CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003200060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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C
%00 LM %.0 IN " I
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
1 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOCUMENT NO. s7
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
EI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:,~S ?. 25X1
111 AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ~'/~?U
State Dept. review completed
COPY NO. 76
OCR NO. 0282/61
TOAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
In the Namone talks, the Souvanna group and the
Pathet Lao refuse to agree to effective procedures for
ICC supervision of the cease-fire and continue to empha-
size the importance of a political solution. A similar
stand has been taken by their representatives and bloc
delegates at Geneva. Attacks are continuing against
government Meo guerrilla bases in Xieng Khouang Province.
Elsewhere, Pathet Lao forces are engaging in limited
skirmishing to consolidate their positions.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
President Balaguer and other Trujillo associates re-
tained power immediately following the dictator's assassi-
nation by a retired army general who had been in close
contact with a pro-US, middle-of-the-road dissident ci-
vilian group. An internal power struggle is likely;
the longer it is protracted, the greater the opportuni-
ties offered to pro-Castro elements, both inside the
country and in exile. 25X1
EAST-WEST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Khrushchev, in his conversation with Ambassador
Thompson preliminary to the Vienna meeting with President
Kennedy, strongly emphasized his determination to con-
clude a separate peace treaty with East Germany if no
agreement can be reached on Berlin by this fall or winter.
Soviet bloc statements and propaganda commentaries have
treated the Vienna meeting as a point of departure for
further negotiations and as a step toward an accommoda-
tion of Soviet and American positions on key East-West
issues. Peiping's first editorial comment on the talks
avoids the polemical language which marked its comments
on the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meetings but suggests con-
tinued reservations about the talks. 25X1
SOUTH KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The South Korean military leaders seem to envisage
an extended period of military rule. The ruling Supreme
Council for National Reconstruction is drafting a basic
law--in effect revising the constitution--in order to
provide a legal basis for ruling by fiat. All social
and political organizations are being brought under con-
trol of the regime, and direct military control of the
government is being extended down through the county
level. There are continuing factional differences within
the council. The regime appears to have little popular
support and may turn increasingly to repressive measures
to stay in power.
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Prime Minister Amini has so far been unable to gather
any base of popular support, and pressure on him has in-
creased with strikes and threats of strikes. A government
spokesman said that the Shah, following his return from
Norway on 31 May, had expressed "full support and appreci-
ation" to the prime minister.
The anti-regime National Front is refusing to
cooperate with Amini, and Tudeh (Communist) party activit
is increasing.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
With the conference at Coquilhatville ended, Kasavubu
apparently plans to convene parliament soon in Leopold-
ville to discuss proposals made at that meeting, and
Gizenga continues to demand that it meet at Kamina. The
UN seems willing to provide protection for legislators
whether parliament meets there or at Leopoldville. Ham-
marskjold appears to prefer Kamina as the more practical
site and has stated that the session would be senseless
unless the Gizenga faction is represented. Economic
deterioration is widespread, and both Gizenga and Kasa-
vubu are facing increasingly serious financial problems.
CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
President Dorticos has accepted an invitation to
visit Prague beginning on 9 June.
Foreign Minister Roa
ead the Cuban delegation to the preliminary Cairo
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conference of neutralist nations opening on 5 June and
will probably maintain that the Castro regime is inde-
pendent of the Sino-Soviet bloc; the Cuban good will
mission visiting Latin American capitals has been reit-
erating this theme.
FOOD SHORTAGE IN NORTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Food shortages are widespread in North Vietnam
there is
considerable evidence of food shortages and unrest in
various localities. This situation is the result not
only of a poor 1960 harvest but also of the growing indus-
trial and export demands on agriculture and the need to
satisfy the food requirements of a rapidly growing popu-
lation. Hanoi acknowledged serious food problems during
the first part of this year, but now that the early harvest
is under way, it is expressing optimism that the food
shortage will be alleviated.
CHANGE IN SOVIET ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The councils for "planning and coordination" within
the 17 economic areas into which the USSR was recently
divided will deal with long-range economic development.
They are intended to ensure a type of coordinated re-
gional development not provided now either by the re-
public bodies or by the more than 100 "councils of na-
tional economy" (sovnarkhozes) which were established
in 1957. The new councils, however, will not be em-
powered to intervene in the day-to-day operation of
the economy, nor will they replace any of the principal
administrative agencies already in existence. This re-
organization--first specifically discussed in 1960--is
in accord with Khrushchev's statement in 1958 that larg-
er economic regions for planning would be established
as a modification of the 1957 reorganization
ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION IN BULGARIA . . . . . . . . Page 17
The Bulgarian regime is continuing to reorganize its
party and government machinery, ostensibly to rectify
administrative shortcomings, particularly in the manage-
ment of the economy. The leadership of the Central Coun-
cil of Trade Unions has been changed and leaders in five
of Bulgaria's 30 districts are known to have been removed.
Those in several other-areas have been severely criti-
cized in the frankest public discussion of internal
difficulties in recent years. The regime's action was
probably forced by the discovery within the party earlier
this year of a dissident group which was demanding
changes in Bulgaria's economic policies.
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MALI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Mali's greater involvement with Sino-Soviet bloc
countries has been marked by the arrival of increasing
numbers of bloc technicians on long-term assignments.
This bloc build-up presently is occurring mainly in the
fields of civil aviation and information, both of which
are headed by-members of the regime's extreme left wing.
Mali also appears to be accumulating large stocks of
Czech arms and military equipment.
COMMUNISTS MAKE GAINS IN CYPRIOT LABOR MOVEMENT .
. Page 20
Communists have recently made significant gains in
the Cypriot labor movement, because anti-Communist elements
and the government have proved unable to cooperate and
government leaders have been unwilling to resist pressure
from the left. The recently elected head of the Cyprus
Confederation of Workers (SEK), the largest non-Communist
labor federation, has come under the influence of the
more astute leader of the Pan-Cyprian Federation of
Labor (PEO), the Communist-dominated federation; as a re-
sult the SEK is likely to become more closely aligned
with the PEO or to break up into warring, factions. Mean-
while, the government has chosen a Communist as a member
of the Cypriot delegation to the conference this month
of the International Labor Organization.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
De Gaulle has apparently won renewed support from
Adenauer for a loose political confederation of the Com-
mon Market (EEC) countries, and France now hopes to
hold the constituent meeting in early July. The two
leaders also agreed at their recent meeting to press
ahead with the scheduled implementation of the EEC
treaty, including the early development of a specific
program for agriculture. There are some indications
that De Gaulle now is prepared to consider the possi-
bility of British accession to the EEC. The expecta-
tion that Britain will join is arousing concern among
the other members of the Outer Seven (EFTA), whose
council is due to meet on 6 June.
WATER DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEAR EAST . . . . . . . . . Page 1
During the next few years a number of projects to
develop the Near East's water resources will be completed.
The political and economic consequences of this develop-
ment, which involves the daily life of over three fourths
of the area's population, can be expected to have a
marked influence on assessments by local leaders of
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future needs for foreign economic assistance. Among the
points that stand out in a survey of the area are that
Egypt's High Dam scheme is progressing without major
difficulties; that Israel has nearly reached the limit
of its water resources without embroiling itself further
with the Arabs or using expensive new processes; that
Iraq's once-promising developments are lagging badly;
and that Iran's ambitious plans are, under present so-
cial conditions, primarily of benefit to the landlords.
BRITISH GUIANA MOVES TOWARD INDEPENDENCE . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Communist-led People's Progressive party has a
clear advantage over its divided rivals as British Guiana
prepares to exercise internal self-government after elec-
tions this August. Complete independence is scheduled
to follow in 1963 or 1964. The party chief, Cheddi Jagan,
in his four years as effective head of the colonial gov-
ernment has pursued a moderate course and avoided actions
that might jeopardize the colony's constitutional advance.
