CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 72
OCI NO. 0432/62
31 August 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Dept. review completed
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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31 August 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 30 Aug)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Berlin: The USSR has made it clear that responsibility
for local Berlin affairs lies with the East German commandant
appointed last week after abolition of the Soviet commandant's
office in East Berlin. The next steps toward formally in-
corporating East Berlin into East Germany may be taken in
early September after Ulbricht's return from the USSR.
Nuclear Weapons: In Geneva, the Soviets are stressing
that the two draft test ban treaties introduced by the US
and Britain are not in accord with the compromise proposal
offered by the eight nonaligned nations last April.
Cuba: Moscow is seeking to counter recent US public
attention to the heavy influx of Soviet personnel and material
into Cuba by exploiting the recent raid in Havana harbor and
by stressing the allegedly nonmilitary nature of Soviet ship-
ments.
CIVIL UNREST IN THE USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The Rostov area of the Soviet Union has been closed
to foreigners since 1 June because of disorders described
variously as a strike, a riot, and a peaceful demonstration.
The disorders were reportedly triggered by the increase in
the retail price of meat and butter. Troops were called in,
party presidium member Frol Kozlov was sent to the area,
and martial law was imposed, but an explosive condition appar-
ently still prevails.
NORTH VIETNAM CONCERNED OVER AGRICULTURAL FAILURES . . . . Page 5
Hanoi is attributing persistent agricultural failures
and resultant food shortages to poor management of coopera-
tives. The authorities, expecting a worsening food situa-
tion in the coming months, are trying to improve food dis-
tribution and are encouraging city dwellers to grow food
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Ben Bella's appeal to Algerian National Army units
loyal to him to send contingents to Algiers to restore
order poses the threat of civil war. Leaders of Wilaya IV,
who control Algiers and the surrounding area, are massing
their forces in Algiers and have announced that they will
resist attempts by Ben Bella's forces to enter the city.
Although Wilaya III--controlled by Ben Bella's rivals Bel-
kacem Krim and Mohamed Boudiaf--has expressed support for
Wilaya TV's position, there is no indication that it will
send troops to Algiers.
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31 August 196;
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Tshombd has implied that he will accept the UN's plan
for reconciliation in the Congo, but in line with his usual
dilatory tactics he wants "clarification" of several points
and certain Western "guarantees."
~ Pressure may be increasing for Adoula
to release Gizenga. Sporadic fighting continues in northern
Katanga.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The North Vietnamese have begun token withdrawals of
"technicians" from Laos through the International Control
Commission checkpoints. Some North Vietnamese troops appear
to have been withdrawn Pathet Lao forces--aided
by North Vietnamese--are continuing mop-up operations against
Meo units in northern Laos.
WEST NEW GUINEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The UN military representative supervising the cease-
fire in West New Guinea anticipates only the normal problems
in maintaining law and order when the LIN administration
takes over the territory from the Netherlands on 1 October.
Some 1,000 UN troops will be available.
u arno as n ca e a ie wall ry o expand t
donesia's
role in New Guinea during the UN administration. 25X1
UAR VS. SYRIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Nasir's prestige in the Arab world has been seriously
damaged by the defection to Syria of a high-level UAR in-
telligence officer. This event coincided with an Arab League
meeting to consider Syrian charges of UAR subversion which
had led Cairo to threaten to withdraw from the organization
Such action would further weaken the League and dramatize
the Nasir regime's estrangement from other Middle Eastern
governments. These developments, on the other hand, are
likely to strengthen the Syrian Government. 25X1
FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Withdrawal from Algeria has improved France's relations
with the Arab world. Diplomatic ties with Tunisia have been
renewed, and Paris has a new aid agreement with Morocco,
France will probably continue to insist, however, that the
UAR make some gesture toward settlement of French property
_
rights there. F
I 25X1
TRINIDAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Trinidad will become an independent state within the
British Commonwealth on 31 August. Prospects for economic
viability are good. Trinidad is generally pro-Western
and wants to join the Organization of American States. Pre-
mier Williams, however, who is moved by personal animus
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 August 1962
against the US, has indicated that his first consideration
after independence will be to obtain more American aid in
return for use of the naval base and radar research facility
at Chaguaramas.
SPECIAL ARTICLE
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page I
Relations between Communist China and India, cordial
in the mid-1950s, have deteriorated to the point of with-
drawal of ambassadors, termination of the 1954 "peaceful
coexistence" treaty, mutual propaganda recriminations, and
skirmishing along the border. Both sides are anxious to
avoid a major military clash and have expressed readiness
to discuss the issue, but there is little prospect of an
early settlement of the long-standing boundary dispute
MULLA MUSTAFA AL-BARZANI: KURDISH NATIONALIST . . . . . . Page 5
Thirty years of Kurdish nationalist activity have
made Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani a legendary figure among the
tribesmen of Kurdistan. He has fought in Iraq and Iran,
and spent eleven years in "exile" in the USSR. A year
ago he sparked a new rebellion in Iraq and is successfully
holding off the Iraqi Army. He is far from having the sup-
port of all the Kurdish tribes, however, and his chances
of leading a general Kurdish uprising seem slim.
ITALY'S CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Premier Amintore Fanfani's coalition of Christian
Democrats, Social Democrats, and Republicans has governed
Italy for six months with Nenni Socialist support. This
long-discussed "opening to the left" has made some progress
toward socio-economic reform and is widening the breach
between the Communists and the Socialists. However, econom-
ic interests, including influential Christian Democrats,
and opponents at both ends of the political spectrum will
make every effort to discredit the new alignment before
the 1963 national elections.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Since the abolition of the I a letter from the French ambas-
Soviet commandant's office in
East Berlin on 22 August and
the appointment less than 24
hours thereafter of East German
Major General Poppe as commandant
of the "capital of the GDR, Ber-
lin," the Soviets have made it
clear that they will no longer
accept any responsibility for
local East Berlin affairs. Thus
far, however, they have taken
none of the steps which would
logically follow the liquidation
of the Soviet commandant's of-
fice, such as East German action
to bar Allied military entry in-
to East Berlin or attempts to
induce the Western powers to
deal with the new East German
commandant. Normal Allied mili-
tary traffic continues to move
in and out of East Berlin with-
out difficulty.
The conclusion of Ulbricht's
month-long stay in the USSR was
signaled by a TASS announcement
on 28 August that he and Khru-
shchev had met in the Crimea
for a "long and friendly" dis-
cussion of important interna-
tional questions. After his
return the East Germans may
proceed with formal steps to
incorporate East Berlin into
the GDR. Such steps might in-
clude a session of the East Ger-
man State Legislature which pre-
sumably would formalize the in-
corporation and enact new regu-
lations imposing international
passport controls at the Berlin
sector border applicable to Al-
lied military personnel of the
Berlin command as well as all
civilian travelers.
