CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO. 56
OCR NO.5452/59
12 November 1959
tto Vm4`t:0 Class. ^ 00
^ ClaTS ----
: "
lleDate
&1
,I&uth70-3 3 -
SUMMARY -
E
-
occurrent He. -------
\Y/r.
Document No. ------ ~ =
No Change In Class. C]
__
p Dmlassltied
Class, Chanced to: TS
S ()
25X1;
?.ext Review late: _
Muth.: MR 70-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAi5X1
State Dept. and PACOM review(s) completed.
13
~CTURN TD WHIM b RECORDS E
I IEDIATEEY AI R USE
Joe rp-.tot
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1 is 7
CURRENT
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
Next Page (s) Next 5 = Page,(s) In Doc
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
u
ment Denied
 T A MM^NL
'>AND KASHI~h
(Status in dispute)
/CFASf-Fjpf LINE; ??
inagar S~eh
- Location of
last two clashes
- -- Selected road
25X1 - - - Selected trail
12 NOVEMBER 1959
MILES 200
WWSTI
New Delhi's negative reac-
tion to Chou En-lai's proposal
for a demilitarization of the
Sino-Indian frontier on the
basis of the "status quo" ap-
pears to leave little prospect
that negotiations can be ar-
ranged in the near future.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
The Chinese Communist pre-
mier's 7 November letter to
Nehru calls for "prompt" bor-
der negotiations and contains
a note of urgency suggesting
that Peiping wants a quick
opportunity to display its
"friendly" willingness to settle
the border disputes. The Chi-
nese probably hope such a meet-
ing "in the immediate future"
would partially counter the ef-
fect of President Eisenhower's
visit to New Delhi--a visit the
Chinese may view as a part of
NEPAL ?.^fucKlM
f KATMANDU
Shillong-
`.r
L_-'mod
Boundary shown on Indian maps
Boundary shown on recent
Chinese Communist maps
Boundaries ore not necessarily those
recognized by the U.S. Government.
C H I N A
A
SECRET
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
an "American plot" to shift India
from its policy of nonalignment':
by "exploiting" the border situa-
tion.
Despite the concern Chinese
leaders recently expressed over
Nehru's "swing to the right,"
Chou's letter shows no inclina-
tion to buy negotiations with
substantive Chinese territorial
concessions damaging to Peiping's
ultimate bargaining position.
Chou suggested that both Indian
and Chinese troops mutually with-
draw some 12 miles from the Mc-
Mahon line in the east and from
present frontier positions in the
west--the Ladakh area. This
proposal does indicate a desire
to prevent encounters similar to
the 21 October Ladakh incident
which inflamed Indian opinion.
However, as far as concessions
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
Page 1 of 5
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
are concerned, Chou's proposal
is nothing more than a refine-
ment of his earlier call for re-
turn to the "status quo" which
existed along the border before
the Indians established outposts
closer to the actual frontier
during the Tibetan revolt. In
this "status quo" situation,
the Chinese nominally "respect"
the McMahon line without ac-
knowledging its legality, and
they remain in unchallenged
possession of northeastern
Ladakh.
The Chinese have refused
to accept Nehru's stipulation
that Chinese troops must with-
draw from disputed outposts be-
fore negotiations begin. Chou's
letter appears an attempt to
break this impasse and' puts Nehru
in a position where he is faced
with the choice of agreeing to
the Chinese proposals or appear-
ing to be the intransigent party
to the dispute.
Nehru's immediate reaction
was that, while "the spirit of
the Chinese letter was not bad,"
the demilitarization proposal
would benefit China, not India.
After conferring on Chou's let-
ter, the Congress party's execu-
tive committee on 10 November
issued a resolution--reportedly
drafted by Nehru himself--stating
that adequate steps should be
taken to prevent further border
clashes but such steps should
not "affect the integrity of
India" or imply any "acceptance
of aggression." This has been
interpreted
as signifying India would accept
Chou's proposal only on condi-
tion that the Chinese first "va-
cate their aggression," that is,
withdraw from territory regard-
ed by New Delhi as traditionally
Indian.
In order to keep the door
open for eventual negotiations,
Nehru may counter with his own
demilitarization proposal. How-
ever, the Indian prime minister,
who recently vetoed a Chinese
suggestion that Vice President
Radhakrishnan visit Peiping,
probably will consider Chou's
proposal for a meeting Pre-
mature.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq
Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim
is still in the hospital, but
he looks well and appears
cheerful. Qasim told the Amer-
ican ambassador on 7 November
that he expected to leave the
hospital in about ten days.
Preparations for celebrating
his release are proceeding,al-
though security authorities re-
main concerned over possible
disturbances.
Iraq's internal situation
has undergone a perce;~tible
change since Qasim escaped as-
sassination on 7 October. His
popularity had diminished con-
siderably following the 20 Sep-
tember execution of a number of
officers implicated in the Mosul
revolt of last March, but the
assassination attempt made him
a martyr in certain quarters.
It remains to be seen, however,
whether the activities being
planned to celebrate Qasim's
release from the hospital will
be effective in retaining this
popularity.
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 5
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 November 1959
The Communists appear to
feel less sure of themselves,
despite the increase in their
overt activity since early Oc-
tober, and are placing their
hopes on a new series of trea-
son trials and on dominating
the demonstrations celebrating
Qasim's recovery. They have
been put on the defensive, how-
ever, by rumors that Qasim in-
tends to form his own party
after 6 January, when a return
to party politics has been
promised.
Anti-Communist elements
including some elements of the
influential leftist National
Democratic party, are proceed-
ing with plans to form a united
front without the Communists.
They hope this front will domi-
nate Qasim's party, but the
premier appears to envisage a
single party embracing both
Communist and anti-Communist
elements. The Communist press
has charged that demands for
the new party are based on "non-
democratic principles," that
they contradict Qasim's state-
ments, and that the idea s one
inspired by Nasir's eXatnpli.
To date Qiasim hag made nb
public comment regarding the
establishment of sdeh a phrt~,
although he has sent tip trial
balloons on the sib jbot . `These
have been warmly welcomed by
nine of Iraq's provincial gov-
ernments,all five army division-
al commanders, and other promi-
nent officials.
Qasim also has apparently
decided since the assassination
attempt to retaliate by insti-
gating trouble for Nasir in Syr-
ia.. Qasim stated on 6 Novem-
ber that "Syria and Iraq should
be united"--an allegation that
is sure to arouse Nasir and
will not be lost on dissident
Syrian elements. Should Qasim
succeed in stabilizing condi-
tions in Iraq, while Nasir makes
only slow progress in Syrian
economic and political matters,
sentiment for union with Iraq
could grow in Syria.
Cairo's attention, which
has been largely devoted to
Syria and Iraq, last week was
focused again on the threat of
Israeli military action. The
4 November clash between Israeli
and Egyptian fighter aircraft
over the Sinai, apparently
arising out of an Israeli re-
connaissance flight, probably
contributed to the UAR's un-
easiness. The Cairo press had
made the most of the situation,
hurling allegations at Ben-
Gurion, the-French, and Qasim,
all of whom are accused of
being linked in a plot against
the VAR and Arab nationalism.
Israel probably is pleased
at Cairo's show of apprehen-
sion over its intentions, and
this may deter Nasir from tak-
ing any action against the Qasim
regime in Iraq. Israel has
consistently maintained that
Qasim should be supported by
the West, since his rivalry
with Nasir tends to perpetuate
Arab disunity. Ben-Gurion
publicly warned the VAR on
3 November that any attempt
to interfere in Iraq would
compel Israel to "reserve
freedom of action."
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Page 3 of 5
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 November 1959
President Ayub of Pakistan
arrived in Tehran on 9 November
for a state visit and talks
with the Shah. They will be
joined on 16 November by Turkish
Premier Menderes. Menderes, in
commenting on the planned tri-
partite talks, told an American
official, "We (Turks) are doing
what we can to bring Iran,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan clos-
er together."
The,Shah, while welcoming
Ayub's visit as a politically
useful event, is less enthusi-
astic over Menderes' visit,
fearing the meeting will give
credibility to Soviet and Iraqi
propaganda that plans are be-
ing coordinated against Iraq.
Ian
18 November, Ayub will Accompa-
ny Menderes to Ankara for a
two-day visit.
Sudan
The group of dissident
junior army officers which had
postponed earlier plans against
the Sudanese Government launched
a coup attempt in the early
hours of 10 November. The Ab-
boud military government evi-
dently was forewarned; its loyal
forces took swift and effective
counteraction, to nip the coup
in the bud. A few hours after
the initial move by the dissi-
dents, the government had the
situation under control and an-
nounced the arrest of several of
the ringleaders of the plot,
The regime is still under
pressure from strong religious
and political elements demand-
ing a return to civilian govern-
ment and the restoration of
civil liberties. Among these
elements are the head of the
powerful, conservative Ansar
religious sect, many leaders of
the major political parties, and
those officials of the Sudanese
Communist party who are not in
jail.
Their campaigns of agitation
and propaganda have stressed
the allegation that the Abboud
government's favorable Nile
waters agreement with the UAR,
signed in Cairo on 8 November,
is a sellout of Sudanese in-
terests. These civilian groups
have been behind a small walk-
out of railroad workers and
widespread strikes by university
and secondary-school students.
The Sudanese Ministry of the
Interior is making preparations
to cope with a possible general
strike on or before the 17 No- 25X1
vember celebrations of the an-
niversary of the military re-
gime's assumption of power.F
SOVIET ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION
Soviet statements and com-
mentary on 7 November marking
the 42nd anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution developed
the main Mere of a new era in
international relations and
were devote largely to Moscow's
present campaign for "peaceful
coexistence" and "universal
disarmament." The peace theme
was emphasi2ed by the routine
nature of Moscow's military
parade. It featured only gun
artillery, rocket launchers,
and an assortment of vehicles.
