CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002600080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2006
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• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 56
OCI NO. 1o10/60
3 March 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
1c: C: r- D C r, 25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
State Dept. review completed
25X1
DATE4 - REVIEWER:
lgg~
CLASS. CHANGE-D TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTH: HR 70-2
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev's ambiguous remarks on Germany and Berlin
in his Djakarta press conference on 29 February did not
if fact modify his previous statements on these subjects
which have carefully avoided directly linking a threat to
sign a separate treaty with the outcome of the summit
meeting in May. His deliberate ambiguity was apparently
designed to elicit the Western press speculation that So-
viet action is dependent on the summit results. Moscow's
strong reaction to reports that the United States would
resume flights in the Berlin air corridors above 10,000
feet suggests that the Soviet leaders view this as an op-
portunity to test Western unity in the pre-summit period
and, if possible, inject the East Germans into technical
discussions on flight procedures.
KHRUSHCHEV CONTINUES TOUR OF ASIA . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Although both Premier Khrushchev and President Sukarno
reportedly were disappointed in the reception given Khru-
shchev in Indonesia, his visit ended in an atmosphere of
harmony. The joint statements signed at the conclusion
gave the Soviet leader material for his propaganda mills
and assurances that Indonesia will continue its policy of
nonalignment. In return, Khrushchev offered a $250,000,000
credit and Soviet support for Indonesia's claims to West
Irian. En route from Indonesia to Afghanistan, the last
country on his four-nation tour, Khrushchev stopped for
talks with Nehru in Calcutta.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Tensions between the UAR and Israel have eased some-
what the past week, but a modified military alert is still
in effect on both sides. Israeli officials have been in
Paris attempting to obtain additional military equipment;
they also plan to go to Britain
The emigration of Rumanian Jews to Israel, which
previously exacerbated relations between the Arab states
and the bloc, has been quietly renewed. At the recently
concluded Arab League meeting in Cairo, Jordan maintained
complete opposition to a UAR-backed proposal to create a
Palestine state and army. In Iraq, Prime Minister Qasim
has assumed the role of patron of the Iraqi Peace Partisans,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
PART I (continued)
in an apparent effort to neutralize this important Commu-
nist-front group by converting it into a nationwide non-
political movement.
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
LARGE COMMUNICATIONS TOWER COMPLEX IN EAST GERMANY . . . . Page 1
Masonry towers to house electronics equipment have
been constructed at 63 locations in East Germany and more
are being built. These towers, one purpose of which is to
expand conventional telephone, telegraph, and broadcast
services, apparently are to be used by four regime organi-
zations, including the Ministry of Defense. The military
may use some of these towers for transmitting radar signals
for air defense and command and control signals for guided-
missile purposes.
POLISH WORKER DISCONTENT BECOMING MORE WIDESPREAD . . . . Page 3
Worker discontent in Poland is growing as the regime
carries out its policy aimed at stepping up industrial
production with only minor increases in the labor force.
Sporadic work stoppages have already taken place in sev-.
eral industrial areas; these have been brought under con-
trol by the threat of punitive measures, including dis-
missals and blacklisting. Unrest is likely to become
more serious, as workers in several key industrial estab-
lishments in Poznan are reported to have met to decide on
a coordinated protest against wage cuts resulting from
higher work norms.
COMMUNIST CHINA SPEEDS CONSTRUCTION IN ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Communist China is making a major effort to expand
its electric power industry. Progress in power-plant
construction during the past two years has reflected this
new emphasis, and China's generating capacity and output
of electricity in 1959 were almost twice the 1957 levels.
The present tempo of construction can be expected to bring
roughly another doubling by 1962.
PEIPING LAYING THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC
PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Recent announcements by Peiping suggest that the
campaign to provide a theoretical basis for present econo-
mic programs has been intensified. The major feature of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
the campaign is a renewed emphasis on "the thought of Mao
Tse-tung" as the motivating force behind the "leap forward."
The forthcoming joint meeting of the National People's
Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Committee will provide an opportu-
nity for launching a new drive for greater communalization
and for consolidating the theoretical foundation of the
"leap forward." Moscow has been reluctant to acknowledge
the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as a contribution to Marxism-
Leninism and will find these renewed claims unpalatable.
CHOU EN-LAI ACCEPTS NEW DELHI AS SITE FOR TALKS WITH
NEHRU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Chou En-lai seems intent on convincing Nehru and the
Indian public that agreement can be reached on principles
and procedures for settling the border dispute. Chou's
letter on 26 February accepting New Delhi as the site for
talks with Nehru in April was conciliatory and seemed in-
tended to lend credibility to Peiping's oft-stated readi-
ness to negotiate a "friendly" settlement. Nehru has wel-
comed Chou's decision, although he reportedly expects no
tangible results from the meeting
ea ers pro a y w a emp o gauge eac other's com-
mitment to territorial claims and create a favorable cli-
mate for further discussions.
ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The government of Laos is making some progress in
preparing for the parliamentary elections scheduled for
24 April. Gerrymandering of electoral districts to mini-
mize Communist capabilities is nearly completed, and the
regime is attempting to develop a single slate of govern-
ment-approved candidates. There now are indications that
the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat may decide to present
candidates before the 9 March filing deadline.
Communist insurgent influence and
activity are more widespread than the government admits,
and in large areas of the countryside, the insurgents may
be in a position to disrupt the elections or intimidate
the populace.
RATIFICATION OF US-JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY STALLED
. Page 9
The Japanese Socialists, aided by factionalism in
Prime Minister Kishi's Liberal-Democratic party, have been
able to stall legislative deliberations on the new US-Jap-
anese security treaty. They hope to provoke the prime
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
PART II (continued)
minister into a rash move which would arouse public opin-
ion against him and the treaty. Kishi has been confident
that procrastination by the Socialist opposition would
overtax public patience and enable him to secure Diet rati-
fication in May, but attempts by his intraparty rivals to
make his resignation the price of their support could lead
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CAMEROUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Prime Minister Ahidjo, having secured endorsement of
his draft constitution in the popular referendum held on
21 February, has set 10 April as the date for legislative
elections which will determine the character of the govern-
ment to succeed Cameroun's present transitional regime. In
an effort to ease the country's tense political situation,
he has also legalized the Union of the Cameroons Population
(UPC), the militant nationalist party banned by the French 25X1
in 1955. At the same time, local and reinforced French
forces are stepping up military operations a s UPC ex-
tremists and other rebels in the southwest.
MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The earthquakes at Agadir apparently have delayed the
pending cabinet reorganization in Morocco. King Mohamed V,
who usually moves with caution, is reported to have ac-
cepted the resignation of Premier Abdullah Ibrahim and to
be about to name Si Mohamed M'Barek Bekkai to head another
caretaker government which would serve until after elec-
tions in May. These elections, the first to be held in
Morocco, should provide more reliable information on the
distribution of party strength throughout the country.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Algerian rebel chief Ferhat Abbas' 29 February pro-
nouncement on conditions for a cease-fire has been gener-
ally well received in France, where renewed hope of a
settlement based on self-determination will probably re-
vive speculation on the possibility of early formal
meetings. The two sides remain far apart, however, on
whether discussions of political guarantees will be in-
cluded in cease-fire talks. On his current tour of French
military field installations in Algeria, De Gaulle is prob-
ably trying to gauge army opinion on the aftermath of the
January insurrection and on new moves toward self-determin-
ation.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
PART II (continued)
CABINET MAKING IN ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
While negotiations to replace the Segni government
are only in their initial stages, the. outlines of Christian
Democratic strategy are beginning to emerge. As indicated
by the program adopted by the party's national directorate
on 27 February, the Christian Democrats appear to be work-
ing toward a coalition with the Democratic Socialists and
Republicans, and depending on the parliamentary abstention
of the Nenni Socialist party.
ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The latent ill feeling between Britain and West Ger-
many has again been stirred up by Bonn's moves to obtain
military facilities in Spain. This British criticism of
this move, following closely the London press campaign
over anti-Semitic incidents in West Germany, has in turn
raised German resentment to a postwar high. The British
Government is increasingly reluctant to permit German
military power to exceed the restrictions in' the 1954
Western European Treaty, and this attitude is likely to
be accentuated by the public indignation over the Spanish -
West German talks in Madrid.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
TRANSPORTATION IN THE SOUTHEAST COASTAL AREA OF CHINA . . Page 1
The railroads built in the last few years in the
Fukien coastal area of Communist China, opposite Taiwan,
now are the most important means of transport serving the
economic and military needs of the area. They appear ade-
quate to support present levels of economic activity and,
together with lines now under construction, projected
levels. They are also providing improved logistic sup-
port to the armed forces in the area. The highways and
waterways of the area, while decreasing in importance, are
still major traffic arteries in many localities and are
being improved. Timber is the principal product moving
out of Fukien, while shipments of a military nature make
up an important part of incoming goods.
NATIONALIST CHINA'S TAIWANESE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The Chinese Nationalist Government during the last
three years has shown growing concern over relations be-
tween the native Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders on
Taiwan. This concern stems partly from demands for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III (continued)
political rights by the Taiwanese, who constitute the
majority of the island's population, and partly from the
induction into the armed forces of greater numbers of
Taiwanese, who cannot share the mainlanders' desire to
return to the mainland. If mainlander liberal elements
and Taiwanese leaders unite on demands for political and
economic reforms, Chiang Kai-shek may be forced to place
emphasis on economic development on the island at the
expense of the military organization.
EFFECTS OF SPAIN'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM . . . . Page 7
The economic stabilization program inaugurated in
July 1959 has put a brake on Spain's inflation and mark-
edly improved its balance-of-payments position. This
achievement and the recent increase in Franco's interna-
tional prestige have strengthened the regime's position
and discouraged opposition elements. Influential cabinet
ministers, however, oppose some of the program's measures
for achieving economic expansion. Production levels re-
main low and workers are restless, fearing a worsening
unemployment situation.
WESTERN AID TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Western nations are seeking to coordinate their capi-
tal exports in order to increase the effectiveness of free-
world aid to less-developed countries. Although such free-
world economic assistance is estimated to exceed $5 billion
annually--considerably more than the cumulative total of
bloc economic and military aid from 1954 to date--its ef-
fectiveness in East-West competition is greatly impaired
by lack of coordinated direction and insufficient long-term
financing. A meeting of eight capital exporting nations
beginning on 9 March will consider, among other aspects of
the problem, methods to coordinate financial contributions
for riorit assistance to such countries as India.
SLOVAKIA'S AUTONOMY GRADUALLY DISAPPEARING . . . . . . . . Page 12
Slovakia's long-standing semiautonomous position
within the Czechoslovak state has recently been weakened
by Prague's moves downgrading administratively Slovakia's
capital, Bratislava, and curtailing the Slovak party's
control over its own party press and over other Slovak-
language publishing activities. Although the strength of
Slovak separatism compels Prague to proceed with caution,
the regime has apparently embarked on a program to liqui-
date within the next few years the autonomous status of
this fiercely nationalistic region.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
'rhrushchev's ambiguous re-
marks on Germany and Berlin in
his Djakarta press conference
on 29 February did not in fact
modify his previous statements
on these subjects,which have
carefully avoided directly link-
ing a threat to sign a separate
treaty with the outcome of the
summit meeting in May. His de-
liberate ambiguity was apparent-
ly designed to elicit the West-
ern press speculation that Soviet
action is dependent on the sum-
mit results. Moscow's strong
reaction to reports that the
United States would resume flights
in the Berlin air corridors
above 10,000 feet suggests that
the Soviet leaders view this as
an opportunity to test Western
unity in the pre-summit period
and, if possible, inject the
East Germans into technical dis-
cussions on flight procedures.
In contrast to such psycho-
logical warfare maneuvers to
generate a sense of urgency in
the West regarding the import-
ance of preventing a failure
of the summit meeting, other
statements by the Soviet premier
in Indonesia reaffirmed his
interest in maintaining personal
contacts with Western leaders.
