CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003100050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CCU
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 73
OCR NO. 0270/61
9 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept., USAF reviews completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The atmosphere of bitter-
ness between the UN Command
and Congolese army elements
may lead to new shooting inci-
dents, and further setbacks
for the UN effort in the Congo.
Congolese soldiers, who appar-
ently do not want to fight each
other, are nevertheless deeply
suspicious of UN intentions to
disarm them. They react
spontaneously to any imagined
threat of UN interference, as
in the incidents with UN Suda+~-
;nese and Canadian troops in
Matadi.
Secretary General Hammar-
skjold, following an emergency
meeting of the UN's 18-nation
advisory committee, reportedly
ordered Dayal to "hold" the
Congolese ports at all costs,
and to "retake" them with force
if necessary. However, Foreign
Minister Bomboko on 6 March
said that Matadi would not be
returned to UST control pending
a full investigation of the dis-
orders. There has been no fur-
ther fighting in the area since
5 March, but the Congolese re-
main suspicious of the UN. The
Leopoldville government, play-
ing on'this distrust as well
as on the scarcity of employ-
ment in the area, recently re-
cruited some 12,000 Congolese
volunteers by calling for "mo-
bilization" against UN "tute-
lage."
Hammarskjold is believed
planning early action to try to
improve the UN's local posi-
tion. The recall of Rajeshwar
Dayal from Leopoldville to New
York--ostensibly for consulta-
tion--probably is a first step
by Hammarskjold to ease him
out of the Congo picture per-
manently. Makki Abbas of the
Sudan has been announced as
the UN's acting representative
in the Congo.
The attack on the Sudanese
UN force led Khartoum to an-
nounce that all of its 390 troops
in the Congo are to be with-
drawn. Its charge that UN of-
ficials were "negligent" in
their deployment of the force
and did not adopt a firm at-
titude toward "imperialists"
is partly a cover for the in-
eptitude of the local Sudanese
commander and a poor performance
by his unit. However, Sudanese
officials state that their gov-
ernment will continue to refuse
to allow UAR and bloc aid ma-
teriel to be sent across the
Sudan to the Stanleyville
regime.
Another African moderate,
Tunisia,:; is concerned that de-
teriorating, conditions in S. CbiP
will leave it isolated fr
other Africaus in its supp rt
of the UN. Nevertheless, it has
sent an additional 600 men to
reinforce its 2,600 troops al-
ready in the Congo.
More significantly, India
plans to send an additional
force of 4,730 men--of whom
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3,000 will be infantry troops.
They are scheduled to leave New
Delhi on 14 March and will be
the largest national contingent
in the Congo. Nehru apparently
has interpreted Khrushchev's
recent letters on the Congo and
UN reorganization problems as
a deliberate attempt to isolate
India from the leading African
neutralists and thus counter
New Delhi's restraining influ-
The Indian position may
have influenced Indonesia, which
announced on 7 March that it
would send a battalion to the
Congo to replace the one being
withdrawn, "in view of the
latest developments." Djakarta
apparently is pinning its con-
tinued participation on effec-
tive implementation of the
latest Security Council reso-
lution.
Support of a somewhat
backhanded kind for the UN was
voiced by President Nkrumah of
Ghana during his 7 March speech
before the General Assembly.
He called for a strengthening
of the UN under a "primarily"
African command. He further
modified his earlier proposals,
which would have excluded Eu-
ropean units in the UN force
and would have put Asians in a
subordinate role.
Nkrumah told American of-
ficials he would be satisfied
with either an African or Asian
as UN military commander and
with some increase in the Afro-
-Asian membership in the UN
`staffs. He presented these pro-
posals--which may have origi-
nated with General Alexander,
the British commander of the
Ghanaianarmed forces--as a
means for stimulating a willing-
ness among uncommitted nations
to furnish troops.
The Ileo government on
8 March sent the UN a proposal
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
for reorganizing the Congolese
Army. Although the government's
suggestions are hedged to re-
tain Congolese control, their
substance is fairly moderate.
They envisage the establishment
of a joint UN-Congolese defense
council, headed by a "neutral"
officer responsible to Kasavubu.
The proposals also express the
Leopoldville government's will-
ingness to begin with the re-
organization of Mobutu's troops,
provided firm agreements are
made with other regimes for
similar steps. There is no in-
dication that these proposals
would be accepted by the troops
concerned, who are largely
unresponsive to civilian au-
thority.
The UN's military problems
may be increased, however, if
General Mobutu carries out his
attack on the Stanleyville re-
gime. Urged on by Leopoldville
political leaders, Mobutu re-
portedly has reluctantly agreed
to strike at Aketi, where the
Stanleyville forces have gaso-
line reserves, and possibly at
Stanleyville itself. His 4,200
troops in Equateur Province are
widely dispersed although rela-
tively well supplied with arms,
ammunition, gasoline, and re-
serves.. It is still problemat-
ical what if any action they
will take.
The success of the reported
coup against Gizenga in Stan-
leyville was unclear as of 1200
hours on 9 March. No informa-
tion has been received?' con-
cerning the reaction of the
armed forces in Orientale Prov-
ince, without whose coopera-
tion or acquiescence no change
could take place. Genera]. Lun-
dula, Gizanga's military com-
mander, reportedly took part
in the coup, but he commands
little respect among his troops.
Friction has long existed be-
tween Gizenga's "central gov-
ernment" and local, tribally
based authorities, which have
tended to be more moderate.
The "legitimate govern-
ment's" control over Kivu Prov-
ince may be facing an increas-
ing challenge; on 4 March,
Antoine Omari proclaimed the
state of Maniema--in western
Kivu--and announced his desire
to cooperate with the Leopold-
ville regime. It is probably
an effort to align with the
anti-Communist grouping of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Tshombd, Kalonji, and Ileo
announced on 28 February, but
it is doubtful that Omari con-
trols enough of Kivu Province
to make this move of any real
significance.
The conference of Congo-
lese leaders being held at
Tananarive in the Malagasy Re-
public finally got under way
on 8 March despite the absence
of Gizenga. Tshombd, who con-
vened the conference, is so far
dominating the proceedings and
is using the general opposition
to the UN in an attempt to weld
the participants into a united
front. The apparent willingness
of Ileo, Kasavubu, and Kalonji
to let Tshombe take the lead is
enhancing his prestige at their
expense. The Katanga leader has
proposed increased military
cooperation among the various
regimes in the Congo, but in
view of the political rivalries,
little of significance is ex-
pected to materialize.
President Youlou of the
neighboring state comprising
former French Congo has called
for another conference on the
Congo problem to follow the
Tananarive meeting, but a more
representative gathering may be
the international one under
consideration by President Tub-
man of Liberia. He has invited
severwl prominent West African
leaders--Nkrumah of Ghana, Tourd
of Guinea, Houphouet-Boigny of
Ivory Coast, Keita of Mali, and
Balewa of Nigeria---to cosponsor
an early meeting of the heads
of all African states to prepare
proposals for submission to the
resumed UN General Assembly ses-
sion. Tourd, Keita, and Hou-
phouet-Boigny have supported
the idea; Nkrumah has re-
plied that the Casablanca
conference produced appropriate
proposals; Balewa has not yet
answered.
