CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
COPY NO. 79`
OCI NO. 0312/61
29 December 1961
SECRET
State Dept, OSD, & ARMY review(s) completed.
('`V, 4 Rt -~ f, ,5X1
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
The bloc has assessed the
Bermuda meeting between Presi-
dent Kennedy and Prime Ministe??
Macmillan in almost completely
negative terms, with the general
conclusion that the talks did
not provide grounds for optimism.
The roost critical observations
have been reserved for the an-
nouncement that plans for pos-
sible nuclear weapons tests in
the atmosphere were being pre-
pared. Soviet propaganda
concentrated on claims that
this decision is another step
in the direction of "aggravating
international tensions"and
part of an attempt to deal with
the Soviet Union from a "posi-
tion of strength." Izvestia's
comment recalled the Soviet
warning on 4 December that if
the US continued tests, and
particularly if it conducted
them in the atmosphere,the USSR
would be forced to resume its
own tests. Moscow has also
asserted that there is an
"obvious discrepancy" between
the announcement on nuclear
testing and the appeal for East-
West negotiations on Berlin.
This line has been accom-
panied by further criticism of
the Western plan for talks in
Moscow on the Berlin question.
While Moscow has been careful
not to reject the proposed dip-
lomatic contacts to be initiated
by Ambassador Thompson, the
general criticism of this move
has been designed to place the
West on the defensive. Soviet
'propaganda adopted the position.
'that the Bermuda talks had con?-
tributed nothing new to the
German question. The main crit-
icism has been directed at the
commnunique's statement that the
purpose of the ambassador's
soundings in Moscow will be to
determine whether a basis exists
for negotiations. Pravda claimed
that this is a "strange ap-
proach," since the "basis" for
negotiations has long existed
in the Soviet proposals for a
free city and a peace treaty.
Izvestia raised the question
of whet ier? the West was using
the bilateral talks as a maneuver
to delay signing of a peace
treaty and solving West Ber-
lin's status.
The Soviets, however, have
stopped short of predicting the
outcome of these diplomatic
probes. One Soviet commentary
concluded that it was too early
to forecast the result, but
that the contacts would be suc-
cessful if the US adopted a
"realistic approach." Thus,
'the over-all impression conveyed
by Soviet propaganda has been
that diplomatic contacts are a
step in the proper direction,
but that the outcome will depend
on a shift in the West's posi-
tion. This line suggests that
Moscow will continue to with-
hold judgment on the value of
bilateral contacts in order to
maintain a free hand to press
for more formal negotiations.
This approach was reflected
in Soviet commentaries prior to
the Bermuda meeting which
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reported that one topic on the
agenda there would be consider-
ation of a meeting with Premier
Khrushchev. Moscow added that
such a meeting would be fully
justified.
A deliberate Soviet affront
to General Watson, the US com-
mandant in Berlin, was also
part of the Communist effort to
strengthen Moscow's hand for
the forthcoming contacts in
Moscow. On 21 December, the
East German police at the
sector border in Berlin had
refused to pass the US.politi-
cal adviser following his re-
fusal to display his identifi-
cation papers, even though he
was proceeding to a meeting
with his Soviet counterpart.
On 23 December, the East Ger-
mans refused permission for
General Watson's three civil-
ian aides to accompany him,
without identifying themselves,
on a pre-arranged visit to the
Soviet commandant. The ob-
vious Soviet complicity in
the East German move suggests
that the USSR viewed these
encroachments on official US
travel as a convenient way of
demonstrating the unconditional
East German authority over the
sector boundary in order to re-
move this question from the
area of negotiations.
The mounting campaign
against West Germany was car-
ried forward on 20 December
with a Soviet note to Belgium
repeating the general line of
recent notes to other NATO
members. The Soviets charged
that an agreement between
Brussels and Bonn for the es-
tablishment of supply depots
in Belgium for the West German
armed forces would have "dan-
gerous consequences."
The alleged aggressive in-
tentions of NATO were also the
subject of a Soviet protest on
23 December to Athens. The
Soviet ambassador in an oral
statement charged that Greek
territory was in danger of being
used as a NATO "nuclear-rocket
springboard." The protest re-
called earlier Soviet warnings
to Greece and asserted that
Soviet proposals to establish a
nuclear-free zone in the Balkans
had been rebuffed by the Greek
Government. In conclusion, the
Soviet ambassador requested an
"explanation" of recent reports
of the installation of foreign
nuclear weapons in Greece.
The Communist attacks on the
establishment of a joint Danish -
West German Baltic command under
NATO was continued in an East Ger-
man note to Copehagen. As in pre-
vious Soviet and Polish demarches,
the East Germans charged the Danes
with abetting the plans for West
German hegemony in Northern Europe.
After reiterating proposals for
making the Baltic a "sea of peace,"
the note warned that East Germany
would "actively participate" in
all security measures introduced
by the "Baltic states.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE CONGO
. Tshombe began to back
away from accepting Katanga's
subordination to Leopoldville
at?an early stage of the Kitona
meeting. Ambassador Gullion
described him as'not having
"psychologically accepted the
fact he was suing for terms."
Tshombe gave no 'evidence he
had changed his views regarding
a confederal relationship ins
the Congo, and he accepted the
eight-point Kitona{agreement
only on the basis that .t was
subject to approval of the Ka-
tanga authorities.
Tshombe, when he returned
to Elisabethville, seemed to
confirm by his actions Adoula's
assessment that "each time
Tshombe'is close to defeat he
asks for negotiations, but when
the fighting is stopped he vio-
lates the agreement." The Ka-
tanga council of ministers de-
clared that Tshombe had no
authority to commit the Katangan
people , and, that . the agreement
had no validity because it was
imposed by the UN and the US.
Foreign Minister Kimba-and In-
.terior Minister Munongo--pro-
ponents of Katanga's secession
-told the consuls in Elisabeth-
ville 'llon behalf of Tshombe"
that Adoula and Tshombe had
agreed only to accept the Bel-
gian-drafted constitution--
the so-called Fundamental Law
--as the basis for negotia-
tion. `
A Katangan government com-
munique of 22 December congratu-
lated Tshombe for not having
committed the Katangan people
and declared the Katangan pro-
vincial assembly is the "only
valid authority" competent to
pronounce a decision.
