CURRENT INTELLIGNECE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
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• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
SEEi2EF
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 56
OCI NO, 0025/60
28 January 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
- 0% - r% I 25X1
ss. a
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:.4.d1ar 80 REV'L '.'
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
DE GAULLE AND ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The extremist uprising in Algiers--a revolt against
French authority having as its immediate goal the repudia-
tion of De Gaulle's self-determination program for Algeria--
has reached a standstill, and the political reliability
of French Army units in Algeria remains in question.
De Gaulle will probably have to demonstrate that he has
solid support in France before the army can be induced to
restore order. Although the insurgents have been disap-
pointed in their hope for sympathetic demonstrations in
France, and most non-FLN Moslems in Algeria continue to
support De Gaulle's program, settler leaders probably feel
that by continuing to defy French authority they can force
concessions from De Gaulle. De Gaulle's intention to main-
tain a firm stand on his Algerian policy is becoming in-
creasingly clear, however, as he moves to cut off the
insurgents' support in France. 25X1
THE CUBAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The Castro government has continued its pressure on
American business interests in Cuba and its verbal attacks
on US policies and officials. These moves are accompanied
by efforts to gain international stature through the pro-
jected conference of underdeveloped nations in Havana
this summer. Thus far a number of neutralist countries
have responded favorably, but Latin American countries are
generally wary and in some cases hostile. Without com-
mitting themselves to attend the conference, Nasir, Tito,
and Sukarno have agreed to visit Cuba.
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Kbrushchev apparently intends to announce reductions
of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe as his next move to set
the stage for his forthcoming trips to Asia and France and
for the East-West disarmament and summit conferences. The
Soviet premier probably believes such an announcement
would give further momentum to his disarmament plan and
strengthen his hand at the summit, particularly in press-
ing for reciprocal reductions of Western forces in Germany
and Berlin.
Khrushchev has reallirmed his position on a erman peace
treaty and Berlin and sought to sharpen his recent public
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
PART I (continued)
warnings that the USSR will sign a separate peace treaty
with East Germany if the West rejects Soviet proposals
for a treaty with both German states.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Charges' that Iraqi Chief of State Rubai and military
governor General.Abdi were privy to the assassination
attempt against Prime Minister Qasim last October are
being publicly aired in Baghdad Qasim has given no indi-
cation that. he will act on these charges, which have some
substance in fact. Nasir meanwhile has adopted a still
more rigid stand against Israeli use of the Suez Canal.
The Libyan Government has formally asked for a new set of
"high-level" negotiations on American aid and base rights;
its initial bargaining price has been set at $20,000,000
"without strings" for the next Libyan fiscal year.
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH . . Page 1
Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 14 Jan-
uary has been followed by several developments which help
clarify the USSR's plans for reorganizing its armed forces.
Meetings are being held among officers and enlisted men
to explain demobilization plans, and a new form of mili-
tary administration on a territorial basis may be set up
with one, objective of enabling those demobilized to main-
tain their military qualifications. Some redisposition
of forces may ensue.
SOVIET "GOVERNORS" VISIT THE UNITED STATES . .
. Page 2
A Soviet government delegation is scheduled to arrive
in New York on 29 January for a 21-day tour of the United
States, returning the visit of nine American governors to
the USSR last year. T be itinerary is limited largely
to the states represented by those governors. The premier
of the Russian Republic (RSFSR), Daitry Polyansky, who is
also a candidate member of the party presidium, will head
the 24-man delegation, which includes the governmental
heads of the most important subdivisions of the Soviet
Union.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
PART II (continued)
SOVIET 1959 ECONOMIC REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The TASS summary of the report on the USSR's economic
performance;, during the first year of the,.Seven-Year Plan
(1959-65) indicates that, except for grain production,
good progress was made toward early fulfillment of the
plan, with rates of growth in general exceeding those
needed to achieve plan goals. The gross value of indus-
trial production was reported up 11 percent in 1959, com-
pared with an average annual increase of 8.6 percent
called for under the Seven-Year Plan.
PEIPING'S ANNUAL ECONOMIC STATEMENT . . . . . . . . Page 7
Peiping has issued a glowing communique on its econ-
omy during 1959, slanted to refute domestic and foreign
critics who have cast doubt on the correctness of the
regime's burry-up economic programs and its recurring
claims of unprecedented successes. Impressive industrial
advances were almost certainly made last year, but the
extent of the gains claimed by Peiping is exaggerated.
Agricultural output, rather than increasing as alleged,
probably decreased, in the case of grain by some 5 to 7
percent.
YUGOSLAV REGIME CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE RESISTANCE . . . . Page 8
Two major public trials of persons charged with anti-
state activity and reports of arrests and secret trials
of Croatian nationalists demonstrate' the Yugoslav regime's
concern over the existence of resistance elements. The
involvement of Roman Catholic priests and church facili-
ties in all the cases reported seems likely to damage
r.ecentlyiaprbved ehurch-state relations, but there is no
indication that this is the forerunner of an antireligious
campaign.
