CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCI NO. 0307/61
23 November 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Dept., OSD, & DIA review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRE Nr INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS
The USSR's agreement to re-
sume negotiations in Geneva on
28 November appears primarily
intended to offset the adverse
nonbioc reaction to the recent
Soviet test series, and to en-
able Moscow to charge that con-
tinuation of the US testing pro-
gram is responsible for any in-
tensification of the nuclear
armaments race. The Soviet note
drew attention to Khrushchev's
remarks during the 7 November
Kremlin reception, at which he
warned that "there will be more
Soviet tests if the West goes
on testing." The USSR may pro-
pose that the new round of ne-
gotiations be accompanied by a
moratorium on all nuclear test-
ing. There is no evidence that
Moscow intends to change its
position on the terms for a test
ban agreement when negotiations
are resumed.
The Soviet leaders' deci-'
sion to accept the US-UK pro-
posal for an immediate resump-
tion of the Geneva talks probably
was based on the assumption that
this would provide the most ef-
fective forum for exploiting
any US decision to undertake
atmospheric testing and for
counteracting the damaging ef-
fects of the Soviet test series
on the USSR's image abroad. The
TASS statement of 5 November, in
response to President Kennedy's
2 November statement regarding
preparations for US atmospheric
testing in the event such meas-
ures become necessary, charged
that the US "is preparing to re-
sume nuclear weapons tests in
the atmosphere."
The USSR may also believe
that the resumption of test
talks will enhance its recent
moves to impress the West with
a more flexible Soviet approach
to negotiations on Berlin and
Germany.
The Soviet note marks some
retreat from the position the
USSR has maintained since the
Vienna meeting between Khrushchev
and President Kennedy in June,
at which the Soviet premier con-
tended that the questions of a
test ban and general disarma-
ment should be solved "inter-
dependently." Subsequent Soviet
pronouncements implied that the
nuclear testing issue could be
considered only in the context
of general and complete disarma-
ment. Although Moscow has now
agreed to resume separate ne-
gotiations on testing, the Soviet
note sought to retain the link
with general disarmament by ob-
serving that the US, Britain,
and the USSR have all "proclaimed
as their common goal universal
and complete disarmament." It
also stated that the USSR's
agreement to return to the Geneva
talks rests on the assumption
that the UN General Assembly in
the near future will "adopt a
decision on the resumption of
negotiations on the whole complex
of questions pertaining to general
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and complete disarmament and
on the setting up of an organ
in which such negotiations can
be conducted."
The Soviet decision to re-
turn to the test ban talks is
probably aimed at impressing
UN members with the USSR's
"reasonableness" and attract-
ing UN support for a compromise
solution to the question of mem-
bership in the new disarmament
forum. The USSR is on record
with a call for a "troika" fo-
rum--five Western, five bloc,
and five neutral represents
tives. In private conversa-
tions with various UN delegates,
Soviet delegates have urged
agreement to add three neutral
countries to the original ten-
nation committee. The Soviet
news agency TASS on 17 November
criticized the US proposal for
a committee of 20 representa-
tives. TASS claimed the US was
rejecting the principle of "eq-
uitable representation" of the
three main groups of states.
In an obvious attempt to
counter adverse nonbloc reac-
tion to the recent test series,
the Soviet note to the US and
Britain was read by Deputy For-
eign Minister Firyubin to rep-
resentatives of the countries
which participated in the Bel-
grade conference of nonaligned
powers, as well as a Finnish
representative. These repre-
sentatives were called to a
meeting at the Foreign Ministry
at approximately the time the
notes were delivered to the US
and British embassies. The US
Embassy reports that there was
apparently no discussion of the
subject matter or any explana-
tion of the choice of countries
to receive the special briefing.
While the Belgrade conference
did not go on record with a
sharp condemnation of the re-
sumption of Soviet tests, several
of the participants in private
conversations denounced the So-
viet action. During the recent
test series Khrushchev deemed
it necessary to respond to let-
ters from leading personalities
from Western and neutralist
countries, including Nkrumah.
These letters criticized the
Soviet test resumption.
While the Soviet leaders
have found it expedient to
resume separate talks on a
test ban treaty, they prob-
ably will take the position
that no final agreement can
be concluded unless progress
is made in the general disar-
mament field. This position
was implied in the TASS state-
ment of 5 November which re-
affirmed the USSR's readi-
ness to sign a general dis-
armament treaty, "on the ba-
sis of which nuclear weapons
tests would also be discon-
tinued once and for all...."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET-FINNISH RELATIONS
Moscow continues to in-
sist on the formal consultations
it requested in its note to Fin-
land on 30 October. Following
President Kekloonen's action in
dissolving parliament and call-
ing for new elections in Febru-
ary, Soviet Deputy, Foreign Min-
ister Kuznetsov on 16 November
called in Finnish Ambassador
Wuori and left no doubt that
.the USSR regarded Kekkonen's
actaons as an atteulpt to evade
the Soviet proposa];s. Kuznetsov
told him that these moves were
not sufficient guarantees of
continued Finnish neutrality,
and that the USSR expected a
"qualified" Finnish delegation
to come'to Moscow as soon as
possible. Although he did not
insist that military officials
be included in the delegation,
the Soviets are clearly pressing
for consultations under the
1948 mutual defense treaty.
Kuznetsov contended that
the situation in the Baltic and
Northern Europe had deteriorated
since the 30 October Soviet note
and that as a result there was
an "immediate" threat from West
Germany to the security of the
USSR and Finland. In support
of these _claims Kuznetsov cited
the visit by Bonn's Defense
Minister Strauss to Oslo, so-
called NATO maneuvers in the
Baltic area, and press reports
of an early agreement'between
Denmark and West'Germany on a
joint naval command in the
Baltic.;
Reactions
The cumulative effect of
the crisis in Finnish-Soviet re-
lations has demoralized the non-
Communist Finns. Following
Ambassador Wuori's return to
Helsinki to report on Kuznetsov's
demarche, the Finnish cabinet
on 18 November issued a com-
munique announcing that the
government had proposed a meet-
ing between President Kekkonen
and Khrushchev. Soviet Ambas-
sador Zhakarov informed the
Finnish Foreign Ministry that
Khrushchev would receive Kek?
konen on 24 November in Novo-
sibirsk. In a background dis-
cussion with the press, officials
of the ministry explained that
Kekkonen's talks with Khrushchev
would not'constitute the ccon_
sul.tation requested by Kuznetsov
and that the visit was a Finnish
initiative not prompted by a So-
viet request.
Mos3ow's Next Moves
Moscow is not likely to ac-
cept the Kekkonen-Khrushchev
talks as a substitute for formal
consultation, but it has been
deliberately vague concerning
the demands for political
guarantees from Helsinki. In
response to a'Finn$.sh inquiry,
the Soviet ambassador stated that
the Finns should make an offer
and define their terms and Mos-
cow would decide whether their
position was acceptable. It
seems likely that one of Mos-
cow's primary demands will be
for strong Finnish support of
the Soviet stand on Germany,
incltding Finnish participation
in any peace treaty-signed be-
tween the bloc and East Ger-
many. The Soviet insistence
that the formal consultations
proceed as proposed also sug-
gests that the USSR would re-
gard Finnish agreement to con-
sult as the first step.toward
an unqualified endorsement of
the Soviet viewpoint on the
dangers from West German mili-
tarism and the consequent
necessity of a peace,treaty.
If consultations are held,
the USSR may press Finland for
some specific action in the
military'sphere which would
demonstrate its concern over
the threat from West Germany.
Some Finnish officials are
apprehensive that Moscow. might
request Finland to raise the
level of its armed forces and
might offer military aid to
accomplish this.' The Soviets
may offer to supply early-warn-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In view o
the previous Finnish interest
in acquiring surface-to-air
guided missiles, Moscow now
may offer these weapons; the
USSR has agreed to provide such
missiles to at least three under-
developed countries. Finally
Moscow may insist that Helsinki
utilize the remainder of a $25,-
000,000 arms credit extended
in 1959.
