CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2005
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO. 463
OCI NO. 1671/60
7 April 1960
UiCURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
DOCUMENT NO.
I ~ DECLASt>:FIED
CLASS. CHANGED ro: T'S S 25X1
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTI- ~~2 - II V
DATfk
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
-6t4jFiDE T0
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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r~ T
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev, in his talks with De Gaulle, failed to
gain any commitments or concessions which would strengthen
the Soviet position at the summit. In contrast to his ex-
travagant appraisal of his Asian tour, Khrushchev summed
up the French visit as "fairly successful," admitting that
on the major issues French and Soviet views do not "fully
coincide." In the final round of private talks, as in the
initial conversations, Germany remained the fundamental
point of disagreement. Although there has been no authori-
tative Soviet reaction to the Eisenhower-Macmillan sugges-
tion for unilateral pledges not to test small underground
nuclear weapons, the Soviet delegate to the test-ban talks
has said that formal inclusion of such a moratorium in a
treaty banning tests above an agreed threshold is "of cru-
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The Iraqi Army, with Qasim's backing, is taking an
increasingly tough policy toward the Iraqi Communists.
Israeli
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has proposed a visit to the USSR
to discuss Middle Eastern questions before the summit
meeting. Representatives of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey at
a meeting of the CENTO military committee in late March
gave firm support to the concept of establishing a CENTO
CARIBBEAN TROUBLE SPOTS .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The Castro regime is moving to tighten its control
over Cuban universities and to squelch the recent manifes-
tations of anti-Communist sentiment among politically ac-
tive student groups. At the same time, it is actively
facilitating Communist youth activities in Cuba and fur-
thering Communist objectives among youth groups in the
rest of Latin America. In the Dominican Republic, the
position of the Trujillo dictatorship continues to weaken,
l
'
a
though the dictator
s use of terror tactics has kept
down overt signs of internal opposition.
.COMMIDENTIAL
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7 April 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOUTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The South African Government, alarmed by the effec-
tivenessof the recent African work stoppage, has intensi-
fied its campaign of repression. The stringent provisions
of the 30 March proclamation of a state of emergency have
been supplemented by further restrictions on demonstra-
tions by Africans. Police are using strong-arm methods in
POLITICAL CONFLICT THREATENS CENTRAL AFRICA . . . . . . . Page 1
In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, growing
African nationalism faces the increasing determination of
the white minority of 300,000 to retain control. This
poses a serious problem for Britain, which shares power
with the white federal government. The three-way dispute
is impeding the orderly evolution toward independence Lon-
don hopes for. The situation probably will be aggravated
by the nationalist agitation of the recently released
African leader, Dr. Hastings Banda, who will push for
early self-government in Nyasaland.
PEIPING'S VIEWS ON "INEVITABILITY" OF WAR . . . . . . . . Page 3
The Chinese Communist party, in the current issue of
its theoretical journal Red Flag, makes its most categori-
cal statement thus far that war is not only probable but
in some cases inevitable as long as imperialism exists.
The article is clearly aimed at Khrushchev's proposition
that bloc strength has progressed to a point where the "in-
evitable war" theory may be put aside in favor of "peace-
ful competition." This and recent bitter anti-American
attacks reflect Peiping's belief that an East-West detente
would impede its effort to eliminate US influence in Taiwan
and the Far East. Khrushchev reportedly told bloc leaders
in Moscow last February that Peiping's refusal to support
Soviet policies was "harming the cause of international
communism."
CHINESE COMMUNISTS LAUNCH NEW DRIVE FOR URBAN COMMUNES . . Page 5
Peiping announced at the National People's Congress
on 30 March that communes are now being established in
cities, reviving an aspect of communalization virtually
ignored since December 1958. A recent campaign to publi-
cize the rapid expansion of collectivized living in major
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
PART II (continued)
cities preceded the announcement. Organizational details
of the new communes have been left obscure. Mao Tse-tung
was present at the congress session, and his authority
will probably be thrown behind the new drive.
PEIPING CALLS FOR ANOTHER BIG LEAP FORWARD . .
Communist China's 1960 economic plan and budget make
clear the regime's determination to continue to push the
Chinese economy forward at "big leap" speed, although the
percentage rate of growth planned for this year is less
than that claimed for either of the two preceding years.
China will probably be able to reach the goals set for
major industrial items, but the agricultural goals--es-
pecially those for grain and cotton--are far beyond reach.
Additional resources are being allocated to the develop-
ment of agriculture this year, although the major share
will still go to heavy industry.
DISSENSION AMONG JAPANESE SOCIALISTS .
Page 6
. . . . . Page 9
A special convention called to reorganize the Japa-
nese Socialist party in the wake of recent defections by
one fifth of its Diet members has elected Inejiro Asanuma
as new party chairman and enabled left-wingers to consoli-
date their control of the party. Some middle-of-the-road
Socialists are expected as a result to join earlier de-
fectors in the recently formed Democratic Socialist party
(DSP). A more far-reaching impact, however, probably will
be on the Sohyo labor federation, the Socialist party's
main support. Moderate elements in many unions may switch
their support to the DSP.
THAILAND'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET BLOC MAY SOFTEN . . . . Pagell
Marshal Sarit, the Thai premier, may be considering
certain gestures to the Sino-Soviet bloc as a means of
registering his dissatisfaction with various aspects of
US aid. He may also stimulate a new round of criticism
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
PART II (continued)
of the United States in the Bangkok press. His reported
decisions to permit government officials to participate
in a trade promotion tour of European bloc countries and
to allow TASS to reopen its office in BangkoK appear to
be tactics designed to support a bid for greater American
aid.
ALGERIAN REBEL ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The Algerian rebel National Liberation Front (FLN),
which has suffered serious military setbacks in Algeria,
retains a disciplined organization in metropolitan France.
It provides a means of collecting funds and soliciting
army recruits from among the approximately 275,000 Alge-
rians in the metropole. Except for sporadic attempts at
sabotage, however, the FLN's energy is largely directed
toward maintaining supremacy over the rival Algerian Na-
tional Movement (MNA).
MIKOYAN VISIT TO IRAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan--the highest ranking
Soviet official ever to visit the Arab world--is heading
an official delegation to open the Soviet exhibition in
Baghdad on 8 April. The visit is probably intended to
counter recent signs of an improvement in Iraq's rela-
tions with the West and to induce the Qasim regime to
soften its attitude toward Iraq's Communists. Soviet pub-
licity for the visit suggests that Mikoyan will offer ad-
ditional economic assistance, apparently in the hope that
its political impact would restore flagging Iraqi hopes
concerning quick benefits from bloc aid.
EAST GERMAN CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT SHARPENS . . . . . . . . Page 13
The chronic church-state conflict in East Germany has
been sharpened by the defiant position of the Evangelical
Church against the regime's measures to force the peasants
into collective farms. The Evangelical Church is under
pressure to reverse the stand against collectivization its
bishops took in a letter addressed to Premier Grotewohl
which was read from pulpits throughout the country. The
unity of the East German clergy behind Bishop Otto Dibelius
in West Berlin has set back party boss Ulbricht's long cam-
paign to separate the church from its West German ties.
THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN FINLAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Pressure continues in Finland to broaden the Agrarian
government which has ruled since January 1959 with a par-
liamentary basis of only 47 seats out of 200. The Agrar-
ians have contended that there is no practical alternative
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7 April 1960
PART II (continued)
Social Democratic participation in the government.
to their rule in view of the USSR's hostile attitude toward
the present leader of the regular Social Democratic party.
They may urge that Finland's interest in associating itself
with the European Free Trade Association is an additional
reason for not irritating Moscow at this time. The Social
Democratic party's congress opening on 16 April, however,
may bring about a change in the party's leadership which
would force the Agrarians to modify their opposition to
POSSIBLE CABINET SHAKE-UP IN SPAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
cabinet reshuffle to avoid further ministerial bickering.
Sharpening antagonism between supporters and opponents
of the economic stabilization program Spain instituted in
July 1959 has resulted in the dismissal of Housing Minister
Jose Luis Arrese, who opposes the program. Influential
ministers seem to be readying an all-out attack on the pro-
gram. There is speculation that Franco may be preparing a
LONDON'S PROBLEMS IN BRITISH GUIANA . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The breakup of the British Guiana constitutional
talks in London over arrangements for transitional meas-
ures toward independence may end the hitherto satisfactory
working relationship between the British and Cheddi Jagan,
Communist leader of the colony's dominant political party.
Jagan has threatened to agitate for immediate independence
and may have enlisted Castro's support during his 4 to 7
April visit to Havana.
ELECTION SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
In El Salvador's elections on 24 April President
Lemus' middle-of-the-road party is expected to win all 54
seats in the National Legislative Assembly and nearly all
the local offices at stake. Despite the President's popu-
larity, however, there are signs of dissatisfaction in the
armed forces and in his own party, and rumors of plotting
are beginning to circulate. Small opposition groups sup-
ported by Communists and sympathizers with Castro's Cuban
revolution will probably create some election disturbances,
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7 April 1960
SINO-SOVIET DOCTRINAL DISPUTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Chinese Communist leaders continue to adopt independ-
ent internal and foreign policies and to put Mao Tse-tung
forward as the "discoverer" of new doctrines. In justify-
ing their unorthodox domestic programs with equally un-
orthodox doctrinal formulations, implying that these could
be applied elsewhere in the bloc, the Chinese in effect
challenge the Soviet Union's "pre-eminence" in this field.
Khrushchev apparently has decided it is time to deal with
these Chinese claims. In some bloc countries Mao's author-
ity in. doctrinal matters appears to be increasing, and
Khrushchev will probably find he cannot obliterate it by
fiat.
. . Page
Many of the almost 1,000 foreign students studying
in the USSR are reportedly dissatisfied with their lot and
disillusioned with the Soviet way of life. Reports of dis-
satisfaction concern chiefly students from the Asian-Afri-
can underdeveloped countries. While some have been indoc-
trinated with a belief in Communism, many appear to resent
Moscow's efforts to exploit them for propaganda purposes.
They also resent their enforced isolation, a result of the
regime's determination to protect Soviet students from
foreign contamination. Moscow's plan to establish a spe-
cial University of People's Friendship for foreign students
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America will probably increase
these students' sense of segregation and regimentation.
WEST GERMANY'S ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The West German military build-up now has reached a
stage where combat effectiveness will increase rapidly.
In all three services, most of the planned combat units
will have been activated by the end of 1961. By the mid-
1960s West Germany's army will probably be the strongest
ground force in Western Europe and its air force a rival
to France's in tactical air power. The Adenauer govern-
ment seems determined to keep its forces integrated with
NATO, but the pressures Bonn is beginning to exert for
full equality within NATO raise problems for the alliance.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
PART III (continued)
BRAZIL AND ITS NEW FEDERAL CAPITAL . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The scheduled inauguration on 21 April of Brazil's
new federal capital, Brasilia, points up both the problems
and successes of Brazil's intense effort to become a "de-
veloped" nation, Brasilia is one aspect of President
Kubitschelc's $6 billion economic development program, now
in its fifth and final year. The success of the program
will favor the government's candidate in next October's
presidential election; however, a recurrence of the balance-
of-payments crisis or the food shortages of 1959 could tip
the balance decisively toward the opposition.
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In his speech in Moscow
on 4 April, however, Khrushchev
implied that De Gaulle had made
concessions to the Soviet posi-
tion on a peace treaty. He
claimed they had "established
that there is a basis for work-
ing out an agreed position" on
a number of most important
questions, and he quoted the
communique on Germany and Ber-
lin as implicit support for
this contention.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
25X1
25X1
talks between
Khrushchev and De Gaulle and
the routine communique which
followed them indicate that the
Soviet premier failed to gain
any commitments or concessions
which would strengthen his po-
sition at the summit. In con-
trast to his extravagant ap-
praisal of his recent Asian
tour, Khrushchev, on his return
to Moscow summed up the French
visit as "fairly successful,"
admitting that on major issues
French and Soviet views did
not "fully coincide."
Khrushchev appears to have
accepted the concept of pro-
tracted negotiations on Germany
and Berlin in agreeing to a
French proposal for a reference
in the communique to "progres-
sive settlement" of these ques-
tions on a basis "agreed on
through negotiations." He fol-
lowed this up in his 'final
press conference on 2 April by
admitting that the conclusion
of a peace treaty and a Berlin
solution "demand some time."
Khrushchev also claimed
that his
views
on
disarmament
coincided
with
De
Gaulle's.
25X1
25X1
Soviet delegate in Geneva used
the communique's reference to
a joint desire for the disarma-
ment talks to achieve "definite
agreed points of view" on com-
plete and general disarmament
in pressing the West to take
up specific measures in the 25X1
Soviet plan.
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7 April T960
The communique's reference
to a mutual interest in rein-
forcing European security may
provide Khrushchev with an open-
ing to raise this issue at the
summit. In his television ad-
dress in Paris, Khrushchev spe-
cifically included European se-
curity in a list of the most
important international ques-
tions, along with disarmament,
a German. treaty and Berlin, and
nuclear testing.
Khrushchev's public state-
ments during the final phase of
his visit and his speech in Mos-
cow provided further evidence
that the immediate objective
for his trip was to maintain a
favorable pre-summit atmosphere
and to project an image of So-
viet reasonableness and flex-
ibility in meeting Western views
on key international problems.
As to the summit meeting,
he said at a. Soviet Embassy re-
ception, "Naturally, it is im-
possible to settle all outstand-
ing problems in one meeting."
In his TV address he held out
the possibility of achieving
progress "if statesmen take ac-
count of mutual interests" and
meet each other half way. His
treatment of the possibility
of a separate peace treaty with
East Germany was intended to
convey an impression of extreme
reluctance to take such action.
