CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002500050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
6~~EL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 56
OCR N0.5453/59
19 November 1959
Document No.
No Change In class. ^
C] Declassified
---------------
Class. Changed to: TS S Jb
25X1
:ext Review Date: ___-_____-_/ x Y Y
late: -_7.62A--JA- 7 1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
QO-ANVIDENTIAL
25X1
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J
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
The exchange of proposals
between New Delhi and Peiping
to neutralize their disputed
frontier seems to have done
little to narrow the gap be-
tween their conflicting posi-
tions. Nehru rejected as "im-
practicable" Chou En-lai's 7
November proposal for a 12-mile
mutual withdrawal of troops from
ASIv1 `rAND KHivtI
I f%
(Status in dispute)
/CEASf~FjRF LINE; ????
?.rinagar
J J N
X Location of
last two clashes
Selected road
---Selected trail
19 NOVEMBER 1959
O MILES 200
Zhikatse
n A N,43-E-8`
'S(KKIM
Gangtovy
ahon Line?
Shillong-
the McMahon line in the east
and from presently occupied
frontier positions in the west
--the Ladakh area. The Indian
leader expressed his apprecia-
tion, however, of Chou's friend-
ly assurances and agreed on the
desirability of negotiations.
In its reply, sent on 16
November, New Delhi apparently
cialist level; following .Chinese
evacuation of Indian territory.
These talks must precede any
Sino-Indian "summit" meeting.
Communist China has shown
no inclination to make prelimi-
nary concessions damaging its
bargaining position or its pres-
tige and has rejected Nehru's
previous demand that Chinese
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maintained its insistence on
Chinese withdrawal both from
the Longju outpost in Assam
and from Indian-claimed terri-
tory in Ladakh.
Nehru has endorsed Chou's
call for negotiations, but he
apparently feels that initial
talks must be held at the spe
Boundary shown on Indian maps
- Boundary shown on recent
Chinese Communist maps
Boundaries ore not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Gocern,oent.
Y y[
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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 6
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 November 1959
troops quit Indian-claimed ter-
ritory before negotiations be-
gin. Peiping has indicated,
however, a strong desire to get
the dispute to the conference
table, where it can make a dis-
play of willingness to find a
peaceful solution.
The Chinese are likely to
reject any proposal that
they withdraw from Ladakh, but
they may be somewhat more flexi-
ble about the McMahon line, per-
haps replying that something
might be worked out about Longju
in the preliminary negotiations
Nehru referred to. Chou En-
lai recently implied to an
Indian leftist that Peiping may
eventually compromise by ac-
cepting the McMahon line if
New Delhi makes some "conces-
sions" in Ladakh. The Chinese
reply is likely to be essen-
tially a restatement of Chou's
call of 7 November for mutual
withdrawal, an attempt to ob-
tain at least partial Indian
acceptance of Pe~ping's_poSi-
tion. The Chinese press is try-
ing to create the impression of
increasing international sup-
port for Chou's proposal.
The USSR is attempting to
gain credit with the Indian
Government for any ostensibly
conciliatory moves the Chinese
Communists make in the dispute.
The continued hostile re-
action in India to the Chinese
has finally forced the Indian
Communist party to abandon its
equivocal position on the border
issue and identify itself with
the vast majority of Indian
opinion. The resolution passed
on 14 November at a meeting of
the party's national council,
giving qualified support to the
Indian Government's stand,
signified a victory for the
"nationalist" leaders over the
"internationalist" extremists.
Some concessions, however, were
made to the latter group's po-
sition. Party Secretary Ghosh,
a close follower of the Moscow
line, apparently maintained his
position by associating himself
more closely with the "national-
ist" stand while at the same
time drawing on Moscow's coun-
sel of moderation to bolster
his "moderatel"leadership.
Despite the outward show 25X1
of unity in agreeing on a res-
olution, the part remains
deeply divided.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq
is developing momentum and has
gained the support of a number
The campaign for a single of influential Iraqis. These
political party led by Qasim supporters, none of whom has
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 November 1959
ties with any party, probably
view the idea as a means to
curb the Communists. The of-
ficial National Democratic par-
ty newspaper has joined the
Communist press in opposing the
single-party idea on the ground
that it is con rary to "demo-
cratic principles." Qasim, who
has promised the return of po-
litical activity by 6 January,
may favor the movement as a
means of eliminating the polit-
ical rivalries which are deeply
dividing the country.
Qasim has resurrected the
old fertile crescent plan, which
envisions the union of Iraq,
Syria, Jordan, and Palestine.
Originally proposed by Nuri
Said, the idea is stanchly op-
posed by Arab nationalists and
is anathema to the UAR because
it would make Baghdad a center
of power in the Middle East
rivaling Cairo. However, Qasim
has declared that "now this
plan is a national one--since
Iraq has been liberated."
The anti-Communist press
has been sharply reduced since
September by the suppression
of three papers closed down by
the Communist-dominated Iraqi
Journalists' Association. The
editors are under arrest.
Qasim remains in the hos-
pital. Communists plan to cele-
brate on the day of his release,
while anti-Communist elements
will carry out their demonstra-
tions on the day following,
Despite efforts by the security
forces to guard against trouble,
clashes between the rival Com-
munist and anti-Communist fac-
tions may occur.
Iraqi students sent to
the Sino-Soviet bloc are very
dissatisfied, according to re-
ports.
Over 300 Iraqi students are
studying in the USSR, according
to a statement made last week
by the Soviet ambassador in
Baghdad.
UAR Vice President Amir's
numerous public appearances and
speeches in Syria appear to have
been generally well received.
His remarks have been toughly
realistic, addressed to press-
ing economic problems but of-
fering no easy solutions. It
is not yet apparent that he has
made real progress in calming
the Syrians' fears of losing all
control over their own affairs,
but he is making a major ef-
fort to do so by his appearances
and by promises to give a sym-
pathetic hearing to problems
and complaints.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Sudan
The Sudan's military gov-
ernment, in an unusual display
of decisiveness, has suspended
regular court-martial procedures
in order to bring the perpetra-
tors of the 10 November coup
attempt to trial as soon as
possible. The summary court-
martial of two army officers
and eight civilians--six of
them former officers dismissed
for earlier intrigues--began
on 14 November. Others arrested
on suspicion may be brought to
trial later. Government secu-
rity forces are still seeking
a captain who played a leading
role in the coup effort and is
believed hiding out in the
northern desert country.
Although individuals who
took part had ties with
both Sudanese Communists and
pro-UAR groups, these ele-
ments do not appear to have
been directly involved in the
plot.
Influential civilian groups
which had been using agitation
and strikes in an effort to
force a return to civilian gov-
ernment have eased their pres-
sures during the past week.
The three-day celebrations
of the 17 November anniversary
of the military government got
under way without disturbances.
Prime Minister Abboud summa-
rized the considerable political
and economic accomplishments of
his regime and made special
mention of the Sudan's improved
relations with the UAR, as ex-
emplified by the Nile waters
agreement. Warning of the con-
tinuing danger from "subversive
elements," Abboud made it clear
that he does not contemplate a
turnover of power to a civilian
government in the near future.
He announced, however, that he
would form a committee to work
out arrangements for more popu-
lar participation by the peo-
ple in government affairs.
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Libya
The American ambassador,
who had an audience with 70-
year-old King Idriss last week,
was struck by the King's list-
lessness and apparent ill-
health. Arrangements are being
made for both the King and Queen
to have medical checkups at
Wheelus Air Base during a visit
of several weeks to Tri oli to
begin on 19 November.
Prime Minister Kubaar has
recently complained to the
British ambassador about the
"inadequacy" of American aid
and claimed that the issue
of Wheelus Air Base is a
"live bomb" in his hands. In
an apparent effort to off-
set criticism of the govern-
ment's lack of progress in
obtaining revision of the fi-
nancial clauses of the Ameri-
can base agreement, Kubaar is-
sued a press release last week
stating that the Council of
Ministers had approved an
agreement--which it had pre-
viously deferred--for the,
USSR to construct two hospi=
tals as gifts to Libya.
Anti-US mob demonstrations
of more severe proportions than
the rioting of 3-4 November are
threatened with the scheduling
of another Panamanian march in-
to the Canal Zone on 28 Novem-
ber--the 138th anniversary of
Panama's separation from Spanish
rule. The impending crisis,
which could easily be turned
against the weak De la Guardia
government, is viewed by several
leading Panamanians as poten-
tially more serious than the 3
November incidents.
the Panamanian Government, which
has used anti-US sentiment as
a means of strengthening its
own political position, may now
be unable to control it. A
vicious anti-American campaign
has dominated the government
press as well as independent
publications since the events
of 3 and 4 November. Although
tension has subsided somewhat,
Panamanian hostility toward the
United States is described as
being at an all-time high.