Berlin Developments
In the first test of the
effects of the abolition of the
Soviet commandant's office, the
Soviet Embassy in East Berlin
declined on 24 August to accept
sador in Bonn, addressed to So-
viet Ambassador Pervukhin, pro-
testing the shooting of an East
German escapee at the wall in
the French sector on 23 August.
In an obvious move to underscore
the Soviet contention that the
USSR no longer has any responsi-
bility for East Berlin, the So-
viet Embassy said this question
was not within the competence
of the Soviet ambassador.
Soviet insistence on un-
restricted access to the Soviet
war memorial in West Berlin
dominated local developments
in the city last week. Follow-
ing the West Berlin disorders
during the weekend of 18 August
in which Soviet buses trans-
porting guards to the memorial
were stoned, the Soviets intro-
duced armored personnel carriers
on 21 August and then demanded
that the US discontinue its
practice of escorting these
vehicles through the US sector.
Soviet officials contended that
the escorts constitute a "forced
measure," not a safety precau-
tion, and said the vehicles
needed no protection. They
warned that if US escorts were
continued, the Soviets would
retaliate by escorting all US
military vehicles entering East
Berlin and on the autobahn be-
tween West Berlin and West Ger-
many.
In an apparent move to
emphasize these warnings, the
Soviets delayed a US convoy on
the autobahn for 43 minutes at
the ]Babelsberg checkpoint on
23 August by renewing demands,
last made in June, that US
troops dismount for a bead
count and that tailgates of
the trucks be lowered for in-
spection.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The vigorous efforts to
stop the US escorts suggest
that the Soviet authorities
regard the practice as implying
an infringement of their rights
of unrestricted access to West
Berlin. They are particularly
sensitive to the presence of
West Berlin police in the es-
cort parties.
Moscow used its 24 August
note to t'-e US protesting the
"'dangerous provocations" against
Soviet vehicles carrying guards
to the war memorial to warn that
if such incidents are repeated,
measures will be taken to ensure
the security of Soviet personnel.
The note charged that both the
US "occupation authorities" and
the West Berlin police had re-
mained inactive when "bandit
elements" tried to prevent the
passage of Soviet guards.
At Geneva, the USSR has
been placed on the defensive
by the US and British offer on
27 August of a choice of two
treaties: one would ban all
nuclear tests and would be en-
forced by obligatory on-site
inspections; the other, includ-
ing no provision for inspection,
would ban tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space, and under-
water, but would exclude under-
ground tests from the ban. So-
viet delegate Kuznetsov attacked
the proposals but attempted to
avoid the impression of a cate-
gorical rejection by stating
that Moscow would study them.
Kuznetsov is attempting
to avoid being isolated by
stressing that the USSR has
already accepted proposals for
a compromise agreement offered
by the eight nonaligned nations
at Geneva last April and that
the US-UK proposals are not in
accord with the neutralists'
position. He reaffirmed Soviet
insistence on an agreement
banning all tests on the basis
of the neutralist proposal.
Kuznetsov also revived
the Soviet test ban draft of
November 1961 which would halt
atmospheric, outer space, and
underwater testing and insti-
tute an indefinite moratorium
on underground tests. He at-
tempted to identify the USSR
with neutralist suggestions
for a moratorium on underground
testing by proposing that all
tests should be stopped simul-
taneously on 1 January 1963.
Moscow is attempting to
counter recent US public atten-
tion to the heavy influx of
Soviet bloc personnel and ma-
terial into Cuba by denouncing
the "piratical shelling" of
Havana on 25 August and renew-
ing charges that the US is
planning another invasion at-
tempt. Soviet propaganda
branded as "cynical" and "hypo-
critical" the official US de-
nial of responsibility for the
Havana raid and charged that
it was carried out with the
"direct support of Washington."
The USSR also renewed cau-
tious expressions of Soviet
support in the event of another
"dangerous adventure" by the
US. Moscow radio stated that
"Cuba does not stand alone,"
and that the Cuban people,
"with the assistance of all pro-
gressive mankind," will deal a
crushing rebuff to any new at-
tacks by the imperialists.
Moscow sought to counter
US statements regarding the
shipment of Soviet military
equipment to Cuba by issuing
a TASS report describing the
allegedly non-military nature
of Soviet cargoes, announcing
that the volume of Soviet-Cuban
shipments this year will double
last year's rate, and pointedly
noting that the USSR has chart-
ered ships of several NATO mem-
bers to transport "industrial
equipment, flour, paper, and
fertilizer" to Cuba.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CIVIL UNREST IN THE USSR
The Rostov area of the So-
viet Union was in a state of
civil unrest for over two months
this summer, and an explosive
condition may still prevail.
The first incident occurred in
the industrial city of Novocher-
kassk, about 25 miles from
Rostov-on-Don, following the
announcement on 1 June of the
increase in retail prices of
meat and butter. The disturbance
has been variously described as
a strike of the 11,000 employees
at the Novocherkassk Electric
Locomotive Plant, as a riot of
townspeople, and as a peaceful
demonstration of students and
housewives. According to the
bulk of the reports, troops were
called in; they fired on the
crowds and killed a number of
people, including some children.
Martial law was imposed with a
7:00 p.m. curfew. Frol Kozlov,
second-ranking party secretary,
was sent to handle the problem.
Beginning on 1 June Novo-
cherkassk newspaper editorials
sought to explain and justify
the price rise to the populace,
becoming increasingly strident
in the process. On 10 June a
headline in inch-high type pro-
claimed: "We Understand: It
Is Necessary Now." The price
rise, however, acted more as a
catalyst for accumulated griev-
ances than as sufficient cause
for the disturbance.
Moscow's attempts to cope
with the problem seem singularly
inept. The use of troops, al-
though halting the first dis-
in neighboring communities. This
hostility and probably sporadic
"incidents" finally led the
Novocherkassk City Council on
12 July to issue an extraordinary
decree on safeguarding public
order in the city.
A temporary modification of
food prices has been reported
but Mos-
cow seems to have relied more
on indoctrination than on im-
provement of living conditions
to bring the situation under
control.
The unrest apparently con-
tinued well into August.F-
turbance, created an ugly mood 32838
not only in Novocherkassk but also
Caucasus
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riots were
still taking place on the 3rd.
The Rostov Oblast party first
secretary was replaced on 15
August by an outsider from
the Ukraine. On 19 August two
American Embassy officers travel-
ing a route previously approved
by the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs were told by a local of-
ficial that the road was closed
and that "incidents could hap-
pen" if his "advice" to avoid
the road were not heeded. He
stressed that the route was "right
on the border of Rostov Oblast."