In Leopoldville, US and
UN officials believe that there
is little time remaining before
inflation gets completely out
of control, with the consequent
possibility of disorders among
the hitherto relatively quies-
ent civilian population.. The
UN Command has failed to pro-
vide leadership in the economic
field as a result of its pre-
occupation with political ques-
tions. The situation is further
complicated by Dayal's igno
rance of economic factors and
his tactic of withholding budg-
etary support as a means of
pressuring the Leopoldville
government.
The benefit of foreign
aid furnished so far has been
reduced by the lack of coordi-
nation as well as inefficiency
and venality on the part of
Congolese officials. UN finan-
cial experts in Leopoldville be-
lieve that the establishment of
a flexible fund under UN con-
trol is the only way to sal-
vage the economic situation.
The danger is particularly acute
in Leopoldville, where most of
the working force is unemployed
and vulnerable to inflation in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Boun Oum government
has suffered a serious reverse
around the Phou Khoun road
junction, now under control of
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces.
Earlier this week these forces
initiated aggressive probing
actions against the government's
advance positions a few miles
east of the junction. Capitaliz-
ing on a premature withdrawal
by government troops, the orig-
inal platoon-size attacks were
broadened successively to the
eventual commitment of two bat-
talions. Enemy forces are now
consolidating their position
around the junction, and may be
encouraged-by their success to
seek further limited military
gains.
Government forces have re-
grouped a few miles north and
south of the junction along the
Vientiane - Luang Prabang high-
way, and reinforcements are be-
ing rushed to Luang Prabang to
guard against any attack on the
royal capital. Government
spokesmen are trying to minimize
the seriousness of this develop-
ment, but the poor showing by
Vientiane's troops carries grave
implications for Vientiane's
over-all military and political
efforts.
Despite General Phoumi's
apparent willingness to go a
long way toward meeting Sou-
vanna's terms for a settlement
in their 9-10 March talks in
Phnom Penh, there are major ob-
stacles to overcome, including'
Souvanna's awareness that any
arrangement would have to of-
fer real hope of a rapprochement
with the Pathet Lao. Souvanna,
anticipating an eventual in-
ternational conference on Laos,
plans to leave this week end
on a tour to include discussions
in Rangoon, New Delhi, Cairo,
Paris, London, Moscow, Peiping,
Hanoi, and possibly other cap-
itals.
Phoumi's mission to Phnom
Penh has been the subject of
closely held discussions among
Laotian leaders, including King
Savang. Former Finance Minis-
ter Inpeng Suryadhay, who had
been with Souvanna in Phnom Penh,
has acted as an intermediary be-
tween the two camps in hopes of
arranging a compromise. Savang's
attitude is obscure, but recent
press handouts by the Boun Oum
government have expressed hope
that Souvanna will be willing
to act as a "bridge" between
Vientiane and the Pathet Lao.
Phoumi intends at Phnom
Penh to give a full explanation
of the government's neutrality
policy and desire to form a new
government including Souvanna
and all nationalist elements.
The question of Pathet Lao rep-
resentation would be deferred to
a later stage. If Souvanna is
unwilling to join such a new
government, another possibility
would be for him to return to
Laos to act as a mediator be-
tween the two sides. Phoumi,
however, has not elaborated on
this rather vague concept.
Phoumi rejects the idea of early
general elections but is not
opposed to supplementary elec-
tions to give the Neo Lao Hak
Sat party a voice in the Nation-
al Assembly.
In recent discussions with
Western diplomats in Phnom Penh,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Phou
Muong I
Ban Ta
Viang
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Souvanna has stressed thd*
urgency for a political set-
tlement in Laos. Judging from
the reception he received from
the people during his visit to
northern Laos, he feels the
Communists could still be kept
from a position of dominance,
but that time is growing short.
He said Pathet Lao leader Sou-
phannouvong had agreed with
him that Laos should follow a
policy of "Cambodian-type so-
cialism."
Cambodian officials, in-
cluding Sihanouk, are inclined
to doubt that Souvanna can
salvage the situation from the
Communists, and have-voiced
skepticism over whether he is
even a free agent. Sihanouk's
concern over developments in
Laos accounts for his continu-
ing efforts to arrange a con-
ference in hopes of reaching
East-West agreement on a neu-
tralized Laos.
In a recent discussion
with Ambassador Trimble in
Phnom Penh, Souvanna suggested
a course of action which he
felt would obviate the need
for an international confer-
ence, provided both East and
West agreed to guarantee Laos'
neutrality. Souvanna said he
would. submit his resignation
if the King replaced the Boun
Oum government with a caretaker
government composed of civil
servants which would be respon-
sible for preparing general
elections. The elections would
be supervised by an internation-
al commission, and the coun-
tryside disarmed, except for
police. Souvanna made it clear,
however, that he believes the
eventual establishment of a
government of national union,
including the Pathet Lao, is
essential for Laos.
The bloc shows no sign of
readiness to end hostilities
in Laos or abandon its de-
mand that an international con-
ference be called before any
commission is sent to Laos.
It seems unlikely, therefore,
that it would welcome Souvanna's
suggestion that an internation-
al conference could be ob-
viated by depositions pledg-
ing to respect Laotian neu-
trality which various inter-
ested nations would file with
the UN.
The Communists probably
would be equally unenthusiastic
about Souvanna's proposal to
put the King in charge of a
caretaker government--in which
they would see the possibility
of US influence but little or
none of their own. Their stand
on an international conference
reflects their belief that
this approach offers the
best prospect for the crea-
tion of a Laotian government
with strong Pathet Lao par-
ticipation.
ruary there were about 150 North
Vietnamese specialists attached
to a group of 800-1,000 re-
cruits of the 2nd Paratroop
Battalion located southwest of
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CURRENT INTELIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Muong Kassy. North Vietnamese
were assigned to the Pathet
Lao in the ratio of 8 per
platoon or 25 per company.
Pathet Lab in this area report-
edly have 158 81-mm. mortars,
over 200 60-mm. mortars, 100
bazookas, 200 automatic rifles,
and 200 light machine guns
which were dropped by Soviet
aircraft at Vane Vieng earlier
this year.
De Gaulle and the rebel
provisional Algerian government
(PAG) both seem to be trying to
reassure each other through good-
will gestures and statements that
early formal negotiations on an
Algerian solution are possible.
As terrorism and military activ-
ity in Algeria continue at a high
level, prospects for high-level
neogitations appear to turn for
the moment on'the question of a
cease-fire. There is some evi-
dence that a cease-fire arrange-
ment may be in the making, and
that secret lower level discus-
sions--possibly on substantive
problems--may already have begun
in Geneva.
De Gaulle's reported immi-
nent release from prison of
Mohammed Ben Bella, the rebel
vice premier whom the French
kidnaped five years ago, will
fulfill a demand Tunisian Presi-
dent Bourguiba made during his
talks with De Gaulle on 27 Feb-
ruary to show evidence of 'French
good faith. Ben Bella is appar-
ently to be transferred from an
island fortress to "controlled
residence" near Paris. His re-
lease is expected to reinforce
the moderate faction of the PAG
headed by premier Ferhat Abbas.
The PAG, while pressing for
public neogtiations, continues
to maintain a conciliatory atti-
tude.
used by De Gaulle's implied
promise to Bourguiba that a
cease-fire would not be a pre-
condition for direct negotia-
tions, and a subsequent "author-
itative" French statement re-
versing this position. A mem-
ber of Premier Debra's entou-
rage made a statement along the
same lines. On 7 March both
Debra and the PAG denied press
reports that a truce agreement
had been reached.
