CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002400070001-9
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• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~~C-R~
CON~FID~NTIAC.
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
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COPY NO.~~
OC~ NO' 4,676/59
17 September 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT lNTEILIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
~SC~E~"
GONFIDENTlAL ~~
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
currer..t situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 1959
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
. . . . . Page 1
Moscow is taking the line that both the successful
Soviet moon shot and what it describes as Khrushchev?s
warm and enthusiastic reception in the United States augur
well for the successful outcome of Khrushchev?s visit and
the creation of a favorable climate for future negotia-
tions. Emphasis on the desirability of "peaceful c oexist-
ence" and "peaceful competition" has continued, one Soviet
Foreign Ministry official expressing the belief that
peaceful coexistence an the basis of the status quo in
Europe will ultimately result in Western recognition of
East Germany and a "permanent solution" of the German and
Berlin proble
ms, Soviet spokesmen have tried to create
the appearance of Moscow?s dissociation from Communist
actions in Asia and have indicated the USSR?s desire to
prevent an aggravation of the situation which could rave
an embarrassment to Kh
rushchev during his US tour.
LAOS .
- - - . . . . . Page 3
The USSR, in a move to undercut United Nations action
on Laos, has proposed a meeting of those nations which
attended the 1954 Geneva Conference ending the Indochinese
war. The French continue to deprecate the emphasis on mili-
tary activity in Laos and appear to favor concessions to
the Laotian dissidents by the Phoui government to "stabi-
lize" the situation. Military activity has slowed as the
investigation by the UN fact-finding mission gets under
way, but sporadic clashes continue in Sam Neua and Phong
Saly provinces and in central Laos.
DE GAULLE ? S PROPOSALS FOR ALGERIA
. . . , Page 5
De Gaulle?s commitment to give Algerians a choice
of several alternatives including independence is intended
partly to isolate the rebels in international opinion as
the UN General Assembly opens. He took a calculated risk
vis-a-vis the French Army in offering self-determination,
but public expressions of support from a wide range of
political leaders in France should help him weather any
overt opposition, whether from the military, French
rightists, or European extremists in Algeria, The rebels,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 1959
PART I (continued)
to whom no concessions were offered, view the proposals
as a tactical move which may undercut their support in
Algeria, and they show no signs of early capitulation.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS Page 1
. .
the
death sentence given Brigadier Ta agcha i, t e ve ement
anti-Communist accused of complicity in the Mosul revolt
last spring, may bring a further deterioration in rela-
tions between anti-Communists and Prime Minister ~asim,
UAR officials appear increasingly apprehensive that their
application for a World Bank loan for improvements to the
Suez Canal will be blocked or delayed. Israel is stepping
up public and private activity in anticipation of another
UN debate concerning Arab-Israeli relations,
SING-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE Page 3
. .
Peiping, in a week-long propaganda campaign, has
sought to counter Indian charges of aggression along the
border. Nehru, under increasing domestic pressure to
adopt a less conciliatory stand, has presented lengthy
rebuttals to the Chinese arguments. Both the Chinese
and Indians, however, continue to call for "fr'
tiations, "
aug nei er side will make significant territorial
concessions, Khrushchev probably would seek to create an
atmosphere in which Communist China and Tndia could dis-
cuss such "small and isolated places" as Longju where same
form of accommodation seems most feasible,
DALAI LAMA' S APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS
-
s
Page 5
Many UN members, including even such Buddhist coun-
tries as Burma, Thailand, and Ceylon, are reluctant to
sponsor Tibet?s appeal to the UN. These countries profess
willingness to support the Dalai Lama on humanitarian
grounds, but oppose any UN discussion of the political
aspects of the case, particularly Chinese suzerainty.
India continues opposed to any UN debate on the subject.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 1959
PART II (continued)
In its first statement on Tibet since last spring, Peiping
on 13 September linked the Dalai Lama with "cold-war can-
"
spiracies,
in an effort to detract from any sympathy
whi
h
i
h
c
m
g
t be given his appeal.
ELECTIONS IN 14TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Page 6
. .
The USSR, in its effort to gain high UN elective _
offices for bloc countries, has an opportunity to exploit
the contests now developing among other members over
elective seats to the major UN bodies. There is specula-
tion among UN members that Moscow will be willing to per-
mit the Eastern European seat on the UN's Economic and
Scecial Council to go to an Asian country this year in
return for Poland's election to the Security Cauneil,
Moreover, high-ranking UN Secretariat officials and many
UN members believe the past practice of relegating Soviet
bloc candidates to lesser UN offices has become inappro-
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF LIVESTOCK BANNED IN SOVIET URBAN
AREA S . . . . Page 7
? ? a ? . p ? A ? . e ? ? ? ,
Private ownership of livestock in virtually all
urban areas of the Soviet Union is to end in October. In
response to Khrushchev's criticism of the practice, the
Russian Republic (RSFSR), the largest administrative area
of the USSR, abolished it in mid-August, following similar
decrees announced earlier for Kazakhstan, Armenia, and the
Ukraine. The regime evidently feels confident that such
measures--unthinkable four years ago when incomes were
lower and livestock products less available in the cities~-
will not evoke serious dissent.
PEASANTS DISTRUST NEW POLISH AGRICULTURAL PRQGRAM Page $
Palish peasants distrust regime efforts to persuade
them to join agricultural "Circles"--formerly peasant self-
help associations--which are to receive state funds for
the mechanization. of Polish agriculture during the next
seven years. The regime's strong commitment to this pro-
ra
ld
g
m cou
create a conflict with the peasantry, which
i
sees
t as a first step toward collectivization.