The Finnish: Communists
A further Soviet objective
appears to be a strengthening
of the Finnish Communists. Some
diplomats in Moscow speculate
that the Kremlin' intends to have
the Communist-front Finnish
People's Democratic League (SKDL)
included in the next government.
Gromyko's criticism of insta-
bility of the present minority
government implied such a goal.
The Finnish Communists are
displaying considerable arro-
gance. Their press has demanded
that upper army echelons be
purged of "unreliable elements"
and that the activities of
"right-wing organizations and
the right-wing press" be curtailed.
There is already specula-
tion in Finland that the new
government will consist of the
Agrarians, the Opposition Social
Democrats, the SKDL, and the
pro-Kekkonen minority within
the Swedish People's party.
Such a coalition would on the
basis of present party repre-
sentation command a majority
in parliament.
Scandinavian Reactions
The Soviets are also ob-
viously exploiting the pres-
sure on Finland to create an
atmosphere of anxiety in
Scandinavia. The new demarche
to Finland, coming three days
before the arrival of Norwegian
Foreign Minister Lange in Mos--
cow, provides an opportunity
for intensification of Soviet
pressure in Northern Europe,
aimed at driving a wedge be-
tween West Germany and Norway
and Denmark. The four Scandi-
navian Communist parties have
issued a joint statement call-
ing for Denmark and Norway to
leave NATO.
The Danish and Norwegian
governments have not replied
directly to the Soviet accusa-
tions regardinig.-their coopera-
tion with a rearmed and al-
legedly revanchist Germany in
the 30 October note to Finland.
Denmark has assured its allies
that it intends to fulfill such
NATO commitments as negotiations
with West Germany for a joint
Baltic Command, but it can be
expected to defer action until
tension in Northern Europe has
abated somewhat. Prime Minister
Kampmann has also publicly reiter-
ated Danish opposition to having
atomic weapons on Danish soil.
Lange, still in the USSR
(his visit was scheduled before
the eruption of the present situ-
ation), will try to convince
Soviet officials that Norway's
association with NATO does not
cloak any aggressive or un-
friendly intentions toward the
USSR. Lange is currently tour-
ing the USSR and will go to
Helsinki before seeing Khru-
shchev in Moscow in early December.
The possibility of an
erosion of Finland's neutrality
has probably caused Sweden to
reassess its political and,mili
tary position. However, nothing
less than an actual Soviet mili-
tary move against Finland would
be likely to cause Sweden to
abandon its alliance-free foreign
policy in favor of closer associ-
ation with the West. Furthermore,
the continued domination of
Sweden's foreign policy by
Foreign Minister Unden rules out
any change unless there is a
threat of direct action by
the Soviet Union against
Sweden itself.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The deterioration in Sino-
Soviet relations set in motion
by Khrushchev's actions at the
22nd Soviet party congress has
picked up momentum. Pravda on
16 November published -a speech
by Italian Communist party
leader Togliatti in which he
noted during the course of an
attack on the Albanians that
they were in part supported
by the Chinese and in which
he characterized Chou En-lai's
rebuke of Khrushchev at the
Soviet 22nd party congress as
"unjustified." This is the
first time that criticism of a
Chinese leader by name has ap-
peared in the Soviet press.
Pravda has taken advantage
of Toglia ti's speech to reveal
more clearly in the USSR the
extent of Chinese Communist in-
volvement with Albania. Al-
though the Soviet public could
have guessed from the speeches
at the 22nd congress that the
Albanian affair involved the
much larger issue of Soviet-
Chinese relations, nothing that
has appeared in Soviet published
material in the past few years
has so explicitly indicated
concrete disagreement between
Peiping and Moscow as these
passages from Togliatti's speech.
Since the congress the
Soviet press has not made much
of the anti-Albanian campaign,
which figured so heavily in
the speeches from the rostrum.
Moscow relied primarily on re-
printing comments from foreign
Communists, particularly the
satellite leaders, suggesting
that for the time being the
Soviet Union was content to al-
low the satellites to take the
lead in attacking Albania. The
use of Togliatti's speech falls
into this pattern, but broadens
the target to include Communist
China, makes clear the extent
and seriousness of the deteriora-
tion of Sino-Soviet relations,
and implies that the pace of
charges and counter-charges is
likely to quicken. On 20 No-
vember, for example, in Moscow's
first original reaction to
Hoxha's counterattacks since
the congress, Pravda editorial-
ized that the Albanian leaders
have "taken the road of deepen-
ing their errors."
The satellite regimes con-
tinue to give heavy play to Al-
bania's "errors." Comment in
some of the satellites now also
includes the same kind of criti-
cism of the Chinese stand as
did Pravda. The official Polish
newspaper Trybuna Ludu followed
Moscow's lemon p=ublishing
Togliatti's statement. In Czech-
oslovakia, however, party boss
Novotny struck out on his own
and in a speech to his central
committee reporting on the 22nd
party congress made a point of
noting that Czechoslovakia could
not agree with the "reservations
entered in the name of the Chi-
nese party by Chou En-lab."
Although it now appears
that the meeting of the Political
Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Pact may not take place
as early as was reported, it
appears more-likely that-when
it does meet, action will be
taken to oust Albania from mem-
bership in the pact. In his
speech Novotny claimed that the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Boun Oum, Souphannouvong,
and Souvanna have agreed to ;,..,,
meet at Vientiane for further
negotiations toward the estab-
lishment of a coalition govern-
ment. The acceptance by Sou-
vanna and Souphannouvong of
Vientiane as the site for the
meetings, scheduled to be held
from 24 to 27 November, was un-
expected in view of their pre-
vious insistence on the Plaine
des Jarres. Souvanna's yield-
ing on this issue might fore-
shadow a willingness to make
substantive concessions at Vien-
tiane but may be merely a move
to bring General Phoumi to the
bargaining table.
Security arrangements for
the conference have been under
discussion by representatives
of the three factions. Mutual
suspicion has been a complicat-
ing factor. This suspicion, in
addition to the basic political
differences, will also present
a serious obstacle to success-
fs.s_. negotiations at Vientiane.
The major task to be ac-
complished at Vientiane will be
the distribution of posts in
the coalition cabinet. Sou-
vanna has indicated that he
wants to retain the ministries
of defense and interior for his
"neutralist" center group,
Phoumi, who is minister of de-
fense in the Boun Oum govern-
ment, will try to get the
same position in the coalition
government. It is possible,
however, that Phoumi will per-
mit Souvanna to control both
these ministries if Souvanna
will agree to the enlargement
of the center bloc through the
addition of several strong non
- Xieng Khouang neutralists.
It is unlikely that Phoumi will
Secretary General Thant
has ordered the UN command in
the Congo to "seal off" Kindu,
disarm the Congo Army units
there, and start inquiries into
support any coalition which in
his view is not adequately safe-
guarded against the possibility
of a Communist take-over.
The antigovernment forces
have initiated scattered probing
actions in northern Vientiane
Province, while Laotian Army
clearing operations have contin-
ued in the extreme northern
and southern provinces of Laos;
more limited sweeps in Vientiane
Province have ended. Further
evidence of the presence of North
Vietnamese troops in Laos was
disclosed by a recent attack on a
South Vietnamese reconnaissance
unit by a Communist force claim-
ing to be part of "Ho Chi Minh's
army."