The officers were kept on a new
route by police stationed at
major crossroads.
The entire Rostov area has
been closed to foreigners since
1 June. Tourists on previously
approved itineraries were at the
last minute refused permission
to visit Rostov and were diverted
to other areas.
Moscow's efforts to hide
the real reason for closing the
area have bordered on the
ridiculous. Tourists have
been told they could not go
to Rostov because of a "storm,"
a cholera epidemic, an in-
ternational meeting to have
been held there the last of
July, an epidemic of hog cholera,
"in:fection" or "illnesses," the
collapse of the roof of the
Rostov hotel, and "some-
thing military going on there."
Late in July the Soviet Foreign
Affairs Ministry finally an-
nounced officially that the
Rostov area was "quarantined"
until 1 September.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NORTH VIETNAM CONCERNED OVER AGRICULTURAL FAILURES
Persistent agricultural
failures since 1960 and result-
ant food shortages are causing
increasing concern in Hanoi.
The government, expecting a
worsening food situation in
the coming months, is encour-
aging city dwellers to supple-
ment their diet by growing
food on unused land. It is
trying to improve food distri-
bution and management of the
collectives.
The party plenum in June
issued a resolution noting that
agriculture is still backward,
is based mainly on manual labor,
and is lagging behind the "re-
quirements of economic develop-
ment and the improvement of the
people's living conditions."
Ho Chi Minh put it more bluntly
when he cited an old Vietnamese
saying that "whatever cause we
want to champion, we must eat
first." Complaining about the
disappointing output of rice
and subsidiary crops in the first
half of this year, the chair-
man of the State Planning Com-
mission warned that the food
situation would get worse
in the second half.
In rationalizing its agri-
cultural problems, Hanoi has
put little blame on the weather
and has directed most of its
criticism at faulty management
and leadership of agricultural
cooperatives. Hanoi has com-
plained that the peasants are
permitted to "pursue their
easy-going and free life," and
that they lack a sense of
participation and responsibility
in the cooperatives.
e author- 25X1
i i.es are serious y dissatis-
fied with the continued fail-
ure of the cooperatives. The
peasants have reportedly shown
no enthusiasm for collectiviza-
tion and have withheld food-
stuffs for their own use or
for sale on the black market.
At the present time 89
percent of the 2,700,000
peasant households in North
Vietnam are in cooperatives;
approximately 845,000 are
in the new hamlet-size units
organized last year. These
figures have not changed
significantly in the past
12 months. They illustrate
the ;hesitancy of the regime
to move into more advanced
forms of collectivization
until the present level of
organization is consolidated.
Expanding agricultural
output is vital, not only to im-
prove-subsistence diets and raise
worker incentive but to provide
raw materials for industry
and goods for export. Recog-
nizing this, North Vietnam's
leaders have recently empha-
sized agricultural development
as their most immediate concern.
Because of the current dif-
ficulties, the regime now
may feel that greater invest-
ment in agriculture is needed
than was orginally antici-
pated in the Five-Year Plan.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Ben Bella's appeal to
Algerian National Army (ALN)
units loyal to him to send con-
tingents to Algiers to restore
order poses the threat of civil
war. Leaders of Wilaya IV, who
control Algiers and the sur-
rounding area, are massing their
forces in Algiers. They have
announced they will resist
attempts by Ben Bella's forces
to enter the city. Although
Wilaya III---controlled by Ben
Bella's rivals Belkacem Krim and
Mohamed Boudiaf--has expressed
support for Wilaya IV's position,
there is no indication that it
will send troops to Algiers. In
any event, ALN Chief of Staff
Colonel Boumedienne and other
military leaders are likely to
press for a prominent political
role in Algeria as the price of
their support.
If the troops moving on
Algiers are drawn largely from
Boumedienne's "exterior" ALN,
which entered Algeria from Tuni-
sia and Morocco after independ-
ence, they will be well-equipped
and disciplined. The presence
of these troops, however, would
be likely to increase Wilaya IV's
determination to resist, since
the guerrilla troops which
fought the war within Algeria
have an intense dislike for
Boumedienne and his forces.
Many of the "troops" of Wilaya
IV, however, are probably men
who hastily joined the guerrilla
forces after independence and
have had little or no formal
training.
Ben Bella had apparently
been trying to organize effective
support among the ex-rebel, non-
military organization which con-
ducted urban operations and kept
discipline before independence,
as well as from Algerians re-
cently returned from France.
Yacef Saadi, a master terrorist
who led and organized the highly
effective "battle of Algiers"
against the French in 1956-57--
which was contained only after
an all-out effort by French
paratroopers--was designated by
Ben Bella's political bureau to
head a Committee of the Party
for Greater Algiers. The arrest
-ALGERIA
At aitic
Ocean
Algerian Liberation Army
military district boundary
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of many of Yacef's men by Wilaya
II and the 29 August gun battle
in Algiers, however, probably led
Ben Bella to reluctantly calcu-
late that a show of force was
necessary.
The resignation of Mohamed
Boudiaf, Krim's representative
on the political bureau, and
Krim's outspoken criticism of
Ben Bella and the political
bureau in a 28 August press con-
ference suggest that these
leaders are exploiting Wilaya
IV's control of Algiers to
press their own campaign against
Ben Bella. Krim, however, spe-
cifically repudiated the use of
force to solve the dispute, and
unless Wilaya III is invaded he
will probably maintain this
position. The US Consulate
General in Algiers felt on 28
August that although armed
clashes could not be ruled out,
Wilaya IV, in return for some
concessions, might be pre-
vailed upon to give way.
The Consulate General also
reported that Algerian officials
in Algiers were disgusted and
disillusioned over the renewed
political-military bickering and
the postponement of the 2 Sep-
tember elections. Pressure from
middle-level young Algerians
reportedly was a considerable
factor in bringing about the
early August compromise "solution"
between the political bureau and
the Provisional Algerian Govern-
ment (FAG), and may have a signifi-
cant effect in the present crisis.
The populace, particularly in
Algiers, is restive as a result
of large-scale unemployment and
ineffective government, and its
sense of frustration may produce
mob violence.
Despite the week's political
confusion in Algeria, French
Minister for Algerian Affairs
Joxe and Algeria's Provisional
Executive President Fares went
ahead with the formal signature
on 28 August of nine protocols
governing French-Algerian re-
lations in a number of important
fields. Six of the protocols
were short-term agreements
establishing the basis for French
technical assistance in educa-
tion, judicial matters, and the
administration, and for continu-
ation of the multinational Common
Organization for Saharan Research
(CjCRS) until the end of this year,
Three long-term agreements pro-
viding for the establishment of
a joint French-Algerian organiza-
tion to replace OCRS and guaran-
teeing French oil interests in
the Sahara were also signed by
Fares, presumably with the con-
sent of key Algerian leaders.
