CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 70
OCI NO. 0404/62
16 February 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
d"A ~ P ~/j
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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16 February 1962
official reactions emphasize regret that Argentina's break
was taken under overt military pressure. The Brazilian
foreign minister and his supporters have indicated that
Argentine policy will not cause a stiffening of Brazil's
attitude toward Cuba. Chile apparently plans no immedi-
GUATEMALA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Sporadic fighting continues in eastern Guatemala be-
tween army units and scattered bands of rebels. The rebels,
who launched their attacks on isolated military posts on
the night of 6-7 February, are composed largely of ex-mil-
itary personnel who staged an abortive revolt in November
1960. No Communists or pro-Castro groups were implicated
in that revolt, but they may subsequently have gained some
influence among the officers involved. A protracted guer-
rilla campaign could wear down government and military
morale, but at present top army officers appear to be firmly
supporting the President.
TOGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
The decline in the popularity of President Olympio's
regime may eventually impair his ability to withstand con-
tinuing pressures from Ghana for a union of the two coun-
tries. Public confidence in the regime, weakened by the
absence of promised economic improvement, has recently
been further diminished by its harsh reaction to the abor-
tive coup attempted last December by Ghana-backed opposi-
tion elements. Olympio is seeking to bolster his ability
to resist Ghana by promoting closer ties with Dahomey and
Nigeria but remains highly vulnerable to subversion.
PAKISTANI REGIME ENCOUNTERS OPEN OPPOSITION . . . . . . . Page 22
President Ayub is encountering his first serious
overt opposition following the arrest of former Prime Min-
ister Suhrawardy for attacking the constitution which Ayub
plans to promulgate soon. Although the regime can probably
curb agitation by arresting key leaders and demonstrators,
sporadic outbreaks of unrest may continue.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN UNION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The rapid advance of the Common Market (EEC) in the
last few years has confronted Western Europe earlier than
anticipated with the practical problems of moving toward
political integration. All six countries believe that the
present momentum toward integration can be maintained only
if economic union is supplemented by closer political ties.
A major objective of French policy is the early organization
of a loose confederation of European states under French
leadership. However, before real progress on a political
treaty can be made, ways must be found to accommodate
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
Antigovernment forces have
continued sporadic shelling of
the provincial capital of Nam
Tha, apparently in an effort
to force General Phoumi into
a resumption of negotiations
for a coalition cabinet. Sou-
phannouvong on 12 February
declared that his forces--com-
prising a major portion of
those besieging the town--would
continue the bombardment "for
political reasons." Phoumi,
undeterred by such pressure,
has continued to augment his
garrison there. With the ar-
rival from southern Laos on
11 February of a fresh para-
troop battalion, the defending
forces now number six battalions.
Souvanna, still trying to
reconcile the divergent factions,
is scheduled to have an audi-
ence with King Savang on 16
February, presumably to be fol-
lowed by a meeting with Phoumi.
Chances for any substantive
agreement, however, are slim;
neither Phoumi nor Souvanna has
indicated a willingness to sur-
render to the other the defense
and interior posts. Phoumi will
probably press for adoption of
his concept of a federation of
the three factions under King
Savang, but it is almost cer-
tain that this would be opposed
by the Communists even if the
King should acquiesce.
The deployment of Thai
military units along the Lao-
tian border underscores Bang-
kok's anxiety over recent Lao-
tian developments. This move
by Sarit may encourage Phoumi
in his determination to resist
the imposition by the major
Western and bloc powers of
what he undoubtedly feels to
be an unsatisfactory political
settlement.
Soviet officials attribute
the delay in achieving a set-
tlement to insufficient pressure
by the West on Vientiane. Soviet
Charge Smirnovsky on 13 February
delivered an official statement
to Ambassador Harriman in which
the USSR said that "it was now
necessary for the US Government
to state directly and openly"
its opposition to Vientiane's
claims to the posts of defense,
interior, and foreign affairs.
Soviet Ambassador Abramov,
although he has joined the British
ambassador in efforts.-,to ,reach
a peaceful solution, has been
truculent in his conversations
with Western representatives
and has indicated that the loss
of Nam Tha would be "just pun-
ishment" for Phoumi. However,
Abramov has not pursued this
line in the talks at Khang Khay
with Souvanna and Souphannouvong.
The Soviet ambassador's
charge of US support for Phbumi's
"provocatory" actions in Laos
has been given increased So-
viet propaganda support during
the past week. A domestic
broadcast on 8 February ob-
served that "Laos again faces
the danger of large military
clashes," and stated that
Phoumi's actions had the full
support of the United States.
The broadcast stated that to
withdraw "lawful government
troops" from the Nam Tha area
would be to "give in to
Phoumi's demands" and pave
the way for additional "mili-
tary provocations." Jeering
at the "bankruptcy" of US
policy in Laos, the commentary
urged the speedy formation 25X1
of a coalition government
along the lines proposed by
Souvanna Phouma,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Shortly after he signed Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak
the agreement at Kitona with has expressed similar concern..
Premier Adoula on 21 December,
UN officials said they would
give Moise Tshombe one month
to
begin implementation of
the
UN
resolutions as agreed to
in
the
document, particularly
on
the
expulsion of his white
mer-
cenaries. UN officials during
the past week have stepped up
their pressure on the Katangan
leader, and this, plus some re-
inforcement of UN military
strength in the Elisabethville
area, has markedly increased
apprehensions among the Katan-
gans that the UN, particularly
its military commanders, is
bent on initiating a "third
round" of hostilities. Their
apprehensions have been in-
creased by the appointment of
the new UN civilian chief in
Katanga--Jose Rolz-Bennet, a
Guatemalan reputed to be sym-
pathetic to the anti-Tshombe
line espoused by the Afro-
Asian states.
Tshombe has agreed to UN
requests to have mixed UN-Ka-
tangan inspection teams visit
Jadotville, Kolwezi, and
Kipushi, the three Katangan
strongholds outside Elisabeth-
ville where most of Tshombe's
mercenaries are believed to be.
Such teams made perfunctory in-
spections at Jadotville and
Kipushi on 10 February without
incident. Tshombe reportedly
has also agreed to the UN's re-
quest to station its forces at
all three locations as a follow-
up to the inspection teams. He
has warned, however, that with-
out careful "preparation," the
move of UN forces might provoke
resistance. Belgian Foreign
Ministry officials suspect that
Tshombe was much less clear in
accepting the troop move than
UN officials say he was.
Union Miniere officials in
Brussels told Ambassador Mac-
Arthur that sending the UN
troops into these towns would
"risk a major disaster," and
Katangan "last d tc
opponents o a reconciliation
with Leopoldville may try to
oust Tshombe should he "betray"
Katanga. The US Consulate be-
lieves Katanga Minister of In-
terior Munongo in particular
would try to promote militant
action by the Conakat youth
organization if he felt his po-
sition were endangered.
UN officials in New York
deny they are planning to ini-
tiate hostilities but cited the
need for freedom of movement
for UN troops outside Elisabeth-
ville if the UN resolutions are
to be enforced. U Thant has
said that no military action
will be undertaken without his
approval, and that if efforts
to expel the mercenaries are
thwarted he will consult with
UN members before allowing
any military action. Reports
indicate that Rolz-Bennet, as
a result of widespread expres-
sions of concern, is proceeding
more cautiously than previously.
Tshombe's UN-appointed le-
gal adviser described Tshombe's
initial proposals for a Congo
constitution as "looser than
the US Articles of Confedera-
tion." Tshombe has been in-
sisting he must have the; services
of a constitutional law expert
before his assembly could make
any: final decision on the Kitona
accord. This adviser, who ar-
rived in late January, met with
Tshombe for the first time on
12 February and has only now
been brought into the assembly's
consultations. He is not op-
timistic that he can convince
the legislators to come up with
a realistic resolution.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Adoula remains skeptical
that Tshomb6 will accede to the
Kitona agreement. He feels that
Tshomb6 is playing for time and
doubts the willingness of the
UN to bring Tshomb6 to heel.
During his American visit,
Adoula again raised his long-
standing proposal that Congolese
Army forces be sent into south-
ern Katanga. Adoula stated pub-
licly on 14 February that prog-
ress on a settlement with
Tshomb6 had been "very slim."
The premier this week won
a parliamentary vote of confi-
French and provisional
Algerian government (PAG) of-
ficials continue to express op-
timism over prospects for early
conclusion of their secret ne-
gotiations. Details on a tran-
sitional period between sole
French rule and Algerian inde-
pendence now are being worked
out,
Meanwhile, however,
rent >control in Algeria is
weakening in the face of activ-
ity by both the Algerian rebels
and the Secret Army Organization
(OAS), and the growing left-right
split in France itself could have
the effect of strengthening
rightist forces opposed to De
Gaulle's Algerian policy.
The meeting of top-level
French and PAG negotiators
which began last weekend re-
portedly dealt with formal PAG
counterproposals which had been
drafted last week, apparently
in response to a French memo-
randum.
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16 Feb 62 WEEKLY REVIEW
dence on his handling of Gizenga.
Pressure is growing, however,
even from Adoula?s supporters,
for the government to bring for-
mal charges against the former
Stanleyville leader in order to
deny him the martyr's role that
might result from indefinite im-
prisonment without trial. There
are still strains between the
moderates and radicals in the
cabinet, and the embassy believes
that for this reason the govern-
ment does not want to face the
Gizenga issue.
Adoula has made some shifts
in his cabinet this week which
indicate he is not ready for any
showdown with the radicals. Rad-
ical Minister of Interior Gbenye,
instead of being dropped, has been
kicked upstairs to a deputy pre-
miership and replaced by Gizen-
ga's leftist rival, Leopoldville
provincial President Cleophas
Kamitatu. Jean Bolikango, a
political leader from Equateur
Province who has been on both
sides of the fence but more re-
cently has played with the rad-
icals, has been brought in as
another deputy premier. This
appears to be an attempt to
strengthen ties between Leopold-
ville and Equateur Province.