Western representatives at
Geneva are studying Soviet dele-
gate Pushkin's latest drafts on
the voting and investigations
procedures for the International
Control Commission (ICC) presented
at a 15 November meeting with the
UK delegate. Pushkin also sub-
mitted new drafts on the func-
tions of the ICC with regard to
the introduction of armaments
into Laos and the time limit on
the withdrawal of foreign mili-
tary personnel from Laos. These
drafts represented a small move-
ment in the direction of the
Western position. Other issues
of the conference still to be
resolved include the matter of
the demobilization of ',private
armies" and unification of the
Laotian Army. The Communists
have consistently maintained
that these are solely internal
Laotian affairs and fall out-
side the conference's authority
and responsibility. 25X1
25X1
the massacre of the 13 Italian
airmen; an undisclosed number of
UN troops have been moved to
Kindu. UN officials have denied
reports from Elisabethville and
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Pointe
Noire
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Republic of the Congo
Bangassou
9 Gemena
Aketi Buta
UN
Rumba 720 Lake
700 UN B is Albert
tanleyville
? Coquilhatvi I le
Goma ~
U N 1340
scattered
U
N
750
UN
150
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fl: Tshombe's Forces
. Adoula's and Gizenga's Forces
Lobito( i'i Selected railroad
_r Selected airfield
a SIA 4aa
32053
Stanleyville that UN planes
have bombed the Congo troops
but indicate that relations
between UN and Congo Army units
in Kivu Province are tense.
The president of the Leo-
poldville provincial govern-
ment, pro-Gizengist Cleophas
Kamitatu, told Ambassador Gul-
lion on 16 November it would be
"criminal" if the UN used force
at Kindu and that he intended
to tell Adoula that if the UN
Kasongo
Kongo to
. Kabalo
0 'T'SB ?dmgt
:::2 ii
Kaniama/ Manorgo
UN
970 I
? Kamina
Kapang,
UN
845
UN
2930
did so without comparable meas-
ures against Katanga, the "na-
tionalist" group would with-
draw its support of Adoula.
General Mobutu has remarked
that without complete "politi-
cal, military, and financial"
unity between the Stanleyville
and Leopoldville forces, it
would be impossible to defeat
Katanga. Press reports indi-
cate that Adoula is stalling
on his investigation of the
Kindu incident.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Ambassador Gullion reports
that it is difficult to estab-
lish whether Gizeriga was actually
responsible for the Kindu inci-
dent, although his presence and
inflammatory propaganda against
the UN over a long period cre-
ated the atmosphere for it. Gi-
zenga's objective in going to
Kindu was probably to demonstrate
that it was he who was actively
pushing the invasion of Katanga
rather than Leopoldville or Gen-
eral Lundulao
ble for the action in Kindu, are
growing impatient and reportedly
intend henceforth to take a rigid
line with the premier on both the
Katanga problem and on Congo's
neutralism. They are pressing
to have the Soviet bloc represen-
tative in Leopoldville accredited
soon and assert that both Soviet
and American presence is neces-
sary to ensure the neutrality of
the UN. They also want to be
able to "weigh" Soviet and Ameri-
can offers of aid.
Gizenga's present where-
abouts is unknown. Interior
Minister Gbenye, recently re-
turned from Kindu, advised the
Adoula cabinet on 20 November
that Gizenga was not in Kindu
at the time of the atrocities.
He may turn up in Stanleyville
for a belated rump convention
of his Lumumbist party, which
he had called for 18 November.
Gizenga'ss rivals, although not
opposed to the formation of a.:
new single.-national party, are
opposed to his heading it. On
20 November, the Leopoldville
cabinet reportedly decided to
make another attempt to bring
Gizenga back to the capital,
and three nominal Gizengist,
sympathizers were to be sent to
Stanleyville to try to locate
him.
Leopoldville's failure to
date to control Tshombd either
by negotiation or force has
created strong pressures on
Adoula. The "nationalists," who
apparently hold the UN and not
the Congolese military responsi-
tary an economic aid. The offer25X1
reportedly included transport and
military aircraft, arms, agricul-
tural and road-construction machi-
nery, and a financial subsidy.
Foreign Minister Bomboko previ-
ously told US officials that the
Soviets in negotiating for the
re-establishment of relations ha.d
offered "all aid" to the Adoula
government.
Tshomb&,has not changed his 25X1
demands that Adoula recognize Ka-
tanga's virtual autonomy, which
he knows Adoula cannot accept and
remain in power.
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a Soviet offer of
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CURRENT INTELLIGECE WEEKLY SUM
The compromise agreement
which brought an end to rebel
vice premier Ben Bella's hunger
strike and the report that he
is about to be released from
prison probably bav a renewed pros-
pects for the opening of formal
negotiations between the French
and the provisional Algerian
government ; (PAG). The, added
publicity and prestige the
strike has brought to Ben Bella
may have produced strains with-
in the rebel leadership and may
delay agreement in negotiations
with the French. The conces-
sions made by the French are
certain to lead the Secret Army
Organization (OAS) to intensify
its plotting against the gov-
ernment, particularly in Algeria.
Ben Bella and four other
rebel leaders are to be trans-
ferred to a convalescent home
the rebels will re-
main under French guard.
A member of Premier Debre's
cabinet told a US official on
17 November that secret talks
with the FAG were progressing
favorably, and had not been
affected by Ben Bella's hunger
strike. The PAG, whose spokes-
man on 16 November emphasized
Ben Bella's statement that there
was no conflict between him
and the PAG1, will probably be
content to drop the matter.
A French Ministry official,
however, said last week that
Ben Bella's status has been
so enhanced internationally and
among rebel militants that..the
entire rebel structure Would
have to be reorganized in a
time-consuming process before
a final settlement could be
reached. Minister for Algerian
Affairs Joxe told a.US Embassy
officer on 16 November that the
PAG was "furious" at being
compelled to support Ben Bella
and his companions, and added
that, "like all politicians,
they are fighting among them-
selves."
At the time of his capture
in 1956, Ben Bella was probably
the most widely known figure in
the rebel movement. Although
he has been an honarary vice
premier of the PAG since its
formation in 1958, his im-
prisonment may have reduced
his power within the rebel
hierarchy. The attention he
has gained from the hunger strike
--coupled with continuing reports
of almost open disregard for
the PAG by the rebel fighting
units within Algeria with whom
Ben Bella has always been pop-
ular--has Drotably put him in
a position where he cannot be
shunted aside, and his clear
association with a negotiated
settlement may be necessary to
obtain compliance from the rebel
fighters.
In order to counter oppo-
sition claims that it has been
derelict in its support of the
Algerian struggle for independ-
ence, the Moroccan Government
continues to claim credit for
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the successful resolution of the
Ben Bella affair. King Hassan
II, fearful that the installa-
tion of a radical regime in
Algeria would be hostile to the
Moroccan monarchy, is anxious
that an Algerian compromise be
reached with Paris and that
French influence remain strong
in Algeria.
The degree to which the OAS might
be able to upset any agreement
between De Gaulle and the PAG
remains an open question. Paris
appears to be operating as
much against the OAS as against
the rebels. A new wave of ar-
rests of.OAS supporters in France
has been announced, and the
civil security forces in Algeria,
demoralized by a series of OAS
murders of their leaders, are
being reinforced by metropolitan
police. In the National Assembly
a so-called "Salan amendment"
looking toward revival of settler
home-defense units in Algeria
was supported by a bloc of 80
deputies.
The director of political
affairs at the Delegation Gen-
eral told the American consul
general at Algiers that the
OAS has split into two factions,
one advocating a French-Algeria
and the other aiming'at a
partition which would set up
independent European enclaves.
The latter idea is arousing
interest among European settlers
who had previously not con-
sidered anything but remaining
French.
Meanwhile, De Gaulle was
scheduled to climax efforts
to re-establish better relations
with the armed services through
a major speech in Strasbourg on
23 November. The initial re-
action of French officers to
De Gaulle's efforts to divert
them from their preoccupation
with Algeria has been described
by the US army attache in
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
In the two days immediate-
ly following his victory over
the Trujillo family on 19 No-
vember, Dominican President
Balaguer concentrated on mili-
tary affairs, acting in his
newly assumed constitutional
role as commander in chief of
the armed forces. By late on
20 November, he felt able to as-
sure the American consul gen-
eral that the newly appointed
military leaders acting under
his orders were in control of
the situation.