Signature of the protocols,
however, is unlikely to relieve
long-standing apprehensions in
Paris that further deterioration
of the political situation in
Algeria could lead to the
emergence of extremist leaders 25X1
who would not hesitate to re-
pudiate such agreements.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Tshombd informed the
American, British, and Belgian
consuls on 28 August that he
was giving serious consideration
to the UN's plan for reconcil-
iation in the Congo and implied
that he would accept it. In
line with his usual dilatory
tactics, however, he said that
he wanted clarification of sev-
eral points from the UN and the
Western powers and Western
"guarantees" on a number of
specific points. He said next
day that the plan was receiving
"minute study" and that he
intended to give his reply
next week.
Katangan forces continues in
northern Katanga along the
Kamina-Kabalo road and between
Kabalo and. Albertville. A UN
staff officer reports that the
Katangans recently sent rein-
forcements to the area and ap-
pear to be moving toward Niemba,
on the Kabalo-Albertville rail
line. He said the Katangans
have also strengthened their
positions at Kitenge, midway
between Kamina and Kabalo.
The UN officer also said. that
an advance party of the ANC
battalion which will operate
with UN forces has arrived at
Kamina.
Before the plan was formally
presented to Elisabethville,
Tshombe's Foreign Minister had
written -U Thant asking that
immediate contact be arranged
between the UN and the Katangan
government so that Katangans
ideas on federation could be
A number of articles have
appeared recently in the local
press on imprisoned Antoine
Giz'enga. The US Embassy be-
lieves Adoula may be under
increasing pressure from Gizenga's
supporters to release h1i, and
that Guinean Ambassador Diallo
"explained" and "delay prevented.'I may be prepared to offer Adoula
Delays probably will also
occur in Leopoldville in spite
of Adoula's efforts to co
operate with the UN.
Sporadic fighting between
Congo National Army (ANC) and
the support of the Casablanca
powers as a quid pro quo. In-
terior Minister Kamitatu, who
has previously been reported
working for Gizenga's release,
visited the former Stanley-
ville leader on 23 August in
the company of security chief
Nendaka.
EQUATEUR
,oquihatville
Thysville
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The North Vietnamese appar-
ently have decided to make
=3ken withdrawals of their
troops through the International
Control Commission (ICC) check-
points at Nhommarath and the
Plaine des Jarres. On 27
August, fifteen "advisers and
technicians"--Hanoi has never
conceded the presence of armed
troops--left the Plaine des
Jarres for North Vietnam.
5__ 00
MILES
32837
CAMBO D/A
r sour"
VrETNAA
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"RMA Muon~.' .r
Sigg Name--
,
Vien ~ Tha
r
Muong-,
Hoa~inSaiVAM H
/ Salk
INIANE
Nanp KhaI
THAILAND
L A O S
Royal Army base area - Road
Meo base area --- Trail
Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North ? Route number
Vietnamese areas .???????? Road under
-- ICC checkpoint construction
11 ilo
? z*u r PRABANi
~
Pa
eng k 'Muong,Hou
_ %? ?,, Prabang _
Sayabour` Phou uon ~~ V
ii Khou ig lanes
4 ~KVSSy ` D o n
h
Veng`. ~
VIENTIANE
Ban Hin ak San
Heup
While only a few North
Vietnamese are expected to pass
through the established check-
points in pro forma observance
of the Geneva accords,
evacuation from neutralist held
areas of some North Vietnamese
troops appears to have taken
place.
have been airlifted from the
PlaLine des Jarres area in
North Vietnamese elements
Haa
KHAMVI
1) Nh
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
addition to having been with-
drawn overland via Route 7.
The withdrawal, however,
is by no means complete. There
are continuing reports of North
Vietnamese activity, especially
in northeastern Laos, a center
of Pathet Lao strength and an
area which the Pathet Lao
probably consider a "base area"
which must be protected. More-
over, substantial numbers of
North Vietnamese will probably
be incorporated incognito into
Pathet Lao units in a cadre
capacity.
Phoumi Vongvichit, Pathet
Lao minister of information in
the new government, on 28 August
called for an end to US resupply
31 Aug 62
flights to Meo guerrilla outposts.
He declared any US resupply
flights subsequent to the
deadline for the withdrawal
of troops would constitute "a
violation of the Geneva accord,"
and added, "It's not up to the
Americans to feed the Meos."
Meanwhile, Pathet Lao
units, reportedly aided by
North Vietnamese troops, have
continued to conduct mop-up
operations against the Meos
in northern Laos. The Pathet
Lao apparently feel that the
Meos, who are scattered through-
out the mountains of northern
Lao:;, present the most serious
threat to Communist consoli-
dation of control over the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEST NEW GUINEA
The UN military represent-
ative supervising the cease-
fire in West New Guinea, Briga-
dier General Rikhye of India,
anticipates no security problem
beyond normal law and order re-
quirements when the UN adminis-
tration takes over the territory
from the Netherlands on 1
October. The UN will have about
1,000 troops available by that
time. The UN also will re-
supply Indonesian forces that
have been infiltrated into
New Guinea during the spring
and summer and will inform them
by pamphlet drops of the cease-
fire. Rikhye also says that
during a recent visit to Djakarta
he took President Sukarno to
task for Indonesian infiltrations
of New Guinea since the 15
August agreement and that he
obtained a promise from him
that these would stop.
Sukarno however, apparently
still wants to increase Indo-
nesia's military presence in
West New Guinea beyond the 1,200
troops estimated to be there.
He also seems eager to acquire
immediately more Indonesian in-
fluence in the area than the
Dutch-Indonesian agreement makes
possible.
Sukarno announce on
21 August that Indonesia's
development plan for West New
Guinea need not wait until May--
the date for transfer of the
territory's administration to
Indonesia--but will begin on
1 October. On that date, he
said, free movement of goods
and people will be possible
between the area and other
parts of Indonesia. He also
said that if the UN forces proved
inadequate tQ cope with the
situation, the Indonesian armed
forces may be asked to assist.
The Indonesian Communist
party will try to exploit the
UN phase of the New Guinea
settlement. In a 20 August
speech in which he endorsed
Sukarno's present position,
party chairman Aidit added'that
"the rule of the UN is, in es-
sence, that of US imperialism.
It will be easy for the Indo-
nesian people to identify those
responsible when difficulties
occux during the UN rule.''