From the outset of his
visit, however, it was obvious
that Khrushchev hoped to gener-
ate popular pressure in France
for some accommodation to the
Soviet position on Germany by
arousing old antagonisms and
sowing the seeds of suspicion
of De Gaulle's ally in Bonn.
He sought to create doubts about
Germany's reliability by recall-
ing the Hitler-Stalin pact and
explaining that diplomacy is a
"tricky game" in which the par-
ticipants must understand that
others can play the "same
tricks on them."
He warned French parlia-
ment members that "West Germany
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
might play the same kind of
trick Hitler Germany played
before World War II." He found
it "a point to ponder" that,
although Adenauer attacked the
USSR in his speeches, Soviet
trade with Bonn was growing-
"I would ask our French friends
to put that under their hat."
French Reaction
Ambassador Houghton in
Paris, in a preliminary esti-
mate of the Khrushchev visit,
reports that the degree of Khru-
shchev's success in generating
popular fears over Germany is
not yet clear, but that such
fears are obviously latent
among certain elements and al-
ready present among anti-Ger-
man extremists such as Daladier,
who thanked Khrushchev for re-
minding the French people of
the German menace. Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville told
Houghton he believed Khrushchev
had badly misjudged French
feelings about Germany and that
his remarks had had little if
any effect on French public
opinion.
Houghton feels Khrushchev's
general circumspection and dig-
nity and his stress on peace and
Soviet-French friendship might
overcome any hesitancy in the
average citizen against reach-
ing agreements with the USSR
because of ideological differ-
ences. He thought the French
Communist party's role in or-
ganizing mass receptions for
Khrushchev might hurt the party,
but estimated that non-Commu-
nist cooperation with the Com-
munists on.domestic issues would
vary with the extent of the
East-West detente.
The French Government took
the unusual step of justifying
the Khrushchev visit to the pub-
lic in a nationwide radio-tele-
vision dialogue between Premier
Debrd and Information Minister
Terrenoire. Debrd said that
Khrushchev's television appear-
ance was required "by the laws
of hospitality," denied that the
communiqud was "of meager sub-
stance," and took special pains
to explain that the Khrushchev
visit was a necessary prelude
to the summit. Debrd also used
the opportunity to state that
France had few illusions about
the practical results of a sum-
mit meeting, that France wants
"absolute priority" on disarma-
ment, and that an East-West de-
tente could not be based on
abandonment of the Western po-
sition on Germany and Berlin.
Couve de Murville said that
De Gaulle was somewhat preju-
diced in judging Khrushchev,
since he had such a high regard
for Stalin. De Gaulle found
Khrushchev "clever, intelligent,
and well informed," but not a
"superior" person.
Test Ban Talks
In reaction to the Eisen-
hower-Macmillan statement of
29 March calling for unilateral
pledges not to test small under-
ground nuclear weapons, the
USSR will probably insist that
a moratorium on such tests be
included in some form in a
treaty banning all other tests.
Moscow would seek to portray
Western agreement to,this ar-
rangement as implying accept-
ance of the long-standing So-
viet demand for a comprehensive
ban on all tests.
Soviet chief delegate
Tsarapkin at Geneva has asked
why the United States favors
such unilateral declarations
rather than formal incorpora-
tion of a moratorium obligation
in the treaty, emphasizing that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY
7 April 1960
the USSR regards this question
as of "crucial importance."
In requesting more de-
tails on the Eisenhower-Mac-
millan plan, Tsarapkin took the
position that the duration of
a moratorium should coincide
with that of the research and
development program to make
all tests detectable. Referring
town alleged statement by AEC
Chairman McCone that four or
five years would be necessary
to develop a reliable control
system over the cessation of
all tests, Tsarapkin asked
whether this is still the po-
sition of the United States.
The British delegation
has been instructed to follow
the United States' lead, but
to agree, if pressed by the
USSR, to the inclusion of the
moratorium on underground tests
below a certain threshold in
the treaty banning tests above
this threshold. London also
believes that the moratorium
and the joint research program
should be conterminous,
Disarmament Talks
The Soviet delegation at
the disarmament talks contin-
ued to insist last week that
the conference recognize the
principle of "complete and gen-
eral disarmament" and proceed
to work out basic principles
toward this objective. Follow-
ing Khrushchev's strong criti-
cism in France of the failure
of the Western plan to offer
common areas for agreement,
Zorin characterized the West-
ern plan as an inadequate re-
sponse to the UN resolution
and unacceptable as a basis
for further negotiations. He
stressed the standard theme
that the West was seeking to
negotiate "complete and general
control," while evading spe-
cific disarmament measures, and
urged that the conference re-
vert to the main task of com-
plete and general disarmament
assigned to it by the UN.
Despite continued bloc
criticism of the Western plan,
the atmosphere of the conference
continued to be relaxed and the
tone of the debate moderate.
Zorin stated publicly that
he will not agree to discuss
partial disarmament measures
until it becomes clear that the
West is not interested in gen-
eral and complete disarmament.
This line provides further evi-
dence that Soviet tactics are
aimed at drawing the West to-
ward at least agreement in prin-
ciple to Moscow's formula of
"general and complete disarma-
ment" as the goal of the con-
ference or, failing this, to
place the blame on the West for
a failure to agree.
Iraq
Many recent reports indi-
cate that the Iraqi Army
i, taking an increasingly
tough policy toward local
Communists and that Prime
Minister Qasim,' despite the
ambiguity of his public
statements, is backing this policy.
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7 April 1960
The Communist press complained
on 4 April that "responsible
officials" stopped citizens
going to Baghdad to partici-
pate in the parade of Peace
Partisans the day before.
]Fears over an increasingly
friendly official attitude to-
ward the West are evident in
the Communist press criticism
of the regime's moves to take
advantage of the modest US
technical assistance program.
Comparisons have been made be-
tween the "octopus trap of
Point Four aid" and the further
"sincere economic aid" Soviet
First Deputy Premier Mikoyan
is expected to extend during
his visit to Baghdad beginning
on 8 April. (See Part II,
page 12).
Measures against the Com-
munists have increased the in-
fluence of anti-Communist army
elements within the regime and
have narrowed Qasim's area of
maneuver by alienating the
Iraqi Communists, except for the
splinter faction backed by him.
Accompanying the stiffening at-
titude of the army has been an
improvement in discipline and
a decrease of Communist influ-
ence within the armed forces.
The army now is the mainstay of
the regime and is in a position
to exert more effective pres-
sure on the civilian government.
Jordan-UAR
Husayn left on 4 April for
official visits to Iran, Turkey,
Ethiopia, and Morocco, and then
will go unofficially to Spain
and possibly other countries.
Meanwhile, the Arab League
Council's political affairs com-
mittee, which reconvened in Cairo
on 31 March, decided that'the
Palestine issue was too delicate
for it to handle, in view of the
diametrically opposed positions
of Jordan and the UAR. Further
consideration of UAR proposals
for a "Palestine entity and army"
has therefore been deferred un-
til the Arab League foreign min-
isters meet in a special session
planned for the end of April.
Israel
Israeli Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion,whose personal odys-
sey so far has taken him to
meetings with Eisenhower, Ade-
nauer, and Macmillan, also pro-
poses to visit the USSR and
France. Ben-Gurion reportedly
has not insisted on a formal
invitation from Moscow but
would simply accept its "con-
sent" to his visit.
The Soviet charge d'af?-
faires in Tel Aviv said on 31
March that his government was
considering the proposal, but
gave no indication of Moscow's
response. The proposed visit
poses a dilemma to Soviet lead-
ers, since it would tend to un-
dercut Moscow's efforts to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
foster an image of the Soviet
Union as the big-power support-
er of the Arab countries against
an allegedly expansionist-
minded-Israel. A refusal, on
the other hand, would show that
Moscow's advocacy of contacts
at the head-of-government level
applies only when Soviet lead-
ers feel such contacts may
further their policy objectives.
Ben-Gurion presumably in-
tends to present Israel's views
on Middle East issues to the
Soviet Government in case there
is any consideration of the
area's problems at the East-
West summit conference. The
Israelis would like a declara-
tion by the Big Four powers that
would guarantee the territorial
status quo in the Middle East
and encourage an Arab-Israeli
settlement. Britain, France,
and the United States joined
in a declaration in 1950 which'
undertook to guarantee exist-
ing Middle Eastern frontiers,
but Nasir continues to de-
nounce it.
According to an announce-
ment in Israel, Ben-Gurion has
been invited to make an official
visit to France. The French
have been cool toward a De
Gaulle - Ben-Gurion meeting,
and this visit probably will
not take place until after the
summit conference.
De Gaulle has4`,sought, over
the opposition of some French
circles, to disengage Paris from
its close relationship with Is-
rael in the interest of better
relations with the Arab states,
his immediate aim being to fa-
cilitate a settlement in Algeria.
Despite this policy, however,
there are indications that the
French sent 12 more Super
Mystere jet fighters to Israel
on 11 March. This would raise
the estimated number of Super
Mysteres the Israelis have to
44; they also have an estimated
57 Mysteres.
Central Treaty Organization
At a meeting in Tehran in
late March of the Military Com-
mittee of the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO), Pakistan,
Iran, and Turkey, strongly backed
a plan to establish a CENTO
command structure. Iran is
seeking to have the Shah named
commander in chief.
While the British represent-
ative personally agreed to the
need for a command structure,
he indicated his government
could not accept the study on
the subject submitted to the
committee, because British mil-
itary authorities had not had
sufficient opportunity to ex-
amine the document. The British
have felt that some gesture
should be made toward Iran to
prevent a "crisis of confidence"
and were less firm than previously
in support of the US position
against a command structure.
After considerable debate,
the Military Committee:. agreed
to report to the CENTO Ministe-
rial Council meeting in late
April that it had taken "cogni-
zance" of the study.
Yemen
Yemeni officials have be-
come increasingly doubtful
about the genuineness of Amer-
ican interest in furnishing
economic aid to Yemen. Late
last year they began urging
fast US action to take advantage
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
of the Imam's suspicion
of Communist intentions and
his reported decision to adopt
a "pro-Western" policy.
They feel that the American
response has been inadequate.
A basic aid agreement was signed
last fall, and a total of $2,-
000,000 in aid funds has been
proposed for fiscal 1961. The ma-
jor project under the agreement
--a highway to be constructed
between Taiz and Sana--is being
negotiated. Yemeni officials
contend that the planned con-
struction period of "three to
with the Chinese Communist Al
Hudayda-Sana road project and
to illustrate the United States'
"real sincerity and esteem re-
garding Yemen."
The American Legation in
Taiz reports that the Russians
and the Chinese Communists have
stepped up work on the projects
they have undertaken within the
scope of a $25,000,000 Soviet
line of credit and a $16,000,000
Chinese Communist interest-free
credit. In addition, activity 25X1
under the Soviet military aid
program seems to have been
four years" must be shortened renewed.
to avoid unfavorable comparisons
CARIBBEAN TROUBLE SPOTS
The Castro regime is mov-
ing to tighten its control over
Cuban universities and to
squelch the recent manifesta-
tions of anti-Communist senti-
ment among politically active
student groups. At the same
time, the regime has provided
television facilities and helped
in other ways the national con-
gress of the youth section of
the Cuban Communist party which
opened in Havana on 4 April.
In line with Castro's in-
sistence that anti-Communism
is counterrevolution, the gov-
ernment-dominated leadership
of the Federation of University
Students (FEU) at Havana Uni-
versity has convened special
courts to try as "enemies of
the revolution" students who
supported newscaster Luis Conte
Aguero's attacks on Communist
influence in Cuba. This has
intimidated Catholics and other
anti-Communists among the stu-
dents, most of whom have thus
far supported Castro.
Che Guevara has told stu-
dents that the traditionally
autonomous universities must
be brought under close govern-
ment supervision, and 25X1
2,000 care-
fully chosen students from
rural areas will be sent to Ha-
vana University by the govern-
ment. The regime will pay all
their expenses and use them as
shock troops to maintain con-
trol there.
The Communist youth con-
gress has attracted delegates
from the Sino-Soviet bloc and
from various Latin American
countries. Its theme of sup-
port for and defense of the
Cuban revolution is another
of the "unity" moves which
have helped the Communists at-
tain strong influence in the
Castro government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
Arrangements are probably
being made at the congress to
manipulate a preparatory meet-
ing to be held on 25 April for
the Latin American Youth Con-
gress which Castro is promot-
ing in..Havana in July. Rep-
resentatives of the 26th of
July Movement are on a tour of
Latin America to invite youth
groups to the preparatory meet-
ing. Although Catholic and oth-
er non-Communist Latin American
representatives will probably
make a strong effort to keep
the congress from being domi-
nated by the Communists, the
Communists appear likely to
control it.
Dominican Republic
The position of the Tru-
jillo dictatorship continues
to weaken. Although terror
tactics have kept down overt
signs of opposition, the dis-
sidents have continued to plot,
and the opposition is steadily
spreading.
SECRET
The Generalissimo's "resig-
nation" on 1 April from the
Dominican party, the country's
sole political organization,
appears to be simply a maneu-
ver to strengthen his position.
Dominicans remember the fate of
those who rose to similar bait
after earlier calls for opposi-
tion parties. If he wants his
resignation rejected, his syco-
phants in the party will cer-
tainly comply--a move that would
illustrate his unrealistic esti-
mate of the present position.
Trujillo's pique at the
United States for failing to
give him moral backing and for
refusing to sell him arms has
recently resulted in an effort
by his foreign minister to have
an American Embassy official re-
called. The foreign minister has
also intimated that his govern-
ment will not renew the present 25X1
agreements covering loran facili-
ties and a long-range missile
proving ground.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY,:SUMMARY
7 April 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The South African Govern-
ment, alarmed by the effective-
ness of the Africans' recent
work stoppages, has stepped up
its campaign of repression,
The provisions of the 30 March
proclamation of a state of
emergency--which established
virtual martial law in the
country's urban areas--have
been supplemented by decrees
placing further restrictions
on demonstrations by Africans.
and authorizing the use of
"force resulting in death" in
the event of "suspected danger"
to. life or property. Although
the government has slightly
relaxed the African pass sys-
tem--partly because it was un-
enforceable--it will not. modify
its control. over the movement
and employment of Africans.