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Dissatisfaction with the
PAG's conduct of negotiations
reportedly still exists within
units of the rebel fighting
forces, who feel that they have
been inadequately informed on
the negotiations and believe
that premier Ben Khedda, along
with foreign minister Dahlab
and information minister Yazid,
have made too many concessions.
Ben Khedda appears to be in con-
trol of the situation, however,
and it is unlikely that dissat-
isfied rebel military commanders
could prevent ratification of an
accord by the National Revolu-
tionary Council.
There are indications of
increasing paralysis of the
French administration in Al-
geria, although there are no
reports of any recent change
in OAS tactics on overall
strength.
The French Army's firing
on a Moslem mob during the 14
February riot in Oran will fur-
ther increase racial tension in
that city, generally conceded
to be an OAS stronghold.
There is some evidence
that ex-general Salan, nomi-
nal head of the OAS, now re-
gards himself as a "prisoner"
of its more rabid elements
who can be expected to attempt
to provoke a mass settler up-
rising at the first opportunity,
such as announcement of a cease-
fire or public negotiations.
The French Government report-
edly is concerned over the pos-
sibility that, if an accord
is reached and implementation
begun, about one tenth of the
approximately 60,000 Moslem
troops serving in the French
Army and a "substantial num-
ber" of the approximately
16,000 Foreign Legionnaires
will desert and join the OAS
guerrilla effort.
Meanwhile, in France, the
repressive measures used by
Paris police in the 8 Febru-
ary leftist demonstrations
against the OAS
have brought the governmen
under widespread political at-
tack. Even though other left-
ist groups seem aware of the
Communist party's exploitation
of such incidents to foster a
"popular front" atmosphere,
their leaders are under in-
creasing public pressure to
"go along." The peaceful
character of the 12-13 Febru-
ary demonstrations and strikes
showed Communist discipline
and probably increased pros-
pects for further unity of
action regardless of the per-
sonal views of such leaders
as Socialist party secretary
general Mollet. The net effect
extreme measures.
of such action will be to
increase the suspicion of
military and moderate civilian
elements and thereby swing
many of them behind right-
ists who wish to reverse De
Gaulle's Algerian policy,
by political pressure or more
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow last week made a
number of diverse moves which
Khrushchev probably calculates
will draw the West into top-
level contacts later in the
year. His probable aim is to
use a summit conference as the
occasion for new Soviet disarma-
ment proposals and to consider
the diplomatic impasse on Berlin.
The USSR publicized the
release of Francis Powers on
10 February as an effort to
improve US-Soviet relations.
This was followed on 11 Febru-
ary by Khrushchev's relatively
moderate letter proposing that
the heads of government--rather
than the foreign ministers, as
the West had suggested--meet
at Geneva prior to the 18-nation
disarmament conference opening
on 14 March. Khrushchev retained
a free hand to accept the Western
proposals and press for a summit
later.
At the same time, the
USSR resumed pressure on
the Western position in Berlin
by attempting to impose tempo-
rary conditions on the use of
the air corridors. This maneuver,
together with Gromyko's adamant
stand in the Moscow talks with
Ambassador Thompson, suggests
that Khrushchev is seeking to
impress on the Western powers
that Berlin remains a potential-
ly dangerous situation.
Khrushchev's Proposals
Khrushchev's letter of 11
February was nonpolemical and
in sharp contrast to vitriolic
Soviet propaganda that US policy
is hypocritical. Khrushchev
noted that US and Soviet "reason-
ing, on the whole, runs in the
same direction," and he expressed
hope that the West would "rightly
understand the motives which have
prompted" the Soviet proposal.
He went to some lengths to dis-
claim that his proposal was a
mere propaganda gesture by ad-
mitting that participation by
the heads of government was
"unusual" and by claiming that
he was actually drafting his
proposal when the letters from
President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Macmillan were received.
Moreover, he acknowledged that
the heads of government could
not be expected to complete a
final treaty, but that their
presence would provide the com-
mittee with a "powerful and
correct start" and open the way
for a "breakthrough in inter-
national relations."
Khrushchev's immediate
and tactical aim in calling
for an 18-nation summit was to
regain the initiative by counter-
ing the US-UK proposals. He
emphasized that "direct contacts
between national leaders" had
become an "established interna-
tional practice," and he accepted
the President's proposals for
a "broader exchange of opinions"
between the heads of government.
Moreover, he did not rule out
acceptance of the Western pro-
posal for a foreign ministers'
conference to precede the Geneva
meeting, stating: "It goes with-
out saying that the foreign'min-
isters must also take part...both
with the heads of government and
in the subsequent period...."
Khrushchev specifically
stated that the heads-of-govern-
ment meeting he proposed should
not be considered a substitute
for a summit meeting "as it is
generally understood." This may
foreshadow an effort to arrange
a four-power summit at a later
date with an agenda broader than
disarmament, or to use an 18-
nation heads-of-government meet-
ing as the forum for establishing
contacts with the US on other
international issues, particu-
larly Berlin.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
While the release of
Powers and the Khrushchev let-
ter point toward a Soviet ef-
fort at establishing a more
favorable climate for resuming
top-level contacts, Khrushchev
has been careful not to over-
commit the USSR to a general
relaxation of tensions. His
letter was followed by an au-
thoritative Pravda "Observer"
article on 13 Fe ruary which
sharply attacked the West for
proposing a foreign ministers'
conference while preparing for
a series of nuclear tests.
Khrushchev's letter, moreover,
left open the possibility that
he might go to Geneva regard-
less of the Western position.
He may view the Geneva confer-
ence as an ideal forum to pro-
ject an image of greater interest
in disarmament than the West,
and may believe that the pros-
pect of attendance by some
neutral leaders would force a
reversal by the West.
The presence of other
leaders might appeal to Khru-
shchev if he plans to unveil
some new disarmament package.
His letter avoided all the sub-
stantive points raised by the
President and Prime Minister
Macmillan. This failure to
reply, particularly on the im-
portant question of dividing
disarmament into three separate
categories for immediate con-
sideration, suggests that he
may initiate further correspond-
ence on the substantive issues.
Soviet diplomats in London have
hinted that Moscow is consider-
ing new comprehensive disarma-
ment proposals which would in-
clude the standard plan for
complete and general disarma-
ment plus some immediate steps
in the field of European se-
curity and partial disarmament.
The USSR may be con-
sidering putting forth a formal
proposal which would be restrict-
ed to a ban on atmospheric
tests in line with the Kennedy-
Macmillan proposal of 3 Septem-
ber. Soviet leaders would
probably calculate that such
a proposal could embarrass the
West and draw considerable sup-
port from the nonaligned powers
represented at Geneva.
Since the US-UK announce-
ment of tentative plans for US
atmospheric tests at Christmas
Island and British underground
testing in Nevada, Moscow has
initiated a propaganda campaign
charging that the tests are a
"certainty" and accusing the
West of having broken off
the test ban talks to continue
with its test program. A Pravda
article said that the new series
of Western tests "is clearly
linked" with plans for making
NATO a fourth nuclear power.
Izvestia warned that if the
West conducts nuclear tests,
"the Soviet Union will have to
resume testing."
Berlin and Germany
Soviet moves to demonstrate
a willingness to negotiate with
the West have not been accom-
panied by any effort at compro-
mise in the Thompson-Gromyko
talks. While Gromyko has simply
reiterated previous positions,
he has not yet indicated that
he is ready to break off the
dialogue. The Soviet attempts
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
this week to place temporary
restrictions on Western use of
the Berlin air corridors, to-
gether with the deliberate
stalling in the Thompson-Gromyko
talks, may be aimed at inducing
the Western powers either to
move directly into formal nego-
tiations or to make concessions.
By resorting to unilateral
moves in the sensitive area of
access, the Soviet leaders may
be attempting to demonstrate
that Khrushchev's withdrawal of
a deadline for a separate treaty
should not be interpreted as
an indication that Moscow will
be content with the status quo
in Berlin. This attitude was
emphasized in a long article
in a special edition of Izvestia
on 11 February which accuses
the West of avoiding solutions
of major international issues
and of playing for time, par-
ticularly on the Berlin ques-
tion.
Soviet interference with
air access to Berlin began on
7 February when the Soviet
controller at the Berlin iir
Safety Center (BASC) announced
that Soviet military transports
would "engage" the southern air
corridor from Frankfurt to Berlin
at altitudes up to 7,000 feet
for three and a half hours on 8
February. While it is unusual
but not unprecedented for So-
viet planes to conduct maneuvers
in the corridors, the prior
announcement and attempt to
"reserve" the bulk of the corri-
dor airspace were clearly de-
signed to infringe on unrestricted
Western access. The Soviet
controller refused to file
flight plans for Soviet air-
craft, as is customary, and
refused to guarantee flight
safety for Western aircraft
flying within the altitudes
"engaged"by the Soviets.
The procedure was repeated
for the northern and central
corridors on 9 and 12 February,
although on the latter date
the Soviets canceled their
restrictions, However, restric-
tions were reinstituted for
14 February, and for 15 Febru-
ary for the southern corridor.
For the first time, the Soviets
warned that if Western aircraft
flew at altitudes planned for
Soviet planes, this would be
considered as "trespassing
with resultant consequences."
This warning was followed
by a "strong protest" against
alleged Western violations
of established procedures and
a demand that Allied flights
cease unless given specific
Soviet approval. These moves,
together with the first de-
liberate harassment of incom-
ing flights on 14 February
and again on 15 February, indi-
cated that the Soviets were
carefully but deliberately
raising the level of tensions.