STATUS OF BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ . . . . . . . Page 10
The Soviet bloc is carrying out its economic, techni-
cal, and military aid agreements with Iraq. The USSR has
begun preliminary work on about three quarters of the proj-
ects called for under its $137,500,000 line of credit and
has continued to make frequent deliveries of military
equipment under its $168,000,000 arms deal. Moscow further-
more has announced that it will build Iraq's first iron and
steel mill, a project with little economic justification
but one which will be a symbol of status in the minds of
the Iraqis.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
PART II (continued)
ITALIAN OIL COMBINE MAY BUILD PIPELINE FOR USSR . . . . . Page 11
Italy's state-contolled gas and oil agency, ENI, has
made an agreement with the USSR to construct an oil pipe-
line from the Urals to East Germany in return for crude
oil deliveries spread over five years. This move, pro-
moted by ENI's head, Enrico Mattel, is in accord with a
widespread desire in the Italian business community to ex-
pand trade relations with the bloc regardless of strategic
considerations. It seems likely at present that the gov-
ernment will approve the agreement.
AFRICAN CONFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Three African conferences now being held in Brussels,
London, and Paris will probably outline the steps toward
independence or self-government for the Belgian Congo,
Kenya, and the Mali Federation in West Africa. At each
conference, a common front reached by the African factions
is likely to gain the maximum in concessions from the colo-
nial powers and to result in significant gains in African
political power--in some cases, a timetable for independ-
ence, as the 30 June date for the Congo agreed to on 27 Jan-
uary.
BRITAIN'S PROBLEMS GROWING IN CENTRAL AFRICA . . . . . . . Page 14
The growing political and racial problems of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland have been emphasized
by the critical reactions of both African nationalists
and right-wing white settlers during British Prime Minis-
ter Macmillan's trip. Increasing tension in British-
Rhodesian relations may develop in the forthcoming offi-
cial discussions concerning the situation in Central Africa.
Nationalist-inspired disorders in Nyasaland, and perhaps
in Northern Rhodesia, may occur in demonstration of African
opposition to the continuation of the white-dominated Fed-
eration.
KERALA STATE ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
In the campaign for India's Kerala state elections on
1 February, the united front of non-Communist parties is
holding, and perhaps increasing, its lead over the former-
ly ruling Communist party. The strong drive by Congress
and Socialist politicians in the last two weeks is having
considerable effect and has put the Communists on the
defensive. While the working agreement among Kerala's non-
Communist parties forms a basis for a coalition government,
it is doubtful that these once bitterly divided groups will
cooperate in power as they have in opposition.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
PART II (continued)
BURMESE NATIONAL ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Burma's third general election since independence
will be held on 6 February under the supervision of Pre-
mier Ne Win's "interim" military government.
observers predict that former Premier Nu 's o -
owers will win a parliamentary majority, possibly by a
large margin. Nu's return to office would probably bring
little change in government policy, as the army intends to
exert "a restraining influence" on the new government.
RHEE OPPONENT MAY WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL
RACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pa ge 17
Illness may force President Rhee's opponent, Demo-
cratic party leader,Cho Pyong-ok, to withdraw from South
Korea's presidential election this spring. Cho enjoys
wide popularity; his withdrawal would make Rhee's re-elec-
tion easier and perhaps make the administration less in-
clined to use repressive and illegal tactics in the elec-
tion. However, it also would probably further weaken
South Korea's repressed opposition and blight the develop-
ment of a two-party system.
SOUTH TIROL ISSUE PLAGUES ITALY AND AUSTRIA . . . . . Page 18
The recent exchange of letters between Italian Pre-
mier Segni and Austrian Chancellor Raab has apparently
averted an immediate crisis in relations between Rome and
Vienna over the rights of the German-speaking minority in
the South Tirol, but an early solution of the problem is
still not in sight. Austria would resume talks on the
basis of the Tirolese demand for "full autonomy" for the
German linguistic area, but Italy contends that such a
status was not provided for in the 1946 agreement between
the two governements.
ICELAND'S ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
The Icelandic parliament is expected to grant early
approval to the new Conservative - Social Democratic gov-
ernment's comprehensive economic reform program, which
includes devaluating the krona from 16 to about 38 to the
dollar and an eventual end to the system of price supports
for fish and agricultural exports. The proposed reforms
would be the most extensive initiated since World War II,
but the Thors government feels it has public opinion
strongly behind it as a result of last October's general
election. The Communists, through their control of the
central trade union federation, are in 'a position to hin-
der effective implementation of the program if they wish to
risk calling politically inspired strikes.