His joint statement with Presi-
dent Sukarno noted that the
May conference would be the first
of a series of such meetings.
He told his press conference
that although one meeting could
not deal with all the issues
under dispute, the May session
would "make a good start." 25X1
The confusion in press
accounts of Khrushchev's state-
ment arose from the fact that
his reference to the USSR's in-
tention to conclude a separate
treaty occurred at the end of
a passage which opened with a
reference to the forthcoming
summit talks. Soviet leaders
frequently resort to this device
of calculated ambiguity when
they wish to create an impression
abroad that some drastic unilateral
action is imminent without
actually committing the USSR
to take such action. This tech-
nique was employed effectively
during the Suez crisis'of 1956
and the Syriar crisis- in 1956
and 1957.
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an official T S statement on
25 February - seized on
the announcement of the West
German and Spanish military
talks to allege that Bonn's
policies "involuntarily bring
to mind the military alliance
of Hitler and Franco." Stress-
ing that the Soviet Government
has constantly warned about
the "sinister danger of German
militarism," the statement con-
cluded by declaring that this
collusion with Spain, aimed at
obstructing an East-West agree-
ment, "again underlines the
urgent need for a peace settle-
ment with Germany."
Moscow's prompt and strong
reaction to press reports that
the United States will resume
flights in the Berlin air cor-
ridors above 10,000 feet sug-
gests that the Soviet leaders
view this as an opportunity to
test Western unity in the pre-
summit period and, if possible,
inject the East Germans into
any technical discussion on
flight procedures.
The warning by a Soviet
spokesman in East Berlin that
flights above 10,000 feet, in
the absence of an agreement
with both the USSR' and 'East
Germany, would be regarded as
a "unilateral violation of East
German air sovereignty" and
existing four-power agreements
probably is aimed at inducing
the Western powers to postpone
such flights and agree to tech-
nical discussions on flight
procedures with East German
participation. Moscow will
probably attempt to increase
pressure for negotiations, as
it did in 1959, by hinting
that possible "incidents" might
result. On the flights in the
spring of 1959, American C-130s
were harassed by Soviet air-
craft.
The impasse over the new
passes for the Allied Military
Liaison Missions accredited
to the Soviet forces in East
Germany continues. The Soviet
Union has not yet replied to
the Western protest notes de-
livered to the Soviet commander
in East Germany on 19 February,
which contended that the passes
violated the 1947 agreement
setting up the missions.
Privately, however, the
Soviet officials have continued
to minimize the problem, insist-
ing that the passes are normal
administrative action and do
not constitute recognition of
East Germany. Soviet mission
officials in Frankfurt took
this approach with American
army officers. They asserted
that the passes are really not
new but merely recognize a
historical fact.
New officers assigned to
the Soviet mission in Baden-
Baden indicated that they
planned to be in West Germany
a long time, suggesting that
they do not anticipate that
the missions will be withdrawn
soon. This pose, however, may
have been intended to suggest
Soviet confidence that the West-
ern reaction to the new passes
is temporary.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Western Positions
The Macmillan government,
in keeping with its disinclina-
tion to disturb the atmosphere
of detente during the pre-summit
period, has opposed several
measures taking a firm line to-
ward the USSR and East Germany.
While agreeing to a joint policy
with the United States and France
to curtail visits by high-level
East Germans to the West, London
has issued a visa to the head of
the East German news agency
as the first exception to the
new agreement. In discussions
in Bonn, British diplomats left
the definite impression that
the Home Office in London,
which actually issues the visas,
does not consider the agreed
policy as necessarily binding.
London argued for some time
against early action in sending
in high-altitude flights through
the corridors to Berlin, and has
shown a willingness to go along
with new passes for its Military
Liaison Missions at Potsdam. In
opposing changes in Western pro-
cedures on approving flights to
the Leipzig Fair, London again
has shown its disinclination to
"rock the boat" before the sum-
mit.
Chief Soviet delegate
Tsarapkin continued his efforts
last week to focus negotiations
at the nuclear test cessation
talks on the 16 February Soviet
proposal, under which the USSR
would accept "temporary" stand-
ards for sending out on-site in-
spection teams, provided the
West agrees to Khrushchev's
plan for a fixed annual quota
of inspections. He asserted on
29 February that the Soviet pro-
posal "clarified" the problem
before the negotiations--agree-
ment in principle to a quota,
followed by settlement on a spe-
cific number of inspections "on
the basis of rational political
compromises." Tsarapkin pointed
out that agreement "in princi-
ple" would not mean acceptance
of any specific quota figures.
In an effort to exploit
possible differences between
the Western delegations, he
recalled Prime Minister Mac-
millan's "position on the quota"
and urged the British delegate
to join him in trying to "con-
vince" the American delegate
to accept the quota concept "in
principle."
While avoiding any mention
of a specific quota level,
Tsarapkin again claimed that
a "small number of inspections
would be sufficient" to deter
any would-be violator of a test-
ban treaty. He denied that the
Soviet proposal implied an ad-
mission that many seismic events
were unidentifiable without on-
site inspection and reaffirmed
the USSR's position that a
large majority of events could
be identified as earthquakes at
the control posts.
The Soviet delegate also
continued to reject the American
insistence on relating the size
of the inspection quota to an
estimate of the number of prob-
able seismic events each year.
He charged that this reflected
a "deliberate unwillingness" to
reach agreement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 196Q
On 26 February, Tsarapkin
announced Moscow's "official
agreement" a joint research
program to improve the criteria
for identifying seismic events
to begin "immediately upon sig-
nature of the treaty, as long
as it banned all tests every-
where." By agreeing to under-
take a research and development
program even before the treaty
is ratified, Moscow probably
hopes to demonstrate its serious
intent to cooperate actively in
improving the detection and in-
spection capabilities of the
control apparatus.
KHRUSHCHEV CONTINUES TOUR OF ASIA
Although both Khrushchev
and Sukarno reportedly were
disappointed in the over-all
reception given the Soviet pre-
mier by Indonesians, the tour
ended in an atmosphere of har-
mony. The joint communique,
technical aid agreement,and cul-
tural accord signed at the con-
clusion of the visit gave Khru-
shchev considerable propaganda
grist. In return, he offered
Soviet support for Indonesia's
claims to West Irian (Netherlands
New Guinea) and extended a $250,-
000,000 credit which, if imple-
mented, will help shore up
Djakarta's rapidly deteriorating
economy.
The tenor of the communique
suggests that one of Khrush-
chev's primary aims in under-
taking his two-week tour was to
assure a continuation of Indo-
nesia's policy of nonalignment.
The statement, almost wholly de-
voted to foreign relations,
stressed the identity of inter-
ests on anticolonialism, discon-
tinuance of nuclear testing,
complete disarmament, and repre-
sentation of Afro-Asian nations
at any summit talks subsequent
to the Paris meeting on 16 May.
Khrushchev does not seem
to have made any effort to smooth
the difficult relations between
Indonesia and Communist China.
He is said to have made some
critical and disparaging remarks
about China, and he failed to
press for inclusion in the com-
munique of a, statement supporting UN
membership for Peiping. In dis-
cussing the desirability of Asian
and African participation in sum-
mit conferences, Khrushchev
lumped Communist China with India,
Indonesia, and Japan as states
that should be represented.
In contrast with other bloc
media, the Chinese Communist
press and radio have virtually
ignored Khrushchev's trip. This
is an additional indication of
the continuing coolness between
Peiping and Moscow, and reflects
Peiping's resentment at Khru-
shchev's failure to support it in
disputes with India and Indonesia.
The Chinese probably also feel
that the trip, coming at a time
when they had begun to make their
own gestures toward easing strains
with these Asian countries, gives
Khrushchev a large measure of the
credit Peiping had hoped to gain
for itself.
Khrushchev's favorable re-
sponse to Sukarno's requests for
aid--the Indonesian President
presumably proposed the aid fig-
ure, inasmuch as this amount re-
portedly was used in Djakarta's
plan discussions this fall--
provides a timely demonstration
of tangible Soviet support. The
new Soviet aid will be used
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CURRENT INTJLLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIDURY
largely to underwrite the am-
bitious and widely publicized
five-year economic development
plan which Indonesia hopes to
implement between 1961 and 1965.
The credit, with the usual
long-term, low-interest provi-
sions, is earmarked for proj-
ects to be built over a seven-
year period conce4trated in
areas of primary importance to
basic industrialization--iron
and steel, nonferrous metals,
chemicals, and light industry.
The USSR's preference for assist-
ing large, basic industrial
enterprises was frequently noted
by Khrushchev, who disparaged
Western aid as consisting chief-
ly of consumer goods--i.e., food
and clothing--items which
Khrushchev insisted would serve
only to keep Indonesia and other
underdeveloped countries eco-
nomically and dependent on the
"imperialist powers." By con-
centrating its aid on construc-
tion that can be readily seen,
Moscow will gain maximum propa-
ganda benefit.
Sukarno was anxious to re-
ceive this large credit and
will publicize it widely as
evidence of swift and decisive
action on the nation's economic
problems, although it probably
will be implemented only grad-
ually. Poor Indonesian planning
has prevented the country from
using more than a quarter of
the $240,000,000 in economic
credits extended by the Sino-
Soviet bloc since 1956, but
work on some projects--including
a program for aiding the es-
tablishment of an atomic energy
research program, the Asian
Games stadium in Djakarta, and
a school of marine sciences at
Ambon--will probably be inten-
sified this year to prepare
for the more important tasks
envisaged by the new credit.
Indonesian Army leaders
reportedly opposed the accept-
ance of extensive credit from
the Soviet Union and tried to
persuade Sukarno not to request
it. Now that he has done so,
however, it seems unlikely that
there will be any significant
army reaction.
En route from Indonesia
to Afghanistan, the last
country on his four-nation
tour, Khrushchev stopped
overnight at Calcutta where
he met privately with Prime
Minister Nehru and later
had dinner with him and
Burma's U Nu.
UAR-Israeli Situation
The concern over possible
hostilities between Israel and
the UAR appears to have abated
in both countries. UAR Foreign
Affairs Under Secretary Ghalib
informed the American Embassy
on 28 February that "certain
military units have been pulled
back," presumably from Sinai,
and there are other indications
that the UAR military alert has
been relaxed. Many of the 5,-
000 Israeli reserves called up
last week now have been released.
UAR and Israeli officials
are continuing to make public
and private statements denying
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
any aggressive intentions, and
Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
is scheduled to arrive in the
United States on 8 March for a
private visit. Ali Sabri,Nasir's
chief aide, has stated that poor
management of the UAR mobiliza-
tion created an unanticipated
war scare in Egypt which the
government now is attempting to
alleviate.
Nasir's vigorous response
to alleged Israeli plans to at-
tack Syria probably has boosted
his stature throughout the Arab
world. The crisis also has
provided Israel with an occa-
sion for intensive arms-procure-
ment activity. Stating that
Nasir's bravado demonstrates
the urgency of their military
needs, the Israelis are supple-
menting their appeal for Ameri-
can equipment with requests to
Paris, London, and perhaps West
Germany.
On 23 February, Shimon Peres,
deputy director of the Israeli
Ministry of Defense, arrived
in Paris for arms-purchasing
discussions with French Defense
Ministry officials. Former
Israeli Army Chief of Staff
Moshe Dayan, now minister of
agriculture, also stopped in
Paris en route to an appearance
in Miami for an Israeli bond
rally. He conferred with the
French chief of staff, General
Paul Ely.
There are as yet no re-
ports on the results of these
talks. The French earlier
had been described as unrespon-
sive to Israel's requests for
additional arms commitments,
although they were ready to
honor existing contracts. A
French Foreign Ministry spokes-
man said in December these would
be fulfilled by the delivery of
four or five aircraft.