The only remaining centers
of pro-Trujillo resistance on
20 November were in two pro-
vincial army garrisons com-
manded by generals with partic-
ularly notorious reputations
for brutality. These generals,
Alcantara and Oliva, are high
on the list of pro-Trujillo
officers whom the opposition
insists be ousted, a demand
now being made also by leading
air force officers. Balaguer
said on 20 November that he
intends to remove the two as
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soon as possible. He is hampered,
however, by the mutual suspi-
cions and apparent rivalries
among the top military officers
and appears to be moving cau-
tiously in instituting: military
changes despite the fact that
public opinion is impatient for
rapid and dramatic change.
Balaguer told the consul
general on 20 November that he
is considering further changes
in top military posts. He
said he may appoint ':Brigadier
General Felix Hermida, Jr,,
whom he had named air force
chief of staff on 19 November,
to the cabinet post of secre-
tary of state for the armed
forces. This post, usually
held by a nonentity, now be-
comes the highest and poten-
tially the most influential post
for a military officer, since
the President now is commander
in chief in fact as well as in
theory. The incumbent is con-
stitutionally first in line of
succession to the presidency
when, as at present, there is
no vice president. If he names
General Hermida to the post,
Balaguer would be selecting an
officer with an excellent repu-
tation both among his colleagues
and among leaders of the mod-
erate opposition.
Brigadier General Rafael
Rodriquez Echevarria, the air
force commander who led the
brief military action on 19
November against the Trujillo
brothers, also seems to be in
a particularly strong position.
The 37-year-old Rodriquez has
been described by the US mili-
tary liaison officer as "alert,
aggressive, ambitious, capable,
and mercurial," a rarity among
Dominican generals who were
usually selected for stolid,
unimaginative loyalty to the
_Trujillos. President Balaguer
told the consul general that
he is considering the appoint-
ment of Rodriquez as chief of
staff of the air force, and
opposition leaders have recog-
nized him as an.acceptable.candi-
date. His contacts during the
recent crisis with leaders of
the largest opposition group,
the National Civic Union, sug-
gest the possibility of polit-
ical ambitions also, although
there is as yet little evidence
that Rodriquez may be a threat
to the Balaguer government.
The return of leading op-
position figures to the Dominican
Republic on 21 November after
a brief absence in the US is
likely to lead to a new round
of discussions on the formation
of a coalition government. The
departure of Ramfis and other
members of the Trujillo family,
whose presence was the main
deterrent to an earlier coali-
tion agreement, leads to hope
for a successful outcome"in the
new talks. Success, however,
will be dependent on the ability
of moderate opposition leaders
to resist the pressures for
more rapid changes which have
apparently built up in opposi-
tion ranks since the events of
19 November.
President Balaguer expressed
apprehension on 20 November
over the sudden appearance of
subversive broadcasts by a
"revolutionary" radio station
in Cuba and seeks to take
energetic action to prevent any
threat from pro-Castro elements.
He said that pro-Castro leader
Lopez Molina is being deported
and that he wants to maintain
tight control to prevent the
entry of extremists who at-
tempt'to?. return.fr.om exile.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S 'RY
PROGRESS OF DE-STALINIZATION IN THE USSR
The issue of de-Staliniza-
tion continues to dominate the
Soviet domestic political scene.
Local party meetings now being
held throughout the'Soviet Union
to discuss the results of the
22nd party congress have focused
greater attention on explaining
the "cult of Stalin" resolutions
than on the new party program
or party statutes. There have
been indications of considerable
confusion among the people and
disapproval of the wholesale
removal of the Stalin symbol.
In the Georgian Republic, where
Stalin has long been revered
as the outstanding native son,
Moscow is particularly concerned
with public reaction and is pro-
ceeding with unusual caution.
The renaming of Stalingrad
appears to have aroused more re-
sentment than the removal of
Stalin's body from the mauso-
leum. Virtually all Soviet
citizens with whom US Embassy
personnel have come in contact
have expressed disapproval of
this step, and many, fully aware
of the complexities of the prob-
lem, have raised embarrassing
questions such as whether the
military medals issued for the
Stalingrad campaign now are to
be recalled and changed. The
eradication of the name Stalin-
grad, despite adverse public
opinion, is to be complete. The
Battle of Stalingrad now is of-
ficially referred to as the
Battle of Volgograd.
Other major cities renamed
include Stalino (now Donetsk)
in the Ukraine; Stalinabad (now
Dushambe), capital of the Tadzhik
Republic; and Stalinsk (now Novo-
kuznetsk) in the Russian Republic.
The removal of statues
and portraits of Stalin and
the renaming of towns, streets,
and landmarks'have been under-
taken everywhere except in the
Georgian Republic. Moscow,ap-
parently fearing a recurrence
of the riots which took place
in Georgia following the condem-
nation of Stalin at the 1956
party congress, may plan to wage
an indoctrination campaign among
the Georgian'people before taking
any action to erase the symbol
completely.
The Georgians were permit-
ted to accord Stalin traditional
honors at the 7 November cele-
bration in Tbilisi, their re-
public's capital. His statues
were decorated with 'fresh flow-
ers, and pictures of him were
prominently displayed. Towns
and streets in the republic
still bear his name.
The first official effort
in Georgia to broach the issue
of de-Stalinization was made by
republic party boss Mzhavanadze
in a speech on 18 November to
the Tbilisi party organization.
Clearly reflecting official
awareness and concern with Geor-
giansensitivity, Mzhavanadze re-
marked that while Georgians, like
citizens of any other nation, were
justly proud of their outstanding
leaders of the past, they could
not pass over the exceptionally
cruel repressions which took
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place under Stalin. "We cannot,"
he added, "have any different
view of the cult of Stalin
simply because he was a Georgian."
Another possible indica-
tion of Moscow's concern is a
rumor reaching the US Embassy
that the house of the Georgian
premier, who seconded the pro-
posal at the party congress to
remove Stalin's body, has been
placed under heavy police pro-
tection.
For several months the
Kadar regime in Hungary has
been making a special effort
to bring all local party units
under firmer central control
and to provide a more effective
party leadership. Personnel
changes and recent pronounce-
ments by regime leaders have
been aimed against active party
members who have been reluctant
to accept Kadar's relatively
liberal and flexible program.
Kadar apparently hopes to use
the renewed attacks on Stalin
to reinforce the campaign against
party dogmatists in Hungary
which started last summer.
The major reshuffle of
government and party personnel
announced on 13 September
streamlined the regime's admin-
istration of economic affairs
and put younger party men, pre-
sumably loyal to Kadar, in im-
portant party posts. Several
of the changes also weakened
hard-line influence in the cen-
tral government. One outstand-
ing example was the demotion of
Karoly Kiss, the veteran Stalin-
ist in the party leadership.
these personnel changes
have assumed the proportions
of a major purge.
A central committee reso-
lution of 19 November discussing
the Soviet party congress and
its meaning for the Hungarian
party includes a strong denun-
ciation of "slaves of sectarian
views" and any group which aims
at disrupting party unity. Even
those who consider "harmful
leftism a tolerable and forgive-
able mistake" must be liquidated.
Although the resolution includes
a warning to "the right-wing
revisionist elements who think
that now that there is more talk
about leftist deviationism they
can act with greater freedom,"
the major problem of the Hungar-
ian party appears to be the "rem-
nants of past sectarian elements"
--i.e., supporters of former
Premier Rakosi.
Kadar's major concern,
nevertheless, is with the party
apparatus in the provinces. The
collectivization of agriculture
alienated the people from the
party and its policies and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
revealed a marked lack of talent
and leadership qualities at lo-
cal levels.
An article last July in
the official party monthly
criticized party activists on
the collective farms for dealing
with the peasants in an inflexi-
ble and arrogant manner;, and
for misunderstanding or disre-
garding directives. Succeeding
issues of that magazine denounced
personal adventurism, conceit,
highhandedness, and deviations
from the party line by local
party officials. Party Second
Secretary Gyorgy Marosan on 17
September called on the 17,000
basic party units in Hungary
to use the local party elec-
tions being held from 15 Octo-
ber to 20 December as the oc-
casion for self-criticism and
for an improvement in party
leadership, while a central
committee resolution of 21 Sep-
tember urged party units to
choose a leadership which was
both professionally and politi-
cally able and which had the
support of both party and non-
party people.