Tshombe has sent a Katanga
parliamentary delegation to
Leopoldville "to discuss modi-
fications of certain articles
of the constitution." He al-
most certainly aims to leave
his position sufficiently hazy
on the Kitona agreement to give
himself time for maneuver, and
to try to extract further con-
cessions from Adoula. Tshombe
himself has expressed doubt that
the Katangan assembly--which is
scheduled to meet on 3 January--
would ratify the agreement.
The assembly, on Tshombe's orders,
may reject the whole agreement
or portions; of it. . In any
event, Tshombe will probably
assume the pose that he must
abide by the will of the Katangan
people.
On 24 December, he reas-
serted publicly the right of
the Katangan people to freedom
and self-determination and
called on the leaders of the
free world to "examine and con-
sider if the war against me is
fair or if it corresponds with
the ideals of the UN." Katangan
Foreign Minister Kimba's current
trip to West European capitals
is probably designed to generate
further support for Katanga
with the aim of blocking a re-
sumption of force by the UN.
Ambassador Gullion sug-
gests that Tshombe's freedom
of action may be limited since
Kimba, Munpngo, and Finance
Minister Kibwe probably "have
the bit in their teeth" and
would move against Tshombe if
he made any serious move fora
settlement.
Adoula was extremely wary
lest the Kitona talks be used
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,SECRET r
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Bakwanga
At/ointlc
Lobito
A
UN
1,950
li~ CoquilhatviIle
O7O United Nations Forces*
Congo National Army (C.N.A.)
- Selected road
-t--t- Selected railroad
Selected airfield
TSf'IOMaE
2,700,
uK
1:000
UN
1,100
T,SHOMfSE
4,500 `:
ezi
The numerical strength of Tshornbe's forces in the Elisabethville area has been reduced
iri the recent fighting, but there are no reliable figures on the number of casualties.
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u [1,110
scattered
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
by his opponents within the gov-
ernment to undercut him, and he
included extremist Minister of
Interior Christophe Gbenye as
a member of his delegation.
Adoula appears to have accepted
the agreement only under the
advice of UN and US officials.
Adoula--as Tshombe?s recalcis
trance continues--may become
increasingly reluctant to follow
a moderate approach.
Adoula has threatened
"energetic action" against
Tshomb? if he fails to im-
plement the agreement. Aware
of his limited capability in
this respect, he and other cen-?
tral government leaders have
succeeded in getting UN agree-
ment to place a Congo battalion
with the UN forces in Katanga.
While the UN intends that these
units will be restricted to
northern Katanga, Leopoldville
may have other plans.
ou a, with his own
position threateA'dd, will prob-
ably increasingly incline to
a tough line toward Tshombe; he
has already indicated publicly
that further talks with the
Katangan lea4 are useless and
that Leopoldville has made all
the concessions possible.
The US Embassy in Leopold-
ville reports more signs that
the deep-seated struggle for
control between the moderates
and left wing in the Adoula
government may break into the
open. The embassy views this
struggle--submerged for the
Kitona meeting--as remaining
acute and one which may end
in violence.
Top UN officials in New
York say they contemplate no
military action in Katanga
except in self-defense or to
hold existing positions and
communications. Under Secre-
tary Bunche has said that the
UN will allow Tshombe up to
one month to implement the UN
resolutions. The American
consul in Elisabethville, how-
ever, reports that the hold-
fire between UN and Katangan
forces remains "fragile" and
that both sides are making
provocative moves. Pillage
and looting by roving bands
of Baluba tribesmen and the
excesses committed by Ethio-
pian ;.troops ' in the TUN com-
mand during the fighting are
adding to the tensions.
Foreign Minister Kimba
has stated that Katanga re-
serves the right of freedom
of movement for its forces, and
US Army sources report reliable
information that the Katangan
forces are taking advantage of
the hold-fire to regroup and
bring up reinforcements. The
American consul in Elisabeth-
ville reported on 25 December
"an impression" that UN mili-
tary circles may be planning a
"maneuver" shortly after 27 De-
cember if the Katangans do pot
accept the Kitona agreement.
The civilian population is re-
ported "scared and discouraged."
Brussels has requested US help
to evacuate 2,500 Belgians,
mostly women and children.
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 Efforts to schedule further
discussions by the three princes
are continuing in the wake of
the failure of their initial
meeting to reach accord or to
provide for a continuation of
the talks. At that meeting,
held in Vientiane on 27 Decem-
ber, Boun Oum, after presenting
his position regarding the for-
mation of a coalition cabinet,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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equipment could be delivered in
four or five days instead of
four?or five weeks. Further-
more5aircraft could be used
to support a summer research
program of three to four months
similar to the US program in
Antarctica. Mapping operations
could be expanded because of
the high ceilings of the turbo-
prop aircraft, and use of the
AN-10--believed to be a "flying
laboratory"--would permit an
extension of research coverage
by airlifted mobile scientific
research teams. The economies
of air delivery could mean an
increase in the number of
Soviet stations in Antarctica,
beginning possibly with re-
activation of Sovetskaya and
the "Pole of Inaccessibility."
The Ob, the flagship of
Antarctic operations, and the
Arctic service vessel Koopera-
tsiya left Leningrad in November
carrying over 3,000 tons of
supplies and equipment to the
main Soviet Antarctic station,
Mirnyy, and to the new Novola-
zaryevskaya station in Queen
Maud Land. The Seventh Soviet
Expedition will involve some
300 people--considerably less
than some earlier expeditions
but more than last year--about
100 of whom will winter over.
In addition, 4 Czechoslovaks,
3 East Germans, and 1 US ex-
change scientist will partici-
pate in the year-round research.
The basic research program
of previous years will be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
continued, including investiga-
tions in meteorology, upper at-
mospheric physics, glaciology,
geodesy and gravimetry, and
geology. Air-supported geologi-
cal exploration and surveying
is to be continued in Queen
Maud Land and expanded into
Enderby Land--an operation
described as one of the most
important tasks of the Seventh
Expedition. An expanding pro-
gram of field observations over
the extensive ice plateau from
the Indian Ocean to the Geomag-
netic Pole and westward to Novo-
lazaryevskaya will be possible
with the introduction of long-
range turboprop aircraft.