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28 January 1960
PART II (continued)
TRUJILL0 TIGHTENS CONTROLS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . Page 20
Recent arrests involving virtually every important
family in the Dominican Republic, as well as members of
the Catholic clergy, reflect the widespread nature of the
opposition to the Trujillo dictatorship. Trujillo for the
present has disrupted the revolutionary organization and
has also taken certain economic measures to make his re-
gime more popular, but extreme tension prevails at all
levels of Dominican society. Dissidence, already reported
in the armed forces, may increase as a result of the large-
scale arrests, and exiles may step up their activities.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET VIEWS OF CATCHING UP WITH THE UNITED STATES . . . . Page 1
By Soviet definition, the first and foremost task in
"catching up with the United States" is to overtake the
United States in per capita output of the major types of
production--those "constituting the backbone of industry
and whose development determines a country's economic
strength." Soviet leaders, pointing to differences be-
tween the two countries and their outlook, say they have
no intention of trying to match the United States in all
types of production, particularly certain consumer goods,
thereby justifying a continuation of present priorities
favoring heavy industry.
MIDDLE EAST OIL DEVELOPMENTS 1959-1960 . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Production of Middle East crude oil in 1959 reached
an all-time high of about 4,560,000 barrels a day--up 7
percent from 1958--and prospects for 1960 are for another
record year. The annual rate of increase is declining,
however, and future yearly increases may average less than
10 percent compared with the 23-percent-per-year average
which characterized the decade 1949-59. The anticipated
entry of Algeria and Libya into world oil markets as major
suppliers will cut heavily into present demand for Persian
Gulf crude. Threatened with prospects of substantially
lower annual increases in income from oil, present Middle
East pr.odud.in.g countries will probably apply heavy pres-
sure for more advantageous profit-sharing formulas.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
PART III (continued)
THE ASIAN COMMUNIST SATELLITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
While the three Asian Communist satellites--North
Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam--acknowledge the ideo-
logical leadership of the Soviet Union, they have not
only geographic and ethnic but long-standing cultural and
economic ties with China. Within this framework, they
have considerable scope in the management of their own
THE FRENCH NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
France's nuclear weapons program has a broad base in
research and in reactor construction, but it lacked ade-
quate backing until the Suez crisis in 1956 gave it an im-
petus which De Gaulle's coming to power accelerated. Plans
for large-scale nuclear production of electricity now may
get less emphasis, both because of the growing availability
of conventional power and because of the heavy stress on
nuclear weapons. The first French weapons test--likely to
begin in February--is expected to be a series oflatmos-
pheric shots.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
DE GAULLE AND ALGERIA
After an initial period
of apparent indecision by the
De Gaulle government and re-
luctance of the French Army to
open fire on the settler in-
surgents in Algiers, De Gaulle
now appears to be taking steps
to reinforce his authority.
He shows no signs of yielding
on his basic Algerian policy,
and his crackdown on rightist
extremist leaders in France in-
dicates that he will not tol-
erate the spread of the dissi-
dence to metropolitan France.
The special cabinet meet-
ing on 27 January ended with-
out an open split or resigna-
tions of ministers, previously
reported to have been imminent.
On the same day, the major
afternoon newspapers published
assurances of public support,
presumably at official request.
Public apathy in France--fos-
tered by the censorship in Al-
geria imposed until 28 January
--now is ending, and De Gaulle
is receiving messages of sup-
port from a wide variety of po-
litical, labor, and religious
groups.
In addition to the already
solid backing of the major left-
center and center parties,-'
Socialists, Radicals, and Pop-
ular Republicans--De Gaulle on
27 January was given a pledge
of cooperation from Union for
the New Republic (UNR) parlia-
mentary representatives from
the Paris area. The UNR, al-
though nominally pledged to
support De Gaulle's policies,
includes the Soustelle wing,
which favors integration of
Algeria.
The police raids on right-
ist ringleaders may undercut
Communist calls for broad co-
operation and public, manifesta-
tions supporting De Gaulle and
demanding forcible repression
of the settlers which appeared
to be making some headway among
officials of the Christian La-
bor Confederation.
The immediate spark for
the settler insurrection was
the transfer on 22 January of
the rightist General Massu,
whose interview with a German
newsman had resulted in the pub-
lication of a magazine article
highly critical of De Gaulle.
The extremist leaders probably
had long sought a suitable op-
portunity to precipitate a
crisis for the De Gaulle re-
gime. Although the extremists
continue to maintain that their
only object is to guarantee a
"French Algeria," many extrem-
ists are neofascist in outlook
and fundamentally unsympathetic
with democratic institutions.
The crisis began on the
evening of 24 January when about
1,000 settler militants--the
hard core of 20,000 settlers
who had demonstrated against
the ouster of Massu on 23-24
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMIARY
28 January 1960
January--entrenched themselves
behind barricades in downtown
Algiers, Many were heavily
armed; among the insurgents
were members of paramilitary
groups who had been equipped
by the French as local security
forces. When army units at-
tempted to disperse the insur-
gents, firing broke out which
resulted in 24 deaths and over
100 wounded.