No guided missiles or tanks
SECRET
PART I OF IMMED!AT1' INTE"IST
Page 4 of 5
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
were shown, and only one new
weapon--a multiple rocket
launcher--was observed.
The traditional keynote
speech on the eve of the an-
niversary, delivered by party
presidium member,Averky Aristov,
contained a review of Soviet
economic and technological
achievements and an outline of
the present situation in in-
ternational relations. The
relatively short speech stressed
Moscow's "peace- offensive,;'
contained no new foreign policy
proposals, and was little more
than a condensed version of
Khrushchev's speech to the Su-
preme Soviet on 31 October.
Aristov made numerous
flattering references to Khru-
shchev, praising him as leader,
policy maker, and "indefatigable
fighter for peace." He pointed
to'Khrushchev's visit to the
United States as "a model" in
the practice of peaceful co-
existence. Portraying the
visit as a personal triumph
for Khrushchev, Aristov claimed
that the trip had won the USSR
many new friends and that Khru-
shchev had received a "sympa-
thetic response" from the ma-
jority of Americans.
Defense Minister Marshal
Malinovsky, in a short speech
following his review of the
troops on 7 November, adhered
to the same general line by
stressing the peaceful inten-
tions of the Soviet Union but
ended with the statement, "un-
til such time as our disarm-
ament proposals are adopted
and until the numerous American
military bases set up around
the Soviet Union are liquidated,
the Communist party and the
Soviet Government consider it
their sacred duty to maintain
the country's armed forces in
a condition of high military
preparedness."
In Peiping, statements by
Chinese Communist leaders in
connection with the October Rev-
olution anniversary contained
strong reaffirmations of soli-
darity with the USSR and ex-
pressed willingness to "work
for the complete realization"
of Moscow's peace initiatives.
Politburo member Peng Chen told
the Peiping rally that lasting
peaceful international environ-
ment is necessary to develop
China's "socialist construction."
Signs that the Chinese do not
intend to moderate their criti-
cism of the United States, how-
ever, appeared in Peng's call
for continued struggle against
the "warlike imperialist circles
in the US" which "continue to
create international tension
in Turkey, Laos, and many other
places."
Chervonenko, the USSR's
new ambassador to Peiping, told
the rally that the Soviet Gov-
ernment fully supports Commu-
nist China on the question of
the "liberation of Taiwan" and
will continue to do so until
the question is "thoroughly
settled." Like Khrushchev,
however, he avoided specific
endorsement of Peiping's "right"
to use any means, including
force, to seize the offshore
islands and Taiwan.
SECRET
PART I 6P f9MEU1ATE IN' EREST
Page 5 of 5
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
S. K. Tsarapkin, Soviet
delegate to the Geneva nuclear
test talks, continues to insist
that the only purpose of tech-
nical talks on detection of
underground tests, which he
proposed on 3 November, should
be to determine the criteria
for on-s.te inspections within
a predetermined annual quota.
He emphasized the USSR's "con-
cession" in agreeing to con-
?sider the new American data on
undergound test detection
problems, but he has continued
to oppose Western demands that
the terms of reference for the
proposed talks be broad enough
to ensure that the group's
final report reflect the impli-
cations of this information.
In abandoning his opposi-
tion to a discussion of the
new data, the Soviet delegate
proposed that a conference of
experts be held to determine
what type of instrument read-
ings would qualify a "suspi-
cious event" for an on-the-
site inspection as well as to
consider the new US informa-
tion. Moscow's proposal was
probably intended to avoid the
appearance of obstructing prog-
ress in the negotiations and to
forestall growing Western pres-
sure for a limited treaty con-
fined, at least temporarily,
to atmospheric, high-altitude,
and underwater tests.
On 4 November a member
of the Soviet delegation told
Ambassador Wadsworth that the
Soviet proposal had been thor-
oughly prepared during the con-
ference recess,' although Moscow
had hoped to side-step these
talks if possible. He asserted
that American insistence on in-
troducing new data had forced
the Soviet delegation's hand
and that it was proceeding along
the "planned fall-back course."
The Soviet delegate pref-
aced his proposal on 3 November
with statements aimed at under-
cutting any Western efforts to
use the proposed new talks to
modify basically the conclu-
sions and recommendations of
the 1958 experts' talks on a
control system to enforce a
nuclear test ban. He made it
clear Moscow still maintains
that the "so-called" new
seismic data will not modify
the experts' conclusion which
pertains to the possibility
of concealing explosions.
He pointed out that all
parties have agreed on the defi-
nition of adequate control and
asserted that the USSR there-
fore did not interpret US in-
sistence on discussing new data
as a desire to revise or review
the 1958 experts' report itself.
He called the Soviet move an
effort to move the negotiations
out of. the "deadlock" caused
by "this artificial obstacle"
which the American delegation
had raised.
The Soviet draft proposal
of 4 November, defining the
terms of reference for the new
technical working group, pro-
vides for consideration of the
new data but appears to separate
it from "technical data relating
to the development of criteria
for inspection." The proposal
seeks to play down the signifi-
cance of the new American infor-
mation and studies by making the
determination of "objective cri-
teria" the sole task of the
working group.
This Soviet call for talks
to work out the "objective cri-
teria" to be considered before
sending inspection teams to in-
vestigate unidentified events
is not entirely new. In letters
to President Eisenhower and
SECRET
Page 1 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
SECRET
12 November 1959
Prime Minister Macmillan on 23
April and again on 15 May,
Trushchev mentioned sending
out inspection teams at, the
request of any of the original
parties to the treaty "when-
ever instrument readings of
the control posts give reason
to suspect any phenomenon as
being a nuclear explosion."
On 22 May, Foreign Minis-
ter Gromyko told Secretary
Herter and British Foreign Sec-
retary Lloyd that the USSR was
willing to undertake a discus-
sion of "technical criteria
limited to readings of instru-
ments." On 12 June the Soviet
delegate to the test-ban talks
expressed "surprise" that the
United States and British dele..
gates had not followed up this
idea; he suggested that techni-
cal discussions on criteria be
held parallel with the talks
on high-altitude`'detection
problems . (Con 25X1
?curred in by OSI)
MOSCOW RESTRAINS EAST GERMAN FLAG DISPLAY IN WEST BERLIN
The decision to ban any
display of East German flags in
West Berlin-during the 7 Novem-
ber celebration of the Soviet
revolution suggests that Soviet
Premier Khrushchev wishes to
avoid serious incidents which
would conflict with hisefforts
to achieve an international de-
tente. In his foreign policy
address on 31 October I'..hru-
shchev called for a "firm
decision" '3y all states to re-
frain from any. measures which
could worsen the international
situation before a s'ummkt meet-
ing. Fe3 stated that the Soviet
Union "will do everything in
its power" to improve the i... -
international atmosphere.
The Kremlin may also feel
that any repetition of the vio-
lence which accompanied the
display of the East German flags
on 6-8 October would have had
the effect of '~alstering West-
ern determination to maintain
the status quo in Berlin, point
i.ng up the necessity of Western
forces in Berlin and underlii
ing East German ambitions to
take over West Berlin. More
over, any incidents would have
been in sharp contrast with the
general stress on the peace
campaign evident. in the 7.No-
vember celebration in the USSR.
The concurrent Western warning
against renewed attempts to,
fly the flag left Ulbricht lit-
tle or no leeway
He thereupon issued
special instructions to all gov-
ernment offices to avoid any-
thing contrary to the Soviet
line.
S-Bann (elevated) trains
in West Berlin limited their
display to small metal flags
carried on the first and last
cars of each train. Further-
more, the East Germans did not
show their flags at a ceremony
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTI$ of 14
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
at the Soviet war memorial in
"lest Berlin, just 200 yards in-
side the sector border. To'cover
its retreat, however, the regime
has launched a propaganda cam-- 25X1
paign calling for a ban on dis-
play of the West German flag
in West Berlin.
Polish party First Secre-
tary Gomulka apparently has
decided that tighter party con-
trol is essential, at least in
the economic, cultural, and ed-
ticational fields. The removal
of politburo and party secre-
tariat member Jerzy Morawski,
a liberal and long a close sup-
porter of Gomulka, from his
party responsibilities for agi-
tation and propaganda suggests
that Gomulka's decision to
adopt tougher policies met with
some opposition in high party
circles. The recent changes
may point to a trend away from
the liberalization which has
characterized the Gomulka re-
gime, but Gomulka's basic poli-
cies regarding collectiviza-
tion, church-state relations,
and police controls probably
will remain intact.
The prolonged
meat shortage ap-
parently forced Go-
mulka to take a close
look at Poland's
general situation.
:^ea_ ize that, in spite
of Vie optimistic and
er:co -,raging reports
he iad been receiving,
.he general econom-
ic situation iii fact
was far from }
satisfactory and that
he had not been kept
:Fully informed. JERZY
anger was directed
largely at his trusted friends,
who he felt had let him down and
had sabotaged his program either
by design or through incompe-=
tence.
poor planning, lack of coordi-
nation, inadequate administra-
tion, and general inefficiency,
and described Polish planners
and administrators as inflexi-
ble and reluctant to admit er-
rors or take steps to correct
them. Many officials virtual-
ly ignored party and government
directives aimed at correcting
shortcomings.
All of the new appointees
are well known for their anti-
liberal attitudes and for their
advocacy of centralized economic
controls. They have reputations
as tough administrators. Gomulka
apparently believes they will
obey party directives and, even
more important, see to it that
others also obey them. While
Gomulka is moving in the direc-
tion of firmer controls and
greater discipline, he probably
has not decided how far he will
go or what the scope of the
changes will be.