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The defection to Syria of
Lt. Col. Zaghlul Abd al-Rahman,
the UAR military attache in
Beirut and a key intelligence
officer, has seriously damaged
Nasir's prestige in the Arab
world. The defection occurred
while Arab League representatives
were meeting in Lebanon to con-
sider Syrian charges that the
UAR is engaged in subversive
activities against the Damascus
regime. The attache had been
heavily involved in these activi-
ties, and was able to substantiate
the Syrian charges. To cover
its embarrassment, Cairo threat-
ened to withdraw from the League.
If Cairo carries out its
threat, it would in effect be
admitting that it now has prac-
tically no friends among Middle
Eastern governments. Nasir may
once more go into a phase of
concentrating on internal Egyp-
tian affairs, although his propa-
ganda against "reactionaries
and opportunists" in the Arab
world is unlikely to slacken.
Zaghlul alleged in a press
conference in Damascus on 28
August that he belongs to a
secret organization composed of
UAR officers, intellectuals,
and students opposing Nasir's
"dictatorship." Whether or not
such an organization exists,
Nasir is likely to tighten se-
curity measures.
His suspicions
are i e y o be deepened by
the fact that Zaghlul is an old
acquaintance of UAR Vice Presi-
dent and Field Marshal Amir,
whose brother was arrested some
months ago for indicating anti-
regime sentiments.
Inside Syria, these develop-
ments will strengthen the regime
of President Qudsi and Prime
Minister Azmah, who have been
under pressure to reorganize
the cabinet. UAR sympathizers,
still numerous in the country,
will also suffer; the Syrian
Government closed the borders
with Lebanon and Jordan while
it rounded up agents and others
whom Zaghlul had exposed.
The Arab League--already
boycotted by Iraq--would be
still further weakened by
the UAR's withdrawal, al-
though other members are
frantically attempting to
paper over the rift. De-
spite its sorry record as
an action agency since its
founding in 1945, the League
has provided a forum in
which the Arab states could
settle their disputes "with-
in the family," without call-
ing on foreign powers for
help except in grave emergen-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD
Withdrawal from Algeria
has enabled France to begin im-
proving its relations with the
rest of the Arab world.
In North Africa, the un-
certain situation in Algeria
gives Paris particular cause
to establish good terms with
the neighbors of its former
possession.
D p omat c
ties have been resumed, and an
exchange of ambassadors is im-
minent. French relations with
Libya have been handled by
charges, but Libya has nominated
an ambassador
Morocco and France on 7 July
concluded a new economic and
financial agreement which makes
available to Morocco the equiva-
lent of $60 million in the form
of development loans, guaran-
tees for French exporters of
capital equipment, and drawing
rights on the Bank of France.
Elsewhere, however, France
has insisted that the Arab
states themselves make the first
move toward restoration of the
relations they broke at the time
of the Suez crisis.
France and Syria exchanged
cultural attaches this spring
pending a full-scale resumption
of relations which was to take
place after a cease-fire in
Algeria.
Reconciliation with the
UAR has been delayed by Nasir's
opposition to French retention
of military bases and nuclear
test sites in Algeria and by
Paris' insistence that the UAR
make some gesture toward set-
tlement of French property
rights in Egypt. Foreign Min-
istry officials have indicated
that France would be willing
to resume relations if the
UAR would show some support
for the 1958 Zurich agreements
designed to settle financial
differences between the two
countries. France reportedly
sees no reason at this time
to resume relations with Iraq,
Yemen, or Kuwait.
equipment.
plier of modern military
It is unlikely thatimproved
French-Arab relations will
weaken France's strong ties
with Israel. France will
probably attempt a more
cautious and balanced ap-
proach to Arab-Israeli
political disputes, but it
will probably continue to
be Israel's principal sup-
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Trinidad and the nearby
island of Tobago on 31 August
will become independent as a
unitary state within the British
Commonwealth. The new country's
prospects are good for continued
economic viability, based pri-
marily on petroleum and agricul-
ture. Generally pro-Western,
Trinidad wants to join the
Organization of American States
(OAS). Premier Williams, how-
ever, who bears a personal
animus against the US, has
stated that his first consider-
ation after independence will
be to "raise the whole question
of aid."
Williams evidently intends
to reopen the financial pro-
visions--which he helped draft
and then signed--of the 1961
Defense Areas Agreement, under
which the US holds the naval
base and associated radar re-
search facility at Chaguaramas
until 1977. In the agreement
the US expressed readiness to
contribute to Trinidad's
economic development, and
specified for priority consid-
eration several projects it
would help finance. Williams
interprets this as a US promise
to underwrite the total cost of
these specified projects--now
estimated at more than $80 mil-
lion--and in addition infers
from the agreement a US com-
mitment to pay for other projects
he has since added. On 11 Au-
gust he blamed Trinidad's con-
tinuing high unemployment on
alleged US nonfulfillment of the
1961 agreement, and attacked both
the US and the UK for not pro-
viding his latest addition, a
$30 million housing loan.
Williams has invited many
countries to send delegations
to the independence ceremonies.
Representatives include the Soviet
ambassador to Mexico, the Chinese
Nationalist ambassador to Brazil,
and a nonentity from the Cuban
Foreign Ministry. The invitation
to Cuba was evidently intended
primarily to annoy vVashington
and London; there is practically
no contact between Cuba and
Trinidad, and Williams indicated
previously that he will be re-
luctant to agree to any Cuban
request to open consulates.
Personally anti-Communist,
Williams has kept tight govern-
ment surveillance over Trinidad's
small Communist party, which is
not represented in the legislature.
The US Consulate General in Port-
of.-Spain finds no evidence to
support recent local comments
about Communist penetration of
the labor movement. The consu-
late general suggests, however,
that Williams may gravitate toward
the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN if
Trinidad has difficulty getting
into the OAS.
Williams is ambitious to be-
come a regional leader despite
Trinidad's long rivalry with
Jamaica and current friction
with the smaller British islands.
Fo:r about six months he has been
promoting a Caribbean common mar-
ket. His visit to Surinam in
early August yielded a joint
declaration recommending closer
cultural and economic ties; the
potential for trade between
Trinidad and Surinam is small,
however, because their economies
are not complementary. Williams
also plans to visit the French
Caribbean territories soon to pro-
mote his common market project.
Williams favors more
trade with British Guiana--now
mainly in rice--but is hostile
to Premier Cheddi Jagan on both
ideological and racial groungs,
Williams is alert to the possi-
bility of a future political
alignment between the East Indian
minority in Trinidad, chafing 25X1
under Williams' Negro government,
and the East Indian party govern-
in; in British Guiana.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
Relations between Communist
China and India have cooled to the
point where there is little contact
except through formal diplomatic
channels. Even these contacts
are maintained through charges,
both countries having pointedly
refrained from replacing their
absent ambassadors.