REORGANIZATION OF THE USSR'S BANKING SYSTEM Page 9
By a recent reorganization of the banking system of
the USSR, announced on 1 July and scheduled to have been
comp eted by 1 September, the Agricultural Bank, the
Industrial Bank, and the Communal Banks were abolished.,
and all banking operations consolidated into two banks:
the existing State Bank CGosbank) and the newly formed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 1959
PART II (continued)
All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investment (Stroybank).
Measures have also been taken to better balance planned
cash outlays and receipts at the local level and to ensure
the proper observance of local cash plans as made. It is
probable that these moves may have some temporary disrup_
ti
ve effect o he banking system at local levels,
PHILIPPINE PRE-ELECTION OUTLOOK Page 11
. ,
The collapse of attempts by the two opposition.
parties in the Philippines to create a coalition. has
boosted the prospects of President Garcia's Nacionalista
party in the provincial and senatorial elections on 10
November, despite the unpopularity of his administration,
The Nacionalistas, however, face trouble in the southern
Philippines, where influential party figures are openly
combating Garcia men in Cebu and aose a threat to the
party's aver-a 11 performance.
POSSIBLE CRISIS IN INDONESIA Page 1~
A serious government crisis may develop in Indonesia
as the result of conflict between the army and high ranking
leftist civilians who are allegedly trying to undermine
the military . T h e a rmy's p c~ ~ i t i on i s s t'i 11 .strong, anal
further development of the situation depends largely on the
attitude of President Sukarno, Sukarno's laudatory remarks
at the closing session of the Communist party's sixth
national congress on 16 September countered to some extent
the army restrictions which had earlier prevented the Com-
munists f om derivin an significant publicity from the
meeting,
CAMEROUN . . Page 13
9 ? ? ? ,
Terrorist attacks, believed directed by Communist-
supported exiled nationalist extremists, remain a serious
security problem in the southwestern area of the French-
administered UN trust territory of Cameroun. With the UN
General Assembly now in session, the extremists will
probably try to extend and intensify the attacks in a
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1? September 1959
PART II (continued)
last-ditch effort to induce that body to order new elec-
tions before Cameroun becomes independent on 1 January.
However, moderate Camerounian Premier Ahidjo appears to
be in a relatively strong position domestically and inter-
nationally, and will probably be able to control the situ-
ation.
ITALY FACES SOMALI DEMAND FOR ACCELERATED INDEPENDENCE Page 15
Rome has voiced no formal objection to the Somali
Assembly's recent resolution calling for an end to Italy's
trusteeship in Somalia "as soon as possible," but the
Italians can be expected to remain in control until the
scheduled termination date of 3 becernber 1960. The
Italian administration shares the attitude of certain
business interests which seem confident of maintaining
Italy's primacy in Somalia by subsidizing the export to
Italy of the territory ? s principa 1 product, bananas .
SWEDEN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS . Page 15
The question of whether Sweden's armed forces are
to be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons will again
come under discussion when Parliament reconvenes next
month. Sweden has planned facilities which will probably
enable it to produce sufficient plutonium for undertaking
a nuclear weapons program in five or six years. The Social
Democratic government is still trying to postpone any
decision, partly because of dissension within the party
and partly aut of fear that Swedish action might be re-
garded with disfavor by the nuclear powers as long as
they are negotiating regarding a test ban. Recent opin-
ion polls, however, reveal growing public sentiment in
favor of acquiring such weapons.
LEFTIST DRIFT IN BOLIVIA . . . Page 16
Radical elements in the ruling party of Bolivia, sup-
ported by Communists, are making increasing headway with
anti-US issues. Specifically, the leftists seek Soviet
economic aid and the abrogation of the present petroleum
code, which is favorable to foreign capital. The failure
of President Siles and his moderate supporters to defend
the US-backed economic stabilization program seems to be
contributing to the success of these leftist effort~_
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 1959
PART II (continued)
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET CONSUMER . Page 1
The standard of living of the Soviet population, still
low by Western standards, has been advancing steadily
during the past seven years, although the satisfaction of
dansumer demands continues to be subordinate to the expan-
sion of industrial and military strength. The rapid growth
of the gross national product has been accompanied by an
average increase since 1951 of 5 percent a year in per
capita consumption, Although this rate will be somewhat
lower under the Seven-Year Plan x1959-65), the Soviet con-
sumer can still expect a major improvement in housing,
shorter working hours, increased pensions and minimum wages,
and a continuing sharp increase in the supply o~ durable
DRIVE ,FOR SOCIALISM CAUSES PROBLEMS FOR EAST EUROPEAN
REGIMES . . . Page 5
The accelerated drive of all the East Earopean satel-
lites except Poland to "achieve socialism"' by 1965 has
created a number of serious problems far the various re-
gimes. In Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary,
there has been popular reaction against elements of the
program, while in F?ulgaria and Hungary ambitious goals
and harsh methods have fostered differences and contro-
versies within the parties thews-elves.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM~dARY
1? September 1959
PART III (continued)
WORLD BANK MOYES TO STRENGTHEN AID T4 LESS~DEYELOPED
COUNTRIES . . . . . Page 13
Finance ministers of 6$ non-Communist nations meeting
in Washington from 28 September to 2 October as governors
of the International Bank for Reconstrdction and Develop-
ment are expected to favor the American proposal fbr a $1
billion International Development Association to help
meet the sharply rising needs of the less-developed coun-
tries for financial assistance. Faced with popular Ares-
spares for rising standards of living, these countries-are
no better off now than 30 years ago in their ability both
to attract foreign private capital and to finance greatly
expanded imports out of their own earnings. In a concur-
rent meeting of the International Monetary Fund, attention
will probably be directed to the removal oi' remaining ex-
change restrictions against the dollar, partidularly in
Western Europe. Action along this line would tend to ease
th~a United States' substantial over-all ayments deficits
and gold losses,
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1? September 1959
OF IMh4EUTATE INTEREST
As Khrushchev prepared to
leave for the United States,
Soviet commentators continued
to build up his personal pres-
tige and give tributes to his
unceasing efforts to bring
peace to the world. The pre-
mier's cool reception ira Wash-
ington was described for the
Soviet people as one of extreme
friendliness and' enthusiasm.