There is no indication at
this time that the changes were
the result of Soviet pressure
or of factional disputes within
the top echelons of the Polish
party. However, the necessity
SECRET
Page 3 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of dismissing Morawski because
of his disagreement with the
harder approach suggests that
the new line will stimulate the
development of factionalism.
The agricultural program
will probably continue in the
direction already announced,
with perhaps an intensified
drive to get the agricultural
"circles" operating as planned.
The general tightening of
central controls will affect
wages especially and will be de-
signed to ensure that Gomulka's
future investment plans for the
development of Poland will not
be impeded by inflationary pres-
sures or by other disturbances
in the economy such as have oc-
curred in 1959. Wage norms may
be revised, but public antagonism
toward wage-norm revisions will
probably retard this until the
economic situation has improved.
In the meantime wage rates have
been frozen, employment cut back
in some cases, and supplementary
payments such as bonuses and
overtime reduced.
The recent developments
have had disturbing effects
among the populace, and the re-
gime probably will be sensitive
to public opinion in gauging
the effect of AyDlving correc-
tive measures.
SOVIET BLOC INTENSIFIES PRESSURE ON GREECE
The USSR and Rumania have
recently intensified their
pressure on Greece to improve
relations with bloc countries.
In addition to suggesting ex-
changes of visits with Greek
leaders, bloc overtures to
Greece-Land, to a lesser extent,
to Yugoslavia--have emphasized
proposals for a conference of
Balkan leaders to discuss out-
standing issues and schemes for
prohibiting nuclear and missile
weapons in the Balkans. Con-
centration on Greece distin-
guishes the current campaign
from earlier bloc proposals for
a Balkan "zone of peace."
Since the announcement in
early August of the exchange of
visits between Khrushchev and
President Eisenhower, bloc of-
ficials have urged Athens to
make a contribution to "dispel-
ling the spirit of the cold
war." Soviet Ambassador Serge-
yev used this line in an at-
tempt to elicit favorable ac-
tion by Greece on Moscow's re-
quests for increased cultural
exchanges and for permission
to reroute Soviet air service
to Cairo through Athens in-
stead of Albania.
The current spate of over-
tures to Athens, however, ap-
pears to have been planned dur-
ing talks in Bucharest from 19
to 25 October between Khrushchev
and Rumanian party boss Gheor
ghiu-Dej. The day after Khru-
shchev's departure, Bucharest
renewed its 1957 appeal for a
Balkan summit conference. Ru-
manian propagandists began to
emphasize that conditions are
favorable for intra-Balkan col-
laboration in all fields--in-
cluding the creation of a Bal-
kan atom-free zone as the logi-
cal application of the "spirit
of Camp David."
The Rumanian regime also
utilized an invitation by the
Athens Academy to Deputy Pre-
mier Joja to sound out the
Greek attitude and to gain pub-
licity for its views on a Bal-
kan detente, Joja's cavalier
behavior in ignoring, the pri-
mary purpose of his visit by
fishing in political waters
was resented by Greek leaders;
Prime Minister Karamanlis re-
fused to see him, and Foreign
Minister Averoff, in a brief
talk, declined to discuss poli-
tics. However, this did not
SECRET
PART I% NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 4 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
deter Joja from calling an in-
formal press conference on 6
November to extend an invita-
tion to Karamanlis to visit
Bucharest.
Moscow also stepped up its
overtures. The Soviet Embassy
in Athens put out a feeler for
an invitation from the Greek
Government for Khrushchev'to
stop over for talks in Athens
on his way to visit De Gaulle,
according to Averoff, who said
that the proposed visit was re-
jected as "not opportune." Av-
eroff told Ambassador Briggs
on 2 November that he had also
rejected an invitation from
Sergeyev for him and Karamanlis
to visit Moscow, whereupon the
Soviet ambassador asked what
are "you Greeks afraid of" now
that the Khrushchev-Eisenhower
exchange has been agreed upon.
On 6 November Sergeyev
also held a press conference--
his first during his six-year
tour in Athens--at which he re-
newed the invitation to Kara-
manlis, suggested that Balkan
leaders should hold meetings,
and explained that the USSR's
proximity to the Balkang- is a
legitimate reason for its in-
terest in Balkan affairs.
As was probably anticipated
by bloc leaders, the Greek Gov-
ernment rejected the call for a
Balkan summit meeting. However,
Moscow probably intends to cite
Athens' refusal, announced on 8
November, as additional justi-
fication for the countermeas-
ures the USSR has threatened to
take to offset Turkish accept-
ance of NATO missile bases.
Bloc leaders, who appear to re-
gard Greece as a potential weak
link in the Western defense sys-
tem, may also believe that, by
eliciting a negative reaction
from Athens to their suggestions,
pressure can be brought to bear
on the Karamanlis government as
a perpetuator of cold-war poli-
cies and that Athens' determi-
nation to resist bloc over-
tures in the future can thus
be weakened.
A longer term aim of this
sort is also suggested by indi-
cations that Moscow is making a
serious effort, aided by the Eu-
ropean satellites, to expand
trade relations with Athens.
The trade protocol covering So-
viet-Greek commerce during 1960,
signed on 31 October, calls for
total trade of about $50,000,-
000. The Soviet bloc accounts
for about 10 percent of Greece's
trade, a figure that appears to
be on the rise.
Athens is in favor of in-
creased trade with bloc coun-
tries, primarily since it can
exchange surplus agricultural
commodities for a variety of
goods, including oil and ma-
chinery, which are normally
purchased from hard-currency
countries.
The bloc campaign has also
been directed against Yugoslavia.
Bloc propaganda attabks on Yugo-
slavia--except from Albania--
have been sharply reduced since
late May, when Khrushchev rein-
troduced proposals for a Balkan
"zone of peace" during his visit
to Albania. Politika, an au-
thoritative Belgrade daily,noted
on 2 November "realistic possi-
bilities" in the Balkans for "the
stabilization of relations and
development of cooperation." Bel-
grade's position remains esse
n-
tially the same as it was in
re-
spect
to earlier bloc overtures.
While
demanding improved bila
t-
eral
relations with bloc coun
-
tries
as a prerequisite to a
Balkan
conference,~they would probably be
willing, to participate if Greece 25X1
ably.
or Turkey were to respond favor-
SECRET
Page 5 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The debate in the Bundes-
tag on 5 November spotlighted
the divergence among West Ger-
many's political parties on the
proper conduct of foreign rela-
tions, especially over the im-
pending East-West negotiations.
The debate itself--the first
in 18 months--was relatively
calm but indicated no signif-
icant change in long-established
party positions.
Presentation of the gov-
ernment's statement on foreign
policy by Foreign Minister von
Brentano led Social Democratic
leader Erich Ollenhauer to as-
sail Chancellor Adenauer's fail-
ure to do so himself as indica-
tive of his "contempt for par-
liament." Ollenhauer also com-
plained that Adenauer's policy
of "personal-letter diplomacy"
prevented the Bundestag from
being properly informed on vital
issues. He said the chancel-
lor's positions on reunifica-
tion and diplomatic relations
with the European satellites
were "inflexible."
The government's state-
ment called disarmament the
chief goal of international
politics and expressed German
willingness to "accept any kind
of arms control that other na-
tions would be willing to take
The Communists are likely
to increase their influence in
the large and politically power-
ful Cuban Workers' Confedera-
tion (CTC) during its national
congress from 18 to 21 November.
Although the revolutionary 26th
of July Movement claims sweep-
ing victories, Communists are
believed to have gained sub-
stantial representation among
upon themselves." The Social-
ists countered by demanding
that the German problem be kept
on the agenda of international
discussions--a reference to
Adenauer's recent suggestion
that the summit agenda be lim-
ited to the topic of disarmament.
Adenauer's stress on dis-
armament, coupled with his ef-
forts to delay the date of the
summit meeting, has given rise
to strong press criticism of
his "new independence of ac-
tion." The widely read Die
Welt said the chancellors "in-
flexible" insistence on main-
taining the status quo threat-
ens to block progress toward
an international detente and
has alientated Washington. The
newspaper called for a "realis-
tic reappraisal" before Germany
finds itself "diplomatically
isolated."
the 3,000 delegates elected to
the congress by local unions on
8 November. Their efforts to
infiltrate the CTC will be
facilitated by the actions of
extremists who now virtually
control the Cuban Government.
The CTC has long dominated the
Cuban labor movement, considered
one of the strongest and best
organized in Latin America.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 6 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
Communists controlled the CTC
in the mid-1940s during the
first Batista regime but were
ousted in 1947.
Raul Castro, considered
leader of the extremists in
the government,
ordered the ex-
nority in the labor movement
a disproportionate behind-the-
scenes voice in the election of
national CTC leaders during the 25X1
congress.
Officials of the Catholic Chris-
tian Workers' Union (UTC) re-
cently agreed with other church
leaders that the Cuban Govern-
ment now is being run by Com-
munists and that it controls
the entire economy. UTC offi-
cials hope to thwart Communist
activities at the labor congress,
but probably are not sufficient-
ly strong and well organized to
be effective.
pulsion of five non-Communists
from the CTC directorate F_
They
evidently refused to agree auto-
matically with government ac-
tions they disapproved. The
new labor minister, Augusto
Martinez Sanchez, who is close-
ly identified with Raul, has
already suggested that he will
not give non-Communists the
tacit government support which,
early in the Castro regime,
enabled 26th of July labor lead-
ers to resist Cuban Communist
party (PSP) efforts to dominate
the CTC.
