CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002200070001-1
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Publication Date: October 18, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO.,-"- --
OCI NO. 1684/59
23 April 1959
140 CHANGE tN CLASS. ^
? DECLASSIFIED ~..,~
IcLASS. CHANGED To: T. ` C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: I ---
AUTH: H 70
OAT VIEWER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
11I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
CONFIDENTIAL
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Sam n
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Surnmary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page I
The USSR is stepping up its effort to soften the
Western position and set the stage for its own proposals
at the forthcoming East-West negotiations. Moscow has
charged in notes to Washington and Bonn that measures to
equip West German forces with nuclear weapons are de-
signed to confront the "conferences" with a fait accompli.
The notes are aimed at placing the USSR in a position to
blame the West for any failure of the talks and to claim
that such failure would give Moscow no choice but to pro-
ceed with unilateral actions regarding Berlin and a sepa-
rate peace treaty with East Germany. Moscow will probably
use the 27 April conference of ministers of the Warsaw
Pact and Communist China to demonstrate bloc strength and
solidarity.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Additional Communist-sponsored mass demonstrations
in Iraq are maintaining the momentum of the local Com-
munist effort toward full control of the country. There
are persistent reports that avowed Communists will soon
join the Iraqi cabinet. Additional anti-Communists have
gone into exile or have been arrested. The Imam of Yemen
is undergoing medical treatment in Italy; Crown Prince
Badr is taking special security measures to prevent the
overthrow of his regency. The persistence of tension and
disagreement within the top army council which governs
the Sudan appears to make further government changes al-
most inevitable.
TIBET SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Chou En-lai says that Tibet now is completely under
Chinese control but that mopping-up operations continue.
Peiping has abandoned its reticence to attack India di-
rectly and has accused "Indian officials" of abetting
"vicious attacks on China." Nehru has criticized the
Chinese as "brutal" and believes that Peiping's Tibetan
policy has failed--with a profound effect on Indian and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
PART I (continued)
Asian opinion--but is unwilling to support th lai Lama's
anal of Tibetan independence. The Dalai Lama
is determined to establish a Tree Trioetan gov
erii aen , an work for Tibetan independence, even if this means
he must seek asylum outside India.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KHRUSHCHEV REACHES SIXTY-FIVE . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Praise for Khrushchev in a greeting sent him by the
party presidium on his 65th birthday is reminiscent of the
"cult of personality" adulation which surrounded Stalin.
The Soviet premier apparently was not in good health dur-
ine his visit to East Germany last month.
KHRUSHCHEV LIEUTENANT APPARENTLY DEMOTEI) . . . . . . . . Page
Khrushchev appears to be carrying his quiet shake-up
of Soviet officialdom into the highest :Levels of the party.
Nikolay Ignatov, who had become a member of both the party
presidium and secretariat since Khrushchev's rise to power,
has been given the relatively inconsequential job of titu-
lar president of the Russian Republic, probably signifying
a sharp setback in his high party career. This move fol-
lows closely the demotion of several high-ranking offi-
cials, including Soviet planning boss Iosif Kuzmin.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
PART II (continued)
PEIPING'S NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Second National People's Congress and Peiping's
new budget for 1959 have reaffirmed Communist China's
intentions to continue the "leap forward" in economic
development and social reorganization. Chou En-lai's
foreign policy statements were moderate in tone but showed
no yielding on substantive issues. The congress was pre-
sented with a picture of a booming economy, which had
scored unprecedented advances last year and was bound to
make bigger end better gains this year.
NORTH KOREAN - JAPANESE REPATRIATION TALKS . . . . . . . . Page
Representatives of the Japanese and North Korean Red
Cross societies have been engaged in talks since 13 April
at Geneva on the Japanese plan to repatriate Koreans in
Japan to North Korea. The major problem is to negotiate
a formula which will overcome North Korean objections to
screening repatriates to make sure they are returning of
their own free will. The Kishi government has asserted
.'
at Koreans will not be sent back involuntarily.
