CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
COPY NO. 58
OCI NO. 0410/62
30 March 1962
WEEKLY DIA review(s) completed.
SUMMARY State Department review
completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
,, KUM C1,11
IP?t~,?L A R USE
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OSD review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 March 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 29 Mar)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Rusk-Gromyko talks ended on 27 March with a joint
statement that contacts would be resumed after the two min-
isters had reported to their respective governments and
consulted with their allies. Bloc spokesmen at Geneva have
expressed optimism about an eventual Berlin settlement.
They have hinted, however, that Gromyko's objective was to
prepare the ground for further negotiations and that Khru-
shchev is holding back now because he wants a summit meet-
ing where he could gain personal credit for any agreement
with the West. Remarks by Communist representatives sug-
gest Moscow believes that a more forthcoming Soviet at-
titude on partial disarmament measures would enhance pros-
pects for an early summit meeting, despite the absence of
significant progress on Berlin at the foreign ministers'
level.
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The armed forces commanders on 28 March ordered Presi-
dent Frondizi's arrest after he persistently refused to
resign under intense pressure from the military and most
opposition political parties. The commanders, who thought
at first that Frondizi would resign to prevent a break in
constitutional order, have no well-developed plan for a
new government. They have asked Senate President Jose
Guido, the legal successor, to accept the presidency, but
he is standing by his earlier refusal to consider the post
in case of Frondizi's ouster. The armed forces are main-
taining firm security measures, but the Communists have
plans to promote violence by embroiling the Peronistas with
the military.
SYRIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The Syrian army command, which has attempted since
the break with the UAR last September to control govern-
ment decisions, has forced out the Qudsi-Dawalibi govern-
ment and assumed direct power. Its initial communiques
suggest that it contemplates resumption of certain social-
ist measures and some improvement of relations with Egypt.
Pressure from radical elements in the officer corps, prob-
ably a major cause of the army command's action, is likely
to lead sooner or later to a further governmental shift to
the left .
ISRAELI-SYRIAN TENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Syria and Israel continue to keep forces deployed in
the Lake Tiberias area. Israel has undertaken a limited,
selective call-up of reserves and has moved an infantry
battalion, an artillery battalion, and a tank-destroyer com-
pany into the area north of the lake near the Syrian bor-
der. Although neither side seems likely at this time to launch
a major attack, further clashes are likely.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 March 1962
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The army's willingness to enforce government policy
in the face of European settler resistance, as evidenced by
action against the Bab-el-Oued quarter of Algiers and the
capture of OAS leader Jouhaud, appears to have damaged OAS
prestige. De Gaulle's orders to liquidate the OAS, the
installation in Algiers of the new French high commissioner,
and the announcement of the composition of the provisional
executive may seriously reduce settler support of the OAS
unless it acts to show that it can prevent implementation
of the Evian accords. De Gaulle is certain to receive an
overwhelming affirmative vote in the 8 April referendum
throughout France to approve the accords and to give him
extraordinary powers to implement them, but his request for
such powers will be increasingly attacked even by many who
favor his Algerian policy because they will consider them
a virtual "blank check" for the future.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Adoula-Tshomb6 talks, suspended for three days,
have resumed, with Tshombd still asserting that, while he
has a free hand to negotiate, any agreement must be ratified
by the Katangan Assembly. Adoula's exasperation with the
Katangan leader appears to be growing, and he may break off
the talks if progress is not made soon. Tshombd shows no
inclination to end the negotiations and continues to press
for constitutional changes to assure a high degree of
Katangan autonomy.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
During his talks with Assistant Secretary Harriman on
24-25 March, Phoumi continued adamant in his opposition to
a government headed by Souvanna. His position is supported
by King Savang and Premier Boun Oum. Souvanna plans to go
to France shortly for an indefinite stay, but has indicated
willingness to return if there are signs of progress. The
Laotian Government has reinforced its Nam Tha garrison,
while antigovernment forces have engaged in sporadic shell-
ing of the town. 25X1
WEST NEW GUINEA DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The Dutch decision on 27 March--taken after renewed
Indonesian infiltration--to send troop and ship reinforce-
ments to West New Guinea apparently precludes any early
resumption of preliminary talks with Indonesia. Presi-
dent Sukarno in retaliation to the Dutch move will prob-
ably order accelerated military preparations and new in-
filtrations; further incidents between patrolling air
and naval units are also likely. 25X1
POLAND TIGHTENS LEGAL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
As a result of its failure to curb large-scale embez-
zlements and thefts of state property, the Polish regime
has begun to overhaul the legal system to provide more ag-
gressive prosecutions, more thorough investigations, and
more severe penalties for major offenses. Opposition by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 March 1962
lawyers to these moves--which threaten the personal liber-
ties gained in 1956--has caused the regime to resort to
intimidation and attempts to increase its supervision over 25X1
MILITARY BUDGETS IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES . . . . . . . Page 15
Most of the European satellites spent more for mili-
tary purposes in 1961 than originally planned, and some of
them plan further increases in 1962. Military expenditures
announced in most of the satellites during the period 1955-
60 declined or remained stable, and the increases for 1961
and 1962 probably reflect bloc reaction to the Berlin crisis
However, these increases will not require a major shift in
resources to the defense sector.
FOOD SITUATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The serious food shortages in Communist China last
spring and the subsequent poor harvest indicate another
crisis this spring--when food supplies reach their annual
low. Although the food situation does not seem noticeably
worse than last year at this time, the cumulative effects
of three bad years have resulted in widespread malnutrition.
Prospects for the coming crops are somewhat more favorable
than last year because of good weather and more realistic
agricultural policies, but these factors may be offset
to some extent by the effect of low peasant morale on
farm work.
CUBAN POLITICAL CHANGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Recently announced cabinet and other personnel shifts
confirm earlier indications of the Castro regime's plans to
develop a political structure similar to that of Communist
states. Fidel Castro, in his denunciation of high-ranking
veteran Communist leader Anibal Escalante on 26 March, re-
vealed the existence of a split within Cuba's top leader-
ship; Castro's own position does not appear to be in jeop-
ardy. 25X1
BRAZILIAN INTEREST IN SHALE OIL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . Page 19
A number of political and military leaders in Brazil,
concerned over the country's dependence on foreign oil
sources, are interested in developing extensive resources
of oil shale. Petrobras, the state oil monopoly, is re-
ported to be sending a mission to the bloc, where there
has been considerable experience in processing shale. Bra-
zilian Communists, who have succeeded over the past ten
years in developing widespread Brazilian distrust of pri-
vate American oil companies, are campaigning to block
US cooperation with Petrobras. The USSR may take advan-
tage of the scheduled visit to Brazil in May of Soviet
Deputy Premier Mikoyan to offer aid for shale development.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 March 1962
EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Recent French concessions have blurred the long-
standing differences among the six Common Market countries
over the treaty to establish a European political union,
but agreement is not yet in sight. Even with further con-
cessions by France, the Netherlands and Belgium are unlikely
to agree to a treaty until they are certain of Britain's
accession. They also want to be satisfied that such polit-
ical union would not abet De Gaulle's hopes of forming a
political-military-economic bloc dominated by France.
JAMAICA'S PRE-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
Jamaica will hold elections on 10 April preparatory to
becoming independent on 6 August. The elections will be a
close contest between two moderate parties which have dom-
inated Jamaican politics for two decades. The island's
viable economy and long period of relatively stable admin-
istration have laid a firm basis for independence, but
unresolved economic problems--including high unemployment--
could lead to instability after the enthusiasm of achiev-
ing independence has worn off. Cuban activities have
recently increased, particularly among the more extreme
racist elements. 25X1
SPECIAL ARTICLES
PROBLEMS FACING THE NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
Italy's Christian Democrats are trying a new experi-
ment: rapprochement with the Socialists in order to modern-
ize the country's institutions through administrative and
fiscal reforms and spread the benefits of the "economic
miracle" more widely by means of coordinated economic plan-
ning. However, both Communists and rightists will be able
to exploit serious sources of friction within Premier Fan-
fani's new coalition. Attempts are already being made by
opponents of the new government to discredit it by paint-
ing it as anti-NATO. With national elections scheduled for
1963, the need to show results before facing the electorate
will be the major incentive to early efforts to push through
Page 1
THE CONGOLESE ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Nearly two years after its post-independence mutiny,
the Congo National Army remains largely undisciplined and
a threat to the country's security. Moreover, its demon-
strated inability to mount effective operations against
Tshombe's southern Katanga stronghold has tended to weaken
Premier Adoula's position in his negotiations with Tshombe.
Within the Leopoldville government there are conflicting
views concerning the reorganization of the army and a
nagging fear that any effort at drastic reform might trigger
new unrest. While Adoula favors at least a 50-percent re-
duction--to between 12,000 and 15,000 men--army commander
Mobutu desires a 24,000-man force comparable to the pre-
independence Force Publique.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
The Geneva talks between
Secretary Rusk and Foreign
Minister Gromyko ended on 27
March with a joint communique
which stated that contacts
would be resumed after the two
ministers had reported to their
respective governments and con-
sulted with their allies. Both
Pravda and Izvestia on 28 March
highlighted the communique with-
out comment in an apparent ef-
fort to create the impression
that some progress, even though
slight, had been made on the
Berlin and German problems.
Bloc spokesmen at Geneva
have expressed optimism about
an eventual Berlin settlement.
They have hinted, however,
that Gromyko's objective at
this stage was confined to
preparing the groundwork for
further negotiations and that
Khrushchev is holding back now
because he wants a summit
meeting where he could gain
personal credit for any agree-
ment with the West. Remarks
by Communist representatives
regarding the possibility of
progress on partial disarmament
measures suggest Moscow be-
lieves that a more forthcoming
Soviet attitude on these meas-
ures would enhance prospects
for an early summit meeting,
despite the absence of any
significant progress toward a
Berlin settlement at the foreign
ministers' level.
