CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002600070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO. 56
OCI NO. 0406/60
25 February 1960
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL'
State Department review completed
D',-'CLAS$IF!ER 25X1
CLA33. CHANGED TO: TS S
/99D
p4 XT nizviEw DATE; 7tf~
AUT,H: HR 70-2
PATE: /" REVIEWER:
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Moscow, seeking to keep
its own Berlin proposals in
the public eye while Western
leaders are drafting and con-
certing positions for the sum-
mit talks in May, on 19 Feb-
ruary made public a memorandum
sent to the West German Social
Democratic party (SPD) on 13
January. Using statements by
West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt
as the pretext for clarifying
the Soviet position, the mem-
orandum sets out in detail the
Soviet proposal to sign a Ger-
man peace treaty and transform
West Berlin into a free city.
The memo appears designed
to re-emphasize for the West
the possible "consequences" of
a separate peace treaty between
the USSR and East Germany and
to enhance the attractiveness
of an interim Berlin solution
as an alternative. It warns
that the Soviet Union would
proceed with a separate treaty
"should it prove impossible"
to settle the issue by negotia-
tions,and that such action
would be irrevocable.
flexibility. Although adhering
to the basic formula for a free
city, the memo suggests Moscow's
willingness to consider counter-
proposals which could lead to a
solution more acceptable to the
West. In an attempt to exploit
Mayor Brandt's numerous state-
ments that the economic ties
between Bonn and Berlin were as
important as the political
bonds,the memo acknowledges
that "in practice, West Berlin's
ties with the Federal Republic
will be closer than with any
other country."
While warning that conclu-
sion of a separate treaty would
leave the West to deal directly
with the East German regimg,the
memo also notes that a modus
vivendi might be found to over-
come the "difficulties" which
might result from the Western
powers' lack of relations with
the East Germans.
The memo also states that
the establishment of a free
city might be approached by
stages. This presumably re-
fers to the proposals advanced
by Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko on 10 June at the Ge-
neva foreign ministers' con-
ference.when he offered to
agree to a provisional status
for West Berlin for a speci-
fied time period on condition
that the two German states es-
tablish an all-German committee
to discuss a peace treaty.
Moscow probably hoped that
the delivery of the memo on 13
January would drive a wedge be-
tween Mayor Brandt and his.
SPA colleagues,: and 'that.
The memorandum points out
that the access routes to Ber-
lin would come under the "full
sovereignty" of East Germany,
and that "any uncontrolled com-
munications" between West Ber-
lin and West Germany would cease.
The Soviet Union, it says,would
carry out its commitments to
the East Germans as an ally and
provide "all necessary support"
to defend East German "sovereign-
ty."
This blunt language is off-
set by a number of hints of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
this pressure, coupled with an
implied offer to consider
counterproposals, would compel
the SPD to take a more flexible
public stand. The display of
interparty unity during the 10
February Bundestag debate on
foreign policy probably prompt-
ed Moscow to try to underscore
publicly the consequences of
Western refusal to consider
the Soviet proposals.
As in the memo,an Izvestia
article on 18 February present
the free-city concept as a con-
cession, claiming that the oc-
cupation of West Berlin is out-
dated and "contrary to interna-
tional law." The article as-
serts Berlin is legally part of
East Germany and should be made
such on a de facto basis; but
that the USSR has offered to
create a free city in an effort
to meet the Western powers' re-
fusal to act "as required" by
international law.
Bloc View of President's Trip
Peiping and Moscow are
giving President Eisenhower's
Latin American visit the same
divergent propaganda treatment
accorded his December trip to
Asia. The Chinese are openly
hostile. People's Daily on 23
February bitterly c aid that
the United States is a "savage
aggressor" and that President
Eisenhower "is no friend of the
Latin American people." Blaming
him for the overthrow of the
"democratic" government of
Guatemala in 1954, the paper
warned that "American imperial-
ism" is increasing its interven-
tion in Havana in order to sub-
vert the Cuban revolution and
impede the anti-US struggle in
Latin America.
Moscow has given the trip
relatively factual coverage,
but has used excerpts from the
foreign press to imply that the
tour is intended to "soften the
anti-American sentiment" in the
area. A domestic broadcast on
22 February reported the Presi-
dent's television broadcast and
quoted him on the purposes of
the trip. This was offset by
comments purportedly taken from
a Senate report on Latin America
which Moscow claims is critical
of US policy, which is motivated
by "egoism" and the "desire to
increase profits." The Ameri-
can press is quoted as claim-
ing that the President is not
taking "any concrete proposals"
which would help Latin Americans.
The Soviet delegation at
Geneva has maintained its strong
stand against a limited nuclear
test ban treaty. Chief Soviet
delegate Tsarapkin told Ambas-
sador Wadsworth privately on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
17 February that nothing less
than total test suspension
would be agreeable to Moscow.
At the same time, he assured
the American chief delegate
that the USSR would not be
the first to break off the
conference, "no matter how
dim the prospects" for agree-
ment.
In an effort to support
the Soviet contention that
small underground tests cannot
be separated from other test-
ing, Tsarapkin warned that, if
the United States resumed its
program, the USSR would follow
with "testing in every environ-
ment it chose." This probably
was intended primarily as a
warning that if the United
States resumes testing,no mat-
ter how'limited the basis, it
will bear the onus for the re-
sumption by the USSR of its
testing program, which might
include even atmospheric ex-
periments. Despite his assur-
ance to Wadsworth, Tsarapkin's
threat was probably also meant
to raise the possibility that
a resumption of testing could
lead to a termination of the
negotiations.
The Soviet delegate indi-
cated that Moscow might be will-
ing to go beyond a provision of
its 16 February proposal--
based on a suggestion by the
British delegate in January--
for joint research to develop
agreement on precisely what
instrument readings would give
any party to the treaty the
right to insist on an immediate
on-site inspection. The Soviet
leaders may plan to expand
their proposal to include West-
ern suggestions for joint ex-
perimentation to improve methods
and instrumentation for detect-
ing underground explosions.
Thus far, Moscow has repeated-
ly rejected the possibility of
including supervised under-
ground nuclear explosions in
any research program.
In the plenary sessions,
the Soviet delegate, has con-
tinued to avoid committing the
USSR to an exact number of an-
nual on-site inspections, as-
serting that the West must first
agree in principle to the 16
February Soviet plan which tied
acceptance of "temporary" stand-
ards for sending out inspection
teams to Western acceptance of
Khrushchev's proposal for a
fixed number of such inspections
each year. He also refused to
set forth Moscow's position on
the course of action to be taken
should the proposed two- to
three-year period for research
and development fail to produce
agreement on improved criteria
for sending out inspection teams.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Egyptian troop movements
late last week into the Sinai
Peninsula raised total UAR
strength there to about
34,000 men, including the en-
tire Fourth Armored Division.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February. 1960
Despite Cairo's fears,
there is still no evidence in-
dicating Israeli preparations
for large-scale action.
UAR anxiety may also be
attributable to reports of im-
pending trouble in Iraq, pos-
sibly requiring UAR involvement.
A coup against Qasim, with
Cairo's intervention, would
probably draw a reaction from
Israel, and the UAR troop move-
ments may be designed to meet
such a contingency.
Nasir in Syria
The Israeli border "crisis"
has conveniently provided ma-
terial for Nasir's speeches in
Syria, where he has made a barn-
storming effort to whip up the
Syrians' lagging enthusiasm for
their union with Egypt. Along
with the Israeli threat, Nasir
has castigated Communism, im-
perialism, and Qasim as "enemies
of Arab nationalism," working
and waiting for an end to the
union.
Soviet officials, who had
expressed satisfaction with So-
viet-UAR relations following
conclusion of the Aswan High
Dam contract last month, now
are probably miffed that Nasir's
anti-Communism has not been in-
hibited by the agreement.
Throughout his sojourn,
which began on 14 February, Nasir
has repeatedly attacked Qasim,
usually in the banter of which
he is a master. Crowd response
reportedly has been enthusiastic.
Although the lasting effect of
his campaign to inoculate the
Syrians against Qasim cannot be
measured, Nasir has probably
done much to undercut Iraqi
propaganda efforts to stir up
Syrian resentment against his
regime.
During Nasir's tour of
Syria, the Baghdad radio and
press have attacked him for
"one-man rule" and for being an
enemy of free political life,
as well as for betraying the
cause of the Palestinian refu-
gees. Nasir also is charged
with looking at Iraq's oil
riches with covetous eyes and
with creating a "forged social-
ism" in Egypt. Qasim is por-
trayed by Baghdad radio as as-
piring to become the savior of
the Nasir-oppressed Syrian peo-
ple.
Iraq
Following Qasim's dismissal
of pro-Communist Minister of
Agrarian Reform Ibrahim Kubba
last week, Qasim has delivered
two telling blows to the as-
pirations of the Moscow-favored
Iraqi Communists. The first of
these was on 23 February when,
in a speech to the Communist-
dominated Iraqi Teachers' Asso-
ciation, Qasim abruptly announced
the abolition of the "Iraqi Parti-
sans of Peace," an affiliate
of the Communist-run World Peace
Council. The Peace Partisans
have a long history as Iraq's
principal Communist front.
The next day the "ortho-
dox" Communists' second appli-
cation for political status
was refused on grounds that
the Qasim-backed splinter
group, led by Daud Sayigh,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
which was legalized on 10 Feb-
ruary as the "Communist Party
of Iraq," sufficiently repre-
sented the Communist viewpoint.
While this group may technical-
ly appeal its case to the
courts, ijn reality it has
little choice but to go under-
ground, unless it is able
to find an outlet for legal po-
litical activity through a
front party. Its members might
attempt to infiltrate and take
over the Sayigh group.
The abolition of the Peace
Partisans is a severe blow to
the Communists, since as late
as last summer the Qasim re-
gime provided them with funds
and supported their demonstra-
tions. A demonstration by this
group in Mosul last spring
sparked the revolt there by
anti-Qasim and anti-Communist
army elements.
Military Governor Abdi in-
formed an American official on
18 February following the dis-
missal of the pro-Communist
minister of agrarian reform that
two more cabinet members may
be dropped. Likely candidates
are Minister of Planning and
Acting Minister of Oil Af-
fairs Shaybani, an extreme
leftist, and the female Min-
ister of Municjpalities Nadia
Dulaymi, a leader of the
Peace Partisans.
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FALLS
The resignation of Italian
Premier Segni on 24 February
increases the pressure on the
Christian Democratic party to
decide whether to form a right-
ist government with heo-Fascists
and Monarchists, as was formed
in Sicily on 23 February, or a
center-left government with
Nenni Socialist support, as
urged by left-wing Christian
Democrats. Another stopgap)
minority government could re-
sult, and,in any case, negotia-
tions will probkbly be protract-
ed.
With the withdrawal of
Liberal party support from his'
all-- Christian Democratic cab-
25X1
25X1
it, Segni decided to resign
rather than face nationwide
spring elections while' relying for
support solely on the parties
of the extreme right--the neo-.