Peres is to continue his
quest for arms in London this
week. London thinks he may
ask for motor torpedo boats and
ground-to-air missiles and says
it will consult the United States
before making any decison on
Peres' request. The British
agreed in 1958 to sell Israel
60 Centurion tanks, of which
30 either have been or are being
sent, and they intend to provide
the remaining 30 tanks and per-
haps more. It is expected that
the second of two submarines
Israel has obtained from Britain
will be refitted by early April
and turned over to the Israeli
Navy in June.
State
Secretary van ac erpen erg of
the West German Foreign Ministry,
however, has told the American
Embassy in Bonn that under no
circumstances would the Federal
Republic consider supplying heavy
arms to Israel. Israel has sold
grenade launchers, mortars, and
submachine guns to the Germans,
and Ben-Gurion said these sales
were continuing. Such deals
with Bonn have been an internal
political issue.in Israel.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
While Ben-Gurion's visit
to the United States is a "pri-
vate" one, he will call on both
the President and the Vice Pres-
ident. He will also see Prime
Minister Macmillan in Britain
on his way home.
Israeli Immigration
The emigration of Rumanian
Jews to Israel--which a year
ago evoked a severe reaction
among the Arab states toward
the bloc as well as Tel Aviv
and caused Bucharest in effect
to stop the flow at that time--
has resumed recently. Since
last November more than 1,800
Rumanian Jews have been proc-
essed for emigration to Israel
and other countries, and be-
tween 1 January and 17 February,
305 emigres had used the route
through Athens to Israel. Is-
raeli officials in Athens are
confident the emigration will
continue at its present rate.
Both the Israeli and Rumanian
governments are avoiding any
publicity about the new flow
in. hopes of preventing Arab
protests.
Arab League
The Arab League ended three
weeks of intermittent sessions
in Cairo on 29 February with an
announcement reflecting little
real accomplishment. UAR and
Jordanian differences on Pales-
tine proved irreconcilable, and
the league finally shifted the
problem to a committee ordered
to complete plans "with
regard to various national
and international aspects of
the Palestine question." A
future session, possible at the
end of March, is to complete
discussion of the UAR-backed
proposal to create a Palestine
state and army. Jordan is almost
certain to continue its oppo-
sition to the proposal, which,
if effected, could cost it the
territory west of the Jordan
River and the allegiance of
many of its 600,000 refugee
citizens.
Cairo is going ahead with
the organization of the Pales-
tinians in Egypt, Syria, and
Gaza, probably in the hope that
these will eventually be capa-
ble of dominating any future
Palestinian government. Nasir
is compelled to keep the initia-
tive in the face of competitive
efforts from Iraq, as well as
Jordan. Iraqi Prime Minister
Qasim has made great propaganda
play on the Palestinian question,
creating a fund for the estab-
lishment of a Palestine republic
and promising to restore refugee
"rights," while criticizing both
Nasir and Jordan's King Husayn
for alleged inaction. Husayn
has sought to sabotage any move
toward a separate Palestinian
state, offering Jordanian citi-
zenship to all refugees providing
they live in Jordan and not in
the UAR or Lebanon.
By comparison, the UAR's
moves have been more direct.
The Damascus press of 29 Febru-
ary carried the views of Gaza
Mayor Munir Rayyis, who has just
completed consultations with
Nasir. Rayyis stated that the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
inhabitants of Gaza had been
accepted into the UAR's single-
party political organization,
the National Union, and that
plans were under way to include
Palestinians of Syria and Egypt
in that organization. He claimed
that Palestinians in all the
Arab states had shown a desire
to participate in a unified
Palestinian effort, suggesting
that Nasir's National Union
idea might eventually serve as
the vehicle for such unifica-
tion or perhaps the nucleus for
the Palestinian state.
Iraq
Prime Minister Qasim, who
declared last week that "hence-
forth, the Peace Partisans are
abolished," now has assumed the
role of the movement's patron.
Baghdad on 1 March broadcast
an announcement by Aziz Sharif,
secretary general of the move-
ment, that a mass meeting of
the Partisans to be held in late
March will be under Qasim's
patronage and addressed by him.
Qasim's strategy seems to be
to treat the Partisans as a
nationwide nonpolitical movement
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
in an attempt to undercut Commu-
nist control. The Partisans
have functioned as the princi-
pal Communist front in Iraq.
They will not be registered
under the Iraqi law controlling
societies and political parties
and, hence, will be particularly
susceptible to the caprices of
the Qasim regime.
Baghdad is showing in-
creased concern over the dis-
mal state of the Iraqi economy,
and has felt constrained to
make promises that will be
impossible to fulfill. Re-
flecting its concern, the gov-
ernment is giving some encour-
agnaant to business dealings
with the West, and is making
new attempts to resolve diffi-
culties with Western contractors.
Some contractors have been
asked to undertake new jobs
on which Baghdad wants quick,
reliable performance. A recent
Czechoslovak offer of a $30,-
000,000 credit will make it
possible for the Iraqi Govern-
ment to carry out quickly a 25X1
number of small projects having
an immediate domestic propa-
ganda value.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Category I (tail)
Category II (medium)
Q Category ill (short)
Strategic area
Railroad (selected)
Road (selected)
POMMCAT
IL BL+CHT ~~//
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LARGE COMMUNICATIONS TOWER COMPLEX IN EAST GERMENY
A complex of masonry
towers to house electronics
equipment is being constructed
in East Germany. Towers have
already been built at 63 loca-
tion, and more are to be erect-
ed. Seven of them are tall--
nearly 440 feet high--and are to
?OTES AND COMMENTS
Category I
439 feet
Towers
Category II
110 feet
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be used largely for television
broadcasting; the 45 short tow-
ers apparently will be used to
expand telecommunication and
broadcasting services. Both
types could be used for mili-
tary purposes. All the towers
are remote from cities, are
East German Towers
Category III
80 feet
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
served by good roads, and are
surrounded by heavy security
restrictions.
The towers are apparently
intended for use by four dis-
tinct organizations: the Minis-
try of Post and Telecommunica-
tions (MPT), the central com-
mittee of the Socialist Unity
(Communist) party (SED), the
Ministry of Defense, and the
State Radio Committee. Some
of the towers serve more than
one user for more than one pur-
pose, indicating the high-level,
integration of the program.
The towers will be organ-
ized into two groups to enlarge
the microwave radio relay net-
works of the MPT and the SED.
The tall towers will be used
in the enlarged MPT network.
It will include three connect-
ed "round-robin" rings--the
northern, middle, and southern
--designed to improve operation-
al reliability of the public
telephone, telegraph, and local
network television services.
When the program is com-
pleted, television service will
be greatly improved in quality
and will cover more than 80
percent of East Germany and a
considerable area in West Ger-
many.
All of the medium and most
of the short towers will be
used in the enlarged SED net-
work, which carries telephone
and telegraph traffic between
party headquarters in East Ber-
lin and the 14 districts of
the country and subordinate of-
fices located in the 215 coun-
ties. Employing eight-channel
telephone equipment, this net-
work will extend the coverage,
improve the reliability, and
strengthen the physical secu-
rity of party communications.
Some of these towers ap-
pear to be intended for special-
ized purposes as well. The
tall towers could be used by
the military to transmit radar
signals for air defense, com-
mand and control signals for
guided missiles, and signals
for electronic countermeasures
and jamming.
Some of the short towers
may close the southern ring of
the microwave radio relay net-
work of the MPT. Others near
the West German border probably
will be used to jam West German
radiobroadcasts. All medium
and short towers serving the
SED probably will be used also
by the Ministry of Defense in
a special air-defense network
as part of a long-range program
to integrate microwave radio re-
lay facilities with a "hardened"
underground coaxial cable line.
An over-all system, probably
with connections to Moscow and
other bloc areas, would greatly
improve the reliability of bloc
communications.
The construction of tall
towers in East Germany is be-
lieved to be part of a program
of the Organization for Coopera-
tion Among the Socialist Coun-
tries in the Fields of Post and
Communications. This organiza-
tion is mainly concerned with
standardizing, integrating, and
expanding the telecommunications
networks of the countries of the
Soviet bloc.
Similar complexes may be un-
der construction in other bloc
countries. Tall towers being
built in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and the USSR are to be used for
microwave radio relay communica- 25X1
tions and television broadcast-
ing and possibly other functions.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
POLISH WORKER DISCONTENT BECOMING MORE WIDESPREAD
Worker discontent in Po-
land is growing as the regime
carries but its policy aimed
at steppipg up industrial pro-
duction with only minor-in,.,
creases in the labor force
and at reduced costs. Spon-
taneous and unorganized work
stoppages in several industrial
areas in recent weeks--Poznan,
Wroclaw, Lodz, and Czestochowa
--have been brought under con-
trol by the threat of punitive
measures, including dismis-
sals and blacklisting.
Unrest is likely to be-
come more serious, however, as
workers from five key indus-
trial establishments in Poznan
--including those at the Ce-
gielski Works, where the riots
of June 1956 began--reportedly
met to decide on a coordinated
protest if the wage cuts re-
sulting from higher work norms
remain in effect through the
10 March pay day.
and further dismissals was suf-
ficient to end the strike. The
Poznan press claimed that the
work stoppage was caused by a
few troublemakers-.; and that the
workers themselves brought
those persons into line at spec-
ial meetings of "Worker Self-
Government Conferences."
The policy of retrenchment
adopted at the party central
committee's third plenum last
October is designed to make
Polish industry more efficient.
Under the wage reforms, workers
may be expected to work harder
at no increase in pay, and in
many instances harder work may
result in decreased wages.
These wage reforms are to be
applied slowly, however, and
will extend into 1961 or after.
A number of workers have been
laid off in an effort to cut
production costs and raise ef-
ficiency, and this has caused
unemployment in several areas.
The most serious work
stoppage thus far occurred it
the railway repair shops and
railway yards at Poznan on 19
and 20 February. This strike
was only partially effective,
as a number of workers on the
second and third shifts re
fused to participate. The
management reacted firmly,
rejected the workers' demands,
and summarily fired about 30
leaders of the demonstration
as "undesirable elements."
The threat of blacklisting
Although strikes are tech-
nically legal in Poland, Gomulka
himself has warned that they
serve the interests of the
"enemies of socialism." The
1960 plan indicates; that. War-
saw intends to continue its
retrenchment policy. It calls
for substantial increases in
production with only a slight
increase, if any, in employment.
Some industries plan a 5-percent 25X1
production increase with a 20-
percent decrease in employment
for the year.
COMMUNIST CHINA SPEEDS CONSTRUCTION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
Communist China is making
a major effort to expand its
electric power industry. The
accelerated pace of economic
development of the past two
years confronted the industry
with increases in power require-
ments not anticipated in original
plans, and the installation of
additional capacity has been
speeded in an effort to keep up
with these requirements.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Power-plant construction during
the past two years has reflected
this new emphasis and has brought
considerable increases both in
generating capacity and in out-
put.
China produced 41,5 billion
kilowatt-hours of electricity
-
....
...... ~w.n.., .v..II? rLflnFa
IN COMMUNIST CHINA u s
in 1959, the target originally
set for 1962, and generating
capacity reached 8,700,000
kilowatts, or almost twice
that of 1957. The present
tempo of construction can be
expected to bring roughly
another doubling in the coming
three years. The chances are
good that by 1962 China will
be producing nearly 100 billion
kilowatt-hours of electricity
annually.
Peiping has under construc-
tion or expansion 65 major power
plants with capacities over
100,000 kilowatts; 14 of them
will have capacities of 500,-
000 kilowatts or more. Five
have already been complet-
ed.
PetP.ne V
At present, 14 of the 15
largest power plants in China
are thermal plants, and thermal
power still accounts for the
major share of China's power
output--82 percent in 1959.
By 1962, however, hydroelectric
power will play a larger role
and will account for well over
30 percent of total output.
Capacity of Fengman, now
China's largest hydroelectric
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
plant, has been increased to
567,000 kilowatts, and work is
nearing completion on the 650,-
000-kilowatt 4sinan River plant.