The delivery of new sledges
and tractors and publicized
plans to cross areas "previously
untrod-den by man" suggest that
an extensive traverse may be
undertaken, such as the long-
deferred crossing from Novo-
lazaryevskaya to Sovetskaya.
Coastal oceanographic research
by the Ob, including hydro-
graphic surveys, will concentrate
on the area between Queen Maud
Land and Enderby Land--the same
area into which geological re-
search is to be expanded.
Soviet whaling operations
in Antarctic waters for the
coming season will reach a new
high. A fourth and new whaling
fleet, the Sovetskaya Rossiya,
has joined the other fleets,
the Slava, the Sovetskaya
Ukraina, and the Ivan Dolgorukiy.
As many as 78 vessels, including
18 tankers, may be operating
in the area. Recognition of
the effects of this expansion
--at the expense of traditional
whaling countries such as Norway,
Japan, and the Netherlands--was
given in a recent Soviet broad-
cast which stated that a whaler
is being dispatched to the South
African coasts for experimental
fishing "because the prospects
for whaling in the Antarctic
area are deteriorating every
year." (prepared by
ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
EUROPE'S NEUTRALS AND THE COMMON MARKET
The applications filed on
15 December by Sweden, Switzer-
land, and Austria for condition-
al association with the European
Common Market (EEC) underscore
the deepening foreign policy
dilemma of the neutral countries
of Western Europe. During the
past year, the struggle over
West Berlin and the Soviet pres-
sures on Finland have emphasized
the extent to which the neutrals
must ultimately rely for their
security on the strength and
cohesion of the West. Yet, the
neutrals' participation in the
prospective European consolida-
tion around the Common Market
would restrict as never before
the basic tenet of their foreign
policies: independence of judg-
ment and action.
ation terms raise difficult
problems for the EEC, the accep-
tance of which is far from
certain. If they are accepted,
the neutrals are likely to find
that even limited ties with the
EEC involve encroachments on
sovereignty which may in the
long run prove politically
intolerable. Moreover, the
USSR has repeatedly warned
Austria against closer align-
ment with the Common Market';
Finland is unlikely in the fore-
seeable future to risk Soviet
retaliation by approaching the
EEC; and through Helsinki, Mos-
cow is in a position to exert,
strong and continuing pressure
on the Swedes.
The Political Imperative
Only Ireland of Europe's
remaining neutrals has decided
to opt for the Common Market.
As Dublin's bid last July for
full EEC membership was largely
predicated on the importance to
Ireland of retaining its British
markets, it is doubtful either
that the country is ready for EEC
competition or that it appre-
ciates the political implica-
tions of its move. Nevertheless,
in the opinion of the American
Embassy, Dublin's endorsement
of the overall objectives of the
EEC treaty is in keeping with:-.a
growing tendency in Ireland to
regard its traditional position
of neutrality as outmoded and no
longer in keeping with the
country's present interests.
By limiting their proposed
participation, the three appli-
cants for association are hoping
to find 'a middle way between
their basic interests in a united
Europe and the requirements of
continued neutrality. It re-
mains questionable whether they
can do so. The proposed associ-
That adjustment to the
prospect of an integrated
Europe is so difficult for the
neutrals stems largely from
the fact that the foreign
policies to which they are com-
mitted reflect exigencies of
law, tradition, history, and
geography.
Switzerland has been a
neutral since 1815, when
it was declared an independent
and neutral state by the Congress
of Vienna. Sweden's policy of
neutrality has kept it out of
Europe's wars since 1814. Since
World War II, Bern and Stockholm
have adopted policies of
"solidarity" or "active neu-
trality" which have permitted
membership in purely economic
organizations like the OEEC
and an active role in the
specialized agencies of the UN.
For nearly a century and a
half, however, both countries
have carefully preserved their
freedom of action and avoided
participation in military or
political alliances.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Austrian and Finnish neu-
trality policies are, by con-
trast, of much more recent
origin, but they are far more
specific in content. In the
so-called Moscow Memorandum of
1955, Vienna agreed to pattern
its neutrality after the Swiss
model--a commitment subsequently
embodied in a constitutional law
binding Austria to join no mili-
tary alliance and permit no for-
eign military bases on its soil.
Under the terms of the State
Treaty, Austria also agreed to
avoid any future union with
Germany.
Finnish neutrality has its
origins in Finland's wartime ex-
periences and its proximity to
the USSR. Consequently, the
Finns are committed to avoid any
action which the USSR might re-
gard as unfriendly or inimical
to Soviet security interests,
and under the provisions of the
1948 mutual assistance pact,
Helsinki is bound to consult
with Moscow in the event of
threatened aggression by Ger-
many or its allies.
The Economic Imperative
The necessity of continued
neutrality is accepted by an
overwhelming majority of official
and public opinion in all the
neutral countries, and only com-
pelling economic reasons have
forced them to consider a major
adjustment in its practice.
In 1960, 55 percent of
Austria's exports went to the
Common Market countries, from
which Austria obtained an even
larger percentage of its total
imports. Austrian exports are
largely manufactures, on which
EEC tariffs will ultimately
range up to 14 percent. Though
somewhat less intensive, Switzer-
land's commercial ties with the
EEC are comparable to Austria's,
and the 40 percent of total Swiss
exports which go to the Common
Market are heavily concentrated
on items on which the EEC's
tariffs will be the highest. Both
countries have established trade
ties in the Common Market and
would in any case benefit from
its trade-creating effects, but
outside the EEC both would suffer
increasing tariff discrimination
and become progressively less
attractive to foreign investors.
Both Sweden and Finland
have the comparative advantage
that a higher percentage of
their exports are crude materi-
als on which EEC tariffs are low
or nil. However, in 1960, 31.6
percent of Sweden's exports went
to the EEC countries. If the EEC
were enlarged by the membership
of the UK, Norway, and Denmark,
this figure would rise to more
than 60 percent of Sweden's ex-
ports. The comparable figure
for imports is something over
55 percent. Moreover, Sweden's
economic growth is geared toward
a progressive shift toward ex-
ports of more highly processed
goods, for which the EEC is al-
ready a major market.