Berlin and Germany
Khrushchev's relatively
moderate statements on Berlin
and Germany in his speech on
16 March have been followed by
the Ulbricht speech published
on 23 March in which the East
German leader publicly broached
the concept of a four-power
"arbitration agency" which
would be charged with ensuring
access to and from West Berlin.
This proposal presupposes East
German rather than international
control over Western access, but
Ulbricht sought to make the
scheme more attractive by stating
that his regime "deems it possi-
ble" to accept recommendations on
access arrangements from the
four guarantor powers or from
an "appropriate UN institution."
He emphasized, however,
that any Berlin settlement must
include not only access guaran-
tees but also "normalization"
of the West Berlin situation in
a manner which would respect
and safeguard East German sover-
eignty and terminate existing
Western occupation rights.
The bloc leaders probably
conceived this proposal, which
would provide only a facade of
international authority over
access, as a means of demonstrat-
ing their "flexibility" and de-
sire for a settlement as well
as for testing prospects of
gaining Western concessions
on this issue. The USSR and
East Germany had strongly op-
posed President Kennedy's con-
cept of an international control
authority for the Berlin autobahn
when this was put forward last
fall and stressed that any as-
surances of free access would
have to be on the basis of an
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agreement with East Germany.
The timing of the latest bloc
approach as set forth by
Ulbricht reflects the USSR's
desire to convey an impression
of readiness to bargain on the
question of access and other
issues involved in a Berlin
settlement.
Following a week of rela-
tively light Soviet traffic
in the lower altitudes of the
air corridors, the Soviets on
26 and 27 March increased the
number of flights and conducted
some at the higher altitudes
normally used by Western civil
aircraft. Additionally, flights
on 28 March were conducted dur-
ing the hours of darkness, for
the first time since 16 March.
They continue to demand that
the West give advance notifi-
cation of its flight plans,
and now are attempting to use
the same technique to harass
Western ground access to Ber-
lin. On 22 March a westbound
British convoy of three vehicles
was held up at the Babelsberg
checkpoint--at the eastern end
of the autobahn--because the
Soviets had not received writ-
ten advance notice of its ar-
rival. A US convoy was delayed
for two hours on the same
grounds on 23 March. Local US
military personnel continue to
inform the Soviets of the move-
ment of convoys of eight or
more vehicles. The Soviets
probably intend to increase
pressure gradually along these
lines in the hope of securing
advance notification from the
Allies of all convoys transit-
ing East Germany. The Soviets
would interpret any broad con-
cession from the Allied powers
on the issue of advance noti-
fication as an implied recog-
nition of Communist control
of the autobahn.
In a note delivered on
26 March by the Soviet Foreign
Ministry to the NATO countries'
ambassadors in Moscow, the East
Germans proposed that these
countries establish consular
relations with East Germany in
order to facilitate movement in
and out of East Germany and
Berlin. The USSR endorsed the
proposal in an attached cover-
ing letter. The timing of this
move further suggests that the
new East German customs law
will introduce new travel con-
trols affecting West Germans
as well as West Berliners.
Construction of new concrete
baffles has been in progress
at four of the seven Berlin
sector border crossing points--
presumably to be used to proc-
ess any new customs require-
ments levied on West Germans
and West Berliners.
In his recent speech, U1-
bricht maintained that it was
"not normal for NATO military
personnel to travel about" in
East Germany's "capital" and
countryside as if it were "Amer-
ican territory." His remarks,
together with the USSR's refusal
to act upon Western complaints
regarding harassment of Allied
military liaison mission per-
sonnel by East German police,
suggest that the USSR is pre-
pared to use such incidents to
induce the Allies to curtail
the activities of the missions
or even terminate them.
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Following a "careful in-
vestigation," Marshal Konev
has rejected General Clarke's
protest over the disabling by
gunfire of a US Liaison Mission
car engaged in a routine tour
near Gotha--just as he earlier
turned down a British protest
over the wounding of a British
Liaison Mission driver near
Potsdam on 10 March. In a let-
ter delivered to Clarke on 27
March, the commander in chief
of the Soviet forces in Germany
insisted that the "hasty and im-
proper" behavior of the US per-
sonnel when stopped by East Ger-
man police had forced the police
to use "measures of restraint."
Konev also denied that his staff
officers had been uncooperative
in advising US Liaison Mission
headquarters in Potsdam of the
whereabouts of the US personnel
during the 26 hours they were
detained by the East Germans.
Since the incident of 20 March,
the personnel in two other US
Liaison Mission tours have been
detained in East Germany, alleg-
edly for entering "restricted"
areas.
Gromyko, Zorin, and Tsarap-
kin have consistently maintained
at the Geneva disarmament con-
ference that the USSR will
accept only "national" controls
over a test ban and have de-
nounced the US-British proposals
for international controls and
inspection as a guise for send-
ing Pentagon "spies" into the
Soviet Union. Soviet press
and radio comment has widely
publicized this charge and
also has stressed that the
US stand on controls is aimed
at causing a deadlock which
will leave the US free to carry
out its decision to conduct at-
mospheric tests.
In private conversations
with Western officials and
correspondents, bloc spokesmen
continue to indicate that prog-
ress might be made on such
"partial" disarmament measures
as nontransfer of nuclear
weapons to the states not now
possessing them, a Central
European nuclear-free zone,
and a NATO - Warsaw Pact non-
aggression treaty--proposals
more related to the German and
European security problems
than to disarmament. They have
occasionally cited a possible
agreement on measures to guard
against surprise attack and
on outer space.
Speaking with US delega-
tion officers on 25 March,
Polish delegate Lachs stated
flatly that the Soviets will
not accept international con-
trols and inspection in a test
ban treaty. The USSR's insist-
ence on national controls over
a test ban treaty, knowing
that the US cannot accept
such controls, and Soviet
silence on "compromise" pro-
posals such as the Indians
have offered suggest that the
USSR expects that the US will
resume atmospheric testing at
the end of April.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Zorin publicly denied on
23 March that the USSR is plan-
ning another nuclear test series
and stated that his government
is not interested in carrying
out further nuclear tests, but
Gromyko four days later reiter-
ated earlier Soviet warnings
that a US resumption will "com-
pel" the USSR to resume its
tests. It seems unlikely, more-
over, that Khrushchev would wish
to participate in a heads-of-
government meeting later this
year without first staging a
Soviet test series to counter
any impression that US testing
had shifted the nuclear balance
in favor of the West.
The USSR will probably
wait until after the US at-
mospheric test series begins
before initiating a Soviet
series. This is suggested
by the line Soviet Geneva
delegates took in conversations
with Krishna Menon, urging that
India should take the lead in
mobilizing opinion in nonaligned
countries against the resumption
of US atmospheric testing. They
also said that the nonaligned
powers should realize that if
the USSR were forced to resume
tests because of the US atmos-
pheric tests, "the responsibili-
ty would lie with the West."
Following the first few US at-
mospheric tests, Moscow will
probably conduct a massive
propaganda campaign asserting
that the tests justify a Soviet
resumption.
As a propaganda gesture
on the eve of a scheduled
resumption of US atmospheric
tests, the Soviets might offer
to conclude an atmospheric
test ban using national detec-
tion means. While Soviet offi-
cials have been silent on the
possibility of a test ban lim-
ited to testing in the atmos-
phere, Polish delegate Lachs
expressed the belief that the
USSR--as an immediate measure--
eventually would propose such
a ban using national detection
systems. The Soviets would ex-
pect the US to reject such a
proposal, but they would prob-
ably calculate that it would
impress the neutralist countries
and embarrass the US. In order
to present the USSR as the major
proponent of a cessation of test-
ing, Soviet leaders might urge a
moratorium on atmospheric testing
while the proposal was being con-
sidered at a summit-level meeting
of the disarmament conference or
of the four nuclear powers. In
his 1 March letter to President
de Gaulle, Khrushchev had pointed
out that the four powers have a
"special role and responsibility"
in the disarmament negotiations
and expressed willingness to take
part in a Big Four "exchange of
views," which, he said, could
"facilitate agreement" on the
most important disarmament prob-
lems.
Bloc officials have mount-
ed a concerted attack on current
US-British positions on detec-
tion and verification by citing
the Kennedy-Macmillan message to
Khrushchev of 3 September 1961
which said that with regard to
atmospheric testing, the US and
Britain were prepared "to rely
on existing means of detection,
which we believe to be adequate."
Zorin and other Communist dele-
gates in Geneva have inserted
the world "national" after the
word "existing" and before
"means of detection" and have
asked, If means are not national,
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what are they?" The US delega-
tion has commented that the
constant invocation of this
US-UK offer is having "some
effect" on the nonaligned na-
tions. Nigerian Foreign Minister
Wachuku, in a speech at the 24
March session of the conference,
demanded that an agreement be
concluded to cease tests in the
atmosphere without mentioning
international controls.
Concurrently with the dis-
armament conference, Moscow ap-
pears to be going to some lengths
to convince Soviet citizens of
Soviet military strength. Major
General Pokrovskiy, a Soviet
rocket-missile expert, wrote in
the current issue of the maga-
zine Ogonek that with the appear-
ance global" rockets, "US
territory has become wholly in-
defensible from the south, east,
and west." He went beyond Khru-
shchev's 18 March remarks on
Soviet "global" rockets and ex-
plicitly claimed,"They can carry
superpowerful nuclear weapons of
great weight." Despite its
superiority in rockets and nu-
clear equipment, he added, the
USSR indefatigably supports dis-
armament. On 25 March, a public
lecturer in Moscow boasted about
the USSR's 100-megaton bomb and
said war could be prevented be-
cause of growing Soviet military
strength based on long-range
missiles and nuclear tests.