Police are using strong-
ariri 3lnethods in several cities
-to "intimidate the intimidators?
who they believe are responsible
for the demonstrations and the
widespread work stoppages. More
than 400 persons have been ar-
rested under the emergency regu-
lations. A law authorizing the
government to outlaw African
organizations was promulgated
on 5 April.
The African labor situa-
tion has returned to normal in
most areas. However, the week-
long strike, which caused an
estimated $60,000,000 loss in
industrial production, demon-
strated to both Africans and
Europeans the potential eco-
nomio loverage of the African
community. The native labor
force probably will be squeezed
by growing pressures from both
nationalist agitators and se-
curity forces, with a concomi-
tant. rise in tension.
The widespread interna-
tional Briticism of the Verwoerd
government's actions---,particu-
larly the UN Security Council's
resolution on I April--have
made the Europeans in South
Africa increasingly aware of
their isolation; as a result,
opposition to the prime minister
has become more articulate and
widespread. However, Verwoerd
apparently retains the support
of the conservative Afrikaner
farmers who form the backbone
of the ruling Nationalist party.
the government's repressive
program, moreover, probably has
at least the tacit support of
a large part of the European
community. Thus a radical
change in South African racial
polities is unlikely in the
near future,
UN'Secretary General Ham-
marskjold now contemplates a
trip to.Cape Town to confer with
officials there and has begun
consultations on this matter with
South African UN delegate Fourie,
%'LITICAL CONFLICT THREATENS CENTRAL AFRICA
In the Federation of Rho-
desia and Nyasaland, g,' >-:iing
African nationalism fa--;s the
increasing determination of the
white minority of 300,000 to
retain control. This develop-
ing conflict poses a serious
problem for Britain, which
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
shares power with the
white federal govern-
ment. The three-way
dispute is impeding
evolution toward in-
dependence. The sit-
uation will probably
be aggravated by the
nationalist agitation
of Dr. Hastings Banda
-the African leader
in Nyasa,larid who was
released from prison
on 1 April.
British dffici-
als are trying to
close the widening
breach between the
races and to counter
the growing separa-
tist,tendencies in
Nyasaland and North-
ern and. Southern Rho-
desia. The Africans
expect quick tangi-
ble gains from a re-
cent tour of the area
made by British Colonial Sec-
retary Macleod, but the Ameri-
can consul. general believes a
fundamental threefold program
is. necessary to.aVert early
violence. The first step was
the release of Banda.. The pro-
gram *Ould also involve far-
reaching constitutional changes
in Nyasaland leading toward an
African-dominated government
sooh, and. similar but less ex-
tensiie.developments in North--
br~in IthodeSSi: '.
Stich a program might satis-
fy the Africans until the future
of "the .Federation is decided
following a conference in London
late this year. However, Fed-
eration` Prime Minister Welensky
would strongly resist African
control of copper-rich Northern
Rhodesia:, where a European minor-
itk of 80y0OO demands continu-
ing close ties with the larger
white community of Southern Rho-
desia.
The three territories of
the Federation have attained
Varying degrees of political
and economic evolution. South-
ern Rhodesia, with some 220,000
of the Federation's European
minority and the greatest eco-
nomic development, enjoys a self-
,governing status limited by the
control of the Commonwealth
Relations Office over racial
legislation. In Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, with much smaller
white minorities and where the
Colonial Office exercises con-
trol over internal matters, Lon-
don has generally encouraged
African advancement.
The Europeans appear to
have little comprehension of
the growing strength of African
nationalism. The more observant
minority is determined to resist
even at the risk of bloodshed,
as in South Africa. Welensky is
extremely critical of the colo-
nial powers for "scuttling"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
their African responsibilities,
and he distrusts Britain's ap-
parently pro-African policy.
The pace of African advance-
ment toward self-government in
Nyasaland will quicken follow-
ing Dr. Banda's resumption of
overt nationalist leadership.
He has called on his follower.;
to avoid violence and, almost
immediately after his release
from jail, conferred with Macleod.
Within a few days, he left for
London to discuss Nyasaland's
future. By freeing Banda, Lon-
don may have secured the native
cooperation essential for con-
stitutional advance toward self-
government in that protectorate.
Subsequent failure to satisfy
African nationalists, however,
might lead to renewed terrorism
similar to that of March 1959.
During Banda's imprisonment,
the Malawi Congress party agitat-
ed against the white-dominated
Federation by means of sizable
demonstrations and some violence.
Moreover, the party may have
established a series of "facto-
ries" in Nyasaland caves to
manufacture crude weapons and
ammunition in case the party
eventually resorts to terrorism,
The threat of disturbances
in the Federation has alarmed
Portuguese authorities in neigh-
boring Mozambique. They have
strengthened military forces,
established new border posts,
and reorganized their defense
and security system by creating 25X1
military strong, points to re-
inforce frontier police and
customs posts.
PEIPING'S VIEWS ON "INEVITABILITY" OF WAR
The Chinese Communist par-
ty, in the current issue of its
theoretical journal Red Flag,
makes its most categorical
statement thus far that war is
probable--and in some instances,
inevitable--as long as "im-
perialism" exists. Using the
90th anniversary of Lenin's
birth as a springboard, the
journal warns Chinese Commu-
nists away from the pronounce-
ments Khrushchev has made on
the nature of the contest with
the West. It implicitly criti-
cizes the Soviet premier for a
less dynamic opposition to "im-
perialism" than Peiping feels
is required by its own and
world Communist objectives.
The article is another example
of the Chinese leaders' readi-
ness to manipulate basic doc-
trine in justification of their
own policies. (See Part III,
page 1).
The Red Flag article is
aimed at Iffirushchev's justifi-
cation for a detente--his prop-
osition that bloc strength has
progressed to a point where the
"inevitable war" theory, so use-
ful to the USSR as a spur to
discipline and production dur-
ing its earlier years, may be
put aside in favor of "peaceful
competition." The Chinese are
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SRy
7 April 1960
attempting to empty
the coexistence
thesis of all mean-
ing, buttressing
their arguments with
selected quotations
from Lenin and the
sayings of Mao Tse-
tung.
Red Flag insists 22 July 1959.
that 'Ti pe- alism"
has not changed and
cannot change and
that its economic
system breeds war because it
is based on "exploitation and
oppression." It states that
"the imperialist policy of
plunder is bound to lead to
war." This contrasts vividly
with Khrushchev's statement to
the Soviet 21st party congress
that "there will be created real
possibilities for eliminating
war as a means of settling in-
ternational issues." The Chi-
nese stress that the "war ma-
niacs" can only be thwarted by
"fighting tooth and nail."
The journal claims that
"within imperialism," colonial
and civil wars are "inevitable"
and that those fighting "im-
perialism" deserve strong bloc
support. In a remark apparent-
ly intended to take issue with
Khrushchev's insistence that
the USSR will. not aggressively
export Communism, Red Flag
states that to ignore such wars
would be "extreme opportunism"
and would betray the "so-
cialist revolution."
While the Chinese empha-
size the "inevitability" of
"imperialist" wars, they skirt
a direct pronouncement that a
major East-West war is equally
certain. Nevertheless, Red
Flag conjures up for its read-
ers the now-familiar image of
implacable US hostility. "The
peace desired by US imperialism
is a peace which provides for
SOVIET
"Only peaceful coexistence and
peaceful competition between the
two systems can prevent war."
Joint Soviet-Polish statement,
CHINESE
"I think the American people and the
people of all countries menaced by
US aggression should unite to repel
the attacks of US reactionaries and
their lackeys. Only victory in this
struggle can avert a third world war;
it can not be averted otherwise."
lino Tse-tung, quoted by Red Flac. 1
January 1960.
US domination of the whole
globe--it is peace for the
purpose of eliminating social-
ism." Red Flag charges that to
realize-ids amTition, the United
States is paying "lip service
to peace" while preparing for a
world war and "actively conduct-
ing" limited wars.
Red Flag's diatribe reflects
the vTe Piping places on
having an external enemy with
which to goad its people toward
greater efforts, as well as frus-
tration with the effect a pro-
longed detente would have on
Communist China's ambitiong to
eliminate US influence in Taiwan
and the western Pacific. Quoting
Lenin, Red Flag states, "We are
surroun ec . by people, classes,
and governments who openly ex-
press the greatest hatred for
us." With implications which
could hardly be lost on Khru-
shchev, the Chinese draw again
from Lenin to express their ir-
ritation: "Whoever has thought
that it is easy to attain peace
--that one has only to mention
the word and the bourgeoisie
will present it on a silver
platter--is a very naive person."
Khrushchev's reported at-
tack on the Chinese at the Feb-
ruary Warsaw Pact meeting for
refusing to support the USSR's
attempts to reduce world ten-
sion apparently has had little
effect on Peiping. He is said
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
to have sharply criticized Chi-
na's refusal to associate it-
self with policies adopted by
"other socialist countries"and
to have charged that this refus-
al "was harming the cause of
international communism." While
Xhrushchev might not have ex-
pected such strictures to in-
Chinese.
duce the Chinese to change, he
would probably hope that his'con-
demnation would forestall any
influence China's independent
views have on the actions of
other satellite regimes and that
it would make clear the Soviet 25X1
Union's intention not to change
its policies to mollify the
The opening session of
the National 'People's Congress
in Peiping on 30 March was the
forum for an announcement by
Communist China's planning
chief, Vice Premier Li Fu-chun,
that "urban communes" are be-
ing developed "in a big way"
in cities throughout the coun-
try. The statement was preceded
in recent weeks by a campaign to
publicize the rapid growth of
facilities for "collectivized
living" in major cities. Al-
though urban communes had not
been mentioned specifically, it
was apparent that the facilities
were a long step in that direc-
tion.
In the fall of l0,58 urban
communes were presented as an
integral part of the program,
but the regime experienced such
difficulties in their organiza-
tion that the attempt was vir-
tually ignored after the end of
that year. This coincided with
Peiping's modification of its
doctrinal claims for the whole
commune program, presumably in
deference to Soviet objections.
Peiping is attempting to
minimize the lapse of more
than a year in the urban com-
mune movement by presenting
the present drive as the out-
come of a two-year period of
experimentation. A People's
Daily editorial of 31 March,
which described the formation
of urban communes as "an event
of great historical signifi-
cance," claimed that they would
be "a good organizational form
for further organizing the eco-
nomic and cultural life" of
city residents.
The editorial claimed the
organization of production was
the first step in forming urban
communes and referred to "com-
mune and neighborhood" industry,
but the exact form the communes
will take has been left obscure.
Some urban communes formed in
the past have been organized
around a single, large economic
enterprise such as a factory or
a mine, while others have been
organized on the basis of dis-
tricts and contained only small-
scale industries. Both of
these methods, and combinations
of the two, will probably be
used in the new movement.
People's Daily declared
that communes were being estab-
lished in "many" cities, suggest-
ing that not all cities will
proceed at the same rate. A
local newspaper recently claimed
that the Manchurian industrial
city of Shenyang at the end of
1958 became the first to be to-
tally communalized. The news-
paper said the communes are
organized on the basis of streets
and contain an average of 30,-
000 members.
Mao Tse-tung attended the
People's Congress session on
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CU'RkENT INT9LLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
30 March--his first public ap-
pearance in Peiping in five
months. In keeping with-the
present campaign to present
Mao as a ..creative Marxist-Len-
inist theoretician, it is like-
ly that t'ze drive'for urban
communes: will be firmly linked
to his "ideology," Expansion
of the commune movement indicates
that Peiping is willing to risk
Moscow's displeasure rather 25X1
than abandon what'.it considers
essential aspects of its cur-
rent programs.
PEIPING CALLS FOR ANOTHER BIG LEAP FORWARD
Communist China's 1960
economic plan and budget,which
were presented to the opening
session -of 'the National
People's Congress on 30 April,
make clear the regime's satis-
faction with the policies fol-
lowed in 1958 and 1959 and
its.. determination to continue
to push the economy forward at
"big leap" speed, The congress
was told that the situation in
the country is "wonderful,"
that economic work on all
fronts is expanding."in ever-
mounting waves," and that
"Communist conscious-
ness" of the masses
is higher than ever
before.
Although the
tone of the congress
is definitely confi-
dent, the over-all
rate of growth sched-
uled in the 1960 plan
is lower than those
dlaimed to have been
achieved in 1958 and
1959. The gross
value of industrial
and agricultural pro-
duction is to increase
23 percent this year,
as compared with 48
percent claimed in
1958 and 31 percent
claimed in 1959.