In Finland's case, the
problem is the heavy concentra-
tion of its exports on products
of the forest industry, about
70 percent of which now go to
Western Europe--30 percent to
the UK. Should the UK and Fin-
land's major competitors--Norway,
Sweden, and Austria--all join the
Common Market, the Finns' hopes for
expansion of their pulp and paper
industry would suffer a heavy blow.
The Search for Alternatives
The neutrals have been
searching since the Common Market
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 93' RIF
was founded for ways of living
with it. Their policies, how-
ever, have reflected a curious
blend of illusion, wishful think-
ing, and contradiction. They
shated,'for example, the wide-
spread expectation that the EEC
would founder at an early date,
and, like Britain, they persisted
in regarding the Common Market
as an economic problem. While
refusing to join it on the
grounds that it was "political, It
they refused to take it serious-
ly as a step toward a political
union.
Thus, in joining with
Britain in ardent support of
the abortive Free Trade Area
(FTA) project, the neutrals
were essentially motivated by
a desire to avoid the economic
consequences of the EEC's pref-
erential system. When the FTA
collapsed in 1957, they turned
to the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) for similar
reasons to gain interim advan-
tages of a preferential system
and to exert economic pressures
on the Common Market to come to
terms--their terms--on an all-
European market.
However, so long as its
members were unwilling them-.
selves to bear the costs of an
'"economic split of Europe," the
EFTA--the so-called Outer Seven
--was a foredoomed experiment
which reached its virtual end
last July when Britain and Den-
mark applied for EEC membership,
Although the other members of
EFTA have extracted a commit-
ment from London not to enter
the EEC until their legitimate
interests have been met, the
neutrals have in effect been
left to their own devices, and
all the Outer Seven countries
have recognized that the EEC
is unlikely to be changed in
essential respects--except
from within.
Mutable Neutrality?
By applying for direct
association with the Common
Market under Article 238 of the
EEC treaty, Austria, Sweden, and
Switzerland have now posed the
issue of whether it is possi-
ble to reconcile the dictates
of neutrality with the long-
range objectives of the EEC.
Although the three countries
have not yet specified in detail
the terms of association they are
seeking, they have all spurned
participation in any moves
toward political integration.
Moreover, in their efforts of
the past few months to concert
their views on the exemptions
they will require, they have
shown special concern over the
indefinite duration of the EEC
treaty, its provisions for a
common commercial policy, and
the various other measures which
look toward full economic union.
It remains unclear whether they
propose to align their tariffs
as regards non-members with the
EEC 's common external tariff--
thus effecting an eventual
customs union--or whether they
will seek to retain tariff free-
dom respecting non-members, thus
creating a free trade area arrange-
ment with the EEC.
These are major issues for
the neutrals. Austria, whose
trade with the bloc accounts for
about 15 percent of its total
trade, has long insisted, for
example, that its future trade
agreements with the USSR must
remain a matter for bilateral
negotiation between Vienna and
Moscow. The same is true of Fin-
land. In both Sweden and Austria,
the potent Socialist parties have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
based much of their opposition
to the EEC on the grounds that
even association would preclude
socialist planning on a national
scale. Furthermore, the Swedes,
who have long felt a certain se-
curity in being removed from po-
litical and economic developments
on the Continent, retain a deep-
seated apprehension of foreign
domination of any part of the
Swedish economy.
The Swiss have also alleged
that any very close ties with
the EEC would be unconstitutional,
since issues which are reserved
in Switzerland to popular initi-
ative and referendum would be de-
cided in EEC forums. Among all
the neutrals there is apparently
growing realization that even
the loosest of arrangements with
an enlarged EEC might ultimately
mean, because of the disparity in
economic strengths, the relinquish-
ment of control over economic
policy, and with it a large meas-
ure of sovereignty.
Mutable Common Market?
The issues are almost
equally complicated from the
Common Market's point of view.
Despite the experience of
EFTA and the essentially free
trade area character of the
EEC's own association with some
16 African states, the EEC has
long been skeptical of free trade
area arrangements of the type the
neutrals may be seeking. This
skepticism is partly a reflection
of the technical problem of con-
trolling the influx of imports
into the area through the member
with the lowest tariffs--a prob-
lem which might have special
relevance to Austrian and Finnish
association in view of their past
trade ties with the USSR. More-
over, if the EEC should accord
to the neutrals a privileged
access to the Common Market
while permitting them to main-
tain whatever tariffs they de-
sired against non-members, there
would be many claimants for simi-
lar treatment--most notably among
the Commonwealth countries.
The prospect that the
EEC might involve itself in an
amorphous and expanding pre-
ferential system also involves
a question of principle. The
countries which founded the EEC
believed that the maintenance
of a single tariff against out-
siders wad essential not only
to their own cohesion but also
to their achievement of full
economic union. If tariffs
are concerted, they hold, this
inevitably requires the coordi-
nation of commercial policies,
which in turn requires the pur-
suit of common fiscal, monetary,
and economic policies.
Thus, even if the neutrals
should align their tariffs
with the EEC's, they might well
find the Common Market reluc-
tant to exempt them from align-
ing their economic policies in
other respects--on the grounds
that it would be not only un-
workable but possibly even dan-
gerous to the EEC.
EEC critics of the attempts
of the neutrals to obtain the
commercial advantages of the
Common Market while avoiding
its sacrifices have been
particularly alive to what they
consider the political dangers
involved.
For example, at a recent
meeting with Ambassador Mac-
Arthur, Belgian Foreign Minister
Spaak expressed grave concern
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
that the enlargement of the EEC
with members which do not accept
its political objectives could
mean the "death knell of polit-
ical unification"--especially
if the EEC were already mov-
ing away from the goal of
federal union implicit in the
Common Market toward the loose
confederation envisaged in the
"union of states" proposed by
the French. Spaak apparently
feels that the neutrals would
oppose closer political ties
with the EEC for themselves,
and also make common cause
against political integration
with the "minimalists" already
in the EEC.