SOVIET TACTICS TOWARD JAPAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The USSR is carrying on a campaign to convince the
Japanese that a "neutral" policy would bring Tokyo sub-
stantial trade and fishing benefits and greater security
against the threat of nuclear war. In a letter replying
to questions by a Japanese newsman on 20 April, Khrushchev
reiterated previous proposals for a denuclearized zone in
the Far East and offered to "guarantee" Japan's neutrality.
At the same time Ambassador Fedorenko, with an eye on the
important elections impending in Japan, has energetically
propagandized for Japanese neutrality in speeches through-
t t
ou
he country. The Kishi government does not intend at
present to answer the Soviet proposals.
TITO PREPARES FOR LONG SIEGE IN DISPUTE WITH BLOC . . . . Page 8
Yugoslavia is digging in for a long struggle with the
bloc. Now that the opposing ideological positions have
crystallized, Tito sees in the controversy many of the
same irreconcilable differences and Stalinist methods that
characterized the 1948 dispute. Belgrade is taking the
initiative more frequently, and Tito is attempting to use
the dispute to restore flagging party unity and enthusiasm.
Tito has recently laid out the future course of the party,
confidently assuring its members that their struggle with
the bloc "will be recorded in history as a shining example
n f +t, a ...,, ... a? _. r .,. _ L , ~ _ _ '- s _ _ -
international labor movement."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
PART II (continued)
OPENING OF THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT . . . . . . . . . . Page
French Premier Debrg's government will face the test
of parliamentary responsibility for the first time since
De Gaulle came to power when the spring legislative ses-
sion convenes on 28 April. Despite Debre's efforts to
avert a strong resolution on Algerian integration, depu-
ties from Algeria may force the issue by arguing that
the current municipal elections there show the necessity
for integration. Parliament is also expected to give
Debr6 trouble on the economic austerity program. De Gaulle,
however, has threatened to dissolve Parliament if it tries
to reassert its previous dominant role.
BELGIAN POLITICAL CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
King Baudouin last week took the unusual step of
vetoing the Belgian cabinet's nominee for new governor
general of the Congo. This move has undermined the pres-
tige of generally progressive Congo Minister Maurice Van
H emeir.jk;. and increased the problems of the Eyskens gov-
ernment in carrying out the policy announced last January
for increasing the territory's autonomy by definite stages.
The veto may also revive latent hostility toward the mon-
archy which has been dormant since Kind; Leopold abdicated
in 1950 because of his World War II record.
THE EUROPEAN COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY . .
. . . . . . . Page
A major test of the supranational powers of the Coal-
Steel Community (CSC) may occur at the meeting of its
council of government representatives on 4 May. In an
effort to alleviate the present coal glut, the CSC High
Authority--the executive body staffed by international
civil servants--is determined to press for production
quotas effective throughout the six-nation community, a
plan which the council may reject. Defeat of the High
Authority would be a blow to the prestige of the EURATOM
and Common Market commissions and would encourage those
critics who want to revise the CSC treaty.
RIGHTIST REVOLUTIONARY OUTBREAK IN BOLIVIA . . . . . . Page
The revolutionary attempt on 19 April by Bolivia's
perennially plotting rightists apparently was prompted by
the division of the governing Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement over the protracted economic crisis. The criti-
cal economic situation is likely to continue generating
tensions which may be reflected in sudden new outbreaks of
violence by either rightist or leftist elements. However,
the government's swift defeat of the rebels and its decla-
ration of a state of siege may enhance its prestige and
improve its control of subversion.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
PART II (continued)
NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE FORMED SOON IN NEPAL . . . . . . . . Page 13
Nepal's first government under the constitution pro-
claimed in February will be formed by the left-of-center
Nepali Congress party, which won a two-thirds majority in
the recently completed parliamentary elections. The new
government, maintaining a close relationship with New
Delhi, is likely to pursue modified socialist policies
internally and to take a neutralist position in foreign
affairs. 25X1
INDIAN CONGRESS PARTY LOSES POPULAR SUPPORT . . . . . . . Page 14
Prime Minister Nehru's Congress party apparently is
losing popular support, despite the major economic advances
India has achieved since 1951 under Congress leadership of
its First and Second Five-Year Plans. Recent municipal
elections in various parts of the country have shown a
strong trend away from the party, notably in Madras and
Punjab states, where the Congress party made a good showing
in the national elections of 1957.