Fascists and Monarchists. Lib-
eral party leaders attributed
their action to reluctance of
their predominantlY.conservative
followers to continue parliamen-
tary support--without any repre-
sentation in the cabinet--of a
government "dominated by a de-
sire" to collaborate with the
Nenni Socialists. They object-
ed also to certain pending
legislation and to the initia-
tive which the Christian Demo-
crats have permitted President
Gronchi regarding foreign policy.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
The recent formation of a
Sicilian government of Chris-
tian Democrats and rightists,
including neo-Fascists, bears
on the national crisis. The
national Christian Democratic
directorate implicitly approved
the new coalition, reversing
the position it had taken in
the fall, when it urged Sicil-
ian Christian Demo-
crats to form a gov-
ernment with the Nen-
ni Socialists in or-
der to isolate the
Communists. The Com-
munists were exploit-
ing their associa-
tion with the Milazzo
government to build
up their grass-roots
strength.
or abstention to accomplish
needed reforms and undercut
the Communists.
The Nenni Socialists, fol-
lowed by the Communists, have offered
to support a government free
from rightist associations.
The Christian Democratic
right-wing fears such a govern-
ITALIAN PARLIAMENT
UNITED MOVEMENT OF
SOCIALIST INITIATIVE- 5
(MUIS)
The left-wing 001063
Christian Democrats,
along with the Re-
publicans and Social Democrats,
oppose any application of the
new rightist Sicilian formula
at the national level. They
believe it would raise the
danger of an authoritarian cab-
inet under strong Fascist in-
fluence, which in turn would
lead to a Communist voice in
parliament as center-left
forces react by moving toward
the far left. They refuse to
revive the old center coali-
tion including Democratic So
cialists, Republicans, and Lib-
erals, believing that the only
viable government would have to
include Social Democrats and
Republicans and depend on Nenni
Socialist parliamentary support
:s i[MUARY is60
ment would accomplish domestic
reforms they oppose. They as-
sert that it would also weaken
Italy's pro-Western foreign
.policy. Rightist leaders may
feel that disunity in the
Christian Democratic left would
make opportune formation of a
Nenni-supported government which
would quickly founder and be fol-
lowed by a more rightist formula.
Meanwhile, if the crisis
is protracted, pressure will de-
velop for postponement of the
local elections, which the right
would like to delay. National
elections, not due until 1963,
might be advanced, but hardly to
any date earlier than the spring
of 1961.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
NOTES.;AND COMMENTS
Khrushchev's public recep-
tion during his Indonesian tour
has not been markedly enthusi-
astic except in Jogjakarta,
where university students wildly
applauded him, and in the Commu-
nist stronghold of Surabaya,
where he addressed an enthusi-
astic mass rally. Elsewhere,
despite the fact that the gov-
ernment and business employees
had been dismissed to assure a
large turnout, only medium-
sizfd crowds greeted him, end,
in the American Embassy's opin-
iop, it is doubtful whether the
populace is very interested.
Khrushchev has been some-
what irritable, as he was in
India and in Burma. He has
been less adroit than usual,
with some of his statements and
actions bordering on rudeness.
His casual habits, his lateness
for appointments, and his disre-
gard for the usual diplomatic
amenities have irritated Presi-
dent Sukarno.
Khrushchev's invidious com-
parison of Indonesian natural
rubberwith Soviet-produced s,yn'i::..)
thetic rubber obviously nettled
Sukarno. Khrushchev belittled
the artistic merits of Indo-
nesian handicrafts being offered
him by Sukarno." While Sukarno's
two daughters were dancing for
Khrushchev'at a dinner in the
palace, Khrushchev turned aside
to an aide, who gave him a ten-
minute summary of a cable.
Khrushchev's behavior may
have been the cause of the can-
cellation of two events, a
scheduled speech to a youth con-
gress in B*Aiid -g, called off "for
security reasons," and-the
planned award of a doctorate by
Gadja Mada University. In a
speech in Surabaya, Sukarno
denied that Communists were
devils and, pointing to Khru
shchev, he said, "Look at him here
before you. He is not tall. He
is a little fat. He is quite
simple...
Khrushchev has avoided any
action which could be interpret-
ed as support for Peiping in
the dispute over Djakarta's
treatment of Overseas Chinese.
He has gone so far as to ignore
completely the Chinese Communist
ambassador d?ring.a state affair.
He reportedly told Indonesian
officials to "do what you think
is right and don't worry."
Economic aid to Indonesia
is probably the main topic of
the talks between Sukarno and
Khrushchev which began in Bali
on 23 February and which may be
resumed in Bogor. The Soviet
leader probably will encourage
more rapid implementation of
Moscow's existing aid program to
Indonesia. Progress on the proj-
ects under the Soviet $100,-
000,000 aid credit of 1958 has
thus far been slow, and only
about $27,000,000 has actually
been drawn.
Khrushchev may be willing
to supply additional bloc arms
by offering to renegotiate the
1958 arms agreements, which
Indonesia concluded with Poland
and Czechoslovakia, probably
under Moscow's sponsorship. Under
those agreements, totaling $175,-
000,000, Indonesia did not re-
ceive the discounts normally
extended by the bloc to arms
purchasers. The inclusion in
Khrushchev's party of Yeemelyanov,,
chairman of the Soviet Atomic
Energy Committee for Peaceful
Purposes, may foreshadow some
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25 February 1960
token agreement on atomic as-
sistance for Indonesia which
was specified under the original
$100,000,000 Soviet line of
credit.
Indonesian Army leaders and
non-Communist civilian govern-
ment elements are hopeful that
the apparent lack of rapport
between Sukarno and Khrushchev
will obviate any large-scale
"deal" between the two.F
Indonesian cabinet changes
announced on 23 February involved
no change in the government's
present non-Communist complexion.
Changes consist merely of upgrad-
ing to inner-cabinet status.eight
former junior ministers, all of
whom retain their present port-
folios, and the creation of a new
inner-cabinet post, that of legal
adviser to the President. The
Defense Ministry, now called the
Ministry of National Security, is
still headed by Army Chief of
Staff General Nasution, who ap-
pears to retain all the functions
of his former office.
SOVIET BLOC AID FOR INDIA
During Khrushchev's stay
in India, an agreement was
signed setting forth uses to
which the USSR's $375,000*,000
credit will be put during India's
Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66).
Most of it will be used to en-
large projects being constructed
under earlier Soviet credits.
No new aid was announced during
Khrushchev's visit.
Total bloc credits thus
far extended for Indian develop-
ment amount to $775,000,000.
Of this total about $550,000,000
--$490,000,000 of it from the
USSR--is available for use dur-
ing the Third Five-Year Plan.
To gain the maximum propa-
ganda benefit from its credit
programs, the Soviet Union
carried out an elaborate series
of announcements which often
magnify the actual value of the
aid. At present, with the begin-
ing of India's next plan period
more than a year away and with
large credits still unused,
Moscow probably sees no need to
add to its already heavy commit-
ments, and new assistance offers
may be held back until present
projects are further developed.
Although the bloc has al-
ready staked out a large share
for itself in Indian develop-
ment plans for the next decade,
almost exclusively in the gov-
ernment-owned sector, credits
used so far total less than
$200,000,000. The Bhilai steel
plant is the only bloc-assisted
project in production, and -only
a few others have passed from
the planning and survey stage
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25 February 1960
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
Coal field
Oil drilling
Oil refinery
Power plant
Foundry forge
Mechanized farm
Optical glass plant
Technological institute
Mining machinery plant
Industrial design institute
Heavy machine building plant
Heavy electrical machinery plant
90955
Major Bloc Aid Projects in India
Bon; nl Baa
BIWnPI~ har
R.nchi?
B es
iah.p.t
Madhya PradeshK-b..*
"yq?~r1
. BhiW;# i
to actual construction. In
spite of its relatively small
size as compared with total
Western aid, the Soviet program
in India has won wide praise
and influence both through
skillful promotion and through
the concentration of projects
in the sectors of primary im-
portance to Indian industriali-
zation.
Soviet projects include
iron and steel production, pe-
troleum exploration and refin-
ing, coal mining, production of
heavy machinery, and
a variety of light
industrial projects.
Poland recently
joined the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, and
Rumania in the bloc's
Indian program by of-
fering a $31,500,000
PAKISTAN/
lrir _
BURMA
credit for.the construction and
equipment of various small in-
dustrial enterprises during the
Third Five-Year Plan. In addi-
tion to formal aid agreements ,
all the European satellites and
the USSR have trade agreements
with` India which in effect grant
short-term credits by allowing
repayments for industrial ex-
ports in nonconvertible rupees
to be used for the purchase of
Indian goods.
The first and most spec-
tacular Soviet project undertaken
Soviet-built steel plant at Bhilai, India.
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25 FEBRUARY 1960
CHINA
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25 February 1960
in India, the Bhilai steel com-
plex, has been producing pig
iron for one year and began
producing steel last October.
The final work on the first
stage of the plant is expected
The attack on a routine
Chinese Nationalist patrol by
Communist jet fighters over the
Taiwan Strait near the mainland
on 16 February reflects an in-
crease in Chinese Communist
confidence since the fall of
1958,. when Communist pilots suf-
fered'heavy losses at the hands
of the more experienced Chinese
Nationalists.
to be finished this year.
During the'Third Five-Year Plan
its annual capacity is to be
increased from,l 0 0 000 to
2,590,000 tons.
(Prepared by OR
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Expanding semiofficial
contacts between the Scandina-
vian countries and East Germany
in a number of fields, partic-
ularly transportation, are
disturbing Bonn and other West-
ern governments, which feel
that the international standing
of the East German regime will
thus be enhanced.
Bonn is particularly con-
cerned about the increasing
frequency of direct charter
flights of the Scandinavian
Airlines System (SAS) between
points in the West and Schoene-
feld airfield outside East
Berlin. It believes these are
no longer "practical commercial
ventures between airlines," as
argued by the Danes and the
Norwegians, but in reality
government agreements.
There is also evidence
that Interflug,; a subsidiary
of the East German Lufthansa,
wants to start regular flights
between Schoenefeld and the
Scandinavian capitals. In the
past year, Interflug made spe-
cial flights to Copenhagen
during the Leipzig spring and
fall fairs, and now has gained
approval for flights from Leipzig
to Stockholm.
Last year, moreover, repre-
sentatives of both the Danish
and Swedish state railways held
talks with East German officials
on steps to facilitate travel
by rail, highway, and ferry be-
tween their countries. In con-
juction with these talks, the
East Germans reportedly also
pressed for the establishment
of travel offices in the Scan-
dinavian capitals with the
hope of having these offices
eventually issue visas.. While
there have been no reports of
Scandinavian concurrence, the
Danes are permitting nationals
of East Germany to visit Den-
mark without obtaining clear-
ance from the Allied Travel
Office in West Berlin.
East Germany?s campaign
for eventual diplomatic recog-
nition also tries to exploit
established trade ties with the
three Scandinavian countries,
even though none of the commer-
cial agreements is at a govern-
ment level. The campaign is
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access to West Germany, submitted
to East German controls.