The further attempts to impose
conditions on Western flights
on the grounds that the Allies
must have Soviet approval may
have been intended as an implicit 25X1
warning that the Soviets would
withdraw from the four-power air
safety center.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-SOVIET TREATY ANNIVERSARY
Activities in the USSR and
China celebrating the 12th
anniversary of the signing of
the Sino-Soviet treaty of al-
liance were the most perfunctory
in the treaty's history. Last
year's ceremonies seemed designed
to create the impression that
issues actually still in dispute
had been resolved at the Moscow
conference of November 1960 and
to ridicule any idea that the
alliance was falling apart.
This year Chinese complaints
and Soviet threats overshadowed
the sullen professions of har-
mony.
In Peiping, the annual
rally--on 13 February--was played
down and the Chinese politburo
was represented only by Foreign
Minister Chen Yi--in contrast
to 1961, when Premier Chou En-
lai and politburo member Peng
Chen were also present. The
principal Chinese speech at
the rally this year was delivered
by Lin Feng, a lesser official
seldom in the news. As in 1961,
the USSR was represented by its
ambassador in Peiping, but the
usual friendship delegation from
Moscow was conspicuously absent.
In Moscow, the annual
reception by the Chinese ambas-
sador--which Khrushchev, Mikoyan,
and Suslov attended last year--
was replaced by an undistin-
guished friendship meeting at
which the leading Soviet of-
ficial was Foreign Minister
Gromyko.
The Chinese used the an-
niversary to imply that Khru-
shchev rather than Mao is re-
sponsible for weakening the
alliance. Lin Feng in his
16 Feb 62
speech insisted that the Chi-
nese have "always" considered
defending Sino-Soviet unity
a "sacred international duty,"
but that revisionists and re-
actionaries are trying "to
sow discord and undermine the
solidarity" between the two
countries. Quoting from Liu
Shao-chi's statement of 1960,
Lin warned that "any word or
deed detrimental to unity
between our two parties and
countries, any word or deed
damaging to the basis of this
unity" will not be tolerated.
People's Daily on 14 February
used the same quote and by
implication complained that
Khrushchev is employing all
means to "alienate" the treaty
partners.
Soviet Ambassador Chervo-
nenko, who followed Lin at the
rostrum, defended Khrushchev,
claiming that the Soviet premier
"has always exerted and will
exert every effort to strengthen
this great friendship." This
statement, which quotes Khru-
shchev, was repeated by a So-
viet commentator on 14 February.
However, Chervonenko contradicted
himself when he warned the
Chinese that their failure
to adopt a friendly attitude
toward the USSR might jeopardize
the military alliance. "What
the Soviet Union possesses
alone is enough to crush any
potential enemy, should he
attack us or our friendly
socialist countries." A similar
hint that Soviet protection
might be provided in the future
only to "socialist countries
which are friendly to us" had
been made by Marshal Malinovsky
on 25 January and by Admiral
Gorshkov several days later.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
These threats reverse So-
viet statements of support
made last year, particularly
Suslov's pledge--using Khru-
shchev's words of 1958--that
the USSR will consider "an
attack on China as an attack
on the Soviet Union." A sar-
castic reference to China's
military weaknesses was made
by a Soviet commentator on 14
February when he stated that
the alliance "was of tremendous
importance in reinforcing the
international standing" of the
Peiping regime--"the young
socialist power in Asia." The
Russians also pointed out to
the Chinese that the treaty al-
legedly prevented "the US from
attacking China" during the
Korean hostilities.
In line with this treat-
ment, Moscow is trying to por-
tray the Chinese "hard" line
against the US as ineffective
bluster and bluff. An article
in Izvestia on 4 February
stresses that the West "cannot
be kept in check by loud in-
cantations and curses." "To
restrain the forces of im-
perialism requires a compre-
hensive strengthening of the
economic, political, and de-
fensive might of the socialist
states." Implying that Mao's
line of "head-on struggle"
causes the West to strengthen
its forces, the article insists
that disarmament tactics con-
stitute an "active and effec-
tive" way to struggle for peace.
The Izvestia article is
intended to su support Xbrushchev's
effort to retain freedom of
action in implementing tactics
of peaceful coexistence against
the West. Lenin is portrayed
as stressing the need to combine
ideological devotion "with the
ability to enter into all neces-
sary practical compromises" and
as teaching Communists to have
"maximum flexibility" in tactics.
"Peaceful coexistence exists...
regardless of whether it is liked
by the gentlemen imperialists
or the dogmatists." The article
attacks "the Albanians" for
openly criticizing the premises
of Khrushchev's foreign policy
at the World Peace Council meet-
ing last December.
Lin Feng made it clear
at the Peiping rally that the
Chinese line of trading "blow
for blow with the US" has not
and will not be softened, despite
Soviet pressure.
Further cutbacks in Soviet
economic support for China--
already limited to trade--may
be in store, but this prospect
is unlikely to influence the
Chinese stance. Sino-Soviet
trade negotiations for 1962,
under way in Moscow for nearly
two months, are likely to be
especially difficult this year
because of the dispute. Financ-
ing massive food imports during
the past year already has
forced Peiping to shift foreign
trade priorities toward greater
attention to sales in Western
markets at the expense of bloc
commitments. Simultaneous
probes for Western industrial
equipment and raw materials
formerly imported almost ex-
clusively from the USSR and
the Soviet bloc strongly suggest
that Peiping is also exploring
alternative sources for these im-
ports should the dispute with 25X1
Moscow lead to an even more dras-
tic cutback in trade with the
bloc. (Prepared jointly
with ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET LITERARY FERMENT
Pressure from Soviet writers
for greater freedom in creativ-
ity has increased significantly
since the 22nd party congress
last fall. Individual writers
are apparently probing to dis-
cover how far they can proceed
in describing the realities of
Soviet life; spokesmen for the
regime, in turn, have criticized
some, of them for moving out too
far, but the party leaders have
yet to make an authoritative
statement which spells out the
line. In this field, as in
several other areas of policy,
the Kremlin apparently has been
undecided since the congress as
to the best way to proceed.
At the congress, the long-
established principle of social-
ist realism in the arts--concen-
tration on the positive aspects
of life in "building communism"--
was reasserted. It was chal-
lenged, however, by poet A. T.
Tvardovsky, who insisted that
people and their surroundings
should be portrayed as they
are, including the negative
aspects. Since that time, ex-
ponents of both schools have
been contending openly. The
orthodox authoritarian group,
however, appears to have only
a limited number of disciplinary
weapons at hand short of inter-
vention by the Kremlin itself.
The' problem is complicated by
the fact that public criticism
tends to increase popular inter-
est in the work criticized. The
international scandal resulting
from the treatment of Pasternak
in 1958 has made the regime wary
of forcing expulsion from the
Writers' Union.
Proponents of socialist
realism have centered their fire
on a novel by Vasily Aksenov,
Ticket to the Stars, and a movie
scr pt by V. Rozov, "A.B.C.D.E."
--both stories of rebellious and
disoriented Soviet youth. A
Pravda editorial inveighed a-
ga nst the authors; they were
sharply criticized at the writers'
plenum in Moscow in December;
and veteran propagandist Leonid
Ilichev devoted a full para-
graph to their failings in his
speech at the ideological con-
ference in the same month.
They have also been defended
publicly, however, and one sup-
porter noted that Aksenov had
been invited to more than'50
"readers' conferences" in Moscow
in the past two months.
The argument surrounding
Vsevolod Kochetov's latest novel,
The Obkom Secretary, has been
still more heated. Published
just prior to the party
congress, it was generally re-
garded as an authoritative at-
tempt to establish guidelines
for writers in depicting the
proper reaction to Stalin's
"errors." The novel received
uniformly favorable reviews
until mid-December, when Literary
Gazette charged that the ergo,
Denisov, failed in his duty as
a candidate member of the party
central committee when he found
himself unable to condemn Stalin's
crimes in view of the latter's
great achievements. Kochetov
and his critics have each gathered
adherents in the literary press
and at the writers' plenum.
The January issue of New
World suggested that Denisov--
Kochetov's ideal party official--
was the sort of person who
supported the "antiparty group"
in 1957, and that characters
in a 1958 Kochetov novel had
themselves exhibited elements
of the "cult of personality"--
the Soviet euphemism for Sta-
lin's crimes. There has been
no official intervention in
the increasingly bitter debate.
Other literary works have
provided exposes of character
erosion in the party ranks.
The chief character in Lev
Nikulin's novel, With New Happi-
ness, had been a s ee'ppherd, a Red
ray volunteer, and a Komsomol
(youth organization) member.
He eventually became a party
member and head of a planning
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last work drew criticism from
a member of the central commit-
tee apparatus as "vague and
confusing," but no public ef-
fort has been made to bring
the authors to book.
bureau. His wife wrote to him
before she committed suicide:
"You no longer walk, you strut;
you do not speak, you force the
words through your teeth with
an air of distaste, and so
quietly that you can hardly be
heard. This is so that people
will hang on your every word--
that is, of course, those who
are dependent on you."
Oblique attacks havE been
made on the principle of party
leadership in the arts. Valen-
tin Ovechkin commented acidly
in his latest play: "Formerly,
creative people bore the obliga-
tion to think about everything.
Now the party and government
have freed them from this burden-
some obligation to think, and
all that is left to them is to
write." An article published
by the Institute of Philosophy
listed "Petty tutelage and
administration" by the party as
the most pressing problem of
creative organizations. This
Poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko
has described the current fer-
ment in a new poem which ends:
Sometime,
Posterity will remember
--and will burn with shame,
When they shall have fin-
ished with shame and lies,
Those strange times
When
Common honesty was called
courage.
In 1957, it took the inter-
vention of Khrushchev himself
to check the literary thaw. An
equally dramatic step may be
necessary this time to put a
brake on the renewed ferment
among Soviet writers.