Peiping has continued to
publicize the Geneva proceed-
ings factually, and on 23 March
Foreign Minister Chen Yi dis-
cussed the conference at a re-
ception on the occasion of
Pakistan's National Day. Ac-
cording to a Peiping summary
of the speech, he lauded Soviet
efforts at Geneva, but cautioned
that the US is actually ex-
panding armaments, and that
"vigilance" must be maintained
against the "imperialists."
The Soviet press briefly men-
tioned Chen Yi's remarks. Mos-
cow noted that he expressed hope
for concrete results at Geneva
and quoted him as saying, "Of
course, it will not be easy to
compel imperialists to come to
genuine disarmament...."
Outer Space
The full text of Khru-
shchev's 20 March letter to
President Kennedy on outer
space cooperation and a 150-
word summary of the President's
7 March letter to Khrushchev
were carried in the 21 March
Izvestia and in Pravda one day
later. Although the summary
of the President's letter
covered its highlights, the
general impression conveyed by
the treatment, accompanied by
reports on favorable reactions
from abroad, is that the Soviet
Union was primarily responsible
for the initiative. Pravda on
23 March carried a brief-TASS
dispatch on the President's
22 March press conference. The
dispatch stressed his expres-
sion of satisfaction with Khru-
shchev's letter and conveyed
the impression that outer
space cooperation is possible
in the very near future.
US and Soviet representa-
tives on 27 March held the
first meeting in their series
of preliminary consultations
to establish the basis for fur-
ther formal discussions in
regard to areas of US-Soviet
collaboration in space.
by OSI)
(Concurred in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The armed forces command-
ers on 28 March ordered Pres-
ident Frondizi's arrest after
he persistently refused to re-
sign under intense pressure
from the military and civilian
elements outside his party. The
political crisis was precipitat-
ed by Peronista gains in the
congressional and provincial
elections on 18 March which
concomitantly reflected popu-
lar discontent with Frondizi's
policies. Calls by most oppo-
sition parties for Frondizi's
resignation added momentum to
pressure for his ouster. The
navy was the most determined
of the services in insisting
that Frondizi step down, and it
overcame initial concern among
the others over the threat to
constitutional government by
arguing that Frondizi would re-
sign ifsubjectedto sufficient
pressure.
The armed forces command-
ers have no well-developed plan
for a new government. They hope
to prevail on one of the three
in the line of presidential
succession to accept the pres-
idency in order to demonstrate
that their purpose in removing
Frondizi was not to establish
a military junta. The first
two in line--Jose Guido, pres-
ident of the Senate, and Fede-
rico Monjardin, president of
the Chamber of Deputies--have
rejected any suggestion that
they succeed Frondizi. Both are
members of Frondizi's Intransi-
gent Radical party (UCRI), which
threatened to withdraw its ma-
jority bloc from congress if
Frondizi were ousted. The
UCRI controls 99 of 192 seats
in the lower house until 1 May
and 42 of 46 Senate seats until
the spring of 1964. Action on
this threat is probably under
UCRI consideration. Third in
presidential succession is the
78-year-old president of the
Supreme Court, Benjamin Villegas
Basavilbaso. Any of these pres-
idential successors would be
required by the constitution to
call new elections within 30
days--a prospect the military
would dislike in view of the re-
cent Peronista victories based
on about one third of the total
vote.
The junta formed by the
commanders in chief of the three
services prior to arresting Fron-
dizi will be obliged to govern
until the crisis over the pres-
idency is resolved. These com-
manders are also reported dis-
cussing a provisional government
to rule presumably until some way
can be found to restore constitu-
tional government.
The armed forces are main-
taining firm security measures
to prevent anticipated attempts
at sabotage and violence. The
Communists are reported planning
disruptive demonstrations to em-
broil the Peronistas with the mil-
itary and to take advantage of
threats by Peronistw that they
will oppose military repression
of their activities. Tenta-
tive Communist plans before Fron-
dizi's arrest reportedly called
for attacks on US installations
and businesses in Argentina.
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The Syrian army command,
which has attempted since the
break with the UAR last September
to control government decisions,
assumed direct power on 28
March, accepted the resignations
of President Qudsi and the
Dawalibi cabinet, and dissolved
parliament. Army Chief of
Staff Zahr al-Din has advised
the American ambassador in
Damascus that there will be no
change in Syrian foreign policy
and that new elections will
soon be held. The tone of the
army command's statement broad-
cast by Damascus Radio on 28
March suggests, however, than
an important change is contem-
plated in Syria's relation-
ship with Egypt, as well as a
leftward shift from the con-
servative Qudsi-Dawalibi line
in internal political and
economic matters.
These prospective modifi-
catior of policy are, in a
sense, complementary. Re-
endorsement of the "socialist"
approach, agricultural reforms,
and industrial nationalizations
instituted by Nasir in Syria
will obviously help to pave the
way for an improvement in
relations between the two
countries. The present tension
between Syria and Israel is
probably an important factor
in the army command's decision
to try for a better relation-
ship with Egypt. Conversely,
suspicion in the army that the
Dawalibi government had gone
too far in developing closer
relations with Iraq hastened
Dawalibi's fall.
Both the composition of
and the pressure on the army
command have changed consider-
ably since last fall. Present
members have become increasingly
involved with various Syrian
political factions and increase-
ingly subject to pressures from
radical elements within the
officer corps itself. The
struggle for power within
the army now seems likely to
become more rather than
less intense; the result over
a period of time will prob-
ably be a government further
to the left.
Syria and Israel continue
to keep forces deployed in the
Lake Tiberias area. Syria
reportedly moved an additional
tank battalion to the border
area on 24-25 March. Israel
has undertaken a limited,
selective call-up of reserves
and has moved an infantry
battalion, an artillery bat-
talion, and a tank-destroyer
company into the area north
of the lake near the Syrian
border. Although neither side
seems likely at this time to
launch a major attack, further
clashes are likely.
On 25 March, Israel seemed
to be trying to invite an in-
cident. It sent a ferryboat,
with only an armed launch as
escort, to cruise about the
area of the lake where the
previous shooting exchanges
between Syrian shore batteries
and Israeli patrol and fishing
boats had taken place. The
maneuver passed off without
incident, however.
That same day an Israeli
military representative in-
formed the assistant chief of
staff of the United Nations
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call for positive steps to
achieve Arab unity and for
mobilization of all efforts
"to liberate and recover
usurped Palestine." However,
its appeal for unity departed
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Truce Supervision Organiza-
tion (UNTSO) that large-scale
military maneuvers will soon
be held in northern Israel,
but "well away from the Syrian
frontier." These maneuvers
are probably designed both as
a show of military strength and
as a means of keeping units
within easy striking distance
of Syrian territory. On 27
March the Israelis reportedly
held a training exercise in-
volving a 500-man paratroop
unit.
The UN Security Council
heard complaints from both
Syria and Israel on 28 March
and agreed to call for a per-
sonal report next week from
UNTSO's chief General von Horn.
Syria last week asked for
an emergency meeting of the
Arab League. However, the Secre-
tariat, which continues to be
under strong Egyptian influence,
apparently did not push itself
to convene an extraordinary
session; instead, "Israeli
aggression against Syria" is
to be discussed at a regular
meeting of the league to be
held at the foreign ministers'
level in Riyadh'`beginning 31
March.
Despite the well-published
Syrian-Iraqi accord and recent
assurances of support for Syria
by the Jordanian and Saudi
governments, prospects for
effective military cooperation
by the Arab states--even against
Israel--have been dimmed as a
result of Syria's breakaway
from the UAR last fall. The
Syrian army command, after
its assumption of direct power
on 28 March, made a standard
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significantly from the Dawalibi
government's line by singling
out "dear Egypt" as well as
"brotherly Iraq" as the two most
desirable allies.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Army willingness to enforce
government policy in the face
of European settler resistance,
as evidenced by action against
the Bab-el-Oued quarter of
Algiers and the capture of
Secret Army Organization (OAS)
leader Jouhaud, appears to-
have damaged OAS prestige. De
Gaulle's orders to liquidate
the OAS, the installation in
Algiers of the new French high
commissioner, and the announce-
ment of the composition of the
provisional executive may
seriously reduce settler support
of the OAS unless it takes ef-
fective action to show that it
can prevent implementation of
the Evian accords.
Last week's fighting in
Bab-el-Oued involved only a
small part of the OAS forces
and materiel, but its sympa-
thizers were shaken by the
vigor of the French Army's
riposte. Systematic army action
since the 23 March battle to
neutralize the quarter has
probably further impressed
many settlers with the army's
increasing identification with
government policy. There are
indications that the Bab-el-Oued
outbreak may have been sparked
by extremists beyond OAS chief
Salan's control, who precipitated
a confrontation with the army
that Salan did not desire.
French officials claim that
captured OAS documents urged
low-level OAS leaders to take
the initiative in combating
the forces of order, and feel
that this directive indicates
a lack of control and responsi-
bility among the top echelons
of the organization.
The French Government claims
that the 25 March capture of
ex-General Jouhaud resulted
from military intelligence that
Jouhaud was in Oran. The US
army attache in Paris feels that
this is further evidence of
army loyalty to the government,
and failure of the OAS to obtain
military support. An attempt
by armed OAS commandos to
rescue Jouhaud was repulsed by
the gendarmerie in a sharp fire-
fight. De Gaulle has indicated
that Jouhaud will soon be tried
before a special military tribunal.