However, the PAG "delegate"
to the UN told US officials on
6 March that the rebels had pro-
posed to the French that both
sides simply agree at the be-
ginning of negotiations to stop
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fighting, without entering in-
to any formal agreement. Such
a solution might be acceptable
to De Gaulle in view of his re-
cent blurring of the cease-fire
issue.
and still powerful elements
on both sides within Algeria
which could precipitate in-
cidents to block successful ne-
gotiations.
There, nevertheless, are diverse
Opposition elements are
maintaining their campaign
against the Castro government
through a variety of activi-
ties. Sabotage attempts against
industrial installations and
public utilities are occurring
frequently, and many tons of
sugar cane have been reported
Fighting is continuing in
th;e Escambray Mountains, al-
though reports of government
seizures of supplies intended
for opposition forces suggest
that anti-Castro operations
there have been considerably
reduced.
Castro's 4 March speech,
delivered at ceremonies mark-
ing the first anniversary of
the explosion of an ammuni-
tion ship in Havana harbor with
a large number of casualties,
blamed the United States for
all activity against his re-
gime and taunted the anti-Cas-
tro exiles for not attempting
to invade Cuba and reinforce
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the guerrilla bands, which he
claimed are being "mopped up"
in Las Villas and Oriente
provinces. He ridiculed at-
tempts to supply opposition
forces by means of air drops
and said that the regime had
captured all such materiel and
would soon exhibit it',in.Havana
so that foreign newspapermen
and diplomats could view it
and "decide to whom it belongs
and who intervenes in affairs
of others."
President Dorticos, ad-
dressing the first Latin Ameri-
can.plantation workers' con-
ference in Havana on 4 March,
frankly exhorted the delegates
to follow the Cuban example on
agrarian reform in their own
countries--a statement sharp-
ly contrasting with the Cas-
tro regime's recent protesta-
tions to other Latin American
governments that the Cuban rev-
olution would not be "exported"
to their countries.
Argentine Ambassador
Amoedo, who is regarded as the
most knowledgeable Latin Amer-
ican ambassador still assigned
to Havana, recently told For-
eign Ministry officials in
Buenos Aires that be believes
anti-Castro activity in Cuba
will shortly be intensified.
He said that Cuba's economic
situation was "crumbling" and
that many of Castro's aides
were deserting him. While
Amoedo's report on the eco-
nomic situation is probably
exaggerated, it is clear that
Castro's opposition is becoming
bolder.
Cuba's circular note of
late February welcoming Latin
American efforts to mediate
differences between the United
States and Cuba elicited a re-
sponse from the Frondizi govern-
ment in Argentina announcing its
intention to send special envoys
to Havana and Washington in
order to seek means of easing
tension between the two coun-
tries. This action was prob-
ably intended as a gesture to
impress public opinion both at
home and abroad, inasmuch as,
among the large Latin American
countries, Argentina has been
the strongest critic of Cuba
and has supported only multi-
lateral consideration of the
Cuban problem. Argentina as well
as most other Latin American
countries criticized a recent
Ecuadorean mediation offer in-
spired mainly by propaganda mo-
tives.
Argentine officials asserted
that the Frondizi government
wanted to demonstrate that all
the possibilities of negotiating
the return of the Castro regime
to the inter-American system
has been exhausted. Cuba declined
the Argentine offer on 8 March,
basing its action on the asser-
tion that the US "does not want
to sit down and talk" about its
differences with Cuba or reduce
hemisphere tensions, as Castro
charged in his speech.
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SOVIET - WEST GERMAN RELATIONS
It appears increasingly
likely that Adenauer will invite
Khrushchev to Bonn sometime this
year, perhaps as early as June.
Although it is unlikely that a
meeting between the two would
produce any basic understanding
between Bonn and Moscow, Ade-
nauer probably feels it would
give him an opportunity to ex-
plore Soviet intentions on Ber-
lin and to try to get any four-
power negotiations postponed
until after the West German
elections in September. He may
also feel that direct talks--
which would demonstrate his flex-
ibility in dealing with the East
and possibly produce Soviet
agreement to continue repatria-
tion of German nationals in
the USSR--would enhance his
prestige with the German voters.
Soviet efforts to arrange
a visit date back to the Soviet
premier's letter to Chancellor
Adenauer in October 1959, when
the former clearly hinted at
his desire for such a meeting.
When Bonn failed to respond,
Khrushchev informed West German
Ambassador Kroll in January
1960 that he would like to
visit Bonn after a summit meet-
ing. The overtures were dropped
after the collapse of the sum-
mit, but Khrushchev revived the
question again in his talks
with Kroll last October. As a
gesture to improve the atmos-
phere, Khrushchev agreed to
delete critical remarks about
Adenauer from a speech he was
to deliver on 20 October, and
Soviet spokesmen followed up
with broad hints that Khru-
shchev would welcome an invita-
tion.
At the same time, Khru-
shchev made overtures to West
Berlin Mayor Brandt for pri-
vate talks. During Khrushchev's
visit to Austria last July,
Foreign Minister Gromyko gave
Austrian Foreign Minister
Kreisky a memorandum, intended
for Brandt, explaining the So-
viet position on Berlin and
strongly hinting at the desira-
bility of bilateral discussions.
Soviet officials in Bonn
sought to play off Brandt's
opposition Social Democratic
party (SPD) against Adenauer
by informing SPD leaders in
early November that, while
bilateral talks with the Bonn
government had already gone
quite far, Moscow was still in-
terested in learning of SPD
views. Brandt's cool reaction
to these overtures and the
SPD's support for NATO and nu-
clear armaments during the par-
ty congress in November evi-
dently convinced the Soviet
leaders that little could be
gained from talks with Brandt.
Khrushchev was probably
encouraged by Adenauer's recent
efforts to obtain some clarifi-
cation of Soviet intentions on
Berlin and Germany. The chan-
cellor sounded out Moscow
through the Austrian and Nor-
wegian foreign ministers and
publicly hinted in November
that he was considering extend-
ing an invitation to the Soviet
premier. Khrushchev indicated
to Kroll on New Year's Eve that
he was impressed with Adenauer's
role in resolving the impasse
in the Soviet - West German
trade negotiations and expressed
dislike for Mayor Brandt.
Adenauer has frequently in- 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the memorandum's claim that the
Soviet proposals for a German
peace treaty open wide possibili-
ties for Bonn to protect its
interests in West Berlin.
Although any talks between
Khrushchev and Adenauer would
undoubtedly include discussion
of the Berlin situation, Ade-
nauer has assured Brandt that
he has no intention of negotiat-
ing unilaterally with the So-
viets about Berlin's future and
has frequently stressed that the
Berlin problem remains a four-
power responsibility.
Moscow carried forward its
efforts last week to promote bi
lateral discussions by publish-
ing its 17 February memorandum
to Bonn on the Berlin and German
questions. The memorandum
stressed that both sides should
spare no effort to achieve mu-
tuai.l understanding on major po-
litical issues. It also empha.-
sizetl that the "wider interests"
of the great powers will deter-
mine the outcome of disputed
issues and strongly implied that
the US might negotiate a settle-
ment on Berlin over Adenauer's
head.