French Army units sur-
rounded the barricaded'area,
but the clashes on 24 January
demonstrated the reluctance of
the military to use force
against compatriots with whose
views they were largely in
sympathy. Overt fraternization
between the military and the
yoking his self-determination
policy--that the French Gov-
ernment and people will work
for a French Algeria. He could
present such an assurance as a
reiteration of his earlier ex-
planation that the entire mili-
tary, economic, and social pro-
gram being carried out in Al-
geria is designed to ensure the
permanence of the French pres-
ence there. Other alternatives
are available to De Gaulle--
such as the assumption of full
powers, a special session of
parliament to reaffirm self-
determination, or a popular
referendum to demonstrate his
public support--but these would
still leave him with the problem
of imposing his will on the army.
insurgents decreased
after
25
In Algiers,
the
January; nonetheless,
the
num-
appear confident
that
ber of insurgents increased to
about 4,000, and they appeared
to have no difficulty in ob-
taining supplies and reinforce-
ments. In Algiers a de facto
cease-fire drifted into a stale-
mate, although in other Algerian
cities sporadic rightist dem-
onstrations continued.-.
There have been repeated
statements from various Algerian
political figures that they see
civil war in cooperation with
army elements as their only al-
ternative if De Gaulle persists
in hi
icy.
If such threats become more
serious, De Gaulle may feel ob-
liged to give some public as-
surances--although without re-
insurgents
their
defiance of authority and the
threat of civil war will force
concessions from Paris. The
extremists were probably heart-
ened by an appeal for order on
27 January by General Challe,
whose statement that Algeria
"will definitely remain French
soil" implied the possibility
of concessions. They are ap-
parently unaware, however, of
the extent of De Gaulle's sup-
port in France.
Prior to 27 January,
the role of Algeria's Moslem
majority was largely pas-
sive. On 27 January, however,
a pro-De Gaulle demonstra-
tion took place in the west-
ern town of Mostaganem.
most Algerian
Moslems support De Gaulle's
policy, and many desire to
support the government ac-
tively in the present crisis.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The Castro government has
continued its pressure on Amer-
ican business interests in
Cuba and its verbal attacks on
United States policies and of-
ficials. These moves are ac-
companied by efforts to gain
international stature through
the projected conference of
underdeveloped nations in Ha-
vana this summer.
Ambassador Bonsai's per-
sonal popularity among Cubans
contrasts with the denuncia-
tions by Castro officials
and the government-subsidized
press and the charges that
he "conspires with traitors
and assassins." Extensive
personal attacks on President
Eisenhower and other high of-
ficials by government-controlled
media increase and decrease in
volume in apparent accord-
ance with the political pres-
sures of the Cuban domestic
scene.
After eight months of
extralegal seizures of large
areas of private land,much of
it American--owned, the Castro
government has actually begun
expropriation proceedings,but
there is still no indication
that proper compensation will
Over be made.
According to "Che" Guevara,
pro-Communist president of
Cuba's National Bank, foreign
banks will no longer be per-
mitted to rediscount with the
National Bank their crop loans
to either American- or Cuban-
owned sugar companies. While
this action appears primarily
to discriminate against Ameri-
can banks in a move to force
them to bring in desperately
needed dollars for loans, it
could also be a prelude to de-
priving all private banks of
the profitable and traditional
short-term loans to sugar com-
panies. It could be a step
toward nationalization of the
entire banking system, one of
Castro's early stated objec-
tives.
The government, in a strong
curb on private business, has
also issued regulations putting
control of all changes of em-
ployment under the Labor Min-
istry.
Foreign Minister Raul Roa,
who has been on tour to invite
Asian and African countries to
the "hungry nations" conference,
reports an "enthusiastic re-
sponse." Nasir, Tito, and Su-
karno have indicated that they
will visit Cuba, although not
necessarily in connection with
the conference. Morocco, Tunisia,
and the Sudan initially have in-
dicated disinterest.
Roa's plans for the con-
ference appear vague. Roa has
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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decided to exclude Israel,
European countries, and Commu-
nist China. or any other non-UN
nation. Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, Nicaragua, and Para-
guay probably will be excluded
as dictatorships. The UN sec-
retariat has denied the con-
ference will be held under its
auspices, as Roa had implied,
and as a matter of principle
the UN could not associate it-
self with a meeting which dis-
criminates against member gov-
ernments.
In Latin America, where a
touring delegation is issuing
the invitations, the conference
response has been generally
wary and the delegates are re-
portedly discouraged.