Delegations from the in-
terior reportedly plan to join
Panama City labor and youth
groups on 28 November in a "re-
affirmation of sovereignty"
march. The new demonstration
is reported:to be backed by
presidential contender Aquilino
Boyd, author of the call for
the 3 November march, whose po-
litical popularity was improved
as a result of the demonstra-
tions of that date.
Panamanian spokesmen main-
tain that "disastrous conse-
quences" can be avoided only by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
some dramatic US concession,
such as permitting Panama to
fly its flag in the Canal Zone.
Members of the Panamanian Gov-
ernment say they are encouraged
by the action of the United
States in sending Deputy Under
Secretary of State Livingston
Merchant on a special mission
to Panama, but that specific
concessions must be made at least
several days prior to 28 Novem-
ber in order to prevent a "holo-
caust" on that date.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 November 1959
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SITUATION IN LAOS
UN Secretary General Ham-
marskjold plans to establish a
permanent personal representa-
tive in Laos in two stages.
The first will be a four week
economic and political survey
by Sakari Tuomioja--the execu-
tive secretary of the UN Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe and
PHONG
SAIY
,Long N
,SAM NEUA
a former Finnish prime minister,
foreign minister, and ambassa-
dor to Great Britain. The four-
week period will allow Hammar-
skjold time to find another,
longer term representative and
try to place him in Laos in a
manner designed to circumvent
Moscow's objections. A Soviet
press release on 16 November
attacked the "pretext" used to
leave a UN representative in
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Laos and stated that any solu-
tion involving the UN will be
opposed by the USSR.
North Vietnam has sharply
protested the UN presence and
has termed Hammarskjold's visit
"inopportune and detrimental"
to a peaceful settlement in
Laos. Recent Foreign Ministry
statements, while continuing
to call for the revival of the
International Control Commis-
sion, apparently recognize the
unlikelihood of such action in
the near future and urge a meet-
ing of the 1954 Geneva confer-
ence participants as the most
advantageous alternative.
The Laotian Army on about
16 November is reported to
have reoccupied Long Nai, an
outpost near the China border
in Phong Saly Province. The
outpost had recently been taken
by a dissident force said to in-
clude an unspecified number of
Chinese. The China border area,
in contrast to Laos' frontier
with North Vietnam, had pre-
viously been quiet.
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
XIENG
KHOUANG
KHAMMOUANE
~SAVANNAKHE
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USSR SEEKS CONCESSIONS FROM IRAN
The USSR is seeking to ex-
ploit the Shah's offer of a
written guarantee that no for-
eign missile bases would be per-
mitted on Iranian territory to
gain concessions which would
restrict further development of
Iran's military ties with the
West. Moscow's delay in re-
sponding to the proposal and its
effort to attach additional
conditions suggest that Soviet
leaders feel Tehran is weaken-
ing in the face of the bloc's
sustained propaganda attacks.
Soviet Ambassador Pegov in-
formed the Shah on 8 November
that Premier Khrushchev was
pleased with the Shah's offer,
but would accept it only if the
Shah would extend it to exclude
"foreign bases of any kind" and
promise that Iran would not be
used as ?a "base for aggression"
against the Soviet Union. The
Shah rejected the additional
demands on the grounds that
neither condition is "subject
to proper definition."
Iranian acceptance of
Khrushchev's additional con-
ditions would, in effect, con-
firm the validity of the dis-
puted articles of the 1921 So-
viet-Iranian treaty which au-
thorized the USSR to send mili-
tary forces into Iran under
certain conditions. Moscow
maintains that these articles
are still in force; Tehran
holds they applied only to the
situation after World War I,
when tsarist forces might have
tried to attack the Soviet state
through Iran, and that they
now are therefore null and void.
Tehran's primary gain in
any improvement in relations
would be cessation of the bloc';s
radio attacks. Iranian offi-
cials, however, do not appear
to be as concerned as they were
prior to the temporary relaxa-
tion of the propaganda pressure
in September. Direct attacks
on the Shah by Radio Moscow ended
then, but the clandestine Na-
tional Voice of Iran resumed
its vicious personal attacks
in late October, terming the
Iranian ruler a "useless, lasciv-
ious, and greedy character."
Radio Moscow's programs to
Iranian listeners continue to
criticize Tehran's domestic and
foreign policies at the rate of
about 30 commentaries a week.
Concurrent with Pegov's
presentation of Khrushchev's
additional conditions, at least
some Soviet personnel in Tehran
dropped the "Camp David spirit"
line in their dealings with
Iranian officials and returned
to a more threatening tone.
More than a year after the
founding in Prague of the inter-
national Communist journal
Problems of Peace and Socialism,
in en a to Vr-ovide advice and
coordination for the interna-
tional Communist movement, Mos-
cow is still groping for a means
of increasing ideological and
organizational unity without
raising the specters of the de-
funct Comintern and Cominform.
Ever since "revisionism" broke
out into the open in 1956 in
the train of de-Stalinization,
the Soviet Union has searched
for devices to check ideological
drift and political heresy, but
it has shied away from the
monolithic, centralized type
of organization which would
clearly demonstrate Soviet dom-
ination of the various national
parties.
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and expanding international co-
ordination and exchanges through
Prague are under consideration.
Problems of Peace and
Socialism, first issued in Au-
gust 1958, is a lackluster pub-
lication which has gained little
influence or following.Officials
of the journal have complained
that in some Communist parties
even medium-ranking officials
were unaware of its existence.
The editorial staff,headed by
a top-level Soviet party propa-
HPOTAEMbI
MHPA
K COIIKAAYI3MA
10
Moscow has been hampered
by resistance,principally from
the Polish and Italian Commu-
nist parties, to a type of or-
ganization,which, in the words
of Italian leader Togliatti,
would be "calculated to impose
excessive responsi-
bility on one or
another" of Its mem-
bers--in other words,
the Soviet party.
In deference to
such attitudes, Prob-
lems of Peace and So-
ciaaaiism alit taken -
pain s o describe it-
self as "not a guiding
organ, but an interna-
tional tribune for
exchanging opinions
and experiences be-
tween fraternal par-
ties." Soviet lead-
ers themselves have
shown sensitivity on
the issue of exces-
sive control from
Moscow and have en-
gandist, A. M. Rumyantsev, has
conceded that the publication
has not fulfilled its mission
satisfactorily.
In response to this situa-
tion, the editors have in recent
months sponsored a series of
international discussion meet-
ings, stepped up their requests
for submissions, and drawn up
detailed schemes for improving
editorial organization and con-
tent--all designed to get at
the root of the apathy and to
broaden the leadership and in-
fluence of the journal. There
are indications that additional
measures aimed at both improving
couraged an increased show of
independence on the part of
the nonbloc parties.
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 November 1959
USSR STEPS UP CAMPAIGN AGAINST BONN
The USSR has used a West
German draft law proposing the
creation of a new radio station
in Berlin as a pretext to empha-
size its continuing opposition
to any implied West German as-
sertion of legal jurisdiction
in the city. In notes to the
three Western powers on 11 No-
vember and to Bonn on 13 No-
vember, Moscow alleged that
the Geneva foreign ministers'
conference "confirmed" that
Berlin has never been a part of
West Germany and cited previous
examples of "illegal" West Ger-
man interference in Berlin's
internal affairs.
Soviet preoccupation with
this legal relationship was al-
so evident in Khrushchev's re-
mark to Austrian President
Schaerf on 13 October that he
could envisage any solution of
the Berlin problem except the
absorption of West Berlin by
West Germany.
The notes were apparently
timed to focus attention on con-
sideration of the proposed leg-
islation on 13 November by the
West German upper house (Bun-
desrat). It had been widely
forecast in the press that the
Bundesrat would reject the law
because of strong state opposi-
tion to federal control of
broadcasting, and Moscow prob-
ably calculated that such re-
jection could be used to dem-
onstrate the effectiveness of
the Soviet protest notes. East
Germany claimed on 14 November
that the Bundesrat's rejection
was an "initial success" for
Moscow.
The notes have been accom-
panied by a marked increase in
Soviet and East German propa-
ganda against Bonn's activities
in Berlin and its alleged policy
of "revanchism." Khrushchev
reiterated the charges of the
Soviet notes in a speech on 14
November. Moscow radio on 16
November singled out as a "prov-
ocation" the visit to West Ber-
lin of Spanish Foreign Minister
Castiella and West German Refugee
Affairs Minister Oberlaendsr.
While Oberlaender has been.a
frequent target of East German
attacks, the stepped-up campaign
also is probably designed to off-
set Western press reaction which
interpreted as a retreat East
Germany's failure to fly its new
flag in West Berlin during the
October Revolution celebration.
East German party members prob-
ably feel this has entailed a
serious loss of prestige.