EAST GERMAN ECONODIC DEVELOPMENTS
Prospects for the con-
tinuation of German interzonal
trade improved when negotiators
for West and East Germany met
in West Berlin on 26 January--
for the first time since 1 No-
vember 1961--and then met again
in East Berlin on 1 February.
East Germany evidently wants
to continue such trade in 1962,
but over the long run it is com-
mitted to reduce Western imports
and to integrate its economy
more completely into that of
the bloc.
Interzonal trade was
organized until 1960 on a vir-
tual barter basis, and imbal-
ances were settled by additional
shipments of goods. An agree-
ment in August of that year, how-
ever, calls for annual settle-
ment of imbalances in converti-
ble currency. In anticipation
of the next such settlement on
30 June 1962, the East Germans
appear to be restricting their
purchases in West Germany and
accelerating deliveries in order
to reduce their indebtedness.
Their deliveries of coal bri-
quettes in January exceeded
shipments for that month in
1960 and 1961, and they have
achieved a small surplus in
subaccount 1, under which "stra-
tegic" materials are traded--
i.e., steels, coal, petroleum
products, some machinery, and
chemicals. Coal and petroleum
products comprise 40 percent
of the East German deliveries.
East German purchase.'1,
probably will be slow unt :R.
June, but the 1962 economic
plan reportedly has been com-
pleted and calls for trade with
West Germany to continue at
a volume not appreciably re-
duced from that of 1961. There
are no large shifts in the
categories of goods to be ordered,
and the volume of steel pur-
chases reportedly will con-
tinue at about the same level
as last year. Acquisition of
machinery, however, will be
governed by East Germany's
capability for repairing and
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maintaining it. The East
Germans would like more favor-
able credit terms for their
purchases and an easing of cur-
rent debt obligations, but it
is doubtful that the West Ger-
mans will agree unless political
concessions--particularly in
regard to Berlin--are forth-
coming in return.
The USSR in its efforts
to isolate West Berlin from
West Germany appears to be
employing economic pressures
against the city in hopes of
creating a psychological im-
pact significant enough to
achieve a political advantage.
In the last stages of ne-
gotiation of the 1961-65 trade
treaty between the USSR and
West Germany, Moscow sought to
exclude West Berlin from the
purview of the treaty. When
the West Germans objected, a
compromise was privately ar-
ranged whereby at the signing
of the treaty, the West Germans
handed a letter to the Soviet
delegation stating that Bonn
assumes that the area for which
the new treaty is valid is un-
changed--i.e., based on the
1958 trade agreement, which
was applicable to the entire
Deutsche Mark area, including
West Berlin. The USSR made no
comment on the letter, and the
treaty was signed. The USSR
receives some goods from West
Berlin, but only a small part
of the city's total trade is
with the USSR. Therefore the
economic effect of a cessation
of Soviet trade would be neg-
ligible.
Until recently, the East
Germans, in a carrot-and-stick
approach, had attempted to in-
crease direct contacts and con-
tracts with West Berlin firms
in order to support their ulti-
mate goal of persuading West
Berlin business that it is to
their advantage to trade outside
interzonal channels. There now
are indications, however, that
East Germany may restrict trade
with West Berlin under current
interzonal arrangements: for-
eign trade organizations re-
portedly have been ordered to
cut business contacts with West
Berliners to a minimum, and
agents of West German firms who
are residents of West Berlin
have been denied entry to East
Berlin, although West German mem-
bers of the same firms were later
admitted.
If the East Germans re-
fused to trade with Berlin,
the effect on the city's economy
would be insignificant, assuming
that arrangements could be made
to obtain elsewhere the fresh
foods and brown coal currently
imported from East Germany.
East Germany now accounts for
about 0.9 percent of West
Berlin's total exports and
2.2 percent of its imports.
The expulsion of Rudolf
Barak from the Czechoslovak
party and government at 6-7
February central committee ple-
num appears to be the result
of internal party politics aris-
ing from conflicts created by
the Soviet 22nd party congress
last fall. At the time of his
dismissal--on charges of mis-
using his former office of in-
terior minister, misappropriating
state funds, and unspecified
"antiparty activities--Barak
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
was a politburo member, deputy
premier, and chairman of the
powerful Commission on National
Committees. Although the actions
taken against him are likely
to be cast as part of the re-
gime's "de-Stalinization" ef-
forts, the move is probably de-
signed as a warning to other
young party leaders who do not
favor many of the policies of
party First Secretary Novotny.
Barak may have been one
of those rumored to oppose the
Czechoslovak leadership last
fall. He was one of the strong-
est opponents of Khrushchev's
policy of detente with the West
--a policy which Novotny had to
support--and he commanded con-
siderable support from the party
rank and file because of his
otherwise. pragmatic outlook.
It is significant that the
plenum which expelled Barak
pointedly reaffirmed the deci-
sions taken at the Soviet con-
gress and.thoseat the November
plenum of the Czechoslovak
party central committee. The
latter included elimination of
the last vestiges of the per-
sonality cult--notably removal
of deceased leader Gottwald's
body from its mausoleum and
destruction of the 6,000-ton
Stalin monument in Prague--
and support of the "Leninist"
concept of peaceful coexistence
and the unity of the interna~-
tional Communist movement.
However, except for the
naming of a commission in Jan-
uary to study uses for the
Stalin monument site and a few
geographical name changes, noth-
ing further has been done to-
ward de-Stalinization. This
caution by Novotny probably re-
flects the dif f icultdes he faces
in the party and may have in-
volved opposition by Barak.
As part of the effort to
downgrade and to undercut any
clique supporting Barak, Novotny
had two of Barak's former com-
rades, Otakar Simunek and Jiri
Hendrych, deliver reports which
implied the need for improvement
in the performance of the Com-
misssion on National Committees.
Novotny had used the support
of these three men in 1958 to
effect some liberalization in
the economy and to defeat the
hard-line and nationalistic
policies of Viliam Siroky,
Baclav Kopecky, and former
economic boss Jaromir Dolassky.
At this past week's ple-
num--at which Novotny personally
read the charges against Barak--
Hendrych reported on the tasks
of agriculture in 1962 and
Simunek reported on the state
plan for the development of the
national economy. These are
both fields in which Barak, as
chairman of the Commission on
National Committees, was
supposed to correct faults.
He reportedly gave up the In-
terior Ministry last July to
concentrate on these problems--
although as deputy premier he
is believed to have retained
primary responsibility for in-
ternal security and national
defense.
Until recently Barak had
been considered Novotny's heir
apparent. He was the young-
est of the politburo members,
and until his departure from
the Interior Ministry his stock
was constantly on the rise.
Novotny apparently now has
decided Barak had gained too
much power and Was becoming a
threat. Other old-time mem-
bers of the leadership were
also probably worried about
their future if Barak be-
came the party leader after
Novotny.
The appointment of Jan
Pilar, a relatively unknown
central committee industrial
specialist, to Barak's post of
deputy premier and the simul-
taneous replacement of Construc-
tion Minister Oldrich Beran--
who rose to prominence with
Barak in 1953--by a regional
party secretary suggests that
other Barak followers may be
replaced by minor officials on
their way up. US Embassy observ-
ers in Prague do not think
such a purge would be wide-
spread, however.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS
Still seeking to draw Iran
away from its commitments to
the West, the Soviet Union has,
submitted to the Shah a new
draft for a Soviet-Iranian agree-
ment. The formulation this time
is less direct than previous So-
viet proposals but in effect
would still restrict Tehran's
participation in CENTO military
planning and prohibit foreign
missile bases in Iran.
The Soviet Union has long
sought a nonaggression treaty
which would exclude any foreign
military installations or troops
from Iranian territory. Such a
pact would not only ease po-
litical and military pressure
on the USSR's southern flank
but would also provide Moscow
with a useful precedent when
dealing with other US allies.
Moscow probably does not seri-
ously expect to draw the Irani-
ans into an agreement which
would require them to forsake
virtually all means of self-
defense, but it continues prob-
ing actions to test their re-
solve to remain faithful to
CENTO and to their bilateral de-
fense agreement with the US.
The latest diplomatic ma-
neuvers began when the USSR in-
dicated in late December that
it now was willing to negotiate
with Iran on the basis of the
Shah's offer--made in September
1959--unilaterally to prohibit
foreign missile bases in Iran.
Inasmuch as Iran had agreed to
reopen discussions, the Soviet
Union probably hoped to find a
middle ground between this po-
sition and its own maximum de-
mands.
16 Feb 62
In mid-January the negotia-
tions shifted to Tehran, and on
20 January Soviet Ambassador
Pegov, in an audience with the
Shah, presented the same de-
mands made in Moscow. The Shah,
in turn, repeated his offer re-
stricted to missile bases--an
offer which the Iranian foreign
minister told the American am-
bassador satisfied Pegov. Wheth-
er Pegov was in fact satisfied
is problematical, but there
does appear to have been some
softening of the Soviet position
at about this time. Although
Soviet overt and clandestine
propaganda attacks on the Amini
government predictably intensi-
fied during the student demon-
strations of 21-25 ' January in
Tehran, Radio Moscow's answer
of 30 January to the Iranian
accusation of the Soviet involve-
ment in these events was nota-
bly mild and conciliatory, sug-
gesting that a shift in Soviet
tactics was being considered.
Apparently awaiting further
instructions, Pegov postponed
his scheduled meeting with the
Iranian foreign minister from
27 January until 3 February,
at which time he was informed
of the wording of the note
promised by the Shah. Pegov
objected to the note, but only
because it did not include an
Iranian pledge of nonaggression
toward the USSR and was not a
bilateral agreement between the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
two governments. The Iranian
foreign minister repeated his
government's position that it
was willing only to make a uni-
lateral pledge to the Soviet
Union concerning foreign mis-
sile bases and declared that
adequate guarantees of nonaggres-
sion could be found in the UN
Charter.