The 1960 goals
for major industrial
COMMUNIST CHINA: PRODUCTION CLAIMS, AND TARGETS
D
1 RICU1 ' . RODUCTIO
L DOLLARS
TOTAL VALUE OF INDUSTRIAL
. PRODUCTION
RILLI N DOLLARS
STEEL MILLION TONS 5.35 8 13.35 18A
L' AL MILLION TONS 120 27k, $41.8 42.5
CEMENT MILLION TONS $ $$, $. 3 12, 2~ 16
PAPER MILLION TONS 1.22 1.63 2.13 2
EDIBLE OILS MILLION TONS 1 1 1, 5 1,,46 1 , 7
ELEC IC POWER BILLION KWN 1.9 3 27 5 41. 55, 5 - 58'
C TON CLOTH BILLION METERS 3 05 5,
CACTOI - 9" .,.._.,..,.. 4, 8'71 22, 0.00
AGRIC `' AL PRODUCTION
IEIRLION DOLLARS
FOOD GRAINS .MILLION TONS ,85 _ ._; _ 250., .H_._. _.. . 297
SOYBEANS MILLION TONS 10.0 10.5 11.5 na
HOGS X45.9 160 180 24,5
SECRET
products call for increases
which in absolute terms are
roughly equal to those achieved
last year. They seem within
the regime's reach, although
in. the case of some items--
most notably steel, pig iron,
and coal--c6ntinued sizable
contributions will be required
from the much-publicized small-
scale enterprises. Agricultural
goals are not specifically
spelled out in the plan, which,
like the revised 1059 plan,
calls simply for an increase
of "about" 10 percent in grain
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SECRET
EARNINGS FROM
STATE UNITS
CULTURE AND
EDUCATION
DEFENSE
ADMINISTRATION
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMUNIST CHINA'S BUDGETS
000 BILLION DOLLARS (2.46 YUAN = 1 DOLLAR) 000 PERCENTAGE
28.46
1960
DRAFT
and cotton output. These
goals suggest that Peiping is
aiming to produce 297,000,000
tons of grain and 2,650,000
.tons of cotton--levels of out-
put almost certainly not at-
tainable even if this should
be an outstanding crop year.
The 1960 budget is
bal-
anced
at levels almost
one
third
above last year's. Di-
rect
military expenditures re-
main
the same, suggesting that
no.abrupt change is contemplat-
ed in the size of the armed
forces. Investment arrange-
ments are designed to handle
"more appropriately" the re-
lations between industry and
agriculture.
The planners now say that
a more rapid development of .
3.7
-1.5
FOREIGN AID
OTHER -
11.1
111.1
27I 8.9
1957 1958 1959 1960
DRAFT
*includes credit funds at state bank (8. 3%).
other payments (U. 5%). and reserve fund (2,4%)
7 APRIL 1960
agriculture is indispensable
to continued highspeed de-
velopment of the whole economy,
and they have allocated increased
resources to this end. The state
subsidy to poor communes and funds
budgeted for agricultural capital
construction are to increase this
year by at least 50 percent,and
sharply increased supplies of
machinery, tractors, and trucks
are being given to the farms.
There is the promise of even
more aid to agriculture over
the next few years. This in-
creased attention is the logi-
cal result of continuing pres-
sures of population on food
supply and of the need to raise
per capita consumption of food.
It is clear, however,that
heavy industry will continue to
get the major share of available
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ECONOMIC
CONSTRUCTION
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
resources in 1960. While steel
is still the "key lever" in
China's industrialization,
Peiping says that it will de-
vote great efforts in 1960 to
strengthening such "weak links"
as the power and nonferrous
metals industries. Weaknesses
are also noted in transporta-
tion, which is admittedly unable
to "keep pace" with over-all de-
velopment. Construction of
new rail lines, as well as
double-tracking, is to be sharp-
ly increased, as is the produc-
tion of locomotives and freight
ars . (Pre- 25X1
cars.[-
pared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
DI SS NS ION AMONG JAPANEa', ' OCIALISTS
Dissension and bitter fac-
tional.rivalry in the Japanese
Socialist party following elec-
tion setbacks in 1959 and de-
fection by 56 of the party's
249 members ih the Diet have
culminated in the resignation
of party chairman Mosahuro Su-
zuki, his replacement by an
advocate of Chinese Communist
views, and the consolidation of
leftist control of the party.
In a showdown election at
the special convention on 24
March, leftist Secretary Gen-
eral Inejiro Asanuma narrowly
defeated middle-of-the-road
-Factional leader Jotaro Kawa-
.cami for the party chairman-
ship. Left: ist3 also grained con-
trol of 13 of the 15 seats on
the party's central executive
committee. The socialist Diet
members immediately defected
to the Democratic Socialist
party (E)SP), and more are ex-
pected to do so. In adding to
its Diet strength, however,the
DSP may be influenced to shift
its right-win; socialism back
somewhat toward the center in
order to prevent the develop-
ment of factionalism in
its own ranks.
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7 April 1960
on the Sohyo labor
federation, the So-
cialist party's main
support. Several
unions within Sohyo
are experiencing se-
vere internal pres-
sures which reveal a
significant trend
against labor union
radicalism.
A split was only
narrowly averted re-
cently in the impor-
tant National Railway
Workers' Union, and
the latest Socialist
shift may influence
The convention results
are not expected to change the
Socialist party's basic policy,
but the new leadership is like-
ly to be more outspoken and ag-
gressive in pursuit of its ob-
jectives. Asanuma, a one-time
right socialist who has shift-
ed progressively to the left,
gained notoriety in early 1959
when he endorsed Communist
China's foreign policy during
a trip to Peiping.
Asanuma has reaffirmed his
statement of last year that
"American imperialism is the
common enemy of Communist China
and Japan." He also intends to
continue opposition to the new
US-Japanese security treaty. At
the same time, the Socialists
have echoed Communist propa-
ganda attacks by asserting
that West German Chancellor
Adenauer's talks with Prime
Minister Kishi during a visit
to Japan in late March consti-
tuted "an effort to revive the
Tokyo-Berlin axis."
The new Socialist posture
probably will not only reduce
the party's appeal to the Japa-
nese electorate, but probably
will have a far-reaching impact
PARTY STRENGTHS IIN THS JAPANESE DIET
VACANCIES 2
INDEPENDENTS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
LOWER HOUSE
LIBERAL DEMOCRATS
287
HOUSE OF COUNCILORS
UPPER HOUSE
LIBERAL DEMOCRATS
136
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS 11 14
17
SOCIALISTS
A7
governmental and managerial ef-
forts to reduce the labor force
in the nation's depressed coal
industry,approximately one third
of the members of the Sohyo-af -
filiated coal miners' union at a25X1
leading mine have withdrawn and
formed a second union backed by
the DSP and Zenro.
SECRET
a sizable faction in that
union to bolt to Sohyo's rival,
Zeriro. Moreover, despite So-
cialist party and Sohyo moves
to maintain labor unity against
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CURRENT' INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY"SUYi'N Rf" '
7 April 1960
THAILAND'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET BLOC MAY SOFTEN
Marshal Sarit, the Thai
premier, may be considering cer-
tain gestures to the Sino-Soviet
bloc as a means of registering
his dissatisfaction with vari-
ous aspects of Thailand's rela-
tions with the United States.
Sarit and other Thai officials
in recent months have become in-
creasingly critical of the United
States over such issues as
American plans to sell PL-480
rice to India, slow delivery
of military equipment, and the
level of economic aid to Thai-
land, both in absolute terms
and in comparison with what Thai-
land considers the dispropor-
tionate amounts given to neu-
tralist Cambodia and India.
These officials have on
occasion given. indirect expres-
sion to their feelings through
articles planted in the Bangkok
press, The most recent example
.is an anonymous'letter carried
in the 31 March edition of the
English-language Bangkok.Post.
Sarit has been stanchly
pro-US since he came to power
in September 1957, but he has
been embarrassed in his deal-
ings with his supporters by the
fact that American aid has de-
clined during this period. This
decline has also coincided with
a growing Thai desire for for-
eign ..,:wy)ital to speed the coun-
try's economic development pro-
gram.
The recent Thai decision
to permit the TASS agency to
reopen its office in Bangkok
would also seem designed to
dramatize Thai dissatisfaction
with the United States. The
office has been closed.since
October 1958, when TASS repre- 25X1
sentative Trushin was expelled
from the country for alle ed
espionage Activities.
aid.
Sarit probably has no in-
tention of abandoning Thailand's
policy of close association with
the West, but in his present 25X1
mood he may Well turn to the
Sino-Soviet bloc for economic
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INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
ALGERIAN REBEL ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE
The Algerian rebel Nation-
al Liberation Front (FLN),which
has suffered serious military
setbacks in Algeria, retains a
disciplined and potentially
powerful organization in metro-
politan France. Except for
sporadic attempts at sabotage,
however, its energy is largely
directed toward maintaining
supremacy over the rival Al-
gerian National Movement (MNA).
The FLN organization consti-
tutes at present a means of
collecting funds and army re-
cruits among Algerians in
France. It could be turned
Into a vehicle for stepped-up
rebel paramilitary activity in
France, should rebel fortunes
in Algeria continue to decline.
The rebel high command
has divided metropolitan France,
like Algeria itself, into ad-
ministrative districts, which
are in turn divided into zones.
Rebel activities in France are
conducted by the Special Organ-
ization, which is responsible
to the rebel government in
Tunis. Although periodic po-
lice roundups of rebel mili-
tants during 1959 weakened the
FLN organization in several
areas, an official French serv-
ice estimated in January 1960
that the rebels controlled
close to 60 percent of the Al-
gerians in France, who report-
edly number about 275,000.
In contrast to Algeria,
where rebel terrorist activity
has been directed against Euro-
peans as well as Moslems, such
FLN activities in France have
been directed primarily against
the adherents of Mesali Hadj,
whose MNA continues to challenge
the FLN as a spokesman for Al-
geria-'s Moslems. Despite occa-
sional police casualties in this
factional strife,French authori-
ties have shown increased tolerance
of the MNA as it has proved use-
ful as a counterweight to the FLN.
Assassination victims of the FLN-
MNA vendetta reportedly numbered
715 during 1959, compared with
937 the previous year.
Rebel preoccupation with
the MNA appears to have pre-
vented FLN members from fully
exploiting their capability
for sabotage and other anti-
French activity. However, the
rebels also appear reluctant
to unduly antagonize'the French
populace, the majority of which
favors a negotiated solution in
Algeria. Not since their at-
tacks on various oil refineries
in August 1958 have the rebels
scored a major sabotage success.
The rebel leadership continues
to direct its primary atten-
tion to the hostilities in Al-
geria and to diplomatic ac-
tivity aimed at prodding France
into cease-fire negotiations.
Its primary goals in France ap-
pear to be the collection of
funds and the maintenance of
the loyalty of Algerians re-
siding in the metropole. Some
recruits appear to reach the
Algerians from France, often
via Belgium or West Germany.
In Algeria itself, rebel
military capabilities continue
to erode as a result of French
military pressure, frequent
shortages of ammunition and
sagging morale.
MIKOYAN VISIT TO IRAQ
First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan is heading an offi-
cial government delegation to
open the Soviet exhibition in
Baghdad on 8 April, Mikoyan--
the highest ranking Soviet
official ever to visit the
Arab world--will hold talks
with Qasim and other top Iraqi
officials.
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7 April 1960
Soviet propaganda for the
visit suggests Mikoyan will
offer additional economic aid
to Iraq. Under the $137,500,-
000 credit of March 1959, the
USSR is to build Iraq's first
steel mill and a number of
other industrial plants, con-
struction of which in most in-
stances will not begin until
1961.
The Soviet Union, in ex-
tracting maximum propaganda out
of its economic aid to Iraq,
nurtured Iraqi hopes for quick,
visible economic results. Now,
however, the initial advantage
gained by the Soviet credit is
beginning to be overshadowed by
unreasonable Iraqi disappoint-
ment. Soviet authorities,
aware of the pressures being
generated in Baghdad by Iraq's
deteriorating economic situa-
tion, may feel that additional
economic aid would forestall
any attempt to blame the USSR
for the failures of Qasim's gov-
ernment.
Moscow probably will con-
tinue to publicize its activ-
ities as the various projects
under the credit are imple-
mented, and encourage Iraqi
officials to take advantage of
other bloc sources of aid.
In February, Iraq was con-
sidering a Czech offer of a
$30,000,000 line of credit which
apparently could be used to fi-
nance small, easily implemented
projects. Moscow may also of-
fer to speed up some of its
projects now under way or ear-
mark some part of a new credit
for immediate utilization.
Soviet leaders probably
hope that the visit will counter
recent improvements in Baghdad's
relations with the West and
soften the Qasim regime's atti-
tude toward Iraqi Communists.
The bloc press and radio, al-
though carefully refraining from
direct criticism of recent meas-
ures by the regime against
Iraqi Communists, have indicated
the concern of bloc leaders by
quoting news stories in the
Iraqi Communist press criti-
cizing these actions. A
lecturer in Moscow on 16 March
censured Qasim along with
such other "bourgeois na-
tionalist" leaders as Nasir,
Nehru, Sukarno, and Abboud--
for the tendency to dis-
card local Communists after
accepting their support in
the "common struggle against
imperialists."
(Prepared jointly with ORR)
EAST GERMAN CHURCH-'STATE CONFLICT SHARPENS
The Ulbricht regime is
waging a campaign on many levels
to break down open church op-
position to forced collectiviza-
tion of the East German peas-
antry and is attempting to
force the Evangelical clergy to
give public support to Commu-
nist objectives. This support
would be adduced to "prove"
that the church has made its
peace with the regime.
Church officials have told
the US Mission in Berlin that
RE
E
!
C
S
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the East German bishops, ex-
cept for fellow-traveling Bish-
op Mitzenheim of Thuringia,
were unanimous in believing the
church must take a firm stand
on the collectivization issue.
On 11 March the Evangelical
bishops delivered a letter to
Premier Otto Grotewohl protest-
ing the inhuman methods used in
the collectivization campaign.
Even Bishop Mitzenheim signed
the letter, when finally he
saw that the others were deter-
mined to go ahead. The text of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
this letter was read in churches
and religious gatherings through-
out the country.
Catholic priests have
openly criticized the regime's
methods in the collectivization
campaign. West Berlin news-
papers recently reported that
a Catholic priest was arrested
in Schwerin District and sub-
jected to long interrogation.
Tie was released after the farm-
ers in his congregation joined
a collective farm.
Regime officials are ac-
celerating their drive to force
rural Evangelical pastors to
repudiate their leaders and
support collectivization.