In another move toward
closer relations with Communist
and neutral countries, the
Castro-subsidized press service,
Prensa Latina, concluded news
exchange agreements on 29 Jan-
uary in Havana with representa-
tives of news agencies from
the USSR, UAR, Communist China,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bul-
garia, Yugoslavia, East Germany,
Indonesia, and Japan. Prensa
Latina frequently appends its
own date and source line to
stories orLginating from these
sources. Its emphasis on Latin
American affairs and on world
news of interest to the hemi-
radio station announced on 27 sphere, plus its generous free
January that Brazil had definite- services, have contributed to
ly refused to attend the con- Prensa Latina's rapid expan-
ference--an action which will sion, although there is already
discourage attendance by suspicion in other countries
other Latin American coun- of Communist influence on its
tries. personnel and output.
Prensa Latina's latest move
is an attempt to liken President
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
Khrushchev apparently in-
tends to announce a reduction of
Soviet troops in Eastern Europe
as his next move to set the
stage for his forthcoming trips
to Asia and France and for the
East-West disarmament and summit
conferences. He told the West
German ambassador on 18 January
that the recent Soviet decision
to cut conventional forces by
one third would be followed by
"proportionate" reductions in
Soviet troops stationed in Po-
land, Hungary, and East Germany.
He added that the USSR was pre-
pared to withdraw all of its
forces from these areas if the
West accepted the Soviet dis-
armament plan.
Khrushchev probably believes
these moves will give further
momentum to his disarmament
plan and strengthen his hand at
the summit, particularly in
pressing for reciprocal reduc-
tions of Western forces in Ger-
many and Berlin. Last December
in a speech in Budapest Khrush-
chev dwelt at length on the
"utmost absurdity" which could
develop if the West agreed to
his disarmament plan and at the
same time insisted on retaining
forces in West Berlin. He as-
serted that "continuation of the
occupation regime completely
contradicts the idea of disarm-
ament."
East German party chief
Ulbricht is already bringing
pressure on Bonn to follow the
Soviet lead and "undertake a
disarmament initiative" in Ger-
many. In his 26 January letter
to Chancellor Adenauer, Ulbricht
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
warned that if Bonn did not cease
its atomic arming and apply a
"ban on armaments within a short
time," East Germany would be com-
pelled to request its allies to
place rocket weapons at its dis-
posal. Ulbricht proposed a
referendum in Germany to determine
the popular attitude on complete
disarmament and the conclusion
of a peace treaty and also sug-
gested that the two German states
agree on ceilings for their forces
and on the "stationing of mili-
tary forces" in Germany.
Moscow followed a similar
pattern in exploiting previous
reductions in 1956 and 1958.
These moves were given heavy
publicity and were accompanied
by appeals to Western governments
and parliaments to follow the
Soviet example. The Supreme
Soviet's resolution on 15 Jan-
uary, appealing to the parlia-
ments of all nations to take
"practical steps" on disarmament
to "create an atmosphere of con-
fidence and facilitate the suc-
cess of forthcoming negotiations,"
is almost identical to the Decem-
ber 1957 resolution which fore-
shadowed the announcement on 6
January 1958 of a 300,000-man
reduction, including withdrawals
of 41,000 troops from East Ger-
many and 17,000 from Hungary.
Khrushchev can also be ex-
pected to follow up his announce-
ment of troop reductions in the
satellites with a renewed effort
to press previous proposals for
a nuclear-free zone in Central
Europe and reductions of foreign
forces in Germany and other
European countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SL'IIWABY
28 January 1960
Communist China officially
endorsed the Soviet decision but
strongly implied that it will
make no comparable gesture.
Foreign Minister Chen Yi sought
to justify this position in a
speech on 21 January by charging
that the "peace" posture of the
United States is simply a "cover
for its policy of aggression and
war." He claimed, however, that
Peiping's sincerity in "safe-
guarding peace and disarmament"
has been repeatedly shown by its
past armament reductions.
Chen Yi also warned that
Peiping would not regard as bind-
ing any disarmament agreement
"arrived at without the formal
participation of the Chinese
People's Republic and the sig-
nature of its delegate."
Germany and Berlin
In his conversations with
the West German ambassador,
Khrushchev reaffirmed the USSR's
proposals on Berlin and a German
peace treaty and underlined his
recent public warnings that the
USSR would sign a separate peace
treaty th ..Egst'^ ?Ge anv un-
Iess&se?idus' on rideration were
given to the Soviet proposals.
He informed the ambassador that
he would insist on discussing a
German peace treaty and Berlin at
the summit but that he would be
"content" with a temporary agree-
ment on Berlin, provided the oc-
cupation was ended. He emphati-
cally rejected linking the Berlin
question with German unification.