The labor minister's in-
fluence and the PSP strategy
of discrediting individual anti-
Communist leaders while not
challenging labor officials who
do not openly oppose Communist
efforts will give the PSP mi-
Other reportedly non-Com-
munist labor leaders like Con-
rado Becquer of the Sugar Work-
ers' Federation, Cuba's most
powerful labor group, may have
decided that they must go along
with the Castro government or
be ousted. Becquer, for example,
is already organizing the work-
ers' militia originally recom- 25X1
mended by the Communist party
and endorsed b Fidel Castro
on 26 October.
MORE ANTI-US INCIDENTS LIKELY IN PANAMA
Further demonstrations pro
yoked by ambitious politicians
seeking to exploit Panamanian
grievances over the Canal Zone
may follow the violent outbreaks
of anti-US rioting on 3 Novem-
ber. Plans have already been
announced for a new demonstra-
tion in the zone on 28 Novem-
ber--the anniversary of Panama's
independence from Spain. The
weak De la Guardia government
is expected to continue falling
in with nationalistic opposi-
tion political leaders and ex-
tremist student groups as a
means of currying popular favor
in anticipation of next May's
presidential election.
An increasingly bitter anti-
US press campaign, presumably
government inspired, was initi-
ated after the 3 November riots
and the subsequent exchange of
protests between the US and
Panamanian governments. Prop-
aganda films and publications
are apparently to be supplied
to all Panamanian missions
abroad in an effort to win
world approval and sympathy for
Panama's cause. The Legisla-
tive Assembly on 10 November
passed a resolution condemning
the alleged desecration of a
Panamanian flag and use of force
by American troops during the
3 November rioting.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 7 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the Panamanian Government irs
refused to help put down the 3
November riots, which resulted
in injuries to more than 60
Canal Zone policemen and Pana-
manian demonstrators. The Pana-
manian National Guard broadcast
instructions to its troops to
stay clear of trouble areas and
not to interfere in the fight-
ing.
It is extremely doubtful
that the De la Guardia regime
could survive if it were to
oppose any efforts directed to-
ward winning new canal conces-
sions for Panama. The govern-
ment has been weakened by a
foreign-based insurrection, do-
mestic revolts, and the in-
trigues of opposition politi-
cians, who are using Panama's
rapidly worsening economic and
social problems to overthrow
the corrupt ruling oligarchy.
Consequently, the De la
Guardia administration is
expected to redouble its
efforts to appear as the 25X1
champion of Panama's per-
ennial fight for increased
canal benefits.
THE ALGERIAN MILITARY SITUATION
The military situation in
Algeria--which will have a ma-
jor bearing on any settlement
between the rebels and the
French--continues to be marked
by a gradual reduction of rebel
capabilities and occasional
manifestations of low rebel
morale. In Oran region, how-
ever, resurgence of small-scale
rebel activity in an area once
regarded as pacified has demon-
strated the difficulties facing
French advocates of total paci-
fication.
ne g ers
newspaper c aims that between
April 1958 and July 1959 the
total number of rebel troops
dropped from 15,600 to 13,700
and that the supply of arms
dropped by one third. It is
more likely,however, that the
total number of rebel effec-
tives is slightly less than
the figure of 21,600
The French offensive in
the Kabylie Mountains, begun
in July, has accelerated the
breakup of rebel forces into
small units, and the local
rebel commander was reportedly
killed on 5 November. This pres-
sure, together with factors such
as the rebels' chronic ammuni
tion shortage, appears to have
contributed to defections and
reduced morale in some areas.
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 14
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
12 November 1959
Despite present
maneuvering directed
toward a cease-fire,
the rebel leadership
has assiduously
avoided giving an im-
pression of desiring
peace at any price,
and appears to have
stepped up efforts
to obtain arms abroad.
Reports from Tunis
that Communist China
will provide addition-
al military ;aid-
valued at $10,000,000
are unconfirmed, but
they serve to adver-
tise the rebels' will-
ingness to continue
the war.
There appears to
be little prospect
that the French can
soon pacify Algeria
to a point where there are only
200 war deaths per year--De
Gaulle's prerequisite for sched-
uling a referendum for self-
determination. Nonetheless,
rebel military commanders meet-
ing in Tunis reportedly have
empowered the provisional gov-
ernment to seek a cease-fire
based on De Gaulle's 16 Sep-
tember proposals. Continuing
rebel difficulties in sustain-
ing military operations should
strengthen the hand of rebel
moderates at the expense of ex-
tremists hostile to De Gaulle's
program.
The new Tunisian National
Assembly is likely to be even
more of a rubber stamp for
President Habib Bourguiba's
policies than was its pred-
ecessor, ta-e Constituent As-
sembly. The 90 assembly mem-
bers, elected almost without
opposition by an estimated 91
percent of Tunisia's electorate
on 8 November are largely Neo-
Destour party men, ...; 't v of them
virtually ,anknown )ii the na-
tional ,scone. Simultaneously,
Bourguiba was selected, un-
opposed, as Tunisia's first
popularly elected presi-
dent.
The only opposition to the
17 Neo-Destour coalition slates
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 o 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BUlptAIT
12 November 1959
standing for election in the 17
.electoral districts came from
13 Tunisian Communist candidates
who sought election in the first
Tunis district and the Gafsa
district. A third Communist
slate, which sought election in
western Tunisia, withdrew,
charging that it was being ham-
pered in its election activi
ties. An independent slate was
disqualified. As in the 1956
election of the Constituent
Assembly, the Communists polled
their largest vote in the Tunis
area--obtaining 3,229 out of
93,206 votes cast, or less than
4 percent of the popular vote
in that district. At Gafsa,
the Communists scored only 242
out of 64,659 votes.
Having won the anticipated
mandate of his people, Bourguiba
will probably continue to pursue
his policy of Western-oriented
nonalignment, although he may
permit the establishment of a
second Soviet bloc diplomatic
mission in Tunis. During his
electoral campaign, however, he
emphasized local rather than.
international issues. Conscious
of the threat to Tunisia's sta-
bility in the presence of sever-
al thousand armed Algerian
rebels, Bourguiba reiterated
Tunisia's support for Algerian
independence but warned the
rebels he would tolerate no
internal subversion. He is
likely to continue to press for
a compromise settlement of the
rebellion.
In one of his major cam-
paign speeches, Bourguiba paved
the way for the acquisition of
control over the important
French-owned Sfax-Gafsa phos-
phate-mining complex. His gov-
ernment also recently moved to
gain control over an important
cement-manufacturing plant,
again raising the specter of
possible nationalization of
Tunisia's industry.
Possibly sensitive to criti-
cism that he is establishing a
benevolent dict4torship, Bour-
guiba also abolished the Tunisian
High Court--established in 1956
to deal with the subversive
activities of his rival Salah
Ben Youssef, although its com-
petence was soon extended to
other fields. Pending cases
have been transferred to ordi-
nary jurisdiction. This act
was seen by many Tunisian lead-
ers, who considered the high
court a rather arbitrary body,
as ending the period of tran-
sition following independence 25X1
and as indicating that, Tunisia
now is politically stable and
mature.
POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The decline in the popular
vote for the ruling Nationalist
party in South Africa's provin-
cial elections on 14 October may
indicate a lack of support for
new extreme apartheid proposals
put forth by the Verwoerd gov-
ernment. The percentage of
Nationalist supporters among
the all-white electorate dropped
from 49.8 ' to 48:4. and., ' the
abstention rate--25 percent--
was high. Nevertheless, aided
by considerable gerrymandering,
the party increased its total
of, seats in the four provincial
.legislatures from 105 to 110,
compared with a total of 60 for
the opposition United party
(UP).
The most controversial is-
sue in the elections was the
question of "Bantustans"--the
creation of "self-governing"
African enclaves within the
union to further the govern-
ment's apartheid policies. The
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 10 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 November 1959
UP, although committed to ra-
cial segregation, opposed the
Bantustans on the ground that
they would tend to divide the
country. The UP was split
prior to the elections by the
defection of a liberal group
favoring a clear stand against
apartheid, an event which may
lead to increased political
activity by liberal elements.
The American, Embassy notes
that while the Nationalist par-
ty has expanded rapidly in the
past decade, the recent elec-
tions may signal a slowdown
in this growth. Prime Minister
Verwoerd, however, has publicly
interpreted the results as a
mandate for his policies, in-
cluding the formation of Ban-
tustans. In any case, imple-
mentation of Bantustans may be
portentous in terms both of
South Africa's race relations
and of European support for
the Nationalists.
Endemic racial unrest
has most recently been mani-
fested in protests concerning
the government's resettlement
of a native woman labor leader.
In its foreign affairs,
the Union of South Africa con-
tinues to be faced with wide-
spread opposition to its ra-
cial policies. While a much-
discussed East African boycott
of South African goods
has not yet materialized, the
UN General Assembly appears
likely to pass resolutions at-
tacking the union;'s apartheid
policies and its refusal to
place Southwest Africa under
UN trusteeship.
Britain's stated intention
to prepare Basutoland for self-
rule may provide an irritant to
TANGANYIKA
FEDERATION
RHODESIA
kND NYASALA
'LGACH
EPUBL
.A.A. AR
the union's always sensitive
relations with the UK. The
Nationalists have made no
secret of their desire to as-
similate within South Africa
Basutoland and the other two
High Commission Territories
now ruled by the UK. South
Africa has delayed renouncing
dominion status in favor of a
republic partly in the hope of
gaining London's blessing for
assimilating the territories.
Britain, however, appears un-
likely to agree to any solu-
tion which would involve South
African control of the terri-
tories.
SITUATION IN LAOS
Insurgent military activ-
ity in Laos continues on a rel-
atively small scale. The
Laotian Army has concluded a
security sweep in northern Sam
Neua Province. Other army
units are engaged in mopping-
up operations against dissidents
in northeastern Luang Prabang
Province, and are exerting pres-
sure on enemy forces in south-
eastern Phong Saly Province.