During this time he and others in top party ranks have in-
creased contacts with Communists abroad, and in the past
year they have become less evasive in advocating a so-
cialist program.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
LAOS
In the Laotian political
talks at Namone, only the Sou-
vanna delegates appear anxious
to move forward on the forma-
tion of a coalition government.
The primary objective of the
government delegation, under
General Phoumi's directives,
is to obtain definitive cease-
fire terms while raising un-
acceptable proposals in the
political talks. At the 31
May military talks, Neo Lao
Hak Sat (NLHS) representatives
seized the initiative with pro-
posals that would restrict sup-
port activities of the Boun
Oum forces. NLHS spokesmen
appear to be stalling on both
the cease-fire and political
issues to enable Pathet Lao
forces to eliminate pockets of
government resistance and to
consolidate their position
throughout the country.
Bloc Stalling Tactics
A further manifestation
of Communist stalling tactics
is the interpretation by Pei-
ping and Hanoi of the agree-
ment reached at Namone to set
up a military subcommittee to
deal with cease-fire problems.
Although picturing this
agreement as the result of
Communist reasonableness, both
indicate that the new group
will have little to do at this
juncture.
They assert that the sub-
committee will merely "study
and discuss" cease-fire rules,
"form" tripartite inspec-
tion teams, and "set up"
terms of reference for the
International Control Com-
mission (ICC). The subcom-
mittee, however, will not
even report its findings under
these headings to the Namone
conference until agreement has
been reached on the formation
of a provisional government.
A "major, pressing" cease-fire
matter can be reported before
that time only if all three
parties agree.
The deputy leader of the
North Vietnamese delegation at
Geneva reportedly told a jour-
nalist that hostilities in Laos
would end "only when the con-
ference ends."
The Soviets last week re-
jected a British proposal at
Geneva that the cochairmen--the
USSR and the UK--specifically
authorize the ICC to conduct
on-the-spot investigations of
cease-fire violations. In a
long and fruitless exchange
with the British delegate on
29 May, the acting head of the
Soviet delegation, Deputy For-
eign Minister Pushkin, refused
to consider placing the ques-
tion of ICC requirements on the
conference agenda and contended
that this matter should be dis-
cussed by the cochairmen outside
the plenary sessions without
committing themselves on the
substantive problems of the con-
trol mechanism.
First Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Kuznetsov told British Am-
bassador Roberts on 27 May that
the cochairmen had done good
work and should continue to,
cooperate to secure the quickest
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
possible settlement in Laos and
make sure that the conference
is not distracted from essen-
tials.
The bloc's intransigence
reflects concern that debate
in the plenary sessions of the
conference on these issues
would keep the conference from
considering the bloc's princi-
ples for a Laotian settlement
presented by Gromyko on 17 May
and strengthen the Western case
for establishing an effective
control mechanism. The bloc
probably feels that instruc-
tions authorizing effective
ICC investigation of cease-fire
violations would inhibit Pathet
Lao military pressure against
government forces and weaken
the bloc's bargaining position
in future substantive negotia-
tions on Laotian neutrality
and related political prob-
lems. The bloc delegates ap-
pear to be pursuing the stand-
ard Communist tactic of demand-
ing agreement in principle on
the general terms of a settler
meat before taking up detailed
consideration of control pro-
visions.
Another factor influenc-
ing the stalling tactics of
the Communist delegates at
Geneva is their hope that the
tripartite negotiations at
Namone, in which the Vientiane
Government has made a
series of concessions, will
produce a political agreement
favorable to the Communists
which would confront the Geneva
conference with a fait ac-
compli.
Laotians in Europe
The purpose of Prime Min-
ister Boun Oum's trip to France
on 28 May was to explain the
government's position to Prince
Sihanouk and to seek his sup-
port. Boun Oum apparently is
operating within narrow confines
set by General Phoumi and is not
likely to play any substantive
role while abroad unless condi-
tions change.
Quinim Pholsena, leader of
the Souvanna delegation, is also
reported trying to get in touch
with government delegates. The
government delegation and the
political party leaders are
described as unanimous in their
support of encouraging further
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
contacts with the Souvanna
group but are reluctant to pro-
ceed without the sanction of
General Phoumi in Vientiane.
Military Situation
Despite the obstacles it
faces, there are indications
that the ICC is now willing to
interpret its directives more
liberally and to undertake an
inspection of cease-fire vio-
lations against government
Meo guerrilla bases in the Pa
Dong area, southwest of the
Plaine des Jarres. ICC action,
however, continues to be hampered
by lack of logistic support
and of cooperation from the
Souvanna factian ~ azid' ' the
NLHS.
Although minor skirmishing
continues in several areas,
the major focus of enemy mil-
itary action remains the Pa
Dong area, where artillery bom-
bardment of the Meo guerrilla
base was resumed on 29 May
after a two-day lull.
Pathet Lao forces control
about two thirds of eastern
Laos south of Xieng Khouang
Province and that large num-
bers of Communist troops are
preparing to infiltrate south-
ern Laos, where much
of the population is s apathetic
to the Pathet Lao. estimates
of enemy troops in the area,
which are probably exaggerated,
are indicative of growing fear
and defeatism.
West of Savannakhet near
the South Vietnamese border on
Route 9, the small South Viet-
namese special forces group in
Laos is continuing to support
Laotian army remnants near the
border. Elements of a South
Vietnamese regular battalion
which had crossed a few miles
into Laos reportedly withdrew
to the border on 23-24 May.
Bloc Airlift
Soviet airlift planes flying
between Hanoi and Xieng Khouang
brought in North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao troops, that
about 2,000 North Vietnamese
troops had come in by truck
via Route 7, and that convoys 25X1
of 40 to 50 trucks accompanied
by armored cars were observed
frequently.
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for the North Vietnamese troops
were airlifted into Laos from
Hanoi. By the end of April,
Pathet Lao troops, except for
regional troops and guerrillas,
were receiving the same pro-
visions as the North Vietnamese.
The Kong Le forces at Khang
Khay were also receiving rice
from North Vietnam.
During March, April, and
May, cigarettes, beer, soap,
textiles, shoes, and other con-
sumer goods were flown into
Xieng Khouang from Hanoi and
turned over to merchants in
Xieng Khouang and nearby
Phong Savan to be sold. The
receipts were given to Kong
Le to pay his troops. The
North Vietnamese said that
consumer goods would soon
be arriving on a continuing
basis.
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President Balaguer and oth-
er Trujillo associates retained
control in the Dominican Repub-
lic immediately following the
dictator's assassination on 30 May
by a retired army general, Juan
Tomas Diaz, who had been in close
contact with a pro-US, middle-of-
the-road dissident civilian group.
An internal power struggle is
likely. The capital was under
tight security measures on 31
May, many dissidents were hiding
out in the homes of friends, and
a wave of panic food buying was
developing; few reports were
available on provincial areas.
General Diaz is reported to
be in hiding in the interior as
the police and units of the Do-
minican armed forces round up in-
dividuals believed to have been
associated with him. He may be
heading for the traditionally
dissident Cibao region in the
east-central part of the country.
Meanwhile, the late dicta-
tor's two sons have arrived in
the Dominican Republic after a
hastily arranged charter flight
from Europe. The elder son, Ra-
fael "Ramfis" Trujillo, Jr., is
a general and a minister without
portfolio and is believed, with
his military associates, to have
a core of fanatical support in
the air force mobile infantry
unit stationed near Ciudad Tru-
jillo. This military unit, rough-
Latin American countries. It
also includes officials of
Radio Caribe, whose pro-Castro
and bitterly anti-US and anti-
clerical diatribes over the
past ten months have probably
contributed to at least some
degree of anti-US feeling among
the Dominican people.