Propagandists praised the suc-
cessful moon shat as a "reaf-
firmation of the leading role
of the USSR in the highly im-
portant spheres of science and
technology" and of the "un-?
doubted superiority of the so-
cialist system," cited it as
proof of the USSR's devotion to
peace, anti declared that
many Americans see it as a
"gaud augury" of Khrushchev's
visit,
speaks at the United Nations on
18 September.
Later, before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,
:Khrushchev listed as topics he
would like to discuss with Pres-
ident Eisenhower disarmament,
liquidation of foreign bases,
and disengagement in Europe.
.Khrushchev parried questions on
Communist interference in
Laos, Tibet, and along the
Chinese-Indian border. on the
grounds that any discussion of
these issues would violate
his arrangement with the Pres i-
dent "not to discuss other
countries" and suggested that
any US inquiries on these mat-
ters be addressed directly to
Peiping.
"Peaceful coexistence"
continues to keynote Soviet
comment on the visit. Khru-
shchev's remarks before the Na-
tional Press Club on 16 Septem-?
ber emphasized this theme and
reaffirmed long-established
Saviet positions on issues in
dispute. The Soviet premier
called far increased US-Soviet
trade as an important means for
improving relations and re-
ferred.to the improved climate
in international relations com-
pared with six years ago, as
is evidenced by Vice President
Nixon's visit to the US5R,Mika--
yan's and Kozlov's visits to
the United States, and the ex
change of exhibitions, He com-
mented he would present a new
disarmament proposal when he
A TASS correspondent in Lan-
don recently said he felt that
something tangible must re-
sult from the Khrushchev-Eisen-
hower exchange of visits, and
he mentioned the possibility
of agreements an the cessation
of nuclear testing and on trade.
lie stressed the importance of
disarmament and urged that the
17nited States sign a nonaggres-
sion pact with the Soviet Union.
Touching also on the Berlin is-
sue, the correspondent said the
USSR will try to work out "some-
thing like a series of status
quos." He denied any Soviet
intention of taking."dangerous"
action on this question and re-
marked, "We can keep talking
about Berlin for same time to
come."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1`7 September 1959
Soviet spokesmen have tried
to create the appearance of So-
viet dissociation from events
in Laos and on the Sino-Indian
frontier and have indicated the
USSR's desire to prevent any
further aggravation of these
situations which could prove em-
barrassing to Khrushchev during
his US tour and to the
Soviet Union in its relations
with-these two Asian states.
The TASS correspondent
took a similar line, claiming
the USSR bears no responsibility
for recent Chinese Communist
actions in the Far East, It is
"hardly logical," he said, "to
assume that the USSR would ap-
ply pressure" against non-Com-
munist Asian countries on the
eve of Khrushchev's visit. He
asked why the Soviet Union
should be blamed for "evexy-
thing that happens" in bloc
countries and stressed that the
USSR wished to prevent any
worsening of the situation and
would "do everything possible"
to avoid jeopardizing the
chances for a detente with the
United States.
Reaction to Lunik II
The Soviet moon shot .won
Western Europe's admiration for
the scientific achievement it
represented and gave rise to a
complete range of speculation
on its likely significance for
Khrushchev~ visit to the United
States.
Most European reaction
followed that of Britain's Pro-?
fessar Lowell, head of the Jod-?
rell Bank station that first
announced the impact, who ex-
pressed his "amazement and as-
tonishment" at the rocket's
precision. West German rocket
expert Hermann Oberth,recently
returned from the United States,
saw the Russian lead in rocket
engines confirmed, even though
he said the United States is
catching up and remains ahead
in basic research. London's
pro-Conservative Daily Mail de-
scribed the Soviet accomplish-
ment as "man's greatest single
scientific achievement,"
A leading British scientist
opined that the launching rock-
et was probably twice as power-
ful as the Atlas now being
tested in the United States.
The semiofficial French press
agency AFP said, however, the
"new Soviet advantage in ultra-
modern arms" was likely to prove
only temporary.
Western European press com-
ment dwelt heavily on the timing
of the shot just prior to Khru-
shchev's arrival in Washington,
This sequence,said Duesseldorf 's
Der Mittag, was "like laying a
pistol on the table before con-
versations begin." No suggestion
has been reported, however, that
the United States would be im-
pressed into making concessions,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1? aeptember 1959
and French press comment has
contained none of the earlier
apprehensions regarding the
exchange. French speculation
was concerned. with how Khru-
shchev would conduct himself;
Le Monde asked: What are the
intentions "of a man who does
not fear to bring his host a
replica of the Soviet emblem
projected to the moon?"