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Operations in central and
southern Laos are getting un-
der way. While these opera-
tions cannot be expected to
have conclusive results, they
serve to bolster the govern-
ment's prestige among the pop-
ulace and to counter the ene-
my's subversive activities.
The government has still
not set a new date for the
twice-postponed trial of Prince
Souphannouvong and other pro-
Communist leaders. Preoccupa-
tion with the funerals of King
Sisavang Vong and Prince
Petsarath, the coronation of
King Savang, and the visit to
Laos of UN Secretary General
Dag Hammarskjold virtually pre-
cludes an early date.
The Soviet Union, while
trailing Peiping and Hanoi in
the quantity and tone of its
propaganda on Laos, continues
to bring diplomatic pressure
to bear in support of a Commu-
nist solution to the Laotian
crisis.
the view of the Soviet Govern-
ment, the Laotian situation is
"outside the competence of the
United Nations." Within the
United Nations, Soviet spokes-
men continue to oppose Secre-
tary General Hammarskjold's trip
to Laos and his plan to leave a
personal representative there.
Soviet Permanent UN Delegate
Sobolev informed Hammarskjold
in a letter on 9 November that
his trip to Laos was "undesir-
able" and that the United Nations
should take no hand in the Lao-
tian situation.
Hammarskjold's decision to
go to Laos despite Soviet objec-
tions exposes him to charges by
Moscow that he has violated
the impartiality associated with
his office. Hammarskjold told
Ambassador Lodge on 7 November
that he would rather incur the
USSR's ire than its disrespect
--"which is what I would do if
I let them kick me around." Ham-
marskjold plans to remain in
Laos about six days and will
probably temporarily appoint
Sakari Tuomioja of Finland--now
executive secretary of the UN
Economic Commission for Europe--
as his personal representative in
SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER MOVES TO COUNTER PRO-COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
The moderate leaders of
Singapore's ruling People's
Action party (PAP) are public-
ly taking a stronger 'ant i-Com-
munist line and appear to be
stepping up their efforts to
counter the growing influence
of the party's extremists.
Yew hopes to develop strong
SECRET
Page 12 or 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
grass-roots support in the rural
areas, where about one third of
Singapore's 1,500,000 people
live. The government is plan-
ning support for an organization
to rival the Rural Dwellers'
Association, which is dominated
by Chan Chiaw Thor, a PAP ex-
tremist released from jail in
June. Chan is a close associate
of Lim Chin Siong, Singapore's
most influential pro-Communist
and Lee's primary rival for con-
trol of the PAP and the govern-
ment.
Several recent public state-
ments by PAP leaders seem to
reflect a decision to take a
stronger public position against
Communist China as well as local
Communists. In a speech on 28
October, Prime Minister Lee re-
portedly warned tie Communist-
influenced, all-Chinese student
body of Nanyang University in
Singapore that a resurgent China
was becoming an "object of ap-
prehension" in Southeast Asia
and that Nanyang must not become
an "outpost of Chinese dominance:'
The deputy prime minister re-
cently told the Legislative As-
sembly that the government had
no intention of jeopardizing the
general welfare for the benefit
of a small group (Communists)
"whose cause we consider mis-
taken."
In another move to strength-
en his government, Lee for the
first time is seeking the sup-
port of the relatively small
group of English-educated Chi-
nese, a large portion of whom
are teachers and civil servants.
During the election campaign and
since the PAP came to power in
June, this group, which prospered
under British rule, has come un-
der sharp attack as colonial
"stooges."
Government plans appear
designed to counter the pro-
Communists and, at the same
time, avoid alienating the mass
of PAP's Chinese supporters,
who are oriented toward main-
land China and easily influ-
enced by the PAP extremists.
This is, at best, a difficult
program to carry out and one
that will be further complicated
by the growing economic prob-
lems facing this overcrowded
CHINESE NATIONALISTS THREATEN TO ENFORCE BLOCKADE OF AMOY
The Chinese Nationalists
have threatened to enforce
their blockade of Amoy and fire
on the next merchant ship which
approaches Amoy harbor. Al-
though military officials have
promised to abstain from firing
on a British ship now in the
port, they are disturbed over
the possibility of increased
British shipping. Admiral
Smoot, US commander of the Tai-
wan Defense Command, believes
the next ship that enters Amoy
waters will be heavily shelled.
The Taichung Shan, which
arrived on 25 September and was
the first British ship to call
at Amoy since January, was
fired on by Nationalist artil-
lery. The American consul gen-
eral in Hong Kong believes that
the Chinese Communists may be
using the Communist-chartered
British ship now in Amoy, which
arrived there on 4 November to
test the Chinese Nationalist
blockade, to keep the Chenmen
issue alive and embarrass US-
British relations. Should the
Nationalists open fire, the
Communists will probably react
promptly--they fired five rounds
of high explosives at the Tai-
chung Shah.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Page 13 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
12 November 1959
AMOY - CHINMEN AREA
Nationalist held territory Q Communist-held territory -Railroad
12 NOVEMBER 1959
30787
Tungan
TATAN
EAR TA N'
Minister of National De-
fense Yu Ta wei apparently is
under pressure from other
military officials, who are
concerned that failure to en-
force the port closure would
impair Nationalist prestige
on Taiwan and among the Over-
seas Chinese, as well as pro-
vide Peiping with useful prop-
aganda. These officials be-
lieve that a blockade of Amoy
is an important reason for
holding Chinmen Island and
for maintaining outposts on
Ta Tan and Erh Tan Islands.
Chinese Nationalist offi-
cials are wary of the present
relaxation of international
tensions and are fearful that
it may result in a curtailment
of United States aid to Taiwan
and make the Peiping regime
more acceptable. Some offi-
cials also believe that inac-
tivity in the strait or a
wd niu
is.
siding
Kaohsiung
renunciation of force by the
Communists would further forma-
lize the present division into
"two Chinas."
Foreign Minister Huang
Shao-ku has asked the United
States to inform the British
that Amoy is in a war area
and that his government could
not accept responsibility for
damages to British ships in
Amoy waters. The British Gov-
ernment has advised British
merchant ships to avoid the
offshore islands under Chinese
Nationalist control. British
authorities at Hong Kong also
try to discourage calls at
Amoy, but London believes it
cannot prohibit such voyages
taken at the owner's risk.
The British Government probably
would feel obliged to protest
strongly against the shelling
of these vessels.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Anhai
Shuitou `
Machiang
CH(. EN
QUEMOr
~`Chinmen
LIEN HSU
4
Page 14 of 14
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
The Indonesian Communist
party (PKI) is the largest
Communist party in Asia outside
the bloc and, among the Commu-
nist parties of the free world,
is exceeded in size only by the
Italian party. In the past two
years, the growth of the PKI's
influence at the national level
has been checked and much of
its mass activity restricted by
the army and President Sukarno,
but party strength has not di-
minished. Overtly, the party
continues to pursue united-
front tactics, especially in
its support of Sukarno. In an-
ticipation of further army ob-
struction, however, the Commu-
nists are reportedly placing
increased emphasis on develop-
ing their covert organization.
Party Strength
The PKI has largely over-
come the stigma of having
launched an abortive but bloody
revolt in 1948. The major
areas of its strength are the
island of Java--where 64 per-
cent of Indonesia's 85,000,000
people live--and the plantation
areas and oil centers of Suma-
tra.
Party Secretary D. N.
Aidit claimed in late 1958
that party strength had in-
creased tenfold since 1954.
He gave total membership as
1, 500, 000, half of whom were
candidate members. He added
that over 50 percent of. the
candidate members--presumably
about 3750000--were ready for
full membership, so current
full membership now may be ap-
proximately 1,125,000.
At its sixth national
congress in September 1959, the
PKI almost doubled its central
committee--from 18 to 35 mem-
bers--probably a reflection of
SECRET
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
greatly increased over-all
membership. Ten of the new
members are non-Javanese, an
indication of the party's ef-
forts to increase its influ-
ence outside the main island.
No up-to-date tally of
the Communist party's elec-
toral following is available,
since national elections have
not been held since 1955 and
the 1957 provincial elections
were not completed. The Com-
munists, who had won fourth
place nationally and third
place in Java in 1955, by 1957
had become the'largeSt.pafty
in Java, drawing 25 percent
of the vote. Their 1957 poll
of 7,200,000 votes in Java and
South Sumatra alone was a mil-
lion votes higher than their
national tally in 1955. Should
the 1960 elections be held as
scheduled, the Communist party's
strength in Java and its growing
activity in the otter islands
are likely to boost its nation-
al total sufficiently to place
it in second, if not first,
place. Realizing this, the
Indonesian Army probably will
make a strong effort to post-
pone elections.
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
rJ
AVA
INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI)
(1957 Elections)
Regency Vote City Vote
Under 33.3% 0
33.3-50%
Over 50%
Government Representation
Despite its basic strength,
the party is not strongly rep-
resented at the national level.
One member of the 43-post cab-
inet is believed to be under
Communist direction and two are
considered susceptible to it.
All three are deputy ministers,
and two of them thus far appear
to have been relatively inac-
tive. The Communists also may
control up to nine persons in
the 46-member Supreme Advisory
Council and as many as 16 in
the 77-member National Plan-
ning Board.
The cabinet and the two
other organizations were ap-
pointed by President Sukarno
in July 1959 by authority of
the readopted "1945 constitu-
tion." This constitution, a
INDON A
o
Pokanboru
Padong: Bukittinggi
SUMATRA
13,987.000
POPULATION
Total population- 84.982.000.
,a. 12 NOVEMBER 1959
30783 ido
BORNEO
3.676, 000
Balikpapon
highly flexible document giving
.considerable power to the execu-
tive, was decreed by Sukarno--
against the wishes of the polit-
ical parties--in order to provide
a legal basis for his concept of
"guided democracy." Although
the Supreme Advisory Council and
the National Plaining Board are
intended to provide political
and economic guidance under
Sukarno's direction, neither
body is likely to be very in-
fluential.