The renewed propaganda at-
tack, together with the charge
in the notes that Bonn was at-
tempting to disrupt the "suc-
cessful conclusion of forthcom-
ing negotiations," suggests
that Moscow hopes to use the
radio issue to further its ef-
forts to brand Bonn as the prin-
cipal obstacle to a Berlin settle-
ment and a general relaxation of
tension. The notes claim that
Bonn's "premeditated" actions
occur at a time when a "favorable
foundation" for a Berlin agree-
ment had been created by Khru-
shchev's visit to the United
states.
Moscow may be seeking to
use this issue to test Western
willingness to restrain Bonn
from actions which would be open
to Soviet interpretation as a
violation of the "improved"
international atmosphere. In
its notes to the Western powers,
Moscow claimed that the Geneva
foreign ministers' conference
"testified to the readiness" of
the participants not to permit
hostile propaganda from West
Berlin.
Bonn's plan to create a
station with headquarters in
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 November 1959
West Berlin is part of a broader
effort to establish some measure
of federal control over radio
and television facilities in
West Germany. According to the
draft law approved by the cabi-
net on 30 September, the new
station, Deutschland-Funk, would
broadcast to the "whole of Ger-
many."
Despite the upper house's
action, the Bundestag,or lower
house, will probably consider
the bill in early 1960. The
chances of its passing depend
on the government's ability to
work out a compromise acceptable
to the opposition Social Demo-
crats, whose votes are necessary
for the two-thirds majority to
override the Bundestat's rejec-
tion. Furthermore, a constitu- 25X1
tional test may be required to
resolve state claims of exclusive
responsibility.
ARISTOV UNDERSCORES MEDIOCRITY OF SOVIET GRAIN HARVEST
Soviet pronouncements on
the 1959 grain harvest have be-
come consistently more pessi-
mistic during the past two
months. On 10 September 1959
a TASS announcement stated that
the 1959 grain crop would be
"as large as" the record-claimed
141,200,000-ton harvest in 1958,
a statement probably made for
political reasons, since it was
released shortly-before Khru-
shchev's tour of the United
States. On 8 October, in a
speech at Bratsk while en route
home from Peiping, the Soviet
* Post-harvest losses probably reduced
this figure to about 115 million tons,
** Post-harvest losses probably reduced
this figure to about 130 million tons.
premier said, "It is true that
this year we are harvesting
somewhat less grain than last
year because there was a drought
in some regions of the country,
but there will be enough grain."
In a speech before the Su-
preme Soviet later in October,
Deputy Premier Aleksey Kosygin,
who heads the State Planning
Commission, said that this
year's harvest of grain, sugar
beets, and a number of Other
crops "is expected to be higher
than the annual average for the
USSR: GROSS HARVEST OF GRAIN ( OFFICIAL USSR STATISTICS)
MILLION METRIC TONS
141.2**
180.0
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1954-58 period." Again speak-
ing on the occasion of the 42nd
anniversary of the October Rev-
olution, party presidium member
Averky Aristov stated, "Despite
the fact that there was a
drought in a number of areas of
the country, more grain was
harvested this year than in the
good harvest years before rec-
lamation of the virgin soil
areas."
The record crop year prior
to the launching of the New
Lands program was 1952, when
92,000,000 tons were produced.
The 1959 grain crop could be
the lowest since Khrushchev's
agricultural reforms began in
1954. Weather data indicates
a grain harvest this year in
the neighborhood of 100,000,000
metric tons. Although there
will be no critical shortages,
the showing this year--the
first of the Seven-Year Plan--
leaves much to be desired, es-
pecially since the plan targets
in agriculture are unrealisti-
cally high under present pro-
grams.
Opportunities to export
grain will be limited, and the
livestock products program will
be adversely affected by de-
creased feed stocks. Vigorous
measures to improve agriculture
will be elaborated at the party
plenum on agriculture scheduled
to convene on 22 December.
(Prepared by ORS
The combined gross agri-
cultural production for 1959 in
the European satellites will
exceed the below-average level
of 1958 and will approximate
the 1954-58 average. According
to preliminary estimates, total
agricultural production in-
creased over 1958 in Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania,
registered little change in
Czechoslovakia, declined slight-
ly in Poland, and fell quite
sharply in East Germany. With
the exception of East Germany
and Poland, which will have to
arrange additional imports of
agricultural products, the food
situation in the satellites is
expected to be at least as good
during the 1959-60 consumption
year as in 1958-59.
The weather was largely
responsible for the increased
output in the southern satel-
lites. These four countries,
which last year had an extended
drought, experienced more fa-
vorable summer and autumn weath-
er this year than the northern
satellites.
Harvests in Rumania point to
an especially favorable year there.
A 30-percent rise in bread-grain
production and a 70-percent in-
crease in fodder grains over the
poor 1958 crops are indicated, as
are a record harvest of corn and
significant increases in potatoes,
sugar beets, and sunflowers. Al-
though Hungarian prospects also
are favorable--a 20- to 25-percent
increase in bread grains and a
20-percent increase in corn--a
recent dry spell may have lowered
earlier expectations for higher
yields of root, crops. Bulgarian
agricultural production in 1959
made just a slight recovery.from
the 1958 drought, with bread and
fodder grains only equal to or
slightly less than last year, but
root crops better.
The decidedly less favorable
agricultural outlook in the
northern satellites will mean
greater dependence on grain im-
ports--which average approxi-
mately 5,000,000 metric tons
in a normal year. Compared
with 1958, total feed produc-
tion has declined in East
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NOTES AND';COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Germany and Poland and has
changed little in Czechoslovakia.
Total grain production in Czech-
oslovakia will be slightly less
than last year, while root
crops are expected to be only
somewhat better. In Poland,
despite only a small decline
in over-all agricultural pro-
duction from the good 1958 year,
output of fodder grains and
root crops are nevertheless re-
ported unsatisfactory.
The most critical area is
East Germany, where the most
severe drought in ten years has
seriously reduced the domestic
food and feed supply. Total
agricultural production in East
Germany may fall 15 to 25 per-
cent below the above-average
1958 level. Feed grains, po-
tatoes, and hay appear to be
especially reduced.
Domestic supplies of meat
and other livestock products
during winter and spring will
be below normal, especially for
city dwellers, in East Germany
and Poland--where meat consump-
tion is comparatively high.
Poland has already arranged for
imports of some meat.
Early prospects for winter
grain crops, which will affect
1960 feed and food supplies,
appear fair to good in the
southern satellites. In the
north, however, a prolonged
dry period during September and 25X1
October restricted planting
and early growth of these crops.
Prepared by ORR)
North Korea is engaged in
a sweeping reorganization of
its educational system. The am-
bitious plans announced at the
Supreme People's Assembly meet-
ing late last month indicate
that the major overhaul, af-
fecting principally secondary
schools,is designed to improve
technical skills and to empha-
size the importance of com-
bining education with produc-
tive labor.
In a lengthy address be-
fore the assembly, Minister of
Education and Culture Yi I1-
kyong termed the government's
program "an epoch-making meas-
ure of historical proportions."
All senior high schools will
be abolished by 1962 and the
present system of "technical
special schools" completely
discontinued by 1964. In their
place the regime will set up
an elaborate system of two-year
"technical middle schools" com-
bining general and technical
education. Attendance at these
schools, which will instruct
junior high school graduates
in the use of tools and ma-
chines and familiarize them
with the "fundamentals of pro-
duction," is to be compulsory
by 1962. There will also be
an expanding network of higher
technical schools by 1962.
North Korea's teacher-
training program also is to be
revamped. Teachers' colleges
are to be abolished by 1963,
and a four-year program will
be established to train in-
structors for all but the high-
est level of technical schools.
Correspondence refresher courses
will be provided for teachers,
and adult education will be pro-
moted through new night and cor-
respondence schools.
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In stressing practical
training in its educational
reorganization, Pyongyang is
adopting a policy similar to
that followed by the Soviet
Union. Such changes are also
being instituted in most of the
European satellites, where
rapid industrialization has
prompted a demand for increased
technical training at the sec-
ondary level.
North Korea's existing
four-year primary schools and
the three-year junior high
schools will remain intact,
as will the present college
and postgraduate programs.
The changes in the system,
while fulfilling the country's
labor needs over the short run, 25X1
may have serious repercussions
at the university level in the
years ahead.
The USSR is making it plain to whet the appetite of Western
that while it hopes to procure businessmen for increased trade
significant amounts of Western with the USSR. Following the
plants and industrial equipment
for its Seven-Year Plan (1959-
65), purchases in excess of its
usual imports depend on the ex-
tension of additional credits
or an increase in Western im-
ports from the USSR. Negotia-
tions are under way with Brit-
ish, French, Swedish, and Japa-
nese companies for the purchase
of capital equipment.
Machinery and equipment ac-
count for about 20 percent of
Moscow's increasing imports from
the West. Purchases in this
category rose from $660,000,000
in 1955 to $825,000,000 in 1958,
when the USSR announced it
planned to increase procurement
of these items as part of its
plan to expand the chemical in-
dustry and especially the output
of synthetic fibers, rubber,
plastics, and fertilizers. The
USSR already has purchased equip-
ment for several complete indus-
trial plants during the past 18
months. British, West German,
French, Italian, Swedish, and
Japanese synthetic-textile plants,
paper mills, cement works, and
plastics factories are on order.