25 February 1960
being pushed with the aid of
ambitious industrial and trade
fairs, increased tourism, ex-
tensive information programs,
and propaganda attempts to
arouse latent suspicions con-
cerning West Germany. Next sum-
mer, an East German cruise
ship carrying vacationing work-
ers will call at Scandinavian
ports, enabling it to show the
regime's' flag and publicize
The MLMs have not had the
same access rights as the Allied
garrisons in Berlin,which are
NEW RESTRICTION ON WESTERN MISSIONS IN EAST GERMANY
Moscow has taken one more
step to force the Western
powers implicitly to recognize
the East German regime. A new
Soviet map delineating restrict-
ed areas in East Germany--re-
ceived on 27 January
by the Western mili-
tary liaison missions
(MLMs) accredited to
the Soviet forces--
leaves open to the mis-
sions only two check-
points on the West
German border, both
manned only by East
German border police.
The Soviet checkpoint
at Marienborn on the
main access route to
Berlin now is denied
them.
The two check-
points for MLM use are
at Selmsdorf, in the
north on the coastal
highway between Lue-
beck in West Germany
and Rostock on the
East German coast,
and at Wartha in the
southwest on the
autobahn to Frankfurt.
Restriction to these
two checkpoints would
not seriously affect
the operation of the
MLMs, but a principle
would be sacrificed
if the missions, other-
wise denied surface
PART II
w
~
DENMARK
East Germany's "socialist achieve-
ments."
Official and public opinion
in Scandinavia remains opposed
to diplomatic recognition of
East Germany, but such opposition
may gradually diminish as these
various "practical" contacts in-
crease and existing economic and
cultural relations are broadened.
GERMANY \
MarienbornHannover ?(checkpoint closed
suhi
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L r-3
A Checkpoints on the East-West German
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Border open to MLMs
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SIIARY
25 February 1960
specifically allowed to use the
Helmstedt autobahn under Soviet
rather than East German control.
The agreement of 5 April 1947
establishing the MLMs provides
that "couriers and messengers
will be given facilities for
free travel between the head-
quarters of the mission and
headquarters of their respective
commanders in chief" and "will
enjoy the same immunity which
is extended to diplomatic cour-
iers." This agreement does not
specifically preclude East Ger-
man authority over these "cour-
iers" at checkpoints as long
as the diplomatic immunity is
respected, nor does it specify
Helmstedt as one access route.
Although this new Soviet
move is not of itself a chal-
lenge to Allied rights of access
to Berlin, acceptance of East
German controls in this case
could be cited as a precedent
by the USSR in any subsequent
move to impose East German au-
thority on the access route to
Berlin.
The missions for the time
being, under instructions from
their own governments, have sus-
pended all travel to avoid use
of the new Soviet passes with
wording which implies recogni-
tion of East Germany.
Hungary's latest collec-
tivization drive, which began
shortly before the party con-
gress last December, was ended
formally on 12 February by a
plenum of the central committee.
The plenum, which heard reports
by party First Secretary Janos
Kadar and his top agricultural
adviser, politburo member and
secretary Lajos Feher, apparent-
ly decided to halt the drive in
order to "consolidate" the farms
which have been organized during
the past two and a half months.
Both Kadar and Feher attended
the recent bloc meetings in Mos-
cow.
To further the consolidaticn
and achieve an over-all increase
in agricultural production dur-
ing the coming year, the regime
has earmarked a record 7 billion
forints (about $300,000,000 at
the most realistic official
rate), a substantial increase
over last year, for agricultural
investments. More than half
of this amount will be used to
purchase 10,000 tractors, 4,000
mechanical planters, 1,400 com-
bines, 2,400 grass scythes, and
3,500 fertilizer sprayers. The
bulk of this machinery will be
added to the existing motor stock
of the machine-tractor stations,
inasmuch as the Kadar regime is
reluctant to allocate to the
collective farms the more ad-
vanced or expensive types of
machinery.
In the past two years, the
proportion of Hungary's arable
land cultivated by state farms,
collectives, and cooperatives
has risen from 29 to 70 percent,
an increase achieved principally
by intensive agitation-propagan-
da work among the peasants.
Some 870,000 individuals are en-
rolled in collective farms, and
six counties are described as on
a fully cooperative farming basis.
The resolution of the 12
February plenum calls for an
increase of 4.9 percent in
over-all agricultural produc-
tion in 1960. It lays particular
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25 February 1960
stress on the formation of basic
party units in the new farms and
demands widespread preparations
for spring sowing--probably as
a consequence of last fall's
unfavorable weather conditions.
Last, year many of the peasants
were permitted to farm their
plots individually even after
their land had been formally
collectivized, but ILF:avy invest-
ments, availability of more
machinery, and actiwo organiza-
tional Work suggest that the re-
gime plans to get rang of the
newly formed units Lnto operation
before spring sowing.
POLAND CRITICIZED FOR SLOW PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURAL SOCIALIZATION
Poland reportedly came;.
under fire at the recent bloc
agricultural conference in
Moscow for its slow progress
toward-collectivization and
the low level of its farm pro
duction. The Poles
oun
it difficult to efen their
collectivization policies, es-
pecially the development of
the "agricultural circles"--
organizations providing co-
operative marketing and pur-
chasing and common ownership
of agricultural machinery and
storage facilities.
Although the Soviet dele-
gates reportedly did not attempt
to pressure the Poles directly,
they appeared to be taking
issue with Warsaw's policy in
their statements that the cir-
cles should soon begin to dem-
onstrate "socialist content"
and show that socialization
can be achieved through such
forms. The Russians and rep-
resentatives of other bloc coun-
tries pointed out that if the
Polish circles do not make more
rapid progress toward socializa-
tion, Poland will find itself
with more than 3,000,000 inef?-
ficientsmall farms at a time
when its neighbors have virtual-
ly completed collectivization.
Asa result, Warsaw will prob-
ably increase efforts to de-
velop the circles in 1960.
The Poles are reported,
however, to have held their own
THE SOCIALIZED SECTOR OF AGRICULTURE IN' EASTERN EUROPE
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FARM LAND
25X1
1
25X1
F7
1956 1958 1959' 1956 1958 1959' 1956 1958 1959 1956 1958 1959
ALBANIA BULGARIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA EAST GERMANY
'BREAKDOWN NOT AVAILABLE
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1956 1958 1959 1956 1958 1959 1956 1958 1959
HUNGARY RUMANIA POLAND
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
at the conference discussion on
agricultural production, owing
largely,to a poor showing last
year in Czechoslovakia and East
Germany.
Party First Secretary
Gomulka permitted Polish col-
lective farms to disband in late
1956 and early 1957 to the point
that the country today has fewer
such farms than it had in 1950,
but he has never abandoned the
aim of ultimate collectivization.
He realizes that peasant resist-
ance would make a complete fias-
co of any attempts to collectiv-
ize forcibly and would probably
result in severe .food shortages.
He has stated on many occasions
that collectivization must be
voluntary, and that once peas-
ants are convinced of the ad-
vantages of collective farming
they will join of their own
accord.
The regime has been en-
couraging the formation of the
circles since early 1957. The
peasants, however, have shied
away from them because of a
deep-seated suspicion of the
regime's'motives, despite the
incentives of substantial finan-
cial and technical assistance
offered by the government.
The experience of a party
activist who failed after two
days of discussion to convince
members of'a circle to build
a common storage place for ap-
ples is typical of the diffi-
culties encountered by the re-
gime. Reasons given by peasants
for not building the storage
facility included: too much paper
work; it would only be another
Object for the state to tax; the
state would soon enact a law
placing it under control of some
other organization; its construc-
tion would be a step toward the
hated collectivization; and the
Russians were pushing the idea.
LATVIAN NATIONALISM STILL CONCERNS MOSCOW
The latest move aimed at
checking the currents of na-
tionalism and "ideological.in-
firmity" in the Soviet Baltic
republic of Latvia has-brought
a new shake-up in the top party
command within the republic.
Reports on the proceedings of
a recent party plenum reveal
that at least two members--in
addition to first secretary Yan
Kalnberzin, removed last Novem-
ber--of the five-member secre-
tariat have been replaced.
Many of the non-Russian
republics have witnessed tap-level
shifts during the last year, but
in none has the charge of nation-
alism been raised as frequently
and explicitly as in Latvia. The
party has indicated it feels that
the solution of such related prob-
lems as economic performance and
ideological discipline hinges
largely on its success in uproot-
ing what it.chooses to describe as
"harmful ideas which come from
abroad." Particular concern has
been shown for the attitudes of
Latvian youths. The continuing
political charges and the ac-
companying propaganda drumfire
indicate that Moscow, after nearly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUYIARY
25 February 1960
20 years of control of the Bal-
tic republic, is still contend-
ing with what it considers an
unhealthy degree of nationalist
spirit.
The issue was first aired
publicly last August, soon after
the dismissal of Eduard Berklav
as deputy chairman of the Latvian
Council of Ministers. The chair-
man of the council at that time
charged that Berklav had argued
for increased investments in
Latvian "light industry and food
industry, the products of which
must be consumed largely within
the republic." Berklav was
guilty of other, similar ecor
nomic heresies which, it was
charged, "signified nothing but
a desire for autarky.natiOflal
exclusiveness,,and isolation."
Arvid Pelshe, installed in
Kalnberzin's post as party chief
in last November's sweeping
reorganization of top posts,
has subsequently reinforced
the indictment of Berklav, al-
leging in Pravda on 27 January
that the ousted official--and
others--had "started to slip
away from the party's class posi-
tion and allowed distortions of
Lenin's nationality policy."
Pelshe also revealed some con-
cern about the orientation of the
upcoming generation. "It is no
secret," he wrote, "that the
upbringing of the future man
takes place during a difficult
and sharp struggle against the
influence of the decaying bour-
geois morals and ideology, as
well as against the harmful ideas
which come from abroad."
Pelshe indicated that a
shake-up of editorial staffs
would be one means of,dealing
with ideological softness,
and the editor of the leading
Latvian-language newspaper has
since been fired. The appoint-
ment in January of a new party
.secretary, whose specialty has
been party organizational af-
fairs, may also mean that a
careful scrutiny of lower party
officials is in the offing. .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
The death of Cardinal
Stepinac on 10 February removed
one of the major obstacles to
a formal improvement of rela-
tions between the Vatican and
the Tito regime. Stepinac had
been convicted in 1946 of col-
laboration during World War II
with the pro-Nazi Tistashi pup-
pet state of Croatia. His ap-
pointment as cardinal in 1952,
while he was still imprisoned
on this charge, led Belgrade
to break off diplomatic rela-
tions with the Vatican.
During the past year Bel-
grade's attitude toward the
church has been more concilia-
tory. The regime officially
congratulated Anton Vovk on
his appointment as resident
bishop of Ljubljana and al-
lowed him--as well as other
churchmen--to go to Rome, and
has permitted Communists to
have their children baptized.