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
President Sukarno's departure on a two-month world
tour has given rise to new rumors of political changes and
maneuvers which would take advantage of his absence.
Should significant opposition develop to Sukarno's call
for readoption of the 1945 constitution, Sukarno with the
army's backing may impose the constitution by executive
decree. Meanwhile, Indonesian negotiations Torizino-
Soviet bloc military and economic aid continue.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
PART II (continued)
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOCIALIST AND SOCIALIST-INCLINED PARTI39S IN LATIN
AMERICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Socialism has considerable appeal in Latin America,
where widely supported national parties have made pro-.
labor legislation and extensive state participation in
the economy a major part of their programs. In five
countries, national revolutionary parties have gained
the allegiance of almost all elements which the Commu-
nists seek to cultivate, and most of them have acquired
a decided anti-Communist orientation.
CHANGES IN THE USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS . . . . . Page 9
During the past six years the USSR Ministry of For-
eign Affairs has been refurbished into a more effective
agency for extending Soviet influence throughout the
world. A drastic reshuffling of ministerial personnel
has been carried out by the regime, and a large number
of former high-level party and government careerists from
other departments assigned to leading posts within the
ministry. Efforts have also been made to expand diplo-
matic relations. Unlike his two predecessors, Foreign
Minister Andrey Gromyko is a foreign policy technician
rather than a policy maker. He is not a member of the
party presidium and has apparently stayed aloof from
factional politics.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS
Moscow is stepping up its
effort both publicly and pri-
vately to soften the Western
position and set the stage for
its proposals at the forthcoming
East-West negotiations. In
similar notes to Washington and
Bonn on 21 April, the Kremlin
charged that measures to equip
West German forces with nuclear
weapons are designed to confront
the "conferences" with a fait
accompli. By focusing attention
on this controversial issue,
the Soviet leaders are seeking
to sharpen differences among
the Western Allies on the eve
of the 11 May foreign ministers'
conference.
The warning that negotia-
tions will be doomed to fail-
ure if Bonn persists in its
rearmament program is another
step in Moscow's effort to es-
tablish in advance the rationale
and justification for unilat-
eral actions regarding Berlin
and a separate peace treaty
with East Germany in the event
the talks fail.
Recent private statements
by Soviet officials reflect the
Kremlin leaders' continuing de-
termination to gain Western ac-
ceptance of a summit conference
regardless of the outcome of
the foreign ministers' meeting.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
The Soviet counselor in
Paris told an American official
on 20 April that one possible
solution of the Berlin problem
would be to reaffirm the rights
of the three Western powers to
remain in West Berlin but to
withdraw all foreign troops
from the city or reduce them
.to token forces. Under this
formula, the East Germans would
exercise physical control of
access routes, in accordance
with a four-power'guarantee of
free access. This same Soviet
diplomat made similar suggestions
to French and American officials
in January and February in which
he minimized the changes that
would occur after the USSR with-
draws from East Berlin and im-
plied that East German controls
would not be far-reaching, He
told an American official on 27
January that the Western powers
could keep their troops in Ber-
lin under an international con-
trol commission.
The first secretary of the
Soviet Embassy in Bonn attrib-
uted Adenauer's decision to
seek the presidency to the
chancellor's conviction that
he could no longer impose his
"inelastic" policy on his West-
ern allies. This interpreta-
tion and the official.;'s allusion
to a relationship between Ger-
man Foreign Minister Brentano's
return from Washington and Ade
nauer's decision to resign the
chancellorship., suggest Soviet
confidence that the Western
powers, under pressure of pub-
lic; opinion, will move toward
an accommodation with Moscow
on Berlin and Germany.