Moscow's apparent intention
to stand firm on its established
positions on Berlin and Germany
at the summit meeting was echoed
in East German party leader Ul-
bricht's recent interview with
an Italian paper. He claimed
that "the positive results of
the Geneva foreign ministers'
conference will undoubtedly serve
as a basis of discussion" at the
summit conference. In his letter
to Adenauer, Ulbricht emphasized
that the creation of a "free city"
in West Berlin would be achieved
sooner or later and renewed his
proposals to establish an all-
German committee, based on equal 25X1
representation, to "deliberate"
the preparation of a peace treaty 25X1
and the reunification of Germany.
and Ulbricht have evolved a long-
range strategy for gaining Western
concessions. The Communist lead-
ers feel that they can afford to
be patient, believing that the
West will eventually grow tired
of the Berlin problem.
In the interim, however,
physical and propaganda pressure
reportedly will be maintained
against West Berlin to keep the
city in a
state
of
"uncertain
suspense."
25X1
25X1
During
t
e Geneva
negotiations, Khrushchev specif-
ically stated, in referring to
the Berlin problem, that "not
one but several meetings of heads
of government will be needed" in
order to solve "those questions
which now are ripe for settle-
ment and which need to be settled
step by step."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
Moscow's aim in passing
such a memorandum to the Social-
ists and Berlin Mayor Brandt is
probably to bring pressure on
the party to take more decisive
action in challenging Adenauer's
recent assertions that the
Western proposal at the Geneva.
foreign ministers' conference
for an interim Berlin solution
should not be the West's start-
ing point at the summit.
Moscow may also be seeking to
create difficulties between
party leaders and Mayor Brandt,
who has taken a position similar
to Adenauer's in contrast to the
more flexible official party
attitude toward the negotiations
at Geneva.
The Soviet premier has
been angling for an invitation
to visit West Germany since his
15 October letter to Adenauer,
but Bonn has not responded.
Such a visit, probably coupled
with at least a stopover in
East Germany, would serve to
accentuate the Soviet con-
tention that two German states
are a political reality which
should be accepted by the West.
Western Attitudes
Chancellor Adenauer.'s re-
ply of 14 January to Khrushchev's
letter of 15 October was bluntly
worded, in the hope of ending
the exchange. Adenauer believes
further correspondence affords
Khrushchev an effective means
of exerting pressure on Bonn
in the pre-summit period. The
chancellor raised no new issues
and referred to previous letters
in refuting certain charges. He
noted that the Berlin question
would be settled as soon as
Khrushchev permitted the German
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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
people the right of self-deter-
mination.
In the course of a visit to
Rome on 20-24 January, Adenauer
may have been less successful
than he had hoped in obtaining
from the Italians a firm commit-
ment to support the status quo.
in Berlin. In the course of
conversations, the Italians con-
tested Adenauer's thesis thatdis-
armament should have priority at
the summit by noting that in such
an event other urgent problems
"such as Berlin" might be neglected.
Nuclear Test Ban Talks
The Soviet delegation at
Geneva is marking time awaiting
the introduction of a new US
proposal for a limited test-ban
treaty. A Soviet representative
at the talks told an American
official privately on 21 January
that his delegation would have
nothing of importance to propose
"for the time being,', adding, "It
is now up to you." On 27 January
chief Soviet delegate Tsaral.kin
told newsmen in Geneva that the
USSR would "never accept" any
American proposal which did not
provide for a "total ban without
any conditions."
The conference has continued
negotiating the routes for dis-
patching aircraft in event of a
suspected nuclear explosion.
Although the Soviet delegate has
continued to resist any provision
for special flights outside pre-
arranged air corridors, he prob-
ably may finally accept a formula
giving Moscow the right to dis- 25X1
approve any routes which it might
believe conflicted with Soviet
security reuirements.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
Iraq
lie Marsh, a British citizen
of Jamaican extraction accused
of working for British intelli-
gence, has been charged with
having prior knowledge of the
assassination plot. Marsh's
case has been referred for fur-
ther investigation.
A further element of
tension was added to the Iraqi
political scene this week
when one of the defendants in
the trial by the People's
Court of plotters against
Qasim stated that Chief of
State Rubai and military gover-
nor General Abdi, as'well as
several high security offi-
cials, were privy to the as-
sassination attempt against
Qasim.last October.
Security force leaders ac-
cused in the court have 0
denied any connection
with the plot and are carrying
on business as usual. Abdi,
at an Indian Embassy reception
on 26 January, "appeared re-
laxed, almost gay." Neverthe-
less, the renewal of testimony
by the court on 30 January
may lead to elaboration of
the charges against them.
Qasim may delay moving against
some or all of the accused
until after their apprehensions
have been lulled by lack of
prompt action.
Rubai and Abdi were ac-
cused of being prepared to
take over the government fol-
lowing Qasim's death, charges
apparently having some sub-
stance. The charges could
create a new political crisis
in Baghdad.