A British paper saw Khru-
shchev now better able to offer
concessions. Rome's conserva-
tive I1 Tempo advised that the
space race dismays no one and
"characterizes the ideally new
relations which one would like
to create between East and SYest :'
AFP hopes the prospects for the
conquest of space will reveal
the pettiness of many worldly
differences.
Fragmentary Latin Ameri-
can commentary on the Soviet
moon rocket focuses mainly on
the magnitude of the scientif-
ic achievement. In Cuba, how-
ever, Fidel Castro's pro-Commu--
nist aide Ernesto "Che" Guevara
argued on a television program
on 14 September that Cuba is
in danger of being a target of
nuclear weapons because of the
US naval base at Guantanamo,
'i9ithout mentioning Russia by 25X1
Warne, he said "If they can hit
'the moon, they can surely hit
The Soviet Union, thwarted
in its attempts to prevent
through a veto the UN resolu--
tion to establish and send a
fact-finding group to Laos, on
14 September proposed a recon-
vening of the members of the
1954 Geneva conference, an ac-
tion that would undercut the UPl
subcommittee, Ivlascow's strong
statement, which obliquely
threatened retaliatory Commu-
nist action against Laos, Cam-
bodia, and South Vietnam, set
forth the Communist conditions
for a settlement of the present
conflict--a return to the use
of the International Control
commission (ICC), reduction in
the imj.~ort of arms and military
.advisers to Laos, and inclusion
of the Pathet Lao in the ~;ov-
ex?nmerrt .
bring pressure on the Laotian
rebels and the North Vietnamese
to curtail their activities be-
:fore they gain some of their
long-term objectives,
The USSR's Geneva confer-
ence proposal has been promptly
seconded by Peiping and Hanoi,
Communist China and North Viet-
nam probably share the Soviet
hope that the proposal will pro-
vide an alternative to UN ac-
tion and will place non-Commu-
nist nations in the position of
seeming to refuse a peaceful
solution to the Laotian situa-
tion, Should a conference ma-
4erialize, both Peiping and
Hanoi would expect further gains
_irY international prestige and
influence in addition to any
substantive benefits that might
~e obtained.
Although previous .state-.
meats by Soviet spol~esmen had
indicated some discomfoxt over
the e.~istence of the conflict
at a time when Khrushchev was
trying to present a picture of
reasonableness, the 14 Septem-
ber pronouncement showed clear-
ly that Moscow was not so em-
barrassed as to be willing to
With the UN fact-finding
subcommittee now in Laos, the
tempo of dissident military ac-
tivity has slowed; sporadic.
fighting continues in Sam Neua
and Phong Saly provinces and in
central Laos, Such elements
from North Vietnam as may have
;;participated in the fighting in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1? SeptembE~r 1959
Sam Neua and Phona
3aly earlier in tlzc
month may now be "ly-
ing law," as the Com-
munists have been at
some pains to deny
''slanderous" char,es
of North Vietnamese
participation in the
r~onflict. A complete
cessation of hostil-
ities coinciu~.ntal
with the arrival of
the UN' mission, how-
ever, would have
tar_ded to refute the
Cazznzunist portrayal
~:,~' a "popular upris-
ir.g.'' Future Commu-
nist mill.tary activ-
ity in Lao;~ probably
will be at a level dE~-
si~~ne~? to avoid clear-
cut ,;+~~:s:7t,ificat_l~n :for
P~estern intervention
r.~ut at a pace su:Pfi-
c~.ent to continue to
~:rade the Laotian
Government's posi-
tion.
Laotian offi-
cials admit the pos-
sibility of some un-
intentional exagger-
ation in the comm~z-
nitq,uds an the i i;i~t-
izz~; ; ~~ cl.ate, but ex-
px?^a:~ confidence that the in-
ve;~>ziation by the UN team will.
boar out Laos' char.~;;'es that
tdorth Vietnam is ~,c;,ively sup-
vortins~; the disci ..~i7ts . Ar-
r^,~~~ PZnents are being made to
t_t.~~ the investigators by lint
plane and helicopter to the re-?
,~;~:~te ~"9.~~1:.~:ir;~; areas. Tlie hit-
aza.,-'-x?un ?t;actics of the enemy
ar;r' the rugged terrain, however,
virtually preclude effective
ob~e:rvation.
French officials, in line
~~r.ith their view that the trouble
in Laois is 1ar~;ely of domestic
political origin, have Nought
to depr. c:ci.ai:e the mil.itax?S* throat
aztc3 ?za~l~; acCltsr''cl the. Laotian
Artiz~r of C?~'.~i,_, : .."a,t'LZi;~ E'Xt ''" ^'
r (_, ~ ~.~ r. ~..t.
;;omtnunist as.~.a.:~tar..co in ax?der
to cover it:~ awr.. "inc~ptvi-??~ss . "
Paria :feels that the cr:i~~1.~:~ ha3
been brouht about by the ?ail-
ing:~ o f the Phoui ~overnra.cnt
which have created a favorable
climate for Coznrr-ur~is~ surroer-
3fon. Plhile France ap~~~?c~re:~ o:P
the UN fact-finding :3uberimnzit-
tee on the ground that this will
have a calming eE:fect, ~yt?renth-
en Laotian morale, and buy tune
for domestic reEorrna, it
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCI~ WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 1959
would oppose any other farm of
international action, particu-
larly the direct involvement
of SEATO, which it thinks might
precipitate "a Communist mili-
tary reaction." It has reject-
ed the Soviet proposals for the
reconvening of the Geneva con-
ference.