Apparently to forestall
the formal presentation of the
Iranian note, Pegov went direct-
ly to the Shah on 8 February
to deliver the new draft for a
bilateral treaty. This included
an Iranian declaration of in-
tention not to allow its "ter-
ritory to be used for aggres-
sion against the USSR," and
denied to any foreign power the
right to construct missile bases
in Iran. Iran objects both to
use of the term "aggression" and
to the bilateral nature of the
document.
The Iranians have shown them-
selves to be exceedingly persist-
ent negotiators, but they have yet
to achieve what they sought as a
condition for entering into talks--
a cessation of Soviet propaganda
attacks on the Shah and the govern-
ment of Amini. Nevertheless the
Iranians will probably maintain
the position they established in
September 1959 and present the So-
viets with a unilateral declaration
of intent not to permit foreign
missile bases on their soil.
EXPANSION OF SOVIET BLOC CIVIL AIR ROUTES
The Soviet bloc in recent
months has expanded its inter-
national civil air routes by con-
cluding several new agreements
with the African and Asian coun-
tries. The Soviet civil airline,
Aerof lot, extended its new Del-
hi - Rangoon route by beginning
weekly service to Djakarta on
31 January. The USSR has also
approached the Cambodian Govern-
ment about a civil air agree-
ment, indicating that'it hopes
to include Phnom Penh on the
Moscow-Djakarta route.
The USSR hopes to inaugu-
rate regular service to Ghana
and Guinea. Ghana Airways has
announced that it plans to be-
gin flights to Moscow early
this year, but it may encoun-
ter difficulties in attracting
enough passengers to make the
operation profitable. A bi-
lateral agreement between Aero-
flot and Air Guinea was signed
in mid-January; although there
has not yet been any announce-
ment of scheduled flights, regu-
lar service may be inaugurated
in the near future--probably
in conjunction with a route to
Ghana.
Meanwhile, the USSR, ap-
parently proceeding on the as-
sumption that talks for a civil
air agreement with the US will'
be resumed, has been negotiat-
ing with the Scandinavian coun-
tries for overflight and land-
ing rights for proposed flights
from Moscow to New York. These
talks appear to have encountered
difficulties because of Soviet
refusal to extend adequate re-
ciprocal rights.
On 3 February the Czech
civil airline inaugurated regu-
lar air service to Havana--the
first route to Latin America by
any bloc country. Although Cuba
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
started air service to Prague
via the Azores in February 1961,
Czechoslovakia could not estab-
lish its route until it had ob-
tained overflight privileges
and technical landing rights
from the United Kingdom, Ire-
land, and Canada.
After protracted negotia-
tions the Czech airline obtained
overflight and landing rights
from Lebanon and sent an inau-
gural flight to Rangoon through
Beirut last December. The Czech
airline has also begun a route
to Baghdad via Beirut and Da-
mascus after obtainiing over-
flight and landing rights from
Turkey.
Phnom Penh has been ad:.led
to the Czech airline's Bombay-
Soviet and Czechoslovak Civil Air Routes
to Asia, Africa, and Latin America
Existing route
----- Proposed route
Djakarta route, and preliminary
talks on possible Czech flights
to Afghanistan have been held.
The Czech airline is providing
regular service to Mali and
Guinea and reportedly is con-
sidering the possibility of ex-
tending its flights to Free-
town, Monrovia, and Lagos, and
to Central or South America.
Other satellites in recent
months have disclosed similar
intentions to expand their in-
ternational networks. Warsaw
has plans to open regular serv-
ice to nine countries in the
middle East, Africa, and the
Far East and has expressed an
interest in concluding an air
agreement with the US.
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Argentina's break in dip- istry, but none has been evident,
lomatic relations with Cuba on and there has been no substantial
8 February resulted from an ul-
timatum to President Frondizi
by his own military, who ob-
jected to Argentina's abstention
at the Punta del Este foreign
ministers' conference on the
vote to exclude Cuba from the
OAS. The military--who still
distrust Frondizi--have pre-
sented other demands for changes
in his policies and advisers.
Their chief target is the group
of officials connected with
Rogelio Frigerio, the Presi-
dent's unofficial adviser, whom
they blame for Frondizi's
policies on Cuba and on concil-
iating the Peronistass
Two pro-Frigerio officials
who helped determine Argentina's
OAS policy resigned on 14 Feb-
ruary--Under Secretary of For-
eign Affairs Oscar Camilion and
Arnaldo Musich, an adviser to
Frondizi. The military expect
that Foreign Minister Carcano--
another of their targets--will
resign shortly after the Duke
of Edinburgh's 22-30 March visit
to Argentina.
Argentina's break with Cuba
has not prompted similar action
by the other abstainers at Punta
del Este--Brazil, Chile, Ec-
uador, Bolivia, and Mexico. In
Brazil there has been some ap-
prehension that its own mili-
tary would exert similar pressure
on the Brazilian Foreign Min-
demand outside the government
for a break. Comment in the
majority of Brazilian news-
papers has condemned Argentina's
military and that country's
"political retrogression." The
Brazilian foreign minister and
his supporters have indicated
that Argentine policy will not
cause a stiffening of Brazil's
attitude toward Cuba. Brazil
will handle Cuba's affairs in
Argentina.
The Chilean Government
considers it unfortunate that
Argentina's break with Cuba
was taken under overt military
pressure, because leftist forces
throughout Latin America will
attempt to identify anti-Castro-
ism with "fascist militar
Uruguay, which did not ab-
stain on the OAS vote and has
been expected to break relations
with Cuba shortly, has prolonged
its consideration of the question
in view of the strong division of
opinion within its nine-man execu-
tive, the National Council of Gov-
ernment.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE is ,KLY SUMMARY
Fighting broke out in
eastern Guatemala on the night
of 6-7 February when rebel
groups attacked a small mili-
tary post in Bananera and raided
the nearby United Fruit Company
offices, capturing supplies,
weapons, and a large amount of
money. Guatemalan Army efforts
to pursue the scattered bands
of rebels have been hampered,
at least initially, by dis-
organization and confusion.
In the week following the ini-
tial outbreak, clashes have
occurred at a number of points
along the Atlantic Highway
between Puerto Barrios and
El Progreso. Some rebels have
been captured. or killed, but
most appear to be moving by
night and hiding during the
day in the Sierra de la Minas
and a rmaller mountain range
nearer the coast.
The rebels--numbering
150-400 by Guatemalan estimates
--are composed largely of ex-
military personnel involved in
an unsuccessful revolt on 13
November 1960. Their leader,
ox-lieutenant Marco Antonio
Yon Sosa, is a native of the
Bananera area and is presumably
counting on his familiarity
with the terrain and contacts
among the people for a pro-
tracted guerrilla campaign.
%!e has had no apparent alter-
native since the failure of the
initial rebel effort to secure
the defection of the key
provincial army garrison at
Zacapa. There is no confir-
mation of reports inspired by
the rebels themselves that they
have been joined by defecting
army patrols or that they have
picked up support from civilian
groups. Unless they gain such
support, the rebels are likely
within a few weeks to straggle
across the nearby Honduran
border into another period of
exile.
While no conclusive evi-
dence has appeared linking the
N
November 1960 revolt with Com-
munists or pro-Castro groups,
the Communists are reported to
have tried to penetrate the
"13 November" group since that
time.
(There is still,
however, no clear substan-
tiation of Guatemalan Govern-
ment claims that the rebels
are Castro-supported.
The American Embassy
reported on 10 February that
it sees no immediate danger
of the government's being
overthrown. It notes, how-
ever, that some nervousness
exists in government circles
and that, if the rebels are
able to sustain protracted
guerrilla activity, government
and military morale could
be worn down.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
TOGO
Erosion of the domestic
popularity of Togolese Presi-
dent Sylvanus Olympio's regime
may eventually impair his abili-
ty to withstand pressures from
Ghana for a union of the two
countries. Meanwhile, Ghana
will probably continue to re-
sort to subversion in pursuit
of its objective. Nkrumah's
regime trained and armed the
group of Togolese conspirators,
drawn from extremist opposition
elements, which attempted last
December to assassinate Olympio
and other key officials, Earlier
Olympio had launched a public
campaign for the "return" of
former British Togoland, which
was joined to Ghana after a pleb-
iscite in 1956, and had granted
asylum to exiled Ghanaian op-
ponents of Nkrumah.
violence, and subversive scheming."
As of mid-January about 90 per-
sons were being held, some of
them under a law--similar to
Ghana's preventive detention act
--permitting the government to
imprison persons for several
years without trial.
While Olympio appears to
be doing little to improve his
dangerously weak internal se-
curity organization, he has
been attempting to strengthen
his position by promoting closer
ties with Nigeria and Dahomey.
Earlier this month he publicly
proposed the formation of a
three-state customs union. He
Although Olympio received
overwhelming support in the
national election last April,
many Togolese since then have
become disenchanted with his
essentially conservative regime.
Criticism has focused particu-
larly on the absence of the
rapid economic and social, prog-
ress promised before Togo'S.
independence from France in 1960.
Most of the development projects
which Olympio had hoped would
strengthen Togo's marginally vi-
able economy have not yet materi-
alized. Unemployment, a chronic
problem, has increased appreci-
ably.
Measures taken by the
government following discovery
of the December plot have
further diminished public con-
fidence. The arrest, in many
cases on flimsy evidence, of
large numbers of suspects--in-
cluding some highly respected
opposition leaders--and reports
of brutal treatment have aroused
widespread resentment. This has
apparently not been allayed by
the subsequent release of some
detainees or by the regime effort
to convince the public that all
the opposition parties and their
leaders are guilty of "treason,
is also trying to improve re-
lations with Ghana, which it-
self appears to have switched to
a softer approach for the present.