The initial Soviet purchases
apparently were intended largely
first-group of orders, Moscow
claimed such purchases were not
really necessary to fulfill its
plans and that if Western sup-
liers wanted to expand trade
with the USSR, credits or in-
creased purchases of Soviet prod-
ucts would have to be arranged.
Moscow is counting on competi-
tion between West European busi-
nessmen seeking a larger share
of the Soviet market to bring
pressure on their governments
to allow greater use of credit
guarantee facilities in trade
with the USSR.
During the past year West-
ern businessmen, frequently with
government guarantees,are known
to have extended--in addition
to normal short-term commercial
credits--over $80,000,000 in
credits for Soviet purchases
of complete plants. Other mem-
bers of the Soviet bloc have re-
ceived over $200,000,000 in
medium-term credits from private
Western sources.
In negotiations for 1960
trade pacts with the UK and Ja-
pan, Moscow has stressed the
need for "mutually advantageous
trade"--the expansion of free-
world purchases to match Soviet
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
imports of industrial equipment
and plants. The British were
given lists of prospective So-
viet purchases running in ex-
cess of a billion dollars with
the proviso that Britain make
reciprocal purchases or extend
credits. Britain has set a-
side almost $150,000,000 in
government credit guarantees
for its exporters doing busi-
ness with the USSR. Italy,which
has had some success in selling
major industrial installations,
has recently been approached
for new credits to support a
continuation or growth in this
trade.
Soviet traders in Japan
are offering to place substan-
tial orders for industrial
goods and transport equipment
for the development of the
eastern USSR if Japan agrees
to accept increased amounts of
Soviet fuels and raw materials
and deferred Soviet payments.
The Austrians have been told
that the extent of future Soviet
imports of industrial goods de-
pends directly on an expansion 25X1
of Austrian purchases of. Sov'ict goods.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
JAPANESE SOCIALIST SPLIT PROMOTES M1 RATE TRADE UNIONISM
The recent split in the
Socialist party has improved
prospects for the growth of a
responsible, anti-Communist
labor movement in Japan. Sue-
hiro Nishio's formation of a
new socialist parliamentary
group has given the moderate
Zenro labor federation a long-
sought political base for ex-
pansion, chiefly at the expense
of the large, extreme-leftist
Sohyo federation.
Zenro, with an estimated
800,000 members, now is less
than one quarter as large as
Sohyo. In the wake of the So-
cialist split, however, Zenro
has succeeded in gaining new
member unions and in fostering
labor support for the Nishio
group. The federation's 1960
action policy, which is ex-
pected to be adopted at the
annual convention in late No-
vember, probably will concen-
trate on winning over unions
which have maintained a re-
luctant affiliation with Sohyo
because of its domination of
the Socialist party, hereto-
fore labor's only political
voice.
Nishio's efforts to coun
ter Sohyo's pro-Communist radi-
calism--by terminating organized
labor's participation in polit-
ical struggles and working through
Zenro for strictly labor objec-
tives--was the major factor
which led to the Socialist
split. Nishio objected to the
concept of the "working-class
party"--a concept he felt blind-
ed Socialist leaders to the po-
tential for attracting support
from small businessmen, farmers,
and other middle-of-the-road
elements. His new group has
emphasized that while it is
initially based on moderate
trade ?unions,it will not be
dominated by labor interests.
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Elements of key unions
within Sohyo already have an-
nounced their support of the
Nishio group. Approximately
10 percent of the estimated
400,000 members in the National
Railway Workers' Union (Kokuro)
--Sohyo's second largest affil-
iate--have decided to support
Nishio. A smaller group, in
the large Coal Miners' Union
(Tanro), also has bolted Sohyo.
Zenro's relatively greater
success in gaining wage in-
creases in important industries,
particularly for textile workers,
and its preference for opposition
to the revised US-Japanese secu-
rity treaty. through parliamentary
means also may tend to attract
new members. Japanese organ-
ized labor, however, is primarily
under hard-core leftist control
which will make Zenro's expan-
sion contingent on the effec-
tiveness of the formal political 25X1
party which Nishio is expected
to organize in early 1960.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A controversy over a US
oil company's possession of
aerial photographs of its con-
cessions in eastern Peru has
given rise to strong anti-US
sentiment in that country, both
in the Congress and in the
press. Another company--the
Peruvian subsidiary of Standard
Oil of New Jersey .and Peru's
largest producer--came under
sharp congressional attack ear-
lier this year when the govern-
ment raised domestic petroleum
prices and may also be drawn
into the present dispute. The
incident could have adverse ef-
fects on US investments in the
country, which totaled approxi-
mately $820,000,000 in 1958--
an estimated 84 percent of all
foreign investment in Peru. Of
this amount, about $143,000,000
was invested in the petroleum
industry.
The Air Ministry has charged
that the photographs were "il-
legally" obtained in violation
of a 1948 aerial-mapping agree-
ment between Peru and the United
States. Peruvians assert that
unauthorized disclosure of ae-
rial mapping to a private com-
pany constitutes a violation
of military security. Ultra-
conservative and pro-Communist
elements, which frequently join
in political allianpe, have
magnified the incident, denounc-
ing the company and the US Gov-
ernment for "violating" Peru's
military security and national
defense.
The Chamber of Deputies on
2 November overwhelmingly ap-
proved a motion presented by
three pro-Communist deputies
urging abrogation of the map-
ping agreement and expulsion
of the company from Peru. Both
progovernment and opposition
parties were significantly unit-
ed in support of the motion.
Opposing parties have joined in
anti-American outbursts on two
other occasions in the past two
years: an attack by the Senate
in 1957 on the proposed US lead
and zinc tariffs and widespread
criticism in 1958 of the setting
of quotas by the United States
on lead and zinc which lead to
a cabinet decision to seek mar-
kets for these products in the
Soviet bloc.
Foreign Minister Porras has
expressed concern to Ambassador
Achilles that any further par-
liamentary debate on the oil com-
pany issue--such as is expected
shortly--would be a "Roman holi- 25X1
day" for criticism of the United
States and US investments in Peru.
The two factions of the
Anti-Fascist People's Freedom
League (AFPFL), Burma's govern-
ing party, until its split in
1958 and General Ne Win's sub-
sequent takeover, are now well
into their campaigns for the
general elections, announced
for January or February 1960.
The "Clean" faction appears to
be capitalizing successfully
on the long-established person-
al popularity of its leader,
former Premier Nu. .It has
scored sweeping victories over
the "Stable" AFPFL faction of
U Ba Swe, also a former pre-
mier, in the first three munic-
ipal elections held since Pre-
mier Ne Win took office. This
was accomplished despite the
arrest and conviction of major
"Clean" leaders for corruption,
army preference for Ba Swe, and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 r
BHUTAN ,
puVe ~t ?
grow ,
PAKISTAN Ir
way toward a significant politi-
cal comeback in the 1960 nation-
al elections.
"~~u.rrG(v
BURMA
the superior discipline and or-
ganization of the latter's fol-
lowing.
In September the "Clean"
faction gained several upset
victories in the voting for mu-
nicipal council seats in the
Irrawaddy delta town of Myaung-
mya, and on 11 November it won
all 21 council seats in the
central Burma town of Pakokku
by a vote of 11,318 to 4,500.
On 17 November the "Clean" fac-
tion gained 10 of the 14 coun-
cil seats in the important oil
town of Yenangyaung. It appears
possible, in the urban areas at
least, that U Nu may be on the
Neither faction of the
AFPFL yet appears confident of
victory, although their campaign
preparations, including the
well-publicized Buddhist mo-
nastic retreats of both U Nu and
U Ba awe, are well under way.
Each concedes that the margin
of victory is likely to rest in
the less accessible rural areas,
where neither party is well or-
ganized and where the voters
are most vulnerable to pres- 25X1
sures from the army and armed
insurgent groups.
The army role in the com-
ing elections may depend on its
leaders' relative distaste for
the two AFPFL factions. Al-
though they continue to prefer
Ba Swe, their disillusionment
with U Nu's political expedi-
ency and tolerance of corrup-
tion has been partially offset
by their dislike of Kyaw Nyein,
a ruthless politician who is U
Ba awe's closest colleague.