If the regime is successful
in its renewed efforts to split
the Evangelical clergy, it can
be expected to take more force-
ful steps to bar contacts with
Bishop Dibelius of Berlin-Bran-
denburg, who resides in West
Berlin and heads the synod of
the Evangelical Church for all
Germany. Legal proceedings have
already been instituted against
Dibelius in East Berlin, charg-
ing him with urging the populace
not to obey the regime. Party
boss Ulbricht is certainly a-
ware, however, that the un-
favorable publicity that would
follow any move to arrest the
bishop when he visits in East
Berlin would probably not be 25X1
palatable to the Kremlin on the
eve of the summit meeting.
THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN FINLAND
Pressure, continues in Fin-
land to broaden the minority
Agrarian government to include
the regular Social Democrats as
well as the small center parties.
SOCIAL TIO
OEMOOIAO C P
PARTS
O
PPN
OPPOSITION
200 SEATS
SECRET
The Agrarians have maintained
their monopoly on the government
Since they took over in January
159. following Soviet pressure
on the coalition government of
Social Democrat Karl
Fagerholm. They con-
tend--largely for par-
tisan reasons--that
there is no practical
alternative to their
rule in view of Mos-
cow's unfavorable at-
titude toward the Con-
servative party and the
present leaders of the
regular Social Demo-
crats. An effective
majority would require
the participation of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
the Social Democrats or the Com-
munist-front Finnish People's
Democratic League (SKDL), which
has the largest representation
in parliament.
The outcome of the Social
Democratic party congress open-
ing 16 April may decide whether
the Social Democrats will be
included in a broadened govern-
ment. Party Chairman Vaino
Tanner, long a favorite whipping
boy of the USSR, is retiring.
N replacement by a moderate
--?presunta.bly less likely to a-
roUase Moscow's suspicions--
would force the Agrarian party
leaders to face up to the ques-
tion of broadening the cabinet.
The Agrarians would thus be able
to avoid early elections and a
possible decrease in their par-
liamentary strength to the bene-
fit of the SKDL and the small
splinter Agrarian group, the
Small Farmers' party.
The regular Social Democrat-
ic. leaders have indicated that
they prefer early elections,
which they feel would largely
eliminate the 14 Opposition
POSSIBLE CABINET SHAKE-UP IN SPAIN
Sharpening antagonism be-
tween supporters and opponents
of the economic stabilization
program drain instituted in July
1959 has resulted in the dis-
missal of Housing Minister Jose
Luis Arrese, and influential
ministers seem to be readying an
all-out attack on the program.
There is speculation Franco may
be preparing a cabinet reshuffle
to avoid further ministerial
bickering.
The government announced
on 18 March that Arrese's post
had been teinporarily taken over
by Minister Without Portfolio
Social Democrats. The initia-
tive for new elections rests,
however, with President Kekkonen,
who may oppose them for fear they
would reduce his party's and his
own influence.
25X1
Although the more conserv-
ative Agrarians may desire to
re-establish the traditional co-
operation with the Social Demo-
crats, the Kekkonen faction)
which controls most key positions
in the party, may for both do-
mestic and allegedly foreign
policy considerations continue
to obstruct efforts to broaden
the government, and thus retain
its dominant position. Kekkonen
and his cohorts may in addition
feel that an Agrarian government
--of which the USSR appears to
be least suspicious--is best
suited to associate Finland with
the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA). Such a move is be-
ing considered by the Finns and
has been recently discussed with
the EFTA members, although Presi-
dent Kekkonen is believed to be
rather lukewarm toward the idea.
Gual Villalbi. Arrese, a long-
time Falangist who held the cabi-
net post of secretary general
of the movement until early 1957,
had privately accused Finance
Minister Navarro Rubio, a prime
supporter of the stabilization
program, of falsifying statis-
tics to block plans for a big
new housing program. Arrese had
apparently charged aiso that
Navarro Rubio had caused a seri-
ous economic crisis in Spain.
Arrese's opposition to the
initial austerity features of
the stabilization program is
shared by influential ministers
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
who favor a resumption of large-
scale government expenditures.
Industry Minister Joaquin Pla-
nell,for example, is in a stra-
tegic position to obstruct ex-
pansion of industrial produc-
tion by virtue of his control
over import licenses. The la-
bor minister and the present
Falangist secretary general are
also reported opposed to the
program, presumably because the
OEEC believes it should afford
employers greater flexibility
in dismissing surplus workers
or at least transferring them
to other types of work.
In February, Planell pub-
licly defended controls over ex-
panded production as necessary
to avoid inflation, directly
contradicting the view of OEEC
spokesmen that Spain now needs
an increase in private
invest-
ment and an expansion
trial output. Planell
parently preparing for
of indus-
is ap-
a major
r.licy battle on this
issue.
Since inflation has
been sub-
stantially halted,
his
position
appears to reflect
the
desires
of business interests
intent on
25X1
retaining the traditional pattern
of low-volume, high-profit pro-
The breakup an 31 March
of the British Guiana constitu-
tional talks in London over ar-
rangements for transitional
measures toward independence
threatens to disturb the hither-
to satisfactory working rela-
tionship between the British
and Cheddi Jagan, Communist
leader of the colony's dominant
political party and now min-
ister of trade and industry.
Britain's propo6al to in-
troduce internal self -govern-
ment in August 1961 was re-
ceived favorably, but the Guia-
nese delegation objected to
making this contingent on
satisfactory operation of in-
terim arrangements. London
insisted that the Guianese
take over control of the police
only gradually and under Btit-
ish supervision, and that ade-
quate provision be made for
British officials in the local
civil service.
The Guianese were prepared
to accept British retention of
control over defense and for-
eign affairs, except for cer-
tain aspects of trade, in the
constitution to be drafted by
August 1961, but they were op-
posed to the governor's retain-
ing the right to legislate in
an emergency. London believes
that the Marxist convictions
of Jagan--who will probably be-
come the first prime minister--
require retention of reserve
controls. London agreed in
principle, however, to discuss
full independence in 1963, or
earlier if British Guiana should
join a then-independent West In=
dies Federation.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
BRITISH GUIANA
Jagan's recent statements
imply that he may end his
amicable working relationship
with the British and not
cooperate toward implementing
London's program. He stated
publicly after the confer-
ence that he would agitate
for immediate independence,
and he underlined this by
visiting Cuba.
is s
the first suc contact be-
tween British Guiana and
Cuba and may lead to sub-
versive aid from Castro.
While Jagan has reiterated
his earlier threats to resign, he
may hesitate to prejudice chances
for foreign investment by any ex-
treme move. He is seeking a
loan from both the Development
Loan Fund and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment. The inability of the
governing People's Progressive
party (PPP) to show much economic
improvement since the 1957 elec-
tions has led to some popular
dissatisfaction, and the party
itself has been restive over
Jagan's autocratic domination
of party councils. The next
moves will be strongly influenced
by the party congress to be held
shortly after Jagan's return.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
In El Salvador's elections
on 24 April, President Lemus'
middle-of-the-road party is ex-
pected to win all 54 seats in
the National Legislative Assem-
bly and nearly all the local
offices at stake. Despite the
President's popularity, how-
ever, there are signs of dis-
satisfaction in the armed forces
and in his own party, and rumors
of plotting are beginning to
circulate.
The President's party, the
Revolutionary Democratic Unifi-
cation party (PRUD), has pro-
vided a stable, moderately pro-
gressive, and cautiously demo-
cratic government since 1950.
PRUD's emphasis on party organ-
ization has given it a distinct
advantage in elections over the
weak and divided opposition
groups, and since 1952 it has
held all the legislative seats.
Under PRUD's administration,
some progress has been made in
improving economic conditions.
The recent dissatisfaction of
the military stems partly from
disgruntlement at not receiving
the favored treatment accorded
by previous presidents and part-
ly from dislike of Lemus' hesi-
tancy in suppressing Communist
activity.
The greatest irritant seems
to be the belief among the of-
ficers that Lemus is grooming
Major Rubio Melhado as presiden-
tial candidate for the 1962
elections. One army colonel
recently stated that a palace
revolution was a "certainty" if
the President persists in cham-
pioning Melhado as his successor.
On 29 March, Lemus ordered the
transfer of 19 high-ranking of-
ficers, perhaps as a measure to
disrupt a suspected plot against
himself. The President's growing
suspicion of his most capable as-
sociates, his refusal to dele-
gate adequate responsibility to
them, and his recent tendency to
replace them with more pliable
figures have lowered party morale
and impeded progress toward bet-
tering living conditions.
The small Reform Action
party (PAR) will be the only
party running candidates against
the PRUD, but several groups,
not legally recognized as par-
ties, are expected to campaign
for the PAR. These include the
Communists and a small but vo- 25X1
ciferous group of sympathizers
with Fidel Castro's revolutionar
movement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SINO-SOVIET DOCTRINAL DISPUTES
Mao Tse-tung once said:
"Dogma is less useful than cow
dung," and Nikita Khrushchev
is fond of repeating Lenin's
colorful slogan; "Theory, my
friend, is grey, but green is
the eternal tree of life."
These expressions of contempt
are accurate reflections of the
thought of both men concerning
those who conceive of ideology
as a body of absolute truths
from which action flows. Com-
munist teaching, however, pos-
its a world in which theory
and practice are intertwined,
and on this level both leaders
are intimately concerned'with
ideology.
Communist doctrine supplies
a ritual language through which
leaders communicate their in-
tentions, define the razor's
edge which divides loyalty from
rebellion, distinguish friend
from foe, and convey to the
initiated an official interpre-
tation of current situations
and conflicts. Soviet ortho-
doxy can make sharp changes,
turning yesterday's ideological
conformity into today's noncon-
formity. Despite changes in
its content, the function of
Marxist theory in the Soviet
system has remained the same:
to assure ideological uniform-
ity behind whatever course of
action the Soviet Government
has adopted at the moment.
.become at least a source of
confusion rather than certainty,
and at most a solvent that loos-
ens the bonds of the Communist
world.
Mao's Authority
The Chinese Communists,
under Mao Tse-tung's undisputed
control, have always sought to
apply--"in a creative way"--
the general principles of
Marxism-Leninism to the actual
conditions in China, and in
this process they have fre-
quently diverged in their views
from Soviet doctrine.
Following the death of
Stalin, Mao won increasing
praise from Soviet leaders for
his creative "originality" as
a Marxist-Leninist theoretician.
This was an acceptance of claims
which the Chinese had been mak-
ing for years but at which Sta-
lin had boggled; Stalin was
jealous of his own prerogatives
as the only living creative in-
novator in Marxism-Leninism,
and he recognized the dangers
in acknowledging a center out-
side his control which could
interpret and adapt theory for
itself.
Marxist ideology is said
to be the cement that binds the
Communist world together. This
is true, however, only as long
as there is but one high priest
to expound the new formulations
which are intended to interpret
changes in objective reality.
With the development in China
of a willingness to justify
courses of action without re-
gard for current Soviet posi-
tions, Marxist ideology can
Immediately after Stalin's
death, China's elevation to a
position in advance of other
bloc countries was made clear
when Chou En-lai was allowed to
march in the front ranks behind
Stalin's coffin along with the
surviving Soviet leaders. Mao's
position was eloquently recog-
nized when Malenkov published
a photograph cropped to show
him standing next to Stalin
and Mao in 1950. Khrushchev
and Bulganin undertook the first
public journey of Soviet lead-
ers to Peiping in 1954 and re-
moved the most irritating causes
of mutual 'disagreement that
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CURRENT INTELLIGFNCF WEEKLY SUMMARY
.7 April 1960
remained from the 1950 treaty.
In 1955, Molotov made the Chi-
nese joint leaders with the
Soviet hierarchy when, in de-
scribing the split of the world
into two blocs, he character-
ized the Communist world as
"the world camp of socialism
and democracy, headed by the
Soviet Union--to speak more
truly, headed by the Soviet
Union and the Chinese People's
Republic."
Earlier Disputes
A series of Chinese actions
and declarations since 1955 re-
flected and added to the en-
desire for greater independence
from Moscow, and in February
1957 Mao enunciated his theory
of "contradictions" between
the leaders and the led. in a
"socialist" country, This the-
sis was almost completely ig-
nored in the Soviet Union; the
specific application which Mao
had in mind--that the leaders
were responsible for this con-
tradiction--was never endorsed.
In an interview with CBS re-
porters, Khrushchev expressly
denied that such contradictions
existed in the Soviet Union,
although his denial was ex-
punged from the TASS account.
hanced authority of Mao in the Hungarian and Polish
Communist world. When the So- leaders in October 1956, driven
viet leaders revamped Stalin's by developments beyond their
methods of control and incen- control, demonstrated that they
tive, both for their own peo- were prepared to renege in. their
ple and for their relations fidelity to Soviet leadership
with the rest of the Communist of the bloc, and they persisted
bloc, they apparently did not in exaggerating the degree to
anticipate the divisive effects which Mao would support them
of the forces they had set in against the USSR. Fundamental
motion, Moreover, they were internal criticism of Commu-
unable to advance a consistent nist rule, brought on by Mao's
explanation to counter the log- doctrine of "contradictions"
ical extension of their indict - and the concomitant "hundred
ment of Stalin to Soviet society flowers" campaign, welled up
as a whole. in China in 1957.