With President Maga of
Dahomey serving as mediator,
the foreign ministers of Togo,
Ghana, and Dahomey recently
met and made plans for a meet-
ing next month of their heads
of state.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Pakistani President Ayub
is encountering his first seri-
ous overt opposition following
the arrest of former Prime Min-
ister Suhrawardy for opposing
the constitution Ayub plans to
promulgate soon.
Suhrawardy is the most
prominent of the politicians
Ayub ousted when he took over
the government with army back-
ing in 1958. A military tri-
bunal convicted the former
prime minister of misconduct
while in office and barred him
from political activity until
1966. He apparently violated
his "parole" by attacking Ayub's
planned constitution and help-
ing plan party strategy for the
elections which are to be held
shortly after it is promulgated.
A more important reason
for the arrest probably derived
from the President's concern
over his ability to retain com-
plete control of the government
after elections. Ayub appar-
ently hoped to silence this
potential rival who still re-
tains a substantial popular
following, particularly in East
Pakistan, and to intimidate
other ousted politicians.
Although the regime seems
to be containing the student
demonstrations in East Pakistan,
the strong reaction in the
province is a major setback for
Ayub's special efforts to de-
velop more support there. The
West Pakistan High Court Bar
Association has passed a res-
olution demanding that Suhrawardy
be tried in a court of law, thus
throwing much of the prestige
of the country's influential le-
gal profession behind the current
agitation. The government is
concerned about possible trouble
from the labor unions and is tak-
ing steps to head off labor agi-
tation.
Although the regime seems
likely to be able to curb open
demonstrations by arresting key
leaders and demonstrators, spo-
radic outbreaks of unrest may
continue until Ayub has resolved
the constitutional question. In
view of his desire to appear as
a democratic leader, this unrest
presents serious problems: how
to suppress elements opposed to
his constitution yet gain an
appearance of general acceptance
for the new governmental system,
and how to relinquish his mar-
tial law authority yet retain
firm control.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN UNION
The six Common Market
(EEC) countries are increas-
ingly preoccupied with the po-
litical implications of their
rapid advance in the last few
years toward economic union.
As the EEC proceeds into more
complex operations--such as the
implementation of a common agri-
cultural policy, coordination
of economic and fiscal measures,
and the conduct of a common
commercial policy--the inade-
quacy of the existing institu-
tional framework has become
evident. As the potential sig-
nificance of the European com-
munity in world affairs has
been made apparent, interest
has grown in the problems of
organizing the community as an
effective political as well as
economic instrument. These
problems are no more likely to
be permanently solved in Europe
than they are in any other po-
litical grouping, existing or
potential, but they are having
to be faced much sooner than
had been anticipated. One of
the most complex is the issue
of confederal versus federal
union.
The European unity move-
ment has been characterized
throughout the postwar period
by conflict between the propo-
nents of a confederal approach
to eventual union and the advo-
cates of a federal or supra-
national approach. The lines
between these two groups have
never been clearly drawn, but
the former may be said to fa-
vor cooperation between sover-
eign states to achieve speci-
fied political, military, or
economic goals.
ingly, they hold that the
nation-states should relin-
quish a requisite measure of
sovereignty through (a) del-
egation of decision-making
powers to independent or supra-
national authorities, or (b)
agreement that the national
representatives will abide by
some kind of majority rule in
reaching decisions affecting
the purposes of the organiza-
tion.
The confederalists have
generally found their strong-
est support in Britain and the
Scandinavian countries, and
their views shaped the earlier
postwar organizations like the
Council of Europe and Organiza-
tion for European Economic Co-
operation. The great federal-
ist leaders, however, have been
continentals like Jean Monnet,
Adenauer, and De Gasperi, sup-
ported especially by smaller
countries, like Belgium, which
see in supranationalism a
guarantee against "big power"
domination. The three Euro-
pean communities--the Coal-
Steel Community (CSC), EURATOM,
and the EEC--are the primary
manifestations of the federal-
ist spirit. Although supra-
nationalism was far from being
fully realized in any of them,
some decisions are made by
majority rule; each of the
organizations has an independ-
ent executive; there is a
supranational court; and an
assembly, chosen from among
the member parliaments, has at
least limited powers of review.
Implicit in all three commu-
nities is the goal of federal
union.
The federalists, by con-
trast, doubt the viability of
any organization whose opera-
tions are subject to the veto
of a single member. Accord-
De Gaulle's Concept
While the federalist-con-
federalist conflict is thus
part of the history of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
European movement, the current
dispute derives largely from
De Gaulle's distrust of supra-
national institutions, his es-
pousal of the concept of a
"Europe of Fatherlands," and
his formulation in 1960 of pro-
posals for bringing it into
'being. These proposals were
first formally presented by
De Gaulle at a meeting with
Adenauer in July 1960 and were
elaborated by him at a major
press conference the following
September.
As set forth on these two
occasions, the De Gaulle "plan"
simply called on the other Com-
mon Market countries to take
steps with France to coordinate
their foreign and domestic pol-
icies with a view ultimately to
the formation of an "indissolu-
ble confederation." To begin
this process, De Gaulle sug-
gested periodic meetings of the
heads of governments of the six
EEC countries, interspersed
with meetings of their minis-
ters for economics, defense,
and cultural affairs. These
meetings would be prepared by
a permanent secretariat which
would also be charged with as-
suring that the decisions--unan-
imously made--were carried out.
The entire apparatus would be
brought into operation by a
European referendum.
Adenauer's first reaction
is believed to have been favor-
able, but he soon joined the
Italians, Dutch, Belgians, and
Luxemburgers in strongly oppos-
ing the De Gaulle plan. De
Gaulle, particularly at his
September 1960 press conference,
had presented his proposals in
a theoretical context, holding
that the essential reality of
Europe remained the nation-
states and that the EEC's supra-
national commission had, at
most, a "technical value."
The other countries ac-
cordingly interpreted the plan
as a new rejection of the fed-
eral union for which the EEC,
EURATOM, and the CSC had been
paving the way, and they saw
in the permanent secretariat
a competitor to the EEC insti-
tutions in Brussels. They were
equally suspicious of the pro-
posal for meetings of defense
ministers, interpreting this
as an attempt by De Gaulle to
form a continental defense bloc
in support of his aspirations
for a three-nation "directorate"
within NATO, or even as an al-
ternative to that alliance.
The Bonn Declaration
Confronted with this solid
opposition, De Gaulle met sep-
arately with the heads of gov-
ernment of each of the EEC coun-
tries in the fall of 1960 in an
effort to sell his plan. By
offering reassurances and a
number of concessions, he won
a generally favorable response
from all except the Dutch. De
Gaulle apparently agreed that
the EEC's institutions were in-
violate; he offered to bring
the EEC's parliamentary assem-
bly into the political delibera-
tions of the Six; he temporarily
abandoned the idea of the secre-
tariat; and, according to Ade-
nauer, pledged "loyalty to NATO"
and agreed not to press for co-
ordination of defense policies.
As an indication of the favor-
able impression these conces-
sions made--even on ardent fed-
eralists--Monnet came out in
favor of a confederalist ap-
proach, provided it was consid-
ered an initial step toward a
federal union operating by ma-
jority rule.
While a meeting of the six
heads of government in February
1961 failed to reach any agree-
ment, largely because of Dutch
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opposition, a new attempt was
made at a summit meeting in
Bonn on 18 July. The result
of this meeting was the so-called
Declaration of Bonn which, while
still ambiguous and reflecting
the Dutch reservations, never-
theless amounted to a general
endorsement of a modified De
Gaulle plan. Referring to a
"determination to develop their
political cooperation toward
the goal of European unifica-
tion," the six leaders agreed
to hold periodic meetings at
the heads of government and min-
isterial levels--these meetings
to be prepared by a "committee"
(i.e., the old secretariat idea).
In addition, this committee was
instructed to submit proposals
as soon as possible on "ways and
means which would make it possi-
ble to give the unification of
these peoples a statutory na-
ture."
The October Draft
This agreement to begin
drafting a European statute or
constitution has been generally
recognized as an important ad-
vance. Nevertheless, the re-
sponsible committee, set up in
February and called the Fouchet
Committee after its French chair-
man, had made no significant
progress by October 1961 in ful-
filling its mandate. This was
due, at least in part, to the
resumption of the struggle be-
tween the federalists and the
confederalists and to the con-
tinuing suspicion--particularly
in the Netherlands--that the po-
litical treaty would lend itself
to French, or French-German,
domination of the Continent.
However, the major new compli-
cating element was Britain's
formal application for EEC
membership on 10 August and
the Dutch determination that
London be represented in the
confederation talks.
In an effort to break the
resulting stalemate, the French
presented to the Fouchet Com-
mittee on 19 October a full-
blown draft treaty and urged
its approval in time for signa-
ture early in 1962. Prepared by
De Gaulle himself, the draft
preserved basic features of his
1960 proposals but nevertheless
went some distance toward meet-
ing the point of view of the
other countries. It called for
the formation of a "union of
states," the aims of which would
be the adoption by its members
of common foreign and defense
policies and their close coop-
eration in science and culture.
The institutions of the
union would be a council (heads
of government or national minis-
ters), the EEC's parliamentary
assembly, and a political com-
mission. The council would meet
at least every four months.
While decisions would be adopted
unanimously and be binding on
those countries which had ap-
proved, absence or abstention
would not be interpreted as a
veto. The commission would "pre-
pare and implement" the council's
deliberations, and the assembly
would have rights of interpella-
tion and recommendation with
respect to the council. After
three years, the treaty woulc:
be revised for the expressed
purpose of strengthening the
union--specifically to estab-
lish a "unified foreign policy'
and to centralize within the
union the three European com-
munities.