China has harassed the In-
dian representative in Peiping
and has made the operation of
India's consulate in Lhasa
virtually impossible. The New
China News Agency offices in
India have been closed, and
operations of the Bank of China
in Calcutta have been greatly
curtailed. India continues the
deportation of Chinese nationals
and has seized several objection-
able publications sponsored by
the Chinese Embassy. India
allowed the 1954 treaty govern-
ing trade between India and
Tibet to lapse in early June,
and trade agencies in India
and Tibet were closed. The
Chinese Communists had attached
importance to the 1954 accord
as the first formal treaty con-
taining the so-called Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexist-
ence. This catch phrase has
been used in much of their prop-
aganda to other Asians.
Early Relations
When the Communists came
to power in mainland China they
made little effort to cultivate
relations with neighbors. Their
interest in the nonbloc world
was focused primarily on revolu-
tionary movements and the activ-
ities of Communist parties.
In 1949 Mao said, "We oppose
illusions about a third road."
newly won independence, became
stanch promoters of their Com-
munist neighbor's efforts to en-
hance its international ac-
ceptability. They endorsed Com-
munist China's claim to Taiwan,
pressed for Peiping's admission
to the United Nations, and voted
against a Security Council res-
olution condemning the Chinese
as aggressors in Korea.
In the years since 1949
there have been major policy
shifts in both countries. Not
long after their entry into the
Korean War the Chinese began
to increase contacts with non-
aligned nations. In 1951 Peiping
concluded its first trade pact
with India. The following year
Peiping's "People's diplo-
macy" began in earnest, Sino-
Indian cultural contacts were
assiduously cultivated, and
delegations were exchanged.
Relations between Peiping
and New Delhi were warmest in
the years immediately following
their 1954 treaty on Tibet. Public
statements of joint opposition
to major facets of Western policy,
such as military alliances and
nuclear deterrence, found sympathet-
ic audiences in Asia. In 1955
these statements were trumpeted at
Bandung, as were the Five Prin-
ciples of Peaceful Coexistence.
The Indians, however, gradu-
ally grew uneasy. Their initial
cordiality was tempered by the
realization that the Communist
advance into Tibet had put Chi-
nese forces some 1,500 miles
closer to India. There were also
glimmerings of concern over
Peiping's intentions along the
ill-defined frontier.
Indian leaders at that time
viewed the Communists' rise to
power in China as an independence
movement parallel to their own
and part of the general anti-
colonial revolt in Asia. The
Indians, proud of their own
Emergence of Border Problem
During the 1950s the Chi-
nese Communists circulated maps
showing large areas of Ladakh,
northern Assam, and part of
Bhutan as Chinese territory.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Replying to repeated protests
from New Delhi, Peiping at first
insisted that Chinese cartogra-
phers were merely reproducing
the line shown on previous Chi-
nese maps. Later, Peiping adopted
its present position that, ex-
cept for the Tibet-Sikkim border,
the frontier has never been de-
limited. India began mildly pro-
testing Chinese intrusions as
early as 1954, but tempers did
not begin to rise until after
the Indians "discovered" the
Chinese road in 1958. Outright
Chinese harassment began at
about the same time and included
attempts to discourage Nehru
from visiting Lhasa; when he
attempted to cross a corner
of Tibet on a visit to Bhutan,
Chinese authorities held up his
transit visa and limited his
entourage.
Communist China's brutal
suppression of the Tibetan re-
volt in 1959 startled India,
and New Delhi's protests mounted
as it became more concerned about
the northern border. In Tibet,
as in Korea, the Chinese felt
that national self-interest
forced them to take decisive
action and to flout opinion in
JAMMU
l ~~,
AND '4.
KASHMIR
.) (Scotus ;n-d{pore)
Boundaries are not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Government.
Disputed area under Chinese control
Boundary shown on Indian maps
Boundary shown on Chinese Communist maps 'T`
Boundary shown on US and Western naps
5
Motorable road {
------ Minor road or trail
.Luchnow
I N D I A
Banaras -
An important turning point
for the Chinese was probably
India's decision to grant the
Dalai Lama refuge. It confirmed
their suspicion that India,
despite its professed nonalign-
ment, might not pursue an
amicable policy indefinitely
and that Nehru was motivated
more by Western than by "revolu-
tionary" sentiments. As a re-
sult, Peiping built access roads
in western and southern Tibet and
moved additional troops to the
border area. India moved less
vigorously, but the stage was
set for armed clashes between
border patrols. These were
brought to public notice in
August 1959, when Nehru told
the Indian Parliament of Chi-
nese Communist incursions at
Longju in the northeast and
Ladakh in the north.
Peiping and New Delhi have
carried on their inflammatory
boarder dialogue with an ear
tuned to world opinion. Each
has used charges of armed in-
trusion and airspace viola-
tilDn to depict the other as
intransigent and aggressive.
In publicizing its successful
border accords with Nepal and
Gyangtse
Dzeng SIKKKIM /
Tsethang.
ATMANDU____T
Gangtolc
Darjeeling
the non-Communist world. The
impact of the Tibetan action on
Indian intellectuals and govern-
ment leaders was immense, and
the ingenuous friendship of the
early 1950s ended.
'Shillong l BURMA'
Burma, Communist China implicitly
drew a comparison with India's
reluctance to seek settlement.
Chinese Communist moves toward
negotiating a boundary agree-
merit with Pakistan were also
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
motivated by a desire to make
India appear isolated from its
Asian neighbors in refusing
Chinese offers to enter talks.
Indian Military Moves
During the period of rela-
tive quiet after 1959Athe Chi-
nese continued their slow and
surreptitious advances in Ladakh.
These were spread thinly along
the frontier, and the Chinese
escaped detection as they pushed
into the more inaccessible
valleys. This spring, however,
emboldened by its own military
buildup and by signs of domestic
weakness in China, India moved
to check and, if possible, to
reverse this advance. Since
April, Indian forces, supported
by an extended and improved
logistics network, have been
moving to outflank Chinese out-
posts which had been set up in
areas not even claimed by Pei-
ping a few years ago. These Chi-
nese posts, many of them nearly
100 miles west of the Tibet-
Sinkiang highway, are supplied
overland via a series of sub-
sidiary roads. The Indian
objective this spring was limited
to forcing the Chinese to fall
back from these forward positions.
The Indian military build-
up, in terms of newly raised
army units, will probably not
be completed until next spring.
India's present strength, while
not sufficient to challenge the
Chinese hold on Ladakh, is prob-
ably sufficient to deter further
Chinese nibbling.
Both New Delhi and Peiping,
despite the strong language
of notes exchanged this year,
apparently want to avoid open
conflict. New Delhi's military
effort this year has been largely
one of maneuver; its troops are
under orders not to fire unless
fired upon. Peiping also ap-
pears to have instructed its
forces to fire only in self-de-
fense. Aware that its apparent
reluctance to fight may en-
courage the Indians to continue
to push forward, Peiping has
repeatedly warned New Delhi not
to interpret this restraint as
a sign of weakness.