Ne Win has announced that
no army personnel will stand
for election and has ordered
army personnel to maintain a
nonpartisan role. Nevertheless,
the army'is expected to inter-
vene at least with sufficient
force to ensure the defeat of
most pro-Communist candidates,
and it may use its influence
further. In addition, army
leaders are reported insistent
that whichever faction wins, the
new government carry forward
the political and economic re-
forms instituted under Ne Win.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
l- Yenangvaung So~aeeq
ii
/f : 7 1 " T HAI LAND/
Rangoo
M
Yaung 'srk')~~
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
Results of the Philippine
senatorial and provincial elec-
tions held on 10 November con-
firmed the basic strength of the
incumbent Nacionalista party,
but they also revealed the ex-
tent of President Garcia's un-
popularity, particularly in
urban areas. Administration-
backed candidates won five of
the eight seats in the nation-
wide senatorial race, as well as
33 of the 54 provincial governor-
ships and about half the 28
mayoralties. Nacionalista
candidates most closely identi-
fied with President Garcia,
however, were defeated.
The opposition Liberal
party has been strengthened by
the election of three senators,
giving the. opposition bloc a
total of six seats in the 24-man
Senate. The Liberals increased
their control of provincial gov-
ernorships from 4 to 19 and won
eight mayoralties. The Liberal
minority leader of the House
of Representatives, Ferdinand
Marcos, received more votes
than any other senatorial can-
didate.
The newly created third-
party opposition movement, the
Grand Alliance, failed to win
any major office and may face
extinction or eventual absorp-
tion by the Liberals. Efforts
to unite the opposition may
continue to be hampered, how-
ever, by rivalry for position
on the opposition presidential
ticket in 1961. The claim of
Philippine Vice President
Macapagal to the role of Liberal
standard-bearer, already chal=lenged in the past, may be
threatened additionally by the
emergence of Marcos as a popular
figure.
None of the Nacionalista
party's successful senatorial
candidates is a close Garcia
follower, and in two provinces
and six chartered cities, includ-
ing the major cities of Manila
and Cebu, Nacionalista candi-
dates openly opposed to the
President were victorious. The
party's top senatorial vote-
getter, the younger brother of
President Magsaysay, is a son-
in-law of Nacionalista chidf
Rodriguez, with whom Garcia has
been battling for party control.
The election results may
cause Garcia to become increas-
ingly preoccupied with political
maneuvering to improve his
chances in the 1961 presidential
race, to the further detriment
of efficiency and responsibility
in his administration. Despite
the relative ineffectiveness of
the administration's campaign
theme of economic nationalism--
carefully divorced from anti-
Americanism--Garcia has announced
that he will continue to follow
a "Filipino first" policy. This
may take the form of increased
harassment of foreign business 25X1
interests as a means of diverting
attention from domestic attacks
on the administration
RECENT DETERIORATION OF AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS
Relations between Afghani-
stan and Pakistan have deterio-
rated sharply during'the past two
and a half months, mainly be-
cause ' of ' Kabul'Is -concern with
SECRET
growing tribal unrest along its
border with Pakistan and with
the propaganda campaign recent-
ly launched by Karachi on the
issue,
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In early September the
Ayub government began to retali-
ate against Afghan propaganda
supporting Kabul's Pushtoonistan
policy, which demands the right
of self-determination for Pushtu
tribesmen living in Pakistan.
Karachi's propaganda outburst
was concurrent with and pos-
sibly designed to encourage
tribal reaction against Kabul's
efforts to promote social and
economic reforms in the area.
This opposition culminated re-
cently in a serious attack by
Mangal tribesmen on an Afghan
Government road-building crew.
Karachi has publicized
Kabul's difficulties with the
tribes, and Pakistani press re-
ports of interviews with tribal
leaders coming from Afghanistan
have featured the Afghan Govern-
ment's "repression" of the
Pushtus and the "escape" aspect
of the border crossings.
The Pakistani press refer-
ences to Kabul's reforms as a
source of the unrest have some
basis, as the tribesmen resent
the unveiling of Afghan women
as well as the government's
road-building program in the
area; they feel new roads will
only subject them to greater
government control. However,
Kabul probably regards Paki-
stan's publicizing of such is-
sues as designed solely to pro-
voke further disturbances and
to intensify opposition through-
out the country to the govern-
ment's policy of abolishing the
veil.
Each side has.accused the
other of military overflights.
Top Pakistani Air Force officers
have cited numerous recent bor-
der overflights by Afghan twin-
jet bombers, which Kabul proba-
bly has used in controlling
tribal disturbances. Continued
Afghan violations of Pakistani
air space would intensify and
lend credibility to Karachi's
accusations and possibly pro-
voke military retaliation by
Pakistan.
Pakistani President Ayub
and Afghan Prime Minister Daud
have expressed their willingness
to discuss mutual problems, but
Pakistan's delay in arranging
a meeting and Daud's reservations
concerning the proposed dis-
19 NOVEMBER 1959
PAKISTAN
JAM M L
P A.__
N. oI .'.(n.! AFRICA. II J .' >
"SWAZILAND
dent Sekou Tourb's neutralist
General Union of Workers of
Black Africa. The meeting au-
thorized a seven-member "head-
quarters bureau" of the commit-
tee to make preparations for
holding a constituent congress
next May in Casablanca, Morocco.
The ICFTU conference held
in Lagos, Nigeria, between 9
and 15 November drew a far wid-
er and more representative re-
sponse. Chaired by Mboya, who
strongly defended the free-
world labor organization as a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 November 1959
vehicle for African national-
ism, the conference adopted
resolutions providing for the
creation next February of an
autonomous ICFTU regional or-
ganization for Africa. Other
resolutions took as militant
a stand on current African po-
litical issues as did the
Accra committee, toward which
a conciliatory attitude was
taken.
Nkrumah and his allies,
however, are apparently deter-
mined to implement their plans
even at the risk of provoking
a schism within the African
nationalist movement. In a
public statement released on
10 November, Ghana's top trade
union official blasted the
Lagos conference as a "gather-
ing of imperialist stooges"
and denounced Mboya as "oppor-
tunistic" and "reactionary."
In addition, Nkrumah is at-
tempting to undermine Mboya's
domestic position by building
up Oginga Odinga, a more radi- 25X1
cally inclined and seemingly
more pliant Kenyan leader.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
POLAND'S ASSIMILATION OF THE FORMER GERMAN TERRITORIES
Poland's eastern and west-
ern boundaries were both shifted
westward following World War II.
Moscow, insisting on the valid-
ity of the 1939 Soviet-German
agreement on the partition of
Poland, forced Warsaw to cede
some 70,000 square miles of its
eastern territory to the USSR.
As compensation, the Allies at
Yalta and Potsdam gave Poland
the right of military occupa-
tion and "political administra-
tion" of approximately 40,000
square miles of German territory
east of the Oder and Neisse
rivers. The area of adminis-
tration included the southern
part of East Prussia and the
former free city of Danzig
(Gdansk). These "recovered
territories" make up one third
of the total area of present-
day Poland.
Legal Status
There is a significant dif-
ference in the legal aspects of
the two territorial changes af-
fecting Poland. Whereas the
cession to the Soviet Union was
a permanent change by treaty,
Polish administration of the
German territories is only tem-
porary, pending a peace treaty
with Germany which presumably
will include a final definition
of Germany's frontiers. It is
this status which plagues War-
saw and makes the unfinished
business of the "recovered ter-
ritories" a major element of
the political, economic, and
psychological life of Poland.
For the Poles, the "Ger-
man problem" is mainly a mat-
ter of maintaining their coun-
try's western border and secur-
ing general recognition of the
legality of its status. If
these lands should be restored
to Germany, Poland would be re-
duced to a rump state of insig-
nificant proportions and power,
and crippled politically and eco-
nomically.
Regarding both Russians and
Germans as traditional enemies,
the Poles are faced with a trou-
blesome dilemma. Occupied by
Soviet troops, ruled by a Com-
munist government, and bound to
the USSR by increasingly strong
political, economic, and military
ties, Poland realizes that its
territorial integrity depends
on the Soviet Union, which has
adopted the role of protector of
the Polish state and of Polish
rights to the German territory.
The Poles have no love for
East Germany, but the Ulbricht
regime has signed a treaty with
Poland recognizing the Oder-
Neisse line. West Germany, on
the other hand, has steadfastly
refused to agree to the cession
of the territory, although it has
renounced the use of force to
change the border.
Poles maintain that only
another war--or, as they cyn-
ically put it, another Soviet-
German deal--can change Poland's
western boundary.
Basis of Polish Claims
The Polish claim to perma-
nent possession of the "recov-
ered territories" is based on
three major premises: 1) the
fact that, nearly 15 years af-
ter the war, the area has been
effectively de-Germanized and
has become an integral part of
Poland; 2) Allied agreement
that Poland should be compen-
sated by Germany for the terri-
tory annexed by the Soviet Union;
and 3) the "historically Polish
nature of the western territo
ries."
In 1939 the population of
the western territories con-
sisted of 7,100,000 Germans and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1,300,000 Poles; in
1958, according to
Polish statistics,
there were 7,500,000
Poles and only 6,000
Germans in the area.