The longer an internal
power struggle is protracted,
the greater will be the opportu-
nities offered to pro-Castro ele-
ments, both inside the country
and in exile. During the past
ten months pro-Castro groups
within the country have been
strengthened by the dictator's
own political machinations. Last
week
told the American Consulate that
the officers involved in the
plot hoped the US would have
military strength available in
the area in case a post-Trujillo
government asks for assistance
in controlling the internal
situation.
Reaction in the rest of
Latin America to Trujillo's
death was generally one of grim
satisfaction. Chilean Foreign
Minister Ortuzar told newsmen
that the assassination was "a
natural end that awaits all dic-
ators...who make a mockery of
the rights and freedoms of man."
In Haiti, on the same island
with the Dominican Republic,
the reaction was one of alarm
as the government sent troops
to the border and mobilized the
President's special militia.
In Cuba, comment in the Castro-
controlled press stressed the
hope that the dictator's death
will mean the "true liberation"
of the Dominican people, who
now have "a magnificent op-
portunity to recover their
freedom."
two army brigades stationed in In Venezuela, where Pres-
the capital city are commanded ident Romu].o Beta::icourt was
by relatives of the late dictator. the target of an almost-suc-
ly equivalent to a US World War
II regimental combat team, is
likely to play an important part
in any struggle for power. The
includes the de facto head of
the hated Military Intelligence
Service, John Abbes, who has been
involved since 1957 in Trujillo's
subversive operations in other
the Chamber of Deputies
unanimously passed a resolu-
tion of solidarity with the
people of the Dominican Repub-
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I cessful assassination attempt
The clique around "Ramfis" mounted by Trujillo last year,
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Official Soviet bloc state-
ments and propaganda commentary
have stressed that the discus-
sions. in Vienna between Khru-
shchev and President Kennedy on
3 and 4 June will serve mainly
as a point of departure for fur-
ther talks, provided the US is
willing to adjust its policy.
Pravda established this line by
stating on 28 May that it is
"inconceivable" that all the
disputes that have arisen since
the end of the war can be cleared
up in two days. Soviet spokes-
men have echoed this view in
public statements, and Soviet
officials are apparently under
instructions to.-portray the
meeting as an opportunity to
lay the groundwork for an ac-
commodation of Soviet and Ameri-
can positions on key East-West
questions.
The Soviet ambassador to
Prague, in an address to a con-
ference on European security and
Germany, stated, "We believe
that this meeting (in Vienna)
will be a major contribution to
a relaxation of international
tension and an improvement in
relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States."
A Soviet Embassy official in
Belgrade took a similar line in
a private conversation with-an
American Embassy officer, stat-
ing, "While we realize that no
agreements can be reached in
Vienna, spade work for future
accords is both desirable and
possible."
At an American-Soviet con-
ference in the USSR attended by
nonofficial representatives,
Soviet writer Aleksandr Korney-
chuk stated that the Vienna
talks "should lay the beginning
for a change in the climate of
US-Soviet relations." Czech
President Novotny,; in a state-
ment at a reception for Presi-
dent Sukarno, said the talks
would have an "important effect
on the subsequent development
of the international situation,"
and it was to be hoped that the
meeting would open the way to
further negotiations.
Pravda has listed general
and complete disarmament as the
paramount issue in the talks.
The only other issues mentioned
by Pravda were a German peace
treaty and a Berlin settlement.
A TASS correspondent claimed
that the talks will be an ex-
change of positions, with a pos-
sibility of agreement on "posi-
tive steps" to improve the
situation.
The first secretary of the
Czech Embassy in Paris told a
US official that Khrushchev
would bring up disarmament,
Germany, and a future summit.
He said the Soviet leader will
make it clear that the test-ban
talks in Geneva will not succeed
unless agreement can be reached
on general disarmament. Khru-
shchev, according to the Czech
diplomat, is also planning to
request agreement on a date for
reopening negotiations on Ger-
many, will state his "obliga-
tion" to sign a separate peace
treaty with East Germany, and
will press for an agreed date
for a summit conference. The
official speculated that Khru-
shchev will also raise the
Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free
zone in Central Europe, since
the Soviets have been discussing
this plan in talks with bloc
countries.
Moscow has printed parts
of the President's special mes-
sage to Congress a.nd excerpts
from his address in Boston. The
TASS summary of this address
stressed that the President fa-
vored personal meetings to help
lessen international tension
and that such meetings could
play a useful role in the search
for peace.
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A note of caution in bloc
commentaries is reflected in
Pravda's warning that "many
commentators" feel that US
foreign-policy makers "will
not be able to get out of the
impasse resulting from their
own reckless course until they
discard the position-of-strength
policy and other outmoded con-
cepts and ideas."
Peiping's first comment
--a People's Daily editorial
on 1 June--portrays the Presi-
dent's decision to hold talks
with Khrushchev, after having
first proposed that such talks
be delayed., as evidence of US
weakness after "repeated set-
backs" in domestic and for-
eign affairs. In contrast to
the Soviet attitude toward
the talks--which is described
as "new proof" of the USSR's
desire for peace and improved
relations with Washington--
the US is depicted as in-
sincere. While the editorial
avoids the polemical language
which marked Peiping's comment
on the Khrushchev-Eisenhower
meetings, it suggests con-
tinued reservations about such
meetings.
In his conversation with
Ambassador Thompson on 23 May,
Khrushchev emphasized his de-
termination to sign a sepa-
rate German peace treaty by
this fall or winter at the
latest if no agreement is
reached on Berlin. He denied
any intention of blockading
the city but made it clear
that East Germany would be
given complete control over
Allied military access. He
asserted that access would
then be prevented unless the
Western powers came to some
agreement with East Germany.
While recognizing that this
would produce a sharp increase
in tensions, Khrushchev again
expressed his conviction that
this would not lead to a gen-
eral war, since none of the
Western powers really wanted
German-unification.
Khrushchev also empha-
sized the importance of rec-
ognition of the.Polish.and
Czech frontiers. Finally,
he insisted that Berlin was
the crucial issue and that
there could be no agreement
on disarmament until that
question was solved.
The Soviet leader also
mentioned the standard Soviet
offer'to conclude a nonag-
gression pact between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact. On a
nuclear test ban, Khrushchev
was adamant in insisting on ac-
ceptance of the Soviet proposal
for a three-member council to
administer the treaty's control
system.
Khrushchev's purpose in
arranging this informal discus-
sion with the ambassador was to
convey to Washington a forceful
restatement of his views on Ber-
lin and Germany, using strong
language which he would not wish
to employ in his initial meet-
ing with the President. By
speaking in such forthright
terms, Khrushchev sought to ex-
ert pressure on the US to be
amenable to early negotiations
on this question and to make this
an attractive alternative to a
separate treaty granting the
Ulbricht regime full control
over Allied access to Berlin.
One of Khrushchev's aims
in detailing the consequences
of a separate treaty was to
counter Western statements
that a treaty would not affect
Western rights. Khrushchev
also sought to forestall any
effort to subordinate the Ber-
lin question to other issues
or to a general improvement in
the international situation.
While Khrushchev did not alter
the substance of the Soviet
position on Berlin, he did
hold open the way for a nego-
tiated solution along the
lines of previous Soviet pro-
posals for a temporary or in-
terim agreement on West Ber-
lin's status.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
South Korea's revolutionary
leaders are providing increasing
evidence that they envision an
extended period of military rule.
The regime is moving to bring
all social and political organi-
zations under its control and
appears to be moving toward a
controlled economy. Brigadier
General Kim Yun-kun, commander
of the marine unit which partic-
ipated in the coup and a member
of the ruling Supreme Council
for National Construction, has
stated that the junta intends to
develop a group of young civil-
ian leaders to whom it will give
control of the government "pos-
sibly after two years."