In his recent speeches
Kadar has emphasized the need
for a more flexible and capa-
ble leadership to convince and
direct the population to con-
tribute to the "building of
socialism." In Moscow on 31
October he said, "The leaders
may elaborate the best politi-
cal line, the best plan, but
it can only be implemented
by all the people in agree-
ment with the leaders." Re-
ferring to the harsh and ar-
bitrary methods of control
in the past which had re-
sulted in the alienation of
the people from the goals
of socialism, he appeared
to use the attacks against
the anti-party group in the
Soviet Union to support
actions against the "undis-
ciplined" elements in his
own party, who do not under-
stand the importance of
persuasion and patience in
their role as the nation's
leaders.
Kadar has been concerned
since he took power in 1956
with gaining popular accept-
ance of his regime. He has
increasingly played the role
of a "folksy" politician,
speaking in the popular idiom
instead of the stiff doctri-
naire prose of his predecessors
and often using the techniques
of a grass-roots politician.
Having established his control
of the central party apparatus
and geared the government ad-
ministration to accomplish the,
national economic goals, Kadar
now seems to be devoting his
attention to using the basic
party cells to overcome apathy
and hostility to the regime.
The local party elections
are apparently his tool for
an attempt to reorganize
and revitalize the party base.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Liberal party members
claim to have information that
President Garcia's reluctance to
concede the Philippine election
of 14 November to Vice Presi-
dent Macapagal and his public
statement of 18 November chal-
lenging the unofficial tele-
graphic count are part of a broad
effort to block Macapagal's
investiture in the presidency.
Official returns announced
by the Philippine Commission
on Elections have borne out the
unofficial tally giving Maca-
pagal a sizable margin. Garcia
may nevertheless point to errors
in some returns, said to have
been officially noted by the
election commission, as a
basis for refusing to accept
the validity of the entire vote.
He has argued that the Naciona-
lista victory in the House of
Representatives--where the
Nacionalistas lost some seats
but returned a high proportion
of incumbents--reflects a
nationwide Nacionalista trend,
and he may hope through control
of Congress to prevent certi-
fication of the presidential
returns. The Liberals are
attempting to forestall such
efforts by giving widespread
publicity to rumors of Garcia's
machinations, which they claim
could provoke "revolution."
Garcia's present course
appears to be a trial balloon;
he is not likely to persist
in his challenge in the face
of vocal public and press
opposition. There is no
indication that he has wide-
spread Nacionalista support in
this endeavor; his running-
mate, Senator Puyat, has for-
mally conceded the election to
the Liberals. Garcia appears to
be influenced by unscrupulous
cohorts such as Cabangbang who
fear prosecution if the new
adminstration carries out its
threats to clean house. The
drafters of the memorandum
sent to Garcia are identified
with the pro-Communist National
Progress Movement, which
supplied the Nacionalista
party some of its more
questionable campaign themes
and which may aim to generate
public doubt in the elections
and in Macapagal.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPANISH INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET
There is growing sentiment
in Spanish business circles and
some elements of the government
for early affiliation with the
European Common Market (EEC).
These groups see this as a way
of furthering the liberalization
of the Spanish economy and speed-
ing its growth; they consider
such association inevitable in
the long run and the difficul-
ties of adjustment certain to
be increased by delay.
The great majority of
Spanish industrial, commercial,
and financial interests, although
supporting Franco's regime as
a guarantee of internal stabil-
ity, are irked by its multiplic-
ity of controls which hamper day-
to-day operations and tend to in-
hibit modernization and expan
sion. Many of these interests
see affiliation with the EEC as
a way of helping to free the
Spanish economy of these restric-
tions and forcing it to move
toward greater efficiency and
improved living standards.
Agricultural export inter-
ests are particularly strong
supporters of EEC ties because
agricultural products make up
most of the 39 percent of total
Spanish exports which goes to
the EEC countries. They fear
that much of Spain's market, in
Britain, which takes 20 percent
of Spain's total agricultural
exports,, will go to Italy when
London completes negotiations
with the EEC
Commerce Minister Ullastres
is the chief governmental ex-
ponent of association with the
European integration movement.
In August he took the public
position that a customs union
without full EEC me5nbership would
be adequate for the time being
to protect Spain's foreign out-
lets for agricultural products,
but in September he visited
Rome, reportedly to seek assur-
ances that Spain would not be
barred from the EEC if it de-
cided later to seek entry. On
8 November he urged negotiating
with the EEC to reduce tariffs
on Spanish agricultural products,
and stated that he regarded-such
negotiations as a steppingstone
to eventual Spanish participation
in the EEC
Leaders of the government-
controlled labor syndicates also
support participation in the
EEC as necessary to reduce the
ever-widening gap between the
economies of Spain and other
Western European countries.
Continued pressure from this
source may oblige the govern-
ment to give it some consider-
ation.
Franco, however, fears that
economic liberalization would
stimulate political agitation
and will probably continue op-
posed to any EEC ties till con-
vinced that the Spanish economy
is in real danger.
On the EEC side, a Spanish
application would raise polit-
ical difficulties, sixkce the
Franco regime is still regarded
with distaste by influential
sectors of European opinion,
particularly the trade unions.
However, Spanish membership in
the OECD has been accepted with-
out major difficulty, and many
would hold that association
with the EEC would have a
liberalizing effect on all
aspects of Spanish life.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
ECONOMIC FEATURES OF NEW
The 20-year Soviet party
program (1961-80) published
on 2 November indicates Mos-
cow's intention to continue
the economic pattern and rate
of development of the past
decade. The primary emphasis
is on the development of a
heavy industrial base second
to none to provide for the
further extension of Soviet
power as well as to advertise
the Soviet "miracle" of rapid
growth.
For the consumer, the
program includes distant ob-
jectives which in some parts
of the world probably seem
grandiose. The stress on
heavy industry, however, makes
it dubious that the economy
will be reoriented to the ex-
tent required to achieve con-
sumer goals.
The final version of the
program differs little from
the draft issued on 30 July.
Khrushchev's speech delivered
to the party congress on 18
October elaborated on the basic
information and added some de-
tails on specific economic
targets. However, it did not
alter the impression that So-
viet economists have developed
only the broadest long-range
concepts for the 20-year period.
Industry
Soviet industrial produc-
tion is scheduled to increase
by an annual average of 9 to
10 percent throughout the 1961-
80 period. This is approxi-
mately the rate actually
achieved in recent years but
is slightly above that called
for in the Seven-Year Plan
(1959-65). The continued high
priority for heavy industry
is clearly indicated by the
SOVIET PARTY PROGRAM
specific commodity goals con-
tained in the program. Electric
power production planned for
1980 would require the addition
in that year alone of as much
new capacity as is planned for
the entire Seven-Year Plan. If
crude steel production in 1980
reached the planned 250,000,000
tons, it would be nearly equal
to total world production last
year.
While the Soviet Union
has sufficient raw material
resources to support such an
effort in industry, substan-
tially increased capabilities
on the part of the construction
industry and the producers of
equipment would be required, in
addition to a sharp rise in labor
productivity and a massive in-
vestment effort.
Labor Productivity
industrial labor produc-
tivity is scheduled to increase
at about 7 percent annually up
to 1970, with a speed-up to
nearly 8 percent during the
second ten years. On the basis
of past performance--6.5 percent
during the previous five years--
these goals probably are over-
optimistic, but shortfalls could
be made up by increasing employ-
ment above plan--particularly
at the expense of the economic
sectors which provide services
to the consumer.
Implicit in several of
the announced long-term goals
are major but somewhat improb-
able changes in the distribu-
tion of the labor force. Em-
ployment in health, education,
and other services, for example,
is scheduled to almost triple
during the next two decades,
and industrial employment will
have to increase almost 80
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
KHRUSHCHEV'S 20-YEAR ECONOMIC FORECASTS
1980 Level 'in Average Annual
Percentof 1960 Percentage Increase
680-700 10.1
500-520 8.5
400-420 7.3
Average Annual
Percents a Increase
.