In the 258-member Parlia-
ment, elected in 1955, the Com-
munists hold 32 seats, control
seven more, and probably influ-
ence at least three others. The
party is carefully watching
progress toward the formation
of the People's Congress, the
legislature which is to be
formed--presumably in the next
PHILIPPINE
CELEBES
6 206000
Palopo- NETHERLANDS
Kendari NEW GUINEA
DJAKARTA
? JAVA
55,130,000 Surabaya
/ Mato-
Total Outer Islands
29,851.000
tin
MOLUCCAS~,, AMBON iJ
777,000
LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS
5.205,000
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
few months--to accord with the
changed constitution. This
body--the size of which has
not been set--will apparently
be appointed by Sukarno partly
from present parliamentary
membership and partly from such
representative organizations as
labor unions and youth groups.
As the result of the 1957
electoral gains, PKI strength
is considerably more impressive
at the regional than at the na-
tional level. In Central Java,
the PKI has a plurality in the
provincial council, majorities
in seven and pluralities in
five of 28 regency (county)
councils, and majorities in
four of six municipal coun-
cils. In East Java it holds
majorities in four and plural-
ities in six of 29 regency
councils, and pluralities in
four of eight municipal coun-
cils.
The Communists will lose
some of their regional admin-
istrative strength, however,
through a presidential decree,
effective December 1959, which
abolishes much of the local
autonomy which has prevailed
during the past two years and
restores it to the central
government.
The party reportedly is
using force to consolidate its
gains in Central Java.
the Commu-
nists have murdered "numerous"
village headmen who are mem-
bers of the National party.
Terrorism, short of physical
attack against non-Communists,
has been reported throughout
the "Merapi-Merbabu Complex,"
a traditional Communist strong-
hold in Central Javahroughly
bounded by the cities of Rem-
bang, Semarang, Salatiga, Solo,
and Madiun.
e Com-
munists hope to develop this
area as an operations base rela-
;tivaly free of olose government
,supervigion or ' interference by
anti-Communist parties.
Tactics and Targets
The Communists achieved
their greatest influence in
national politics in 1957
through a series of develop-
ments which included Sukarno's
cultivation of Communist sup-
port for his "guided democracy"
concept, PKI gains in the Jav-
anese provincial elections, and
Communist exploitation of the
official take-over of Dutch
interests in December 1957.
At this point the army abruptly
seized those Dutch enterprises
which had been taken over by the
Communists. This period marked
the beginning of Sukarno's tacit
support of the army's policy of
obstructing the Communists.
During the past two years
the army has forestalled Com-
munist-inspired labor unrest
and mass demonstrations, and
from time to time it has severe-
ly restricted the PKI's polit-
ical and propaganda activities.
Moreover, Sukarno's "guided
democracy," by de-emphasizing
political party and parliamen-
tary activity, has been unfavor-
able to the Communist strategy
of "peaceful parliamentary tac-
tics."
Despite its setback, the
PKI has continued united front
tactics, with its cardinal
principle support of President
Sukarno. The most revealing
recent Communist document is
Aidit's "Draft Theses;" pre-
sented to the PKI central com-
mittee in November 1958 and to
the party's sixth national con-
gress in September 1959. Aidit
stated that the party's two
most urgent tasks are support
of the "anti-imperialist na-
tional front based on alliance
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 12'
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
the army. The army is under
strong non-Communist leadership,
and less than 100 members of an
officer corps of 12,000 have
been identified as Communist
sympathizers. Communist sub-
version among enlisted ranks
in East and Central Java, how-
ever, is presumably growing.
12 November 1959
of workers and peasants" and
the development of the party on
as large a scale as possible
with a "broad mass character."
He cautioned against failing
to distinguish between the par-
ty's ultimate program and the
special program it must follow
in light of the present situa-
tion.
Despite initial reluctance,
the party strongly supported
Sukarno's decision to return to
the 1945 constitution. Although
it regards the present army-
influenced Sukarno-Djuanda cab-
inet as a disappointment to
"the people," it has pledged
to support the cabinet's "prog-
ressive" policies but to oppose
policies harmful to the people.
These tactics have undoubt-
edly been closely coordinated
with Moscow and Peiping. Aidit
spent approximately six weeks in
Moscow and three weeks in Pei-
ping in early 1959. Reported
dissension over tactics among
the Indonesian Communist lead-
ership has not yet appeared
sufficient to affect the basic
unity or the effectiveness of
the party.
Major Communist targets
listed in the "Draft Theses"
are the usual ones--workers,
peasants, youth, and the intel-
ligentsia. Apparently one re-
sult of army obstruction of
Communist labor activity is an
intensified PKI effort among
the peasantry. Although Com-
munist strength predominates
among the organized peasantry,
party officials complain of
member apathy toward work among
the peasants and acknowledge
that only 3,700,000 of Indo-
nesia's 65,000,000 peasants are
"under the leadership of rev-
olutionary peasant organiza-
tions."
The priority target for
infiltration apparently is still
fluence vary greatly.
in Central Java are Communist
influenced, but the army chief
of staff, General Nasution, in-
sists that his battalion command-
ers are reliable and control
their men. The Communists are
obviously sending recruits into
the Village Guard organization,
while non-Communist organizations
are making no deliberate effort
to do so.
Faced with possible in-
creased army obstruction, the
Communists are reportedly plac-
ing increased emphasis on their
covert organization.
new Communist members are be-
ing brought directly into the
underground party and that this
has been going on since about
March 1959.
Front Activity
The Communists have large
and vigorous party-controlled
organizations in every signifi-
cant area of Indonesian society.
SOBSI, their labor federation,
is the largest labor organiza-
tion in Indonesia; the Commu-
nist peasant group, the BTI, is
the largest and most effective
in organized peasantry. The
PKI is represented among youth
by Pemuda Rakjat, among women's
organizations by GERWANI, is al-
most alone in the cultural realm
with LEKRA, and has strong in-
fluence in the national veterans'
organization. All of these or-
ganizations have come under a
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
degree of army supervision
through the ingenious use of
the army-controlled National
Front for Liberation of West
Irian. However, a reorganiza-
tion of the front by Sukarno,
which would reduce army con-
trols, may be imminent.
A significant facet of
Communist activity which has
been permitted to flourish with
little or no interference is
the People's University. Found-
ed in Djakarta in September
1958, it now has branches in
Surabaya, Bandung, and Jog-
jakarta in Java, Mataram in
Lombok,,and Medan and Palembang.
in Sumatra. The "university"
chain, which is not accredited,
appeals to those who are finan-
cially or academically unable
to attend accredited institu-
tions. Some 2,000 to 3,000
students are attending the
seven branches. Marxist pol-
itics and economics and a
course in the Indonesian inde-
pendence movement are compul-
sory.
Sukarno, Army, and PKI
Indonesia's political ori-
entation depends on three fac-
tors--President Sukarno, the
army, and the Communist party--
and their attitudes toward one
another. Sukarno, despite a
gradual reduction in his pres-
tige and his area of maneuver-
ability, remains the dominant
political factor in the nation.
The army, which is under strong
non-Communist leadership and
has expanded its administrative
and policy-making role in the
past year, is the only organiza-
tion capable of opposing the
Communists effectively.
The Communists have lost
influence at the national level
during the past 18 months be-
cause of cooperation between
Sukarno and the army. In re-
cent weeks, however, Sukarno
has reasserted his, good will to-
ward the Communists in several
instances. The most significant
of these were his personal in-
tercession to permit the Commu-
nists to hold their sixth na-
tional congress and his address
at the congress' closing recep-
tion.
Sukarno remains the key to
Communist influence in Indonesia.
The Communists believe they are
not strong enough to oppose him
in the arena of their mutual
support--the minds of the peas-
ants of Java. For this reason,
support of Sukarno and identifi-
cation with his policies consti-
tute the touchstone of overt
Communist tactics.
Sukarno, although aware of
the danger of a strong Commu-
nist party and willing to as-
sist in restraining it, is reluc-
tant for two reasons to chal-
lenge it personally and specific-
ally. First, he wishes to re-
tain Communist support for use
in his own tactics of polit-
ical balancing within Indonesia.
Secondly, the major source of
his power rests--as does that
of the Communists--in populous
Java. Sukarno apparently fears
that a challenge of the Commu-
nist party would force the Jav-
anese masses to choose between
him and the Communists, thereby
splitting his own support.
Although elections may be
postponed, the Communist party
continues to be intensely active
at the village level, in marked
contrast to other parties, and
its following continues to grow.
It is as active in its front or-
ganizations and in the government
structure as is possible with-
out incurring stronger army re-
taliation. Army pressures thus
far do not amount to destructive
opposition but to obstruction and
containment; Communist expansion
into new levels of activity would
result if army pressures were re-
moved. 25X1
SECRET
PART TTT DAWVRNC ANTI DTi.RgDTi'.("I TVPQ Daae 5 of: 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 November 1959
ENLARGEMENT OF MAJOR UN COUNCILS
The problem of increasing
the number of elective seats
on major UN councils to accom-
modate the rapidly growing
membership of the United Nations
is becoming acute. The 14th UN
General Assembly has again in-
conclusively discussed the mat-
ter, but the USSR remains op-
posed to any increase until
Peiping represents China on
the UN Security Council. En-
larging the membership of UN
councils requires a charter
amendment and as such is sub-
ject to ratification by a two-
thirds majority of member
states, including all five
permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council.
acute over the next five years
when UN membership is expected
to increase to at least 95,as
UN trust and non-sell-governing
territories, mostly in Africa,
attain independence.