Factional differences with-
in the junta leadership are much
in evidence, and lines of com-
mand between moderate senior of-
ficers and their more rash
juniors are becoming increasing-
ly uncertain. Tension between
Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen.
Chang To-yong and coup strong-
man Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui may
be approaching a climax, with
the ouster of one or the other
from the ruling junta reported
possible before the end of the
month. Chang is credited with
being a moderating influence on
the insurgent leadership and is
believed to favor a relatively
early return to civilian govern-
ment.
The clique of young colonels
surrounding Pak favor prolonged
military rule. The Supreme Coun-
cil has been expanded and reor-
ganized to provide them with
greater representation. As a
group, the colonels are extreme-
ly nationalistic and eager to
undertake extensive reforms but
they lack positive plans or ad-
ministrative training. Should
the regime fail to win public
support, these junior officers
probably will push for increas-
ingly repressive measures against
any opposition.
Foreign Minister Kim Hong-
il informed the American charge
on 27 May that the regime was
drafting a "provisional" consti-
tution to "legalize" the trans-
fer of power to the Supreme Coun-
cil. The "provisional" constitu-
tion--which may be dignified by
a popular referendum--is intended
to provide a legal basis for the
extraconstitutional actions of
the regime while preserving the
appearance of continuity of gov-
ernment. The military leaders
fear that unless such continuity
is maintained--the Rhee govern-
ment was recognized by the UN
resolutions of 1950 and 1951--
Seoul's claim to be the only
legitimate Korean government
will appear no more valid than
that of Pyongyang.
Generals and one admiral
have been appointed governors
of all provinces and mayor of
Seoul. The regime is seeking
some 500 field officers to staff
national and local government
administrative posts down to
and including the county level.
Former Lieutenant General Kang
Mun-poing--a follower of the pro-
posed ambassador to the United
States, retired General Chong
I1-kwon--has been ordered to or-
ganize an extreme right-wing
veterans' group to support the
revolutionary government.
Twelve leading businessmen
accused of accumulating "illegal
fortunes" have been ordered ar- 25X1
rested, possibly as a sop to
public economic and social dis-
content.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Public reaction to the new
regime continues to be largely
passive, with known opponents
reluctant to speak up for fear
of possible repression. .tu-
dents, who toppled the Rhee gov-
ernment in 1960, appear to be
Prime Minister Amini has so
far been unable'to gather any
base of popular support, and
pressure on him has increased
as various labor groups threaten
postal and telegraph workers
are reported to be on strike,
and a bakers' organization claim-
ing 15,000 members has given the
government two weeks to meet its
demands or face a walkout. A
strike in the oil fields, where
there is always labor unrest,
is also a possibility.
From the beginning of
Amini's tenure the Shah has at-
tempted to retain significant
personal power. The Shah has
consulted security officials
independently of the prime min-
about evenly divided for and
against the coup. Many have been
impressed by the speed and effi-
ciency of the military in moving
to clean up government corrup-
tion and other obvious: manifes-
tations of bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency. Some, however, are be-
coming increasingly concerned
over limitations placed on
academic freedom. Should re-
pressions continue, student
elements may be moved to take
bolder action calling for a
return to civilian government.
ister, and apparently was also
instrumental in having former
Prime Minister Eqbal appointed
ar.}-) tssador to Spa i.n .
In the first public state-
ment following the Shah's return
from Norway on 31 May, a govern-
ment spokesman said that the
ruler had expressed "full sup-
port and appreciation" to Amini
during a meeting with the prime
minister.
Minister of Agriculture
Arsenjani, who is a confidant of
Amini and has been the spokesman
for the government, on 20 May
expressed the fear that a mili-
tary coup is both imminent and
inevitable.
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Although Amini has adopted
most of the program demanded by
the National Front except im-
mediate elections, it is not in-
clinedto cooperate with him, Its
leaders believe that Amini will
not succeed in his reform pro-
gram and that he will be forced
to act strongly against the
Front,
A radical offshoot of the
National Front, the National
Liberation Movepnent (formerly
the National Resistance Movement]
has decided to begin
agitation independently of the
National Front and to demand the
return of former Premier Mossa-
deq to active politics,
The Coquilhatville confer-
ence--which was dominated through-
out by officials from Leopold-
ville, particularly Foreign Min-
ister Bomboko--ended on 28 May
after five weeks of deliberation.
Its final resolutions reiterated
earlier Leopold ille proposals
for a federal glouping of trib-
ally based states with a
strong central authority. The
Kasavubu regime apparently plans
to call a meeting of parliament
early in June to discuss these
proposals,
The American ambassador in
Leopoldville believes that Gi-
zenga will try to prevent the
convening of parliament by
Kasabuvu and, if unsuccessful,
The Tudeh (Communist) party 25X1
appears to be taking advantage
of the uncertain situation to
step up agitation,
will seek to delay any parlia-
mentary session while attempt-
ing to line up support in the
Congo and abroad, If the
legislature does meet, the
ambassador feels Gizenga
will probably boycott it and
attempt to discredit its ac-
tivities,
Gizenga continues to demand
that parliament meet at Kamina
in Katanga, and he is supported
in this by the bloc and the rad-
ical African states, The UN ap-
pears willing to provide protec-
tion for legislators whether
parliament convenes there or at
Leopoldville; Hammarskjold, how-
ever, apparently has endorsed
Kamina, a UN-controlled base where
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2,900 Indian troops are statigmed,
as the more practical site. He
has also asserted publicly that
a meeting without the Gizenga
faction would be senseless.
The Leopoldville government
has moved Tshomb6 from Coquil-
hatville to Leopoldville, where
he is being kept under house ar-
rest. It appears to be using
the Katanga president as a bar-
gaining counter in its negotia-
tions with the acting government
in Eli*abethville, with the ob-
ject of including Katanga in a
federal system and obtaining the
support of Elisabethville?s dep-
uties to the national assembly.
In Elisabethville, the re-
gime led by Interior Minister
Munongo has reluctantly acqui-
esced in the eventual withdrawal
of several key Belgian military
and civilian advisers but has
refused to agree on a date for
their departure. A member of
the Belgian Foreign Ministry in-
dicated to an American official
on 29 May that Brussels intended
to put further pressure on the
Katanga regime to permit the
speedy repatriation of the ad-
visers; Belgium is still con-
cerned, however, that a whole-
sale Belgian withdrawal would
lead to economic chaos.
Economic difficulties are
increasing elsewhere in the coun-
try.[ 25X1
the
central government's financial
position ma collapse in July
or August. dete- 25X1
rioration has so far been
checked in part by psychologi-
cal factors which led to a hoard-
ing of banknotes and thereby
held off an inflationary spiral.
if this tendency, 25X1
should be reversed by favorable
political developments, the
Congolese Government would be
unable to cover its own expenses
and the monetary system would
begin to crumble.
The Stanleyville regime ap-
parently has more immediate fi-
nancial problems. According
to United Nations economic
officials, army units in' Stan-
leyville are pre-empting all
available banknotes, with the
result that no currency is
available for other purposes.
Gizenga?s position will be in
jeopardy unless he can find
funds for his troops. The
Leopoldville government re-
portedly is relying on this
economic deterioration to
topple the Gizenga regime.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Typical of the growing num-
ber of economic and cultural
delegations now shuttling be-
tween Havana and the bloc is a
recently announced Cuban-Soviet
exchange in the field of agri-
culture. Moscow radio re-
ported on 27 May that a group
of Soviet "agronomists, tractor
drivers, and technicians" had
left for Cuba, and that a Cuban
agricultural delegation would
soon arrive in the USSR to
"study agricultural tech-
nology, engage in sports, and
rest and amuse themselves."