Major hydroelectric projects
expected to begin production
this year include one at
Hsinan, which will supply
power to the Shanghai-Nanking-
Hangchow complex; one at Huan-
jen in Liaoning, which will
serve the industrial northeast;
one at Hsinfeng, which will
serve Canton; and a plant on
the Ili River which will be
the largest power plant in
Yunnan,
Construction is also under
way on seven of the 46 dam proj-
ects planned for control and
development of the Yellow River.
Two of these--in the Sanmen
and Liuchia gorges--will have
capacities of over 1,000,000
kilowatts, and the other five
will have a combined capacity
of over 1,000,000 kilowatts.
The Sanmen project, the gener-
ating equipment for which is
being supplied by the USSR, is
expected to be in operation in
1961, and the power plant at
Liuchia should be in operation
the following year.
Work on plans for develop-
ment of the Yangtze River has
been in progress since 1955,
but no formal construction
schedule has been announced.
One proposal envisages a
single high dam at Three Gorges
with a reservoir of over 100
billion cubic meters and a power
plant rated at more than 20,-
000,000-kilowatt capacity.
However, the huge investment--
almost $5 billion--the flooding
of ten cities including Chung-
king, and other problems cast
doubt on the feasibility of
such a project.
Work is already under way
on hydroelectric projects on
a number of tributaries of the
Yangtze. Initial construction
has been concentrated on the
min, Wu, Hsiang, Han, Yuan,
and Ili rivers. Projects on
the Ili will have a total gen-
erating capacity of 330,000
kilowatts and will supply mining
and manufacturing industries
in northern Yunnan, including
an important copper installation
at Tungchuan. The 290,000-kilo-
watt Tsupingpu project on the
Min River will serve Chungking
and Chengtu. A 1,000,000-kilo-
watt plant on the Yuan River
in central China and a 900,000-
kilowatt plant at Tanchiangkou
on the Han will supply the in-
dustrial centers of Wuhan and
Tayeh.
The largest power plant
planned for China in the near
future now is under construction
on the Chienchi River in north-
ern Fukien. This 1,200,000-
kilowatt plant will be about
one tenth larger than the San-
men Gorge project and will even-
tually contribute about 4 bil- 25X1
lion kilowatt-hours to the
country's electric power output.
PEIPING LAYING THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC PROGRAMS
Recent announcements by
Peiping suggest that the cam-
paign to provide a theoretical
basis for present economic pro-
grams has been intensified.
The campaign has been devel-
oping since mid-December con-
currently with a decline in
attacks on "rightist" opponents
of these programs, suggesting
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
that the authorities feel that
the opposition has been dis-
posed of for the time being
and a more positive phase can
now be introduced. The major
feature of the campaign is a
renewed emphasis on "the thought
of Mao Tse-tung" as the motivat-
ing force behind the "leap for-
ward."
People's Daily on 28 Feb-
ruary carried an article by
Vice Premier Li Fu-chun en-
titled, "The Mass Movement Under
the Guidance of the Ideas of Mao
Tse-tung." Li asserts that the
great leap forward, under Mao's
guidance, combines the "univer-
sal truth of Marxism-Leninism
with the concrete practice of
the Chinese revolution," thus
linking present economic pro-
grams,firmly with the party's
unique use of the "mass move-
ment." This mass movement, Li
says, is permeated with the
spirit of Mao's concept of un-
interrupted revolution.
The Li Fu-chun article
credits Mao with having drawn
up the Chinese Communist party's
"general line for building so-
cialism." The article explains
that Mao's "two legs" policies
of simultaneous development of
industry and agriculture, heavy
and light industry, large and
small enterprises, and native
and modern methods have created
a great change in the national
economy. The rapid advance of
the leap forward is credited to
the correct handling of a series
of contradictions "under the
leadership of the party and in
accordance with the teaching of
Comrade Mao Tse-tung."
The entire second page of
People's Daily on 29 February
was devoted to an article en-
titled, "How a Marxist Should
Look Upon New Things." The
article consisted of excerpts
25X1
from the "classical writers of
Marxism--Marx, Engels, Lenin,
Stalin, and Comrade Mao Tse-
tung,`?but omitting Khrushchev.
Moscow has been reluctant to
acknowledge the "thought of Mao
Tse-tung" as a contribution to
Marxism-Leninism and will find
these renewed claims unpalatable.
An editorial note appended
to the article pointed out that
the development of new things
"is not all smooth sailing but
a process of serious struggle,"
and.that "there are bound to be
shortcomings and mistakes."
The note suggests that the pur-
pose of publishing the selec-
tions is to argue that the ob-
vious difficulties of the leap
forward have been part of a na-
tural process.
An article in the current
issue of the party's theoreti-
cal journal Red Flag furnishes
further evidence of the cam-
paign's direction. The article,
entitled "The People's Commune
Is a Great Creation of the Mass-
es of Our Country," cites "his-
torical facts and other refer-
ences to prove that the people's
commune is anatural product of
Chinese history." The purpose
apparently is to counter charges
that the commune system is an
artificial creation imposed on
an unwilling people.
On 29 February Peiping
also announced that the National
People's Congress and the Nation-
al Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative
Conference would meet jointly
in the latter part of March.
The agenda for the meeting are
almost exclusively economic
and provide an opportunity for
launching a new drive for great-
er communalization and for con- 25X1
solidation of the theoretical
foundation now being d
for the leap forward.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
CHOU EN-LAI ACCEPTS NEW DELHI AS SITE FOR TALKS WITH NEHRU
0
30839
Communist China's Premier
Chou En-lai seems intent on
convincing Prime Minister Nehru
and the Indian public that
agreement can be reached on
principles and procedures for
settling the border dispute.
In a letter devoid of the con-
tentious claims which marked
Peiping's previous correspond-
ence, Chou wrote Nehru on 26
February that he would be "very
Selected road
Selected trail
3 MARCH 1960
MILES
SECRET
to Peiping's oft-stated readi-
ness to negotiate a "friendly
and peaceful settlement." It
would also facilitate Chou's per-
sonal diplomacy in the meeting
with Nehru--a meeting Chou has
been soliciting for some time.
It is unlikely that Chou
expects the April meeting to
result in specific agreement on
Area from which Nehru has asked
Chinese troops to withdraw
Songcho Frontier post from which
Chou En-lai has asked Indian
troops to withdraw
Boundary shown on Indian maps
Boundary shown on recent
Chinese Communist maps
Boundaries are not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Government.
the major areas in dispute.
Rather, he probably will try to
gauge the extent of Nehru's
commitment to India's border
claims, and he may hint that
Peiping would be willing to
recognize the McMahon line in
the east if New Delhi eventual-
ly accepted the status quo in
Ladakh. Chou also will want
to create a favorable climate
for further discussions. To
this end he may be prepared to
glad" to accept the latter's
invitation to hold talks in
New Delhi, although "state af-
fairs" dictated that he go in
April rather than in March as
Nehru had suggested.
Chou apparently hopes his
willingness to go to New Delhi
will be interpreted as a con-
cession. Any accommodation
would lend an air of credibility
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offer minor concessions on
some of the small disputed
enclaves in exchange for an
:'agreement to preserve the sta-
tus quo while more detailed--
and lengthy--negotiations are
conducted at a lower diplomatic
level.
Nehru immediately welcomed
Chou's agreement to meet in
the Indian capital. He had as-
sured his cabinet, who opposed
any meeting outside the coun-
try, that Indian prestige
abroad would benefit if Chou
were to come to India. Chou's
acceptance of New Delhi also
makes it easier for Nehru to
mollify elements in Parliament
and the press who have criti-
cized his willingness to con-
fer with the Chinese.
The Indian press and pub-
lic are likely to give Chou a
chilly reception, with some
open hostility. Although re-
action since the announcement
of Chou's acceptance has been
restrained, conservative and
Socialist opposition leaders
had earlier warned that their
groups, as well as the people
in general, would refuse to go
along with the government in
treating Chou as a "honored
guest. These groups probably
will soon begin efforts to un-
dermine Chou's mission and to
prepare the public for anti-
Chinese demonstrations. Govern-
bounds.
ment authorities, however, un-
der strong instructions from
Nehru, probably are capable of
keeping such activities within
ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS IN LAOS
The government of Laos is
making some progress in preparing
for the parliamentary elections
scheduled for 24 April. Gerry-
mandering of electoral districts
in eight of Laos' 12 provinces
has been completed, and the task
in the other four is expected
to be finished shortly. Redefini-
tion of the electoral districts
is only one of a number of de-
vices planned to assure the re-
turn of a large anti-Communist
majority in the National Assem-
bly. Efforts are now in prog-
ress to develop a single slate
of candidates which the regime
will endorse and support.
The old-guard Rally of the
Lao People (RLP) and the reform-
ist Committee for Defense of Na-
tional Interests (CDNI) have
each prepared a list of possible
candidates for inclusion on the
single slate. An electoral com-
mittee composed of Deputy Pre-
mier Nhouy and three other cab-
inet ministers will shortly
choose from these lists the
strongest candidate for each of
the 59 assembly seats at stake.
Others wil be encouraged to
withdraw, possibly through fi-
nancial inducements or the of-
fer of government posts. Al-
though this method of screening
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candidates will not prevent
some individuals from running
without official endorsement,
it should reduce considerably
the number of candidates com-
peting for and splitting the
anti-Communist votes.
There now are indications
that the Communist-front Neo
Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) may present
candidates before the filing
deadline on 9 March. Prince
Souphannouvong, titular leader
of the NLHS who with other par-
ty officials is imprisoned,re-
portedly is considering running
against former Premier Phoui.
He may have to run from jail,
however, since there is a good
chance the NLHS leaders will
not be released. In districts
where the NLHS or its neutralist
ally, the Santiphab party,
presents candidates, the gov-
ernment plans to make special
efforts to prevent more than
one anti-Communist candidate
from running.
Laotian officials profess
confidence that the country
will be sufficiently pacified
for elections to be carried
out.
communist n- 25X1
surgent influence and activity
may be more pervasive than the
government realizes or admits.
A USIS-led team traveling in
tribal villages in Xieng Khouang
Province found the villagers
under constant threat of re-
prisal and subject to intense
Communist propaganda, despite
government assurances that the
area was secure.
The Laotian Army has im-
planted elements of its
volunteer battalions in var-
ious areas of the country
as a security measure in con-
nection with the elections,
but it is doubtful that their
influence will be felt much
beyond the main towns and
adjacent villages. In the
remainder of the country, the
insurgents may thus be free
to disrupt the elections or
intimidate the populace into
voting for Communist-favored
candidates.
RATIFICATION OF US-JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY STALLED
The Japanese Socialists,
aided by factionalism in Prime
Minister Kishi's Liberal-Demo-
cratic party, have been able
to stall legislative delibera-
tions on the new US-Japanese
security treaty. They hope to
provoke the prime minister into
a rash move which vould arouse
public opinion against him and
the treaty. Kishi has been con-
fident that procrastination by
the Socialist opposition would
overtax public patience and en-
able him to secure Diet ratifi-
cation in May, but attempts by
his intraparty rivals to make
his resignation the price of their
support could lead him to call for
a general election on the issue.
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The Socialists thus far
have challenged the government
to give a precise definition of
the "Far East" area covered
by the treaty and have objected
to the treaty's 11-year duration.
In the absence of constitutional
or legislative provision to the
contrary, they assert that the
Diet has the right to amend or
revise treaties. Kishi's intra-
party rivals--led by Ichiro
Kono, Kenzo Matsumura, and Tan-
zan Ishibashi--are supporting
this contention.