The OAS is attempting to
exploit the "martyr" aspect of
the firing by security forces
on unarmed settlers in Algiers
on 26 March, probably in the
hope of creating individual
crises of conscience within the
army as well as increasing the
settlers' determination to resist
De Gaulle's policies. Although
some French officials in Algiers
reportedly described the incident
as "tragically alarming," and
official spokesmen there have
expressed regrets for the
deaths, the government has
nevertheless reiterated that
the security forces will continue
to keep order by any means deemed
necessary. Continuing government
concern over possible repercus-
sions of the event both among
the Europeans and security forces
is evidenced by the secret night-
time burial of the victims.
French officials say that
captured OAS documents clearly
indicate an intention to employ
"the masses" in accordance with
Chinese Communist revolutionary
theory. The OAS publicly indicated
on 29 March, however, that it
would henceforth rely on guerrilla
warfare and would not again call
out the populace.
Prospects for successful
implementation of the Evian
accords will be increased by
the announcement on 27 March
that Abderrahmane Fares will
head the provisional executive
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEB&LY SUMMA 1*1
which is to "direct the ad-
ministrative and civil services
of Algeria" and prepare for the
self-determination referendum.
The appointment of Fares, a
highly respected and competent
Moslem who is a former president
of the Algerian Assembly, will
increase the stature.and impor-
tance of the mixed French-Moslem
provisional executive, whose com-
plete membership was announced
on 28 March, and focus attention
on it rather than on French
High Commissioner Fouchet, who
is less well known. Fares re-
portedly left Paris on 29 March
to take up his duties in Algeria.
The installation of the provi-
sional executive at Rocher Noir
will present the OAS with the
alternative of attempting to
prevent this step in the im-
plementation of the accords or
risking a further decline in
popular support.
De Gaulle's appeal for
full support against the OAS
in his 26 March radio-tele-
vision address underscores his
determination to maintain the
momentum of the government's
successes against the organiza-
tion. His request for a massive
affirmative vote in the 8 April
referendum throughout France
to approve the Evian accords
is certain to be granted, as
is his simultaneous request for
extraordinary powers with which
to implement the accords. How-
ever, he will be increasingly
attacked for seeking such powers,
even by many who favor his Al-
gerian policy because they will
consider them a virtual "blank
check" for the future.
De Gaulle's biting refer-
ences to the USSR in his speech,
which reinforced Paris' request
that Moscow recall its ambas-
sador because of the USSR's de
jure recognition of the PAG,
were probably designed to serve
both as a rap to French rightists
who oppose his Algerian policy
and to re-emphasize his conten-
tion that the time is not propi-
tious for fruitful East-West
negotiations. Although the 27
March Soviet declaration charged
France with seeking to worsen
relations between the two coun-
tries, Moscow seems to be some-
what defensive about its quick
recognition of the PAG and does
not appear desirous of letting 25X1
this issue further aggravate
relations with France.
Tshombe's strategy, as it
appears to be evolving in his
talks with Adoula, is to offer
the prospect of Katangan economic
concessions and to expect in
return constitutional changes
to permit a high degree of
autonomy for the provincial
government. In over six days
of talks--resumed on 27 March
after a three-day suspension--
the two leaders have not yet
begun to discuss practical
measures--financial, economic,
or military--for Katanga's re-
integration into the Congo.
Considerable time has been
spent wrangling over Tshombe's
assertion that while he has a
free hand to negotiate, any
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
agreement must be ratified by
the Katangan Assembly.
Tshomb$,by insisting on
assembly ratification,has raised
the issue of the validity of
the Loi Fondamentale, the Bel-
gian-drafted constitution which
established the primacy of
Leopoldville over the Congo's
provinces. He wants to drasti-
cal.lyamend, if not totally dis-
pense with, this law. Adoula,
on the other hand, who wants
to retain it, maintains that
the law requires no provincial
ratification of agreements be-
tween a province and the central
government. Adoula insists that
he cannot suspend the Loi
Fondamentale, since it affects
all the provinces and revision
is up to parliament. One of
Tshomb6's European advisers
told the American consul in
Elisabethville that Tshomb6
had all the authority he needed
without reference to the Katanga
Assembly. Tshombd himself re-
portedly told UN sources he
would not hold out on the ratifi-
cation issue, although he clear-
ly intends to continue to press
for constitutional concessions.
Tshomb6 listed four items
in the agenda he proposed
for the resumed talks: the first
three involve discussion of new
constitutional arrangements;
the fourth is "an examination
of accords to be reached on
financial, economic, and fiscal
matters." According to the
European adviser, Tshomb6 will
make "generous" economic con-
cessions in return for political
concessions.
According to UN sources,
Tshomb6 wired Katangan officials
on 24 March--during the suspen-
sion of the talks--that he was
satisfied with the "progress"
being made. He also informed
UN civil chief Gardiner that
he expected the talks to go on
for some time. Adoula, on the
other hand, appears to be grow-
ing more exasperated with the
Katangan leader and doubtful
that he can budge him. On 24
March, Adoula laid the blame
for Tshomb6's intransigence on
the US and the UN, which he
charged have in effect been
aiding Tshombe. He asserted
that the UN had not carried
out its mandate and that the
US had blocked the establishment
of a Congolese air force.
Adoula said Tshomb6 was
acting as if he were the head
of an independent state rather
than a provincial president.
The prime minister said that he
himself might be censured by
parliament for his failure to
show some progress, and he might
have to try to forestall such
a move by taking the initia-
tive and seeking a vote of con-
fidence. He said he had to
have something, even if he had
"to go to Satan" to get it. On
27 March, Adoula called for a
convocation of members of all
six provincial assemblies to
meet on 2 April at the University
of Lovanium, near Leopoldville.
Adoula's move is apparently
designed to exert pressure on
Tshomb6 to end what Adoula charges
are "dilatory" tactics.
If Adoula were to break
off the talks while blaming
Tshombd for their failure,
it would seem that he would
need to unveil some dramatic
new tactic aimed at solving the
Katangan impasse in order to
maintain his political posi-
tion. Another Congolese army
"invasion" of Katanga, with-
out UN logistic support, is
almost certain to fail and
thus worsen Adoula's position.
In view of previous reports
of plans by him to seek bi-
lateral aid outside the UN
framework--and his sharp
criticism of the US and UN--
this appears to be the most
likely tack. If he got no
satisfactory response from
the Afro-Asian states,Adoula
might, in desperation, turn to
the bloc for assistance as the
only means available to him.
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General Phoumi, following
meetings with Assistant Secre-
tary Harriman last weekend in
which he was pressed to accept
a Souvanna government, continues
adamant in his refusal. In
talks held at Nong Khai, a small
Thai border town, and at Vien-
tiane, Harriman outlined to
Phoumi and his colleagues the
Western view of alternative
courses open to their group:
either participation in a coa-
lition government in which Sou-
vanna supporters would hold the
key posts of defense and inte-
rior, or assumption of responsi-
bility for the military take-
over of Laos by the Pathet Lao.
Phoumi, probably unconvinced
that the US would withdraw vital
military aid, argued that a
government headed by Souvanna
and without strong anti-Com-
munists in control of the army
and the police would rapidly
fall under the domination of
the Pathet Lao. Additional
meetings between Harriman and
other prominent right-wing
leaders, including King Savang
and Premier Boun Oum, showed
united support for Phoumi's
obdurate stand.
Souvanna is becoming dis-
couraged and has announced that
he will fly to France during
the first week in April for a
visit o' undetermined length.
He has, however, stated his
willingness to return if there
are signs of progress. In talks
with the British ambassador on
28 March, Souvanna declared
that he had no intention of re-
linquishing his "mandate" from
the King to form a coalition
government.
Meanwhile, the suspension
of dollar aid to the government?
amounting to three million dol-
lars a month--has resulted in
the imposition of stringent
financial controls designed
to conserve foreign exchange.
To date, such measures appear
to have been relatively in-
effective. A US government
official in Laos recently
estimated that "without out-
side assistance, the country
will soon be bankrupt," prob-
ably within six months.
The military situation
has been marked by Vientiane's
reinforcement of the Nam Tha
garrison with paratroop elements
from southern Laos, raising
the total commitment there to
seven battalions. They are
opposed by an estimated seven
anti-government battalions:
two North Vietnamese, three
Khamouane/Kong Le, and two
Pathet Lao. Sporadic shelling
by both sides occurred at Nam
Tha during the past week.
Government forces Road
Kong Le-Pathet Lao forces --- Trail
Kong Le-Pathet Lao areas 0 Route number
Road under
construction
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEST NEW GUINEA DISPUTE
The Dutch decision on 27
March--taken after renewed Indo-
nesian infiltration--to send
troop and ship reinforcements
to West New Guinea apparently
precludes any early resumption
of preliminary talks with Indo-
nesia about the disputed terri-
tory. President Sukarno had
withdrawn his representatives
from the discussions on 26 March,
claiming that they were making
no progress. He is likely to
view the subsequent Dutch deci-
sion as a belligerent act, con-
firming his belief that the
Netherlands is unwilling to
transfer the territory to Indo-
nesia. It is possible, however,
that he will pursue a peaceful
settlement through other diplo-
matic channels.
Indonesia continues its
military buildup in the east
Indonesian area, apparently both
as a pressure tactic and as
preparation for additional and
larger operations against West
New Guinea if diplomatic methods
to acquire the territory are
unsuccessful. The area command-
er for New Guinea operations is
General Suharto, with headquar-
ters in Makasar.
In retaliation for the
Dutch decision to reinforce,
Sukarno probably will order
accelerated military prepara-
tions and new infiltrations.
Further incidents between
patrolling air and naval units
are increasingly likely.