The General Assembly has
since 1956 discussed the prob-
lem of increasing the number
of elective seats on the Secu-
rity Council and the Economic
and Social Council. Each year
the assembly has acknowledged
the need for such an increase
but has deferred the question
because "amendment of the char-
ter requires a larger area of
agreement than prevails at the
time."
Pending approval of such
an increase, the small Asian-
African nations are already
pressing to have the General
Assembly re-allocate the ex-
isting geographical distribu-
tion of the elective seats to
the detriment of the Latin
American and Western European
areas. The desire of many
new UN members--mostly from
Asia and Africa--to gain elec-
tive offices, coupled with
the Latin American bloc's de-
termination to maintain its
large share of such offices,
will result ultimately in
strong pressure for admitting
Peiping to the UN.
The Problem
The increase in UN member
states from 60 in 1955 to 82 in
1959 underscores the need to
enlarge UN councils in order
to afford more equitable geo-
graphical distribution of
elective seats than is now the
case. The 20 Latin American
nations received a large share
of the seats on UN councils in
the early years in recognition
of the fact that they mustered
one third of the total General
Assembly vote. The problem of
equitable distribution of elec-
tive seats will become more
Security Council
Article 23 of the UN Char-
ter provides that the Security
Council shall consist of 11
members, the five Big Powers,
i with permament seats, and six
other members elected by the
General Assembly for two-year
terms. Concerning the election
of nonpermanent members, the
charter specified that due re-
gard shall be paid to a member's
ability to contribute to the
maintenance of international
peace and security as well as
to equitable geographical dis-
tribution. In practice the
smaller states of the UN have
emphasized the geographic cri-
terion when seeking Security
Council vacancies.
The so-called "gentlemen's
agreement" of 1946 was an effort
to define "equitable geographic
distribution," and mirrored the
power position of the immediate
postwar period. The plan, as
set up then, allocated two seats
to Latin America, and one each
to the British Commonwealth,
the Middle East, Western Europe,
and Eastern Europe. Filling of
the seat for Eastern Europe has
produced the most friction.
The first three General
Assembly sessions honored the
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 November 1959
understanding in practice. The
first modification of the dis-
tributional scheme, as inter-
preted by the Soviet bloc, took
place in 1949 when the General
Assembly chose Yugoslavia to
replace the Ukraine. There was
bitter opposition from the USSR,
which felt that Tito's break
with Stalin in 1949 no longer
entitled Yugoslavia to the So-
viet bloc seat. At the 1951
and 1953 assembly sessions,
Greece and Turkey respectively
were elected to the "Eastern
European" seat after contests
with Soviet-backed candidates.
The USSR could neither command
the votes in the assembly nor
-convince others that Greece and
Turkey did not qualify as East-
ern European states.
In 1955 the bitter contest
between Yugoslavia and the Phil-
ippines resulted in a decision
to split the two-year term be-
tween the two countries, thus
setting a precedent for an
Asian to occupy this seat. The
strong support for the Philip-
pines from new Asian-African
members reflected their desire
to establish a council seat for
that area. The widest departure
from usual Soviet behavior in
elections occurred in 1957 when
Japan defeated Czechoslovakia
on the first ballot. The Soviet
delegation let this go without
a protest.
European seat specifically allo-
cated to the Soviet bloc. In
the meantime, some UN members
are calling the Eastern Euro-
pean seat a ."floating seat" open
to candidates from Asia and
Africa.
Economic and Social Council
Charter provisions specify
that the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) shall consist
of 18 members, one third of
whom are to be elected at each
session of the General Assembly
for a three-year term. Unlike
the Security Council, retiring
members are eligible for imme-
diate re-election. No criteria
have been laid down, but past
elections reflect the general
understanding that the council
seats should represent the prin-
cipal geographic regions and
groupings.
This year, the USSR has
returned to the attack and has
assiduously promoted the Polish
candidacy by citing the 1946
agreement as well as the cur-
rent detente resulting from the
exchange of visits between Pres-
ident Eisenhower and Khrushchev.
The strong support for Poland
through 37 inconclusive ballots
indicates the strength of such
arguments among UN members who
consider this council seat allo-
cated to Eastern Europe under
the 1946 agreement.
In the discussion of how
many seats should be added to
the Security Council in the un-
likely event of Soviet concur-
rence, most UN members are
agreed on one seat each to Asia
and Africa, with the Eastern
Three factors determine
the trend in ECOSOC elections.
First, the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council--
including Nationalist China--
have been consistently re-elected.
Second, it appears that some of
the smaller states which are not
in a position to make a substan-
tial contribution to the main-
tenance of international peace
I and security and consequently
have not been elected to the
Security Council are elected to
ECOSOC. Third, an attempt is
made to maintain a balance be-
tween the advanced and under-
developed countries on the
council.
In addition to the Big
Five, ECOSOC seats have gen-
erally been allocated as fol-
lows: four to Latin America,
three to Western Europe, and
two each to Asia-Africa, the
Commonwealth, and Eastern Europe.
The Eastern European seats have
always been occupied by Commu-
nist countries.
Pressure to increase the
number of seats on ECOSOC stems
primarily from the type of work
this council does. Technical
UN aid programs in economic and
social fields are channeled
through this body. Most UN
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pave 7 of 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
members agree that more repre-
sentation for the underdeveloped
countries of Asia and Africa
would aid ECOSOC in its plan-
ning of aid programs for these
countries. Their presence
would also help educate them
to the realities and diffi-
culties attendant on any aid
program.
It seems doubtful at this
time that the USSR would con-
sent to amending the charter
to permit enlargement of UN
councils. Moscow has reiter-
ated at the current session
that such changes are impossi-
ble until Peiping's "legitimate
rights in the UN are restored."
On 14 October during the as-
sembly's special political com-
mittee discussion of the ques-
tion, Soviet permanent UN dele-
gate Arkady Sobolev asserted
that the main problem was not
the increase in the council's
membership but the "nonrespect"
for equitable geographic dis-
tribution. He had earlier sug-
gested that the issue might be
handled by reducing Latin Amer-
ican representation on the councils.
The Soviet position will re-
sult in further pressure for Pei-
ping's admission to the UN. This
pressure will come from those
Asian and African members who
strongly desire additional seats
and the Latin American countries, 25X1
which are equally determined to
maintain their present share of
allocated offices.
MOSCOW'S CAMPAIGN FOR A "NEW COMMUNIST MAN"
Since the Soviet 21st
party congress last January,
the creation of a "new Commu-
nist man" has been widely dis-
cussed as one of the regime's
basic objectives. Voluminous
propaganda on the theme has
been accompanied by a series
of measures which purport to
aim at "increasing the Commu-
nist consciousness" of the
masses. The campaign, still
ACCORDING TO MOSCOW
...All the ideological work of party and
state is called upon to develop new qualities
in the Soviet people...
-- N. S. Khrushchev
at the 21st party congress
January 1959
Thousands and thousands of Soviet teachers,
modest, unknown, daily, hourly, forgetting rest
and diversion, personal comfort, with astonish-
ing patience, but more important with a feeling
of ,boy and tremendous creattvitU,are accomplish-
ing a great deed: they are creating the most
precious thing in the world--the new Communist
man.
-- Izvestia, 25 October 1959
in its initial stages, is prob-
ably not expected even in Mos-
cow to reach its grandiose
goals, but it has already had
some effect.
In ideological terms, the
creation of a "new man" is repre-
sented as a corollary of the
Soviet Union's entry into the
"full-scale building of a Com-
munist society"--the material
equivalent of which is the
Seven-Year Plan. Despite its
doctrinal trappings, the "new
man" drive is primarily calcu-
lated to promote immediate po-
litical and social aims, par-
ticularly the elimination of
some of the more serious ills
of Soviet society and the uni-
fication of all the people in
enthusiastic support of the
regime and its policies.
One of Moscow's purposes
in declaring the "full-scale"
building of Communism is to jog
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of.12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
SECRET
the people into renewed effort
and to overcome their skepticism
about the future. In seeking
to recapture the elan of the
revolutionary days, the Kremlin
is promoting an atmosphere of
national excitement and is ex-
horting the people to partici-
pate in a dramatic episode of
history--the big push toward
Communism. The Soviet leader-
ship presumably hopes that such
a spirit will result in greater
efforts to achieve its immediate
economic goals.
The principal target of
the drive is the younger genera-
tion,during whose lifetime,
Khrushchev has claimed, Commu-
nism could conceivably come
into being. These people are
to carry out the great economic
expansion projected by Khru-
shchev but, at the same time,
they are probably the ones from
The Soviet people perform noble feats, but
not for the sake of personal glory and selfish-
ness. Their action is motivated by lofty ideol-
ogy and care for the public good. This is a
Communist feature, because it is in concern for
the common interests that Communism begins.
-- Pravda, 12 July 1959
whom Moscow can expect the most
trouble; it is among the youth
that ideological malaise seems
to be greatest and the accumu-
lated frustrations of Soviet
life most keenly felt.
The New Man--A Hero Image
Those characteristics
which the leadership wants to
inculcate in the Soviet people
are not new to Marxist doctrine,
but in the past the pure Com-
munist state to which such con-
duct would lead was admittedly
remote. Now, however, Khrushchev
is trying to convince the peo-
ple that the drive for a Com-
munist society is well on its
way; the future will belong to
a new kind of citizen--the
"Communist man," who is heroic
not because he dies for the
revolution, but because he "lives
and works in a Communist way."
Valentina Gaganova? a< factory
Worker, is' held up 'as an example
of the .new -'heroism because
she voluntarily took a cut in
salary and transferred into a
substandard shop out of a de-
sire to help boost production.