During the past week,
People's Court President Colonel
Mahdawi also leveled accusations
that the United States and Brit-
ainwere involved in the Qasim
assassination attempt. Specifi-
cally, the American ambassador
in Cairo was charged with turn-
ing over $1,120,000 to refugee
antiregime plotters, while Les-
In addition to the "ortho-
dox" and splinter Communist
groups, it appears that a new
Communist-front group will ap-
ply for party status. Led by
Aziz Sharif, a member of the
Iraqi Communist party central
committee, and the pro-Commu-
nist director of the oil re-
finery, this group is probably
intended to draw support from
non-Communist left-wing parties.
UAR-Israel
The recent discussions in
Cairo between UN Secretary Gen-
eral Hamarskjtold and UAR offi-
cials have failed to resolve the
dispute over Israeli shipping,
via the Suez Canal. The UAR's
position, as defined to Hammar-
skjold, has in fact become more
rigid and categoric than it was
previously.
25X1
in addition
to t e prev ous an on Israeli -
f lag vessels and ships chartered
by Israel, Cairo will not permit
any ship owned wholly or in part
by Israeli companies to transit
the canal, no matter what flag
it carries. The UAR also "re-
serves the right" to seize any
cargo coming from Israel, even
if shipped f.o.b. the port of
embarkation, on grounds that
such a cargo is regarded as "il-
legal fruit of Palestine's soil
which Israel has acquired through
aggression. Earlier,the-UAR had
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 January 1960
agreed with Hammarskjold to pass
cargoes sent f.o:b. from Israel
and those sent c.i.f. to Israel,
since they would not be legally
owned by the Israelis.
Cairo's intransigence
probably was inevitable in view
of the publicity that has at-
tended recent developments in
the dispute. Nasir wants to
avoid adverse Arab criticism,
particularly from Iraqi Premier
Qasim, of any "moderate" atti-
tude toward Israel. The f.o.b.-
c.i.f. arrangement was accepted
on the premise that there would
be no publicity surrounding ship-
ments under its terms.
The Danish vessel Inge Toft,
which has been detained for eight
months, and the Greek ship As-
typalea, stopped in mid-December,
are still impounded at Port Said.
The UAR will not allow them to
proceed through the canal unless
they unload their cargoes from
Israel. The Israelis, who have
awaited the results of Hammar-
skjold's personal diplomacy,
probably now will lodge a formal
complaint with the UN Security
Council.
Libya
Following the setback the
government sustained in the 17
January parliamentary elec-
tions, the Libyan Council of
Ministers formally requested a
new round of high-level negoti-
ations with the.United States
on the Wheelus base agreement
and on economic aid. Prime
Minister Kubaar has told the
American ambassador in Tripoli
of his government's "keen de-
sire" to present new "positive"
US proposals to the new House
of Deputies at its first meet-
ing in early February.
Kubaar indicated that a
$20,000,000 aid package--$14,-
000,000 with no US controls on
expenditure and $6,000,000
with very limited controls--
for the Libyan fiscal year be-
ginning 1 April would meet "the
immediate political exigencies
imposed by public opinion and
the new parliament." Such a
package, without subsequent ad-
ditions, would not increase the
total level of American aid
compared with the last two years,
but would give the Libyan Gov-
ernment much greater latitude
in its expenditures.
The powers of the Libyan
parliament are very limited un-
der the constitution and have
been even more limited in prac-
tice. It can, however, serve
as a focal point for popular
criticism and a sounding board
for opposition elements, thus
causing major embarrassment to
the government. The new House
of Deputies will have an aug-
mented minority of vehemently
anti-American members, a sizable
group of young Arab nationalists,
and a considerably reduced num-
ber of reliable government sup-
porters. The exact alignment
in the new house is not yet
clear, however, since many of
the candidates who displaced
incumbent government-backers 25X1
are young men without previous
experience on the Libyan par-
liamentary scene.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
28 January 1960
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH
Khrushchev's speech to the
Supreme Soviet on 14 January has
been followed by several devel-
opments which help clarify the
USSR's plans for reorganizing
its armed forces.
On 19 January, in an ad-
dress to officers of the Moscow
Garrison at a meeting in the
Kremlin attended by five pre-
sidium members and ten marshals
of the Soviet Union, Defense
Minister Malinovsky announced
that more than 250,000 offi-
cers--including "generals and
admirals"--would be among the
1,200,000 armed forces person-
nel to be demobilized by the
autumn of 1961. Malinovsky
said that a number of units,
bases, depots, schools, and
administrative organizations
would be disbanded.
Similar meetings were held
within the next few days in all
branches of the services; these
included addresses to officers,
enlisted men, and even wives.
These meetings took place
throughout the USSR, Poland,
Hungary, and East Germany, indi-
cating an effort to have the
reductions carefully explained
so as to provoke the least pos-
sible resentment.
On 18 January, Khrushchev
told the West German ambassador
in Moscow that the USSR would
reduce'the number of Soviet
troops in Poland, Hungary, and
East Germany. He did not say
when or how much, but he added
that if his disarmament pro
posals were accepted, all So-
viet troops would be withdrawn
from these countries.