The announcement of Vice
President Nixon's forthcoming
trip to the USSR, according to
the Soviet press, has been fa-
vorably received in the USSR.
TASS commented that leading
circles in the Soviet Union
expect the visit to serve the
further development of personal
contacts between government
heads and improve US-Soviet
understanding.
Moscow has resumed propa-
ganda attacks on the high-al-
titude American flights in the
Berlin air corridor, calling them
deliberately provocative vio-
lations of flight regulations
and "blackmail aimed at aggra-
vating the international situ-
ation" on the eve of the foreign
ministers' conference. Pravda
added that such acts will -not
be permitted to go unpunished.
In line with the Kremlin's
professed desire to create a
favorable atmosphere'for ne-
gotiations, Soviet propaganda
had :refrained from exploiting
the air corridor incidents in
the 'two-week period following
the Soviet note of protest of
4 April. The resumption of
propaganda attacks and Pravda's
implied warning constitute a
attempt by Moscow to use this
issue to exploit differences
among the Western powers and
may indicate an intention to
claim, credit if the flights
are discontinued.
The USSR has announced
that the foreign ministers of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMWARY
23 April 1959
the Warsaw Pact powers and Com-
munist China will meet in Warsaw
on 27 April to review questions
to be discussed at the East-West
foreign ministers' conference.
Moscow will probably use the
conference to demonstrate bloc
strength and solidarity with
the aim of bolstering the Soviet
position at the 11 May Geneva
conference.
Nuclear Test-Cessation Talks
Moscow apparently wishes to
avoid any developments:'in the nu-
clear test-cessation talks in
Geneva which might affect ad-
versely the Soviet posture of
seeking to create a favorable
atmosphere for forthcoming ne-
gotiations on the Berlin-German
problem. The American chief del-
eghte believes the Soviet dele-
gation is attempting to create
the impression of progress in
the negotiations by gradual ac-
ceptance of noncontroversial ar-
ticles introduced by'the_United
States and Britain, while care-
fully skirting all the difficult
issues. The conference now has
agreed to ten. draft articles
and a draft preamble.
Moscow probably believes it
can avoid detailed discussion of
the American plan for an agree-
ment limited to atmospheric and
underwater tests, unequivocal re-
jection of which would detract
from the Soviet posture of de-
siring compromise on East-West
issues.
East Germany
Speaking to the East German
parliament on 16 April, Premier
Grotewohl categorically rejected
any solution-. of the Berlin prob-
lem which would include East Ber-
lin in a free city under interna-
tional control. In line with
previous Soviet and East German
official statements, he said ac-
ceptance of such proposals would
violate the "sovereignty" of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR).
Grotewohl's announcement
that the GDR "representatives"
at the foreign ministers' meet-
ing in Geneva will include For-
eign Minister Bolz is clearly
intended to support'.the East
German claim to full and equal
participation in the conference.
The large size and high level of
the 50-man delegation which will
reportedly accompany Bolz--in-
clueling Deputy Foreign Minister
Otto Winzer and Peter Florin,
head of the party central com-
mittee's foreign policy depart-
ment;--underline the puppet re-
gime's attempt to present an
appearance of "sovereignty" at
the meeting.
On 17 April the GDR Minis-
try of Transport requested its
West; German counterpart to au-
thorize the transit of an East
German train, presumably to carry
its delegation to Geneva at the
beginning and end of the confer-
ence!. The East Germans also re-
quested overflight rights for
one GDR plane to fly daily be-
tween Geneva and Berlin-Schoene-
feldi airport during the confer-
ence. In conformity with quad-
ripartite views on the matter,
the West German Transport Minis-
try has approved both requests.
The West Germans also intend to
inform the East German airline,
Interf lug, that the Federal Re-
public will ask the three Allied
powers for permission to author-
ize East German planes to fly
the Berlin air corridor in view
of the special circumstances.