Secretary General Harnmar-
skjold believes that the real
value in the UN's action on
Laos to date is the establish-
ment of its "presence" in the
area. Iie is anxious to shift
from Security Council action to
General Assembly action, which
could legally enable him to ap-
point a personal representative
to Laos.. There appears to be
growing support among non-Com-
munist nations for the reten-
tion of some kind of UN pres-
ence in Laos.
Hammarskj.old forecasts that
the UN subcommittee on Laos--
naw in Vientiane--should sumbit
its final report in about a
month. The Security Council
then would call far an investi-
gation on the basis of the sub-
committee's findings. The USSR
would veto such action, thus en-
abling General Assembly action
under the 1950 "Uniting for
Peace" resolution. The secre-
tary general plans only to ask
the assembly to authorize him
to appoint a special representa-
tive to the area rather than an
investigative body, in an of -
fort to offset criticism from
the many UN members who favor
using the ICC machiner y in
Laos. Iiammarskjold's thinking
ref lects his basic desire to 25X1
keep all UN activities on as
,pound a legal basis as possi-
ble .
DE GAULLE'S PROPOS.~LS FOR ALGERIA
French President de Gazelle's
16 September commitment to self -
determination for the Algerian
--including independence as one
of three future options--is
aimed partly at isolating the
rebels in international opinion
as the UN General Assembly con-
venes. The proposals also will.
serve to undercut opponents of
De Gazelle's liberal policies
among French rightists, the
army, and European settlers in
!llgeria. Rebel leaders fear
the impact of the proposals on
the Algerian Moslem masses,and
tend to see them as a purely
tactical move; they show no
signs of accepting De Gazelle's
terms in the near future,
De Gaulle took a calcu-
lated risk vis-a-vis the army
in offering independence as a
choice. He hedged the offer,
however, by promising continued
pacification efforts until total
annual French casualties are
below 200--the current total
is estimated at 1,500--and
warned the Algerians of the po-
litical and economic chaos which
would follow secession. He made
clear France's intention to re-
tain control of the Sahara and
its riches regardless of the
Algerians' choice.
His clear hint of parti-
tion was a threat to the Moslems
and a sop to military and ci-
vilian rightists who might also
be swayed by his offer of inte-
gration of Algeria with France.
The attention De Gaulle devoted
to the middle-road., federal-type
option, however, indicates his
personal preference far this as
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1'7 September 1959
the mast realistic and equitable
solution.
Although the press has re-
ported bitterness among junior
army officers over "shedding
blood and. then abandoning A1-
geria," the supreme commander
in Algeria, General Challe, ha:~
publicly pledged tbie army to
back De Gaulle's decisions, and
has warned extremists against
any overt opposition.
French rightist leaders
such as Georges Bidault, who
had been approached by Europeans
settler representatives who
anticipated De Gaulle's pro-
posals, refused to participate
in protest demonstratians. They
can be expected to blast De
Gaulle vocally, but the public
temper seems best expressed by
the many middle-of-the-road
French political leaders--rang-
ing from Socialist leader Guy
Mollet to Independent Paul
Reynaud--who immediately an-
nounced their support, Simi-
lar support is evident in the
press, and publicized reaction
in European capitals has also
been f avorable>
The most outspoken discon-
tent has been expressed by the
European settlers in Algeria,
particularly the veterans' or-
ganizations. The degree to
which the settlers can marshal
any effective opposition is
limited, however, by the quar-
relsome fragmentation of their
groups and by uncertainty as
to any firm support from like-
minded military elements. Press
censorship has been imposed in
Algiers, forbidding any comment
on De Gaulle's proposals,
The American Embassy in
Paris believes De Gaulle's
statement to have been genuine-
ly and earnestly designed as
a means of evolving a solution
of the problem which would
safeguard France's essential
rights and protect the long-
established European settle-
ments in Algeria. The embassy
feels De Gaulle has a good
chance of "winning his gamble,"
but notes as potentially dan-
gerous to him the increasing
desperation of French opponents
of his policy and the addition-
al complications which wider in-
ternational recognition of the
rebels would produce.
Algerian rebel leaders
gathered in Tunis appear cer-
tain to denounce De Gaulle's
unwillingness to negotiate
with the rebels' National Lib-
eration Front (FLN), although
they may offer counterpropos-
als, Even prior to his speech,
rebel officials had expressed
concern that De Gaulle might
offer "meaningless" proposals
designed to influence the forth-
coming UN debate on Algeria.
The De Gaulle program,
far all its qualifications with
respect to independence, ap-
pears to hold out a sufficient-
ly attractive prospect to
Algerian Moslems as to pose a
threat to popular support of
the FLN. A large proportion
of Algerian Moslems has been
regarded as largely apathetic
concerning the five-year-old
war, and skillful French ex-
ploitation of De Gaulle's pro-
gram might further undercut
Moslem support of the rebels.
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CURRENT INTELLICrENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 1959
NOTES AND COI.VlMENTS
MIDDLE EA>T HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq
The death sentence given
Brigadier Tabagchali on 16 Se p-
tember for his alleged role in
the Mosul revolt last spring
may lead to a further deteriora-
tion of relations between Qasim
and the anti-Communists. Tabaq--
chali, through his defiant be-
havior during his "trial" befoi?e
Colonel Mahdawi's People's Court,
had become a symbol of resist-
ance to Communist intimidation.