Reactions to the October Draft
At a meeting of the Fouchet
Committee on 10 November, Bonn,
Rome, and Luxembourg generally
endorsed the new draft but pro-
posed a number of amendments,
some of which were accepted by
the French. Among these were
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provision for an independent
secretariat in addition to the
commission, a stronger role for
the assembly, and explicit as-
sertion that common defense pol-
icies would contribute to the
strength of NATO. The reaction
of the Netherlands was again
violently negative, however.
Its representative insisted
that the Dutch had never agreed
to six-nation consideration of
defense matters. Although the
Belgian representative was some-
what milder, he also declared
that Brussels could never ac-
cept a treaty so minimally
supranational in content, and
he joined the Dutch in insist-
ing that London participate in
the talks.
The persistence of The
Hague and the intermittent ef-
forts of Brussels in trying to
drag London into the dispute
are explicable largely in terms
of their small-power psychology.
Lacking the assurance against
domination in any political
union which federal institu-
tions might provide, the Dutch
and the Belgians looked to
London not for any immediate
support of supranationalism
but as a balance to the weight
of the French and the Germans.
Indeed, when the negotiations
on Britain's accession to the
EEC formally opened on 10 Oc-
tober, the British representa-
tive, Lord Privy Seal Heath,
specifically endorsed the Bonn
declaration with its implicit
confederalism.
Moreover, while trying to
avoid taking sides, London has
on various occasions since then
shown its basic sympathy for
the De Gaulle approach. This
position is in keeping with
Britain's official opposition
throughout the postwar period
to federal European union. It
also reflects the concern of
the Macmillan government that
confronting the House of Com-
mons with a political treaty
involving a further relinquish-
ment of British sovereignty--in
addition to that required for
EEC membership--might jeopard-
ize ultimate ratification of
that membership.
In any case, because of the
adamant opposition of the Dutch
and Belgians the next meeting
of the Fouchet Committee sched-
uled for late November was post-
poned, with Belgium's Spaak re-
questing instead a meeting of
the foreign ministers. At this
meeting, which convened on 15
December, Spaak vented his
increasing uneasiness over the
outlook for a federal union in
view of the French refusal to
go much beyond a loose confed-
eration and in view of the pros-
pective enlargement of the EEC
with countries which either
shared the French view or, like
the Swiss, Swedes, and Austrians,
refused to participate in a po-
litical union of any sort.
While the foreign minis-
ters declined to take a direct
stand on whether or not the
neutrals should be permitted
to associate with the EEC,
Spaak did obtain agreement that
any country which became a Com-
mon Market member would also be
"obliged" to work toward polit-
ical unity. Armed with this
commitment, Spaak subsequently
proposed to strengthen the Oc-
tober French draft with various
amendments, the precise nature
of which has not been reported.
Spaak is known to believe, how-
ever, that any political treaty
should at least provide for a
"second stage" of development
in which decisions would be
made by majority vote.
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Tactical Maneuver by De Gaulle
French officials warned
that continued Dutch and Belgian
unwillingness to accept the
amended October proposal could
cause De Gaulle to revert to
earlier demands, and when the
Fouchet Committee finally re-
convened on 18 January, the
other EEC countries were con-
fronted with still another French
draft. The new proposal, also
prepared personally by De Gaulle,
not only failed to include many
of the amendments proposed by
the other countries in the pre-
vious three months, but in sev-
eral significant respects was
weaker even than the October
draft. For example, it no long-
er alluded to the strengthening
of NATO as one of the objectives
of a common defense policy; it
implied that EEC decisions would
be subject to review in the new
organization; and it gave no
precise definition of the pur-
poses for which the treaty would
be revised within three years.
As De Gaulle may have an-
ticipated, reactions to this new
maneuver were sharp and bitter,
with charges that he had re-
gressed from the 19th century
to the 18th. At the Fouchet
Committee meeting on 25 January,
the five other countries were
agreed that the integrity of
the EEC's institutions must be
respected, that the common de-
fense policies of the new organ-
ization must aim at strengthen-
ing NATO, and that the ultimate
goal must be genuine political
union. Although not fully in ac-
cord as to practicable measures
which could be taken at this
time to assure the achievement
of this goal, they were agreed
on the need for eventual direct
election of the European assem-
bly, some kind of majority vot-
ing in the council, and unifica-
tion of the three communities
within the new organization.
Given the conflicting na-
tional interests involved, it is
difficult to say whether a com-
promise will begin to take shape
in the foreign ministers' meet-
ing later this month. Despite
differences in theoretical ap-
proach, the six countries appear
to be coming together on some-
thing like the October draft as
a practical compromise. More-
over, De Gaulle is known to at-
tach major importance to early
agreement on some kind of Euro-
pean political structure. He
considers it essential to tie
West Germany to the West, and
the recent Soviet overtures to
Bonn may have increased his anx-
iety to develop these ties fur-
ther in the foreign policy and
military fields.
It is questionable, however,
whether he is willing to accept
real limits on French freedom
of action in order to achieve
this. Even though De Gaulle
agreed on 14 January to a far-
reaching EEC farm policy which
is essentially federal in struc-
ture, his great disdain for the
federalist concept was again
manifest in his 5 February ad-
dress.
The other EEC countries
are also caught in a dilemma.
As the Common Market encourages
a worldwide relaxation of tariff
barriers, these countries see
its preferential system declin-
ing in significance as the co-
hesive element of the community.
To avoid a loss of community
identity and to maintain the
present momentum, they see a
growing need for political inte-
gration. While confederation
could prove to be a step in
this direction, there is no guar-
antee that it would--especially
as the EEC adds new members which
have not heretofore shared in
laying the foundations of a
united Europe. The federalists,
however, are also painfully
aware that to insist on federal
union now involves a risk of an
adverse vote by the British
House of Commons on Britain's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Indonesia's intensified
campaign to acquire the Dutch-
held territory of West New
Guinea has focused attention
on the substantial role being
played by the USSR in support
of Djakarta's military estab-
lishment. Since 1958, Moscow
had demonstrated its ability
and willingness to provide Su-
karno with the arms the Indo-
nesian leader feels are neces-
sary to realize his country's
ambitions for big-power status
in Asia. The Soviet Union
probably feels that this will
encourage Indonesia's neutralism
at the expense of Western in-
terests and create conditions
favorable to an expansion of
Soviet influence in Southeast
Asia.
Moscow has always viewed
its arms program as an excellent
vehicle for penetrating military
services and, in the case of
Indonesia, probably is convinced
that increasing reliance on
Soviet weapons will gradually
erode the anti-Communist posi-
tion of the Indonesian Army,
which Sukarno has used to
counterbalance the power of the
country's Communists. Soviet
arms deliveries are vital to
the success of any military
take-over of West New Guinea,
and the West's expanding boycott
of arms supplies to Indonesia
will probably influence Sukarno
to depend even further on the
USSR for military assistance.
The Soviet campaign in
Indonesia is probably directed
also at solidifying Moscow's
position there--already
stronger than Peiping's--and
ensuring that the dominant bloc
voice influencing the direction
of Indonesian policy will con-
tinue to be that of the Soviet
Union. However, Communist China,
whose long-range policy goal to
extend its hegemony throughout
Asia is threatened by the USSR's
drive in Indonesia, has also
moved to establish closer rela-
tions with Djakarta. Peiping
has assured Sukarno of its
full support for any military
move against the Dutch and is
moving to exploit Indonesian
sentiment for pan-Asian
solidarity and ambitions for
Afro-Asian leadership. The
Chinese Communists gave excep-
tional prominence to Indonesia's
role at the Belgrade conference
of nonaligned states and have
repeatedly urged Djakarta to
call for a second Bandung con-
ference.
Sukarno initially turned
to the Communist bloc in an
effort to reduce his country's
heavy reliance on trade ties
with the West. This was in
accordance with his "active
independent" foreign policy
aimed at achieving a balance
in relations between the major
Communist and non-Communist na-
tions. Sukarno was also par-
ticularly anxious to eradicate
Dutch influence over Indonesia's
economy. Increasing economic
difficulties made improvement
in this sphere heavily dependent
on external assistance. In
late 1957, Djakarta seized Dutch
interests in Indonesia, and Su-
karno's aspirations toward West
New Guinea assumed a greater
anti-Western cast. Soviet of-
ficials moved swiftly to assure
Djakarta that they were willing
to render all assistance neces-
sary to alleviate any economic
dislocations which resulted
from the rupture with the Dutch.
Indonesia viewed Soviet offers
of economic assistance as a
means of expanding the economy
in the agricultural and indus-
trial sectors.
Sukarno's belief that
the United States was behind
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the armed civil rebellion which
erupted in 1958 in the outer
islands, and the continued re-
fusal of the West to fill long-
requested Indonesian military
:requirements inclined the Indo-
nesian leader to be more recep-
tive to bloc offers of economic
and military aid. A Soviet
$100,000,000 economic loan, of-
fered first in 1956, was accepted
by the Indonesians in early 1958
and was quickly implemented with
the delivery of Soviet cargo
ships to compensate for the
withdrawal of Dutch shipping
on which Indonesian interisland
transportation depended. The
first major delivery of bloc
arms was made in 1958. Until
1960 almost all bloc arms shipped
to Indonesia--about $225,000,000
worth--were supplied by the Euro-
pean satellites and Communist
China. However, much of the
:military equipment apparently
originated in the USSR, and
Moscow early established
training programs in Indonesia
to handle the military assist-
ance program.
Later events reflected
a sensitivity on the part of
Soviet leaders to signs of
improved US-Indonesian rela-
tions, and continued restric-
tions on the Indonesian Com-
munist party (PKI) apparently
aroused concern in Moscow.
In an effort to forestall
Indonesian acceptance of
additional Western aid for
major development programs,
Soviet officials assured In-
donesia that further project
requests would be accepted by
the USSR and that new loans
would be proffered. The bloc
role in the Indonesian economy
and military establishment was
dramatized by the announcement
from Moscow that Khrushchev
would visit Indonesia in Feb-
ruary 1960 as part of an exten-
sive Asian tour.
