercifully the openings we make for them.
The struggle over Europe, focused in Germany, continues despite the surface
calm of recent years, and that area is still more crucial to our security
than any other.
ion MEGA
Board of National Estimates
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060010-4