There is also concern as
to the impact the neutrals
might have on the overall polit-
ical alignment of the EEC.
The Common Market countries
might feel a greater sense of
responsibility for the "fate"
of the neutrals if they were
formally associated with them.,
and perhaps less inclined to
take positions on East-West
issues which could add to the
neutrals' problems. Conceiv-
ably, the neutrals could con-
tribute to the development of
"third force" sentiment within
the European Community. The
most important objection to
the admission of the neutrals,
however, is the belief that as
long as they must avoid polit-
ical and military alliances,
they would be a constant drag
on the development of European
North American ties in the frame-
work of an Atlantic Community.
Neutrals Between East and West
Moscow, which has long
been hostile to the EEC, may
see European integration in
this broader context. The
possibility that Austria and
Finland would follow the British
lead in seeking Common Market
ties has prompted an intensive
Soviet effort to deter such a
decision. In addition to their
particular sensitivity to any
extension of West German in-
fluence in these two countries--
which Moscow believes would re-
sult from such ties--the Soviet
leaders realize that the consoli-
dation of Western Europe would
be a major contribution to free
world strength.
This attitude was reflected
in the Soviet aide-memoire to
Vienna on 12 December which
charged that the Common Market
was an active political-military
arm of NATO, intended to support
Western military preparations..
The NATO countries, the note
alleged, were opponents of neu-
trality and were attempting to
drag European neutrals into
active participation in the
Western military alliance.
Despite the signs of in-
creased Soviet opposition, Mos-
cow probably does not hold great
expectations that Sweden, Aus-
tria, or Switzerland can be
permanently isolated from their
major trading partners. Pros-
perous Switzerland and Sweden,
lacking extensive trade ties
and contiguous borders with
the bloc, appear relatively in-
vulnerable to any direct counter-
measures which Moscow seems
likely in the foreseeable future
to attempt to take. As mem-
bers of EFTA, both Bern and
Stockholm have resisted past
pressures to accord the USSR
most-favored-nation treatment,
and neither would find a com-
plete severance of trade ties
with the bloc an irreparable
loss.
in Stockholm, however,
and to a degree in Bern, the
more serious consideration is
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CURRENT ,INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY'
the much more vulnerable posi-
tion of Finland and Austria.
Since 1958, and especially since
its 30 October note to Helsinki,
Moscow has demonstrated the
multiple economic and political
pressures it is capable of ex-
erting on the Finns, and through
them on Sweden.
While the Soviets have not
directly raised the question of
Finland's relations with the
EEC, the extensive charges they
have made against West German
penetration of Northern Europe
leave no doubt that the USSR
would almost certainly act to
prevent any direct association
by Helsinki. The outcome of
the recent crisis in Finnish-
Soviet relations also provides
Moscow with a pretext to use
Finland as a hostage against
Swedish association with the
EEC. In effect, Moscow has
served a warning that increased
ties between West Germany and
the Scandinavian countries
could lead to further pressure
on Finland.
Vienna's policy toward the
EEC has been geared from the
beginning to the expectation
that Moscow would not tolerate
Austrian membership, and it
has been apprehensive of the
Soviet reaction even to an ap-
plication for association. Al-
though the Soviet note of 12
December merely adjured Austria
to bear in mind the Soviet po-
sition in its negotiations with
the EEC, Foreign Minister Kreisky
has said he is certain that So-
viet reprisal ld follow an
Austrian bid.
Multiple Dilemmas
In reluctantly applying
for EEC association, the three
neutrals have raised a problem
for which no quick or easy solu-
tion is in sight. From the
point of view of the neutrals,
they have been forced to do so;
they have no enthusiasm for the
broader objectives of European
unity. Indeed, the older neu-
trals, Switzerland and Sweden,
still ardently defend the use-
fulness of the role they play
as neutrals in international
affairs against the charge that
they are anachronisms in the
present state of world affairs.
Unless they are readily accepted
by the EEC on the terms which
they specify, some of their re-
sentment will be directed at the
US, which they feel blocked the
creation of a loose European
trading arrangement and "forced"
Britain into the EEC.
It will be equally diffi-
cult for the EEC to reconcile
its conflicting interests with
the neutral applicants. All
three are important markets
to some of the EEC members,
notably West Germany, and
none of the members would
wish to contribute to the
economic and political iso-
lation of the neutrals, lest
this push the more vulnerable
among them involuntarily to-
ward the bloc. This basic
sympathy, however, will be
balanced by the suspicion that
the neutrals are claiming the
profits of integration while
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In the seven years since
the Indochina War, the Hanoi
regime has moved to consolidate
its control throughout North
Vietnam. Today, with the army,
public security forces, and
party rank and file under firm
control, there is little op-
portunity for large-scale re-
sistance to develop among the
disgruntled but politically
apathetic peasantry. In recent
months, however, the government
has shown growing concern that
sporadic anti-regime violence--
in the past, generally confined
to areas inhabited by Catholics
and the ethnic minorities--could
spread to peasants in other
areas and to intellectuals and
other dissatisfied elements.
Catholics
Estimates of the total
number of Catholics in North
Vietnam range between 500,000
and 750,000. They are concen-
trated in the Red River delta
around Hanoi and Haiphong and
in Nghe An and Ha Tinb prov-
inces to the south. Initially,
the Catholics, who as Vietnamese
nationalists had aided in ef-
forts to-break away from France,
supported the new regime in
Hanoi. After 1954, however,
relations between the Commu-
nists and the church deteriorated
rapidly, and Catholics soon be-
came the most vocal critics of
the regime.
A violent outbreak oc-
curred in Nghe An Province in
November 1956. The smoldering
resentment of the Catholic peas-
antry was brought into the open
by the brutal excesses of the
land reform program. By Hanoi's
admission this three-day revolt
involved 4,000 dissidents, but
refugees report the number may
have exceeded 10,000. More than
5,000 troops reportedly were
rushed to the scene. Since that
time, there have been occasional
reports of similar, smaller scale
disturbances in the same area.