The Ship carrying the Soviet
delegation is said by the Cuban
radio to be due in Havana on
5 June. A Havana radio an-
nouncement of 25 May said that
President Dorticos has accepted
an invitation to attend the.9
June opening of a national fair
in Prague.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Cuban Foreign Ministry of-
ficials are still engaged in
what seems to be a major dip-
lomatic offensive aimed at con-
vincing other countries of
Havana's peaceful intentions and
independence from the political
system of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
This is evidently the theme that
has been reiterated by the Cu-
ban good-will mission in each
Latin American capital visited
--apparently with limited ef-
fectiveness in some countries.
That part of the delegation led
by Foreign Affairs Under Secre-
tary Carlos Olivares arrived
in Ecuador on 27 May, its last
stop before returning to Havana
via Mexico City about 1 June.
The other part of the delega-
tion was to go on to Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and
Uruguay after conferring with
Venezuelan officials on 24 May.
Foreign Minister Raul Roa, who
will represent Cuba at the pre-
liminary conference of neutral-
ist nations opening in Cairo on
5 June, will probably take a
similar line on Cuba's "in-
dependence" of the bloc.
Private groups in at
least 14 Latin American coun-
tries have organized fund-
raising drives in order to con-
tribute to the purchase of the
the 500 heavy tractors demanded
by Castro in exchange for the
lives of some 1,200 insurgents
captured in the mid-April
landings. The responsible
press in nearly all Latin
American countries continues
to condemn Castro for the
proposal, scoring him for
his lack of regard for
human life.
Food shortages are wide-
spread in North Vietnam, accord-
ing to a French diplomat sta-
tioned in Hanoi. During a re-
cent trip to Bangkok, he told
the US ambassador to Thailand
that he had seen persons faint
from malnutrition in the streets
of the North Vietnamese capital
and that Ho Chi Minh had apol-
ogized to the diplomatic corps
for the general shortage of
food. The French official said
he had heard of three recent
riots brought on by hunger and
resentment of the regime's
forced-draft labor policy.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
While the Frenchman's re-
marks probably exaggerate the
situation, there is considerable
evidence of food shortages and
unrest in various localities.
In February 1961, the Indonesian
consul general in Hanoi reported
that his office has heard numer-
ous complaints from North Viet-
namese about difficult condi-
tions in Hanoi; the average
North Vietnamese, he said, was
weary of statistics about the
country's progress and wanted
more food.
the ration for both
rice and meat was progressively
reduced during late 1960. This
has contributed to the exist-
ence of a flourishing black
market and to hoarding. Fre-
quent and bitter complaints in
the Hanoi press about the lack
of "socialist consciousness" on
the part of peasants who hoard
grain or seek to dodge tax pay-
ments in kind provide ample testi-
mony to the passive resistance
the regime is encountering from
a hungry population.
Hanoi acknowledged serious
food problems at the beginning
of the year, admitting that these
difficulties were basic and
would take many years to solve.
Demands on agriculture to meet
the consumption requirements
of a rapidly expanding popula-
tion and to supply raw materials
for local industry and for ex-
port have outpaced the somewhat
erratic growth in agriculture.
As a consequence the regime has
not been able to build up ade-
quate reserve stocks of food to
keep unfavorable weather from
disrupting the supply.
The poor agricultural year
in 1960 was due primarily to
weather. Prolonged drought
damaged last year's spring har-
vest, and floods and insects
affected the fall crop, causing
a drop in food production of 14
percent from the previous year's
level., Per capita consumption
of food is._cprrebtly estimated
to be the lowest since 1957 and
considerably below the prewar
level. As is normal in a
year of poor harvests, short-
ages are most severe during the
spring, immediately before the
first harvest. Stepped-up so-
cializatiorr, drives in the rural
areas also contributed to the
present food difficulties.
In a press announcement of
24 May, Hanoi expressed opti-
mism over the prospects for
the harvest now in progress,
asserting that this crop will
be the best in many years. The
Communists claim that in the im-
portant rice-producing prov-
inces of Ha Nam, Ninh Binh,
and Nam Dinh--in the delta area
--the early rice crop should
be even better than in 1959,
the peak year for rice produc-
tion in North Vietnam. Al-
though rainfall this year has
been below normal, it has been
better than in 1960. In addi-
tion, crop acreage has been ex-
panded--more than doubled for
corn and sweet potatoes.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CHANGE IN SOVIET ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
A network of 17 economic
areas has been created in the
USSR, and all but one are to
have a council for "planning
and coordination," according
to the Soviet press. The new
councils will plan and coord-
inate long-range economic de-
velopment at an administrative
level not adequately covered
in the present organizational
setup. However, the councils,
as outlined last year in a pre-
liminary recommendation, will
not be empowered to intervene
in the day-to-day operation of
the economy, nor will they
replace any of the principal
administrative agencies now
existing.
The present reorganization,
an adaptation of a plan dis-
cussed in Soviet journals in
mid-1960, is in accord with
Khrushchev's statement in 1958
that larger economic regions
for planning, rather than opera-
tional purposes, would be estab-
lished as a modification of
the 1957 reorganization, which
divided the country into over
a hundred areas administered by
councils of the national econ-
omy (sovnarkhozes).
The 17 new economic areas
will in all cases contain sev-
eral sovnarkhoz areas; in the
Baltic, Caucasus, and Central
Asiatic regions they will con-
tain more than one republic;
both the Ukraine and the Rus
Sian Republic will be divided
into several economic areas.
The Kazakh area alone is con-
terminous with the boundaries
of that republic; this fact,
probably accounts for the deci-
sion to permit the Kazakh State
Planning Committee (Gosplan)
to handle the work relegated
in other areas to the coun-
cils. The entire Soviet Union
will be included in the new
scheme, excepting Belorussia
and Moldavia, which will remain
independent administrative eco-
nomic units.
The new areas replace 13
areas which did not adequately
fulfill the planning purposes
for which they had originally
been created. The TASS report
indicates, as one example, that
the populations of the former
areas were quite disproportion-
ate, ranging from 3,000,000 to
45,000,000. The new units will
be more uniform in this respect.
The relationship of the
new economic areas to republic-
level agencies and to the local
sovnarkhozes has not been re-
vealed. When the subject was
discussed last year, one Soviet
official said the councils
would be under the USSR long-
term planning agency (Goseko-
nomsovet).
As recommended last year,
the councils will deal with
territorial planning problems,
such as the development of com-
plementary industries in adja-
cent sovnarkhoz areas. They
will provide a type of coordi-
nated regional development which
neither the republic bodies nor
the individual sovnarkhozes
now accomplish.
The councils are intended
to formulate for higher planning
organs proposals and recommenda-
tions concerning the basic di-
rection of economic development
in their respective areas, new
technological developments and
their effective introduction in
production, the correct distri-
bution of capital investment,
improvements in inter-enterprise
specialization, cooperation,
and combination, and better
utilization of labor and natural
resources. They would work out
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ?''EEKLY SUMMARY
balances for products to be
produced and consumed mainly
within the boundaries of each
economic region.
The present changes reflect
the regime's continuing concern
with the problem of finding the
most effective way of achieving
its economic goals and at the
same time encouraging local in-
itiative. Other changes since
the major reorganization of
1957 included the creation last
year of republic-level sovnar'
khozes in the Russian, Ukrainian,
and Kazakh republics; the sepa-
ration of responsibility for
national long- and short-term
planning functions into two
separate agencies; and occa-
sional alterations in the terri-
torial and internal structure
of the sovnarkhozes.
,Vhile the present change
has long been planned and ap-
pears to be routine, the coun-
cils might in the future be
assigned significant additional
responsibilities such as regulat-
ing intersovnarkhoz industrial
supply, a troublesome problem
currently evoking sharp argu-
ment among Soviet economic ad-
ministrators.