Qasim reportedly is pleased wii:h
the news that Mahdawi and the
court prosecutor are scheduled
to depart for Peiping later this
month, thus removing two of the
most immediate objects of "na-
tionalist" hatred.
On the general Iraqi scene,
the seesaw between the Commu=
nists and their opponents has
seemed to be tipping slightly
in favor of the latter during
the past week, A government
decree, which may be of consid-
arable significance if the anti-
Cvmmunists can take advantage
of it:'; has in effect ordered a
reorganization of the peas-ants '
associations wfiich multiplied
under Communist aegis early
this year, Licensing of local
associations will now be in~the
hands of provincial governors,
:rather than in the control of
the central Communist-dominated:
federation, and the leadership
~af the associations is to be
.placed in the hands of
genuine peasants rather than
in those of professional
agitators,
On the other hand, a possi-
ble longer to rm gain for Commu-?
nist influence is indicated by
information that the Sino-Soviet
bloc is likely to obtain a far'
:higher percentage of Iraqi stu-?
dents abroad than it has in they
past. During 1958-59, twelve
students, less than one half of
one percent of these Iraqis,
were placed in universities in
the bloc. For 1959-60, however,
the bloc has offered some 450 g,ar-
tial or full scholarships. The
Iraqi Ministry of Education,onE~
of the first government depart-
ments to come under strong Com-
munist influence, will probably
abet a shift toward educational
institutions in the bloc, and a
substantial number of the 2,000
students whom it plans to send
out of the country this year orr
Iraqi Government scholarships
may also go to the bloc,
UAR officials are showing
increasing concern that Cairo's
application for a World Bank
loan for improvements to the
Suez Canal may be blocked or
delayed, largely as a result
of complications with Israel,
and it has been suggested that
Cairo might withdraw the appli-
cation rather than suffer a re-
buff like that it received over
the Aswan Dam financing in 1950,
UAR Economics Minister Qaysuni
conferred with British Foreign
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in Lon-
don this week, and expressed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 19b9
.his apprehensions on this issue
while concurring that relation:
between London and Cairo were
generally improving? Lloyd, ac-
cording to British officials,
told Qaysuni that Britain
would not object to the loan,
although he made no commitment
to support~it~
Internally, President Nasir
is still faced with problems in
the Syrian region which affect
the organization of the over-all
UAR Government structure, Syri-
an Interior Minister Abd al-
Ilamid: Sarraj is ~~isiting Cairo,
reportedly to air~his complaints
that the Syrian regional admin-
istration is still too much
ridden with political factional-
ism.
The resignation on 14 Sep-
tember of Rs.yad Malki, Syrian
minister of culture and guidance,
may speed up Nasir's previously
reported plans for a general
reorganization. Malki, one of
the few remaining Baath party
members of the Syrian regional
cabinet, probably ran-afoul of
Sacra j
With Malki already
ou~ o ~ e way, the regime may
take the opportunity to drop
other troublesome ministers by
means of a cabinet switch, which
would serve to avoid the appear-
ante of a purge
internal anti-Communist campaign
yearly this year Demands have
also been made that the UAR Gov-
ernment release Farajullah Hilu,
a member of the central commit-
tee of the Lebanese Communist
party who was arrested in
Damascus last July.
Within the UAR, Communist
activity has practically .come
to a halt; the party's clan-
destine propaganda effort has
been feeble, and the number of
its partisans arrested is al-
most certainly over a thousand
A number of party leaders, es-
pecially in Syria, have recanted
and thereby gained release;
others have fled the UAR, main-
ly to Lebanon and Iraq; the
whereabouts of Khalid Bakdash,
leader of the Syrian party antfi.
the outstanding Communist lead-
er in the area, is periodically
reported to be somewhere in
the bloc
Jordan
The Arab press has been speculat-
a:ng on the possibility of a meeting be-
tween King Husayn and, .Nasir, and 25X1
the possibility of a tripartite
meeting including Saudi represent-
ative
~,re 25X1
also concerns again a out the
perennial issue of Israel's ac- 25X1
cess to and use of Mount Scopus
in the Jerusalem area
The Nasir propaganda appa-
ratus continues, meanwhile, to
take sporadic pat shots at the
Soviet bloc, apparently mainly
in retaliation for bloc radio
and press criticism The Cairo
-moves in this field have been
"r
telegrams into Cairo from
various international Communist
and Communist-front organiza-
tions protesting the state se-
curity trials now going on in
the UAR, The defendants are
all top-flight members of the
Communist party rounded up since
the beginning of Nasir's latest
Th? Israelis recently have
been giving an unusual amount
of publicity to border infil-
trations and other incidents
which normally receive a mini-
mum of attention Two factors
are probably responsible: an
Israeli Army officer was killed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 195J
by infiltrators recently, and
sterner measures against them
will probably be taken for a
time; and the Israelis are move-
ing into high gear their propa-
ganda and diplomatic efforts
in anticipation of a UN General
Assembly debate over the Suez
Canal and Palestine issues.
Aviv's reluctant decision that
Israel must give France unqual-
ified support on the Algerian
and other issues which may come
before the assembly. According
to an Israeli Foreign Ministry
official, this decision was made
because of the necessity of
relying an the French in ma t-
ters vitally affecting Israel's
The Israeli position with
some of the "friendly states"
it has cultivated in the Asian-
. African bloc in the UN may be
undermined, however, by Tel
security--i.e., the supply of
arms and the cooperation be-
tween the two countries in
scientific and nuclear ener~v
matters.