To these gestures is added the
decision to allow Stepinac's
burial services to take place
in Zagreb Cat1edial--the seat
of his diocese--rather than in
Krasic, his native village.
This act has been termed a
"post-mortem amnesty" by a
Yugoslav official in Zagreb.
Several difficult problems
remain, however, including the
questions of religious educa-
tion for Catholic children and
of the clergy's rights in car-
rying out its work. The ed-
ucation issue is particularly
difficult, as the same problem
exists in relation to ali'reli-
gious and ethnic groups in Yugo-
slavia, particularly in the
Orthodox and Islamic centers in
the southern parts oi''thecountry.
There have been limited
improvements in church-state
relations during the past year.
Vladimir Bakaric, Communist
President of Croatia, in com-
menting on 16 February on the
recent trials in Croatia in-
volving the clergy, stated that
the regime was "not conduct-
ing antireligious propaganda,"
but only keeping "politics out
of the church."
The day before Stepinac
died, 80-year-old Archbishop
Ujcic of Belgrade was award-
ed the "Order for Services
to the People, First Class"
for his efforts to define
the position of the church
in its relations with the
The elimination of church-
state irritants would enhance
Belgrade's standing in Catholic
Latin America and the Islamic
Middle East. The reported
release by the Vatican on 22
February of Cardinal Stepinac's
1957 last testament, which is
highly critical of Communism
in Yugoslavia, may prove, how-
ever, to be an obstacle to an
improvement in relations be-
tween the Vatican and Tito's
regime. In view of Tito's gen-
eral interest in winning sup-
port in these areas, there is
considerable inducement for
him to effect a settlement
with the Vatican.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 Feburary 1960
THE PRESIDENTIAL OUTLOOK IN BOLIVIA
Bolivia's governing party,
the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR)--whose firm con-
trol virtually guarantees the
outcome of the elections to be
held next May or June--has
chosen former President Victor
Paz Estenssoro as its candidate
for president and key labor
leader Juan Lechin as his run-
ning mate. The nominating con-
vention chose the left-wing
leader Lechin despite strong
opposition from Paz, who appar-
ently saw this choice as a blow
to his plans to act as mediator
between the left and right
wings of the party.
Paz's term as president
from 1952 to 1956 was marked by
sweeping reforms--extension of
suffrage to the illiterate
Indian majority, nationalization
of the tin mines, and a radical
agrarian reform decree. His
greatest achievement was devel-
opment of petroleum resources
through a government oil company,
and the resultant change of
Bolivia's position from a net
importer to an ex1m ter of
oil.
During this period Paz was
regarded as the one man who
could maintain a balance between
the two wings of the MNR--the
right wing headed by incumbent
President Hernan Siles and the
left wing headed by Juan Lechin.
His future efforts in this di-
rection, however, will be
hampered by the choice of Lechin
for the vice presidency and by
the weakness of the party's
right wing. With Lechin as
vice president, Paz will have
trouble avoiding total aliena-
tion of the middle-class ele-
ments of the party.
Intraparty ri?v tries; may
lead to new outbreaks of vio-
lence in'the next few weeks,
since most political leaders
in Bolivia are backed by groups
of armed civilians. Serious
violence in recent months, both
in the mining areas and in the
agricultural section near
Bolivia's second largest city,
Cochabamba, has threatened
civil war.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
The arrival of Julian
Amery as a British negotiator
in Nicosia on 23 February has
revived speculation among Cyp-
riots that Britian is about to
offer new concessions in an ef-
fort to resolve the dispute
over the size of British mili-
tary bases. In'London, however,
a Foreign Office official says
Amery's objective is merely to
confirm agreements already
reached with Archbishop Makarids
on other points at issue, such
as problems regarding civil
administration within the bases
and potential British financial
aid to Cyprus.
Following this, the British
official says, London will make
a "superhuman" effort to see if
anything more can be done to end
the dispute over the size of
the bases. He states, however,
that any "adjustments" in size
would be small anti would not
live up to the optimistic spec-
ulation in the Cypriot press.
There are ominous indica-
tions that the recent close
collaboration between Greek and
Turkish Cypriot leaders may be
weakening. Turkish Cypriot
leader Kuchuk, in particular,
has collaborated closely with
Makarios on the issue of the
bases, and has demonstrated con-
siderable initiative in attempt-
ing to find a compromise solu-
tion. It now appears that Ku-
chuk has incurred the displeas-
ure of leaders in Ankara who
regard the British bases on Cyp-
rus as vital to Turkey's secu-
rity.
A change in Kuchuk's stand
would be a serious blow t+b Ma-
karios and would tend to revive
the latent distrust between the
two communities on Cyprus.
Within his own community, the
archbishop can retain his pres-
tige only by securing some fur
they concessions from Britian.
Any indication that he is weak-
ening in the controversy with
London would bring down immedi-
ate:.attacks on him from extrem-
.ists of both the right and left.
Cyprus.
While Makarios would probably
survive such attacks, his, own
influence and that of his mod-
erate, pro-Western advisers
could be diminished, to the
detriment of the new Cypriot
government's stability and pos-
sibly also to the detriment of
long-range Western interests on
NEW GOVERNMENT FORMED IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE
Kerala's non-Communist po-
litical leaders resumed control
of the state government on 22
February after nearly three
years out of power. Formation
of a coalition government by
the Congress and Praja Socialist
parties climaxed the drive be-
gun last summer which led to
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the ouster of the Communist re-
gime and the victory of the
anti-Communist united front in
a special state election on 1
February. Congress and Social-
ist candidates, together with
those of the Moslem League, won
75 percent of the state assembly
seats.
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25 February 1960
Dissension among the vic-
torious coalition parties at
first threatened to block for-
mation of a new government.
Intensive negotiations during
the first three weeks of Feb-
ruary became deadlocked over
the question of the Moslem
League's participation. The
league's demand for one min-
istry, which was strongly sup-
ported by the Praja Socialists,
was unacceptable to the domi-
nant Congress party. Resist-
ance to the inclusion of the
Moslems came primarily from
the national Congress leaders,
who regard the league as an
alien communal organization
and who feared that Hindu-Mos-
lem cooperation in Kerala
would provide Hindu extremist
elements in northern India
with an opportunity to stir
up communal antagonisms.
The Moslem League eventual-
ly withdrew its demand, ena-
blingthe Congress and Socialist
leaders to work out a two-par-
ty coalition, which the Moslems
promised to support in the as-
sembly. The Congress party
agreed to let Praja Socialist
leader Pattom Thanu Pillai head
the government, while reserving
for Congress politicians eight
of the other ten cabinet seats.
Pillai, a 75-year-old former
Congress leader who has served
as chief minister twice pre-
viously, is considered to have
greater prestige in Kerala than
any of the Congress leaders.
The personal rivalries and
communal differences which de-
layed the formation of the new
cabinet probably will also ham-
per the non-Communist parties
in establishing a stable and
effective government. Pillai's
tendency to run a one-man show
may antagonize his coalition
partners. The Congress party's
preponderant strength in both
the cabinet and the assembly,
however, will help its leaders
keep Pillai in line and main-
tain unity. In addition, the
considerable mass support re-
tained by the Communists in
Kerala and their capability for
exploiting any government short-
comings will give the anti-Com-
munist parties a strong incen-
tive to maintain their coopera-
tion.
PAKISTANI PRESIDENT MOVES TO RESTORE "CONSTITUTIONAL" GOVERNMENT
Pakistani President Ayub
is continuing his efforts to
give his regime the appearance
of representative government,
but apparently intends to keep
control in his own hands. His
prestige seems to have reached
the highest level since the
first days following the army
takeover in October 1958. His
regime has given Pakistan a
stronger and more stable gov-
ernment, strengthened the coun-
try's economy, and raised its
international reputation. In
addition, Ayub in his recent
successful tours of West and
East Pakistan demonstrated
increasing confidence and skill
as a politician.
Ayub arranged a "vote of
confidence" on 14 February, ob-
taining favorable votes from
about 95 percent of the 80,000
newly elected members of the
recently established local coun-
cils. This vote constitutes his
election as president for the
first term of office under the
proposed new constitution. Ayub
took a new oath of office on
17 February. Cabinet members
submitted pro forma resigna-
tions, and were immediately
reappointed.
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25 February 1960
On the same day, the Pres-
ident appointed a commission
to prepare proposals for a new
constitution which will pro-
bably follow the lines he has
already described in public.
The draft is expected to be
completed by next fall. Ayub
apparently wants to use repre-
sentative institutions such as
the local councils to gain
support for the government, but
he does not want these institu-
tions to interfere with the
centralized authority which he
believes to be necessary for a
competent administration.
He also advocates a strong
executive, dominated by the
president and not subject to
recall by the legislature. Ayub
apparently will ask for some
system of checks to prevent po-
litical parties from harming
the national interest, as he
believes happened before the
1958 army takeover.
During the coming months
Ayub will probably have his
hands full making an effective
instrument of government out of
the newly elected local coun-
cils. These councils are to be
given major responsibilities in
carrying out national develop-
ment programs at the local level.
A large proportion of the mem-
bers are without previous gov-
ernment or administrative ex-
perience. Many who do have
such experience probably have
ties with the ousted political
parties and may resent the re-
gime. Even if the regime se-
cures the wholehearted coopera-
tion of these new councils, it
would have a major job educatin
them to their tasks.
Communist propaganda in
the Congo and efforts to pene-
trate nationalist groups appear
to be increasing with the pros-
pect of independence on 30 June.
Congolese delegates at the
round-table talks in Brussels
were contacted by various Sovi-
et bloc trade representatives,
who reportedly outlined attrac-
tive barter proposals to be
implemented following Congolese
independence.
Communist activity in the
Congo during the past year in-
volved primarily the introduc-
tion of propaganda material and
the granting of scholarships
for study in the bloc. The
Czechoslovak Consulate, the
only official bloc mission in
Leopoldville, is believed to
have supported these efforts
as well as penetration opera-
tions aimed at nationalist
groups. Among the Belgian Com-
munists there have been some
indications of dissatisfaction
with what they believe to be
the low level of Communist ac-
tivity in the Congo.
The Communists may recent-
ly have increased their influ-
ence within two of the most
important African groups, the
Abako and the Congo National
Movement (MNC). Propaganda
organs of the Abako have lately
taken on pro-Communist and anti-
American overtones, while of-
ficials of the MNC wing led by
Patrice Lumumba are believed
to have been in frequent con-
tact with Belgian Communists.
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Communist penetration ef-
forts have been aided consider-
ably by the Congo's accelerated
rush toward independence, which
has prompted numerous, Congolese
politicians to seek foreign
financial support for legisla
tive elections, some of which
are scheduled assearly as April.
Delegates to the round-table
talks in Brussels are known to
have made side trips to the bloc
and elsewhere.
Congolese delegates
were "constantly contacted" by
bloc representatives with offers
of economic assistance.
In some instances, however,
the Congolese appear to have
sought aid from non-Communist
sources.