As an inducement for bi-
lateral discussions prior to
four-power negotiations, the
memorandum assured Bonn that in
the event of German counterpro-
posals the USSR was prepared to
"display maximum understanding
of the wishes of the Federal
Republic and take them into ac-
count during negotiations." So-
viet propaganda has stressed
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Khrushchev's long interest
in bilateral talks with Adenauer
probably reflects his belief that
such discussions could be used
to probe for Western differences
prior to four-power negotiations
and arouse suspicions of a So-
viet-German deal. The Soviet
premier's main objective in talks
with Adenauer probably would be
to take advantage of the chan-
cellor's desire to avoid any ap-
pearance of obstructing set-
tlement of the Berlin and Ger-
man problems to elicit a
statement which the USSR could
represent as endorsing the So-
viet contention that the "ab-
normal"situation in Berlin must
be adjusted.
Moscow would view any state-
ment which even implied West
German support for an interim
solution in Berlin as a valuable
device to weaken the West's
bargaining position in future
high-level negotiations. Khru-
shchev may also feel that bi-
lateral talks in Bonn this sum-
mer would make it difficult for
Adenauer to oppose a four-power
conference before the German
elections.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Mali's six-month-old re-
gime, heavily influenced by
Marxist ideas, is moving to re-
duce the predominant French
role in the Malian economy and
to introduce a system of state
socialism.
As French commercial in-
terests are being forced out by
monopolistic state-controlled
corporations, new opportunities
are opening for the Sino-Soviet
bloc, which has made clear its
readiness to provide aid in
virtually any desired field.
This is likely to result in a
progressive reorientation of
Mali's economy toward the bloc
along lines already far advanced
in neighboring Guinea--Mali's
close ally. At present, France
is scheduled to provide about
$12,000,000 in economic and
technical assistance to Mali
in 1961.
sale would be paid in converti-
ble foreign exchange and the
balance in bloc goods. Ndour6,
who professed to see no danger
to Mali's avowed policy of neu-
trality, cited a resolution call-
ing for "decolonization" in the
economic realm passed at a
special party congress last Sep-
tember as providing the policy
framework for the deal.
Although Ndour6 has stated
that Mali is not planning to
leave the French franc zone
"for the time being," such a
step may nevertheless soon be
taken. Recent reports indicate
that new banknotes printed in
Czechoslovakia and designed to
provide Mali with a new currency
similar and related to'that of
Guinea--which broke away from
the franc zone a year ago--may
have already arrived in Bamako.
Mali's recent decision to
sell virtually its entire peanut
crop--accounting for about 90
percent of the country's ex-
ports--to the USSR and Czecho-
slovakia was apparently motiva-
ted by the regime's anti-French
bias. According to Minister of
Commerce Ndoure, the USSR agreed
to take 30,000 tons and Czecho-
slovakia 20,000 tons oii terms
which met an earlier French
offer to continue buying Mali's
peanuts at premium prices.
Ndour6 stated that half of
the $10,000,000 earned from the
Meanwhile, Mali has just
concluded with a visiting Chi-
nese Communist delegation an
initial trade-and-payments ac-
cord and an exchange of letters
under which Peiping has agreed
in principle to furnish Mali
with long-term economic assist-
ance. A Malian delegation is to
visit Communist China later this
year for detailed negotiations.
This agreement takes on special
significance in view of the
tendency of the Chinese to re-
strict aid offers outside South-
east Asia to countries--such as
Guinea and Cuba--deemed partic-
ularly receptive to close eco-
nomic relations with Peiping.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
KENYA
The British East African
colony of Kenya appears headed
for a period of confusion and
uncertainty following the elec-
tion in late February of a new
Legislative Council in which
Africans will predominate for
the first time.
The Kenya African National
Union (KANU) campaigned for the
immediate release and return to
politics of Mau Mau leader Jomo
Kenyatta. It won 17 of 33 pop-
ularly elected African seats
in the legislature, despite
intraparty disputes and person-
ality conflicts between its rel-
atively pro-Western leader, Tom
Mboya, and more radical ele-
ments. The rival Kenya African
Democratic Union (KADU)--composed
of minor tribes united primarily
in their opposition to KANU--
won 10 seats. Six seats went
to independents.
Twenty other seats were
reserved for non-African candi-
dates, including ten Europeans,
eight Asians, and two Arabs.
The legislature's membership
will be completed on 16 March
when the 53 popularly elected
members, sitting as an electoral
college, will choose 12 "na-
tional members."
Kenya's Governor Renisbn
announced on 1 March that Ken-
yatta would not be released un-
til after the new government *as
functioning satisfactorily. In
the interim, however--a period
British officials in Kenya sug-
gest may last only until late
April--Kenyatta will be placed
under modified detention and
moved nearer to Nairobi to
facilitate visits by African
party leaders and government
officials. Three times during
his speech the governor referred
to the possibility of early in-
dependence for Kenya if stabil-
ity is maintained--an obvious
attempt to persuade the new
legislators to pursue a policy
of moderation. Nevertheless,
KANU officials, under increas-
ing pressure from the extremist
anti-Mboya faction which now
holds the upper hand in the par-
ty, convoked an emergency caucus,
in which they decided to refuse
to participate in the new gov-
ernment but to serve in the
legislature. They presumably
hope to continue to press for
Kenyatta's release by adopting
obstructionist tactics in the
legislature.
Although KADU leaders cam-
paigned for Kenyatta's release,
they did not insist that he be-
come Kenya's first chief min-
ister, as did KANU. KADU Pres-
ident Nkala, consequently, does
not feel that his party is com-
mitted to a policy of nonpar-
ticipation in the government.
He apparently hopes that with
the support of disgruntled KANU
members and independents his
party can form the new govern-
ment over KANU opposition.
Leaders of both African
parties, nevertheless, are faced
with the dilemma of possibly
delaying Kenya's independence
by continuing to press the Ken-
yatta issue or having to back
down on their main campaign
issue. While Kenyatta re-
mains a political enigma after
eight years under detention,
most African leaders envis-
age his position in the
country as more of an elder
statesman or figurehead than
as an active leader in the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
MAJOR CHANGES IN INDIAN CABINET LIKELY
The death on 7 March of
Indian Home Minister Pant, Neh-
ru's chief deputy and one of
the few remaining members of
the Congress party's "old
guard," probably will lead to
a reshuffling of top government
officials and again focuses
attention on the problems of
Indian leadership.
The loss of 73-year-old
Pant will be felt keenly by
Nehru, not only because he was
the prime minister's closest
collaborator in government af-
fairs and most influential
party wheelhorse, but because
Pant's key post can be filled
only by shifting another top
figure away from a position
where he is badly needed.
The Home Ministry is the
most important post in the In-
dian cabinet. Its supervision
of the affairs of India's 16
states and control of various
internal security forces place
the home minister in a position
of considerable power. The
job calls for a first-rate ad-
ministrator, able parliamentar-
ian, and shrewd politician; it
is a natural steppingstone to
the premiership. Pant ran the
government in Nehru's absence
and, until his health began to
fail in 1959, was considered
his most likely successor.
Nehru has put Commerce and
Industry Minister L. B. Shastri
in charge of home affairs tem-
porarily, but this able, well-
liked, unambitious politician
may be out of the running as a
permanent choice because he
suffered a heart attack in 1959.