Public criticism of the
Soviet proposal to finalize the
Oder-Neisse frontier has persisted
in East Germany, both by the gen-
eral public and party members.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 19,59
Britain
In the interest of achiev-
ing Western harmony, Britain is
endeavoring to soften the clash
between its own position and
those of its allies. In the
working group discussions in
London, the British have sought
principally to keep open the
way for a pilot inspection plan
in central Europe. British
ideas on the controversial spe-
cial security zone nevertheless
remain unclear--presumably to
allow for maximum Western flex-
ibility in East-West negotia-
tions.
West Berlin
Mayor Willy Brandt has in-
formed American officials that
he is satisfied with the general
situation In West Berlin. He
said that unemployment is con-
siderably lower than last year
MIDDLE EAST
Iraq
Additional Communist-spon-
sored mass demonstrations are
maintaining the momentum of the
Iraqi Communist effort toward
,full control of the country.
,The end of the Peace Partisans
meetings in Baghdad last week
was marked by a well-controlled
parade of an estimated half-
million marchers, and another
series of mass rallies in Bagh-
dad and other centers has been
called for 24 April to commemo-
rate the "struggle against im-
and that there has been no sig-
nificant removal of people,cap-
ital, or industry from the city.
He emphasized that morale is
primarily dependent on belief
in US firmness in retaining
garrisons and free access, by
force if necessary.
Adenauer's decision to run
for president has had no visi-
ble effect on Berlin morale.
Most Berliners doubt there will
,be any changes in Bonn's for-
eign policy, and some regard an
anticipated introduction of
"tactical flexibility" as a
"positive" development. Ber-
lin's political leaders do not
expect Adenauer's successors to
do less for Berlin than the
chancellor--an attitude which
reflects their belief that US
policy is the determini atg fac-
tor in Berlin's futures
HIGHLIGHTS
perialism." These demonstrations
are being organized in the first
instance by the Communist-direct-
ed youth organizations, but the
udual swarm of labor, women's,
writers', and other groups is
taking part.
The demonstrations are phys-
ically managed by individual or-
ganizers,each of whom directs a
specaLal segment of the marchers,
while traffic and general crowd
control is being handled largely
by the Communist-dominated Poplar
Resistance Force. The regular
police and the army seem
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
in many cases to have abdicated
internal security functions.
Should these demonstra-
tions result in any attacks
on Westerners or their prop-
erty, the action would al-
most certainly be deliberate
on the part of the demonstra-
tions' organizers rather than
a by-product of excessive en-
thusiasm.
Reports persist that a
cabinet shake-up is imminent,
involving both the replace-
ment of some ministers and
the appointment of new ones.
one o the prospective casual-
ties is said to be Finance Min-
ister Hadid, an intellectual
Marxist but also a wealthy in-
dustrialist who has been at
odds with Economics Minister
Kubba, the cabinet's outstand-
ing pro-Communist:,
Another pro-Communist,
Health Minister Shawwaf, announced
last week that the USSR, rather
than Western Europe, will hence-
forth be the locale for special
medical treatment for Iraqis,
and that private hospitals and
clinics in Iraq will be nation-
alized. An American mission
hospital was taken over some
time ago by the government.
Baghdad has announced that
Kamil Chadirchi, leader of the
left-wing National Democratic
party and until recently Prime
Minister Qasim's principal civil- 25X1
ian political adviser, will
go 1:6 Moscow for medical
treatment.
Chadirchi's de-
parture from Iraq, for what-
ever reason, will remove the
only non-Communist influence
ever known to have really had
Qasimm's ear.
Nasir's latest propaganda
attacks have continued to
stress the anti-Communist
theme rather than hit Qasim
directly, and UAR propaganda
officials now are seeking
"hard" anti-Communist ma-
terials to use in their
campaign.
Arab Petroleum Congress
No surprises thus far have
come out of the Cairo-sponsored
First Arab Petroleum Congress
which began on 16 April. Most
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23 April 1959
of the Arab papers presented
have been versions of earlier
proposals. Lebanon's EmilBustani,
for example, again submitted
his plan for the oil-producing
Arab countries to set aside 5
percent of their profits for the
benefit of the "have-not" states,,
Besides Lebanon, the "have-nots'
include the UAR and Jordan. Al-
though Bustani claimed to have
the support of Kuwait, the re-
sponse to his speech was not
warm.