SING-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
In a week-long propaganda
campaign to counter Indian
charges of aggression, Peiping
called for "friendly; negotia-
tions" to settle the Sino-In-
di~,n border dispute, The
standing committee of Communist
China's National People's Con-
gress, in a three-day session
beginning on 11 September, be-
came a forum for replying to
the "anti-China campaign"
launched in the Indian Parlia-
ment by Prime Minister Nehru's
~8 August announcement of the
Chinese incursions.
Premier Chou En-lei keynoted
the session, complaining that
India "has resorted to force"
to back up its territorial de-
mands and insisting that the
McMahon line is "illegal." While
lesser speakers adopted a harsher
tans and specifically criticized
Nehru, no Chinese statement has
yet refused to accept the Mc-
Mahon line as a temporary basis
for re-establishing the "status
quo" which existed before Indian
troops moved up to new positions
on the frontier last spring.
Reflecting the standing commit-
tee's theme, Chinese Communist
,press, radio,-and public rallies
condemned Indian activities
along the border, charging that
Indian criticism is encouraging
elements hostile to Sino-Indian
friendship.
On the last day of the
standing committee session on
13 September, Foreign Minister
Chen Yi said there was "no ques-
tion of Chinese troops withdraw-
ing from anywhere"--but that
Peiping was willing to negotiate
such disputes as that over claims
to Longju, where the Chinese
seized an Indian outpost on 26
August. In an effort to pressure
Nehru into muzzling the Dalai
Lama and to detract from his UN
appeal, Chen also made Peiping's
first reference to the Tibetan
leader in recent months, imply-
ing Indian connivance in the
Dalai Lama's international maneu-
vering. Chen, however, welcomed
Nehru's stand on Laos, and the
resolution adopted by the stand-
ing committee did not attack the
Indian Government in its mildly
worded call for a "reasonable
settlements"
On 16 September, Peiping
broadcast a People's Daily
editorial, t e one o~wT~ch
suggests' the 'Chinese may soon
reduce the volume of their anti-
Indian propaganda. This would
be intended to encourage a letup
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 Sepi:ember 1959
in Indian attacks and help
create an atmosphere in which
talks could be held.
Nehru showed his irrita-
tion aver the extensive Chinese
propaganda activity by present-
ing lengthy anc~ heated rebuttals
to Chinese arguments during the
closing sessions of the Indian
Parliament, He took Chou to
task for accusing the Indian:
of following in the tradition
of Eritish "imperialism," noting
that China "got so big" as a
result of past "imperialism."
Nehru has been strongly
criticized for keeping the re-
cent history of Sino-Indian
border disputes from the pub-
lic until the present time, and
has come under increasing pres-
sure in :Parliament to adopt a
less conciliatory stand on
the border dispute, Nehru has
reaffirmed his desire far a
peaceful settlement and, like
Chou En-lai, expressed a will-
ingness to discuss the "small
isolated places" where same
form of accommodation is most
feasible.
There have been further
sins of Moscow's concern that
deve7,opi:~ents in the border dis-
pute might have an adverse ef-
fect on tthrushchev's trip to
the United States and might
damage the USSR's relations
wi.tli India... The Soviet lead-
. ers are anxious to ease the
situation and are seeking a
wcty out of the dilemma which
tixe dispute has created for
~1Roscow's relations with both
countries.
:thrushchev's decision to
:intervene in this situation
apparently was prompted by his
concern over the hardening in
both Peiping's and New Delhi's
positions. I-Ie probably feels
that their claims have created
an impasse which, if allowed
to continue, will give Moscow
na choice eventually but to
support Peipin~;'s position at 25X1
the risk of jeopardizing the
USSR's important relations with
India.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
17 September 1959
DALAI LAMA'S APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS
-Many TJN members, including
even such 3uddhist countries as
Burma, Thailand, and Ceylon, are
reluctant to sponsor Tibet's
appeal to the UN, These coun-
tries profess willingness to
support the Dalai Lama on human-
itarian grounds, but they op-
pose any UN discussion of the
political aspects of the case,
particularly Chinese suzerainty
India continues apposed to any
UN debate on tlae subject, but
the 1~4alayan and Philippine ?JN
delegates are pursuing their
campaign to get widespread sup-
port for the Dalai Lama.
pei were forced to express its
views on the status of Tibet,
"it would be put in the extreme-
ly distasteful position of hav-
ing to side with Peiping,"
Britain is reluctant to en-
courage UN discussion of Tibetn
London apparently fears that any
Western UN initiative on Tibet
would weaken the anti-Peiping
trend in Indian public opinion
caused by New Delhi's pres-
ent problems with Communist
China,
Although the Dalai Lama in
his 9 September appeal specifi-
cally cited Chinese Communist
"aggression against the sover-
eign state of Tibet," most UN
members are agreed that his case
would obtain wider support if
it were based solely on "oppres-
sion of human rights." British
Hig?1 Commissioner to India Mal-
colm MacDonald has warned, how-
ever, that even this charge
would require very good basic
evidences
Even Nationalist China's
chief ~JN delegate ?has expressed
dou~:yt that the Tibetans could
pxoduce convincing evidence of
Communist atrocities, lIe added
that Peiping had probably done.
no more in Tibet than elsewhere
an the mainland.