The Chinese did not fully These developments caused
accept Khrushchev's degradation Mao to reconsider his earlier
of Stalin, and they were par- positions, and in June 1957 he
ticularly halfhearted on the reversed his temporary liberal-
issue of the "cult of the indi- ism.. This took the form of an
vidual," which continues to attack on "rightists" within
flower around Mao. In this China--followed by a nation-
case, although the USSR has re- wide "rectification" campaign--
treated from the extremism of and solid support for Moscow
its original condemnations, the in a struggle against "revision-
chasm between the two powers is ism" in the bloc. By 1958,
still wide, as was demonstrated when the second break with
in December 1959, when Moscow Yugoslavia occurred, Mao had
and Peiping reiterated their shifted to a position far more
positions on the anniversary rigid than Moscow's. Chinese
of Stalin's death, strictures against Yugoslav re-
visionism have continued to the
In 1956 the Chinese ex- present, while Soviet output
panded their political and has tapered off.
ideological activities with
regard to over-all bloc affairs, Mao played a significant
During that year they encour- role at the meeting of Commu-
aged the satellites in their nist leaders held in Moscow in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
November 1957. Neither Chinese
leaders nor propagandists had
ever echoed the formulation
that the Chinese were coequal
with the Soviet Union in the
leadership of the Communist
world, and the Soviet Union
itself had dropped the slogan
within two years of its appear-
ance Mao's attitude and ac-
tions while in Moscow seemed
to reflect the reality of the
situation, however: in bloc
affairs and in the formula-
tion of doctrinal and program-
matic theses both the Chinese
and Soviet leaders shared the
pinnacle.
Until the Chinese launched
the "great leap" and began the
development of their commune
program in the middle of 1958,
Chinese innovations in doctrinal
matters were either greeted in
Moscow by silence or were ad-
justed to Soviet doctrine
through compromise. In this
period, the Soviet succession
question was still not settled
and the problem of the USSR's
control over its European satel-
lites was an overriding one. By
1958, however, the USSR had
managed to stabilize Eastern
Europe, and Khrushchev had elim-
inated Marshal Zhukov, the last
powerful force that stood be-
tween him and firm control at
home.
The general claim that
emerged from the Chinese pro-
grammatic papers on the commune
movement was that Peiping had
the right not only to work out
particular solutions to specif-
ically Chinese problems but
also to elaborate the funda-
mentals of its "path to Com-
munism." Not only did the
theoretical justification ap-
pear sharply at variance with
Moscow's canons, but the Chi-
nese claim included an impli-
cation that Peiping's path
could be followed by other
"socialist" countries and
constituted a bolder challenge
to the USSR's leadership and
pre-eminence as the "first so-
cialist country." Faced with
this challenge and strength-
ened externally by the devel-
opments of the previous year
and with a personal internal
victory behind him, Khrushchev
apparently decided it was time
to deal with Chinese doctrinal
claims.
Commune Aftermath
Although the Chinese
abandoned some of their more
extravagant claims to an early
achievement of Communism through
the medium of the communes, they
maintained that the commune
would be the best form of so-
ciety for moving into Communism
and that the communes themselves
contain the "sprouts of Commu-
nism" in their supply and mess-
hall systems. Despite Soviet
pressure to substitute a less
pretentious term for their
large agricultural components,
the Chinese have preserved the
name with all its implications.
They have dropped their defen-
sive retrenchment on the ques-
tion of the communes as the
means of achieving Communism
at some future date and have
moved to re-establish the theo-
retical foundation for the
commune program.
During the early contro-
versy over Chinese claims for
the communes, Khrushchev and
other Soviet spokesmen raised
fundamental objections--based
on more customary Soviet views--
revolving around the primitive-
ness of the Chinese economic
machine, the necessity for ma-
terial incentives in building
Communism, and payment accord-
ing to the work performed. Pei-
ping now is claiming that Mao
has made new "discoveries" in
political economy which run
directly counter to the Soviet
position.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
At the 21st party con-
gress, Khrushchev stressed
that the only way to build a
base for Communism was to in-
crease the "material interest"
of the workers in their labor.
Mao now has "discovered," how-
ever, "the decisive principle
for the encouragement of pos-
itiveness among laborers: pol-
itics taking command is first,
while material incentives can
only occupy the second posi-
tion." Khrushchev asserted
that "under socialism, all
people... receive payment ac-
cording to their work." Peo-'
1p e's Daily, discussing Mao's
new "discovery," countered,
"The people's Communist work-
ing style (is)...selfless labor
with total disregard for re-
muneration."
People's Daily asserts
that Mao has "discovered" the
"definite elements of high-
speed development of socialist
construction," an outgrowth of
Mao's theory of the "uninter-
rupted revolution." The Soviet
Union has never accepted the
thesis of "building socialism"
by means of a "permanent rev-
olution," stressing instead the
building of socialism by stages.
Mao, Khrushchev as Ideologues
Concomitantly with the de-
velopment of a theoretical foun-
dation for its economic pro-
grams, Peiping is reserving to
Mao the right to be considered
the most eminent living Com-
munist theoretician. A re-
cent Chinese listing of clas-
sical writers of Marxism set
Mao after Marx, Engels, Lenin,
and Stalin. A provincial Chi-
nese party leader has advanced
criteria for the study of Marx-
ism and recognition of a genu-
ine Marxist as follows: "The
only correct way to study
Marxism is to use Mao Tse-tung's
ideology as guidance and Mao
Tse--tung's works as the key,"
and, "The yardstick by which to
judge each individual as to
whether or not he is a genuine
Marxist is his comprehension of
Mao Tse-tung's ideology."
Although Soviet spokesmen
hailed Khrushchev's report to
the 21st party congress as a
"shining" and "genuine" contri-
bution to the "theory of scien-
tific Communism" and claimed
that the works of the congress
belonged with the classical
works of Marxism-Leninism, there
has been no intense, sustained
attempt to build Khrushchev up
as a great Marxist thinker.
Khrushchevhimself has accen-
tuated his pragmatic approach,
deriding "theoretical phrase-
mongers" whose "beautiful words
remain empty promises." He
wishes to be known primarily as
a man who is best at combining
theory and practice, who through
practice enriches theory.
As a result of Mao's latest
claims to eminence as an ideo-
logue--claims which serve to
buttress views antipathetic to
those in the Soviet Union--
Khrushchev may find it neces-
sary to accelerate the develop-
ment of his role as the arbiter
of what is or is not permissible.
His style does not lend itself
easily to developing a picture
of himself as a great and "orig-
inal" thinker, however, while
Mao already has considerable
ideological authority as a
"creative" Marxist thinker.
Khrushchev probably will
rely for the moment on the coun-
terweight of the authority of
Soviet accomplishments, To
counter Chinese contentions, he
will probably call on the author-
Itq,, of.: Marx and Lenin and use
formulations that are part of
the baggage of Soviet ideology.
He may also hope that continued
use of the slogan of "collective
leadership" and continued cen-
sure ,of the "cult of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
individual" will work to under-
mine Mao's position in the eyes
of Communists throughout the
bloc.
Khrushchev probably recog-
nizes, however, that simple
outright opposition to the Chi-
nese will not gain his ends.
While attempting to contain
Mao's challenge and reassert
Soviet ideological primacy, he
may offer formulas which, while
countering Chinese claims, will
still offer the Chinese more
than they now have.
A hint of this was con-
tained in his postulate on bloc
relations introduced at the 21st
party congress: "It would be
theoretically correct to assume
that socialist countries... will
more or less simultaneously
reach the highest phase of Com-
munist society." While this
concept undercut Chinese claims
that their attainment of this
goal had become imminent, it
changed a previous tentative
thesis on the "stages of Com-
munism" which held that the
Soviet Union would enter Commu-
nism first, followed by the
European satellites, and fi-
nally by the bloc countries of
the Far East.
New Soviet Party Program
Even without the Chinese
challenge, the logic of Soviet
methods of leadership would
have required the focusing of
doctrinal authority in Khru-
shchev, once he attained com-
plete power within the Soviet
Union. Khrushchev, however,
is not a Stalin, keeping him-
self remote and unapproachable
while producing "masterpieces"
of Communist thought, or a
Lenin, whose philosophical bent
was early established. When
changes of doctrine are neces-
sary, therefore, Khrushchev's
practical and administrative
innovations are presented as
"enriching" doctrine.
SECRET
The stage now is set for
the next step. A committee under
Khrushchev is preparing, for
presentation at the 22nd con-
gress, a new Party Program to
replace the one under which
the regime has theoretically
been operating since 1919. This
fundamental document will es-
tablish criteria for a society
"building the basis for Commu-
nism", set:.: forth norms of
behavior for Soviet Communist
party members, and be applicable
throughout the bloc, It will
be said to be based on the po-
litical and economic realities
as developed in Khrushchev's
practical innovations over the
past years. It will become a
basic part of Communist theol-
ogy, but it will not deter
the Chinese from the path they
have marked out for themselves.
Unity of the Communist in-
ternational movement under sole
Soviet leadership requires a
strict conformity and does not
allow for polycentrism or devia-
tion. The Chinese, by manipulat-
ing doctrine in ways that do
not follow a Soviet model so as
to increase their prestige and
to justify their unorthodox
domestic programs, have created
both deviation and a rival cen-
ter of ideological authority.
While the Chinese continue
to defer to the Soviet leader-
ship of the bloc and have great
need for Soviet scientific, eco-
nomic, and military assistance,
they reserve the right to adopt
independent internal and foreign
policies along with new doctri-
nal claims for Mao Tse-tung.
By demonstrating an increasing
willingness to justify their
own unorthodox domestic pro-
grams with equally unorthodox.
doctrinal formulations, and by
implying that these formula-
tions could be applied else- 25X1
where in the bloc, the Chinese
are in effect boldly .challen -
ing Soviet leadership.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
DISSATISFACTION AMONG FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE USSR
Disillusionment in vary-
ing degrees appears widespread
among foreigners studying in
the USSR. Although some have
been indoctrinated with a be-
lief in Communism, reports of
such occurrences are rare. On
the other hand, adverse reac-
tions on the part of foreign
students both to their own lot
in Soviet universities and to
Soviet life around them have
been reported frequently over
the past two years.
The problems of foreign
students in Soviet universi-
ties have stemmed in part from
the difficulties encountered by
any foreigner in adjusting to
a highly regimented and un-
familiar way of life. Their
annoyance derives also, however,
from the special restrictions
imposed by Soviet authorities,
who view all foreigners as sus-
pect and recognize
that a close view of
Soviet conditions is
likely to cause ad-
verse reactions.
Categories of Foreign
Students
Foreign students
study in the USSR un-
der three different
types of programs:
bilateral exchange
agreements, covering
chiefly students from
Western Europe and the
United States; special
Communist party schol-
arships offered to
Communist-oriented
students in both bloc
and free world coun-
tries; and education-
al aid plans for un-
derdeveloped areas,
primarily to countries
of the Near East and
Asia. While the
causes of complaint
are much the same for
all foreign students,
the equanimity with which they
accept their frustrations var-
ies greatly.
The exchange students are
generally prepared for the ir-
ritants they encounter, and they
accept them as a necessary evil
compensated for by the special
opportunity to study the Soviet
scene at close range.
Some Communist scholarship
students are undoubtedly dis-
illusioned and frustrated, but
their reactions are less fre-
quently reported. An exception
was the reaction of at least
half the approximately 70 Ital-
ian students who attended Mos-
cow University last year with-
out the approval of their gov-
ernment. The dissatisfied mem-
bers of this group consulted
the Italian Embassy about going
home, although they face charges
FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE USSR
(excluding students from bloc countries)
ASIA
Burma 20
WESTERN EUROPE
Great Britain
17
Ceylon 5
Denmark
3
India 25
Finland
15
Indonesia 150
France
3*
Japan 3*
Iceland
5
Nepal 3*
Italy
70
206
Norway
2
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
West Germany
10
Afghanistan
6
125
Algeria
5
LATIN AMERICA
Belgian Congo
1
Brazil
3
Cameroun
1
Ecuador
2
Ghana
3
Peru
2
Guinea
33
Uruguay
1
Iraq
300
West Indies
i
Nigeria
1
Unidentified
6
Senegal
1
15
Somalia
3*
Sudan
40
Togo
3*
UAR
175
Uganda
4
Yemen
15
591
* Exact number unknown, probably not more than three
00404 7 APRIL 1960
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
when they return of evading
military service.
A few scattered reports in
1957 and 1958 also attest to
the shock suffered by students
from Eastern Europe who had
been taught to regard the USSR
as the world's most advanced
country and on arrival found
it in many ways more primitive
than their homelands.
The reactions of the third
group of recipients of Soviet
educational aid have been the
most widely reported and gener-
ally the most adverse. They go
to the USSR to obtain an educa-
tion not available to them else-
where, and their'frustrations
when they feel themselves
blocked in this regard are
greater than those of the West-
erners whose purposes for study-
ing are different. Moreover,
unlike the Western'exchange
students, they are subject to
both official and community
pressures to accept political
doctrines with which they are
not necessarily sympathetic.
In many cases their disillu-
sionment has been exacerbated
by their growing recognition
that they are being exploited
for propaganda purposes.
Living Conditions
Bad food and poor housing
are the subject of frequent
complaints. Some foreign
students have been assigned
quarters outside the Moscow
University skyscraper. Their
experiences in inadequately
heated,cold-''.water flats in
six-story buildings without
elevators, six to eight per-
sons to a room, have given
them firsthand evidence,
of the hollowness of boasts
about the material well-being
of the Soviet people.
Inadequate medical sup-
plies and facilities have also
been a roblem.
One foreign student reported
being told by Soviet medical
authorities that his severely
inflamed appendix could not be
removed, since all hospital fa-
cilities were overtaxed. He
was ordered, instead, to try
the ancient Chinese remedies
of needles and cupping.
Regimentation
A major irritant to foreign
students has been the activity
of Komsomol brigades--groups
of Soviet students organized to
police every aspect of student
behavior. 0 student who 25X1
had ordered some Western dance
records was first told by the
brigade he could not have them.
After a heated argument, it was
agreed he could receive them
but would not be permitted to
take them out of his room.
A New Year's party given
a year ago by the African group
broke up in a fight when the
Komsomol brigade entered the
room and ordered all the girls
out. The Africans inevitably
regarded this interference as
evidence of racial prejudice.
Several Arab students have re-
ported being told by Soviet
acquaintances that the Komsomol
brigade had warned them to break
off their friendships with the
Arabs.