Kishi's rivals, however,
face a double handicap. The
Japanese in general find mili-
tary cooperation with a foreign
country distasteful, but they
believe close cooperation with
the United States is in Japan's
vital interest, politically and
economically, and thus acquiesce
in the security treaty. Any
member of the government party
who jeopardizes Japan's rela-
tions with the United States
by upsetting the security ar-
rangements would probably en-
danger his own chances of be-
coming prime minister. At the
same time, Kishi's opponents
recognize that, should he re-
sort to a general election on
the treaty issue, his position
probably would be strengthened
and their own weakened.
On 11 February Kishi re-
portedly agreed with Suehiro
Nishio, head of the new Demo-
cratic Socialist party (DSP),
not to hold an election before
September, providing that party
does not boycott Diet delibera-
ations and voting on the treaty.
Kishi's apparent strategy
is to allow the Socialists
abundant time for objections
and debate in the Diet before
calling on his party's large
majority to ratify the
treaty. He expects a full-scale
Socialist boycott of the Diet
voting, but believes that the
ample opportunity for dissent
given to them and the DSP's
participation in the voting
should assuage the frequent con-
tention among the Japanese that
the government uses its majority
in a tyrannical fashion.
Diet deliberations on the
treaty have been suspended at
least until 10 March, pending
action on the national budget.
Subsequently, Socialist obstruc-
tionism can be expected to con-
tinue, but Kishi is confident
that he can overcome it and
obtain ratification of the
treaty without change by the
end of the Diet session on
26 May.
Political activity will
increase in Cameroun now that
Prime Minister Ahidjo has set
10 April as the date for
legislative elections which
will determine the character
of the government to succeed
the present transitional regime.
Ahidjo's announcement came three
days after the endorsement by
national referendum of his gov-
ernment's proposed constitution
for Cameroun, which gained its
independence on 1 January. This
constitution, like its French
model, provides for a powerful
presidency--probably the goal
of Ahidjo--a government headed
by a prime minister, and a
legislature with limited powers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The balloting on the con-
stitution was the first test
of the political strength of
the present moderate government.
The results--an over-all af-
firmative majority of 60 per-
cent but a majority of negative
votes in the more advanced
southern area--reflect the
basic regional cleavage in this
former French trust territory.
However, the participa-
tion of a record 75 percent of
registered voters was a victory
of sorts for Ahidjo, a Moslem
from the north, in that it re-
vealed the lack of significant
popular support for his chief
foe, Felix Moumie, leader of
the terrorist wing of the mili-
tant nationalist Union of the
Cameroons Population (UPC).
Moumie and his associates,
whose principal headquarters
have recently been in Guinea,
had called for a boycott of
the referendum. Having failed
in his bid, Moumie later pub-
licly called for total amnesty
for-the UPC, withdrawal of all
foreign troops, and the freeing
of all political detainees. In
exchange, the extremists would
end terrorism, refrain from
proclaiming a "revolutionary
Cameroun government," and
would participate in delayed
general elections.
Encouraged by Moumie's
failure,Ahidjo has lifted the
ban imposed by the French on
the Marxist-oriented UPC in
1955 after it first resorted
to major violence. This con-
ciliatory move, aimed at pro-
moting a reconciliation among
Cameroun's diverse political
elements in advance of the April
election, has been well re-
ceived.
Chief beneficiaries of the
UPC's restoration will almost
certainly be its more moderate
adherents; they have provided
the backbone of the constitu-
tional opposition to the gov-
ernment since they returned,
under other labels, to legal
political activity last year.
These elements are expected to
convene an early party congress
to formalize their break with
Moumie, and can be expected to
make a major effort to demon-
strate the validity of their
claim to the party name and
to make the UPC once again the
most effective political organ-
ization in the country. Ahidjo's
action may presage a move on
his part to bring the UPC and
other more representative south-
ern elements into the govern-
ment, possibly even before the
April election.
As part of its pre-election
preparations, the government
has also undertaken--with the
aid of reinforced French Army
forces serving at the request
of the Cameroun Government--a
new military effort in the
southwestern area,where Moumie's
followers and other dissident
elements are in open rebellion.
British officials are supporting
these operations by tightening
border controls on their side of
Cameroun's frontier with British
Cameroons. The operations, be-
gun on 15 February under French
direction, are apparently having
some success.
MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
The earthquakes and tidal
wave which claimed nearly
6,000 lives in the southern
Moroccan coastal city of'Agadir
on 29 February and 1 March ap-
parently have delayed the pend-
ing cabinet reorganization.
King Mohamed V, who usually
PART II
moves with caution, was earlier
reported to have accepted the
resignation of Premier Abdallah
Ibrahim and to be about to name
Si Mohamed M'Uarek Bekkai to
head a caretaker government
Which would serve until after
local elections. The elections,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SKRY
the first. to be held in Mo-
rocco, should provide more re-
liable information on the dis-
tribution of party strength
throughout the country.
Bekkai, who headed the
first two Moroccan governments
from December 1955 until May
1958, is a member of the Beni
Snassen tribe of eastern Moroc-
co and of the rural-based Popu-
lar Movement. He has long been
closely associated with the
King, and is a capable but un-
dynamic administrator. Other
anticipated changes are the
replacement of most, if not
all, left-wing supporters of
Ibrahim by members of the Is-
tiqlal party, which had re-
fused to participate in the
Ibrahim government formed as
a caretaker regime in December
1958.
Ibrahim and to some extent
the King are caught in the cross
fire between left- and right-
wing groups. Ibrahim is sup-
ported by the leftist National
Union of Popular Forces (UNFP)
formed in September following
a schism in the Istiglal party.
The UNFP--proponent of a con-
stitutionally limited monarchy
--seeks to have the military
and police forces subordinated
to the government rather than to
the King. Ibrahim, whose exact
relationship with the UNFP is
not known, may have jeopardized
his political future by not
defending more vigorously the
position of the UNFP.
Traditional Istigialists,
remembering that leftist,pres-
sure on the military-police
issue brought the fall of the
Balafrej government 15 months
ago, and with an eye to the forth-
coming elections, are sharply
critical of the Ibrahim govern-
ment and seek the complete sup-
pression of the UNFP. Recent
police moves against the UNFP,
coupled with somewhat spurious
claims of the discovery of a
UNVP plot to assassinate the
crown prince, apparently indi-
cate some success in the efforts
of Istiqlal and the prince--al- 25X1
lied at least for the moment on
this target--to cripple the left-
wing organization.
Algerian rebel chief Per-
hat Abbas' 29 February pro-
nouncement on conditions for
a cease-fire has been general-
ly well received in France,
where renewed hope of a settle-
ment based on self-determina-
tion will probably revive specu-
lation on the possibility of
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
early formal meetings. The two
sides remain far apart, how-
ever, on whether discussion
of political guarantees will be
included in cease-fire talks.
be Gaulle plans an immediate
tour of French military
field installations in Al-
geria.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Abbas' 29 February speech
was largely a recitation of
rebel grievances against France,
but reiterated the desire for
a negotiated solution. It at-
tacked any French plan involv-
ing the partition of Algeria
into French and Moslem sectors,
as well as the scheduling of
cantonal elections for this
spring. Although the declara-
tion appeared designed largely
for its propaganda effects, it
reflected the rebels' concern
for their following in Algeria,
and a fear that cantonal elec-
tions could lead to the crea-
tion of a French-sponsored
"Third Force."
The American Embassy in
Tunis observes that the Algeri-
ans appear convinced that they
are on strong ground in insist-
ing on guarantees concerning
their role in an Algerian ref-
erendum, both with respect to
their own followers and inter-
national opinion.
Public opinion in France
increasingly favors a negotiated
rather than a military solution
to the Algerian question, and
rebel declarations are being
discussed more objectively than
heretofore. Most Parisian news-
papers believe Abbas wants a
solution, but several moderate
rightist dailies are critical
of what they see as continuing
rebel pretensions to be th:3 ex-
clusive representatives of Al-
geria. Rumors of negotiations
are reviving, and a rebel emis-
sary is said to be in Paris to
make arrangements for the ar-
rival of an official delegation.
During his 25-28 February
tour of southwestern France,
De Gaulle reaffirmed his policy
of self-determination and in-
sisted that the future of Al-
geria was not a topic for cease-
fire negotiations. He cau-
tioned that the consultations
with all groups--to take place
after the"end of hostilities--
to decide on the political fu-
ture of Algeria would be long-
drawn-out, taking "perhaps
years and years before the
right balance is found."
De Gaulle's current visit
to military field installations
in Algeria is probably designed
to sound out army opinion on
the aftermath of the January
insurrection in Algiers. He
will probably also gauge army
sentiment on moving ahead with
the civilian-administered can-
tonal elections,which have al-
ready been announced for late
May or early June. He is also
reassuring the army that paci-
fication is still a prerequisite.
25X1
CABINET MAKING IN ITALY
While negotiations to re-
place the Segni government are
only in their initial stages,
the outline of Christian Demo-
cratic (CD) strategy is begin-
ning to emerge. As indicated
by the program adopted by the
party's national directorate
on 27 February, the Christian
Democrats appear to be working
toward a coalition with the
Democratic Socialists, and. Re-
publicans, and depending on the
parliamentary abstention of the
Nenni Socialist party.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Premier Segni had indi-
cated his government's adher-
ence to the broad general pro-
gram his party adopted follow-
ing the 1958 elections, but
the Liberals abandoned him on
the charge that he was becoming
oriented to the left and that
his regime failed to implement
the program. The Christian
Democrats' current program bids
for support from the left by
advocating full compliance with
the constitution, many of whose
articles have never become law,
by approving "useful state in-
tervention" in the economy, 25X1
particularly in the energy
field, by endorsing relaxation
of international tension, and
by rejecting the support of neo-
Fascists. Rejection of support
from the Communists is probably
opposed by only a minority within
the Nenni Socialist party.
The Christian Democratic
program's concessions to the
right--endorsement of "absolute
loyalty to the traditional Atlan-
tic and European foreign policy"
and protection of the freedom
of private enterprise--are rel-
Ativelr noncontroversial. An
attempt will probably be made
to allay rightist fears of a
leftward drift by the allocation
of the premiership and certain
other ministries to persons--
such as Senator Piccioni or
former Premiers Scelba or Pella
--acceptable to at least the
moderate right.
It is likely that the Lib-
erals w'il be unimpressed by
these concessions and will join
the Monarchists and neo-Facists
in voting against such a govern-
ment. With Nenni Socialist
party abstention, a center-left
coalition could win a comfor-
table majority unless, as is not
expected, a large number of
Christian Democrats should de-
cide to split away.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
ANGLO-GERMAN
The latent ill feeling
between Britain and West Germany
has been stirred up again. Re-
cent events seem to have largely
nullified the efforts in late
1959 to improve relations--
Chancellor Adenauer's discussions
with Prime Minister Macmillan in
London in November, the agree-
ments between Defense Ministers
:Strauss and Watkinson for in-
creased defense production co-
operation in December, and ex-
pressions of a mutual desire to
resolve the incipient economic
and political rivalries between
the Common Market and the Outer
Seven.
The revelation of Bonn's
moves to obtain training and
logistics facilities in Spain
touched off the most recent
eruption. The British press
immediately protested the by-
passing of NATO, especially since
Bonn's moves involved Franco
`3pain. Foreign Secretary Lloyd
made it clear that London pre-
ferred that such arrangements
be made with a NATO ally, but
in answering a barrage of ques-
tions in Parliament he kept the
government's hands free by re-
fusing to state that Britain
would oppose in the North Atlan-
tic Council any German military
facilities outside the NATO area.
The British criticism,fol-
lowing closely the distorted han-
dlingby London's popular press
of anti-Semitic incidents in
West Germany, in turn raised
German resentment to a postwar
high. The German public resents
particularly the British incli-
nation to cast Germans in the
role of wartime enemies. A high
Bonn Foreign Ministry official
has complained to an American
representative that the opposi-
tion of other NATO powers to the
talks with Spain amounts to
mistrust of Germany and an ap-
parent desire to relegate West
Germany to a "second-class"
status.