The Soviet premier's stay
in Indonesia was the highlight
of his Asian tour, and his
activities there demonstrated
his efforts to bolster Soviet
prestige in Asia. The USSR
was clearly concerned that
events since Khrushchev's
previous trip to non-Communist
Asia in 1955 had eroded the
Soviet image there. Moscow
seemed determined to assure it-
self that Sukarno intended to
continue his policy of nonalign-
ment.
Although one reason for
Khrushchev's trip to Asia was
to offset the effect of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's visit the
previous December, another im-
portant consideration seems to
have been to repair the damage
to Communist prestige resulting
from Peiping's aggressive poli-
cies in the area. The Soviet
leader's trip included India,
whose relations with China were
being strained by their border
dispute; Indonesia at the time
was engaged in a bitter dispute
with Peiping over the forcible
removal of thousands of Chinese
from Indonesian rural areas to
the cities. During his tour,
Khrushchev indicated his con-
cern that Peiping's attitude
might cause President Sukarno
to reappraise his attitude to-
ward the whole Communist bloc.
The Soviet premier dis-
played irritation over Peiping's
handling of the Overseas Chinese
problem and pointedly referred
to Indonesia's right to conduct
its own internal affairs. Khru-
shchev throughout his trip played
on the historical Indonesian dis-
like of the Chinese and emphasized
Moscow's greater ability to assist
in Indonesia's economic develop-
ment. His statements amounted to
a repudiation of Peiping's actions
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
as a potential hindrance to the
USSR's position in Indonesia,
and Khrushchev probably con-
~3idered his success in restoring
Communist prestige as one of the
most important results of his
trip. The Soviet leader's visit
also benefited the Indonesian
Communists, who had tried to
remain aloof from the Overseas
Chinese dispute. The visit had
the effect of distracting atten-
tion from the dispute and taking
she heat off the party.
Khrushchev climaxed his
ten-day visit with the signing
of a $250,000,000 economic and
technical cooperation agreement
--to which the Indonesian Army
was opposed. Indonesia's eco-
nomic problems were steadily in-
creasing, and Moscow's new assist-
ance provided for extensive in-
dustrial projects and agricul-
tural development. A separate
agreement reached between Khru-
shchev and Sukarno provided for
Soviet equipment for the Indo-
nesian Navy and marked the
USSR's formal entry into the
Indonesian arms procurement
picture.
The USSR now has extended
a total of more than $400,000,000
in economic aid and credits to
Indonesia. Much of this assist-
ance is still in the initial
stages of implementation, but
Soviet technicians are working
on the construction of factories,
roads, a sports stadium, an
atomic reactor, and other proj-
ects. Even more important from
the Soviet viewpoint has been
the conclusion of arms agree-
ments totaling more than $600,-
000,000 and a consequent strength-
ening of Soviet influence over
Indonesia's military structure.
The first of the major arms
pacts was negotiated in September
1960; it covered aid for the
navy and provided for a wide
variety of ships, including
units for amphibious operations.
An agreement signed in Moscow
in January 1961 during a visit
by Army Chief of Staff Nasution
provided extensive aid to all
three services; for the first
time large amounts of bloc
equipment were purchased by
the Indonesian Army. A subse-
quent agreement with the army
was concluded in June 1961.
The Soviet leaders went
to great lengths to impress
Nasution and other army leaders
with their support of Indonesia's
claim to West New Guinea. Mos-
cow probably feels that the
army's dependence on the USSR
for military assistance in its
planning for action against
West New Guinea will upset the
balance Sukarno has tried to
maintain between the army and
the Communists in Indonesia
and undercut the former's oppo-
sition to Sukarno's plans to
include the Communists in his
cabinet.
Moscow, Peiping, and the PKI
Peiping, meanwhile, has
been trying to recover lost
ground. Foreign Minister Chen
Yi last spring led a good-will
delegation to Indonesia which
erased some of the ill will
engendered by the Overseas
Chinese dispute. A $30,000,000
Chinese economic aid program,
which lay dormant during the
period of the dispute, has been
reactivated. Peiping has also
sought to encourage Sukarno to
look to Communist China for the
solution of uniquely Asian prob-
lems. At the same time, Peiping
has probably warned those members
of the PKI who sympathize with
its point of view that the party
is in danger of losing its revo-
lutionary character if it refuses
to adopt more violent tactics
when a suitable opportunity pre-
sents itself.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Unlike Peiping, Moscow
wholeheartedly endorses the
PKI's policy of cooperation
with Sukarno as the most effec-
tive means for ensuring continued
Communist gains in the Indonesian
political sphere. The PKI ac-
tively cooperates with Sukarno's
"national bourgeois leadership"
and rarely goes beyond a public
posture of complete approval
and support of governmental
policy. Sukarno in turn views
the party as a large, disciplined
group willing to give its full
support for his programs. How-
ever, there is within the PKI A
militant minority faction,
generally regarded as pro-
Peiping, which has vigorously
criticized the party's support
for Sukarno. This faction,
which fears that the party is
gradually losing its identity,
would prefer to follow the
more militant revolutionary
line advocated by Communist
China and adopt a harder line
against Sukarno.
The 3ino-Soviet dispute
has exacerbated factionalism
in the PKI and threatens its
position in the Indonesian po-
litical structure. Party Chair-
man D. N. Aidit, long loyal to
Moscow, is concerned that the
3ino-Soviet struggle may
strengthen the militant faction
in the party and force the PKI
to adopt a more vigorous domestic
policy to advance the Communist
cause--a course which in the
past has brought swift repression
by the army. Aidit finds that
Khrushchev's actions have posed
a dilemma for him which stems
in part from the problem of
authority and control inherent
in all the Asian parties. Minor-
ity factions, while adhering to
the orthodox party line, are con-
tinually casting about for vital
political issues which can be
legitimately exploited in an
attempt to wrest control from
the majority leadership. The
Sino-Soviet dispute provides
a ready weapon in this continu-
ing struggle for power.
Aidit was embarrassed by
Khrushchev's tactics at last
October's Soviet Party congress
was irritated by the
Soviet leader's public airing
of the Albanian dispute. Aidit
later admitted publicly that
the PKI delegation was completely
unaware of any impending Soviet
attack on Albania. Aidit's pub-
lic remarks on the Soviet party's
relations with Albania and China,
which apparently move the PKI
closer to the Chinese Communist
position on the issue of author-
ity in the world Communist move-
ment, may reflect the successful
exploitation by the pro-Chinese
faction of Khrushchev's actions
at the party congress. On the
other hand, it is quite possible
that Aidit indicated sympathy
with the Chinese viewpoint only
to avoid antagonizing the leftist
faction and to reduce the chance
of impairing party unity.
It would be premature to
conclude either that the mili-
tant faction has gained ascendancy
or that Aidit now has moved to
align the PKI with Peiping on
other basic issues of tactics
and strategy. At the 7th PKI
congress, expected to be held
in April, Aidit intends to have
written into the party's consti-
tution changes which reflect its
support for such "bourgeois"
notions as Sukarno's concept of
"guided democracy," in which
all political parties, includ-
ing the Communists, submerge
their identities and interests
in support of the government.
Aidit, who has already won
central committee approval of
these changes, may be apprehen-
sive over the probability that
the militant faction will op-
pose his decision openly. He
has directly appealed to the
party congress to adhere to the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
principles of democratic central-
ism and has issued a significant
warning against resistance frori
factional groups.
It seems unlikely that the
PKI intends to swerve from its
united front policy.
To this extent, the current
build-up of tensions surround-
ing the West New Guinea issue
is politically advantageous
for the PKI. The party has
stressed the importance of
relying on the threat of armed
force as a lever with which to
extract political concessions
Soviet officials in Djakar-
ta and Moscow have attempted
to arouse Sukarno's suspicions
of Western intentions toward
his government. Moscow re-
cently issued a strong govern-
ment statement protesting the
continued Dutch refusal to
turn over West New Guinea to
Indonesia. The official pro-
test, which probably was re-
quested by the Indonesians,
warned the Dutch Government
of t'ie dangerous consequences
of this policy and stated that
the USSR could not remain a
"mere spectator" in the face
of Dutch provocations against
Indonesia. The statement
implied that the Dutch would
not be as steadfast in their
deliberations with the Indone-
sians were it not for the active
support of NATO and SEATO. So-
viet leaders probably feel that
focusing their propaganda efforts
on this aspect of the West New
Guinea dispute will convince
Sukarno that the US is either
unable or unwilling to exert
pressure on the Dutch.
Although Moscow is prob-
ably advising Indonesian lead-
ers privately to proceed cau-
tiously in any military move
to gain possession of West New
Guinea--and avoid risking
another defeat similar to the
naval setback on 15 January--
the USSR and the PKI continue
to exploit the situation as
part of their long-range
drive to gain a preponderant
influence in the Indonesian
Government. The Soviet Union is
already delivering advanced
military equipment to Indonesia,
and Djakarta reportedly intends
to request accelerated deliver-
ies of air force equipment.
Although it is probable that by
mid-1962--Sukarno's reported
target date for attacking West
New Guinea--Indonesian forces
will be capable of operating
some of the advanced equipment
delivered by Moscow, they will
not be able to fully assimilate
and make effective use of all
the equipment until at least
sometime in 1963.
The USSR probably feels
that continuing pressure by
Sukarno, backed up by the threat
of military action, will even-
tually compel the Dutch to
transfer the administration
of the disputed territory to
Indonesia. Any settlement ac-
commodating Indonesian demands
would be offered by the USSR
as demonstrable proof of its
ability and willingness to
render all-out support for these
"independent national democra-
cies" which are ready to main-
tain the fight against colonial-
ism.
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