Prospects for Settlement
In the past three years
no progress has been made toward
a diplomatic settlement of the
border problem. While both
sides have said repeatedly that
they want negotiations, sub-
stantive agreement on the more
than 40,000 square miles in dis-
pute has never been close.
Chou and Nehru met in April
1960, but their week of frigid
talks and the subsequent meet-
ings of their respective border
experts did little to mend the
breach. This past winter the
Chinese
broached
the .subject of new top-level dis-
cussions, and after the Indian
elections last February Peiping
reiterated its December call
for renegotiation of the
Indo-?Tibetan trade treaty which
was due to lapse in a few months.
In both cases the Indians werd
unreceptive, insisting that be-
fore any talks could take place
Communist China would have to
"vacate its aggression."
The Chinese reject such
preconditions and urge negotia-
tions on the basis of the status
quo, apparently hoping that
something approaching the status
quo will be ratified in a formal
agreement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In mid-August, Nehru as-
sured Parliament that his policy
regarding the conditions for
negotiations had not changed.
However, he seems more willing
than before to discuss possible
steps to reduce tensions and
create a climate conducive to
negotiations.
The Soviet Union has long
urged a negotiated settlement
of the boundary dispute and has
maintained a public policy of
noninterference. On a trip
through Asia in February 1960,
Khrushchev told newsmen only
that he hoped the two coun-
tries could resolve their dif-
ferences. This pointed lack
of Soviet support for Peiping
has been exploited in every pos-
sible way by New Delhi. It has
been made doubly aggravating to
the Chinese Communists by
subsequent Soviet shipments to
India of transports and heli-
copters which New Delhi pictured
as strengthening its northern
border. Moreover, India has
recently made much of the pur-
ported Soviet willingness to
provide India with MIG-r21s, as
well as facilities to manu-
facture engines for jet fighters.
Nevertheless, Peiping prob-
ably welcomes any initiative
which may help move New Delhi
toward the conference table.
Peiping argues that a satis-
factory settlement could be
reached if New Delhi would be
"reasonable" and hints that an
acceptable solution would, in
general, give the Chinese the
road and the portion of Ladakh
they now occupy while permitting
India to retain the territory
south of the McMahon line in
northern Assam. The Indians,
who now control the region
below the line, do not consider
a renunciation of Chinese claims
there a fair exchange for ter-
ritory at the other end. of the
frontier. Nehru told the Indian
Parliament in late March that
there could be no major con-
cessions to Communist China,
and that only little bits
of territory "here and there"
are negotiable.
Under present circum-
stances, with each side's
version of a negotiated set-
tlement tantamount to the
other's capitulation, there
is little prospect for fruit-
ful negotiations. Peiping
probably shares Nehru's re-
cently expressed expectation
that exploratory talks could
last "five or six years."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
MULLA MUSTAFA AL-BARZANI:
Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani,
leader of the year-old Kurdish
rebellion in Iraq, comes natu-
rally by his hostility to foreign
authority. Even in the days of
the Ottoman Empire, the Barzani
was one of the most troublesome
of the Kurdish tribes. Probably
now in his fifties, Mulla
Mustafa presumably received
typical Kurdish upbringing,
which includes indoctrination
with a profound contempt for
the "soft" Arab people of the
Mesopotamian valley and a deep
attachment to the freedoms of
the mountaineer. His elder
brother, Sheik Ahmad, rebelled
frequently against the British
in Iraq in the 1920s. Both
were captured, and Sheik Ahmad's
career ended in enforced resi-
dence.
Mulla Mustafa assumed the
leadership of his people about
1941 or 1942. He escaped from
detention in the summer of 1942,
and returned to his tribal area
in northeastern Iraq. In 1945
he led a new rebellion, but his
1,000 "rifles" were no match at
that time for the forces of the
Iraqi Government. In October
1945 he and his band fled with
their families into Iran. They
carried with them a number of
Iraqi petty officials and school-
teachers of Kurdish descent, as
well as some Kurdish deserters
from the Iraqi forces. Among
the deserters were a dozen army
officers, some of whom had been
trained in England and had held
posts on the Iraqi general staff.
That such people would join Mulla
Mustafa testifies both to his
leadership qualities and to the
KURDISH NATIONALIST
growing appeal of Kurdish na-
tionalism.
This group came to the
attention of the Soviet mili-
tary authorities, who then were
occupying the western part of
Iranian Azerbaijan. Mulla
Mustafa there met a number of
Russian officers, including
the commanding general of the
Soviet forces. The Soviets
suggested he place himself
under the orders of Qadi Muham-
mad, leader of the Soviet-in-
spired Democrat Party of Kurdi-
stan.. By the end of October
Mulla Mustafa's forces, in-
creased by refugees and adven-
turers from Iraq, numbered
nearly 3,000 armed men.
As the result of Soviet
instigation, the province of
Azerbaijan was thrown into re-
bellion and the eastern part
of Azerbaijan came under the
control of an "Azerbaijan Peo-
ple's Republic." In the west-
ern portion Qadi Muhammad de-
clared his own area independent
and inaugurated the Kurdish
People's Republic. Mulla
Mustaafa received the rank of
"Marshal" and appeared in a
Soviet uniform, complete with
high boots, epaulets, and
red-banded garrison cap.
Soviet support was grad-
ually withdrawn, however, and
the 'Iranian Government refused
to grant Kurdish autonomy.
Kurdish irregulars resisted
an Iranian Army campaign to
reconquer the area but were
defeated. Mulla Mustafa and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
about 300 of his tribesmen then
fought their way northward and
crossed into the Soviet union
in June 1947. They remained
there for eleven years, during
which Mulla Mustafa sank into
obscurity.
the and his fol-
lowers were given some military
training in the Tashkent area.
After the Iraqi revolution
in July 1958, Prime Minister
Qasim invited Mulla Mustafa
and his followers to return to
their homeland. Mulla Mustafa
arrived in Baghdad in early
October; 830 of his followers--
together with their families,
which by this time included
some Russian wives--returned
in April 1959 on a Soviet ship.
Qasim gave Mulla Mustafa an
allowance and a residence in
the capital.
Relations between Mulla
Mustafa and Qasim appeared
cordial, and. Mulla Mustafa
extolled the new order in Iraq.
However, as time passed and
Mulla's expectations of Kurdish
autonomy were unfulfilled, he
apparently realized that this
Iraqi government, like the
others, intended to suppress
Kurdish separatism. He began
to agitate for more Kurdish
freedom. He retired, to Barzan,
took over day-to-day leadership
of the tribe, and continued. po-
litical agitation.