The West German Gov-
ernment, however,
claims that there are
approximately 1,300,-
300 Germans there.
Determination
of who `s a Pole or
a German differs. The
Vest German figure
obviously includes
prewar inhabitants
of the area who chose
Polish citizenship
in 1946. Many Ger-
mans were evacuated
by the German Reich
S.O..i.
S nnini
EAST I
GERMAN
19 NOVEMBER 1969
UT[ MilLf ~
%a
POLA]
Lodz.
w 171,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Present-day Poland.
Former German territories and former
Free City of Danzig (Gdansk) now unde
Polish Administration.
Former Polish territory annexed by the USSR,
in the latter part of the war
when the approach of the Soviet
armies caused a mass exodus.
In addition, large numbers of
Germans were deported by the
Poles during 1945. The census
of 1946 revealed that about
2,000,000 Germans remained in
the area. Most of these moved
to Germany during the next two
years, with the majority going
to West Germany.
The overwhelmingly Polish
character of the population :'
SECRET
is an important element in War-
saw's confidence that it will
retain the western territories.
The impracticability of a mass
movement of the present inhab-
itants out of the area e.cept
as a result of war encourages
the Poles in their belief that
they will remain there.
Yalta and Potsdam
The Poles argue that the
provisions of the Yalta Agree-
ment regarding territorial com-
pensation for Poland
at Germany's expense
were confirmed at
Potsdam and labeled
"final" by the West-
ern powers and the
USSR. They point
out that the trans-
ferred territory was
not placed under Al-
lied occupation and
was clearly differ-
entiated from the
other German terri-
tory, and that the
"final demarcation"
of the Polish-German
border was to be ef-
fected after the con-
clusion of the peace
treaty. The terms
"demarcation" or
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
"delimitation" of Poland's west-
ern frontier, used in the agree-
ments, do not imply to the
Poles that there were any doubts
concerning the irrevocable na-
ture of the cession of the ter-
ritory to Poland.
Poland also claims that
the Allies themselves confirmed
the transfer of the territory
when they assisted the Poles in
evacuating the Germans from the
area. Since the Potsdam Agree-
ment provided for the adminis-
tration of occupied Germany as
a unit, Poland claims that the
separation of the western ter-
ritories from the occupation
zones shows that the Allies in-
tended to give Poland de jure
as well as de facto possession.
West Germany rejects the
Polish argument, maintaining
that the wartime agreements
placed these areas only tem-
porarily under Polish adminis-
tration. The question of the
final disposition of Germany's
"lost provinces" was left to be
decided at a peace conference,
the West Germans contend.
The Western powers have
refused to commit themselves
beyond stating that the prob-
lem can be settled permanently
only by a peace treaty with a
unified Germany. Prominent
Western officials visiting Po-
land usually refuse invitations
to visit the western territo-
ries,lest their travel in the
area be construed as recogni-
tion of the validity of Poland's
claim. Bonn spokesmen have de-
clared repeatedly that the de-
mand for the return of the
"lost provinces" cannot be
dropped. Poland has been
heartened, however, by recent
statements by French officials
that the Oder-Neisse should be
accepted as Poland's western
frontier.
Fear of Germany
Poland's greatest fear is
a reunified Germany:: The Poles
realize that East Germany's rec-
ognition of the Oder-Neisse line
has little meaning in the long
run, and they know that a uni-
fied German state would not con-
sider itself bound by the East
German action. Poland fears
that any discussion of a peace
treaty with the Germans or
serious negotiations looking
toward reunification would only
reopen the question of the
validity of its claims to the
territories. In the 'Polish
view, a powerful, unified Ger-
many would soon make demands
on Poland for territorial re-
adjustments.
The issue of the western
territories is one on which the
Polish people and the regime
agree. The people are sus-
ceptible to regime-inspired
propaganda that Western non-
recognition of the Oder-Neisse
line implies bad faith and a
preference for war-guilty Ger-
many over the Nazis' innocent
victim, Poland. The regime,
therefore, portrays the coun-
tries of the Soviet bloc, in-
cluding East Germany, as friends
of Poland, and casts the West
in the role of supporters
of German "militarism and
revanchism."
This image of bloc support
for the Oder-Neisse line is not
particularly impaired by the
fact that the USSR seized Polish
territories in the east. Most
Poles refuse to comment on the
eastern lands or to compare the
respective values of the areas
that Poland lost and gained as
a result of the war. They have
put these territories out of
mind, even though the loss of
many Polish cities--especially
Lvov--was keenly resented.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Reconstruction and Development
The western territories
have come a long way from their
wartime devastation and the dif-
ficult period of their resettle-
ment to their present situation
as one of the best developed
areas of Poland. An important
result of the territorial and
population shifts was the trans-
formation of the country from
a predominantly rural, agricul-
tural country into an urban,
industrial one. This was largely
due to the annexation of the al-
ready urbanized and industrial
German lands, rather than to a
significant increase in indus-
trialization in the old Polish
territory. The addition of
German Silesia with its great
industrial capacity and large
deposits of coal, iron ore,
and other valuable minerals
was especially important.
Even the agricultural lands
gained from Germany, although
less extensive than those lost
to the Russians, are more pro-
ductive than those in the east.
The new lands also were used for
the resettlement of an esti-
mated 2,000,000 Poles forced by
the USSR to leave the eastern
territories. In addition to in-
creasing Poland's industrial and
agricultural potential, the ac-
quisition of the western terri-
tories gave the Poles possession
of the important Oder River
waterway system and the ports
of Szczecin (Stettin) and
Gdansk, vastly increasing Po-
land's foreign trade capability.
Current Status
While farm production in
the western territories is ap-
proximately 20 percent lower
than before the war, it none-
theless accounts for about a
fourth of Poland's livestock,
28 percent of the nation's grain,
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nearly a fourth of its potatoes,
and 40 percent of its sugar
beets.
When the Poles took over
the area in 1945, more than 60
percent of the land was lying
fallow, and only 10 percent of
the prewar livestock remained.
The Poles estimate that in 1945
some 60 percent of the prewar
industrial capacity of the area
had been lost either through
destruction or removal of equip-
ment by the Germans or the Rus-
sians. They also claim that 45
percent of the urban dwellings
were uninhabitable, 70 percent
of the railway system destroyed
or dismantled, and all the load-
ing and floating installations
at the port of Szczecin de-
stroyed or removed.
The Poles maintain that
1957 industrial production in
the western territories ex-
ceeded that of the prewar
period by 50 percent and con-
stituted 25 to 28 percent of
total Polish industrial out-
put. The former German area
now produces all of Poland's
ships, nearly all its brown
coal, and substantial propor-
tions of other items. Forty-
two percent of Polish railway
lines and 43 percent of all
hard-surfaced road are located
in the western territories.
Much of the credit for the com-
munications net and industrial
capacity, however, belongs to
the Germans.
Poles in the western terri-
tories demonstrate considerable
enthusiasm for reconstruction
and transformation of the area.
In population, economic struc-
ture, and cultural life, the
wes,tern:. territories are no
longer German. The Poles have 25X1
left their stamp on the area, and
it has become an integral part
of Poland.
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The recent development of
the Soviet aircraft industry is
marked,by the greatly increased
priority given the production
of transport aircraft. Five
new transport models for Aero-
flot, the Soviet civil airline,
have appeared in the last few
years, and four of them now
are believed to be in series
production. At present seven
plants,
constituting
abou
t 35
percent
of the floor
spac
e in
Soviet
air-frame plants,
are
used to
build transports
for
Aeroflot. Two other factories
are producing military trans-
ports. Rapid strides are be-
ing taken toward creating the
world's largest national air
fleet to compete increasingly
in international commercial
aviation.
Aeroflot's Role
Aeroflot's operations
differ markedly from those of
the typical American commer-
cial airline. To hold down
costs, poorly loaded flights
are frequently delayed, can-
celed, or combined with other
flights. Aircraft and per-
sonnel losses are acknowledged
P~ r%,no
only when it is impossible to
conceal the information.
VIP and other special
flights of the largest and
latest aircraft to neighbor-
ing bloc capitals appear to'
take place quite frequently.
Aerof lot also serves an im-
portant function in maintain-
ing contacts between the
USSR and neutral countries
which have accepted extensive
Soviet economic and military
assistance.
In mid-1959 there were per-
sonnel changes in the top eche-
lons of Aeroflot. The new direc-
tors probably are expected to
tighten government control of
the organization and to improve
its efficiency.
Competition With Free World
The number of passengers
carried by Aeroflot in 1959 may
be as much as 50 percent over
1958--12,000,000 as compared
with an estimated 8,000,000 last
year. New types of aircraft
were produced in large numbers
in 1958 but, because of techni-
cal difficulties and Aeroflot's
SOVIET AIRCRAFT PLANTS CURRENTLY PRODUCING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
? 30 ? 22
Moscow Kazan
. 18
64 Kuybyshev
Voronezh
Kharkov
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 November 1959
conservative training policy,
they apparently did not come
into use in large numbers un-
til this year.