Indonesia has largely a-
voided public comment on Dutch
reports of an Indonesian in-
filtration of the Dutch-admin-
istered island of Waigeo, prob-
able infiltrations at Fakfak
and Namaripi on the New Guinea
mainland, and two air-naval in-
cidents during the week of 20-
27 March. A high-ranking Indo-
nesian intelligence officer has
generally confirmed to the US
army attache that the infiltra-
tions did occur, as well as the
bombings and strafing of a
small Dutch ship by an Indone-
sian plane near the island of
Gag. According to press reports
of 27 March from Hollandia,
Dutch naval craft have blockaded
the entrances to rivers and
small bays on the south coast
in an effort to trap three or
four Indonesian torpedo boats
which fled there to avoid pur-
suit on the nights of 25 and 26
March.
The Indonesian Government
appears still to be holding to
the mid-1962 deadline for the
completion of preparations for
New Guinea operations. By that
time, however, the armed forces
will not have absorbed military
equipment still being delivered
from the Soviet Union, and some
of the training programs provided
by the Soviets will not have
been completed.
The Dutch decision to
reinforce was made in response
to growing pressure within the
cabinet for more decisive meas-
ures to meet the stepped-up
pace of Indonesian military ac-
tivity and to the heightened
public concern for the safety
of Dutch nationals there. Ear-
lier this week, the Dutch took
the preparatory step of advising
the North Atlantic Council that
they might be compelled to
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withdraw some of their NATO-
committed forces for duty in
West New Guinea.
In announcing the decision
to parliament, Prime Minister
de Quay stated that several
naval units were on their way
and that a "limited strength-
ening" of troops was also con-
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SECRET
The Dutch Government appar-
ently has authorized the airlift
by KLM of 1,500 troops from the
Netherlands to West New Guinea,
a sizable number of which al-
ready are en route. The Dutch
press reports that military
authorities in West New Guinea
have sought an additd.onal bat-
talion of marines to augment the
present garrison of some 5,000
troops in order to cope with
the Indonesian infiltration
operations as well as to deal
with possible unrest among the
native population.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
POLAND TIGHTENS LEGAL
As a result of its failure
to curb embezzlements and thefts
of state property--amounting to
many millions of dollars--the
Polish regime has begun to over-
haul the legal system to provide
more aggressive prosecutions,
more thorough investigations,
and more severe sentences for
major offenses. Opposition to the
moves--particularly among law-
yers--has delayed implementa-
tion and has caused the regime
to resort to intimidation and
efforts to bring all solicitors
and attorneys under closer
supervision.
The shakr'iip has its origins
in a 1960 Warsaw economic show
trial when regime leaders demand-
ed a precedent-setting death
sentence but were frustrated,
despite heavy party pressures,
by strong counter-pressures
from members of the bar and
the judiciary, as well as by
some elements of the party and
the government. The minister of
justice and the prosecutor
general were said to have re-
signed in protest; the minister
of justice reportedly was per-
suaded to return to his post,
but the prosecutor general re-
fused, with the result that in
May 1961 he and all of his
deputies were replaced by hard-
line Communists.
Concerned over its inabil-
ity to impose its will, the re-
gime has enacted into law a
compromise reform of the Supreme
Court under which the regime
retains the right to appoint
justices every five years and
to recall them for "bad work."
The former chief justice has
been shunted to a seat on the
World Court at The Hague. Sum-
mary court procedures--from
which there is no appeal--have
been introduced for economic
offenses. Quasi-legal workers'
courts continue to be established
in factories, and lay courts,
sitting as a part of the local
people's councils, have been
reinstituted to handle minor
offenses. Party control com-
missions have stepped up their
work, and in 1961 over 4,000
members were expelled from the
party for economic crimes.
A year-long press campaign
against lawyers has exaggerated-
ly accused them of peddling in-
fluence and demanding excessive
fees; many have been threatened
with suspension from practice,
and some have already been
suspended. Actually, however,
during 1959-60 only 13 of Po-
land's 5,500 lawyers were con-
victed for malpractice. The
Polish bar association has been
under heavy fire for "failing
to control" its members.
The association helped,
however, to draft a bill call-
ing for a drastic reform of
the bar which was submitted
to the Sejm (parliament) on
22 March and, if adopted,
would severely curtail the
independence of Polish lawyers.
Under its provisions, private
practice would be abolished,
and teams of lawyers would
work under profit-sharing rules
and the "influence" of the
team's party representative.
Legal training is to be re-
vamped to produce a "socialist
type of lawyer." The state
would have a veto over decisions
of the bar association's dis-
ciplinary commission and would
also have the power to transfer
lawyers to "localities where
they are needed." Earnings--
which in 1961 ran from three
to nine times the average work-
er's monthly wage--would be
regulated to a "level recognized
as socially correct."
Two other bills before
the Sejm would significantly
aid the regime's efforts to
increase control over the
populace. One would grant
wide leeway to the police,
who would be empowered to col-
lect, or ignore for political
reasons, delinquent taxes.
The other would give the po-
lice wide discretion to deter-
mine what constitutes a legal
public gathering. These laws
could be particularly effective
against the Catholic Church
and the peasants. The over-
haul of the legal apparatus
is potentially a serious threat
to the individual freedoms
instituted in 1956.
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WEEKLY REVIEW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Recent data indicate that
most of the European satellites
increased their explicit military
expenditures for 1961 above orig-
inally planned levels and that
some of them plan further increases
in 1962. During the period 1955-
60 such expenditures in most sa-
tellites declined or remained
stable, and the increases probably
are in reaction to the Berlin
crisis. They are not sufficiently
large, however, to constitute a
significant increase in the share
of military spending in total
budget expenditures and therefore
do not represent a major shift in
resources to the defense sector.
MILITARY BUDGETS IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
Planned Increase Further Increase in 1961 Planned Increase
1961 over 1960 Over Planned Levels 1962 over 1961 plan
Bulgaria 15.3 5.4 9.0
Czechoslovakia 8.3 13.6 14.0
Hungary 8.9 Considerable Increase 45.5
Poland 12.6 2.4 16.1
Rumania 3.3 Not Available 13.8
25X1
announced military budget. East
Germany, on the other hand, appears
to be a special case. The announced
figure for military expenditures re-
mained virtually constant between
1956 and 1961 at approximately one
billion East marks per year, but in
1962 such expenditures were announced
to be roughly 2.8 billion East marks
(4.9 percent of the total budget).
This figure represents only a frac-
tion of total defense costs, however.
The satellite regimes in 1960
announced plans to raise expendi-
tures for national defense in 1961,
and defense spending during that
year was further raised above
planned levels in Bulgaria, Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, and Hungary. De-
fense budgets for 1962 show further
increases (see chart). East Germany
also has planned increased defense
spending, but no meaningful data
are available. Except in Poland,
where the revision in wholesale
prices in July 1960 may have some-
what inflated the defense budget
for 1961, the indicated rise in
military budgets appears to reflect
a real increase in defense spending.
The possibility of unannounced in-
creases in military pay or in pro-
curement prices, or of changes in
budgetary accounting, cannot be ex-
cluded, however.
The announced military budgets
probably are not comprehensive, and
the percentage of defense costs
accounted for elsewhere in the
budget probably varies considerably
among the countries. In Poland,
the only country which publishes
detailed data on budgetary expen-
ditures, the budget does not appear
to contain any large components of
defense allocations outside of the
BUDGETED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
(Curr.nt Prices)
Bolgoro (million old Ievo) 1,895 1,472 1,540 1,729 1,628
Co,choslovakia (million crowns)` 10,429 9,606 9,319 8,933 8,789
Hungary (million forints)` 5,700 4,085 1,912 2,078 2,403
Poland ( illion zlotys) 12,577 12,682 10,136 11,220 14,259
Romonio (million lei) 4,227 3,984 3,817 3,597 3,446
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET
EXPENDITURES
Bolgorio
Cnechoslovokio
Hungary
P.Iand
R-ia
161 11 1962
(plan) (006,01) (plan)
1,786 2,059 2,171 2,244
8,783 9,512 10,810" 10,842
3,100 3,376 4,912
16,920 16,800 17,200 19,500
3,392 3,503 .... 3,988
11.1 8.5 8.2 8.5 6.2 6.0 6.25 6.6 6.0
12.1 10.7 9.5 9.4 9.2 6.5 8.5 .... 8.8
2.5 9.7 3.7 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.5 5.9
0.2 9.5 6.6 6.7 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.85 7.95
9.8 9.5 8.7 8.0 7.1 6.1 5.4 "?' 5.1
'Plan dots only. Defense expenditures in Czechoslovakia inclsde outlays for public sec0rity.
"Estimated.
"`Considerably hi1hor thou planned
.. Not ovatloble.
SECRET
No major reallocation of
satellite resources has resulted
from the recent and planned in-
creases in defense spending.
In general the increases are
large enough to keep the defense
share of total expenditures con-
stant or to cause a small in-
crease (see chart). During the
years 1956-60, however, the share
had been decreasing or had remained
constant in most European satel-
lites, and the share in 1961 and
1962 remains well below the 1955-
56 level in all countries.
In real terms, moreover,
defense expenditures probably
remained below the 1955 level,
at least until 1960 or 1961. This
tentative judgment is based on the
assumption that changes in defense
costs roughly paralleled price
changes of nonmilitary items.
A comparison of 1962 planned
increases with actual 1961 ex-
penditures indicates that the
bulk of recent increased de-
fense expenditures took place
during 1961. In Czechoslovakia
and Bulgaria, planned increases
in 1962 expenditures over actual
expenditures in 1961 totaled
only 0.3 percent and 3.4 percent
respectively. In Hungary, more-
over, it appears that actual
defense expenditures rose sharply
in 1961. Of the remaining coun-
tries for which data are available,
only Poland plans a considerable
increase--13.4 percent--in 1962.