The Kurd's aspirations at
that time did not go beyond
more favorable tax treatment,
education in their own language,
and a pro-Kurdish interpretation
of that article of the tempo-
raryIragi constitution which
guarantees full equality of
Arabs and Kurds. When Qasim
refused to meet these demands,
Mulla Mustafa and his followers
rebelled. in the summer of 1961.
These demands had been
formulated to some extent by
the Democratic Party of Kurdistan
(KDP). The KDP, which had
maintained an ephemeral exist-
ence with Communist help since
the 1940s, now is led by Mulla
Mustafa. Despite his long
residence in the Soviet Union
and his association with the
KDP, Mulla Mustafa seems to
remain an unreconstructed
Kurdish nationalist. Even Com-
munist Kurds feel so strongly
on the autonomy issue that they
have insisted on a separate
Kurdish Communist party branch.
Dissension between this branch
and the Arab Communists over
Kurdish nationalist aspirations
is chronic.
However, even with his
increased stature as the leader
of a successful rebellion against
the Arab-dominated Qasim regime,
Mulla Mustafa does not represent
all of the Iraqi Kurdish tribes.
Ambitious leaders of other
tribes are traditional enemies
of the Barzanis. Among these
tribes are the Zibari, Surchi,
and 1Herki--big tribes which
are actually aiding the govern-
ment against the Barzanis. Other
tribes, such as the Jaf, have
remained aloof. Temporary
truces might be arranged if those
tribes still friendly' toward the
regime, or rather still anti-
Barzani,,decide it is in their
interest to join in and enlarge
the rebellion. The chance of
developing any kind of tight lead-
ership organization under Mulla
Mustafa, however, is practically 25X1
the Kurdish tribes is not in sight.
nil. The leader who can unite all
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ITALY'S CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT
The center-left governt-
ment--a coalition of Christian
Democrats, Social Democrats,
and Republicans governing with
the support of Pietro Nenni's
Italian Socialist party--was
formed on 22 February after a
congress of Fanfani's Christian
Democratic party voted in favor
of the long-discussed experiment.
The coalition has made some
progress toward socio-economic
reforms. Nenni's cooperation
with the government is widening
the breach between his party
and the Communists. A signif-
icant by-product has been the
creation of serious strains
within the Communist party--
which controls about a fourth
of the Italian electorate--
over strategy in countering
the Fanfani government and the
Nenni Socialists.
However, even some Chris-
tian Democrats still oppose the
"opening to the left" out of
mistrust of the Socialists,
whose unity-of-action pact with
the Communists was not broken
until 1956. Economic interests,
including influential Christian
Democrats, fear the effect of
the government's economic re-
form programs, and plan strong
legislative opposition. The
Communists can be expected
to intensify strikes and
thereby embarrass the Social-
ists over the "labor unity"
issue.
The new government has
taken more positive steps than
The coalition's most
controversial measure has
been the bill to nationalize
the electric power industry--
a quid pro quo for Socialist
support of the government.
This is to be the first order
of business when parliament
reconvenes in September. The
measure is expected to pass,
although strong efforts will
be made by right-wing elements
to postpone the final vote
until the national elections.
Despite its dependence on
Socialist support, the Fanfani
coalition has continued the
strongly pro-Western stand of
previous Italian governments
and continues to cooperate
closely with the US on major
goals. The Socialist party
has accepted NATO as an instru-
ment of defense, and there has
been no threat to the mainte-
nance of US missiles on Italian
soil. One house of parliament
has already passed a 7.5-per-
cent increase in the defense
bud?;et--which remains one of
the lowest in Western Europe
in relation to GNP. In this
vote the Socialists abstained,
refusing for the first time to
join the Communist opposition
on this issue. A Socialist
spokesman on defense matters
stated that, in view of East-
West defense increases, it
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After six months in power,
Italian Premier Amintore Fanfani's
"opening to the left" still
faces stiff challenges before
the national elections sched-
uled to be held in the spring
of 1963.
its predecessors to implement
a reform program. It has moved
to plug tax loopholes, to ac-
celerate and expand the school
development program, and to in-
crease social security pensions.
It has passed measures liberal-
izing censorship, and has begun
to carry out the provisions of
they 1946 constitution for re-
gional administrations. It has
also initiated government-
management-labor meetings.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
would be unrealistic to ask
for a reduction in Italy's de-
fense budget.
The center-left parties
have been cautiously optimistic
over the results of the June
local elections--which involved
about 2.5 million votes. The
Christian Democrats lost fewer
votes than expected, the Social-
ists held their own, and the
smaller coalition parties made
some gains. While Communist
losses were slight, it is note-
worthy that their record of
steady advances has been broken.
Nenni is repo ted to have indi-
cated to Christian
Democrat leaders that after the
next national elections his
party would cooperate with them
in attempts to form local admin-
istrations even in areas where
the Socialists and Communists
have a majority. Socialists
and Christian Democrats now are
allied in about 100 local admin-
istrations, including Rome and
all large Italian cities with
the exception of Turin, Bologna,
Palermo, and Naples; attempts to
form a Christian Democratic -
Socialist government in Naples
are under way.
However, the Socialists
remain linked with the Commu-
nists in cooperatives, some
1,800 small local governments,
and in Italy's largest labor
confederation, the Communist-
dominated CGIL. While they have
now joined with the cabinet par-
ties in sending representatives
to periodic meetings to coordi-
nate labor policies, the Social-
ists will find it difficult to
disengage themselves from the
Communists in the labor field
without losing their mass sup-
port. Socialist periodicals
have stepped up arguments with
the Communists over Italian
ITALIAN PARLIAMENT
AUGUST 1962
jIIALIAN DEMO PARTY OF
MONARCHIST UNITY
(PDIUM) 7
'^NEO-FASCISTS (MSI) 8
VALDOSTAN UNION=(UVD) 125X1
ITALIAN DEMO PARTY OF
MONARCHIST UNITY
(PDIUM) 11
government policies, Soviet cen-
sorship, and the undemocratic
nature of Communism. While
Nenni has been the motivating
force in this process, his dis-
appearance from the scene would
probably not be enough to halt it.
Renewed attempts to discredit
the coalition are in prospect
this fall. The parliamentary
opposition is expected to make
a strenuous effort to delay
nationalization of the electric
power industry. Labor agita-
tion will probably be more in-
tense and more widespread than
usual. Summer strikes were
exceptionally severe, and vio-
lence can be expected when the
principal metalworkers' contracts
expire in October. Fanfani will
try to maintain momentum, how-
ever, so that the coalition
partners and their Socialist
backers have clear-cut campaign
issues for the spring elections.
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