Communist influence was not
apparent during the actual nego-
tiations in Brussels, where Afri-
can delegates of various politi-
cal shadings were largely united
in their efforts to wrest maxi-
mum concessions from the Bel-
gians. The conference ended
on 20 February after Brussels
had agreed to virtually everv
major Congolese demand.
LABOR UNREST IN WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY
West Berlin and West Ger-
many face the threat of a strike
by 1,200,000 public service,
transportation, and communica-
tion workers. The member un-
ions, including those in West
Berlin, are scheduled to start
voting on 25 February regard
ing managementw-'s latest wage
offers.
Labor leaders, who have
been moderate in their demands
during the past decade, now
argue that rising prices and
business profits justify sub-
stantial increases and that
labor deserves a larger share
of national income. This is
the first of several demands
German labor will make during
.1960. The Bonn government, how-
ever, wants wage increases lim-
ited to hold down inflationary
pressures.
In the recent round of
transport negotiations held in
Bad Kreuznach, the labor lead-
ers reduced their demands for
a wage increase of 15 percent
to one of 11 percent, while
the management representatives
increased their wage and
salary offers from 5 percent to
maximums of 10.5 and 8.5 per-
cent, respectively'. Despite
the impression that this nar-
rowing would produce a settle-
ment, negotiations were broken
off by the labor leaders on 17
February after a 22-hour session.
Any settlement in West Ger-
many would, presumably extend
also to West Berlin. The West
Berlin union leaders, however,
have taken a stronger stand
than their more conservative
counterparts in West Germany,
and have indicated a willingness
to strike for "several weeks"
if necessary. A strike of long-
er than 36 hours would probably
cause the city's gas and water
pressure to fall to a point
where services would cease.
In the event of a West Ber-
lin strike, the East Germans
might take "sympathy" action,
as they did during a 24-hour
demonstration walkout in 1958,
by cutting off elevated S-Bahn
train service to West Berlin.
Communist agitators are already
circulating leaflets in West Ber-
lin urging workers to stand firm
in their original 15-percent
wage demands.
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BRITISH PUBLIC PRESSURES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT
The Macmillan government
finds itself under slowly in-
creasing public pressure to
reach a disarmament agreement.
Considerations of domestic
opinion only partially account
for the recurrent efforts of
the British delegation at the
Geneva test-suspension talks to
explore possible compromises be-
tween the American and Soviet
positions--efforts which the
Soviet delegation is seeking
to exploit. Testing is prob-
ably of decreasing importance
to Britain's own defense program
in view of the tendency to de-em-
phasize the nuclear aspect.
British officials consider that
world opinion is susceptible
to Soviet propaganda blandish-
ments on the testing issue.
British opinion appears to
be the government's greatest
concern, however. According
to an opinion survey in Novem-
ber, almost as many of those
polled named the USSR as the
US as the country making the
more serious effort.--.toward
general disarmament. On the test
ban issue, the press supports
Macmillan's desire for a com-
prehensive ban, and has viewed
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25 February 1960
favorably Moscow's insistence
that any agreement include at
least a moratorium on all
underground testing. The
heavy press play given reports
that the United States is pre-
~aring to resume underground
tests tends to blame Washington
for blocking progress.
A skillful pressure group,
composed principally of non-
Communist intellectuals, which
seeks unilateral unclear disarm-
ament has played on latent
British fears that nuclear war-
fare would obliterate civilized
life in the United Kingdom.
The American Embassy in London
believes this group has gained
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
some increased publicity dur-
ing the past year, partly
through demonstrations at mili-
tary installations on news-
sparse week ends. Among the
group's prominent supporters is
Frank Cousins, leader of Brit-
ain's largest trade union.
Labor party leader Hugh
Gaitskell rejects unilateral
disarmament for Britain and
has agreed to only slight com-
promises in his party's stand,
but maintains continuing pres-
sure in Parliament for the gov-
ernment to show progress toward
a disarmament agreement start-
ing with a suspension of nu-
clear tests.
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25 February 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Khrushchev and De Gaulle
will each probably use the So-
viet leader's visit to France
from 15 to 28 March to explore
the other's intentions for the
summit meeting in May.
The invitation stems both
from De Gaulle's determination
to demonstrate France's status
as a great power, and `f-rom his
desire to develop a European in-
itiative toward furthering an
East-West detente. The Kremlin
has long considered France a
vulnerable link in the Western
alliance, and De Gaulle's pol-
icies have probably sharpened
Moscow's expectations of new op-
portunities to exploit possible
.
... ...............................................
:: .......................................
........ ...................................................??
:.. ........... .
15 - 28 March 1960
3 days ,n;,'Paris
7 days in provincial cities shown
'I-Ay flight to Saharan oil center of Hassi Messaoud
2 days of talks at Rambouillet
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25 February 1960
differences between France and
its allies. De Gaulle's appre-
hension over Communist advances
in Africa and his hope for a
Moscow-Peiping'misunderstand-
ing may encourage him to ex-
plore the possibility of a mu-
tual accommodation with the
Soviet Union.
The French leader appar-
ently is convinced that Khru-
shchev does not want war 1106-
Extreme rightist opponents
of the regime are using the
visit to characterize De Gaulle
as a "man of the left" who is
about to sell France out to the
Soviet Union. Their plans for
anti-Khrushchev demonstrations
have probably been stymied,
however, by the government's
roundups in connection with
the Algerian crisis last
month.
Background of the Invitation
De Gaulle made the Khru-
shchev visit an "indispensable"
condition for French participa-
tion in an East-West summit
meeting, in view of British
Prime Minister Macmillan's trip
to Moscow and Khrushchev's trip
to the United States in 1959.
"SEND FOR PICASSO! "
cause the Soviet Union "must
reckon with a growing class of
technicians and managers who
want higher living standards
and more security." Moreover,
De Gaulle sees the growing
strength of Communist China
as an additional pressure to
"Europeanize" the Soviet Union.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
The USSR and De Gaulle
The Soviet attitude toward
France was formulated by Khru-
shchev shortly before De Gaulle
returned to power. In an inter-
view with a French paper, the
Soviet leader stressed that the
USSR had no reason to fear a
strong France, because "the
more France displays its inde-
pendence as a great power, the
easier it will be, by joint ef-
fort, to achieve a settlement
of European and world prob-
lems." Khrushchev's remarks
underline the Soviet Union's
long-standing belief that it
can encourage France to move
toward an independent position
on key East-West issues,.espe-
cially the German question.
Soviet confidence that an
intensified French nationalism
can be exploited by dividing
France from its allies has
probably been reinforced by
De Gaulle's actions over the
past year and a half.
Moscow's policy of re-
straint and caution in criti-
cizing De Gaulle is a further
reflection of the priority
which the USSR assigns to gen-
erating divisions within the
West.
De Gaulle's failure to ac-
tively oppose Anglo-American
policy during the Middle East
crisis in 1958 and his subsequent
demonstration that-he intended
to maintain close ties with Bonn
probably led to a downgrading
of the Soviet estimate that im-
mediate opportunities for Moscow
would be developed,by De Gaulle.
Khrushchev, however, empha-
sized in a Pravda article of 22
September 1s conviction
that re-emergence of the histor-
ic conflicts between France and
Germany was merely-a matter of
time.
As a corollary to this the-
sis, Khrushchev advanced his ap-
praisal that traditional French
national interests closely coin-
cided with the Soviet interest
in containing the revival of
German military power. During
the Berlin crisis Moscow repeat-
edly directed warnings to Paris
against the danger of a. -revived
Germany.
The Soviet objective of
cultivating De Gaulle personally
was clearly evident after the
Soviet leader's return from the
United States. After Khrushchev
had failed to gain agreement on
a summit conference before the
end of 1959, he conceded that
Do Gaulle's desire to exchange
views prior to the summit was
not "unreasonable and could make
for a better understanding" at
the East-West meeting. More-
over, Khrushchev's moderate
handling of De Gaulle's efforts
to delay a summit contrasted
sharply with his repeated at-
tacks on Adenauer for the same
reasons.
Khrushchev also took pains
to respond to French views that
some evidence of decreased ten-
sions was necessary before agree-
ing to meet at the summit. The
Soviet leader's cautious endorse-
ment of De Gaulle's program for
Algeria was an obvious gesture
to appear responsive to French
conditions for the heads-of-gov-
ernment meeting.
On Algeria, Moscow has tried
to avoid antagonizing De Gaulle,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
while still maintaining a pub-
lic posture as the champion of
anticolonialist movements.
During the recent crisis in
Algeria, Soviet propaganda
media firmly endorsed De Gaulle's
handling of the situation and
lauded his 29 January state-
ment on self-determination
there.
Khrushchev in France
During his meetings with
De Gaulle, the Soviet premier
will probably maintain a re-
served and conciliatory atti-
tude, most recently evident in
his reaction to the French a-
tomic test. He is'determined,
however, to maintain pressure
for a German settlement based
on a peace treaty with both
German states which would con-
firm the postwar division of
Europe. Khrushchev's dismissal
on 5 August 1959 of the Bonn-
Paris axis as a "marriage of
convenience" is a reflection of
his conviction that growing
German military strength pro-
vides a field for maneuver in
bargaining for French conces-
sions on Germany. As Khru-
shchev put it in his speech on
14 November to Soviet journal-
ists, "De Gaulle understands
the danger of a revival of Ger-
man revanchism."
Khrushchev will also prob-
ably tie the dangers of German
militarism to the problem of
disarmament in Europe. Mindful
of De Gaulle'$ preoccupation
with "doing something for the
Poles," Khrushchev can be ex-
pected to press for a favorable
consideration of a partial
disarmament agreement.in Cen-
tral Europe along the:lines of
the Rapacki plan.
The main themes which Khru-
shchev will develop for French
public consumption will be that
the balance of power has shifted
toward "the socialist camp" and
that there is an irreversible
trend in the West toward accom-
modation with the Soviet posi-
tion. He will attempt to make
it clear that such an accommo-
dation is in the interest of
France as a great power, and
he probably will suggest that
the French should take an active
part in promoting a European
settlement. An indispensable
condition, however, will be
his insistence that Paris ac-
knowledge the postwar situation
in Eastern Europe.
As Khrushchev sees it, the
interests of France and the USSR
do not "objectively collide,"
and their policies on Germany
differ in form but not in sub-
stance.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
In this connection, Khru-
shchev will explore the possibil-
ity of 'a moe,formal endorsement
by De Gaulle of the status quo
in the East along the lines of
the French leader's remarks in
March 1959 on the permanency of
Germany's postwar boundaries.
Shortly after that statement by
De Gaulle, Moscow used a.TASS
statement-to respond with an
expression that "this is a cor-
rect, realistic approach," and
Khrushchev told the Supreme
Soviet on 31 October that "we
greatly appreciate the realis-
tic statement" by De Gaulle
and Debrd on the "inviolabil-
ity" of the Oder-Neisse fron-
tier.