The Nationalists are also
aroused aver the Dalai Lama's
stress on Tibet's "sovereign
status." Vice Minister for For-
eign Affairs Chou Shu-kai told
American officials that if Tai-
Peiping broke its long si-
lence on the Dalai Lama on 13
September, when Foreign Minis-
ter Chen Yi said the 3uddhist
leader's appeal far exceeded
"what is allowed under the in-
ternational practice of asylum."
The same day,. Chinese Communist
propaganda media, wi+hout at-
tacking the Dalai Lama directly,
charged that "reactionary farces
in India and abroad are using the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Si1MIKARY
17 :5eptember 1959
Dalai Lama as a tool against
China," To avoid encouraging
world interest in Tibet, the
Chinese have not mentioned the
Dalai Lama since last spring,
when they claimed he was taken
to India undex duress. Peiping
probably now hopes, by linking
him with "cold-war conspira-
cies," to detract from any 25X1
sympathy which may be aroused
among UN members by his re-
cent appeal.
ELECTIONS IN 14TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The USSR, in its effort to
gain high UN elective offices
far the bloc countries, has an
opportunity to exploit the con-
tests now developing among
other members over electiv e
seats to the major UN bodies.
There is speculation among UN
members that Moscow will be
willing to permit the Eastern
European seat on the UN's Eco-
nomic and Social Council to go
to an Asian country this year
in return for Poland's election
to the Security Council. More-
over, high-ranking UN Secretar-
iat officials and marry UN mem-
bers believe the past practice
of relegating Soviet bloc candi-
dates to lesser UN offices has
become inappropriate.
Security Council
Of the three openings on
the Security Council, the seat
now held by Japan is considered
by many UN members to be allo-
cated to "Eastern Europe" al-
though Greece, Turkey, Yugosla-
via, the Philippines, and Japan
have occupied the seat since
1950, No strong candidate to
oppose Poland has yet off icial-
ly been announced. The present
relaxed atmosphere may lead many
members to support Poland and
may also have dissuaded other UN
members from seeking the office.
Greece, thought to be a likely
carrcli.date, i,s reluctant to run,
Council ele~;tions may be deferred far
several weeks to clarify the situationf,
Ecuador will replace Pana-
ma in one of the two -seats nor-
mally assigned the Latin American
bloc. With Ghana's withdrawal
as a candidate, Ceylon is vir-
tually assured election to the
council to replace Canada in
the Commonwealth seat,a
Economic and Social Council
Four of the six vacancies
on the 18-member Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) are un-
contested, but the rivalry be-
tween India and Japari for Paki-
stan's seat has split the Asian-
Af rican bloc , New De lhi ma in-
tains that Pakistan's seat is
normally considered assigned to
the Commonwealth and has spread.
the rumor that Japan is running
:for the Eastern European seat
and not the Asian,
There is speculation that
the Soviet bloc, in an effort
to curry votes for its other
candidadies, is willing to fore-
go the election of a satellite
to the council this year--per-
mitting both India and Japan to
be elected to ECOSOC,
Giving an Asian a seat
normally accorded a satellite
would ignore the principle
of geographic distribution, 25X1
a precedent the Soviet bloc
could exploit in future UN
elections..
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SECRET__.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1? September 1959
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF LIVESTOCK BANNED IN SOVIET URBAN AREAS
Private ownership of live-
stock in virtually all urban
areas of the Soviet Union is
to end in October The regime
evidently feels confident that
such measures--unthinkable four
years ago when incomes were
lawer and livestock products
less available in the cities--
will not evoke serious dissent.
Under a mid-August decree
in the Russian Republic (RSFSR),
and earlier orders in Kazakhstan
and the Ukraine, urban dwellers
must sell their cattle to col-
lective or state farms at pre-
vailing prices by 1 October of
this year. Failure to da so
will bring confiscation with com-
pensation at 1958 state procure-
ment prices. An Armenian de-
cree simply forbids the further
breeding of privately owned live-
stock by citizens in towns and
settlements.
At the June central commit-
tee plenum, Khrushchev decried
the evidently widespread practice
of f attening urban livestock on
bread purchased in state retail
outlets, Remarking that it
would be impolitic to raise
bread prices to make this habit
uneconomical, and infeasible to
lower meat prices 3.~e ,?ause of the
high cost of production, Khru-
shchev suggested that laws pxU--
hibiting ownership would remedy
the situation
The elimination of private
ownership of livestock in both
the urban and rural areas has
long been an aim of the regime,
State f-arm workers now are being
forced to sell their livestock
PARENTS' DAY
Urbanites visiting their livestock on Sunday at state farms.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 11'EEKLY SUMMARY
1? September 1959
to the farms in the next two or
three year 7, while collective
:farmers are being "encouraged"
to do soM Peasants on several
leading collective farms such
as ILalinovka--IChrushchev's fa-
?vorite--have already sold their
~~ows to the collective farm, and
the farm has guaranteed to sell
by ORR
milk to the farmers. Eager lo-
cal officials have tried to force
the pace of the program in some
cases, but I{hrushchev, aware of
the peasants' opposition, has
warned against coercion-and has
called far~a greater education-
al effort in' furthering .this pro-
gram . Prepared 25X1
PEASANTS DISTRUS'7C NFW POLISH AGRICULTURAIL .PROGRAM
~, full-scale campaign is ?. Outstanding in this situa-
under