An outburst occurred in April
1957; again in March 1959, ac-
cording to one report, some
2,000 Catholic youths clashed
with provincial Yiilitary units.
In April 1960 still another dem-
onstration was broken up by
troops and police.
Recognizing the fairly
sizable resistance potential
of the Catholic minority, Hanoi
has alternated between policies
of conciliation and harsh re-
pression. After crushing the
1956 revolt in Nghe An the regime
was placatory. Pro-Communist
Catholic leaders and newly formed
lay groups were encouraged to
hold special services for Catholic
"comrades" killed in the war
against the French. Party officials
were. directed to appoint Catho-
lics to village agricultural ex-
ecutive committees and to re-
store and repair churches "req-
uisitioned" during the land
reform program.
Six months later, however,
Hanoi began denouncing individual
priests and accusing the church
of political activities. This
crackdown was followed by another
brief period of relaxation in
the fall of 1958. Bell-tolling
and requiem masses were permitted
following the death of Pope Pius
XII, and official greetings were
extended to the new pontiff.
At present, official harass-
ment is the pattern. All church
schools are closed, and political
indoctrination sessions are
scheduled to conflict with church
functions.
In contrast to Communist
China, North Vietnam has a rela-
tively high proportion of native
Catholic clergy and thus has been
less dependent on foreign mis-
sionary efforts. For this rea-
son, the expulsion -of the
remaining foreign priests in
1958 and 1959 may not have greatly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ? WEEKLYSUMMARY
CHINA
;RAIN TRIBES
Thai Muono
Phong Tho
Lai Chau,
'Muong Khoa
Phong Saly
Dien Bien Phu
vli,I' VAC,
'( %NC)MOUS
f:r,lON Lang Son.
NbR
Hab
L A 0 S
'Luang Prabang
Haiphong-.
V/ETNr4
Nam Gjnh'
on Cay
Thanh'
Hon
-
ti ill(Jff AN PROVINCE
North Vietnam
weakened the Catholic community.
The church's continuing strength
is reflected in a series of arti-
cles last summer criticizing the
recalcitrant native clergy. In
June, a "Father-Trull in Thai
Binh Province near Hanoi--pos-
sibly the bishop of the diocese--
was attacked in a North Viet-
namese publication for allegedly
ordering priests to refuse to
hear confessions by Catholic
peasants who had joined co-
operatives.
These press attacks on the
intractable clergy document a
passive opposition that, if not
widespread, is at least suffi-
ciently prevalent to cause the
Communists a good deal of con-
HAINAN
SOUTH
tern. One of the regime's coun-
termeasures has been the promotion
of a more docile priesthood
organized as the Association
of Patriotic and Peace-Loving
Catholics. The association
has not been generally successful
in attracting priests, however,
and laymen prominent in its
activities are ostracized by
fellow Catholics.
Ethnic Minorities
The ethnic minorities of
the highland areas, numbering
1,500,000 or more, view the
Vietnamese of the delta and
coastal plain with suspicion
and frequently with open hostil-
ity. Mountain tribes such as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the Meo, Thai, Muong, and Man,
have long regarded themselves
as masters of the rugged hinter-
land of North Vietnam. Al-
though the regime now claims
that more than three quarters
of the peasant families in
minority areas have joined co-
operatives, it has always moved
with caution in leading them
"along the road to socialism."
Hanoi's, deference to the minor-
ities was illustrated by the
establishment five years ago
of the so-called autonomous
regions: the Thai-Meo in the
northwest bordering Laos and
the Viet Bac in the north bor-
dering China.
The fighting in Laos, where
Meo tribesmen have been highly
successful in activities behind
the lines, has apparently com-
plicated Hanoi's problems. The
Meos have effectively harassed
supply routes from North Vietnam,
and Hanoi has been concerned
lest guerrilla dissidence spread
to its own Thai-Meo territory.
Hanoi's concern derives
from a previous history of dif-
ficulties. Since early 1958
there have been reports indicat-
ing unrest near North Vietnam's
frontiers. In January 1958
several clashes were reported
between government forces and
Meo guerrillas near Muong Khoa.
Later that winter incidents were
said to have taken place near
Phong Tho, and the situation
in the area apparently remained
unsettled for more than a year.
Hanoi's troubles with Meos
apparently continue. According
to a recent report, the Meos
last spring obstructed census
operations and balked at govern-
ment efforts to regroup unruly
villagers in an agricultural
camp. More than a dozen party
officials were poisoned, and
the army had to restore order.
Food shortages have figured
in many reported disturbances. Dis-
content over shortages may have
prompted reported disorders in
the southwestern portion of the
Thai-Meo Autonomous Region early
in 1960. Two villages were burned,
and there were desertions from
regular army units in the area.
At the same time about 70 percent
of the population in the Dien
Bien Phu district was said to
be hostile to the regime be-
cause the people were required
to deliver more than half
their harvest to the local
authorities.
In North Vietnam, the.,
peasantry comprises about 90
percent of the population, and
a sizable proportion has been
antagonized by the drastic land
reform program between 1954
and 1956 and by the subsequent
measures to collectivize the
countryside. More than 100,000
peasants were arbitrarily labeled
"landlords" and their property
expropriated. Many were jailed
and some executed by "people's
courts."
After mid-1960, the regime
accelerated its drive for col-
lectivization throughout the
lowlands. Collectivization,
however, has been concomitant
with widespread food shortages.
Although the poor harvest in
1960 and the absence of suc-
cesses this past year have
been due primarily to adverse
weather conditions, the situa-
tion seems to have been aggra-
vated by passive resistance on
the part of the? -,peasants,
who have planted less in
some areas and harvested
in haphazard fashion in 25X1
others.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
peasants failed to build proper
dikes and had not fertilized
properly. Many peasants also
reportedly refused to sell their
food "surpluses" and killed
livestock for their own use.
The persistent lack of confidence
in government rice collection
and redistribution procedures
is reflected in continual com-
plaints in the party press
about peasant "hoarding."