De Gaulle on Summit Issues
On the issue of Germany,
De Gaulle is unlikely to go
beyond his suggestion that in-
creased political contacts be-
tween East and West Germany
would be desirable short of
recognition of the East German
regime. His views were presum-
ably reflected in Foreign Min-
ister Couve de Murville's ex-
pression of doubt in November
that the Berlin question is
"ripe" for settlement. Couve
de Murville said again in De-
cember that a summit meeting
would be a success if "some
practical agreements" were a-
chieved on the other two prob-
lems; disar~ament and East-
West relations.
De Gaulle reportedly
agrees with Adenauer that the
disarmament issue; should be
the "acid test" of Soviet inten-
tions. Paris would assign first
priority to the abolition of
all delivery systems for nu-
clear weapons and second to
the elimination of nuclear weap-
onee:. - It'. opposes any agree-
ment on nuclear test cessation
which does not provide for the
destruction of nuclear stocks
and for a general disarmament
in conventional weapons. The
recent Frendli demonstration of
approaching nuclear weapons
capability is more likely to
reinforce than soften this po-
sition.
African considerations
underlie, De Gaulle's insistence
that the summit agenda include
discussion of his proposals for
nonintervention by states in
each other's affairs and for a
joint East-West aid program for
underdeveloped areas. De Gaulle
is seeking to bar arms shipments
to "neutral" states, and he
envisages global apportionment
of underdeveloped areas into
Eastern and Western spheres of
influence--with Africa' witfiin
the Western complex.
Khrushchev's prospective
visit to Africa, particularly
Guinea, probably sharpens French
apprehension, and De Gaulle is
certain to press Khrushchev on
these points.
Curbs on Peiping
De"Gaulle can also be ex-
pected to probe for any signs
of Soviet willingness to curb
Peiping. Although De Gaulle
seems increasingly taken up
with,the hope of aligning Moscow
with the West against Peiping,
Paris+;is probably more and more
inclined to envisage some formal
agreement on disarmament as ul-
timately including Peiping.
There are some indications
that in addition to an expan-
sion of trade and cultural
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
exchanges, an agreement on So-
viet-French scientific exchange
may be reached.
LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CASTRO REGIME
Fidel Castro's regime has
lost prestige in other Latin
American capitals because of
its authoritarian methods at
home, its- susceptibility to
Communist influence, and its
unorthodox behavior in hemi-
sphere affairs. Only a few
Latin American leaders, however,
are prepared to dismiss Castro
as a mere radical demagogue
who has lost all chance of mak-
ing in the long run a positive
contribution to Cuba; for many
Latin Americans in general,
particularly the less sophis-
ticated, Castro remains an im-
portant political symbol. His
proclaimed objectives parallel
those of numerous groups through-
out the hemisphere, and con-
certed Cuban efforts to appeal.
to dissatisfied and oppressed
groups in many countries may be
making headway.
Castro's Tactics
The Castro regime has
rapidly dissipated the consid-
erable good will it enjoyed
among Latin American leaders
when it assumed power in Jan-
uary 1959. The authoritarian
tactics that belie Castro's
proclaimed democratic ideals
quickly became apparent and
have progressively eroded the
Cuban leader's prestige among
democratically oriented Latin
American governments.
President Lopez Mateos of
Mexico has publicly expressed
regret that the Cuban revolution
is not proceeding according to
constitutional paths. The re-
sponsible press and government
officials in Argentina, Uruguay,
Colombia, Costa Rica, and other
countries are showing increasing
disgust with the undemocratic
attitudes and:aetions of Cuban
leaders.
Communist Influence
The growth of Communist in-
fluence in Cuba is another cause
for serious concern in Latin Amer-
ican capitals. Although few of-
ficials consider Fidel Castro a
Communist, many are convinced that
close Aides such as Che Guevara
and Raul Castro are promoting
Communist objectives and that
the premier himself is in danger
of becoming a captive of the Com-
munists. The Mikoyan visit this
month and the resulting close
economic ties seem tto>have,further
alarmed Latin American observers.
The Liberal party's El
Tiempo in Colombia declared that
the Mikoyan visit will "fortify
the influence, already consider-
able, of Communism in the gov-
ernment, with all that this sig-
nifies." President Betancourt of
Venezuela is reported "very dis-
turbed" at the implications of
the Cuban-Soviet agreement.
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25 February 2.960
Unorthodox Diplomacy
Castro's diplomatic rep-
resentatives, many of them
young, inexperienced, and 'im-
bued with revolutionary fervor,
have irritated a number of Latin
American governments by their
unorthodox behavior and blatant
propaganda activities. His am-
bassadors in El Salvador and
Venezuela had to be recalled
late last year because of their
indiscretions. Cuban envoys in
Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala,
and Panama have irritated the
governments or important polit-
ical groups by becoming involved
in domestic affairs. The Chil-
ean and Venezuelan governments
formerly protested the unan-
nounced and undocumented arriv-
als of Cuban military planes
in their countries last summer
and fall.
Attitude Toward OAS
Numerous Latin American
leaders fear that the Castro
regime's indifferent and occa-
sionally hostile attitude
toward the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS) and other
inter-American organizations
will weaken hemispheric co-
operation. Direct Cuban sup-
port for revolutionary move-
ments opposing the regimes
in the Dominican Republic
and Nicaragua last summer
was in defiance of the ardently
professed Latin American
principle of noninterven-
tion.
Fidel Castro attacked the
meeting of foreign ministers
in Santiago de Chile last
August as a "farce," and Raul
Castro described the OAS as a
"worthless organization" unre-
sponsive to the real interests
of the people. More recently,
Cuban officials have ridiculed
the new Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank as of little use be-
cause of its alleged domination
by the United States; Cuba is
the only Latin American country
not to become a member.
Latin Americans look a-
skance at the Cuban Government's
efforts to identify itself with
the Asian-African neutralists,
and have been definitely cool
toward Castro's proposal to hold
a world conference of "hungry
nations" in Havana late next
summer. They doubt Cuban as-
surances that the conference is
to be purely economic and tech-
nical. Cuba has been unable to
secure the agreement of any
Latin American government to
cosponsor the conference, and
only Mexico, Venezuela, and pos-
sibly Panama have agreed--even
conditionally--to send repre-
sentatives. Most countries op-
pose holding the conference but
may feel obliged to attend if
many Latin American governments
do so. Brazil regards it as a
direct threat to the success of
Operation Pan America, its plan
for strengthening inter-American
ties.
In another move which
threatens hemispheric solidarity,
Cuba has been actively campaign-
ing in the UN for election to the
Security Council, without first
asking customary support from the
Latin American caucus. Several
Latin American countries had al-
ready indicated approval of a
prior Chilean bid for caucus
support, but Cuba's candidacy
seems to have elicited some
Latin American support too. Cu-
ba's move will probably lessen
caucus effectiveness on other
issues as well.
US-Cuban Relations
Many leading Latin Amer-
icans, including some who have
their own strong grievances
against US policies, have ex-
pressed surprise at the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25 February 1960
bitterness of Castro's invec
tive against the United States.
The Uruguayan newspaper Accion
--mouthpiece for the lefTT-sf-
politician Luis Batlle Berres,
who has beed an especially
caustic critic of the United
States--warned Castro not to
lose contact with his liberal-
minded friends in the United
The majority of Latin
American leaders approve the
moderation of President Eisen-
hower's 26 January statement
on Cuba and have indicated ad-
miration and relief that it
was basically conciliatory.
Chilean President Alessandri
and Colombian President Lleras
Camargo in January declared
they understood the US Govern-
ment was under considerable
provocation but expressed the
belief that any punitive steps
or anything resembling force
against Castro would strengthen
rather than weaken him. They
counseled continued moderation
and patience.
The widely respected Chil-
ean diplomat Benjamin Cohen has
expressed a viewpoint probably
shared by many thoughtful Latin
American leaders who believe
that Castro has not yet lost
all opportunity of making, on
balance, a positive contribu-
tion to Cuba. Cohen pointed
out in mid-February that the
Cuban situation must be viewed
in the context of a drastic
social revolution, with its
inevitable violence and disor-
ganization, and that the issue
of Communism is only inciden-
tal to this central fact.
The newspaper El Pais,
owned by PanamanianPres ent
de la Guardia, published some-
what similar views: "The bal-
ance of history is, up to now,
favorable. me, new Cuba shows a
a series of victories, which,
without doubt, any other Latin
American count" oI ld have
taken much longerchieve.
Every revolution has its--mis-
takes--and necessary bloodshed."
Appeal in Latin America
The general feeling of
inferiority in dealing with the
United States probably has a
large part in the dramatic ap-
peal Castro apparently holds
for many Latin Americans.
In addition, the picture
of Castro as a courageous
fighter against a corrupt dic-
tatorship is still valid for
many Latin American people, es-
pecially the less sophisticated.
Castro's drastic agrarian re-
form program and his controls
over private capital also evoke
a sympathetic response in a
continent where abusive social
practices by a small wealthy
class are frequent. Communists,
always quick to exploit Latin
American grievances, have be-
come, along with such Commu-
nist-influenced parties as the
Chilean Socialist party, Cas-
tro's most uncritical defend-
ers in the hemisphere.
Although Castro has al-
ienated the top leaders of im-
portant Latin Awer.i?an
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25 February 1960
leftist-nationalist non-Commu-
nist parties such as APRA of
Peru, Democratic Action of Ven-
ezuela, and National Liberation
of Costa Rica, sympathy for
Castro remains strong in the
lower echelons of these parties.
An APRA rally on 7 January re-
vealed strong discontent among
secondary party leaders, youths,
students, and the more radical
elements because of the moder-
ate policies of the party lead-
ership and its refusal to come
out strongly in favor of Castro
and advocate Castro-type pol-
icies for Peru.
hopes on him--have tried to dis-
tinguish between Castro and the
Cuban revolution by continuing
to support the revolution while
refusing to endorse Castro's
methods. This distinction, how-
ever, eludes most party members.
to appeal to the masses over
The Castro regime seems
well aware of its large reservoir
of sympathy among presently dis-
organized and less articulate
groups in many countries. Ha-
vana's diplomatic representa-
tives, Cuban labor groups, and
the Castro-subsidized news
agency Prensa Latina are em-
barked on a concerted campaign
the heads of the governments.
President Betancourt, head
of the Venezuelan party, is
faced with a similar dilemma,
as is former Costa Rican Pres-
ident Figueres, head of the Na-
tional Liberation party, who
publicly broke with Castro last
April. These leaders--who are
perhaps more bitterly disillu-
sioned with Castro because they
once aided him and pinned great
STATUS OF OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The status and influence
of the approximately 12,000,000
Overseas Chinese in Southeast
Asia has generally declined over
the past decade. Disliked for
their cultural separatism, en-
vied for their economic prowess,
and feared for their subversive
potential, they have come under
steadily increasing pressures
and surveillance by their host
governments, except in Singa-
pore, where the Chinese control
the government, and, to a lesser
extent, in the Federation of
Malaya, where the Chinese have
a voice in the government by
virtue of their large numbers
and economic dominance.