Finance Minister Morarji
Desai (65), now the most power-
ful member of the cabinet and
leading contender to succeed
Nehru as prime minister, is
best qualified for the Home
Ministry but is deeply engaged
at present with his responsi-
bilities in the critical fields
of fiscal planning and foreign
aid. Moreover, the temporary
choice of Shastri and the con-
sideration given to several
other possibilities suggest
that Nehru prefers to check the
growing power of Desai, whose
conservative outlook and aloof-
ness have made a close personal
relationship with Nehru diffi-
cult.
Prime Minister.Nehru, now
71 years old, has outlived all
but a few of those close as-
sociates from the independ-
ence movement who since 1947
have comprised the Congress
government's "high command."
His sense of loss and loneli-
ness in power have become in-
creasingly marked as one key
figure after another has died
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The agreement on oil ex-
ploration signed in Karachi on
4 March after several months of
bargaining is the first major
Soviet aid program accepted by
the Pakistani Government. Pak-
istani officials, impressed by
the discoveries of oil by Soviet
teams in India and Afghanistan,
hope that the Soviets will suc-
ceed where Western oil companies
have failed. The agreement pro-
vides for a credit of $30,000,-
000 to finance a five-year pro-
gram of technical assistance in
oil prospecting and surveying.
The credit carries the usual
favorable terms--repayment over
12 years at 2.5-percent interest.
Agreement in principle on
the Soviet credit was reached
in Moscow in December during
the visit of the Pakistani min-
ister of fuel, power, and nat-
ural resources, but consummation
of the deal was delayed pending
further negotiations in Karachi.
Other economic moves by
the Soviet Union were indicated
when the Soviet ambassador to
Pakistan recently discussed
publicly the possibility of ad-
ditional assistance in such areas
as atomic-energy development for
peaceful purposes, medical train-
ing, and agrarian problems. He
also expressed hope that a cul-
tural agreement would be signed.
Pakistani officials have
shown some reluctance with re-
gard to further aid programs,
but conclusion of the oil deal
may make it difficult for them
to turn down publicized offers
in the social welfare field, be-
cause these are keyed to popular
demands and have stirred con-
siderable public interest.
Leaders of the military
government probably are also
motivated by political con-
siderations. While maintaining
Pakistan's commitment to its
Western alliances and continuing
to rely strongly on US aid,
President Ayub and his associates
have sought in recent months to
demonstrate a greater "independ-
ence" in foreign policy as a
reminder that Pakistan's coop-
eration should not be taken for
granted. Despite Ayub's re-
peated reaffirmation of Paki
stan's pro-Western foreign policy
and commitment to the CENTO and
SEATO alliances, neutralist
tendencies have been increasing-
ly evident in government circles
since mid-1960.
A number of top officials,
sharing the view held by many
intellectuals and large sections
of the public, question the value
of a rigid commitment to the
West, believing that neutralist
countries often gain more by ex-
ploiting the competing interests
of both major power blocs. The
Pakistani military government
since early this year has per-
mitted much of the press to
carry on a sustained editorial
campaign calling for "gradual
disengagement from the role of a
committed nation" and for im-
proved relations with the bloc.
The line taken by the press pre-
sumably has reinforced the la-
tent neutralist sentiment of
the bulk of the population, es-
pecially in East Pakistan.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Moscow may be willing to
make some adjustments in its
long-standing positions con-
cerning the border disputes in-
volving Pakistan with Afghan-
istan and India in order to
further this swing toward great-
er "independence" on Pakistan's
part.
might be prepared to revise its
stand on the Pushtoonistan is-
sue if Pakistan is willing to
make some changes in its for-
eign policy. Until recently the
Soviet Union had consistently
and publicly sided with Afghan-
istan on the issue.
There are some indications
that the Soviet Union may also
be shifting its line on the
more complicated Kashmir dis-
pute. Communist China and Pak-
istan have both indicated a de-
sire to negotiate a border de-
marcation. The Chinese probably
would hope to use an agreement,
following the pattern of recent
border accords with Burma and
Nepal, to put additional pres-
sure on New Delhi to accept a
compromise solution in the
Sino-Indian border dispute.
Indian claims in the Ladakh
area might well prejudiced by
a bilateral Sino-Pakistani
boundary settlement, and the
dispute between India and Pak-
istan over Kashmir would also
be further complicated.
The Indian Government in-
sists that Pakistan has no
right to enter into any nego-
tiations with the Chinese, since
India claims sovereignty over
all of Kashmir and thus there
is no common border between
the two countries. Khrushchev
had assured Nehru on many oc-
casions that the USSR agrees
with India and that India has
25X1 de jure sovereignty over all
With the opening of talks
between Pakistan and China on
the border issue, the USSR, by
remaining carefully noncommit-
tal, could better its relations
with Pakistan and at the same
time remove a serious irritant
in its relations with China.
Nehru's strong support for the
UN Congo operation and his
equally strong opposition to
Khrushchev's plans to revamp
the UN Secretariat might well
be factors in a Soviet shift
to a more favorable attitude
toward Pakistan.
Nehru apparently has in-
terpreted Khrushchev's recent
letters on the Congo and UN re-
organization problems as a de-
liberate attempt to isolate
India from the leading African
neutralists and thus counter
New Delhi's restraining influ-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
i,ew :C::cihi apparently is
particularly nettled over the
implication in Soviet First
Deputy Premier Kosygin's recent
offer of further economic as-
sistance that the Indian Gov-
ernment can be "blackmailed"
into changing its independent
policies. In addition, Nehru
probably is concerned that
Soviet-Indian friction will
make it more difficult for
New Delhi to pursue its
tactic of playing off Mos-
cow against Peiping.
BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CEYLON
A Ceylonese economic mis-
sion headed by the trade minis-
ter has Just returned from Mos-
cow, and Ceylon's finance min-
ister is to visit there later
this month. These visits will
probably result in an expansion
of Soviet economic relations
with Colombo and additional
Soviet aid for Ceylon's reacti-
vated economic development plan.
The new Ceylonese Govern-
ment's intention to take a more
neutral. position in world af-
fairs combines with its grave
economic problems--including a
deteriorating balance of pay-
ments--to present the bloc with
r_ew opportunities for offers of
additional economic aid and ex
panding trade.
and that a long-term agreement
would be signed soon.
Ceylon's trade with the
bloc in the first tan months of
about 8.4 percent of its total
trade--as compared with $50,000,-
000, or 7.5 percent of total trade,
for the same period in 1959.
The annual rice-rubber
protocol with Communist China--
Ceylon's largest bloc trading
partner--has been nef;otiated
and is awaiting signature.. Un-
der the protocol. Communist China
reportedly is scheduled to de-
liver this year 200,000 tons of
rice to Ceylon in exchange for
28,000 tons of rubber--amounts
in excess of those stipulated
in the 1060 protocol, but the
Bloc countries are seeking
to increase commorcia.21 ties
with Ceylon by arguing that ex-
panded trade with Communist
countries will bring Ceylon's
over-all trade pattern more in-
to balance. Since December,
several of the European satel-
lites and the USSR have con-.
tracted to deliver about 80,000
tons of sugar--mostly Cuban--
to Ceylon. The USSR, in an of
fort to capture Ceylon's oil
inarlket, has offered to sell pe-
troleum products at prices be-
low those charged by Western
companies now operating in the
country. The Ceylonese trade
mission has announced that an
"understanding" had been reached
on further expansion of trade
same level as usually agreed to
prior to 1060. China will prob-
ably meet most of its commit
men.t to Ceylon with rice from
Burma.