Adenauer's attitude toward
London seems more one of distrust.
He feels the British are overly
eager to obtain a compromise in-
terim agreement on Berlin's fu-
ture and sees their laxity in
permitting travel of East Germans
to Britain and their initial
willingness to accept the new
Soviet passes for the military
missions---bearing the name
"German Democratic Republic"?
as further evidences of a tend-
ency to accept the East German
regime.
The Macmillan government
on its part has recently been
stiffening its attitude against
the relaxation of Western
European Union treaty restric-
tions of German armaments
production. In particular it
has been stalling on Bonn's
request to raise displacement
limits on combat ships from
3,000 to 6,000 tons, and a
Foreign Office official has
cited the British reaction to
the German-Spanish talks in
Madrid as likely to increase
the difficulties of granting
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
TRANSPORTATION IN THE SOUTHEAST COASTAL AREA OF CHINA
In the latter part of 1954
Peiping, motivated by strategic
as well as economic considera-
tions, begin construction of a
railroad link between the iso-
lated province of Fukien and
the main Chinese rail net. This
was the beginning of a far-
reaching effort to improve the
Transport in Southeast China
Railroads, selected
operable
-+-under construction
- - projected
ChuchouJ
ONG KONG
OA (UK)
j Lungchi
STATUTE MILES
SECRET
KWAITUNG
logistic position of the armed
forces in the area, to provide
a means of rapidly supplying the
network of fighter airfields
then under construction, and to
give impetus to Rukien's eco-
nomic development. This move
was provoked by the pressure of
the Chinese Nationalist armed
Pa'
Kutien
' TAIWAN
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
forces, which hampered the
coastal shipping on which Fu-
kien had traditionally de-
pended.
The Railway Engineer Corps
of the People's Liberation Army
started work on the 435-mile
Yingtan-Amoy line in October
1954. This line, constructed
through.diff icult terrain
necessitating many expensive
bridges, tunnels, cuts, and
fills, was completed in Decem-
ber 1956. In April 1956 the
Ministry of Railways started
construction on a 130-mile
branch line from Wukeng, near
Nanping, to Foochow; this sec-
tion was completed in Decem-
ber 1958. The'two lines con-
stitute the present rail sys-
tem serving Fukien and give
the province its first really
high-capacity overland connec-
tion with the rest of China.
They already are the most im-
portant form of long-distance
transport in the area.
Yunnan line. Construction is
going on westward from the
minor river port of Chuanchou,
the proposed eastern terminus
of the line, and from Changping.
The roadbed on the latter sec-
tion may be finished as far as
Lungyen. Work is said also to
be under way on a line south
from Lungyen toward Kwangtung.
Finally, a direct coastal rail-
road between Foochow and Amoy
is being surveyed. When all
these lines are completed,the
rail net serving Fukien will
have gained greatly in flexi-
bility, and rail service will
have been brought to within 50
miles of any point in the prov-
ince.
On the basis of what is
known about the present sys-
tem's physical characteristics,
equipment, and operating pro-
cedures, its theoretical
through-operating capability
is 7,300 tons each way per day,
or 5,300,000 tons a year. Con-
siderably less than this is
now is use, however.
A number of additional
lines are being surveyed or
are under construction. The
line to Foochow is being ex-
tended and will eventually
curve northward up the coast
to connect with a pair of
lines being built southeast-
ward from the Chekiang-Hunan
Railroad to the sea. The first
of these, which begins at Chin-
hua, will pass through Wenchow
and then proceed south along
the coast to meet the line
from Foochow. Work was begun
on this line in 1958. The
second, on which work was be-
gun in January 1959,begins at
Yushan, roughly parallels the
first, and will join it around
Patu. These two lines may be
finished next year.
In the southern part of
the province, work is in prog-
ress on the eastern sections
of what will ultimately be
China's "second great lati-
tudinal railway"--the Fukien-
The system does have a
number of important weaknesses,
the most important being the
bottleneck section between
Yingtan and the Wukeng junction,
which limits traffic on the en-
tire line. Then, a combination
of terrain and heavy seasonal
rains from March to September
makes the lines highly suscep-
tible to periodic damage and
interruption.
Highways
Prior to 1949, highways
provided the only and very lim-
ited means of overland movement
in the southeast coastal area.
The Chinese Communists after
they came to power concentrated
first on restoring and renovat-
ing the 2,800 miles of prewar
roads. A program of building
new roads was launched later,
and by the end of 1959 there
were about 4,500 miles of fair-
ly good motor roads in the prov-
ince. In addition, there are
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
2,200 miles of "simple" high-
ways having little or no sur-
facing, few if any bridges, and
little drainage. Peiping re-
classified these as "motor
roads" in 1958, but they are
passable only by jeep and then
only in fair weather.
There are four major high-
way routes serving the area.
The coastal road which links
Wenchow Foochow, Amoy, and
Swatow is of major economic
importance, as it serves one
third of Fukien's population.
It also is of prime military
importance. Under normal op-
erating conditions, it can prob-
ably handle about 1,200 tons
each way per day. A second
route, a section of the old im-
perial post road from Hangchow
to Canton, parallels this one
about 100 miles inland and is
still an important link between
Fukien and adjacent provinces.
It can handle about 850-1,200
tons each way per day, depend-
ing on the section involved.
These two major north-
south routes are crossed by two
major east-west routes. The
more northerly, which connects
Shangjao with Foochow via
Chienou, can handle some 850-
1,000 tons each way per day.
A portion of this route will be
flooded by the Chienchi dam
reservoir, but an alternate
route from Yushan to Foochow
via Pucheng has been built. A
more southerly route, connect-
ing Changting with Lungchi and
Amoy, can handle about 1,000
tons each way per day under
normal conditions. Since the
improvement of the railroads,
Fukien's highways handle large-
ly local traffic.
It is estimated that civil-
ian agencies in Fukien control
some 4,000 vehicles, mostly
trucks. Military units in the
area are believed to have about
7,500 trucks.
Except for the "simple"
highways, Fukien's net is gen-
erally of good quality. The
major roads are limited, all-
weather roads with.. gravel or:
crushed-rock surfacing. Some
roads are not completely
bridged, and this, plus the
existence of a number of one-
way bridges and defiles, has
limited traffic. The chief
weakness, however, is the
mixed-vehicle park and limited
repair facilities, which for
civilian vehicles are confined
to five main depots. Road
maintenance apparently is sat-
isfactory; Fukien was honored
last year as an "advanced high-
way maintenance" province. The
future role of the highways
probably will be as a feeder
to the railway and waterways.
The Chinese Communists have in
fact indicated that the major
highway network is complete,
and that future highway con-
struction will concentrate on
short feeder routes.
Waterways
Fukien has some 9,000
miles of inland waterways,
2,500 miles of which are nav-
igable by modern powered ves-
sels. The Min River and its
tributaries--the Shachi, the
Futanchi, and the Chienchi--form
the principal inland water sys-
tem. Modern powered vessels
can make the run between Foochow
and Nanping, with 100-ton ves-
sels going as far as Shiukow--
about halfway--and 40-ton ves-
sels the rest of the way. Nav-
igational aids permitting both
night and day traffic have been
erected. Cargo movement on the
tributaries is accomplished by
smaller vessels making shorter
runs.
It is believed Fukien's
inland waterways could move
some 20,000,000 tons of cargo
a year. Some three fourths of
this total would be basic com-
modities moved short distances
in small vessels to meet local
needs; the remaining quarter
would be moved longer distances
in more modern powered vessels.
Performance is well below this
level.
Fukien has a long coast-
line, which traditionally has
served as the springboard for
contacts with the rest of China.
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Since 1949 the presence of Chi-
nese Nationalist forces in the
Taiwan Strait area has prevented
Peiping's free use of coastal
shipping. The Chinese Commu-
nists have 400,000 tons of
coastal shipping in powered ves-
sels of 1,000 tons or more. On-
ly a small portion of this fleet
is active in the area. Major
Chinese Communist flag vessels
do not call at Amoy, and the
number which calls at Foochow
is limited. The gap is served
by a few foreign flag vessels--
British and Norwegian for the
most part--and by junks rang-
ing in size from 50 to 200 tons.
The cargo-moving capabil-
ity of coastal traffic is lim-
ited by the cargo-handling
capacities of the principal
ports. It is estimated that
Amoy, the best equipped in this
respect, can handle 7,600 tons
a day; Amoy, however, is the
place where the Chinese Nation-
alist port closure is the most
effective. Wenchow and Swatow,
which receive much cargo for
onward movement to Fukien, have
capacities of 5,600 and 3,000
tons a day, respectively. Foo-
chow can manage only 1,000 tons,
and various minor ports another
several hundred tons a day.
Thus the ports between Wenchow
and Swatow can handle in the
aggregate something on the or-
der of 6,000,000 tons a year.
They probably account for no
more than 2,000,000 tons at
present, divided equally be-
tween modern and primitive
carriers.
General Considerations
The authorities in Com-
munist China have shown them-
selves to be fairly effective
in their control of transport
operations in Fukien, despite
the added burden placed on fa-
cilities there by the military.
On occasions, however, they
have experienced difficulties
in coordinating traffic among
the various types of carriers.
In the latter part of 1958, for
example, when the demands be-
ing put on the transportation
system by the "great leap for-
ward" were at their greatest,
the major transport centers in
Fukien became badly congested.
The response was to establish
what the regime called a "uni-
fied command" to coordinate and
control all modes of transport.
This command may still be func-
tioning. Prior to its estab-
lishment, separate organizations
controlled rail traffic on the
one hand and highway and water-
way traffic on the other.
Timber is the principal
item in all outgoing traffic.
Lesser amounts of agricultural
products, such as tea and fruit,
as well as ores and other raw
materials are also shipped out.
Coal appears to be one of the
main items coming into the area,
along with manufactured goods,
petroleum products, and fertil-
izer. Grain, cement, and other
construction supplies make up an
important part of intraprovince
movements.
The ability of the Chinese
Communists to expand coastal
service once the Chinese Na-
tionalist threat is removed is
obvious. Even without its re-
moval, however, they could
move greatly increased amounts
of cargo if they would give such
movement sufficient priority.
The main ingredient for a sharp
increase would be the provision
of large numbers of shallow-
draft vessels--junks for ex-
ample--which could operate in
coastal waters and offload
without developed port facil-
ities.
It is clear that Peiping
intends to tie Fukien's economy
more closely to that of the
rest of China and plans that
Fukien itself achieve a modest
level of industrialization.
Some measure of the regime's
intentions in this respect may
be found in its plans to erect
a 1,200,000-kilowatt hydroelec-
tric power plant on the Chien-
chi. Construction has already
begun. The first stage of a
200,000-kw.installation near
Kutien is already generating
power. In addition, an iron
and steel plant capable of pro-
ducing 300,000 to 400,000 tons
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of steel a year is being built
at Sanming.
Efforts are also being
made to exploit the province's
iron ore deposits, which,are
more important for their qual-
ity than for their size. Coal
mines are being developed in
an attempt to reduce the de-
pendence of the province on
coal produced elsewhere.
The total transportation
picture in Fukien is steadily
getting better. The transport
net is growing and is increas-
ingly able to depend on more
efficient carriers. Thus rail-
ways and coastal shipping now
carry the bulk of long-distance
cargo movement, :leaving,' the
highways and inland waterways
to take care of short-distance
transport from the primary pro-
ducing areas to the nearest
railroad or port. The net is
becoming flexible, so that when
adverse weather curtails ship-
ments on one route, alternates
are often available for priority
cargoes. This net, plus the ad-
ditions now programed, should be
adequate to meet future economic
demands and provide greatly im-
proved logistic support to the
armed forces in the area.
The Chinese Nationalist
Government during the last
three years has shown increas-
ing concern over relations be-
tween the native Taiwanese and
Chinese mainlanders on Taiwan.