P an
-yr P an 7-yr
Output
1 70
1980
(1961-80)
(1959-65)
12.1
11.8
Crude Steel
(million metric tons)
65
145
250
6.9
6.6-7.4
Petroleum
(million metric tons)
148
390
690-710
8.1
11.1
Gas
(billion cubic meters)
47
310-325
680-720
14.5
26.2
Machine Building and
Metalworking
(value in billion rubles)
34
115
334-375
12.4
15.7
Artificial and Synthetic
Fibers
(million metric tons)
.211 1.35
3.1-3.3
14.6
21-22
Cement
(million metric tons)
45.5 122
233-235
8.5
14.3
Leather Footwear
(million pairs)
900
4.0
5.5
percent if production and pro-
ductivity goals are to be met.
Agriculture goals indicate no
drop in employment during 1961-
70 but a drop from 51 million
to 30-35 million during 1971-
80. Such a drastic decline in
farm employment could be ac-
complished without hindering
production goals only if agri-
cultural productivity is mark-
edly increased. In view of
the poor management of agri-
culture in the past, it is
very unlikely that so many
workers will be shifted off
the farm.
One of the most impressive
and important features of the
Gross Agricultural Production
Output in Industry
"Group A" (goods for production)
"Group B" (goods for consumption)
Industrial Productivity
20-year program is the plan for
education--on which prospects
for approaching the productivity
goals depend heavily. Improved
training of the labor force has
been an important factor in the
growth of the economy in the
past and will be even more so
in the future. According to
Khrushchev, the plan is to "im-
plement" during the next decade
an 11-year, general polytechni-
cal education for all children
coming of school age and at
least an eight-year education
for all youths now at work. En-
rollment in higher educational
institutions is to triple by
1980. These are formidable
tasks: less than one third of
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CURR NT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Soviet children of high school
age now are in school, and the
educational attainment of the
labor force averages only about
6 years of schooling.
Investment
Investment during the
next 20 years--Khrushchev in-
dicated that it would be 2
trillion rubles--appears likely
to be adequate and can be
achieved by continuing the
rapid rate of growth of in-
vestment of the past few years.
However, much depends on major
improvements in the use of
capital through better planning,
production relationships, and
equipment utilization. If these
improvements are not realized,
investment in industry well
above the volume planned would
be required.
Two important aspects of
the investment program--machine
building and construction--were
given considerable attention
at the congress. An estimated
13-percent annual increase in
equipment will be required,
only slightly below the rate
achieved during the last decade.
A rapid rate growth for
the construction program during
the next two decades is ap-
parently scheduled, but the
focus of the congress in this
field was on current difficul-
ties. Khrushchev repeatedly
emphasized that the construc-
tion program is plagued with
serious shortcomings, primarily
the result of poor planning
and the failure of the building
materials and equipment indus-
tries to keep up with the rapid
pace of building. Essentially,
the problem is one of disper-
sion of limited investment re-
sources among too many construc-
tion projects. Projects
generally run substantially
beyond their scheduled comple-
tion dates, and a large volume
of resources is tied up in un-
finished work. At the core of
the problem is the lack of
adequate incentives to encourage
managers to make the best de-
cisions as to when and where
to start new construction and
to encourage prompt completion
of the project once it has
been started.
Some improvement has taken
place in recent years through
such measures as assigning
priority to certain projects,
but progress apparently con-
tinues to be too slow. To
remedy the problem Khrushchev
"suggested" a moratorium on new
starts in construction, "per-
haps for a year," with excep-
tions subject to the decision
of the central government only
for especially important
projects.
Deputy Chairman Kosygin
also proposed some specific
measures to attack the problem.
In the future new construction
must be closely linked with
the provision of supplies of
materials and equipment; new
projects will be allowed only
when similar projects, already
under way, are assured of suf-
ficient resources for their
completion. Incentive awards
will be tied to the completion
of projects rather than simply
the volume of construction under
way. Payment for equipment will
be withheld until it is actually
placed in operation. He also
suggested as an "experiment" a
transition from budgetary fi-
nancing of capital investment
to long-term credits. Funds
could thus be firmly earmarked
for specific construction
projects rather than parceled
out in annual plans.
Agriculture
A large part of the eco-
nomic portion of the party
program is devoted to plans
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
for agriculture, which Khru-
shchev called the "main task"
of the party. Agricultural
production is to increase 6-7
percent annually during the
next 20 years, while grain
production is to be doubled.
Similar large increases are
planned for other farm commodi-
ties.
Increased investment in
agriculture, together with new
technology, could bring sub-
stantial increases in output
in the next two decades, but
results probably will fall far
short of Soviet ambitions. The
goals in general are completely
unrealistic, representing in-
creases unprecedented for any
major agricultural area in the
world over such an extended
period, much less for the USSR,
where agriculture has tradi-
tionally been treated as the
stepchild of industry.
Although agriculture ulti-
mately is to receive a higher
priority than in the past,
Khrushchev's speech strongly
implied a continuation of the
"bootstrap" approach: organi-
zational juggling and experi-
mentation with new crops and
methods in the hopes of getting
high returns from low expendi-
tures.
A tenfold increase over
1961 in production of mineral
fertilizer and a fourfold in-
crease in irrigated area is
planned for 1980. The goal
for mineral fertilizer
appears to be much too high,
but emphasis on irrigation may
yield results and could mean
that cotton production, of all
farm commodities, will come
closest to reaching the 1980
goal.
Consumer Program
The consumer goods industry
by 1980 is to increase to five
times the current level, whereas
industry as a whole will grow
sixfold. This means that both
light industry, which produces
most of the consumer goods, and
heavy industry are expected to
grow at approximately the rates
claimed in recent years--8 and
10-11 percent respectively.
Although Khrushchev implied that
by 1980 the consumer would be
receiving a greater share of
total industrial production than
at present, the share actually
will decrease. In general, the
goals set for light goods and
consumer durables are fairly
realistic as measured by the
"scientific norms" for consump-
tion which were announced in
1958 and which are roughly
equivalent to US production in
1957.
In support of the program's
claim to "solve" the housing
problem, Khrushchev promises
three times as much housing by
1980, implying about 120-130
square feet per capita. If this
level is achieved, it would be
a welcome improvement for Soviet
citizens, although it would still
be far behind present US stand-
ards. As scheduled, the program
for housing is feasible but will
place an increasingly heavy
burden on construction during
the second decade. Housing will
remain a serious problem in the
Soviet Union for many years to
come.
The party program--replete
with offers of "free goods and
services"--promises a utopian
future, Communist style, to the
Soviet citizen and the achieve-
ment of "a standard of living
higher than in any capitalist
country." Even this remote
promise is not quite backed by
the specific goals in the
program. The promised 350-per-
cent increase in real income,
for example, would bring the
USSR barely to the 1960 US level.
In reality, the Soviet citizen
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
can look forward to Spartan
existence by Nestern standards.
The prospective "free" items
now cost the consumer relatively
little in direct outlays--slight-
ly more than 10 percent of total
consumer expenditures in 1960;
the balance of the cost of the
goods and services is paid pri-
marily through indirect taxes.
Whether the consumer pays di-
rectly or indirectly for such
services is mainly a bookkeeping
problem and has no effect, as
such, on his standard of living.
Increases in agricultural
production will provide some
improvement in the Soviet diet,
long on potatoes and short on
meat, but improvements will be
far short of the levels implied
by the program's goals. Light
industry, hampered by shortages
of agricultural materials, will
provide sufficient clothing but
of limited and perhaps poor
quality and style. Small, poor-
ly constructed apartments will
be sparsely furnished and, in
spite of promises of wide in-
troduction of "cheap household
machines," the Soviet citizen
will likely be expected to share
these with other occupants of
his apartment building.