Another African student
reported that after he had
danced often with a Russian
girl at a university function,
she received--and showed to
the African--a letter from her
Russian boy friend attacking
her conduct. The boy friend
said he did not mind her danc-
ing with other students, but
that the flaunting of her
friendship with a "black man"
was an insult to his personal
honor. The same African com-
mented that he found Little Rock
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE' WEEKLY SUMMARY
:.7 April 1960
and Notting Hill easier to
bear than the sniggering he
heard on the streets of Mos-
cow when with a white compan-
ion, as the West does not share
the USSR's "hypocritical" claim
to be the African's only friend.
A second irritant is the
student. group which polices
the cleanliness of =student
rooms. One Indian was so an-
noyed that he drove the stu-
dent inspectors out and re-
ported them to the university
authorities for slovenly dress,
untidy haircuts, and dirty fin-
gernails.
Travel restrictions are a
continuing source of complaint,
and permission to leave the
area of study is rarely granted
An Iraqi student studying near
Alma-Ata said he was forbidden
to go even the few miles to
that city "because there were
American tourists there."
Moscow undoubtedly has
reason for its concern. One
Indian student who managed to
get permission to visit a small
village just outside Moscow re-
turned with the comment, "For
contingent received no mail
from home for six weeks. These
students refused to attend
classes for a day and then pre-
sented their grievance as a
group to university authorities.
The mail was eventually pro-
duced after the students threat-
ened to continue their strike,
but no explanation of the de-
lay was ever offered. There
have been continuing complaints
that both incoming and outgoing
letters are never received.
Restricted Opportunities
More serious have been
student charges that special
security restrictions have
handicapped them in their stud-
ies. Medical students have
been forbidden to attend class-
es in radiology and bacteriol-
ogy, a fisheries industry spe-
cialist has been prevented from
visiting any fishing centers, a
specialist in rare metals has
been forbidden to study any ex-
cept the most common metals,
and an atomic-energy student
was not allowed to visit Dubna,
now an'.almost routine stop for
foreign scientists.
all their boasting, their vil- A student of airport land-
lages are not much better than ; ing facilities who was permitted
many comparable Indian villages."; to see only those at Vnukovo
An Egyptian student was quoted airport said he could see far
along similar lines, adding better equipment in his own
that Egyptians were not only country. There has also been
better off materially, but had
freedom of religion to boot.
Student disillusionment was
probably accurately expressed
by the Iraqi engineering stu-
dent in the group near Alma-
Ata who commented: "The best
way to become an anti-Communist
is to live here."
Soviet suspicion of for-
eigners has complicated the
lives of foreign students in
other ways.
in Alma-Ata one
student had been expelled and
sent home by the Soviet author-
ities . for photographing a
dirty bazaar. A large Arab
the curious spectacle of a chem-
istry student who spent six
months in the USSR without be-
ing allowed to see the list of
chemistry courses offered by
the university in which he was
enrolled.
The UAR Government appears
to be having second thoughts
about the value of Soviet edu-
cational aid. From a peak of
600 students last year, UAR
enrollment in Soviet institu-
tions of higher learning has
dropped to approximately 175
this year.
the UAR now plans to
send only graduate students
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
for a period of one year and
will not consider either wom-
en or Syrian students, both
being viewed as too suscepti-
ble to Communist indoctrina-
tion.
More advanced students,
including several Indians,
have complained that the aca-
demic perspectives in the USSR
are so limited in comparison
with what they felt they could
accomplish elsewhere, even at
home, that they felt much of
their time was being wasted.
Students have also complained
that Soviet educational tech-
niques, with the heavy em-
phasis on rote learning, re-
sulted in time-wasting atten-
tion to fine points.
Student Resentment
Efforts to make propagan-
da of the presence of Asian
and African students led one
group from Ghana, Nigeria,
Uganda, Cameroun,Togoland, and
Senegal to organize formally
in order to prevent exploita-
tion of individuals. Soviet
authorities countered by plant-
ing an informer within the
group, by increasing petty
harassment through obvious sur-
veillance, and by depriving
them of minor privileges.
The Indians have com-
plained that strong Soviet ef-
forts have been made to pre-
vent them from associating
with Westerners. The Soviet
authorities have even made of-
ficial representations asking
the Indian Embassy to order
Indian students to keep away
from Westerners. the Africans
have bitterly resisted efforts
to keep them from communicat-
ing with their British and
French embassies.
The ready acceptance by
the Iraqi students near Alma-
Ata of a rumor circulating
this year to the effect that
Komsomol brigades were beating
up Egyptian and Syrian student
pilots studying at Frunze re-
vealed their own sense of iso-
lation in a hostile society.
commented that in the future,
Americans should be prepared
to act as a wailing wall for
Asians and Africans who turned
to them for sympathy, compan-
ionship, and news of ,the out-
side world. He quoted an Arab
who told him protestingly: "We
are your friends, although you
may not realize it--we have
far more in common with you
than with them."
this year that every Indian
student in Moscow had asked to
be recalled. The Indians as a
group have been especially re-
pelled by the emphasis on power
and expediency they have heard
in explanations there of the
Soviet system. Indian engineers
receiving training in connec-
tion with the Bhilai steel mill
project expressed shock over
the harsh penalties imposed on
an individual who had failed
in the production plans through
no fault of his own, and over
the total lack of protection
against such arbitrary punish-
ment.
The New University
The recently announced
University of People's Friend-
ship planned in Moscow for the
benefit of students from Asia,
Africa, and Latin America will
facilitate Soviet regimenta-
tion and control of the for-
eign students. From the lat-
ter's point of view, however,
it may provide additional ir-
ritants. According to the
American Embassy in Moscow,
the announcement of the new uni-
versity has already produced
some initial unfavorable reac-
tions. Students from Africa
and the Near East and some
Asian diplomats are reported
to regard the university as a
form of further discrimination
against them, and some Latin
Americans are said to question
the Soviet decision to group
them with the Asians and Afri-
cans.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
WEST GERMANY'S ARMED FORCES
The West German military
build-up now has reached a
stage where combat effective-
ness will increase rapidly.
In all three services most of
the planned combat units will
have been activated by the end
of 1961, and by the mid-1960s
West Germany's army will prob-
ably be the strongest ground
force in Western Europe, and its
air force a rival to France's
in tactical air power. The
Adenauer government seems de-
termined to keep its forces
integrated with NATO, but the
pressures Bonn is beginning to
exert for full equality raise
problems for the alliance.
The service leaders, for
their part, accept the concept
of the citizen soldier. The
officer corps, conservative in
outlook, is aloof from politics.
The services are making an
effort to orient officers along
democratic lines by means of
schools designed to acquaint
them with democratic institu-
tions.
To protect the rights of
drafted soldiers, the legisla-
ture has installed a represent-
ative in the Ministry of De-
fense to investigate complaints.
He has on occasion obtained the
dismissal from service of an
Domestic Considerations
A German contribution to
the military strength of the
West has become an increasing-
ly accepted objective in West
Germany in the last two years.
Popular approval of the armed
forces continues to grow, and
even the opposition Social
Democrats voted last October
to omit from their revised
party platform a plank oppos-
ing military service. The so-
called "anti - atomic death"
program, which they and the
main labor organization spon-
sored in 1958, now is virtually
moribund,
officer or noncom who has
abused his men. Thus far,
his relations with the high
command seem good, officer
morale and leadership have not
suffered, and the morale of
the enlisted men is excellent.
West German strategic
planning is fully integrated
with that of NATO. Most of
West Germany's combat forces
are to be committed to NATO,
but there is a sizable non-NATO
territorial reserve designated
for logistic support and rear-
area security. Bonn is among
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"i SECRET NOW
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
the strongest supporters in
NATO of close integration in
such fields as combined supply
and transportation facilities,
standardization of weapons,
and joint scientific and weap-
ons research.
This emphasis on NATO
integration reflects in part
the problems West Germany has
encountered in obtaining from
its European allies space for
depots, maneuver areas, mili-
tary airfields, and air-gunnery
ranges. Such facilities are
STRENGTH
UNITS OR EQUIPMENT
ARMY
158, 000
3 corps headquarters
7 armored infantry divisions
2 armored divisions
1 airborne division
1 mountain division
NAVY
22, 500
5 destroyers
11 training frigates
2 training submarines
4 motor torpedo boat squadrons
6 minesweeper squadrons
1 landing-craft squadron
2 fighter bomber air squadrons
1 antisubmarine air squadron
AIR FORCE
61, 000
20 fighter, fighter-bomber,
(1, 000 pilots)
or reconnaissance squadrons
4 transport squadrons
1, 130 jet aircraft (F-84F, RF-84F,
Canadian Sabre 5 & 6, F-86K,
T-33)
TERRITORIAL
000
13
DEFENSE FORCE
,
FEDERAL AND STATE
24,500
BORDER POLICE
00404 2
needed because of a lack of
space in West Germany and be-
cause of its proximity to
potential combat areas. Ac-
cording to Defense Minister
Strauss, the West German forces
have only 40 percent of their
required maneuver area and are
at present unable to fulfill
their NATO requirement of main-
taining sufficient military
supplies for 30 days east of
the Rhine and for 60 days west
of the river.
The American Embassy in
Bonn believes that the logistics
France, but it is uncer-
tain these can satisfy
Germany's needs. The
sharply negative re-
action from other NATO
members to Defense
Minister Strauss'
initial overtures to
Spain for facilities
has ruled out any re-
vival of this ap-
proach for the time
being.
Army
The West German
Army presently has
about 158,000 men,
two thirds of its
planned strength of
220,000. In addition,
the territorial defense
force, which will
have a professional
cadre strength of
20,000 or 30,000 and
a mobilized strength of 200, 000,
is to provide civil defense and
rear-area support. The fact
that neither it nor the 25,000-
man militarized state and
federal border police is com-
mitted to NATO has occasioned
some concern among Bonn's allies.
The basic fighting elements
of the army are its armored
brigades of 2,700 men each and
its armored infantry brigades
of 3,500. For command and ad-
ministrative purposes, these
are organized into 12 divisions,
each controlling two to five
SECRET
problem is so serious that it
thr.eatens.to place the entire
German military build-up in a
"deep freeze." A generally
acceptable solution is not
readily apparent, and an agree-
melt on the full integration
of NATO's logistic facilities
--which Bonn clearly prefers--
probably cannot be achieved.
Bonn has apparently made some
progress recently in negotiat-
ing purely bilateral arrange-
ments with such other NATO
countries as Portugal, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and
WEST GERMAN ARMED FORCES
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU RT
7 April 1960
brigades. This type of organi-
zation, established last year,
is intended to provide flexi-
bility under conditions of
atomic warfare.
Each of the 11 divisions
organized so far is capable of
furnishing one well-equipped
and well-led brigade for com-
bat purposes. The enlisted
men are well trained in basic
soldiering, despite the short
conscription period of 12
months, and the officers and
SECRET `..*
strength of 38 squadrons is
planned by the end of 1961,
and 60 by 1964, in terms of
aircraft strength, the air
force has a total of 1,130 jet
aircraft on hand, but because
of the serious shortage of jet
pilots--which will continue
until about 1962--only about
500 aircraft have been brought
into combat units.
The air force--like the
army--has been hesitant to
order new equipment, fearing
senior noncoms are chiefly ex-
perienced combat veterans of
World War II. Two armored
brigades participated in joint
NATO maneuvers in February.
The army is fairly well equipped
and has begun to receive rocket
armaments--including the Honest
John.
Air Force
The West German Air Force
now has a total of 20 activat-
ed fighter, f ighter-bomber, and
reconnaissance squadrons and
four transport squadrons. Of
these, six fighter-bomber
squadrons and one transport
squadron are combat ready. A
it might be obsolete before
reaching units. During the
past year, however, it was de-
cided to procure approximately
665 supersonic F104G fighters
for air defense and long-range
interdiction and some 300 sub-
sonic G-91 lightweight fighters
for short-range ground support
of combat troops. The construc-
tion of most of the F-104Gs in
Germany will make the country's
aircraft industry the most
sophisticated in Europe in
terms of advanced construction
techniques. The bulk of the
F-1Q4Gs and G-91s will come
gradually into service after
1962, replacing the obsolescent
Sabre and P-84F aircraft now
on hand.
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SECRET NOF
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
The air force has also
decided to purchase American
Matador and Mace cruise-type
missiles with ranges up to
1,000 miles, and to procure
Nike and Hawk guided anti-
aircraft missiles. For political
reasons, Defense Minister
Strauss has agreed to support
the development of the short-
range British Blue Water mis-
sile as a prospective standard
NATO weapon.
Navy
The West German Navy is
at present a training force
with little or no combat capa-
bility. Despite the fact that
the navy, with 22,500 of its
eventual 28,000 men now in
service, is nearer its over-all
personnel goal than the other
two services, it will probably
reach full combat effectiveness
later than the other two.
The navy's most modern
ships are the new minesweepers
and motor torpedo boats which
are beginning to come into
service in quantity. Its other
surface units consist chiefly
of destroyers of World War II
vintage and training vessels
acquired from the United States
and Britain. Four new escort
vessels are nearing completion,
however, and the first of four
destroyers under construction
was launched on 27 March. The
construction of 12 small 350-
ton submarines will start next
summer.
The naval air arm, which
has a very limited combat capa-
bility, consists of two squad-
rons of British-built Seahawk
fighter-bombers and one of
Gannet short-range planes'for
antisubmarine warfare.
The restrictions of the
Western European Union (WEU)
Treaty of 1954, although not
thus far an important obstacle
to'the development of the West
German armed forces, are con-
sidered by German military
leaders the chief barrier to
long-range development. Under
the treaty terms, Bonn agreed
not to build atomic weapons,
bacteriological or chemical
munitions, long-range guided
missiles, warships-of over
3,000 tons, submarines of over
350 tons, or influence-triggered
mines.