China's emergence as a ma-
jor power in the region follow-
ing World War II and the decline
of the colonial powers in South-
east Asia gave prominence to
the position of the Overseas
Chinese communities. However,
postwar political developments
have placed them under new na-
tionalist governments which are
particularly sensitive to the
presence of alien communities.
With the Communist victory on
the mainland, the Overseas Chi-
nese have come to be regarded
as potential bases of Communist
infiltration and subversion.
These fears are well grounded.
The overwhelming majority
of Overseas Chinese, although
emotionally attached to their
cultural heritage and their an-
cestral homes on the mainland,
are not ideologically motivated.
As in the past, they remain po-
litically apathetic and are con-
cerned primarily with their per-
sonal security and economic op-
portunities. They continue to
promote these interests direct-
ly with local authorities. Except
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25 February 1960
in Singapore and the Federa-
tion of Malaya, they are not
in a position to undertake con-
certed action against their
host governments. Even in
Malaya, despite the economic
power of the Chinese, such an
effort would result in severe
governmental reprisals.
Nationalist-Communist Rivalry
Peiping and Taipei are
competing for the loyalty of
the Overseas Chinese, and both
generally consider ethnic Chi-
nese, regardless of place of
birth, as Chinese nationals.:..
Both governments allot legisla-
tive seats--in Taiwan's Legis-
lative Yuan and Peiping's Na-
tional People's Congress--to
the overseas communities, en-
courage visits from overseas
OVERSEAS CNN ESE NN SOUTNEAST ASIA
(CURRENT ESTIMATES)
COUNTRY
TOTAL
POPULATION
CHINESE
PERCENTAGE
WRMA
19,500,000
150.50,00
2.6
CAMR001A
5,000,000
300,000
6.0
IIM0IMSIA
a5,000,000
3,000,11110
3.5
LAOS
2,000,000
30,000
1.5
MALAYA
6,300,000
2,343,60
37.2
MMUPPMIES
22,000,000
330,00
1.5
SINGAPORE
1,105,00
1,550,00
76.5
TNAILAIM
21,000,000
3,171,00
15.1
SOUTH VIETNAM
12,100,800
$30,00
6.9
00]ri 25 FEBRUARY 100
community leaders, and have of-
fered scholarships to Overseas
Chinese students.
The two regimes work prin-
cipally through their diplomatic
and consular establishments.
Thus the Chinese Nationalist
Government is more successful
in the Philippines, South Vietnam,
CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
Areas of Origin and
Overseas Concentrations
A KASHMIR
U1, Des
GOA-1
(Port.',
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
C H I N A
Hakka Other
Teochiu-Hokkien
OVERSEAS CONCENTRATIONS
Ma Other
concentration concentration
SECRET
41imor
TERR. OF
NETH. INEW
NEW GUINEA
(In D,,pum) GUINEA
NEW GUI JEA
rn ri A
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
Laos, and Thailand, while the
Chinese Communist regime domi-
nates where it is represented--
in Burma, Indonesia, and Cam-
bodia.
In this effort, Communist
China in the countries where it
is recognized is making effec-
tive use of its Bank of China
branches as instruments of per-
suasion and for the transfer
of remittances to the mainland.
The Bank of China is an impor-
tant instrument in Singapore,
and had similar importance in
Malaya until the recent closure
of its branches there.
In Southeast Asia as a
whole, the Chinese Communist re-
gime has had more appeal than
the Chinese Nationalist. It
has considerable influence with
the majority of Chinese-language
publications and schools, as
well as Chinese associations.
This is attributable more to
Peiping's demonstration of mil-
itary strength, vitality, and
apparent permanence than to its
propaganda campaign.
Peiping's influence on the
Chinese of Southeast Asia has
recently been diminished by the
generally unfavorable reaction
to its suppression of the Ti
betan revolt, its commune pro-
gram, and by the reports of
disillusioned Chinese return-
ing from visits to the main-
land. The Chinese of Malaya
and Singapore were particular-
ly disillusioned by the fail-
ure of Peiping to produce the
goods it offered in its 1958
economic offensive.
The Chinese communities
of Laos, Malaya, and Singapore,
for differing reasons, are the
least subject to governmental
harassment in Southeast Asia.
In Laos, the Chinese community
is small--approximately 30,000,
or 1.5 percent of the popula-
tion--and the Chinese are ac-
cepted as an integral part of
the heterogeneous society. The
Chinese Nationalists opened a
consulate last year, but it has
SECRET
had little impact on the local
Chinese. The Laotian Government
is preoccupied with the threat
of the Communist-dominated Neo
Lao Hak Zat, and has neither
time nor inclination to inter-
fere with the Chinese community.
Even the presence of Chinese
Nationalist irregulars in the
Burmese-Laotian border area--
anathema to Rangoon--is viewed
with mild favor by Vientiane.
Malaya and Singapore
In the Federation of Malaya,
terrorist tactics Of the Malayan
Communist party, almost exclu-
sively Chinese, as well as the
demands of the independence
movement have forced conserva-
tive Chinese community leaders
into politics. They are asso-
ciated through the Malayan Chi-
nese Association with the United
Malay National Organization in
the government, although only
as a junior partner. Both ele-
ments support, at least pub-
licly, the "Malayanization" of
the population.
Communal problems generated
by the mutual distrust between
the Malays (50 percent of the
population) and the Chinese
(37.2 percent) dominate govern-
mental thinking. The political-
ly dominant Malays prefer to
have the Chinese isolated from
the influence of both Chinese
regimes. Chinese cultural ties
with the mainland are strong,
however, and pro-Communist
sentiments are particularly
evident among Chinese students.
The situation in Singapore
is unique: a left-wing govern-
ment which is dominated by Chi-
nese is minimizing Chinese cul-
tural ties and is encouraging
the development of a "Malayan"
society. Some 1,185,000 out of
Singapore's 1,550,000 citizens
are Chinese, culturally oriented
toward the mainland, and much
influenced by local pro-Commu-
nist leaders. The government,
motivated mainly by economic
necessity to seek closer ties
leading to the long-range goal
of merger, is attempting to
improve relations with the
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25 February 1960
anti-Communist and aloof gov-
ernment of Malaya.
In Burma and Cambodia,
where the Chinese populations
are 2.6 and 6 percent respec-
tively, the Chinese communities
are in relatively good stand-
ing. In both countries other
alien minorities are more dis-
liked by the local populations
and governments' than the Chi-
nese--the Indians in Burma, and
the Vietnamese in Cambodia.
Peiping holds a command-
ing position in the competition
for the loyalties of Burma's
Chinese through its geographic
location and evident political
and economic power. As a re-
sult, it has gained control
over most Chinese institutions
in the country. The pro-Na-
tionalist Chinese, hampered by
a lack of funds and by the de-
predations of the Nationalist
irregulars in the northeastern
part of the country, appear to
be losing ground, and their in-
fluence probably will continue
to decline in view of the re-
cently concluded Sino-Burmese
border agreement and nonaggres-
sion treaty.
There are between 450,000
and 500,000 Chinese residents
of Burma, who, unless they have
formally declared their Chinese
citizenship, are generally ac-
corded the privileges of Bur-
mese citizenship. Intermar-
riage with Burmese is frequent,
and the Chinese assimilate eas-
ily into Burmese society. Nev-
ertheless, most Chinese have
retained their cultural identity
and are objects of government
suspicion. Formal discrimina-
tion against Chinese does not
exist, but the government's ef-
forts to force aliens out of
major economic activities has
ended the Chinese domination of
rice marketing and mining and
forced the Chinese into less
important commercial fields,
where they have little influ-
ence with the government.
The 300,000 Chinese in Cam-
bodia are in a similar position.
Through its large embassy, Pei-
ping has gained control over
most Chinese institutions, and
pro-Nationalist Chinese are
severely handicapped by lack of
funds and the absence of diplo-
matic representation. Communist
advances have been slowed, how-
ever, by the unfavorable reac-
tion to developments on the
mainland in the past year.
Thailand's Chinese
The position of Thailand's
3,171,000 Chinese, 15.1 percent
of the population, differs from
the other Chinese communities in
that for more than 50 years they
have been under varying degrees
of governmental pressure to be-
come Thai in citizenship and
culture. Many still maintain
their cultural identity, despite
effective governmental control
over their schools--in which the
time allowed to Chinese studies
is limited and the use of Thai
curricula required--economic re-
strictions, and limitations on
Chinese immigration.
Formally, at least, the Over-
seas Chinese have maintained
loyalty to Nationalist China, in
keeping with the Thai Govern-
ment's outlook, and Communist
China appears to have little
overt support from them. The
clandestine Chinese Communist
party of Thailand may have suc-
ceeded, however, in organizing
segments of the Chinese popula-
tion in Thailand.
Vietnam and The Philippines
The Chinese communities of
South Vietnam and the Philip-
pines have been established for
centuries and have flourished.
However, they are not popular
in either country, and neither
Peiping nor Taipei appears able
to exercise strong influence on
their behalf.
In South Vietnam, where the
estimated 830,000 Chinese (6..9
percent of the population) had
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
,been granted a separate cultur-
al and political status by the
French, the government in 1956
launched a vigorous program of
forced "Vietnamization," giving
locally born Chinese the choice
of accepting Vietnamese citizen-
ship, language, and culture,
or of being excluded from vital
businesses}a'nd professions in
which they were active.
After two years of re-
sistance, the Chinese bowed to
government demands and, out-
wardly at least, became Viet-
namese. They had almost no
choice, as little opportunity
was provided for them to leave
South Vietnam. Despite vague
threats to turn to Peiping for
assistance when Taiwan's inter-
cession on their behalf proved
ineffective, the Chinese of
Vietnam, following the govern-
ment's lead, continue to favor
Nationalist China over Peiping.
In the Philippines, where
friction involving the local
Chinese has continually marred
relations with Taipei, the
outlook for the Chinese commu-
nity may be even less promis-
ing than in South Vietnam. A
growing clamor for social and
economic restrictions, like
the recent law intended to
wrest control of retail trade
from Chinese hands and the de-
cision to deport "undesirable"
Chinese aliens, appears to pre-
clude any rapid assimilation
of the Chinese community. The
Chinese village retailer, how-
ever, is still considered an
excellent marriage prospect
among rural Filipinos.
Although a pro-Peiping
minority probably exists among
the Philippines' 330,000 Chi-
nese (1.5 percent of the popu-
lation), the community as a
whole tends to favor Taiwan,
reflecting the government's
position, and continues to de-
fend its interests, primarily
through informal use of its
economic power with influential
Filipino legislators and offi-
cials.
Chinese in Indonesia
The Chinese community in
Indonesia, some three million
or 3.5 percent of the total pop-
ulation, is probably the least
stable in Southeast Asia.
Granted a special status some-
where between the European and
the native in the era of Dutch
colonial rule, the Chinese
community gained major economic
power--and the hearty dislike
of Indonesian nationalists.
Approximately 25 to 30 percent
of the community accepted Indo-
nesian citizenship when Chinese
were required to register their
citizenship in 1951.