No bloc aid has been ex-
tended to Ceylon since.1958,
..but after the visit of the Polish
premier to Colombo last October,
Warsaw reportedly offered a
"fleet of cargo vessels and
trawlers" on credit and a $20,-
000,600 line of credit for eco-
nomicdevelopment. A Soviet of-
fer of IL-18 passenger aircraft
and helicopters on credit or
barter terms was announced at
about the same time but was re-
ported, subsequently to have
been refused.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The bloc has recently
taken steps to expedite the
existing aid program. To date
Communist China, Czechoslovakia,
and the USSR have extended to
Ceylon grants and credits
totaling $58,000,000 for agji-
culturala.and irrigation devel-
opment projects, a sugar re-
finery, a tire factory, and a
flour mill and grain elevator.
Of this amount, however, only
about $5,000,000 had been uti-?-
lized by the end of 1960.
02( thevsevpno])roject13 --ap-
proved by the Ceylonese Govern-
ment under the Soviet $30,000;-
000 line of credit of 1958, de-
liveries have been made onlonly
one, although project reports
have now been submitted on the
other six and several Soviet
teams of experts have recently
been in Colombo conductingsur-
veys. Prominent among the proj-
ects to be built with Soviet as-
sistance is a steel rolling mill,
estimated to cost $20,000,000,
which is to be constructed in
threecstages with an ultimate
capacity of 100,000 tons. De-
spite the fact that A total of
16 projects were originally men-
tioned for includion under this
credit, it is likely that the
$30,000,000 will cover the costs
of only the approved seven. In:
late 1960 the Ceylonese Govern-
ment resumed negotiations with
Communist China for utilization
of a $15,700,000 grant promised
in 1957 for :Ceylon's rubber
replanting scheme.
(Prepared by ORR)
"HUNDRED FLOWERS" IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Reviving the concept "let
a hundred flowers bloom, let a
hundred schools of thought con-
tend," Peiping's authoritative
party journal Red Flag discuss-
es in its latest issue the need
to permit freer discussion,
criticism, and experimentation
within theaacademic community,
particularly among scientists.
The first "hundred flowers" cam-
paign ended in fiasco almost
four years ago, and Peiping has
since demanded rigid conformity
from its intellectuals under
such slogans as "let politics
take command." Such harsh
regimentation has resulted in
a stultifying academic atmos-
phere. Now that Peiping has
been forced by economic neces-
sity to reconsider its extremist
programs, it may also feel that
a new approach toward the in-
telligentsia is in order.
The Red Flag editorial
deals primarily with the coun-
try's need to raise the stand-
ards of its scientific personnel.
The withdrawal of Soviet tech-
n1dians last summer must have
brought home to the Chinese the
extent of their dependence in
this field on the USSR and
strengthened their determina-
tion to become scientifically
independent. The editorial
states that Chinese scientists,
while making use "of the suc-
cesses of our predecessors,"
should "work inddpendently to
solve the problems our pred-
ecessors did not conquer."
Science was the first
field to be affected by the ear-
lier liberalization campaign.
In January 1956, Peiping an-
nounced its intention of bring-
ing Chinese science in tune
with the rest of the world with-
in 12 years and began to en-
courage free use of Western
scientific sources and innova-
tions. Again today, scientists
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
are being urged "to seek the
truth" freely, and party cadres
have been warned against demand-
ing absolute orthodoxy.
Red Flag points out that
politics an academic study,
although related, "are not the
same," and that achievement in
scientific research can be made
by persons who "suspect Marxism-
Leninism academically." Achieve-
ment should not be denied or
denounced because of any polit-
ical backwardness on the part
of the originator. Further-
more, according to the edito
rial,even if one has completely
mastered Marxism, it does not
follow that it will be easy to
master scientific truth: cadres
cannot judge the validity of a
scientific dispute simply be-
cause they have "memorized cer-
tain principles of the Marxist-
Leninist theories."
The editorial suggests that
liberalization may carry over
into the political arena, but
warns against any effort to take
advantage of this development
to embarrass the regime. It
foresees that the principle of
"hundred flowers" will be used
against the regime by its polit-
ical enemies, but declares that
"Marxist-Leninists are not
afraid of carrying out the prin-
ciple because of that."
The first campaign, begun
during the over-all bloc "thaw,"
took on added impetus after Mao's
speech on contradictions in
February 1957 invited criticisms
from the people. The bitter-
ness of the subsequent verbal
attacks of the intellectuals
shocked the leadership. Commu-
nist cadres were termed "nincom-
poops" and "idiots," and Mao
Tse-tung himself was character-
ized in public as "vain," "meet-
ing only with those who flatter
him," and "desirous of becoming
a benevolent god."
Peiping's drastic measures
brought the campaign to an abrupt
end. It was immediately follow-
ed by a vindictive drive against
those who had expressed opposi-
tion or, in many cases, were
simply suspected of disloyal
opinions. The "rightist" label
was pinned on thousands of
intellectuals, who were then
imprisoned or sent to camps to
be "reformed through labor."
Some of these individuals
have recently been released and
allowed to appear in public--
another small sign that Peiping
is permitting some relaxation
in the intellectual climate.
Both the Communists and the
intellectuals have had their
fingers burned, and both will
try to avoid a repetition of
the events of 1957. A second
liberalization is thus more
likely to stay within bounds,
with most of the flowering con-
fined to theses in the natural
and physical sciences which do
not openly challenge the Commu-
nists' political axioms-
AGRICULTURAL AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Suffering from two years
of poor harvests and now appre-
hensive about 1961 crop pros-
pects, Communist China is negoti-
ating with Australia, Canada,
and Argentina for additional
amounts of food which may add
as much as 2,000,000 tons of
wheat, corn, and barley to the
3,000,000 tons of food grains
purchased earlier. Although
rumors persist that the USSR is
providing foreign exchange to
pay for these imports, avail-
able evidence indicates the Chi-
nese so far have neither re-
quested nor received such
aid.
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tinue exporting food to select-
ed countries, , but', its major
commitments--to Ceylon, Cuba,
and Albania--will be fulfilled
chiefly with grain purchased
from third countries.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Drought conditions have
persisted for three years in
North China. A further serious
complication for 1961 wheat pro-
duction is the apparent failure
in autumn 1960 to sow the planned
acreage in winter wheat. A
short note in Peeople's
Dail of 15 Fe ru'G ary implies
that the area sown to winter
wheat in 1960 was below the
level of the previous year, and
possibly even lower than in the
fall of 1958, when the regime
encouraged a reduction in sown
acreage. Previous information
had indicated that wheat sowing
was late last autumn and if the
failure to get in winter wheat
acreage was as serious as sug-
gested in ;People's Daily,
prospects for the wheat harvest
are poor.
Peiping's admission that
precipitation this winter in the
major wheat-producing areas of
North China was from 25 to 50
percent less than in the last
two winters is supported by evi-
dence from USAF weather reports.
Chinese authorities have ordered
intensive irrigation efforts
this spring in an attempt to
bring in a good wheat harvest.