The Bulgarian regime is
continuing to reorganize its
party and government machinery,
ostensibly to rectify admin-
istrative shortcomings, particu-
larly in the management of the
economy. The leadership of the
Central Council of Trade Unions
has been changed, and leaders
in five of Bulgaria's 30 dis-
tricts are known to have been
removed. Those in several
other areas have been severely
criticized in the frankest
public discussion of internal
difficulties in recent years.
The decision to air these
shortcomings--many of which
have existed for years--was
probably forced on the regime
by the discovery within the
party earlier this year of a
dissident group which was de-
manding changes in Bulgaria's
economic policies.
On 6 April the party first
secretary in Pleven was fired,
and it was recommended that
the head of the People's Council
be dismissed; the charges have
not been spelled out. On 22
April the first secretary in
Dimtrovo was fired; on the
same day, Spas Rusinov, member
of the Mikhailovgrad party
committee, was ousted for "in-
correct methods of work" and
for violations of "state and
financial discipline" during
the time more than a year
earlier when he had been first
secretary.
A local paper revealed
that sometime in early May the
party first secretary in Khas-
kovo District had been ousted,
and on 17 May, the Plovdiv
District People's Council chief,
Nikola Stoilev, was fired "for
having tolerated serious short-
comings and mistakes in work."
On 30 May, Todor Prakhov,chair-
man of the Central Council of
Trade Unions, was fired along
with three of the six secre-
taries. No reasons for the
changes were given.
Many of the individuals
who have been purged may have
been among the "doubters" who
questioned the feasibility of
the "leap forward" in the spring
of 1959. At that time, polit-
buro member and Trade Minister
Boris Taskov was fired for this
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SIRY
reason, but the regime contin-
ued into July of that year to
warn against questioning the
'.'leap" and against Attempting
to establish "other centers"
aside from the party central
committee. Purges did not
follow the warnings, however;
the regime may have felt that
it could not afford to shake
up its administrative organs
in the midst of its forced-
draft economic program, or that
Taskov's ouster would be suf-
ficient warning.
However, a dissident party
group was uncovered last Feb-
ruary. The May issue of the
party theoretical journal,
Novo Vreme, confirms earlier
reports that the dissidents
used Bulgaria's economic and
administrative ills to argue
for an economic reform of un-
specified dimensions. The Novo
Vreme article and the regime
an ing of the expulsion of
Yugoslav diplomat Sindjelic on
8 March implied that the dissi-
dents were oriented toward
Yugoslav "revisionist" economic
policy and were working with
Sindjelic. The man said to be
leader of the dissident group
was a secretary of the Central
Council of Trade Unions but was
not among those ousted at the
end of May.
Mali's drift away from the
West and toward greater involve-
ment with Sino-Soviet bloc
countries is underscored by the
arrival in Bamako of increas-
ing numbers of bloc personnel--
mostly technicians--on long-
term assignments.
The Novo Vreme article also
stated that the regime was having
to defend its policies against
attacks by supporters of Bulgar-
ia's former party boss, "Stalin-
ist" Vulko Chervenkov, who was
ousted as premier in 1956 but
still holds high positions in
the party and government. There
may be little substance to this
assertion, however. In every
move the regime has taken against
real or alleged opponents in the
last five years, it has in the
process condemned the policies
of the Chervenkov era.
The potentially disparate
elements, "revisionists" as
well as "hard-liners," in the
Bulgarian party may have viewed
the Communist conference last
fall at Moscow and its subsequent
Declaration as a sign of Moscow's
inability to rule over the inter-
national Communist movement.
The regime of party boss Todor
Zhivkov, in purging the district
apparatuses, may be reacting,
therefore, to a deterioration of
party discipline resulting from
the Moscow conference.
The regime remains in firm
control of the situation and
apparently does not intend to 25X1
make a public display of the 25X1
dissidents in trials. incar-
cerations, or executions.
there were more than 100 bloc
representatives in the country;
most of them are from Czechoslo-
vakia, which has been most
prominent in the bloc effort
in Mali.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY $t~IMARY
This bloc build-up is most
marked in the sensitive fields
of civil aviation and informa-
tion, both of which are headed
by members of the regime's ex-
treme left wing.
Some 15 other Czech avia-
tion specialists have arrived
in Mali and been assigned by
Corenthin to control tower and
other duties at Mali's prin-
cipal airports. However, as of
late May, these specialists
apparently had not yet appeared
at the control towers, which
were still being manned by
French military personnel. The
delay may have resulted from
threats by France to remove some
of its more sensitive equipment
from Mali's airports unless
French civilians are permitted
to man the towers after French
military forces have been with-
drawn from Mali.
Bloc aviation personnel
in Mali will almost certainly
increase when the USSR de-
livers the three IL-14, twp IL-
18, and an unspecified number
of AN-12 aircraft which a
Malian official contracted for
in Moscow last March. Mean-
while, 39 young Malians are
pursuing two-year flight and
maintenance training courses
in Czechoslovakia. Mali ac-
cepted three gift DC-3s from
Britain in March, but recently
rejected a US offer to pro-
vide two DC-4s.
Secretary of State for In-
formation Gologo--like Corenthin
a bard-core Marxist--has simi-
larly facilitated bloc penetra-
tion efforts. Aid-seeking vis-
its by Gologo to both Czech-
oslovakia and East Germany last
February have resulted in the
placement of at least two East
German journalists in Mali's
Information Ministry and in
Czech commitments to help Mali
set up its own'news agency and
educate journalists.
With the recent establish-
ment of a Polish Embassy in
Bamako, Mali now maintains dip-
lomatic relations with seven
bloc countries. In addition,
East Germany has a permanent
trade mission for which it is
seeking maximum official status.
Mali has also signed trade,
economic, or cultural coopera-
tion accords with at least five
bloc countries, including Com-
munist China and the USSR--
which has extended a $44,000,-
000 line of credit. A sixth
bloc country--Bulgaria--pro-
posed the conclusion of such
agreements last month.
Mali also appears to be
acquiring relatively large
stocks of Czech arms and mili-25X1
tary equipment and may be nego-
tiating for bloc military ad-
visers as well.
Czech military items recent y
purchased by Mali had arrived
the previous week from neigh-
boring Guinea. At least one
other shipment of arms from the
bloc reached Mali last winter.
Mali has also accepted the
military aid program offered by
the United States under which it
is to receive uniforms, certain25X1
types of equipment, and some
training assistance.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMUNISTS MAKE GAINS IN CYPRIOT LABOR MOVEMENT
The Communists, who have
long been active in the organ-
ized labor movement on Cyprus,
appear to have made significant
new gains. Anti-Communist ele-
ments within labor and members
of the conservative, pro-West-
ern government have contributed
greatly to this situation by
their inability to cooperate
and unwillingness to take a firm
stand against Communist pres-
sures.
About 65,000 Cypriots be-
long to labor federations, the
largest of which is the 40,000-
member, Communist-dominated Pan-
Cyprian Federation of Labor
(PEO). The Cyprus Confederation
of Workers (SEK), a non-Commu-
nist federation established to
counter PEO influence, has some
15,000 members. Both federa-
tions are Greek Cypriot in com-
position; the Turkish Cypriots
have their own right-wing organ-
ization.
Prior to Cypriot independ-
ence last August, PEO initiated
a concerted drive to dominate
the Greek Cypriot labor move-
ment. In this effort, its past
achievements on behalf of its
members constituted an advantage.
PEO leaders are experienced
trade unionists with a reputa-
tion for getting concessions
from industry and for estab-
lishing workers' benefit proj-
ects--such as clinics and rest
homes. SEK, on the other hand,
has had inexperienced leaders,
some of whom have devoted more
energy to politics than to labor
matters. It has received some
financial support from the
right-wing leadership of the
Greek Cypriot community and
from the International Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions.