In the last three years,
discriminatory measures have
borne heavily, not only on
alien Chinese who are loyal to
Peiping or Taiwan, but also on
uncommitted Chinese and Indones-
ian citizens of Chinese ancestry.
Pro-Nationalist,Chinese busi-
nesses, organizations, schools,
and newspapers were either con-
fiscated or banned in 1958 when
the Indonesian Government
charged Taipei with assistance
to Indonesian rebels. For a
period thereafter, pro-Communist
influence was unchallenged.
In May 1959, however, the
government banned Chinese re-
tailers in rural areas and
ordered the resettlement of all
Chinese from some rural regions
to nearby towns and cities.
Peiping's remonstrances have
been ineffective, and the Chi-
nese fear that these restric-
tions are but the forerunner to
their expulsion from the country.
However, the Chinese Communist
Government, through its willing-
ness to accept Chinese repatriates
and to provide transportation
to the mainland has remained
more attractive than the Chinese
Nationalist Government to the
Chinese of Indonesia.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
POLAND LOSING BRIEF CULTURAL FREEDOM
Poland's intellectual and
cultural life since Gomulka
came to power in 1956--once re-
garded as a test of whether
freedom of expression could be
compatible with Communist rule--
is being subjected to ever-in-
creasing repression. While
there have been few dramatic
moves against intellectuals, the
margin of freedom permitted them
is shrinking gradually but
steadily.
The party seems determined
not only to curtail freedoms,
but also to direct the talents
of the intelligentsia into what
it considers the desirable po-
litical and ideological channels
and to make Poland's cultural
life conform more closely to
that in the remainder of the
bloc. The increased controls
are part of First Secretary Go-
mulka's broader campaign to
tighten the party's authority
over every aspect of Polish life.
A major factor in the cul-
tural tightening is Gomulka's
dislike and distrust of Intel-
lectuals generally. He never
really favored the freedom en-
joyed by Polish writers when he
came to power, but his position
was not firm enough to enforce
his views. Most Polish party
leaders look on journalists,
writers, and artists as revi-
sionists at heart and have long
wanted to bring them under party
control.
generally--but more specifically
those in the cultural field.
Politburo member Edward Ochab,
who now is in charge of cultural
matters, probably will attempt
to impose a more doctrinaire
party line.
Education Reforms
Increasingly dissatisfied
with the poor political indoc-
trination provided by Polish
universities, the party con-
gress in March 1959 laid down
the line that the compulsory
courses in philosophy "must be
conducted exclusively in the
spirit of Marxism." There are
practical difficulties in teach-
ing philosophy with a Marxist
slant, however, because few pro-
fessors will admit to such views,
and many who are qualified find
themselves "too busy" to teach
these required courses.
Professor Adam Schaff,
leading party ideologist, stated
recently that the party is con-
sidering reinstating in the uni-
versities compulsory courses in
Marxism-Leninism; these had been
dropped following Gomulka's re-
turn to power. Such a step,
Schaff said, is "indispensable"
to the strengthening of the
Marxist ideological offensive
against the pressures of alien
ideologies. He admitted, however,
that regime efforts to impose
compulsory courses in Marxism
by "administrative means" have
proved self-defeating.
Since the third plenum of
the party central committee in
October 1959, the hard-line ele-
ments in the party appear to
have been in the ascendant.
Zenon Kliszko, a close friend
and confidant of Gomulka,
has urged him to take sterner
action against the intellectuals.
The "resignation" of Jerzy Mor-
awski from his posts on the
party politburo and secretariat
apparently resulted from his op-
position to greater controls
Polish students are not
interested in Communist ideol-
ogy, and attempts to popularize
Marxism would encounter at least
indifference and possibly open
resistance. There is also a
move under way to revise all
textbooks and teaching aids in
an effort to instill the "proper
socialist attitude" in Polish
school children.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
Retreat of the Writers
In the long struggle against
the reimposition of party con-
trols, Polish intellectuals--
especially writers--had given
ground only grudgingly until
the Writers'. Union Con-
gress last December.
At the 1958 congress
at Wroclaw, for ex-
ample, the writers put
up such a spirited
battle against the
government's censor-
ship policy that they
succeeded in retaining
an independent leader-
ship under the re-
spected non-Communist
poet Antoni Slonimski.
By 1959, however, most
of the writers had
been cowed.
Party and govern-
ment leaders speaking
at the December con-
gress told the writers that it
is not enough for them to refrain
from writing in a vein critical
of the regime; they must also
"make a positive contribution
to the building of socialism."
All hostility--even by implica-
tion--must be eliminated. Deputy
Premier Jarosewicz complained
that in the past few years Pol-
ish literature, hampered by "re-
actionary and backward political
trends," had failed to meet the
needs of the times; he called on
the writers to be active allies
of the party.
Another party spokesman
warned that the Writer's Union
must again become the ideological
stronghold it had been from 1949
to 1956, and that it must give
up the purely professional role
it has attempted to play since
October 1956.
Of the 14 men elected to
the governing presidium of the
Writers' Union at the December
1959 meeting, six are party mem-
bers and two or three others
have been called "non-card-
carrying party members." Only
a few of the liberal writers
previously elected to union
posts in the period since Octo-
ber 1956 were named to high posi-
tions last December. Jaroslaw
Iwaskiewicz, a leading nonparty
literary figure who bends with
the prevailing political winds
was elected president of the
union, replacing Slonimski, who
consistently opposed party domi-
nation of the writers.
Important new members of
the Writers' Union presidium in-
clude candidate member of the
party central committee Jerzy
Putrament, another opportunist
who jumped on the Gomulka band-
wagon after October 1956; central
committee member Leon Kruczkowski,
a Stalinist die-hard who also
heads the party's cultural com-
mission; and central committee
member and former education min-
ister Stefan Zolkiewski, who
laid down the party line at the
congress.
Regime Measures
The regime is using a
number of methods to apply pres-
sure: threat of loss of a job;
refusal to permit a work to be
published;. occasional'Icheck-ups"
by the police; and various overt
and subtle pressures on families.
The party has also appointed
special commissions to investi-
gate the ideological situation
in all areas of cultural life.
As a result of these pressures,
the intellectuals have become
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 February 1960
more prudent and passive,,.and
less willing to express them-
selves.
The government has institut-
ed a thorough re-examination of
publishing policies, with major
emphasis on assuring that all
materials published are completly
acceptable from the ideological
point of view. Widespread rumors
of drastic editorial and per-
sonnel changes and unclear and
inconsistent party directives
have caused a great deal of un-
certainty about publishing plans
for 1960.
A major effect of the in-
creasingly severe control over
intellectuals is that novels,
stories, articles, and poems
can no longer pass censorship if
they portray life and conditions
as they actually are in Poland
today. There is no place for
such works of protest as Adam
Wazyk's Poem for Adults, Leopold
Tyrmand's The Man With the White
Eyes, or Marek Hlasko's The
Eighth Day of the Week and The
Graveyard, a few of the works
that once made Polish literature
vital and fascinating.
The economic pressures are
having their effect, and many
writers have turned to noncontro-
versial subjects such as medieval
architecture. Translation of
Western books into Polish prob-
ably will be reduced, since the
party apparently has decided that
too much emphasis has been given
to pessimistic, avant-garde books
--to the neglect of more opti-
mistic "socialist" works. While
the regime can apply its negative
controls and prevent the publi-
cation of works it does not ap-
prove, there is little evidence
that it has succeeded in forcing
writers to make a "positive con-
tribution to the building of
socialism" or to return to pro-
ducing works of "socialist real-
ism."
The Polish film industry,
renowned for its imaginative and
realistic portrayal of contem-
porary life,. has not escaped
the heavy hand of censorship.
Motion picture producers have
been called on the carpet by
party functionaries and told
that while Polish movies might
have won prizes abroad, they did
so only because the Western judg-
es considered them anti-Commu-
nist. Producers were warned that
henceforth Polish movies, like
Polish literature, would be
judged according to whether they
aid the party in achieving na-
tional goals. Several films al-
most completed have been halted
in production, others have been
heavily censored and revised, and
a number of scripts have been re-
jected.
Jazz and avant-garde music
are still being played by orches-
tras both in Poland andon tour
abroad without interference from
the regime. Nevertheless, such
music is under a cloud in Poland,
and there is considerable specu-
lation that the regime might de-
cide not to hold the annual au-
tumn festival of contemporary
music.
While there is no firm
evidence that the regime is
making foreign travel more dif-
ficult for Polish intellectuals
and artists, few of them are
seeking permission to travel.
There have been some delays in
obtaining passports, and many
who have received grants for
study and travel abroad and
and others, including Antoni
Slonimski, who have been ap-
proached by American impre-
sarios about tours to the United
States, consider it wise not to
push their applications for pass-
ports at this time.
Prior to this year, Polish
television newscasts were for the
most part factual and well
balanced, with comparatively
unbiased coverage of events in
the West through the extensive
use of film clips. Since the
first of the year, however,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLT SUMMARY
25 February 1960
television newscasts have under-
gone a change indicating tighter
political control of the news
and a greater conformity with
bloc policies. Not only has there
been a significant increase in
news and film coverage from bloc
countries--especially from the
Soviet Union--but there has been
a definite trend toward inter-
preting the news according to
the Communist line through care-
ful selection of news items and
some slanted editorial commen-
taries.
Although the United States
has not been criticized directly,
no opportunity is lost to asso-
ciate it with NATO, Chancellor
Adenauer, and West Germany--
the thief targets of Poland's
Propaganda. The recent newscasts
portray the USSR as the leader
of the Communist bloc, the pro-
tector of Poland's interests,
and-.the leader of the forces
seeking peace.
Soviet Pressures
There is considerable de-
bate among Polish intellectuals
concerning the role played by
the Soviet Union in the cultural
tightening. Some believe that
Soviet criticism of Polish art,
music, literature, and films
has been largely responsible
for the party's sterner action.
Others cite the trend toward
liberalization in these fields
inside the USSR as indicating
there is no reason for official
pressure from the Kremlin.
Nevertheless, Soviet
criticism of Polish cultural
life has been rather sharp in
recent months. Critics in the
USSR have reproached the Polish
movie makers for "unduly thick-
ening the dark colors" and for
failing to maintain the proper
proportion when dealing with
the struggle between the old
and the new in Polish life.
The Russians have long been crit-
ical of Polish art, which has a
freshness and vigor found no-
where else in the bloc, and
have strongly implied that it
is having a bad influence on
art in other "socialist" coun-
tries.
The curbs imposed on Po-
land's cultural and intellectual
life so far have been somewhat
arbitrary and inconsistent and
often have consisted more of
threats of dire things to come
than specific restrictive meas-
ures. While there is little
evidence that the regime will
be successful in forcing the
intelligentsia to cooperate
actively in "building socialism,"
it seems clear that Poland's
literature, art, and culture for
some time to come will no longer
exhibit the freedom, vitality,
and imagination that has charac-
terized it ' since the c
ber 1956 revolt. F_ 7
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1.7 of 17
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