A UAR delegate apparently
made the only "political" speech,
aimed at the United States and
charging Washington with trying
to control the Middle East be-
cause of American oil companies.
Other UAR addresses were note-
worthy for their lack of recrim-
ination and fairly businesslike
character.
A mild stir and some con-
cern was generated by Frank Hen-
drix, an American who is Saudi
Arabia's top legal adviser on
oil matters. Hendrix sought to
lay a legal foundation for uni-
lateral Arab modification or
elimination of existing petro-
leum concession agreements. The
presentation of his thesis,
which was quickly challenged by
both Arab and oil-company of-
ficials, appeared to be largely
a Saudi skirmish with the Ara
bian--American Oil Company and. was
generally unwelcome to the con-
gress as a whole.
Saudi Arabia's energetic
director of Petroleum affairs,
Abdulla Tariki, and Venezuela's
minister of mines and. hydrocar-
bons, Dr. Juan Pablo Perez Al-
fonzo, appear to have dominated
the congress. Tariki pressed
hard for a new, Arab-owned
pipeline which would carry Per-
sian Gulf oil, probably except-
ing Iraq and Iraq, to the Med-
iterranean by a route largely
paralleling the existing Tapline.
Tar:iki publicly agreed that
there were "grounds" for an oil
price and production agreement
between the Middle East and Ven-
ezuela but did not think action
could be taken during the con-
gress.
The Imam of Yemen has ar- 25X6
rived in Rome and is under treat-
ment by Italian doctors for his
various ailments.
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23 April 1959
Crown Prince Badr, who
has been left in charge of the
Yemeni Government as chairman
of a four- or five-man council,
has taken a number of unusual
security precautions.
Considerable maneuvering
almost certainly will develop
in Yemen in the Imam's absence.
A previous report that tribal
leaders opposed to Badr had
pledged -that they would remain
quiet has been denied, and un-
less the crown prince moves cau-
tiously he could be faced with
a revolt. In what may be an ef-
fort to reduce foreign influ-
ences--both Western and Soviet--
the Yemeni Government reportedly
intends to close diplomatic and
consular establishments in Sana
and Taiz and conduct all rely
tions in Cairo. The long-dor-
mant United Arab State--the
year-old Union of Yemen and the
UAR--presumably would be used
as the technical vehicle to
justify this move.
Sudan
Persistence of tension and
disagreement within the top army
council which governs the Sudan
appear to make further govern-
ment changes almost inevitable.
Premier Abboud is again reported
preparing to retire from the
scene in the f ace of the rest-
lessness of junior officers
whose spokesman is the leader
of the "semicoup" last March,
Brigadier Shannan.
A Soviet economic delega-
tion left Khartoum on 16 April
without reaching any major agree-
ments despite two months of ne-
gotiations, The Soviet delegation
refused to deviate from the es-
tablished pattern of Soviet aid
programs, which the Sudanese re-
jected because of concern over
the presence of bloc personnel
TIBET SITUATION
Premier Chou En-lai told
the National People's Congress
in Peiping that Tibet now is
completely under .Chinese con-
trol. He admitted, however,
that mopping-up operations were
continuing in "remote" areas.
Peiping later reported that
Chinese forces control the
whole Tibetan frontier north
of the Himalayas.
The Peiping press on 23
April dropped its reticence
to attack New Delhi direct-
ly and accused "Indian of-
ficials" of abetting "vicious
attacks on China" by re-
leasing the Dalai Lama's
first statement denying he
had been abducted from Ti-
bet.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
Although embarrassed and
undoubtedly bitter over Nehru's
sympathy for the Dalai Lama,
the Chinese have so far avoided
formal actions or statements
which would further antagonize
the Indians and to which Nehru
would be forced to respond on
a government-to-government ba-
sis. Chou En-lai,speaking be-
fore the congress, had toned
down earlier charges that Kal-
impong in India's West Bengal
State was the Tibetan rebels'
command center o He also hailed
2,000 years of friendship with
India and said there was no rea-
son why such friendship should
be shaken by a "handful" of
rebels.
