SECOND MEETING OF TEAM B ON SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES - 25 AUGUST 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00983A002200010010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 26, 1976
• Content Type: MFR

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26 August 1976
SUBJECT: Second Meeting of Team B on Soviet Strategic
Policies and Objectives - 2S August 1976
1. Attendees included.:
.Richard Pipes, te.a;n leader
General John Vogt
General Daniel Graham
William Van Cleave
Paul Wolfowitz
2. Dr. Pipes made.a brief opening statement. He
said that he wanted to prepare an agenda for the subteams
and establish a definite list of briefers for the 15-17
September briefing sessions. He advised the members to
read The Track Record in Strategic Estimating.
3. .Pipes stated the Team has two tasks: (1) to
reinterpret the data made available on strategic weapons
and the threat they pose to-see if a different estimate
of threat is possible. - If Team B 'does come up faith a
different interpretation, it should make as strong a case
as possible for its position. Task (2) is to criticize
the -methodology underlying the NIE process. Pipes
J distributed a list of suggested topics for the Team to
investigate.
4. The Team members agreed that a two part report
would be produced.
1) evidence and conclusions: all contributing
with Pipes drafting final text;
2) criticism of methodology: Pipes drafting
with.contributions from other members.
S. The meeting was opened to more general discussion.
Graham said that he had read several. of the NIE 11/3
reports. He said that he noted a change in tone and
nomenclature over the years as well as a general tendency
to put U.S. perceptions and terms into the Soviet vocabulary.
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Van Cleave believed that the topics suggested by
Pipes were too technical.- Pipes, with Vogt concurring,
explained that he did'not envision a technical paper but
felt that the Team had to address and indicate areas of
uncertainty. Vogt added that the incomplete evidence
used in the NIE process often does not support the con-
clusions reached by the drafters. As an example, Graham
cited the Soviet civil defense effort and agreed with.
Vogt's comment that the Soviet CD effort is aimed at a re-
con,stitution capability. Graham said.he believed the
Soviets want to assure a sustaining force and. a second
strike capability.
There was general agreement that thei%E underesti-
mates the seriousness of the Soviet CD effort and assumes
that the U.S. could make an immediate response. Vogt
said an immediate response is unlikely.
Pipes and Graham, with agreement of the members
present, commented that the NIE assumes, without evidence,
that the Soviets want to spend as little as possible on
defense.
6. The Team agreed on a list of topics and volunteered
to direct their efforts as indicated below:
Topics
1. Capabilities of a break-through in
ASW
Team Expert
Graham, 25X1
2
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Tics Team Expert
2.' Civil Defense Graham
3. Command and Control capability Vogt
including Hardening and Redundancy
Backfire and Strategic Air Force Vogt
Anti-Satellite Testing Welch (?)
Directed Energy Weapons Van Cleave
ABM Research amended to include Van Cleave
Air Defense Wolfowitz
Mobile ICB',',i's (SS 16 SS 20) Vogt
Depressed Trajectory Threat Van Cleave
10. Soviet Defense-Spending Graham
11. Soviet Doctrine of Strategy of
Limited Nuclear Options Wolfowitz
12. Concealment and Deception Van Cleave
The following topics were added at the suggestion of
Team Members
13.
Soviet-Strategic Objectives in SALT II
Van Cleave
negotiations
14.
Soviet efforts to acquire US technology
Wolfowitz
15.
Soviet view of non-central (non-
Wolfowitz
strategic) systems
16.
Knowns and Unknowns in Soviet R&D
Team
The Team experts agreed, to write contributions on the
topics in their areas of expertise as indicated in the list.
Each member,will submit contributions of 200-500 words and
be prepared to defend the Team position during conferences
with Team A. Pipes will be principal drafter on the
methodology section and put the entire report in final form.
Target date for completion of draft contributions is
8 September.
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offered secretarial support for the Team.
Wolfe, Weiss, and Welch will be asked to work on
topics in which they have particular expertise.
Team B Strategic Policies and Objectives will check
with the other sections of Team B to see how broadly they
have interpreted their charters.
In response to a question from Van Cleave, Pipes
said that he felt there would be no problem with funds for
moderate travel by Team members as this could be handled
7. Graham opened the discussion on methodology with
the comment that the NIB, from the time of the McNamara
era,'has made net assessments which are not supported by
the evidence. He also said there is a tendency to mirror-
image when writing about the Soviet military effort. As
a final point he noted that every estimate since 1962 has
used the impact of economic pressures in the Soviet system
as the fundamental reason for a judgment of the Soviet
military effort.
Pipes said there should be two aspects to the critique
of the VIE, process
1) noting that the estimate is based on assumptions
which are not spelled out, for example, that the
Soviet military effort is basically defensive and
that the-Soviets want to spend as little as possible
on weapons, etc.;-
2.) technical flaws in the process of preparing
the NIB.
Van Cleave commented that the NIE seems to reject the
idea of unanimity.in the Soviet decision making process
and suggested that some attention be given to party-military
relations.
Graham noted that the NIB process forces compromises
on controversial issues.
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 k.
Richard Foster
3. The Team agreed to invite the following individuals
to brief:
NIE process
Soviet strategic weapons and
their role in Soviet strategic
thinking
economic aspects of the Soviet
strategic effort
lasers - other directed
energy weapons
Soviet command and control,
hardening as well as the thrust
of the Soviet strategic effort
NIB process
NIE process
JCS problems with the NIB
process
briefers:
agreed to contact the briefers and
schedule them for the 15-17 September briefing period. Ten-
tatively it was agreed to schedule one briefing in the
morning and two in the afternoon. Briefing sessions are
to be limited to one and one-half hours.
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Andrew Marshal
General Keagan
Sherman Kent
James Schlesinger
Thomas Noorer
Possible additional
Paul Nitze
James Angleton
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