Since independence, PEO,
under the leadership of Secre-
tary General Andreas Ziartides,
has sought to work more closely
with the other labor federations
--in particular SEK. Last Novem-
ber, Michael Pissas, long-time
leader of SEK, resigned, and
Petros Stylianou was named to
fill the position until an elec-
tion could be held in May. During
this period Stylianou, a rela-
tively inexperienced labor func-
tionary, appears to have fallen
increasingly under the influence
of the more astute Ziartides.
As the SEK election ap-
proached, the anti-Communists
sought to find a candidate who
could defeat Stylianou. Both Pres-
ident Makarios and Minister of
Labor Papadopoulos assured the
American ambassador of their in-
tention to prevent his selection.
The government and the leading
anti-Communist members of SEK
were unable to agree on an opposi-
tion candidate, however; as a
result the anti-Stylianou forces
divided their vote, and Stylianou
won a plurality.
Under Stylianou's leadership,
SEK probably will draw closer to
PEO or split into warring fac-
tions. PEO and the Communist par-
ty, meanwhile, have charged the
US with interfering in the elec-
tion and hope to capitalize on
any anti-American feelings which
Stylianou may have developed from
rumors of US opposition to his
election.
In an almost simultaneous
development, the Communists gained
increased respectability by the
government's selection of Ziar-
ti-des as the workers' representa-
tive in the Cypriot delegation to
the conference this month of the
International Labor Organization
(ILO) in Geneva--the first ILO
meeting attended by Cypriots.
While both Makarios and Papado-
poulos were aware of the potential
danger of sending Ziartides, they
apparently were unwilling to risk
PEO hostility and criticism by
picking a non-Communist for the
post or by declining to send any
delegation.
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European integration was
apparently the predominant sub-
ject at the meeting in Bonn on
20 May between De Gaulle and
Adenauer--a meeting highlighted
by an unusual interest on the
part of De Gaulle in some of
the substantive problems con-
fronting the European Economic
Community (EEC or Common Market).
De Gaulle confirmed that France
is prepared to move ahead next
January to the second of the
three four-year transitional
stages of the Common Market,
provided only that prior agree-
ment is reached on the EEC's
agricultural policy. Any mem-
ber may veto the transition to
the second stage for one to two
years, and there has been some
concern that Paris might exer-
cise this privilege.
In making French approval
of the next stage of the EEC
conditional on a solution of the
controversial farm problem,
De Gaulle may be doing the
Common Market a service. Most
observers agree that the EEC
will be in serious trouble if
integration is confined to in-
dustrial products, but the
strong protectionist sentiment
of the German farmer has so far
prevented agreement on how to
harmonize the various national
markets for farm produce. Ade-
nauer reminded De Gaulle that
he would have difficulty in at-
tempting any decision on agri-
cultural policy before the
Bundestag elections next Septem-
ber, but he did agree to begin
interim talks, perhaps in July.
More in line with his
usual approach, De Gaulle
pressed Adenauer as well for
support of his "confederation"
plan, which has been stalled
principally by Dutch insistence
that six-nation consultations
not extend to the "structure
and strategy of NATO." Adenauer
federation's council should be
competent to discuss all mat-
ters, including defense. As a
result of this agreement, Bonn
and Paris now hope to call the
constituent meeting for the con-
federation early in"July.
Britain's place in this
developing economic and politi-
cal community was also discussed,
and there has been some evidence
lately that De Gaulle is willing
at least to consider London's
The expectation that London
will eventually opt for the Com-
mon Market is creating sharp
tensions among the other members
of the European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA or Outer Seven),
whose council is expected to
meet on 6 June.
Although EFTA was designed
to maintain a "solid front"
against the EEC, several EFTA
countries have realistically
taken private soundings with
the Common Market. However,
Sweden, which was encouraged by
Britain to play a leading role
in forming the Outer Seven, is
finding it particularly diffi-
cult to contemplate its dis-
integration. Swedish officials
have declared that Britain's
name in Northern Europe "would
be mud" if it joined the EEC.
These officials have termed
"outrageous" Washington's favor-
ing negotiations to this end
while opposing simultaneous
still gives primacy to NATO in talks between EFTA's neutrals
military affairs, but he never- I and the EEC.
theless agreed that the con- I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
While international atten-
tion and the concern of Near
Eastern governments themselves
have generally been focused on
the spectacular oil develop-
ments or on prestige and "im-
pact" projects of industriali-
zation, the development of
water resources remains the
most important basic factor in
the economic future of the area.
Agriculture occupies between 75
and 80 percent of its popula-
tion, and the "little man" in
Iran and the Arab states--and
to a large extent even in West-
ernized Israel--is still the
farmer, whose concern over water
supply is constant. Moreover,
the most pressing current is-
sue which might again bring on an
Arab-Israeli war appears to be
the distribution of water from
the Jordan River.
The decade of the 1960s is
a critical period for the Near
Eastern water problem. During
the next nine years the schemes
planned and started after World
War II will either be completed
or will have at least reached a
stage where assessments of their
economic and political impact
are likely to be made by the
area's leaders. The water devel-
opment balance sheet would, in
turn, seem likely to have a sig-
nificant effect on these leaders'
views of the kinds and sources
of foreign economic assistance
that are wanted in the future.
This article is intended
as an interim report on the
various water-development plans,
the stages they have reached,
and their short-range pros-
pects. A number of points
stand out: Egypt's High Dam
project is proceeding, under
Soviet guidance, on schedule
and without significant setbacks.
Israel, apparently very near to-
tal exploitation of its water
resources except for the polit-
ically sensitive Jordan River,
must either defy the Arabs or
turn to sea-water conversion on
a large scale if its over-all
development is to continue.
There is a chance--as seen in
Kuwait--that new technical ef-
forts will reveal water sources
in hitherto unpromising areas.
Iraq's water program, once
the most promising in the area,
has been dragging under the rev-
olutionary regime, and a gran-
diose plan has been substituted
for genuine achievement. Iran,
still relying to a very large
extent on ancient irrigation
techniques, is developing schemes
which are likely to add to its
social and political problems.
There is no rainfall in
Egypt except along the narrow
Mediterranean littoral, and
agriculture is completely de-
pendent on the Nile. Most other
Egyptian streams are ephemeral,
flowing possibly only once in
ten years. Ground water is
available in the desert on both
sides of the Nile, but peren-
nial quantities have been devel-
oped only in the oases which
dot the Western Desert. About
6,400,000 acres are watered by
the Nile. The Aswan High Dam
being built by the Soviets will
put a further 2,000,000 acres
under perennial irrigation over
the next few years.
Despite thousands of
years of use, the Nile is still
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controlled only on an annual
basis. The Aswan High Dam is
designed to provide storage
over the years, in addition to
increasing the acreage under
irrigation. The Nile flow,
relatively constant in recent
years, is capable of wide
swings. In 1913-14, for ex-
ample, the water flow at Aswan
was only. 40 billion cubic me-
ters--less than half the annual
average of 84 billion cubic
meters. A recurrence of:such
a flow would be disastrous.
Construction of the High
Dam appears to be proceeding
according to plan. No setbacks
have developed, nor are any ex-
pected. A substantial quantity
of Soviet heavy construction
equipment has been at the site
for several months. Plans,call
for water storage to begin af-
ter the 1964 flood. Recent
Egyptian press announcements
claim that stored water will
increase to 4 billion cubic
meters in 1965, 6 billion in
1966, and 8 billion in 1967.
These quantities reportedly
will enable reclamation of
about 1,000,000 acres of now
I!
25X1
S U D A n. ("
UAR
(EGYPT)
Irrigation are.
L~ Desert area
^ Bread grains
? Clover
o Cotten
? Rice
() Legumes
barren land and the conversion
of about 100,000 acres from
basin to perennial irriga-
tion.