This concern stems partly'
from increasing demands for
political rights by the
Taiwanese, who constitute the
majority of the population,
and partly from the induction
into the armed forces of in-
creasing numbers of Taiwanese,
who cannot Ehare the mainlanders'
desire to return to the
mainland.
Taiwanese-Mainlander Relations
Over-all relations between
the eight million native Tai-
wanese and the two million
mainland-born Chinese remain
cool, and close friendships be-
tween the adult members of the
two groups are rare. Most
Taiwanese have not forgotten
the 1947inassacre which followed
their revolt against the cor-
rupt rule of Governor Chen Yi,
and many--particularly former
landowners--remember Japanese
rule with pleasant nostalgia.
The peasants, however, who
have benefited from land
reform, are more favorably
disposed toward the Nationalist
Government.
The cultural differences
between the Taiwanese and Chi-
nese are sharp. Most mainland-
ers cannot understand the South
Fukienese dialect of the Taiwan-
ese, and the majority of Taiwan-
ese have great difficulty under-
standing the Mandarin speech
used by government officials.
The Taiwanese resent the su-
perior status and privileges
assumed by the mainlanders, many
of whom regard the Taiwanese as
inferior and provincial.
Relations appear to be
gradually improving. Taiwanese
children are being taught the
Mandarin dialect and Chinese
history and culture in govern-
ment schools. At the same time,
many of the children of main-
landers are adopting the out-
look of the Taiwanese. There
is increasing intermarriage,
generally mainlander men mar-
rying Taiwanese women, appar-
ently without loss of status
for either partner.
Taiwanese Political Activity
The Chinese Nationalist
Government is sensitive over
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the small, ineffective emigre
groups in Japan and the Taiwan-
ese students in the United
States who openly agitate for
the independence of Taiwan. It
is even more concerned, how-
ever, over a revival of Tai-
wanese interest in political
activities. The government re-
cently suppressed the Local
Self-Government Study Group,
which was formed in 1957 and
included many prominent Tai-
wanese politicians. The pub-
lic aim of this group was to
further democracy at local and
provincial levels, an objective
to which the Nationalist Gov-
ernment pays lip service. The,
group's actual purpose, how-
ever, was to develop gradually
a Taiwanese opposition party
to work for a self-governing
Taiwan independent of mainland
claims.
the only remaining independent
newspapers fostering political
opposition.
Many Taiwanese leaders
have been openly critical of
government suppression of po-
litical freedom. In a public
attack last year, Li Wan-ch'
a prominent member of the Tai
wan Provincial Assembly, ac-
cused the government of fail-
ing to establish democratic
rule, of restricting civil lib-
erties and personal freedom,
and of discriminating against
Taiwanese in appointments to
public offices, particularly
the exclusion of Taiwanese
from major positions in the
central government. The fact
that a few Taiwanese are mem-
bers of the Legislative Yuan
and on the central committee
of the Kuomintang party has
not appeased the Taiwanese.
Kuomintang agents infil-
trated the organization, and
government red tape blocked re-
quests for a charter. The only
means of organized political
expression now open to polit-
ically articulate independents
is membership in one of the
government-subsidized minority
parties. This is unacceptable
to the independents, who are
considering a boycott of the
local elections of 24 April, but
absence of an effective organ-
ization probably precludes a
successful boycott.
The administration also has
subverted independent newspapers
and magazines. . The press
organ of the local Self-Govern-
ment Study Group, Self-Govern-
ment Research, published-the
speeches o opposition members
of the Taiwan Provincial Assem-
bly. Police seized issues
from the newsstands and sup-
pressed the publication. The
government stifled the opposi-
tion Independence Evening News
by financing the purchase B-ya
Kuomintang stalwart of one-
third control. The virtually
bankrupt Kung Lun Pao, and the
Free China Fortnightly, which
the government endures because
of high-placed influence, are
Almost all of the 80,000
men inducted annually into the
armed forces since 1956 have
been Taiwanese. They now con-
stitute about 32 percent of
the armed forces and approxi-
mately 65 percent of the lower
enlisted grades. Few Taiwanese
become professional soldiers,
as most of them leave after a
two-year term of service, but
increasing numbers probably
will move into the junior of-
ficer ranks.
The government is con-
cerned at the growing propor-
tion of Taiwanese inducted in-
to the services because it
fears that Taiwanese troops,
not having the mainlanders'
drive to return home, lack en-
thusiasm for fighting Commu-
nist China. The government's
fears were allayed when Taiwan-
ese soldiers performed well un-
der fire during the Communist
shelling of Chinmen in 1958.
It now regards Taiwanese sol-
diers as dependable for the
defense of Taiwan and the off-
shore islands and believes
they can be trained for offen-
sive action. On the question
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of defending the offshore is-
lands, however, the government
must continue to consider the
feelings of civilian Taiwanese
who have given only reluctant
public support and have private-
ly voiced opposition.
The regime has set 35 per-
cent as the maximum proportion
of Taiwanese in the armed
forces. Mainland-born youths
will be available to supply
most officer requirements, but
ultimately the government will
have to choose between accept-
ing a higher proportion of
Taiwanese in its armed forces
or reducing the number of mili-
tary personnel. Problems of
age will make it impossible to
retain the mainland veterans
in service, and the army even-
tually will become Taiwanese.
Outlook
Taiwanese leaders are
aware that vigorous political
activity on their part may
generate instability, but they
probably will continue to press
for greater representation and
seek to develop an organiza-
tion into An acceptable and ef-
fective vehicle for the Taiwan-
ese political movement, despite
government harassment.
If liberal mainlander and
Taiwanese leaders can cooperate
in pressing for reforms, par-
ticularly in the Provincial As-
sembly, where political contact
between the two groups is clos-
est, the Nationalist Government
may yield and modify certain
of its military and austerity
policies in favor of the
economic development of Tai-
wan. if, as seems less
likely, the government re-
sponds by adopting increas-
ingly harsh repressive meas-
ures against both Taiwanese
and liberal mainlanders, ten-
sions will rise, and the
present trend toward improved 25X1
relations between the Taiwanese
and mainlanders will be reversed.
EFFECTS OF SPAIN'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM
The success so far of
Spain's economic stabilization
program and the enhancement of
Generalissimo Franco''s inter-
national prestige through a
series of diplomatic visits
have strengthened the regime's
position and discouraged op-
position elements in their ef-
forts to achieve united action.
Production levels are still
low, however, workers are in-
creasingly discontented over
the prospects of greater un-
employment, and influential
cabinet ministers are opposing
some of the program's measures
.for abhieving economic expan-
sion.
Accomplishments
The program which Spain
formally inaugurated with $426,-
000,000 in international fi-
nancial aid on 20 July 1959,
when it won full membership in
the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC),
now has attained the primary
goal of bringing financial sta-
bility. The increase in in-
flation has been drastically
slowed through a retrenchment
in government expenditures,re-
strictions on bank credit,and
an increase in interest rates.
Prices on most commodities,
with some important exceptions
such as food, have been stabi-
lized, and the heretofore
rapid rise in the cost of liv-
ing has been considerably
slowed.
Controls on foreign trade
have been loosened, and Spain's
balance-of-payments position
has improved. For the last five
months of 1959, the country's
surplus of foreign-exchange re-
ceipts was $117,000,000, and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUXIARY
its gold and foreign exchange
position improved by $130,600,-
000. Of the outside financial
aid made available under the
program, the only amount
(N
OVEM
BER 1
956=100)
so
70
60
50
40
30
ZO
0
1
00
90
D
EC MA
R JU
N S
EP DE
C MA
R JU
N S
EP D
EC M
AR JU
N SE
P NI
SPAIN: Cubl - - G INDEX
visits to Spain sometime this
year by Adenauer.,and Economics
Minister Erhard.
The regime is exploiting
these visits, to-
gether with President
Eisenhower's stopover
in Madrid in December
and Castiella's pros-
pective trip to Wash-
ington in March, as
indicating the end
of Spain's long iso-
lation from Western
Europe, its increas-
ingly important role
in international
diplomacy, and its
close ties to the
United States.
1957 " 1958 If 1959
SOURCE: AMERICAN EMBASSY, MADRID
drawn was $74,000,000 in
August.
The OEEC has described
the accomplishments of the
program to date as "an out-
standing success--achieved
much sooner than was expected."
Financial and business circles,
however, complain that "stabili-
zation" has been overemphasized
and too little attention paid
to achieving full employment
and expanded industrial output.
International Prestige
Shortly after the stabili-
zation program started,Spanish
Foreign Minister Castiella be-
gan a series of diplomatic
visits abroad. On his Septem-
ber visit to London, primarily
to meet President Eisenhower,
he conferred with Prime Min-
ister Macmillan and Foreign
Secretary Lloyd, and he stopped
in Paris for consultations with
President de Gaulle and Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville. In
November he met President Luebke,
Chancellor Adenauer, Foreign
Minister Brentano, and other
cabinet members in Bonn and
took part in planning for
Regime Strengthened
The success of
the stabilization program and
Spain's improved international
status have strengthened
Franco's position among his
supporters, particularly the
military, who might be tempted
to replace him in the event of
serious worker unrest. More-
over, improved prospects for
increased military collabora-
tion with other Western Euro-
pean countries will help re-
duce much of the army's dis-
satisfaction over the drastic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
contraction of Spain's mili-
tary position in North Africa.
There probably will also
be a slackening in the modest
progress which non-Communist
left-of-center opposition
groups have apparently been
making in cooperating on an
anti-Franco program. The So
Cialists, Basque Nationalists,
and several other parties re-
portedly accepted late last
September a pact sponsored by
exiled leaders of the Christian
Democratic Left and Socialists.
This agreement called for com-
mon action to hasten Franco's
downfall without creating
chaos, and pledged a provision-
al government to restore civil
liberties and hold elections
to determine Spain's political
future.
The Christian Democratic
right wing, under Jose Maria
Gil Robles, and the Monarch-
ists have rejected this pact.
The Communists, excluded from
participation as a "totali-
tarian force," are trying to
sabotage it by inviting all
opposition groups to join in
planning for a nationwide
peaceful strike and a similar
provisional government.
The ardor of militant op-
positionists for public demon-
strations is likely to be damp-
ened, however, by the rigorous
treatment accorded those ac-
cused of complicity in the un-
successful general strike of
June 1959. Widespread arrests
were made at the time, and se-
vere,pri'son sentences were
meted out by military courts
to several persons--mostly So-
cialists and Communists and
including a former diplomat,
Julio Ceron--on charges of
having instigated "military
rebellion."
The achievement of finan-
cial stability has been attend-
ed by a lag in industrial out-
put, a reduction in hours of
work, and a sharp rise in un-
employment. Uncertainty over
the future of the economy is
making a large sector of the
business community unwilling to
increase investment in indus-
trial plants and machinery.
Some 250,000 persons--3.2 per-
cent of the total labor force
of 7,500,000--are unemployed,
as compared With some 120,000'at
the end of 1958. The overtime
and incentive pay of workers
still on the job has also been
cut. Such developments have
had a disproportionate effect
in Spain, where unusually low
hourly wage rates have been com-
pensated for by long hours of
work and a high degree of job
security. Until the beginning
of the stabilization program,
it was extremely difficult to
dismiss regular employees who
had become surplus.
Unemployment benefits are
available to only a portion of
those workers who have been
laid off or are working part
time. The government's new
unemployment insurance program
limits eligibility to permanent
workers discharged as the re-
sult of employers' financial
difficulties. The extension
of this program 'tot-cover a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reduction in normal working
hours, which was approved by
the cabinet on 19 February,
also excludes temporary em-
ployees.
The OEEC mission which
visited Madrid in December at-
tributed the negative aspects
of the stabilization program
to industry's need to use up
excessive inventories accumu-
lated during the inflationary
period as well as to the un-
certainty of businessmen re-
garding the future. It felt
that the present period of ad-
justment would soon end as in-
ventories are liquidated, and
that demand would then provide
the stimulus for accelerated
output.