Procedures were provided
for modifying these restrictions
in some cases, however, and
Germany has since been permitted
to construct small antitank
missiles, ground-to-air Hawks,
air-to-air Sidewinders, and a
training ship of about 5,000
tons. A request to build
warships of 6,000 tons and to
manufacture influence mines
has been pending since November.
The WEU treaty would have
to be renegotiated to permit
Germany to make atomic, bacte-
riological, or chemical weapons
on its own territory. Bonn
recognizes that such a renego-
tiation could not be accomplished
in the present climate of pub-
lic opinion in Western Europe
--particularly that in Britain.
Bonn, however, could make fi-
nancial and technical contribu-
tions to a French missile and
nuclear weapons program and
could possess such weapons with-
out violating the letter of the
WEU treaty restrictions.
There is no reliable evi-
dence that West Germany has yet
undertaken any collaboration
of this sort, but there have
been hints that Adenauer may
be contemplating such a possi-
bility at some future date if
German requirements for advanced
weapons cannot be satisfied
through NATO machinery. F
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
BRAZIL AND ITS NEW FEDERAL CAPITAL
The scheduled inauguration
on 21 April of Brazil's new
federal capital, Brasilia, points
up both the problems and suc-
cesses of Brazil's intense ef-
fort to become a "developed"
nation. President Kubitschek's
program, ridiculed locally dur-
ing the first two years of his
administration, has at the start
of the fifth and final year en-
listed the enthusiasm of nearly
every segment of the population.
Brasilia, located 600 miles
inland from Rio de Janeiro in
the sparsely settled central
plateau, is ringed to the east
1 EXECUTIVE OFFICES
CONGRESS, SUPREME
COURT
2 MINISTRY ROW
3 EMBASSIES &
LEGATIONS
4 PRESIDENTS
RESIDENCE
5 AIRPORT
and northeast by the nine dust-
bowl states and to the west and
northwest by the six jungle-
covered states and territories
of the Amazon region. Kubi-
tschek's determined drive to
move the capital has stemmed
from his belief in the need to
develop the neglected northern
two thirds of the country as
rapidly as possible. This area,
comprising some 2,000,000 square
miles and some 25,000,000 in-
habitants, contains only two
cities of over 500,000, and un-
til this year has had almost no
road or rail connections with
the rest of the country.
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
In early Feb-
ruary, however, the
first motor caravan
reached Brasilia from
the north over the
newly bulldozed 1,500-
mile jungle highway
from Belem, the Ama-,
zon trading center.
Plans for the Move
Construction
crews, the first of
which were Airlifted
to the scrub-covered
site
in 1956,
have
been
working
around
the
clock for
the
past
year to
finish
interstate supply
roads, city streets,
a power dam and water
supply system, gov-
ernment buildings,
and shopping and busi-
ness area. They will
also have readied
apartments and houses
f or about 4, 000 civil"-
service families by
21 April.
The first contingents of
Kubitschek's personal staff
left Rio de Janeiro for Brasil-
ia in mid-March. By inaugura-
tion day, the congress, the
supreme court, and the cabinet,
plus about 1,000 selected civil
servants, will be permanently
installed. Daily courier
flights between Brasilia and
Rio de Janeiro have already
begun and presumably will be
continued for a year or more
until the move is complete.
Rio de Janeiro, now the
Federal District with a popu-
lation of about 3,500,000, is
to become the twenty-first state
on 21 April and will be known
as Guanabara, according to the
constitutional provisions gov-
erning the move. The city's
actual future status remains
uncertain, however, as congress
is still debating the desira-
bility of a plebiscite which
ree~rr. es air..
11,11,11 11 MIT 111,
ITT
would permit annexation to the
neighboring state of Rio de
Janeiro.
Brazil's Basic Problems
Kubitschek's view of his
development program as the force
that will propel the country
toward its "manifest destiny"
as a great power has focused
attention on the weaknesses as
well as the strengths of Bra-
zil's social and:_,economic struc-
ture. The statement of a Bra-
zilian journalist 15 years ago
that the southern, temperate-
zone state of Sao Paulo is a
locomotive pulling 20 empty
freight cars--the rest of the
country--is less true how but
still has validity. Sao Paulo
produces most of the country's
heavy industrial goods and also
most of its chief export,
coffee.
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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SECRET yr
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
Br. _11
(,uiana
L Ap all
j~ Electric Power Installation
(Present or planned capacity
over 100,000 kw.)
Electric Power Installation
(Present or planned capacity
under 100,000 kw.)
Selected Steel Mill (Ingots only)
Selected Oil Refinery
Selected Shipyard
A Selected Iron Mine
0 Selected Manganese Mine
--?-- . Main road links to Brasilia
BRAZIL
Vitoria
o \Jacuacanga
rim Piratininga
Cubatao Santos
7 APRIL 1960
STATUTE MILES
Brazil's economic growth
in the last 15 years has in-
creased the gross national prod-
uct (GNP) by an average of
5 percent per year in "real"
terms. This contrasts with a
recent decline in productivity
in neighboring countries.
Brazil now leads Latin America
in steel and electric power
production, but per-capita GNP
is only now reaching the $250
to $300 average for the area.
This results principally
from the continued inactivity
of that third of the population
living in the vast northern
dust-bowl and jungle areas
where tropical diseases and
malnutrition are still common.
Brazil's development has.
also been hindered by its his-
tory of one-crop, boom-and- '
bust cycles beginning with sugar
in the 17th century and suc-
ceeded in turn by gold and dia-
monds, cotton, rubber, and now
coffee. Because of its present
dependence on the unstable
coffee market for over half its
foreign-exchange earnings and
because of its costly industrial-
ization efforts, Brazil suffers
periodic balance-of-payments
crises.
A new balance of payments
crisis is likely this year, since
Brazil must make loan repay-
ments of over $350,000,000 in
convertible currencies in 1960
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SORT
7 April 1960
and will probably also have
a trade deficit, as it has for
the past four years. Last year,
President Kubitschek publicly
rejected suggestions that he
institute various financial
reforms that would make Brazil
eligible for a stabilization
loan from the International
Monetary Fund. Inflation
reached the unprecedented
:Levei of 52 percent in 1959, but
for .1960'it may total no more
than a "normal" 15-25 percent.
Five-Year Program
Brazil's first coordinated
development plan was inaugurated
in 1956 when Kubitschek took
office. Based on studies by
the defunct Joint Brazil-US
Economic Development Commission,
the plan called for an invest-
ment of $6 billion in the period
1956-1960--about $2 billion of
this in foreign exchange--and
was aimed primarily at eliminat-
ing bottlenecks in transporta-
tion and at production of fuel,
steel, and electric power.
The development program
spells out 30 targets and numer-
ous subgoals, most of which are
being met on schedule. The
most successful programs have
been those for power, transport,
and heavy industry; the least
successful, those for agricul-
ture. No goals were set for
light industry or consumer goods
other than food and automobiles,
SECRET
BRAZIL: GOALS OF FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
-
1959
SELECTED
1955
1960
LEVEL
CATEGORIES
LEVEL
TARGETS
ATTAINED
ELECTRIC POWER
MILLION KILOWATTS
3.0
5.1
4.1
PETROLEUM
YEAR END
FIGURES)
THOUSAND BARREI S PER DAY
CRUDE
6.8
100.0
74.0
REFINING
130.0
330.0
183.0
RAILROAD TRACK
23
0
24
7
11958)
23.7
THOUSAND MILES
.
.
HIGHWAYS STATE AND
THOUSAND MILES INTERSTATE
2.6
p
18.2
(11958)
8.7
MARITIME SHIPPING
THOUSAND TONS IN SERVICE
FREIGHTERS
747
1,100
952.6A
TANKERS
217
535
408.0*
ANNUAL CONSTR.
(VIRTUALLY
100
(YARDS UNDER
CAPACITY
NIL)
CONSTRUCTION)
AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES
T iOUSAND UNITS PRODUCED
0
0
80
4
TRUCK
0
.
1.3
JEEPS & UTILITY
0
50.0
34.9
PASSENGER
0
40.0
15.2
TOTAL
0
170.0
97.7
STEEL INGOTS
1.2
2.3
1.9
MILLION TONS ANNUALLY
CEMENT
2, 7
4.9
4.0
MILLION TONS ANNUALLY
WHEAT
600
1,500
550
THOUSAND TONS ANNUALLY
FERTILIZERS
20
300
350
THOUSAND TONS ANNUALLY
H Of these, 61,600 tons of freighter capacity
and 93, 500 tons of tahker capacity were under
construction abroad but not yet delivered
since production of most con-
sumer goods has kept pace with
demand in Brazil's essentially
free economy.
Foreign investors have
entered virtually every phase
of the program except petroleum
production. Oil development on
a scale at least double the
present target is urgently needed,
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1-r --ve
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CURM IXTJtLIOENCE WEEILY . S T '
7 April 1960
BRAZIL: PRODUCTION OF SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PLANTS
I-A
CAPACITY OF
PRESENT
ADDITIONS
SITE
STATE
CAPACITY
OR NEW
PLANTS UNDER
CONSTRUCTION
MAJOR ELECTRIC POWER INSTALLATIONS (KILOWATTS)
CUBATAO
SAO PAULO
734,000*
390,000
FURNAS
MINAS GERAIS
1,100,000
TRES MARIAS
MINAS GERAIS
520,000
PIRATININGA
SAO PAULO
250,000
250,000
PEIXOTO
MINAS GERAIS
80,000*
400,000
NILO PESSANHA
RIO DE JANEIRO
330,000*
PAULO AFONSO
BAHIA
202,000
120,000
DOURADA(near BRASILIA
GOIAS
27,000
218,000
ILHA DOS POMBOS
RIO DE JANEIRO
162,000*
FONTES
RIO DE JANEIRO
154,000*
BARIRI
SAO PAULO
132,000
FUNIL
MINAS GERAIS
48,000
120,000
CAPIVARI
SANTA CATARINA
15,400
100,000
JURURIMIM
SAO PAULA
100,000
BARRA BONITA
SAO PAULO
100,000
*Indicates 19
57 figure.
SELECTED STEEL MILLS (INGOTS IN METRIC TONS)
NATIONAL STEEL CO.
VOLTA REDONDA
RIO DE JANEIRO
812,000
250,000
BELGO-MINEIRA
SAHARA & MONLEVADE
MINAS GERAIS
274,000
282
000
(2 mills)
(both near BELO
,
HORIZONTE)
USIMINAS
IPATINGA
MINAS GERAIS
504
000
(near BELO HORIZONTE)
,
MINERACAO GERAL
MOGI DAS CRUCES &
SAO PAULO
190,000
200
000
(2 mills)
SAO CAETANO DO SUL
,
(both near SAO PAULO)
COSIPA
PIACAGUERA
SAO PAULO
383,000
(near SANTOS)
ACO VITORIA
VITORIA
ESPIRITUJ SANTO
300,000
ALIPERTI
SAO PAULO
SAO PAULO
70,000
70,000
ACESITA
ITABIRA
MINAS GERAIS
58,000
62,000
BARRA MANSA
Near VOLTA REDONDA
RIO DE JANEIRO
NA
90,000
SIDERURGICA
(between Porto Alegre
RIO GRANDE DO SUL
22,000
RIOGRANDENSE
and Rio Grande)
SELECTED OIL REFINERIES (BARRELS PER DAY)
CUBATAO
CUBATAO
CUBATAO, SAO PAULO
95,000
40,000
MANGUINHOS
RIO DE JANEIRO
10,000
MATARIPE
SALVADOR
SALVADOR, BAHIA
32,000
15,000
CAPUAVA
SANTO ANDRE
SANTO ANDRE,SAO PAULO
33,000
MANAUS
MANAUS
MANAUS, AMAZONAS
6,800
DUQUE DE CAXIAS
RIO DE JANEIRO
90,000
RIO GRANDE
RIO GRANDE
RIO GRANDE,RIO GRANDE
7,000
DO SUL
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 18 of 19
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 April 1960
but Brazilian law prohibits
private investment in this field.
Although oil production has in-
creased tenfold since 1955, it
still supplies less than a third
of total consumption.
The development program has
also attracted interest within
the Soviet bloc. A number of
bloc countries have included
Brazil in their long-range
trading plans and have con-
tracted to supply industrial
equipment and complete factory
installations. Although this
trade is still negligible in
terms of Brazil's total, it
will probably increase sub-
stantially in the next few years
as a result of recent agreements
with the USSR and Poland.
In January, Brazil reversed
its policy of refusing visas to
Soviet technicians and admitted
a group of chemical engineers
to help with studies for a large-
scale natural-gas plant. Czecho-
slovakia is supplying Sao Paulo's
new 132,000-kilowatt Tiete
River power plant with generat-
ing equipment on a barter basis.
The Political Situation
The development program
has not been an issue in the
early campaigning for the 3
October presidential election.
The chief opposition candidate,
colorful former 25X6
Sao Paulo Governor Janio Quadros,
has attacked various aspects of
the program, but his principal
argument is that he could do
the job better. He may also
hope he can make an issue of
Kubitschek's relative neglect
of agrarian matters and his
refusal to attend Fidel Castro's
proposed world conference of
underdeveloped nations. Kubi-
tschek fears the Cuban confer-
ence would detract from inter-
American meetings scheduled for
this year to discuss his hemis-
phere development plan, Opera-
tion Pan America.
Kubitschek cannot succeed
himself and is backing his former25X6
war minister, the scrupulously
honest
Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott.
Lott, who is strongly pro-US,
is now riding a wave of pro-
government sentiment based main-
ly on the scheduled inauguration
of Brasilia and the other suc-
cesses of the development pro-
gram. However, a repetition of
the balance-of-payments crisis 25X1
or food supply crisis of 1959
could tip the balance decisively
toward the opposition.
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