Nehru is convinced Peiping will
not reverse its policy of total
repression in Tibet, and he
believes the eventual return
of the Dalai Lama is out of the
question.
India
will try to keep the Dalai
Lama
relatively quiet. Nehru
again
told Parliament on
20
April
that the Dalai Lama
Is
free to conduct religious
activities, but "Political 25X1
activities are not carried on
from one country against another,"
Nehru probably will put
considerable pressure on the
Dalai Lama to prevent him
from carrying out political ac-
tivities from within India,
and is likely to ask him to
seek asylum elsewhere if he
persists in his present plans.
High-level committees are
being set up in India and else-
where to handle the expected
flow of Tibetan refugees. Al-
though insignificant thus far,
the exodus probably will in-
crease and pose further prob-
lens
The Chinese Nationalists
may become more determined
than ever to demonstrate their
ability to play an active role
in the Tibetan revolt as a re-
sult of the Dalai Lama's fail-
ure! to mention Nationalist
China in his 18 April press
statement or to respond to
Chiang Kai--shek's offer of
future "self-determination,"
Any increased support for the
Tibetan revolt, however, would
probably be limited primarily
to a step-up in Nationalist
propaganda efforts against the
mainland, such as a resumption
l e a s
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
KHRUSHCHEV REACHES SIXTY-FIVE
Khrushchev's 65th birthday
on 17 April coincided with an
unprecedented volume of reports
and speculation on the state
of his health, and with strik-
ing evidence that adulation of
Khrushchev is beginning to re-
semble closely "the cult of
personality" which surrounded
Stalin.
Khrushchev has been on va-
cation, first in Sochi and lat-
er in Yalta, since about 25
March. Late last summer and
early in the fall he was on va-
cation for six weeks; he appar-
ently also took time off for
about two weeks in January of
this year. A pattern seems to
be developing of longer, more
frequent and probably quieter,
more restful vacations.
Khrushchev leadership aura
was advanced markedly on 19
April when the Soviet press pub-
lished an unprecedented birthday
greeting sent to him by the
party presidium. Soviet leaders'
65th birthdays are not
normally noted with
party greetings. Some
of the words chosen
for the congratulatory
message were last used
to describe Stalin at
the height of the
"cult of personality"
period. The message
was signed by all full
and candidate members
of the presidium ex-
cept M. G. Pervukhin,
ambassador to East
Germany--probably
signifying that he is
no longer a candidate
member.
The presidium members called
Khrushchev "elder comrade and
friend" who ""dedicates all your
seething energy, wealth of po-
litical experience, wisdom, and
daring initiative to the build-
ing of Communism and the consol-
idation of the might of the So-
viet state.... "" They credited
to Khrushchev's initiative and
direction the major political
and economic innovations taken
by the ceftral committee in re-
cent years and acknowledged
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
"the farsighted,, flexible., and
principled Soviet foreign poli-
cy, to which you dedicate so
much energy and skill."
Perhaps for the benefit
of the Chinese Communists,
Khrushchev's speeches and re-
The "election" on 16 April
of Nikolay Ignatov, a member of
both the party presidium and
secretariat, as chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Russian Republic (RSFSR)
appears to be part of a general
shake-up of Soviet party and
government officials which has
been going on for several months.
Since last December, a number
of high-ranking fig-
ures have lost their
jobs. These include
party and government
leaders in the Turk-
men, Uzbek, and Belo-
russian republics and
Moscow Oblast, as
well as Soviet plan-
ning chief Iosif
Kuzmin.