Aeroflot's 1965 target
for passengers handled is
CIVIL AVIATINITED STATES
AND THE USSR
PASSENGER MILES FREIGHT TON-MILES
(BILLIONS)
( MILLIONS)
1951
1957
1965
1950
1957
1965
USSR
1.0
3.0
29*
147
400
1,644*
US
13.2
31.3
75**
239
993
2,055**
"ESTIMATE. BASED LARGELY ON CURRENT TRENDS
19 NDVE - I-
about 48&,000000, 'or `six. times
the number 11 lown In'.1958. On
the basis of present and antic-
ipated rates of aircraft pro-
duction, this goal should be
achieved easily, particularly
if the airline continues to re-
duce its fare-rate structure.
American scheduled airlines
handled 49,000,000 paying pas-
sengers in 1958 and may handle
about 54,000,000 in 1959.
Moscow apparently plans
for Aeroflot to compete success-
fully with the airlines of the
free world. The USSR is astride
the shortest great-circle route
between Europe and the Far East,
and"Soviet leaders are actively
working to establish Aeroflot
as a major link between these
areas.
The USSR has sought agree-
ments permitting the expansion
of Aeroflot's international
routes. In the 1955-58 period,
it concluded air agreements
with Yugoslavia, Finland, Aus-
tria, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
India, Afghanistan, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Brit-
ain, and the UAR. Informal dis-
cussions have taken place be-
tween Aeroflot and Pan American
World Airways in which Aeroflot
officials have indicated recip-
rocal tourist movements would
be desirable, but formal nego-
tiations on an intergovernmen-
tallevel have been stalled for
over a year by the USSR. The
only new route established out-
side the bloc in 1959 has been
the 'biweekly service between
London and Moscow.
At present, the Soviet
Union is especially interested
in obtaining new routes and con-
cessions in the Middle East and
Africa. Prevented from estab-
lishing regular services across
Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Pak-
istan, the Russians have made
noticeable progress in obtain-
ing air rights and other con-
cessions in Afghanistan, Iraq,
the UAR, and Ethiopia., In the
meantime, pressures for both
overflight rights and actual
civil air agreements have been
directed against Greece and
Iran, accompanied in the case
of Iran by a limited amount of
authorized and unauthorized
overflying to Iraq.
Sales of Transports
The USSR has encountered
little enthusiasm on the part
of other countries to buy its
high-performance aircraft, and
there have been no such sales
outside the bloc. Even within
the bloc, only three jet TU-
104s have definitely been sold--
to Czechoslovakia for service
to Bombay, Cairo, and Moscow.
A few turboprop IL-18s may go
to the EuL~opean satellites and
China.
Attempts were made in 1958
to sell TU-104s at bargain prices
to Japan, Egypt, and other coun-
tries, but there were no trans-
actions. The TU-104 does not
appear to be economically com-
petitive with free world air-
craft. Proposed sales have gen-
erally been tied In with agree-
ments for reciprocal air rights
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
which strongly favored the
USSR.
Even in the case of air-
craft such as the IL-18 and the
turboprop AN-10, which are more
economical than the TU-104 and
can operate from
shorter, unimproved
runways, there is
not likely to be
great interest out-
side the bloc. Aside
from international
competition, the
world market for
large modern trans-
port aircraft has
definite limitations,
since such aircraft,
if not used inten--.
sively, soon consti-
tute a burden for
the purchasing coun-
tries.
New Transports
The one pure
jet transport now
known to be in se-
ries production in
the USSR is the TU-
104B, the 100-seat
version of the TU-
104 (Camel). This
aircraft is supple-
menting the older
50- and 70-seat ver-
sions in Aeroflot
operations. Through
September 1959, ap-
proximately 60 TU-
104Bs and 110 TU-
104s and TU-104As
had been produced.
The TU-110
(Cooker), a four-en-
gine version of the
Camel, was originally displayed
in 1957. There still'is no ev-
idence of its production in
numbers, however, and accord-
ing to recent statements made
by designer Tupolev, the Camel
B will be built instead.
The second type of modern
transport in production, and the
first Soviet turboprop trans-
port aircraft to enter regular
civilian service,is the four-
engine IL-18 (Coot), which car-
ried cargo late in 1958. There
will be several versions. Through
September 1959, about 85 Coots
had been produced.
The AN-10 (Cat), a four-
engine turboprop transport air-
craft designed to operate from
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USSR: PRODUCTION HISTORY OF PLANTS CURRENTLY
PRODUCING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PLANTS
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
KAZAN
Camel A
BatyTer
Badger
Camel B
Camel B
NO.22
Badger
Badger
KNARKOV
Fresco
NO.135
Fresco
Mi dge
t
Camel A
Camel A
Camel A**
Midget
Camel
OMSK
NO.166
Beagle
Camel
Camel A
Camel A
Camel A**
MOSCOW
Crate
Crate
Crate
NO
30
Beagle
Beagle
Coot
Coot
Coot
.
Mascot
Mascot
TASHKENT
Crate
Crate
Crate
Camp
Camp***
NO.94
Crate
VORONEZH
Beagle
Badger
Badger
Badger
Cat
NO.64
Badger
IRKUTSK
Beagle
Beagle
AN-12
AN-12
AN-12 ***
NO.39
Beagle
KIEV
Camp*
Camp*
Cat +
NO.473
Colt
Colt
Cat
Colt
Clod
colt
Clod
KUYBYSHEV
NO. 18
Bear
Bear
TU-114D
Cleat
Cleat
rough airfields, was displayed
at Moscow in 1957. Its seat-
ing capacity, originally 70,
has been increased to 100. Al-
though series production of the
Cat is well advanced--65 or
more having been produced
through September 1959--opera-
tions were limited until re-
cently. This delay may have
been due to stability diffi-
culties, reflected by later
design changes made in the tail
surfaces. An increase of the
tail area was first noted in
the fall of 1957 and has been
incorporated on most of the air-
craft observed since that date.
An enlarged and improved ver-
sion of the Cat, seating 130
passengers and iden-
tified as the AN-16,
reportedly is under
development, but it
is believed that this
aircraft has not yet
been flown.
Soviet press re-
ports suggest that pro-
duction of the AN-14
(Clod), a small util-
ity transport aircraft
with spectacular
shortfield perform-
ance and powered by
two piston engines,
was to begin at Kiev
during 1958. To date,
however, only a few
Clods have been ob-
served at the factory
airfield.
The fourth of
the modern Soviet
transports in series production
for Aeroflot is the TU-114 (Cleat)
--world's largest transport air-
craft--which is capable of carry-
ing 120 passengers for distances
of up to 5,400 nautical'miles
and 220 passengers for shorter
distances. This aircraft, first
displayed in'Moscow in 1957,: has
been used in several: flights
outside the bloc for prestige
purposes, such as the recent
trips to New York and Washing-
ton. Until a second TU-114
flew to Washington, these trips
had been made by one plane, the
prototype TU-114 first dis-
played in 1957 and numbered
5611. Tupolev says that the
TU-114 is in series production.
Camel
French
Cat
British
Coot
Lockheed
Cleat
Boeing
AIRCRAFT
TU-104
Caravelle
AN-10
Vanguard
IL-18
Electra
TU-114
707
Engines
2 jet
2 jet
4
turbo prop
4
turboprop
4
turboprop
4
turboprop
4
turboprop
4 jet
Gross Weight
(lbs. )
157,000
94,000
112,400
141,000
134,006
113,000
407,000
295,000
Payload
(lbs.)
22, 000
19, 840
26, 200
25, 000
23, 000
26,500
39, 700
40,000
Passenger
Capacity
70-100
64-80
84-126
96-138
75-100
66-85
120-220
131-162
Range with less) )
(nautical miles)
2,300
1, 250
1, 250
2,275
2, 800
2, 380
5,400
4,160
Cruising Speed
(knots)
450
430
335
380
340
350
485
515
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It is believed 16 had been pro-
duced through September.
By.l: October 1959, about
460 large modern transports had
been produced, of which about
340 were of the four types
which are becoming basic in the
new civil air fleet--TU-114s,
IL-18s, AN-10s, and versions of
the TU-104. Combined produc-
tion of these latter types is
apparently continuing at a rate
of 15-20 per-'month. If pres-
ent prodsction rates continue,
iycr the end of 1960 the inven-
tory could reach between 500
and 600 of these high-perform-
ance aircraft.
The majority of the trans-
ports--of the four basic types--
produced so far are subordinate
to Aeroflot.
Aerof lot is believed to
possess in addition to these
new transports over 1,500 twin-
engine, piston-driven airplanes
--LL-2s, IL-12s, and IL-14s.
Two years ago there were only
25 TU-104s and no four-engine
transport aircraft in service.
By comparison, US airlines,
which had at that time 1,735
aircraft including some 800
four-engine piston types and
about 50 new Viscount turboprop
transports, now have 1,830 air-
craft, including 250 jet and
turboprop types.