Peiping has asked for
special efforts "to assist the
people in calamity-stricken
areas. to live through the spring
famine."
The Chinese minister of
agriculture has reported that
work effort in these areas had
been slowed down to allow the
people "to recuperate."
Payment Difficulties
Including some $90,000,000
worth of Cuban sugar, China's
purchases of foodstuffs for de-
livery this year already total
about $300,000,000 and may rise
to over $400,000,000. China
became a new food exporter soon
after the Communist regime was
established, and food imports
in recent years have not ex-
ceeded $40,000,000. Peiping has
made clear its intention to con-
To cover immediate foreign
exchange needs for food imports,
the Chinese have stepped up
sales of silver bullion and
have secured limited short-term
banking credits in Hone Kong
These measures provide
a temporary cushion while more
basic efforts are undertaken to
generate foreign exchange through
exports. A cutback in imports
of industrial goods is also
under way.
Trade With the Bloc
After repeated postpone-
ments, Peiping has opened trade
negotiations with a number of
bloc countries. Chinese export
commitments probably will be
scaled down considerably and
long-term import plans re-
written to reflect Peiping's
reduced capabilities and more
cautious economic plans.
Preliminary Sino-Soviet
economic and trade talks be-
gan in early February in Pei-
ping. On 2 March the head of
the Soviet trade delegation,
Deputy Foreign Trade Minister
Kumykin, left for Moscow amid
announcements that "satisfactory
agreement" was reached on trade
relations. The talks will be
completed in Moscow by a Chinese
trade delegation which arrived
there on 7 March.
Meanwhile, preliminary
talks on economic relations
continue in Peiping, and they
too will eventually be shifted
to Moscow. These conversations
probably center on rescheduling
Soviet deliveries of capital
equipment, a possible resump-
tion of some Soviet technical
assistance, and other aspects
of Soviet aid to China disrupted
during the past eight months.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Kumykin's short stay in
Peiping and the cautious wording
of Soviet and Chinese state-
ments suggest the first stage
of the negotiations was con-
cerned largely with charting a
new course for Sino-Soviet
trade. This trade has been sub-
jected to severe strains since
the exodus of Soviet technicians
last summer, and has been com-
plicated further by China's
domestic economic difficulties.
High priority probably was as-
signed to the issue of China's
short-term indebtedness to the
USSR, which rose $237,000,000
last year when Peiping failed
to keep up the trade pace set
by the Soviet Union.
There is no indication. of
how the issue was settled--
whether Moscow will allow the
Chinese to incur further trade
debts or whether it will hold
down its deliveries to what-
ever level can be matched by
Chinese shipments to the USSR.
Postponement of repayment on
at least China's short-term
debt probably has been accepted
by Moscow as inevitable
SOVIET PARTY PRESIDIUM MEMBER HEADS NEW PROCUREMENTS COMMITTEE
The designation of Niko-
lay Ignatov, who is a member of
the ruling party presidium and
a deputy premier, to head the
new State Committee for Agricul-
tural Procurements, underlines
the importance of the committee
in Khrushchev's program for re-
vitalizing Soviet agriculture.
Ignatov has the experience and
political stature needed to
direct such an agency, but since
it is to play such a key role
in Khrushchev's program Ignatov
is exposed to a considerable
risk of disgrace if the program
fails.
During the past two years
Ignatov appears to have been the
target of some political maneu-
vering--probably related to his
role in agriculture and to the
controversies over policy which
have taken place since the abo-
lition of the Machine Tractor
Stations (MTS) in early 1958.
He suffered some reverses but
managed to retain his position
on the ruling party presidium.
In April 1959 he was
shunted to the largely ceremo.
riial and politically insignifi-
cant post of chairman of the
Russian Republic (RSFSR) Su-
preme Soviet Presidium. Five
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9 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW
months later he was relieved
of this post because the cen-
tral committee "found it neces-
sary" to recall him to "his
main work" in the party secre-
tariat where, since 1957, he
had directed the party's day-
to-day responsibilities in
agriculture.
There is some evidence
that he was again relieved of
those responsibilities shortly
after he had played a key role
in the February 1960 bloc agri-
cultural conference. Then in
the reorganization of the party
secretariat in May, he lost
his job as secretary and was ap-
pointed deputy premier, ranking
below First Deputy Premiers
Kosygin and Mikoyan.
There have been few clues
to the nature of his duties as
deputy premier, but on at
least two occasions he exhibited
continuing interest in the
agricultural field. Although
there is no good evidence con-
necting him with the recent
changes in Soviet agricultural
policy, he presumably played
a behind-the-scenes role.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 3M&RY
OUSTED UKRAINIAN PREMIER RECEIVES AGRICULTURAL POST
Nikifor Kalchenko, who,was
removed as Ukrainian premier
last week, has been named a dep-
uty premier and head of the new
Agricultural Procurements Min-
istry in the republic. His de-
motion further exemplifies Khru-
shchev's reliance on organiza-
tional changes and assignment
of new administrators to achieve
an improvement in agriculture.
Kalchenko had been head of
the Ukrainian government for al-
most seven years. The signal
for his downfall came at the
January plenum of the party cen-
tral committee, when Khrushchev
contemptuously recalled the
disastrous results of his panic
during the drought of 1956. He
told the central committee that
everything rolled off Kalchenko
"like water off a duck--it
does not matter to him that he
has made a mistake."
Kaichenko's new position
is slightly lower than that be
held just before his accession
to the republic premiership in
1954; he was then a first deputy
premier and minister of agri-
culture and procurements. His
new Procurements Ministry is the
Ukrainian equivalent of the re-
cently formed all-union organ-
ization, the Committee for Agri-
cultural Procurements, headed
by party presidium member Niko-
lay Ignatov. These new agencies
are evidently intended to play
an important part in Khrushchev's
agricultural program; for both
Ignatov and Kalchenko, however,
the assignments' might well be
only temporary, and further de-
motion could easily result if
the 1961 harvest fails to meet
Moscow's expectations.
Kalchenko is the second of
Khrushchev's associates from
the Ukraine to be dismissed for
poor leadership in agriculture.
Last December, Vladimir Matske-
vich was fired as Soviet agri-
culture minister and posted to
work in the virgin lands of
Kazakhstan. Other Ukrainian
officials, including four oblast
party secretaries, have also
lost their jobs, and it is cer-
tain that at least two of these
were fired outright for poor
work in agriculture. Such moves,
coupled with Khrushchev's scath-
ing criticism of republic party
chief Podgorny at the January
plenum, are clear signs that
Khrushchev's old associates
from the Ukraine can no longer
expect special treatment.
Kaichenko's appointment to
a lesser post illustrates, at
the same time, the regime's
preference for reassigning of-
ficials under censure rather
than sending them into oblivion.
Similar shifts are taking place
elsewhere in the Soviet Union,
and numerous lesser officials
have already been fired on
grounds of mismanagement of
agriculture. These include at
least four oblast party secre-
taries, one of whom was deprived
of his party membership. The
weeding-out process will con-
tinue for some time, and other
members of the party central
committee will probably become
involved before the election
of a new committee at the 22nd
party congress next October.
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Kal-
chenko's successor as premier
in the Ukraine, is one of sever-
al younger party administrators
recently brought into prominence.