Intellectuals
The French-educated pro-
fessional classes in North Viet-
nam, for a time outspoken
critics of the regime, in re-
cent years have remained silent,
muted by the futility of re-
sistance. During the Vietnamese
Communists' "hundred flowers"
interlude the leading literary
journal Nhan Van published let-
ters to the ;e i.tor bitterly
criticizing the regime. In
December 1956 ldhan Van was sup-
pressed, and a more orthodox
magazine was launched with the
party's blessing. The follow-
ing year the successor journal
was closed down for printing
cartoons deriding the applica-
tion of socialist realism to art.
The regime's highly ef-
fective campaign against intel-
lectuals entailed a sharp de-
nunciation of personal lives
and habits; intellectuals were
accused, as a class, of secret
vices--opium smoking and sexual
immorality. The majority ap-
pear to have resigned themselves
to their isolation and have made
no further efforts to vocalize
their anti-regime attitudes
publt.c ly .
Sabotage
References to "bandit ac-
tivity" have been cropping up
in the North Vietnamese press
with increasing frequency since
midsummer. Hanoi leaders are
understandably apprehensive
about anything they interpret
as an effort to repay in kind
their-own guerrilla war against
South Vietnam's President Diem.
In October, the party paper Nhan
Dan reported that "major fires
broke out in a few warehouses,
factories, and crowded localities
...and had bad effects on pro-
duction." A large proportion
of this arson was attributed
to the ."enemy's sabotaging hands,"
and home service broadcasts have
warned, "The nearer the enemy
draws to his final defeat, the
more desperate his cunning and
hazardous activities."
Open defiance of the regime
is rare in urban areas, where
the security apparatus is most
effective, but the particularly
acute food shortages this past
spring may have sparked violent
demonstrations in Hanoi itself.
According to one report, in June
a government-organized demonstra-
tion against Diem and the US
turned into a wild anti-regime
riot damaging an important oil
storage area near the capital.
Hanoi's home-front crusade
against saboteurs, spies, and
"counterrevolutionary elements"
suggests an element of official
concern lest certain long-dis-
satisfied elements in the popu-
lation be incited to open opposi-
tion. Judging by the tone of
current references to "bandit"
activity, however, Hanoi does
not feel it faces a major internal
security threat at the moment.
Press treatment rather suggests
that "enemy sabotage" and the
capture of "Diem commandos" is
being given publicity as a do-
mestic reminder of the governmenth
all-pervading watchfulness--and
the quick punishment meted out
to all who disturb the established
order in North Vietnam.
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 The elections in Greece on
29 October 1961 confirmed that
country's present political sta-
bility. Premier Constantine
Karamanlis, who has held office
since October 1955, was returned
to power:, and his party, the Na-.
tional Radical Union (ERE), won
a sizable increase in popular
vote over that received in the
1958 elections. The terms of
the electoral law limited the
party's increase in parliament
to only a few seats--it now
holds 176 of the 300, as com-
pared with 172 in 1958. The
period of rule by what has been
basically the same right-of-
center government since 1952 will
probably be extended to at least
the end of Karamanlis' term in
1965. Greece had 20 governments
and 435 cabinet ministers in the
eight years following its liber-
ation in 1944.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS IN GREECE
LIBERALS
k 36
UNITED'
DEMQCRATIC
LEF1'_(EDA)
NATIONAL
RADICAL
UNION (ERE)
172
SEATS
300
"PACE,-the Progressive A9rariar Democratic Union was a coalition of four small *PAME, the Pon-Democratic Agrarian Front of` Greece, was a caalition of al
partiesy including Morkezinis`Progressives, created only for the period of the United Democratic Left (EDA) and a small IeflIIStagrarian party creoted by=
elecfians. EDA in 1960.
Independentsreceived 0.2% of popular votes in 1958, .and 1 . 1% in 1961, but no seats,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM?ARY
The Opposition
uties--as compared with nearly
25 percent of the vote and 79
deputies in 1958, when it be-
came the largest opposition
party in the Chamber o? Dep-
uties. That position now falls
to the non-Communist Center.
Union. This grouping, led.by
veteran politician George Papan-
dreou, was hastily formed
several small parties befo^?
the elections, in which it won.
86 seats. However, some of the
leaders of its diverse factions
may find it impossible to contin-
ue to subordinate their person-
al ambitions to the demands of
party unity.
The other member of the so-
called nationalist opposition
is the Progressive party of
Spiros Markezinis, with 14 seats.
Markezinis, who was the only
member of his party elected in
1958, has emerged as a potential
rallying point for many of
Karamanlis' non-Communist oppo
nents. His party was well organ-
ized, had a consistent program,
and presented attractive candi-
dates. Markezinis himself, how-
ever, tends to be rigid in his
views and is unwilling to share
in leadership, factors which
The Communist-front United
Democratic Left (EDA), operating
under a new label, the Pan-Demo-
cratic Agrarian Front, this year
won less than 15 percent of the
popular vote and elected 24 dep-
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have limited his political po-
tential in the past.
All opposition parties have
denounced the "intimidation" and
"adulteration of the vote" which
they claim occurred before and
during the election. Papandreou
and most Center Union deputies
as well as all the EDA deputies
boycotted the opening sessions
of parliament. The Progressives,
however, have taken their seats
in the Chamber, and it is assumed
the other opposition deputies
will return when parliament re-
convenes in January. Even so,
the charge that the Karamanlis
victory was "illegal" probably
will continue to embitter domes-
tic politics.
Economic Situation
Karamanlis' victory was due
in large part to the"accomplish-
ments of his government. He
capitalized on the nation's
financial stability, on his
reputation as a "man of works,"
and on his promise that another
four years will, allow him to
complete his program. He has
done much to improve transporta-
tion,, electric power, and irri-
gation and to stimulate the ship-
building, steel, aluminum, and
fruit-processing industries.
Under him, Greece has also re
solved most of the economic re-
construction problems which con-
fronted it after World War II
and the three-year war against
Communist rebels. (1946-49).
Grave economic and social
problems remain, nevertheless,
including the basic one of
limited' natural resources. The
annual per capita income has.
risen slowly to $300--but re-
mains far lower than in most
Western European countries.