The General Desert Devel-
opment Authority, with some
assistance from the United
States, is moving ahead rapidly
on the so-called "new Nile Val-
ley" scheme, officially called
the Wadi al-Rakha Project., Work
began in earnest in 1959 fol-
lowing a speech by President
Nasir calling for creation of
"a new valley parallel to the
Nile Valley." Basically, the
plan envisages developing un-
derground water resources in a
string of oases which parallel
the Nile in the Western Desert.
Several hundred thousand acres
are involved, and substantial
progress has already been made
in the Kharga Oasis, which con-
tains several towns. According
to the director of the de-
velopment authority, more than
300,000 acres. will be recovered
within the next five years.
Plans call for distributing this
acreage to landless peasants,
who would each be given about
ten acres and a cow.
While it is clear that
vast quantities of underground
water are available--officials
Mnh.r.h Dem
e,.Harnah
TartusF "I V-- Dam
F o Homs
Tvdm o
2 J
BEIRUTW/ r ~S
o DAMASCUS
vl /:
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(SYRIA)
? Fo rest area
Cultivated area
Barren area
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
claim usable water reserves
are equivalent to the flow of
the Nile over an eight-year
period--it is not at.all cer-
tain that the water source is
recharged. It might be that
the water now being tapped was
laid down in earlier geological
and rainy epochs and is not re-
plenished naturally. On the
other hand, the water-bearing
strata may be recharged con-
tinuously by seepage from the
Nile and from the rainier re-
gions of north-central Africa.
In any case, the water avail-
able by this means probably is
adequate to support a consid-
erably increased agricultural
output for some time.
In the Syrian Region, sub-
stantial progress is being
made, largely with Communist
bloc help, on a five-year plan
(1960-65) for greatly expand-
ing the irrigated area under
cultivation. Over 1,240,000
acres are irrigated now, but
farming on the remaining
10,000,000 acres is risky.
Syria normally is capable of
producing a small export sur-
plus of food grains, but.three
successive years of drought
have forced the import of
substantial quantities of grain,
including American surplus
stocks.
Generally, Syrian water-
development plans envisage the
construction of a relatively
large number of small earthen
dams, as opposed to a single
major project such as Egypt's
Aswan High Dam. Although the
Soviets have been studying the
location of a major dam on the
Euphrates, a decision to build
this dam has been postponed
pending conclusion of a water-
sharing agreement between the
UAR and Iraq, West German in-
terests are considering under-
taking the project.
Source
Annual flow
in Cubic Meters
Percent
Orontes River
1,000,000,000
3.5
Euphrates River
26,500,000,000
84.0
Khabour River
1,750,000,000
5.5
Other
2,250,000,000
7.0
Syria has a large number
of rivers varying in size from
the Euphrates to some only
slightly larger than streams.
However, most of the usable water
comes from three major streams.
Of the 31.5 billion cubic meters
available, some 17 or 18 billion
could be diverted into irriga-
tion.
The Bulgarians have al-
ready completed work on the
Rastan Dam on the Orontes River
and are well along on the Muhar-
dah Dam farther downstream. Ras-
tan, now partially filled from
the heaviest spring rains in
recent years, will store about
250,000,000 cubic meters of
water. The Muhardah Dam is de-
signed primarily to control flood
waters and relieve the Rastan
Dam. Provided the earthen walls
of the dam are not excessively
porous, this dam may be used
for perennial storage of about
100,000,000 cubic meters. How-
ever, because of a shortage of
foreign exchange and overambi-
tious planning, it appears un-
likely that Syria will be able
to fulfill its plans for in-
creasing irrigated acreage 50
percent by 1965.
Syria also controls the
source of the Baniyas River--
an important tributary to the
Jordan--and has threatened to
divert this stream if Israel
implements its plans to in-
crease withdrawals of Jordan
water. The cost of such a
diversion would be enormous,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
IRAQ
C~ woodland and grazing,
cu
et+on valleys
Cultivation watered by rain or
small streams
C7 Desert grazing
E7 Irrigated cultivation
E Desert and semidesert
however, and the engineering
problems formidable. Syria
could engage in activity which
would arouse Israeli hostil-
ity, but it would fall far
short of a meaningful denial
of water.
Iraq
Iraq since antiquity has
depended on a river system to
provide irrigation for agricul-
ture. Unlike the Nile, however,
the Tigris and Euphrates have
until recently been uncontrolled.
Also unlike the Nile, the Tigris
and Euphrates tend to rise
without warning. They carry
five times the sediment of
the Nile; have their annual
flood in March, April, and May
--too late for winter crops and
too early for summer ones; trav-
erse a country where the temper-
ature rises to 120 degrees in
summer and falls to .20 degrees
in winter; and flow between
degraded deserts of:gypsum and
salted mud.
Despite these disadvan-
tages, the Tigris and Euphrates
basins can be made to support
several times the present pop-
ulation of Iraq at a consider-
ably higher standard of living.
Since 1951, control of rivers
has been a major feature of de-
velopment programs. While far
from bbmplete, the new works
are adequate to prevent disas-
trous spring flooding of the
cities and farms downstream.
When all works planned are com-
plete, Iraq will have about 14,-
000,000 cultivatable acres,
compared with about 8,000,000
acres in Egypt when all proj-
ects on the Nile are completed.
Following Qasim's assump-
tion Of power in July 1958,
work on the major irrigation
projects begun under the for-
mer regime was either actually
or virtually brought to a stand-
still, and Qasim began to divert
development funds to ordinary
government expenditures. Since
then the momentum of work has
increased somewhat, but com-
pletion dates for most projects
have been extended substantially.
A new $2 billion, five-year
development program beginning
1 April 1961 replaced the older
development plan, but even
with Communist aid this plan is
patently out of Iraq's financial
reach and is designed largely
for public consumption. Thus it
is not possible to predict when
new irrigated acreage will be
added. At present, more than 50
percent of the cultivated acre-
age is under irrigation.
Jordan
The dearth of water is per-
haps the chief reason for the
nonviability of Jordan's economy.
Jordan is increasing the number
of artesian wells and utilizing
more efficiently the modest flows
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by December 1962 and will irri-
gate another 10,000 acres. Thus
far no date has been set to be-
gin the 14-mile link which will
complete the 30,000-acre project.
Even this project will fall far
short of making Jordan self-sup-
porting, however, although it
might reduce the burdens on
Jordan's foreign backers--the
US and Britain--which in recent
years have paid for almost three
fourths of Jordan's imports and
government expenditures.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Johnston Plan for unified development of
the Jordan Valley irrespective of political bound-
aries was prepared by the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity at the request of the UN Relief and Works Agen-
cy for Palestine Refugees. The plan was presented
for consideration and used as a basis for negotia-
t ton by Eric Johnston, special American envoy to
the Arab states and Israel. Counterproposals by
the Arab states and Israel regarding division of
the Jordan River's water and the means by which
the plan was to be accomplished resulted in pro-
longed negotiations in the period 1954-55. Tech-
nical agreement on the plan was virtually achieved,
but in late 1955 the Arab League political commit-
tee refused to approve it on political grounds.
of its numerous wadis (water
courses which are dry part of
the year) especially in the
western portion of the country,
Its only important source of
water, however, is the Yarmuk
River, a tributary of the Jor-
dan.
Under an American-financed
program, a 43-mile canal which
"would not draw from the Yarmuk
River more than the share allot-
ted to Jordan under the Johnston
plan" was approved in 1958. The
first 14-mile section is sched-
uled for completion this June.
When finished, this section will
irrigate about 10,000 acres,
which are being distributed to
866 families. Section two of
the main canal--about 15 miles
long--is expected to be complete
Forest and scrub.
Small areas of crops
valieys, on slopes
and terraces.
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
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