(Prepared by ORR)
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The seasonal low in food
supplies in Communist China is
from March through June, when
stocks from the previous fall's
harvest are nearing depletion
and the first summer crops
are not yet in. Grain produc-
tion is estimated to have been
far short of requirements
since 1959. Successive annual
deficits have been offset to
some extent by drawing on re-
serve stocks and by sizable
grain imports, but the food
situation has become increas-
ingly precarious. Especially
serious food shortages were
noted in the spring of 1961, and
the poor grain harvest in the
fall indicated another crisis
this spring.
In some ?respects the cur-
rent shortages may be worse
than last year's. The cumula-
tive effects of three years of
food shortages have resulted
in widespread malnutrition,
and further shortages may ag-
gravate an already serious
health problem. Also, more
serious deficits throughout
North China and a greater
emphasis on pegging peasant
rations more closely to local
output will widen the dispari-
ties between the various local-
ities. However, there has been
some improvement over last year.
The regime's encouragement of
private plots has resulted in
a significant increase in sub-
sidiary foods, and the contin-
uation of free markets permits
greater access to vegetables
and other protective foods.
While some areas face
worse shortages than others
and malnutrition will probably
continue to be widespread, the
basic food situation does not
seem noticeably worse than
last year at this time. In
this regard, there have been
fewer reports of edema and
other nutritional ailments
than at this time a year ago.
The planting season for
crops to be harvested early this
summer is past, and the outlook
for these crops is mixed. Weather
conditions, especially in the
north, were much more favorable
than in the preceding year. On
27 December, however, People's
Daily reported, contrary to
ear ier indications, that the
five North China provinces which
account for about 60 percent of
total winter wheat area planted
less acreage this past fall
than in 1960. With the winter
wheat area below normal in 1960-
61, People's Daily thus implied
for 1961-62 one of the smallest
winter wheat acreages since the
regime came to power. Although
good growing conditions should
improve yields significantly
compared with last year, the
implied decline in acreage would
seem to rule out any hopes for
a bumper harvest of winter wheat
in 1962.
Indications that low morale
is affecting farm work have ap-
peared with increasing frequency
since late winter. The Hupeh
Daily on 27 February indicated
concern that an improper at-
titude toward "spring scar-
city might affect spring plant-
ing in that province; Shansi
has reported that the enthusiasm
of some peasants for production
is "not too high"; and Honan
has complained of "complacency"
among the cadre and peasants
and a "laissez-faire" attitude
toward spring farm work in some
units. More recently, Chekiang
remarked on the need to raise
the peasants' enthusiasm for
work and in turn their attendance
rate in the fields.
It is possible that the
regime is merely being more can-
did this year, in which case the
problem may be no more severe
than in previous seasons; it is
equally possible that there is
good cause for the apparent in-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Recently announced cabinet
and other personnel shifts con-
firm earlier indications of the
Castro regime's plans to devel-
op a political structure sim-
ilar to that of Communist states.
Further shifts of assignments
among top leaders can be expected.
Two cabinet changes were
announced on 24 March. Manuel
Luzardo, a veteran Communist,
is the new minister of internal
trade, responsible for adminis-
tering the domestic supply and
distribution of consumer goods.
This appointment follows recent
regime statements partially at-
tributing the necessity for food
rationing to failures in the sup-
ply system. Luzardo, unlike his
predecessor, is a member of Cuba's
top policy-making group, the
National Directorate of the
Integrated Revolutionary Organ-
izations (ORI). The recall of
Ambassador Faure Chomon from
Moscow to become minister of
communications probably was dic-
tated by his earlier appoint-
ment to the ORI directorate.
The announcement on 23
March that Fidel and Raul Castro
had been "elected" to the posi-
tions of first secretary and
second secretary of the direc-
torate may have been timed to
quiet speculation that the power
of the two men is being grad-
ually assumed by veteran Com-
munist leaders. The subsequent
appointment of Raul to the
newly created post of deputy
premier puts him in a position,
at least theoretically, to suc-
ceed Fidel Castro in both party
and government posts.
Perhaps the most signifi-
cant political event in recent
weeks was Fidel Castro's deni-
gration of ORI leader Anibal
Escalante in a televised ad-
dress on 26 March. The 53-
year-old Escalante, a Commu-
nist party member since 1932
and generally considered to be
the third-ranking party leader,
was named to the 25-member
ORI National Directorate on
9 March. In his unexpected
attack--apparently launched
only hours after Escalante had
left Cuba for Czechoslovakia--
Castro openly admitted the
existence of a split within
the top Cuban leadership, al-
though the nature of the breach
and the issues involved remain
unclear. Escalante was charged
with "serious errors" in follow-
ing a "non-Marxist and devia-
tionist line" in his efforts to
"set up an apparatus to pursue
ends of a personal nature."
Castro's warning that
"from this moment on all dif-
ferences between the old and
the new must end" suggests that
Escalante's fall results from
a conflict between the old-
guard doctrinaire Cuban Commu-
nists and the younger leader's as-
sociated with Castro. Castro's po-
sition as "maximum leader of the
revolution" does not seem to be
jeopardy, nor do the most influ-
ential veteran Communists, Blas
Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
seem in conflict with Castro. It
is possible that Escalante was
purged by his own party colleagues
because of "Stalinist" traits and
a reluctance to accept the prin-
ciple of collective leadership.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BRAZILIAN INTEREST IN SHALE OIL DEVELOPMENT
A number of influential
political and military leaders
in Brazil, concerned over the
country's dependence on oil
imports, are interested in de-
veloping oil shale resources.
A mission from Petrobras, the
Brazilian state oil monopoly,
is reported to be going to
the bloc, apparently to in-
spect oil shale facilities.
Brazil lacks adequate re-
serves of natural crude oil and
must import two thirds of its
oil requirements at an annual
cost of some $250,000,000. It
has, however, oil shale in the
amount of some 100 billion bar-
rels of estimated but unproved
reserves. Exploitation of
these shale reserves would re-
quire substantial capital in-
vestment.
it would cost about
$150,000,000 to establish a
shale oil industry able to pro-
duce 50,000 barrels a day--one
quarter of Brazil's current
imports. Expert opinion is
divided as to whether the cost
of shale oil produced in Brazil
would be competitive with im-
ported crude.
Brazilian Communists have
achieved major successes in
the past ten years in building
Brazilian distrust of American
oil companies. The Communists
were the first group to advo-
cate the national petroleum
monopoly, which was set up
with general support in 1954.
In the past year they have
been playing up the negative
results of the American-directed
$300,000,000 oil exploration in
Brazil. A recent editorial in
a leading Communist weekly stat-
ed that a US offer of $7,000,000
to finance a pilot shale plant
was motivated by a plan of US
oil companies to bloc production
in Brazil and to preserve their
market.
The USSR reportedly is
about to supply equipment for
a pilot shale-processing plant
under a contract signed in 1960
with a private Brazilian firm.
The plant would be used to de-
termine the feasibility of pro-
ducing gas commercially. The
USSR may vie'Gv the prototype
project as an opportunity to
demonstrate the effectiveness
of Soviet techniques and as the
forerunner of extensive aid for
shale development in cooperation
with Petrobras.
Moscow probably would in-
sist on thorough investigation
before agreeing to any large-
scale venture for the extraction
of oil from Brazilian shale.
Forthcoming conversations with
Petrobras officials may lead to
an agreement for undertaking
such studies. Soviet First Dep-
uty Premier Mikoyan, who is re-
portedly scheduled to open the
USSR's trade fair in Brazil in
May, may make a formal offer
of Soviet economic aid which
probably would envisage, among
other things, a program for
shale development.
The Soviet Union and Commu-
nist China are the world's lead-
ing producers of shale oil, with
China producing 20,000 barrels
a day in 1961. The USSR prob-
ably could supply any type of
equipment for the industry
found in the West and some not
used outside the bloc.
Prepared jointly with
ORR)
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION TALKS
Despite months of negotia- and they want explicit guarantees
tions, agreement on a treaty to that common defense policies
establish a European political adopted by the union will be
union still eludes the six Com- geared to NATO's.
mon Market (EEC) countries.
Recent meetings, notably that There are a number of rea-
of the foreign ministers in Lux- sons for the importance attached
embourg on 20 March, have blurred to these remaining differences,
the long-standing differences which on the surface appear small.
over the actual text of the All the EEC countries except
treaty, but final signature is France regard the loose union
unlikely until there is some now under consideration as a
reduction of the distrust poor substitute for a fully in-
among the EEC countries of De tegrated political community, and
Gaulle's overall European and while they recognize that federa-
Atlantic policies. tion is not attainable now, they
wish to preserve the possibility
Major textual issues have of one. In the meantime, the
been reduced to those articles smaller members--Belgium and the
setting forth the competence of Netherlands particularly--want
the union in economic and defense assurances against the union's
matters and providing for treaty domination by Paris and Bonn,
revision after an initial tran- and they feel they can get this
sitional period. French Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville made
new proposals on these points at
Luxembourg. While insisting
that the union must be able to
deal with economic matters, he
agreed to a protective clause
for EEC institutions, suggested
stating that one of the union's
only if the union is truly
supranational, or if they are
certain that Britain's accession
to the EEC will not in the long
run be blocked by France.