Underemployment in the poverty-
stricken countryside has led to
a heavy movement from rural to
urban areas. This not only has
destroyed the traditional stabil-
ity in rural Greek society but
has increased the problem of
unemployment in the cities. In
addition, the maldistribution
of wealth between the rural
areas and the more prosperous
cities has not been remedied
but has continued to grow. The
conspicuous consumption of lux-
uries by the wealthy, combined
with increasingly frequent con-
tact with tourists and other
representatives of Western Eu-
rope and the US, has stimulated
the demand among the middle-in-
come and lower economic classes
for rapid change of both the
economic and social order.
In the drive for economic
improvement, Karamanlis is re-
lying heavily on his Five-Year
Economic Development Program
(1960-64) and the recently nego-
tiated association of Greece
with the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC). A main aim of
the development program is to
achieve an annual rate of in-
crease of national income of
about 6 percent for the five-
year period, with an increase
in per capita income to around
$380.
Owing in large part to
good weather during the past
year, the over-all increase in
gross national product for 1961
now is projected at 7-8 percent
because of a rise of at least
11 percent in agricultural out-
put. This is considerably above
the increase in GNP in 1960--
less than 4 percent--and has
improved the prospect of achiev-
ing the annual 6-percent target.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY
The second major goal of
the plan--to create 400,000 new
jobs by 1962--will probably be
more difficult to reach and in
any case is probably too low to
take care of the unemployment
problem satisfactorily. In late
1960 unemployment Plus under-
employment added up to a shortage
of about 700,000 full-time jobs.
The unemployment problem has
been somewhat ameliorated in the
past by the heavy emigration of
unskilled workers--chiefly to
`Nest Germany--but with the heavy
influx into the labor force of
youths born after World War II,
the situation will probably now
become worse.
Development Financing
The program projects a five-
year total of investment spending
of about,$3.68 billion. To fi-
nance this program, the govern=ment anticipates that $600,000,-
000 will be supplied by foreign
capital. Greece has received
over $1.65 billion in US eco-
nomic aid since 1947, including
about $50 million in grant aid
and PL 480-Title I and Develop-
ment Loan Fund credits in 1961.
Aid in the form of grants is
expected to be greatly reduced
in future years.
In his policy statement to
parliament on 5 December, Kara-
manlis noted that continuation
of external defense aid is of
basic importance to his program
for economic development. He
cited the economic burden Greece
is under in maintaining its de-
fense organization, most of which
is committed to NATO and for
which Greece devotes a larger
proportion of its budget--about
28 percent--than most countries.
Recent Greek efforts have been
devoted to securing continued
US aid at past levels while ob-
taining increased aid from other
NATO states--particularly West
Germany.
Karamanlis has also pro-
posed establishment of a special
fund within NATO to help financi-
ally weaker members preserve
their defensive capabilities.
In addition, a three-member NATO
mission is investigating the
special economic problems of
Greece and Turkey and is to
report to the North Atlantic
Council on "considerations
justifying the requests of
these countries for aid in
implementing their economic
plans." Further economic aid
to Greece from Western sources
would be facilitated if the
government could settle its
defaulted pre - World War II
debts--a problem Karamanlis
was reluctant to approach
before the recent elections.
EEC Association
The association agreement
with the EEC was signed last
September after nearly two years
of complex negotiations. Under
the terms of the agreement,
which is expected to become
operative in early 1962, Greece
will be granted a period of 22
years for readjusting its tariff
structure and general economy
before joining in a full cus-
toms union with the EEC. To
accelerate economic development,
the EEC bank will loan Greece
$125,000,000 over a period of
five'years.
Association with the EEC
should also permit Greece to re-
direct its exports to Western
European markets and away from
dependence on-the Soviet bloc.
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Exports to the bloc have in-
creased from 6.2 percent of to-
tal exports in 1953 to an esti-
mated 25.3 percent in 1961, this
trade being of particular import-
ance for the agricultural sector
of the Greek economy.
Greece's balance of pay-
ments problem has grown more
acute with the gradual increase
in consumer purchasing power.
It appears that for 1961, less
than 40 percent of Greece's im-
ports will be covered by exports.
There has been a steady rise in
recent years in earnings from
emigrant remittances, shipping,
and tourism, but only foreign
aid has permitted Greece to re-
frain from drawing heavily on
its convertible reserves, which
totaled $212,000,000 in July
1961. The government's current
program emphasizes stimulation
of domestic production, both to
provide substitutes for imports
and to increase exports, and
encourages private savings
rather than consumption.
Foreign Relations
Contacts with the Soviet
bloc are coldly formal but are
frequently interspersed with
threats from the USSR and Bul-
garia over Greek participation
in NATO. Bulgaria has long been
active in sending espionage
agents into Greece. Relations
have never been re-established
with Albania since World War II,
and Greek leaders and the press
have reacted nervously to the
situation developing in the Bal-
kans since the appearance of the
Albanian-Soviet rift. Greek of-
ficials have indicated that
Greece prefers three kinds of
communism to only one or two on
its northern border; attitudes
are also heavily influenced by
its historical claim on part of
southern Albania.
Despite public assurance by
government spokesmen that rela-
tions with Yugoslavia remain,
harmonious, there. is an under-
current of suspicion in G',eece
over Yugoslav designs on Mace-
donia--much of which is incor-
porated in northern Greece. Re-
lations with Turkey were greatly
improved following the settle-
ment of the Cyprus controversy
in,1959, but a residual disc
trust of the Turks is currently
mainfested in Greek fears that
the new Turkish Government will
eventually move toward a neu-
tralist course in East-West re-
lations.
Attempts over the past
few years to maintain good
relations with the LIAR have
not prevented the imposition
new pressures on the Greek mi-
nority in Egypt and the subse-
quent flight of many of these
persons to Greece. Criticism
of Nasir now appears more fre-
quently in the speeches of gov-
ernment leaders and in the press.
None of these foreign po-
licy problems, however, is like-
ly to come close to attracting
the attention Karamanlis' gov-
ernment will be giving its eco-
nomic program. The government's
ability to continue to outdraw
its opposition will depend even.-
tually on whether it can inspire
a pace of economic development-
which will not only be faster
than in the past but will be
fast enough to meet the higher
expectations of the Greek elec-
torate.
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