The average citizen will
work shorter hours, but the
demands on his leisure time
will be increased for "volun-
tary" work without compensation
for the party's "common good."
Everyone, including women, will
be expected to work, and the
availability of "free" nurseries
and communal dining will make
it difficult to avoid this obli-
gation.
Although the average Soviet
individual will be better off
in 1980 in terms of having addi-
tional goods, these may well
not be the goods of his choice.
The "new" Soviet man will have
to learn to be satisfied with
a "reasonable" standard of
living as defined by the party.
Some will think the time period
for implementing the "benefits"
far too long and will view
certain of the progra=.:'s ob-
jectives as postponements of
benefits they expected earlier;
achievement of the goal for pro-
duction of meat, for example,
in the remote possibility that
it should be met, would come
ten years later than Khrushchev
promised on an earlier occasion.
Failure of the program to be more
specific on production of consumer
goods as well as the warning that
it may be necessary to increase
defense spending may dampen pub-
lic expectations of a sharp im-
provement in standard of living.
International Implications
The Soviet party program
has several international aims
peripheral to its central one
of presenting a strong and confi-
dent image to the world abroad.
Khrushchev stressed the importance
of receptiveness to foreign ideas,
especially in regard to advanc-
ing technology. Trade is an
implicit feature of the program,
both from the point of view of
its usefulness in strengthening
the Soviet economy and of its
value in "peaceful competition."
Khrushchev explicitly stated
that "the Soviet Union in the
near future will take such a po-
sition in the world market that
Messrs Imperialists will feel
how our agriculture is increas-
ing." Although Soviet agricul-
ture is the least likely quarter
from which Khrushchev could
expect to draw resources for his
export program, the statement
does illustrate intentions, and
the fact remains that each year
the USSR is increasingly able to
threaten established world market
patterns.
In many parts of the world
the Soviet claims for the future
will be accepted in the light of
the rapid industrial advances
already made by the USSR. Like-
wise, the welfare program will
have its appeal.
For the West the message
remains clear. The outstand-
ing commitment of resources
is to industrial growth--that
is, investment in heavy in-
dustry. Productive capacity
is largely committed through-
out the 20-year period simply
to building more productive
capacity. Between the two
other major alternatives of
a state--consumer welfare
or military spending--there
is no explicit commitment,
but the obvious implication
is for a sharp increase in
military potential.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The British-administered
UN trust territory of Tangan-
yika becomes independent on 9
December in an atmosphere of
relative political stability
and racial harmony, and with
the economy showing a slow but
steady advance. Under the
leadership of Julius Nyerere,
its able and pro-Western prime
minister, the territory can be
expected to pursue a moderate
neutralist line in foreign re-
lations and to push for a re"
gional grouping in East Africa.
Internally, Nyerere apparently
is considering the establish-
ment of a :looser version of the
monolithic state found in sev-
eral West African countries in
an effort to cut off the nascent
opposition to his Tanganyika
African National Union (TANU).
The Tanganyika government's
effectiveness will be hampered
by the country's basic weakness
and by the inexperience of its
leaders.
Background
In some respects, the cre-
ation of a unified state was an
easier task in Tanganyika than
elsewhere in British East and
Central Africa. The 9,000,000
Africans are divided into 120
different tribes, none of which
was large enough to prevent the
development of TANU along supra-
tribal lines. Moreover, the un-
certainties resulting from Tan-
ganyika's mandate status between
Vorld Vars I and II, coupled
with the territory's poverty,
discouraged European immigra-
tion. There are only about 21,-
000 whites, most of them trait"
sient civil servants, managers,
and businessmen rather than far-
mers competing with Africans
for the land. As a result there
is little of the racial tension
so prevalent in Kenya and South-
ern Rhodesia.
Nyerere began to exploit
this favorable climate early in
the 1950s. After earning a
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23 Nov 61 RD rTAT. AR'TTC'T.T,' Dorm
master's degree in history and
economics from Edinburgh Univer-
sity, Nyerere taught school for
a few years following his return
to the territory. In 1954 he
founded TANU and the next year
resigned his teaching job to
devote full time to politics.
By 1958 and 1959, when the
territory's first elections were
held, TANU was strong enough to
secure the election of its mem-
bers or supporters--Asian and
European as well as African--
in every constituency. Sub-
sequently the party, which
had begun by limiting its member-
ship to Africans, became offi-
cially multiracial and further
consolidated its hold on the
country; 70 of the 71 members
of the legislature are TANU
adherents.
As Nyerere and TANU demon-
strated their moderation and
their hold on the electorate,
Britain stepped up the pace of
political advance. Nyerere be-
came Tanganyika's first "chief
minister" in October 1960 under
a constitution which granted
substantial internal autonomy
and provided an elected majority
in the legislature. Following
another constitutional revision
last March, Tanganyika received
virtually complete autonomy.
Nyerere was named prime minister
in May.
Tanganyika thus is moving
into independence with a reputa-
tion for stability and modera-
tion. This reputation may be
eroded after 9 December as a
result of a variety of factors.
Sources of Friction
Considerable friction is
likely to stem from the dispar-
ity in ability and sophistica-
tion between Nyerere and his
African followers in TANU. One
British official described
Nyerere as "fifty years ahead"
of any other Tanganyika African.
He is an excellent parliamentary
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TANGANYIKA
ZP
UGANDA
REPUBLIC
OF
THE CONGO
0
0 Mpanda
AND NYASALAND
(U.K
9 Lake
KENYA
p (U. K.)
* Nairobi
Lake
(~2u kwa
0 Mbeya
RHODESIA
MOZAMBIQUE
(PORT.)
manager who reportedly "handles
loRAl extremists in a manner
eminiscent of a schoolmaster."
Outside the legislature, how-
ever, there is little apprecia-
tion for Nyerere's sophisticated
ideals of multiracialism and
East African federation. When
Nyerere's reputation as the
engineer of independence has
faded, his hold on the populace
may be challenged by extremists
with less farsighted but more
easily understood programs.
A nascent and so-far dis-
united opposition to Nyerere
already exists. It centers in
a dissident faction in the Tan-
ganyika Federation of Labor (TFL),
which Nyerere has been trying to
turn into a TANU-controlled
organization on the Ghanaian pat-
tern, and in the small but nois-
ily extremist African National
Congress (ANC). The union group,
headed by Christopher Tumbo, has
an assortment of axes to grind:
it criticizes the slow rate of
"Africanization" in industry and
government; opposes Tanganyika's
MALAGASY
REPUBLIC
14 1
participation in the East Afri-
can High Commission, a customs
and common services union which
Nyerere hopes to use as a nu-
cleus of an East African federa-
tion; and condemns the TFL's
financial weakness and the will-
ingness of its leaders to subor-
dinate themselves to TANU.
In mid-October, ten legisla-
tors led by Tumbo, exploiting
the anti-Asian feeling which
exists despite Nyerere's efforts
to smooth over race relations,
presented Nyerere with his first
open challenge in the legisla-
tive council. The prime minister
easily beat down the attack, but
American observers believe Tumbo's
challenge may presage a rise in
African chauvinism, to the detri-
ment both of racial harmony and
of Nyerere's authority.
The ANC, whose president is
Zuberi Mtemtru but whose real
leader reportedly is Michael
Sanga, was ineffective until
early this year; Mtemvu polled
only 67 votes in the September
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1960 elections. Beginning in
January 1961, however, the
party's stridently anti-Western
line began to take effect, and
Mtemvu and his associates picked
up the popular theme of the slow
rate of Africanization. These
efforts have won the support of
some of the lower ranking Afri-
can civil servants, and attend-
ance at ANC meetings is in the
These two focuses of oppo-
sition have so far not merged--
Tumbo, in fact, is seeking ICFTU
support in his dispute with the
TFL and is unlikely to join with
the Communist-supported ANC
while his case is pending. How-
ever, they might do so in time
if they felt they could thereby
oust Nyerere. They probably
would be joined by many TANU
opportunists, and the resulting
coalition, which almost certainly
would be racist and anti-Nestern,
could have considerable strength.