Belgium's Foreign Minister
Spaak especially has voiced the
smaller members' deep suspicions
objectives would be to strengthen of De Gaulle. Spaak is increasing-
the Atlantic alliance, and ly critical of De Gaulle's ten-
offered a new clause saying that dency to go it alone on NATO and
the treaty would be revised to other matters, and during the
"broaden its democratic insti- Luxembourg meeting Spaak said
tions." he could see no point in attempt-
Although conciliatory, none
of these proposals proved en-
tirely acceptable to the other
five members. All or most of
them want still further assur-
ances that the new union will
not encroach on the economic
prerogatives of the EEC. More-
over, they insist that the
French commit themselves now to
eventual popular election of the
Euronean assembly and to the
introduction of the majority
rule in the union's operations,
ing to institutionalize politi-
cal cooperation among the EEC
countries until they first demon-
strated an ability to reach an
identity of views on issues of
such crucial importance. Prob-
ably adding to Spaak's concern
is the expectation that an Alge-
rian settlement will permit De
Gaulle to push his ideas respect-
ing Europe and NATO with even
greater vigor.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
JAMAICA'S PRE-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS
Jamaica, which decided last
September to secede from the West
Indies Federation, will hold
elections on 10 April preparatory
to becoming on 6 August the
first of Britain's Caribbean
possessions to gain full inde-
pendence. The political cam-
paign may become turbulent as
the island's two closely balanced
moderate parties strive to gain
the edge. These parties, which
have alternated in administering
the colonial government for near-
ly 20 years, are similar in
policy and program, and either
could win.
Jamaica has a viable, diver-
sified economy based on bauxite,
tropical agriculture, light in-
dustry, and tourism, and has
enjoyed years of relatively
stable administration. These
have laid a firm basis for
independence, but unresolved
problems could lead to insta-
bility after the enthusiasm of
achieving independence has
subsided. Despite extensive
development and encouragement
of industry, unemployment per-
sists--the current rate is at
least 14 percent--and will be
aggravated when Britain's migra-
tion curbs begin to take effect.
Britain's entry into the Common
Market, moreover, could seriously
hurt Jamaica's agricultural ex-
ports. The Jamaicans are likely
to make requests for US defense
aid, in view of the island's
commitment to uphold the 1961
Defense Areas Agreement respect-
ing US space and missile research
facilities on Grand Turk Island,
a Jamaican dependency.
Both Premier Norman Manley's
People's National party (PNP)
and Sir Alexander Bustamente's
Jamaica Labor party (JLP) are
middle-of-the-road parties fa-
vorable to US interests, but
each is plagued by aging leader-
ship and internal factionalism.
Each attracts support from all
sections of the electorate, with
the result that the election
outcome depends on the uncom-
mitted rural voter. Whichever
party is defeated is likely to
face a leadership shuffle, with
less conservative politicians
coming into greater prominence.
Extremist elements now are
quiescent: the Back-to-Africa
Rastafarian agitation of 1960
has largely collapsed, and the
radical leftist People's Po-
litical party (PPP) has lost
some of its appeal among the 25X1
urban slum dwellers by moderating
its former extreme Negro racialist
line
The Cuban Consu-
a e as tly augmented both
its personnel and its activities,
and the government was sufficient-
ly concerned to reject a proposal
for an exchange of visits by
50 students.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
PROBLEMS FACING THE NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
Italy's Christian Demo-
crats are trying a new ex-
periment: rapprochement with
the Socialists in order to
modernize and "moralize" the
country's institutions, spread
the benefits of the "economic
miracle" more widely, and cut
into the strong voting appeal
of the largest Communist party
in Western Europe. However,
vested economic and political
interests--both Communists and
rightists--will be able to ex-
ploit serious differences among
the government parties on such
questions as NATO bases, de-
fense spending versus domestic
development, church versus
public schools, fiscal and
bureaucratic reforms, and anti-
trust legislation. Before any-
thing more than a start can be
made on any of the government's
major programs, the election
of a new President near the
end of April will absorb gen-
eral attention. The result of
the election will have an im-
portant bearing on the new
government's longevity.
The effectiveness of the
new government depends on a com-
bination of factors, the most
significant of which may be
the deadlines Premier Fanfani
set for his program in his in-
vestiture address. The program
is not much different from that
his party has long proposed but
never pushed through, and a
majority of the 19 Christian
Democratic ministers, including
Fanfani, are holdovers. More-
over, Socialist support is not
absolute, since, while the
Socialists can be expected to
vote for most of the govern-
ment's domestic reform legis-
lation, they abstained in the
vote of confidence and will prob-
ably do so on some foreign policy
measures.
Nevertheless, the basis
for important steps toward socio-
economic reform is apparent--for
example, in the creation of a spe-
cial post for economic planning
under the key Budget Ministry.
Ugo la Malfa, who has this post,
is a leader of the coalition
Republican party and one of the
postwar political leaders re-
sponsible for Italy's remarkable
economic recovery.
Program Deadlines
On the touchy school is-
sue, Fanfani would replace the
present ten-year plan by an ac-
celerated 1962-1965 program to
provide additional state schools.
He proposes continuing aid for
religious schools, but within
certain limits designed to ap-
pease leaders of the coalition
lay parties. He also called
for greater government support
of scientific research and asked
for other reforms designed to
bring order into technical and
higher education. This program-
ing, which appears to result
from a compromise proposal by
the Social Democrats, would
appear to have a good chance of
success. It could be scuttled,
however, should the Christian
Democrats insist on especially
large sums for aid to church
schools.
Fanfani wants increased
economic planning at the nation-
al level and emphasis on re-
ducing disparities between
northern Italy and the under-
developed south. He has pledged
an immediate start on the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
problems of the farm-tenancy
system, proposing long-term low-
interest loans which would en-
able tenants to buy about half
of the million acres operated
under share-tenancy contracts.
Most Italians, however, will
view land reform activities
skeptically, in view of the
slow progress made thus far in
the large areas of southern It-
aly scheduled for land reform.
Nationalization of energy
is a standing demand by the
Socialists, who consider it nec-
essary as a symbolic act to mol-
lify their constituents. Fan-
fani has promised a draft law
within three months. A start
would be made with nuclear en-
ergy, and a timetable for con-
ventional sources of electric
power would be developed by a
committee of experts headed by
Pasquale Saraceno, author of
the 1954 Vanoni ten-year plan
for economic development, which
has not been strictly adhered
to by previous Italian govern-
ments.
Right-wing Christian Demo-
crats oppose state control of
energy, and others may be wary
of current proposals to give
the state holding company, IRI,
control over the electrical in-
dustry. The government has
failed to exercise adequate con-
trol over IRI industries, and
attempts to remedy this situa-
tion by giving it greater access
to the records of IRI firms
would be opposed by such influ-
ential figures as Enrico Mattei,
freewheeling chief of the gov-
ernment's petroleum holding com-
pany, ENI.
Regional Government
Fanfani has committed his
government to establishment of
a special region for Friuli-
Venezia Giulia as soon as pos-
sible, with bills to be pre-
sented by October setting up
the other regions called for by
the constitution. These region-
al governments would be estab-
lished after the national elec-
tions in 1963. The Christian
MARCH 1962
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS
O SUPPORT
ABSTAIN
M OPPOSE
PARTY (PDI)
B~NEO-FASCISTS (MSI)
COMMUNITY MOVEMENT
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS (PSDI)\ il,REPUBLICANS (PRI)
,SOUTH TYROLEANS (SVP)
-VALDOSTAN UNION=(UVD)
Democrats have long postponed
such a step on the grounds that
the Communists would thereby
gain control of many regional
assemblies and, through this
means, of the local police. How-
ever, government leaders, who
point out that the national
police will remain outside the
control of regional officials,
will also claim that the danger
of local Communist control has
been lessened since 1960 by the
breakup of many Socialist-Com-
munist alliances in key city and
provincial governments and their
replacement by coalitions of So-
cialists and Christian Democrats.
They expect more Socialist-Com-
munist ruptures now that Chris-
tian Democratic - Socialist rap-
prochement has been blessed at
the national level.
Fiscal and Bureaucratic Reform
Although fiscal reform is
a basic party of the new govern-
ment's program, early deadlines
have realistically not been set.
Such measures as anti-trust leg-
islation, registration of share-
holding, a withholding tax on
dividends, and new taxes on land
used for commercial development
will meet determined opposition.
The Socialists may not insist
on abolition of the secrecy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUWIAARY
of bank balances--but they may
demand greater enforcement of
tax laws already in existence.
The present treasury minister,
Roberto Tremelloni, is the
author of one such law.
A basic problem from which
public cynicism toward Rome has
sprung is the need for bureau-
cratic reform and the "morali-
zation" of public administra-
tion. The press points out that
little has been accomplished in
this regard since the liberation
of Italy from the Fascist re-
gime, despite the formation of
many discussion and study groups,
and even the establishment of a
Ministry for the Reform of the
Bureaucracy. Italian journal-
ists urge that the government
use as the spur for reforms the
recent inquiry into the Fiumicino
airport scandal, which resulted
in a parliamentary censure. The
names of leading politicians,
including cabinet ministers,
were involved.
Foreign Relations
Social Democratic leader
Saragat pointed out recently
that an intensification of the
cold war could end Fanfani's
Socialist-backed government.
Although the Socialists have
privately hinted they might not
vote against a NATO nuclear force,
their public statements of op-
position have been used by mem-
bers of the Liberal party--erst-
while partners of the Christian
Democrats--to challenge the gov-
ernment's foreign policy. Even
within the Christian Democratic
party, former premier Scelba, a
strong opponent of Socialist-
backed government, is seeking
to convince US observers that
Fanfani is an opportunist who
would work for Italy's with-
drawal from NATO if such a move
would benefit his personal
fortunes.
Historian Luigi Salvato-
relli, who welcomes the new
government's approach to do-
mestic reforms and its attempt
to broaden the democratic base
by inclusion of the Socialist
party, nevertheless points out
in an 18 March editorial in the
center-left daily Stampa that
foreign policy is one Meld in
which experimentation or "his-
toric turnabouts" should be
avoided.
In his summing-up speech
before the confidence vote in
the Chamber of Deputies, Fan-
fani reaffirmed Italy's loyal-
ty to NATO and to all interna-
tional commitments, including
"support in principle" of a
NATO nuclear force.