The USSR has an estimated
350,000 ground and air troops
in East Germany, 70,000 in
Hungary, and 40,000 in Poland.
Many probably could be with-
drawn without jeopardizing the
local regimes.
25X1
25X1
oes reduce naval strength in the
Black Sea, many of these units--
particularly the submarines--
probably will be deployed to
the Northern and Pacific fleets,
where their potential could be
more fully realized. The diffi-
culty of moving vessels through
the Turkish Straits during war-
time makes deployment in the Black
Sea of marginal military value.
There are now 65 submarines, 26
destroyer-type vessels, and 8
cruisers there.
The emphasis given by Mali-
novsky in his speech to the
Moscow Garrison on the need for
demobilized officers to main-
tain their military qualifica-
tions and to be ready to
return to service "at the
first call of the party "; .may
relate to plans to establish a
number of territorial units,
as suggested by Khrushchev.
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28 January 1960
The territorial system estab-
lished by Lenin in 1923, which
Khrushchev said might be a mod-
el, set up units under the con-
trol of local military district
commanders. These units were
led by regular officers and
noncommissioned officers and
manned by local personnel, who
spent about two months a year
in training., In 1923 it was
planned that only about 25 per-
cent of the entire military
establishment was to be made
up of regular units. The sys-
tem was abandoned in 1939.
The re-establishment of a
territorial organization might
simultaneously accomplish sev-
eral Soviet objectives: 1) It
would fit in well with the al-
ready established mobilization
and reserve system to expand
the reservoir of trained man-
power, while permitting the
USSR to claim a massive reduc-
tion of its armed forces; 2)
It could provide jobs for some
demobilized officers and non-
commissioned officers as train-
ing personnel or advisers with
territorial units; 3) It
would permit demobilized per-
sonnel to enter the civilian
economy, while providing them
with military training; and
4) It could provide an oppor-
tunity for altering the pres-
ent'deployment of forces in
view of changes in the world
situation.
The present disposition of
forces, essentially unchanged
for a number of years, is
characterized by heavy con-
centrations in the western
USSR, Eastern Europe, and the
Far East. An article in Pravda
on 20 January by Col. Gen. V.
A. Penkovsky, commander of the
Far East Military District,
which attacked the US-Japanese
Defense Treaty, warned that
Moscow might not return the
Habomai and Shikotan islands
to Japan, as had been promised,
and implied that the USSR might
have to re-evaluate its secu-
rity situation in the Far
East.
A,note was sent to Tokyo on
28 January stating that the is-
lands would not be returned un-
less the treaty with the US was
scrapped. This suggests that
the USSR may use the signing of 25X1
the treaty as an excuse not to
reduce the heavy concentration
in the Far East.
A high-ranking Soviet
government delegation is sched-
uled to arrive in New York on
29 January for a 21-day tour
of the United States, return-
ing the visit of nine American
governors to the USSR last year.
Their itinerary is limited
largely to the states repre-
sented by those governors.
The premier of the Russian
Republic (RSFSR), Dmitry
Polyansky, will head the 24-
man group, which includes the
governmental heads of the most
important subdivisions of the
Soviet Union--the Russian,
Ukrainian, and Kazakh republics
and Moscow and Leningrad ob-
lasts--and other important ad-
ministrators.
Although their careers
have not followed the same
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28 January 1960
pattern, these men have for the
most part come to the fore in
the post-Stalin era and are
representative of the younger,
professionally qualified per-
sons whom Khrushchev is promot-
ing to executive positions.
Most of the group have received
university-level education at
technical institutes specializ-
ing in agricultural or industrial
fields. They have generally
impressed observers as competent
and knowledgeable administrators.
Polyansky, 42, one of the
youngest members in the top
party leadership, has been RSFSR
premier for almost
two years. He has
risen rapidly and ap-
pears to be in line
for further advance-
ment. He was edu-
cated as an agricul-
posts in Crimean and Chkalov
oblasts and in Krasnodar Kray.
In March 1958 Polyansky suc-
ceeded Frol Kozlov as RSFSR
premier, and the following June
was made a candidate member of
the party presidium.
Impressing observers with
an air of quiet competence,
Polyansky seems willing to talk
at length on any subject and
displays detailed knowledge of
a wide variety of topics. He
is well informed about life in
the West and appears interested
in promoting cultural and agri-
cultural exchanges. He is quite
tural specialist but Dinmukhamed A. Kunayev
made his career in
party work. After
the war he attended
the Higher Party
School in Moscow and
then worked for a
number of years on
the staff of the par-
ty central committee,
possibly in the ag-
riculture department.
He then held party
Kazakhstan*
Ukraine
Georgia
Azerbaydzhan
Moscow Oblast
Leningrad Oblast
*Was the republic's premier until 19 January, when he became
party first secretary in Kazakhstan.
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