Economic expansion is
still dependent, however, on
the govexnment('.s,reediness to
drop conbro Ls,,over,)private in-
vestment ...A :high: official --of
the.Commerce Ministry'tnf;ormed
the-American Embassy on-2-,Feb-
ruary.,that;-there;ks.'major opposi-
tion in,'the cabinet ~to->a further
liberalization of economic pol-
icy. The influential minister
of industry in particular is
opposed to the removal of most
economic controls, as urged by
the commerce and finance min-
isters in line with OEEC rec-
ommendations.
In the absence of a more
general economic improvement in
the next few months,rising labor
unrest might reach serious propor-
tions. In this event,Franco, who
has
not
to
retained maneuverability by
publicly committing himself
the program and has a long
25X1
the program.
record of dropping unpopular
ministers,might quietly drop
WESTERN AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Western nations are seek-
ing to coordinate their capital
exports in order to increase
the effectiveness of free-world
economic aid to less-developed
countries. Although such assist-
ance is estimated to exceed $5
billion annually--considerably
more than the cumulative total
of bloc economic and military
aid from 1954 to date--its ef-
fectiveness in East-West com-
petition is greatly impaired by
lack of coordinated direction
and insufficient long-term fi-
nancing. A meeting of eight cap-
ital-exporting nations beginning
on 9 March in Washington will
consider, among other aspects
of the problem, methods to coor-
dinate financial contributions
for priority assistance to coun-
tries such as India.
Free-World vs. Bloc Aid
The need for improved coor-
dination and longer term financ-
ing of Western aid is emphasized
by the growth of the Communist
bloc's aid program and by pay-
ments imbalances largely attrib-
utable to the disproportionately
large share of the foreign as-
sistance burden carried by the
United States. In the bloc pro-
gram--totaling almost $4 billion
since 1954--purely economic aid
reached a peak in 1959, is ex-
pected to rise still higher in
1960, and is to a large extent
under unified direction.
Free-world economic aid,on
the other hand, is predominantly
directed bilaterally and is aimed
largely at achieving commercial
and investment advantage for
donor countries. About 90 per-
cent of Western Europe's annual
$1 billion foreign development
assistance goes to colonial
territories or to countries with
which the contributing nation is
affiliated in some way. Further-
more, the failure of Western Eu-
ropean nations to provide adequate
longer term financing of their
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capital exports--despite their
sizable monetary reserves--is
an important element in recent
free-world payments imbalances.
It is estimated that about
half the $3.4 billion decline
in the United States' gold stocks
in 1958-59 resulted from payments
to Western Europe of gold and
dollars by less-developed coun-
tries. Substantial proportions
of these means of payment had
been obtained as earnings from
exports to the United States or
in the form of grants or loans
from the United States, the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD), or
the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
Problems of
Coordination
The industrial
nations of the free
world all participate
in the expanding ac-
tivities of the IMF,
the IBRD, and the
IBRD's prospective
affiliate, the Inter-
national Development
Association (IDA).
Their governments gen-
erally agree that they
should contribute a
larger share of the
aid to less-developed
countries and relieve
W
1950 1951
some of the burden now borne by
the United States. However,most
industrial nations have them-
selves only recently been aid
recipients and are preoccupied
with preserving their own eco-
nomic and financial gains. Thus
they hesitate to extend aid on
a scale and on terms appropriate
to their present means.
West Germany, for example,
with its spectacular economic
growth and formidable exchange
reserves, confines its foreign
assistance largely to govern-
ment-guaranteed, private,short-
term credits which promote its
own exports. Last month a
ities in both the Executive Com-
mission and the European Invest-
ment Bank of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) favor glo-
bal development assistance not
tied to exports. However, of-
ficials in EEC member countries,
particularly France, may success-
fully oppose them and, instead,,
direct EEC financial resources
mainly to associated areas in
Africa and to Greece and Turkey.
Britain, the only major
capital exporter among the seven
nations of the European Free
Trade Association, says its aid
resources are fully committed to
Commonwealth development. The
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 15
special committee of the Economics
Ministry recommended substantial
increases in the outflow of longer
term capital to less-developed
countries and outright grants
from the federal budget for spe-
cial development projects. As in
the case of other Western Euro-
pean countries, however, Treasury
and Central Bank officials oppose
expansion of foreign credit; they
consider it potentially infla-
tionary when corresponding tax
increases are not politically
feasible.
Regional economic ties also
restrict the availability of cap-
ital for coordinated free-world
assistance. Responsible author-
GOLD AND FOR HOLDINGS
lug
1959
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
British, moreover, are cool to-
ward participation by Japan in
present efforts to coordinate
free-world aid. London fears
that, with this status, the
Japanese in the future would be
able to oppose existing dis-
crimination against their "low-
wage" exports.
Prospects
The Washington meeting of
finance officials of the United
States, Canada, Britain, France,
West Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Belgium, and the commission of
the European Economic Community
will be the first meeting of the
so-called Development Assistance
Group (DAG). Several such ses-
sic..xs we e planned at the mid-
January meeting in Paris of se-
lected C ],BC countries, the
SLOVAKIA'S AUTONOMY GRADUALLY DISAPPEARING
Slovakia's long-standing
semiautonomous position with-
in the Czechoslovak state has
been weakened by several re-
cent policy decisions in Prague,
the most important of which
was the administrative down-
grading of Slovakia's capital,
Bratislava. The Slovak party
paper is no longer the only
authoritative Communist daily
appearing in Slovakian, and
Bratislava has lost its con-
trol over Slovak-language pub-
lishing houses. These moves
appear to be important steps
toward ending Slovak autonomy
within the next few years.
Slovak Separatism
The people of Slovakia
have always had strong separa-
tist and fierce nationalistic
tendencies which have from
time to time cropped up with-
in the Slovak Communist party
itself. The Slovak populace,
including many elements of the
party, oppose integration into
the Czechoslovak state. Prague
has thus found it necessary to
undertake long and careful
propaganda campaigns justify-
ing each step it has taken
against Slovak autonomy, and
to criticize openly any opposi-
tion to these moves.
SECRET
Executive Commission of the EEC,
and the United States and Canada.
The meeting on 9 March is
likely to make some progress to-
ward the larger group's compre-
hensive goal of more effectively
mobilizing Western resources in
competition with the Communist
bloc. Preliminary agreement may
be reached on measures to bring
the terms of financing Western
European development assistance
closer to the 10- to 15-year
period allowed by the United
States' Export-Import Bank.
Tentative agreement may also be
achieved on establishing a per-
manent aid-coordinating agency
and on the procedure for effect-
ing such coordination for pri-
ority recipients such as that 25X1
now being worked out fpr India
in cooperation with the IBRD.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 March 1960
East Germany
,Pederal
Republic
of
Germany
PRAGUE
(PRAHA)
Slovakia is officially de-
scribed by Prague and Brati-
slava as a "nation" and pos-
sesses party and government
organizations separate from,
but subordinate to, those of
Czechoslovakia. This status
derived from a combination of
historical tradition and Com-
munist political expediency in
the years immediately follow-
ing World War II.
Modern-day Slovakia's
autonomous status had its birth
in the United States at Pitts-
burgh in 1918, when Czech- and
Slovak-Americans met to formu-
late
the principles of
a com-
bined
Czech and Slovak
state.
This
group advocated a
federa-
tion
in which each nation would
have
equal status, including
its own administrative system,
parliament, and courts, as well
as recognition of its own lan-
guage. When the Czechoslovak
state actually came into exist-
ence, however, the central
government in Prague had more
centralized powers than those
outlined in the Pittsburgh
agreement, and Slovak adminis-
trative offices and education-
al institutions were staffed
with over 9,000 Czechs.
P o l a n d
H u n g a r y
Repo. (0biptl boundary
KOSICE
O
This action by Prague
gave rise to a political move-
ment of strong separatist per-
suasion, the Slovak Populist
party, led by Andrew Hlinka.
The party championed the Pitts-
burgh principles of autonomy,
even at the cost of destroying
the Czechoslovak state. The
Populists gained increasing
numbers of sympathizers and ad-
herents as Prague persecuted
their leaders and procrasti-
nated on promises of greater
autonomy. As this dispute
sharpened through the 1930s,
Hitler's pressures on Czecho-
slovakia grew to major propor-
tions, culminating in the Munich
conference of 1938.
Immediately following
Munich, six Slovak political
parties joined in declaring
full autonomy, and their de-
mands were met by Prague. In
1939 the independent Slovak
state was created under Hitler's
aegis, and existed--at his suf-
ferance--until 1944.
During the Slovak uprising
against the Germans in 1944, a
Slovak National Council was
constituted as an ad hoc parlia-
mentary body that administered
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the area until the Czechoslovak
nation, supported by Moscow
and the Allies, could get on
its feet after the war. This
Slovak National Council spoke
for Slovakia at the formative
Kosice meeting in April 1945
which adopted a national-front
program for Czechoslovakia's
first government after World
War II.
At this time the Czecho-
slovak Communists split into
two parties: Slovak and Czecho-
slovak. The major effect of
this was to gain for the Com-
munists 'twice the number
of cabinet posts held by any
other party in the newly
formed central government. As
the national-front government
began to centralize control,
the Communist parties became
proponents of Slovak autonomy;
this helped them gain signif-
icant popular support in Slo-
vakia and consequently to gar-
ner enough votes to gain polit-
ical strength for the 1948
coup.
After the Communist coup,
Slovakia was given autonomy,
but more in form than substances
leaving the Slovak populace
and many Slovak Communist par-
ty members bitterly disap-
pointed. Prague then was faced
with the problem of a Slovak
Communist party heavily infil-
trated with separatists--a
problem which Prague has strug-
gled with ever since. The
facade of Slovak autonomy that
has been preserved to date tes-
tifies to the continuing
strength of separatist feeling
among Slovaks. Prague has been
unable to break down these
separatist and nationalistic
sentiments, despite numerous purges
and an ambitious industrial-
ization program designed in
part to extend Prague's con-
trol in Slovakia.
The Erosion of Autonomy
Bratislava received equal
rank with Prague in the admin-
istrative setup created in 1948.
Both cities were given the
status of a region--the largest
geographic-administrative di--
vision in the country--and no
other cities shared this rank,
The January 1960 plenum of the
central committee of the Czecho-
slovak party, however, announced
details of a reorganization of
the territorial administration
of the country which is to be
carried out this year. Under
this new system, the city of
Bratislava has been downgraded
to a district, the second larg-
est division of the country,
while the city of Prague retains
a rank equal to that of a region.
Three other cities in the Czech
lands have been given rank
equal to Bratislava.
On 1 January, the Czecho-
slovak Communist party daily,
Rude Pravo, began to publish
a special Slovak edition in
Bratislava with Slovak party
affairs as one of its special
features. Formerly the Slovak
party paper Bratislava Pravda,
which' is still being publi
stood alone as the authoritative
press voice on Slovak party
affairs.
In addition, the Slovak
and Czech publishing associa-
tions--the two trusts control-
ling individual publishing
houses--have been merged into
one central organization lo-
cated in Prague, according to
a Bratislava radio announcement
on 9 January. Thus Prague has
seized complete control over
the vast bulk of published
material for Slovakia.
Prospects
These developments sug-
gest that Prague believes that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the full integration of Slo-
vakia is possible fairly soon.
The gradual erosion of Slovak
autonomy will be furthered both
by the recent party campaign
to perfect "democratic central-
ism" and by the construction
in Slovakia of an ever-growing
number of industrial enterprises
controlled from Prague, Prague
has always moved cautiously,
SECRET
pressing the population at the
maximum pace consistent with
domestic peace, and it can be
expected to act in this manner
on the question of Slovak inte-
gration. Barring a miscalcula-
tion, Prague will probably
succeed in the next few years
in wiping out all visible ves-
tiges of Slovak autonomy.
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