The Christian Democrats
are still sharply divided on
government policy and, despite
protestations of cooperation,
right-wing leaders would take
any good opportunity to dump
Fanfani on a secret ballot.
Agents of vested economic in-
terests, such as the National
Association of Manufacturers
(Confindustria), are probably
also seeking to sabotage the
government. Within the cabinet,
Defense Minister Andreotti--
leader of the Christian Demo-
crats' extreme right wing--may
be a rallying point for those
determined to block Fanfani's
program.
Saragat's moves in favor
of the present center-left for-
mula have averted the threat of
a split-off by his party's left
wing. Saragat could balk, how-
ever--possibly to the extent
of pulling the party out of the
government--if he felt that
Christian Democractic rapproche-
ment with the powerful Nenni
Socialists was undermining his
own position and that of his
small party. He has already
charged publicly that the Social-
ists' decision to abstain rather
than vote in favor on the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
confidence vote resulted from
a deal made without his knowl-
edge by which the Christian
Democrats and Socialists sought
to avoid appearing too concil-
iatory toward each other.
Leadership of the Republi-
cans--the smallest of the three
cabinet parties--has been con-
solidated by La Malfa and party
secretary Oronzo Reale. They
have at least temporarily sub-
dued their stormy right-winger
Pacciardi, but he is unlikely
to relinquish his deep-seated
aspiration to be the De Gaulle
of Italy.
Socialist chief Nenni, in
achieving his party's benevolent
abstention in the vote of con-
fidence, has apparently been
able to discipline the party's
pro-Communist faction with the
argument that support for the
government's domestic program
will pay off in patronage and
influence. However, the Com-
munists--although they voted
in opposition and thus failed
to give the new government the
"kiss of death" as they had
threatened todo--will try hard
to avoid isolation. They can
be expected to concentrate
their efforts on the Italian
General Confederation of Labor
(CGIL) and stress working-class
unity as a deterrent to attempts
to detach the Socialist unions.
On the right, the Liberals,
the fragmented monarchist groups,
and the neo-Fascists will be
alert to support right-wing
Christian Democrats on contro-
versial issues. If the occasion
arises, both rightists and Com-
munists may even seize the op-
portunity to harry the new gov-
ernment by finding excuses for
street demonstrations leading
to riots.
Prospects
Despite its substantial
investiture majority, the
Fanfani government's position
will be precarious when it at-
tempts to press for extensive
changes in the Italian social
structure. Routine delays may
block initial steps toward re-
forms before the interruption
occasioned by the April pres-
idential elections, after which
the government must sake a pro forma
offer of resignation to the new pres-
ident. A president hostile to
the present government formula--
as are such Christian Democratic
aspirants as Foreign Affairs
Minister Segni and Senate Pres-
ident Merzagora--would have the
power to try to replace Fanfani
with someone else at that time.
Whether or not he attempted to
do so, his incumbency would re-
new the controversy between
Christian Democrats favoring and
opposed to the"opening to the
left,"and the disruptive effects
of this upsurge could be used to
try to sabotage the government.
plishments.
Even if Gronchi is re-
elected, or if he is replaced
by someone else such as Saragat
who favors the center-left ex-
periment, there will. be little
time left for legislation be-
fore the summer parliamentary
recess, after which parliament
must concentrate on passage of
the budget before 31 October.
National elections--due in the
spring of 1963--will further
limit the time available for
preparation of controversial
legislation.
Reluctance to face the elec-
torate before results are evident
will probably be the major in-
centive to early reform efforts
by the cabinet parties. Al-
though the Nenni Socialists
probably expect that these ef-
forts will not have brought suf-
ficient results by election time
to prevent the shift of some votes
from them to the Communists as a
result of the Socialist party's
new tack, they will hope to be
able to point to the vigor of the
government's initial efforts as
an indication of future accom-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Nearly two years after its were dismissed, and the immi-
post-independence mutiny, the gration of European mercenaries
Congo National Army (CNA) re- was encouraged. Elsewhere in
mains largely undisciplined the Congo, CNA units led the
and a threat to the country's pillaging of African and
security. Moreover, its demon- European installations alike
strated inability to mount and helped to alienate the
operations against Tshomb6's provinces from the central gov-
southern Katanga stronghold ernment.
has tended to weaken Premier
Adoula's position in his nego-
tiations with Tshomb6. Within
the Leopoldville government
there are conflicting views
concerning the reorganization
of the army and a nagging fear
that any effort at drastic re-
form might trigger new unrest.
Legacy of Independence
At the time the Congo
became independent on 1 July
1960 the Force Publique, which
became the nucleus of the CNA,
was regarded as one of the best
trained forces in Africa. Its
equipment--mostly Belgian--in-
cluded automatic rifles, machine
guns, mortars, bazookas, and
armored vehicles. It had no
African officers, but indi-
vidual Congolese had demon-
strated competence as noncom-
missioned officers and were
counted on to provide leader-
ship after independence.
In the period following
the mutiny of the Thysville
garrison only five days after
independence, there was a com-
plete breakdown of discipline
in the CNA except in Katanga.
There, with a view to maintaining
Katangan autonomy if not inde-
pendence, Tshomb6 retained
Belgian advisers for the 3,000-
man nucleus of the present
10,000-man Katangan army. Un-
reliable Force Publique elements
In the months following
independence, the CNA became
on paper one of the world's
best paid armies. In an effort
to forestall new depredations,
the late Premier Lumumba initia-
ted army pay raises which made
the pay of the average soldier
$90 per month. An army-wide
promotion made the rank of
private temporarily obsolete.
Lumumba and his successors came
to realize that only through the
prompt meeting of CNA payrolls
could new disorders be averted,
and the army became the Congo's
new elite. Nonetheless, "raids"
on provincial banks by local
CNA units were a common occur-
rence.
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*LURNDA ANGOLA
was routed at the Kasai-Katanga
border by a numerically inferior
Katangan force which may have
been advised of Mobutu's move
by sympathizers in the CNA.
The Kasai debacle suggested,
however, that one result of
the CNA's taste of the good
life was an indisposition to
indulge in that kind of fight-
ing which could lead to fatali-
ties.
32294
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
The Army and Gizenga
With the establishment of
a rump Congolese government in
Stanleyville in January 1961,
the erstwhile Force Publique
was divided into three factions.
In Elisabethville, Tshomb6
continued to. build a Katangan
army. In Leopoldville, General
Mobutu--whose coup had forced
Lumumba from office--maintained
an uneasy hold over the largest
single segment of the CNA. In
Stanleyville, Gizenga was able
for a time to command the loyalty
of 3rd Group commander General
Lundula, and through him to
neutralize if not control the
most unruly segment of the army.
In November 1961, elements
of the Leopoldville and Stanley-
ville groups, operating virtually
independently, initiated simul-
taneous moves into Katanga from
Kasai and Orientale provinces.
The invading Leopoldville force
Meanwhile, some 2,000 troops
moved south from Stanleyville,
heavily encumbered with beer,
concubines, and other battle gear.
In Kindu, undisciplined units
of the Stanleyville force killed
and mutilated 13 Italian airmen.
Some elements of the 2,000
reached northern Katanga, where
they became involved in the
massacre of 22 Roman Catholic
missionaries.
Major CNA concentrations
are now found in northern Katanga,
in eastern Kasai, and in the
Leopoldville area. Recently,
General Lundula has become rec-
onciled with Leopoldville and
has sought without notable
success to establish some degree
of order in his command.
The disintegration of the
once-potent Force Publique was
the result of various factors,
including the Belgian failure
to train Congolese officers, a.
prevailing view in the Congo
that independence would bring
the millenium, and a lack of
national solidarity among tribally
oriented Congolese soldiers.
The deterioration has been
accelerated by the unwillingness
of either the central government
or the UN to undertake major
reforms, and by the failure of
new leadership to emerge within
the army.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CONGO NATIONAL ARMY T/O
3 groupment headquarters
1 independent brigade headquarters
12 infantry battalions
5 gendarmerie battalions
2 commando battalions
2 paracommando battalions
2 harbor defense companies
3 field artillery batteries
2 antiaircraft batteries
A typical CNA camp has
been described by one US observ-
er as dominated by various fam-
ily and other nonmilitary pre-
occupations, and accompanied by
loudspeaker renditions of the
cha-cha-cha into the night.
The problems involved in
retraining the CNA are so for-
midable that little has been
done. The UN--despite prodding
by the US--has not worked out
a retraining program. What
foreign assistance is available
has been provided largely by
some 17 Belgian advisers, some
of whom are survivors of the
1960 mutiny.
Prospects for Reorganization
Premier Adoula reportedly
is convinced that in order to
restore discipline and reduce
the army's drain on the treas-
ury, the CNA must be reduced
from its present size--possibly
as high as 29,000--to between
12,000 and 15,000. General
Mobutu, however, is disillusioned
with his past failures to obtain
UN assistance in reorganizing
the CNA and apprehensive con-
cerning the effects of any abrupt
demobilization. He wants an
army of around 24,000, arguing
that if a force of this size
was necessary before independence,
it is necessary today. He dis-
counts UN forces in the Congo,
on the grounds that they cannot
be counted on to end Katanga's
secession.
Although modest about his own
capabilities, Mobutu appears con-
fident of his ability to judge
the temper of his troops; he
reportedly seldom issues an order
without first checking to see
whether it will be obeyed. His
conviction that he cannot ini-
tiate a radical reorganization
without risking new disorders may
have caused some strain in his
relations with Adoula. In con-
versation with a UN official
earlier this month, Adoula
warned that if he were unable
to reach an accommodation in
his talks with Tshomb6, he
might request military assist-
ance outside the UN framework
from friendly African states.
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