Aeroflot still has many
problems to solve before it
can become a really first-class
airline. Civil airports with
paved runways are still very
few, and modern airways and
traffic control systems have
not yet been installed at all
of these. Ground handling
equipment, passenger service
facilities, and terminal build-
ings are badly lacking, al-
though major improvement is
scheduled under the present
Seven-Year Plan.
Military Use
One noteworthy factor
about Aeroflot is the relative
ease with which its aircraft
could be utilized for moving
military personnel. An esti-
mate of the current ready
strength of Aeroflot high-
performance aircraft gives the
airline a capacity sufficient
to airlift, approximately 15,-
000 men at one time. This
excludes all high-performance
aircraft undergoing repair
or modification and all those
assigned to the military serv-
ice, or awaiting assignment.
The estimated maximum range 25X1
between stops for such an air-
lift is about 1,250 miles.
(Prepared by ORR)
As a result of the UAR-
Sudanese agreement signed last
week over how to share the
waters of the Nile River, the
UAR;'s Aswan High Dam project,
with long-term expectations of
increased cultivable acreage
and of new hydroelectric pow-
er development, now can be
pushed with fewer internation-
al complications. Internation-
al'-financing may also become
available for the Sudan's own
large-scale irrigation proj-
ects, centering on the $100,-
000,000 Roseires Dam..
Nevertheless, the agree-
ment does not seem to be a step
toward an over-all internation-
al control program for the
Nile waters, since it sets off
the Sudan and the UAR against
the six other riparian states..
--Ethiopia, Uganda, Ruanda-
Urundi, Tanganyika, and the Bel-
gian Congo. In addition, it is
not likely to end Sudanese-UAR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
differences, since some impor-
tant problems have merely been
postponed for future considera-
tion.
The Sudanese negotiators
won a major victory over the
heretofore intransigent Egyp-
tians in the month-long discus-
sions which ended in the rati-
fication of the agreement. It
is concerned essentially with
each country's share of unused
N. le waters. Domestic critics
of .the `Sudanese Government
nevertheless have attacked cer-
tain provisions as a "giveaway,"
particularly the "loaning" to
Egypt of a portion of the Su-
dan's share for a number of
years. There has also been
some Sudanese criticism, large-
ly politically inspired, over
the amount of compensation
Egypt will pay for flooding Su-
danese lands when the Aswan
High Dam is completed.
Early Difficulties
The .:Egyptian;;;' Government
proposed in 1952 a major expan-
sion of the country's cultivated
land by construction of a $1.2
billion dam at Aswan. Initial-
ly, Cairo sought Western financ-
ing for the foreign exchange
costs of the dam; but American
and British aid offers were
withdrawn in 1956, and in 1958
Nasir accepted a Soviet offer
to lend the equivalent of $100,-
000,000 to build the first stage
of the project. Construction
now has begun.
The Sudan is the only other
of the eight riparian countries
using significant quantities of
Nile water for irrigation. It
agreed in principle in late 1957
--with some misgivings--to the
Aswan project, but it rejected
Egypt's plan for sharing the
surplus waters which would be
made available.
For almost two years both
governments remained adamant;
the Sudan insisted that the
total Nile waters be divided 75
percent for Egypt and 25 percent
for itself. In addition, Khar-
toum claimed that the dam's res-
ervoir, which will extend 125
miles into the Sudan, would dis-
place about 50,000 Sudanese and
flood valuable resources. The
Sudan's demands for water were
calculated on the basis of care-
ful study, but the Sudanese com-
pensation figure of $100,000,000
was set high for bargaining pur-
poses. It would have been po-
litical folly for any Sudanese
government, especially the pres-
ent somewhat shaky Abboud mili-
tary regime, to have yielded
substantially on the waters is-
sue.
UAR President Nasir, ap-
parently feeling pressure to
get on with the High Dam and
recognizing at long last that
no Sudanese government would be
able to give in, intervened
personally to make the agree-
ment possible. Not only did
Egypt yield on the waters ques-
tion, but Cairo proposed the
compromise figure of $43,200,000
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19 November 1959
for compensation--an amount
which seems more than adequate.
The New Agreement
The Nile flow, as measured
at Aswan, has averaged 84 bil-
18711945
INCLUDES MAXIMUM
AND MINIMUM
FLOOD YEARS
Figures based on selected periods
(BILLIONS OF CUBIC METERS)
40
1913.1914
Vollsw YEAR
1870 '80 '90 1900 '10 '20 '30 '40 '50 1960
lion cubic meters of water a
year during this century. The
new agreement sets forth the
Sudan's "acquired" share--the
water it is already using--at
4 billion and Egypt's at 48
billion. Most of the remain-
ing 32 billion flows on into
the Mediterranean. The High
Dam is designed to conserve
this wasted water and thus make
use of an additional 22 billion
cubic meters annually. The 10
billion difference between the
total flow and the amount avail-
able after the High Dam is con-
structed is accounted for by
evaporation at the reservoir.
The agreement sets the Su-
dan's share of this surplus at
14.5 billion and only 7.5 bil-
lion for Egypt, giving Khartoum
a total of 18.5 billion and
Cairo 55.5 for the 75/25 ratio
the Sudan has been demanding.
The final allocation of
water thus, on its face, re-
duces sharply the irrigation
benefits Cairo expected from
the dam. Originally Egypt
planned to have a total of
from 61.2 to 62.3 billion cubic
meters of water available;
this would have permitted Egyp-
tian irrigated acreage to ex-
pand by 1,349,400 acres--from
the present 6,383,700 to 7,733,-
100--and would have allowed con-
version to perennial irrigation
of the 695,460 acres of land
normally irrigated by flooding.
Depending on the crops planted,
the new allocation reduces by
more than 30 percent the amount
of new land which can be irri-
gated by the Aswan scheme. Other
benefits from the High Dam, such
as electricity, would remain un-
changed.
To offset the effects of
the reduction, Egypt has agreed
to construct with the Sudan a
number of works in the Sudanese
equatorial swamps designed to
increase the flow of the Nile
above the average 84 billion
cubic meters. Any additional
water thus made available will
be distributed equally between
the two countries, as will the
cost of construction.
Since it will be many, years
before the Sudan will be able
to use even its present quota
of water, the agreement gives
Cairo the right to build such
projects by paying the entire
cost, although the Sudan will
pay its share when it is ready
to make use of the water.
About 13 billion cubic meters
now are lost by evaporation and
absorption in these swamps. To
increase the }Water available
to Egypt for irrigation before
these projects; are finished,
the agreement gallows Cairo to
borrow up to 1.5 billion cubic
meterg annu ,l1:y tfrrom_?the Sudan.
Problems
The Nile waters pact appar-
ently was drafted in rather
EXCERPTS FROM THE NILE WATERS PACT
The Republic of Sudan agrees on the princi-
ple of granting the UAR a loan of water from the
Sudan's share in the waters of the High Dam to
enable it to carry on with the stipulated pro-
grams for agricultural expansion. The UAR'a re-
quest for this loan will be made after reviewing
its programs for five years from the date of the
signing of this agreement. If this review by the
UAR shows that it is still in need of the loan,
the Republic of Sudan will grant it a loan not
exceeding 1.5 billion cubic meters of its share,
on condition that the loan expires in November
1977. (Appendix 1)
As the benefits of the stipulated shares of
the two republics from the surplus of waters re-
sulting from the High Dam willnot start before
the building, of the High Dram and its operations,
the two aides1 will agree about the organisation
of their agriultural expansion during the tran-
sition from now until the building of the High
Darn, so that it will not affect their present
water needs. (Article 6)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
vague terms in order to put off
a number of problems for later
solution. The "loan" of water
may cause difficulties, since no
repayment program is specified.
It is also not clear whether
the UAR "review" required to
establish a need for such a
loan is open to questioning by
the Sudan.
One of the most serious
gaps may be the lack of provi-
sion for years when the Nile
flow falls substantially below
average. The agreement calls
for drawing up plans to cope
with such a situation which
''will not harm" either country.
But if a crisis should develop,
it would be difficult to avert
serious damage to both states.
The agreement also leaves
an opening for continued wran-
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gling between Egypt and the Sudan
about how the water is to be
shared prior to the construc-
tion of the Aswan High Dam.
Furthermore, the claims of oth-
er riparian countries are rec-
ognized only by a statement
that the UAR and the Sudan will
adopt a unified stand in deal-
ing with them.
The over-all agreement
thus appears to be a major ac-
complishment made possible
chiefly by Egyptian willingness
to pay a steep price. It is
not, however, definitive in a
number of important respects,
and differences of interpretation
are still likely to plague Su-
danese-Egyptian relations. Deep-
rooted Sudanese suspicion of 25X1
Egypt's intentions is also likely
to make it difficult.to implement
the agreement.
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