A specialist in industrial mat-
ters, he has been a party member
only since World War II. By
the early 1950s he had become
a professional party worker, and
in 1954 he was named to head
the party organization in
Dnepropetrovsk. He was elected
a member of the Central Auditing
Commission at the 20th party
congress in 1956, and has been,
one of the secretaries of the
Ukrainian Party sin
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'STJMMA;RY
YUGOSLAVIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC
Despite the differences
between the Soviet and Yugoslav
parties, there has been a grad-
ual improvement over the past two
years:!at:the bloc-Yugoslav gov-
ernmental level. Belgrade now
is asserting, however, that
state relations have begun to
deteriorate.
The foreign policy posi-
tions of both Belgrade and
Moscow are served by maintain-
ing reasonably normal state re-
lations. The two countries hold
similar positions on many in-
ternational issues. During
talks in New York last fall,
Tito and Khrushchev agreed to
exchange visits by their foreign
ministers this spring. Most
bloc states have signed long-term
trade agreements (1961-65) with
Yugoslavia, and--after delays
occasioned by economic problems
--a Soviet delegation arrived in
Belgrade for this purpose on 24
February. East Germany report-
edly agreed in principle recent-
ly to grant credits--thought to
exceed $15,000,000--to Belgrade
for the development of coal min-
ing in Slovenia. This would be
Yugoslavia's first bloc credit
since 1956.
A worsening of party rela-
tions, on t'he!other hand, was most
recently shown by the publication
on 22 February of two statements
of the Yugoslav politburo accus-
ing the Soviet party of associat.-
ing itself with the anti-Yugo-
slav policies of Communist China
and Albania. These documents
were intended in part as Bel-
grade's answer to the condemna-
tion of "Yugoslav revisionism"
in the Moscow declaration issued
following last November's confer-
ence of world Communists. How-
ever, Belgrade's criticism also
stems from?_its' irritation with the
bloc's:increased. ?a.nti-Yugoslav
propaganda. Moscow, which has
yet to reply directly to Bel-
grade's charges, shares in prin-
ciple Albania's objections to
Yugoslavia's "revisionist"
ideology, but apparently prefers
Belgrade's foreign policy to
Tirana's.
Belgrade did not substanti-
ate its charge that the Moscow
declaration and subsequent events
have reversed, or even halted,
the trend of improving bloc-
Yugoslav state relations. How-
ever, a withdrawal of the East
German credit offer or cancella-
tion by the USSR of Yugoslav
Foreign Minister Popovic's
planned trip to Moscow might
account for the Yugoslav charges.
Alluding to past Soviet practices
and perhaps to his current ne-
gotiations with East Germany,
Tito,-addressing the Ghanaian
parliament on 2 March, referred
to the political strings "some
countries" attach to economic
relations. Lending substance to
Belgrade's charges, moreover,
Bulgaria expelled a Yugoslav dip-
lomat on 7 March for espionage;
Yugoslavia retaliated in kind
the next day.
Relations between Belgrade
and Tirana have grown particular-
ly tense. Since the first of
the year Belgrade has held six
trials of Albanians for espio-
nage, sent seven official pro-
tests to Tirana, expelled an
Albanian diplomat, and cut the
staff of its mission in Albania
by more than half. Both Peiping
and Tirana are exerting pressure
on other bloc states to abandon
harmonious relations with Bel-
grade even at the state level.
If Tirana stages anti-Yugo-
slav trials, as hinted by Al-
banian party boss Enver Hoxha,
at the party's recent congress,
Belgrade may sever diplomatic
relations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Ecuadorean Communist
party has been involved in a
number of recent outbreaks of
violence among the peasantry of
the country's highland prow-
incest;! . This appears to be
part of a growing Communist
effort to exploit agrarian
grievances in Latin American
countries, accelerated by the
example of Castro's confisca-
tory land reform program in
Cuba. Similar Communist activ-
ity among depressed peasant
groups has been reported over
the past few months in several
other countries, notably El
Salvador, highland Peru, and
the drought-stricken north-
eastern region of Brazil. In
Colombia, where rural violence
has been a major national issue
for over 12 years, the Commu.'-
ntsts reportedly have been active
in promoting the recent upsurge
in agrarian unrest and are being
aided in this objective by the
Castro regime.
Most countries of Latin
America have attempted agrarian
reform or recognized the need
for it to some degree, but with
little sense of urgency before
Castro came to power. The
popular appeal of his agrarian
reform program has highlighted
the political importance of the
problem. In a number of areas,
including Ecuador, political
stability will depend to an
appreciable degree on the abil-
ity and willingness of govern-
ments to proceed with effective
land reform programs.
Ecuador, which is host
to the long-postponed 11th
Inter-American Conference now
set for Quito beginning 24 May,
is predominantly rural like
most of the other countries of
Latin America. About 50 per-
cent of the country's total
population is Indian, and most
of the remainder have a heavy
Indian admixture. To a large
degree the peasants are outside
the money economy, living under
feudal conditions and exercising
little influence on national
politics; the best land is con-
centrated in the hands of a few
wealthy landholders who have
political power and are reluc-
tant to cooperate in improving
the lot of the peasants. A
recent decree raising minimum
daily wages to 20 and 40 cents
respectively for tenant farmers
and agrarian laborers is appar-
ently widely ignored.
The peasant classes of
Ecuador are a potential source
of widespread unrest, as evi-
denced by an uprising of 2,000
peasants in one sierra region
last month--an incident which
Peiping radio promptly public
eized, as it has other similar
rural problems in Latin America
in recent months.
Ecuador's 6,000-member
Communist party has for several
years conducted a program de-
signed to provoke agrarian
unrest, particularly in the
sierra, and has assigned some
of its most competent leaders
to this project. It is almost
the only political group in
Ecuador to "champion" the cause
of the peasants. The party has
apparently had considerable
success in recruiting and train-
ing organizers fluent in
Quechua--the primary language
of a large portion of the In-
dians--and in fomenting acts
of violence by peasants against
landowners. The Communists
now claim control over about 10
percent of the tenants and ag-
ricultural workers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Communist party has set
up several provincial peasant
commissions and a national peas-
ant committee to coordinate
the organizational drive.
Communists also control the
Federation of Indians, an affil-
iate of the country's Communist-
dominated principal labor or-
ganization. Last October the
party sponsored the "First
National Peasants Conference,"
held in Quito and attended by
a number of Indian delegates.
In early 1960, the Communists
planned a "march of Indians" on
Quito to demonstrate at the
time of the 11th inter-American
Conference, then scheduled for
March.
The Communist party has
also used Cuban agrarian reform
propaganda. Its impact on labor-
ers in the coastal area is
illustrated by an uprising last
August of about 300 armed peas-
ants who demanded land titles
and shouted pro-Castro slogans.
Communist speakers at the Quito
peasant conference also stressed
the theme of Cuban reforms. The
pro-Castro former minister of
'government, Manuel Araujo, one
of President Velasco's demagogic
lieutenants, reportedly studied
Cuban agrarian reforms during
a recent visit to that country
for possible application in
Ecuador. He advised a worker
before departure to Havana that
the "revolutionary feeling"
among coastal peasants was high
and that he soon planned to
exploit this group.
Velasco has done little to
carry out his 1960 campaign
promises of agrarian reform, and
Foreign Minister Chiriboga AZieggs
that the President has little
interest in such a
for political gain.
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