Nyerere
claims that the problems facing
Tanganyika are too great to per-
mit the luxury of dissidence,
and the ANC has been harassed
by the Tanganyika bureaucracy,
which periodically threatens to
proscribe it.
In his relations with the
opposition and with the trade
union movement, Nyerere shows
the influence of Ghana. His
moves against the TFL, in fact,
were taken on the advice of a
Ghanaian labor leader, John
Tettegah. Nyerere on occasion
has defended Nkrumah in emotion-
al terms, asserting that the
Ghanaian President is misunder-
stood by the West.
Nyerere's Federation Hopes
Nkrumah's pan-African ideals
are an obvious inspiration of
Nyerere's dream of an East Afri-
can federation. According to
the American consul general in
Dar-es-Salaam, the Tanganyika
premier is strongly committed
to this goal and can be expected
to press for it, perhaps even to
the extent of endangering his
position within Tanganyika. For
a time, in fact, Nyerere was
willing to delay Tanganyika's
accession to independence in
hopes that the other candidates
for federation--Kenya, Uganda,
and Zanzibar--could resolve their
constitutional disputes with
Britain and all four could be-
come independent together as
part of the federation. He was
forced to yield to internal
pressure for further political
advance, however, and now feels
that a federation will be im-
possible for several years after
the other territories achieve
independence.
Nyerere's preoccupation
with federation is the main gov-
erning factor in his relations
with other African leaders in
the area. He recognizes that
the prestige of Kenya's Jomo
Kenyatta among Africans far out-
shines that of any other East
African leader, including him-
self; moreover, Kenyatta's party,
the Kenya African National Union
(KANU), is pushing for the kind
of highly centralized state in
Kenya which Nyerere would like
to bring in the federation. As
a result, Nyerere has supported
KANU over its rival, the Kenya
African Democratic Union, so
openly as to give rise to charges
of interference in internal Kenya
politics.
Economic Aspects
There is a school of thought,
led by Tanganyika's British finance
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
minister, Sir Ernest Vasey, that
in federation Nyerere is pursu-
ing a-goal which runs counter
to the best economic interest
of the territory. Tanganyika
has not yet fully recovered
from the economic stagnation
of the period between the two
wars, and its per capita gross
domestic product is only about
$56 a year.
Nevertheless, thanks both
to Vasey's skill in attracting
outside capital and to the
territory's fairly well diver-
sified agricultural and mineral
production, the balance of
trade is favorable and there
is often a small budgetary sur-
plus. Investment continues to
flow into the territory--notably
$35,700,000 in grants and loans
from Britain in support of Tan-
ganyika's three-year develop-
ment plan. Vasey argues that
in a federation, Tanganyika
would be underwriting Kenya's
trade deficit, and its drawing
power for foreign capital would
be compromised by the political
uncertainty which has led to
economic stagnation and capital
flight in Kenya.
Although Vasey is Nyerere's
most influential adviser in
economic matters, the prime
minister apparently is letting
political considerations rule
on the federation question.
At any rate, Tanganyika seems
likely to retain its economic
independence for the next few
years, by which time its own
economy should be further
strengthened.
The principal internal
obstacles to economic develop-
ment are underpopulation and
an inadequate capital base.
Much of Tanganyika is arid or
infested with the tsetse fly,
and the population density is
only 25 per square mile. The
population is concentrated
around the edges of the terri-
tory: in the northern and
southern highlands, along the
Indian Ocean coast, and around
the lakes in the northwest and
west. These factors have made
the construction of communica-
tions routes expensive and have
greatly hindered economic de-
velopment. As a result, Tan-
ganyika's principal exports
either are produced close to
a port--as in the case of sisal
and coffee--or they are high-
price, low-bulk items such as
diamonds. Much of the expendi-
ture of the three-year plan
is to be devoted to improving
the transportation network.
Foreign Relations
Tanganyika's foreign
policy probably will parallel
that of Nigeria, associated
with the West in general and
with Britain in particular,
but reserving the right to dif-
fer on specific issues, particu-
larly in Africa. As in Nigeria,
the existence of an unsophisti-
cated population and of dema-
gogues willing to exploit it
will pose a limit to the modera-
tion of the current leaders;
they are unlikely to associate
themselves with the West when
by so doing they would open
themselves to challenges from
inside the country.
Tanganyika's pro-Western
attitude will be further modi-
fied by admiration for the eco-
nomic achievements of the Com-
munist system. Nyerere has
been particularly impressed by
Yugoslav "controlled capitalism,"
and he has repeatedly held
socialism up as the ideal for
African governments. Within
this socialistic framework, how-
ever, he will continue to wel-
come private investment, both
because of Tanganyika's poverty
and because of his own moderate
inclinations.
Nyerere has demonstrated
some lack of realism with regard
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to Tanganyika's foreign rela-
tions. The territory's poverty
has led to a determination to
keep its diplomatic establish-
ment to the minimum; at one
time, in fact, Tanganyika was
to be represented only at the
UN. There was some sentiment
for the exclusion from the
territory of all embassies,
with the possible exception of
Britain's, on grounds that
all diplomatic missions are
subversive. Subsequently,
Nyerere has agreed to permit
a few diplomatic establish-
ments in Dar-es-Salaam and
reportedly will send ambassa-
dors to the US, Britain, and
possibly the UAR and India as
well as the UN.
Tanganyika hopes to follow
a policy of "independence" on
East-Nest issues. Despite his
admiration for Nkrumah, Nyerere's
idealism is likely to draw him
more toward Nehru and other
moderate neutralists who are
trying to bridge the gap between
the two major blocs. He has a
realistic idea of the likely
extent of Tanganyika's influence
in these areas, however, and is
likely to devote most of his
attention to matters closer to
home.
Like Nigerian Prime Minis-
ter Balewa, Nyerere has been
strong in his denunciations of
South Africa. Prior to the
Commonwealth prime ministers'
conference last spring, he
threatened to refuse to bring
Tanganyika into the Commonwealth
if South Africa remained a mem-
ber. He probably will try to
maintain correct relations with
his European neighbors in Mozam-
bique and the Federation of Rho-
desia and Nyasaland, but he and
his lieutenants are giving sym-
pathy and aid to African nation-
alists from those areas. He is
a friend and admirer of both
Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rho-
desia and Joshua Nkomo of South-
ern Rhodesia; his attitude to-
ward Nyasaland's Hastings Banda
is much more reserved.
Tanganyika has a long
border with Mozambique, and the
tribes in the area are similar
on both sides of the border.
TANU, in the person of Tan-
ganyika Education Minister Oscar
Kambona, Nyerere's ambitious
party lieutenant, has furnished
support to the small Mozambique
African National Union, and
Nyerere persuaded Britain to
expel the Portuguese consul
in Dar-es-Salaam. Nyerere has
tried to limit his support to
moderate Mozambique elements,
but pressure to extend aid to
more radical groups, such as the
Communist-supported Mozambique
National Democratic Union, is
certain to increase after inde-
pendence.
Tanganyika is riding to
independence on a wave of
euphoria both at home and abroad.
In comparison with the difficul-
ties in neighboring areas--ra-
cial tension in the Rhodesias,
tribal and personal bickering
in Kenya, and anarchy in the
Congo--Tanganyika's outlook ap-
pears advantageous.
Independence will not,
however, solve the territory's
basic weaknesses: the low level
of economic development, the
paucity of competent leaders,
and Nyerere's own idealism and
inexperience in foreign affairs.
Once the euphoria has worn off,
problems which had been suppressed
up to then are likely to as-
sert themselves: the problems
of lethargy, corruption, and
individual ambition in TANU's
monolithic structure, and the
question of increasing extremist
opposition to Nyerere both in-
side and outside TANU. The de-
gree to which Nyerere can con-
trol these elements will set
the limit to the contribution
Tanganyika can make as a moderate
force. In any case, however,
the territory's influence will 25X1
not be great, particularly in
issues outside Africa.
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