Proclaimed a "Hero of Socialist
Labor" by the government, she
inspired the workers' movement
which bears her name. Individ-
uals with outstanding labor
records and exemplary personal
lives are designated "shock
workers of Communist labor" and
are often further rewarded by
having their photographs dis-
played on the front page of
Pravda. Production teams in
factories are urged to compete
for the title "Brigade of Com-
munist Labor."
The regime emphasizes that
the common characteristic of
these latter-day Stakhanovites
is their self-sacrifice for the
common good. This is a Commu-
nist feature, according to
Pravda, "because it is in con-
cern for the interests of the
whole of society that Communism
begins." The wide publicity
accorded the example of the
selfless person, along with Khru-
shchev's injunctions about con-
sciousness of one's debts to
society, emphasize how important
this trait is to the regime.
Official encouragement of
self-sacrifice, however, seems
to have a more immediate pur-
pose than "building Communism."
The creation of a Communist
society may be a long-term goal,
but the more immediate aim is
more effective work for fulf ill-
ment of the Seven-Year plan.
The self-sacrifice theme
may also be part of a renewed
attack on the problem of incen-
tives. Marxism recognizes the
need for material rewards dur-
ing the era of socialism. How-
ever, distribution of goods and
services under Communism theo"
retically is to be made accord-
ing to need; material incentives
will be unnecessary because the
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
urge to work will have become
fundamental. The members of
the Gaganova movement represent
the emergence of this charac-
teristic in the present epoch.
Their selfish wishes for ma-
terial betterment are said to
have been replaced by the de-
sire to work for the common
good.
In the future, the ordin-
ary worker will ideally over-
come his selfishness and, like
the party professional, subject
himself to the iron discipline
and unquestioning obedience
necessary for building Commu-
nism.
Remnants of Capitalism
In his mental outlook, the
"new Communist man" is repre-
sented as completely devoid of
"remnants of a capitalist con-
sciousness." This term embraces
all those negative traits which
the Kremlin wants to see eradi-
cated in present Soviet society,
and the struggle for their elim-
ination is a major part of the
"new man" drive. Crime, hooli-
ganism, and alcoholism are the
chief problems. Their continu-
ing presence in the USSR is
explained by the fact that many
people still have not overcome
the "remnants of the bourgeois
past."
During the past year, the
struggle against alcoholism,
hooliganism, and "antisocial
behavior" has been turned in-
creasingly over to volunteer
militia brigades and to the
so-called comrades' courts.
Last month, the legislative
proposal commissions of the
Supreme Soviet published draft
laws increasing the powers of
the comrades' courts and pro-
viding for the formation of
juvenile delinquency commissions
at the local level. The mem-
bers of these quasi-judial
vigilante units are said to
typify the new man's voluntary
support of the law and his im-
patience toward lawbreakers.
SECRET
For example, the primary func-
tion of the comrades' courts
is to summon meetings in shops,
factories, and apartment houses
and subject petty offenders to
mass condemnation.
Despite some objections
to this procedure from legal
circles, the fear of public
embarrassment has won increas-
ing recognition as a legitimate
means of ensuring social con-
formity and "educating" people
away from habits reminiscent
of the capitalist past. Moscow
evidently wants to throw the
fear of disgrace into would-
be offenders, and at the same
time to fire up the "Communist"
fervor of the law-abiding citi-
zen by encouraging his personal
participation in law enforce-
ment and in mass upbraidings of
his neighbors.
Religion has also come
under increased attack as one
of the most dangerous vestiges
of capitalism, and some calls
have been made for a revival
of the Society of the Militant
Godless, one of the regime's
principal weapons against the
church in the early years of
Soviet rule.
Minority Nationalism
Fundamentally, the new man
is a Soviet Russian. One of
the aims of the Kremlin is to
instill Great Russian patriotism
in the non-Russian population.
Some facets of Khrushchev's
present drive against local na-
tionalism strongly suggest that
increased Russification of the
national minorities is being
contemplated.
During the first few months
of the antinationalism campaign
Moscow tried to solve the prob-
lem by dismissing local party
and government leaders who, in
various ways, had sought to en-
courage the national pride of
the minorities or who had dis-
criminated against the Russians
sent into their bailiwicks.
PART III PATTERNS AND PRESPECTIVES Page 10 of 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY. SUMMARY
12 November 1959
More recently, however, direct
action against some of the lead-
ers in the minority areas has
been augmented by a general
propaganda attack against any
form of nationalism or local-
ism; Moscow complains about
"those backward people" who
still harbor hostility toward
"representatives of other na-
tions and national groups"
(i.e., Russians) and who show
disrespect for the language
and culture of others.
Increased teaching of the
Russian language may be the
first step in the effort to
hasten assimilation. According
to Moscow radio, "the Great
Russian language has an impor-
tant cultural effect on the
other peoples of the USSR."
Further, "the knowledge of Rus-
sian by all the Soviet people
will make the best example of
Russian culture...accessible
to all." Recent Soviet articles
have hinted that eventually
Russian should be the lingua
franca of the Communist world.
The Kremlin has apparently
urged scientists and educators
to begin thinking about how the
"new Communist man" can be fos-
tered within the existing social
framework and to recommend
steps to be taken in the future.
Numerous reports claim
that research in the behavioral
sciences is being stepped up.
Some Western scientists have
come back from conferences with
their Soviet counterparts with
the feeling that Russian re-
search may ultimately aim at
achieving mass control and .manip--
ulation of human behavior.
Moscow's main emphasis at the
moment, however, is on less
grandiose schemes in the fields
of education and mass propa-
ganda work. Pravda, for in-
stance, recently discussed a
decree on the importance of
assigning specific work tasks
to school children, claiming
that this step would help over-
come the aversion to physical
labor so common to the Soviet
younger generation. It could
also help transform work into
a vital inner need.
Some educators have begun
to re-evaluate educational
methods to determine the proper
use of social pressures in
rearing the new man. Among the
problems with which they are
seeking to cope is widespread
cheating on examinations. They
are also trying to solve the
problem of conflicting sources
of authority in schools and
homes. Boarding schools, with
their substitution of state
authority for parental, may
be one answer.
The Communist Youth League
(Komsomol) has also committed
itself to the "new man?t drive.
At its plenary session last
The LKomosomoJ plenum emphasised that a
profound study of theoretical problems and prac-
tical tasks set by the 21st party congress and
by the central committee plenum .. must be the
main content of all mass political work for the
next few years. Komsomol organizations are
called upon to bring up young people ma spirit
of...high principles of Communist morality, to
develop in youth the features of a man of Com-
munist society.
-- TASS communique, 23 October 1959
month, the Komsomol central com-
mittee called for a nationwide,
long-term campaign to raise the
general educational and cultural
level of Soviet youth, pointing
out that it is the Komsomol's
task to develop "a Communist
world outlook and the qualities
of a Communist society in boys
and girls." It was proposed
that this task be assigned to
Komsomol commissions which would
be set up in all territorial
units; the plenum also enjoined
the Youth to follow the example
of Gaganova and more actively
develop shock workers and bri-
gades of Communist labor.
Prospects for Success
If the "new man" drive
continues to gain momentum,
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page .11' of 12'
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
certain features of the Soviet
system will work for its suc-
cess. Along with the relaxa-
tions which accompanied de-
Stalinization, tangible economic
progress has evidently convinced
significant numbers of the pop-
ulation that Khrushchev's brand
of Communism is indeed the
"wave of the future," and has
created a comforting sense of
stability and security. This
has helped to make the sacri-
fices necessary for Communism
somewhat more bearable. In
any event, most of the people
have little hope of living
under any other system; there-
fore they can only await changes
for the better in the one they
have.
"the groundswell
is already one of pride, op-
timism, and confidence in a
future whose worst feature is
that it comes too slowly."
At the same time, the
Kremlin is faced with serious
stumbling blocks. Rampant op-
portunism has always been a
hallmark of Soviet society.
The same self-interest against
which Moscow rails so loudly
has been built into the system
through the bonuses. and emolu-
ments which are customarily
awarded for good work.
While incessant propaganda
about the virtues of the "Com-
munist man" may result in in-
creased lip-service to the idea
--especially when played to a
captive audience--there is
little reason to believe that
the Soviet status-seeker will
join the ranks of the Gaganova
movement out of any genuinely
self-sacrificial desire to build
a new world. It is quite ob-
vious that personal betterment
will remain a primary'objec-
tive of a majority of the peo-
ple for some time to come.
Unless the regime can come
up with a satisfactory solution
to this and the related prob-
lems of disdain for physical
labor and growing class-con-
sciousness, the "new Communist
man" may evolve into something
quite different from the saint-
ly superman envisioned by the
propaganda hacks.
Yet this is not an imme-
diate problem. Soviet socialism
under Khrushchev is deeply com-
mitted to an elaborate system
of incentives and will certain-
ly continue to be for some time.
At least over the short run,
then, the regime will probably
be quite satisfied if the cam-
paign succeeds in combating
some of the common ailments
which beset Soviet society to-
day. If the Kremlin continues
to combine incentives and visi-
ble progress toward the better
life with the proper dosage of
education, exhortation, and
coercion, some of the desired
results might be achieved.
The problem of the moment
is to revitalize a society
which has grown indifferent to
the long-term goals of the re-
gime; the promise that pros-
perity for all is just around
the corner might get people
to work harder and with a little
more enthusiasm. Such innova-
tions as the comrades' courts
will keep the problems of anti-
social behavior before the pub-
lic eye and could give the peo-
ple a feeling of participation
in government affairs. Taken
as a whole, the campaign could
bring about a new sense of Rus-
sian'national pride and the re-
sultant increased to alt to the
regime. 25X1
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 12
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1
9"T
CONE-DENTIAL
FJDEN%t
CON
WkT
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02500040001-1