In "proposing"
Ignatov for a hereto-
fore largely ceremo.-
hial and politically
insignificant post,
party secretary and
cadre specialist
Awerky Aristov stressed
ports were credited with "dis-
playing models of creative en-
richment of the theory of
Marxism-Leninism, especial-
ly on questions of build-
ing socialism and Commu-
nism. "
since his new post is a
full-time job.
Aristov's remarks suggest
some increase in the responsi-
bilities of the RSFSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium. In addition,
Igr.Latov will probably be called
on to represent the Soviet Union
in place of ailing President
Voroshilov, and he will be in
line to succeed Voro-
shilov when the latter
dies or has to retire.
Even so, Ignatov's new
responsibilities do
not appear commensurate
with those he enjoyed
as party secretary,
and he has probably
suffered a political
reverse.
Ignatov, now 58,
had held high party
posts for many years.
He did not enter the
highest levels of the
hierarchy until after
Khrushchev's rise to
;power, however, He
the "great tasks which the Su-
preme Soviet of the RSFSR is
called on to decide" and stated
that the party central commit-
tee had recognized that it is
"necessary for the RSFSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium to be headed
by a member of the presidium of
the Soviet party central com-
mittee." Ignatov thus appears
certain to remain on the party
presidium but will probably be
released from the secretariat,
was made a member of the party
presidium in June 1957, follow-
ing the ouster of the "antiparty"
group, and was brought into the
secretariat from an important
provincial party post in Decem-
ber 1957. He apparently has
been party secretary responsible
for agriculture.
There had been no previous
indications of a decline in
Ignatov's standing,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY-
23. April 1959,
There has been no indica-
tion of a new assignment for
Mikhail Tarasov, Ignatov's
predecessor as RSFSR Pre-
sidium chairman and a
candidate member of the
party central committee.
PEIPING'S NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
Communist China's Second
National People's Congress--
which opened in Peiping on 18
April and is scheduled to meet
for ten days--has heard a re-
statement of current policy in
the major report by Premier
Chou En-lai and economic and
budget plans for 1959. Chou's
30,000-word report reaffirms
Peiping's intentions to continue
its "leap forward" in economic
development and social reorgan-
ization and moderates the tone
of Peiping's foreign policy
statements. The "election" of
the new government--including
Mao Tse-tung's successor--will
probably not take place until
the closing sessions of the con-
gress. Mao, meanwhile, is receiv
ing homage as. the guiding spirit
of the regime's past and present
programs.
Foreign Relations
On the subject of China's
foreign relations, Chou's grand
display of forbearance--a sharp
contrast with statements in 1958
--was clearly intended to dispel
the notion in the bloc as well
as the West that the Chinese
Communists are Stalinists of the
East. He hoped the peace area
"already formed" in Southeast
Asia would last "forever" and
noted that despite forays into
China by Surma-based National-
ist irregulars, Peiping has done
no more than guard the frontier
and "remain patient," waiting
for "friendly" Burma to handle
the situation on its own. Chou's
effort to quiet international
criticism of restrictions on
freedom in China included a
call for "hundred flowers" in
science and art, but he added
the significant qualification
that the policy must "serve
socialism."
Chou's moderate tone re-
flects no yielding on substan-
tive issues dividing Communist
China and the West. He applied
to all countries a principle
which recently appeared in
Peiping's propaganda on Japan--
that is, "so-called" diplomatic
relations with Taipei must be
severed before formal relations
with Communist China can be
established, He made it clear
Peiping continues to regard the
United States as its major
enemy, citing a belligerent state-
merit of Mao that "the enemy
rots with each passing day."
Turning to Tibet, Chou
to]:.d the congress that the area
now is completely under Peiping's
control but admitted that mopping-
up operations were continuing in
"remote"regions.
The Economy
The congress was presented
with a picture of a booming econ-
omy, which had scored unprece-
dented advances last year and
was bound to make bigger and
better gains this year. The
1959 plan gives every in-
dication of having been
bared on Peiping's question-
able 1958 production claims,
It is described as "both
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
grand and arduous" but entirely
capable of being fulfilled. It
retains the high targets for
steel, coal, food grains,and
cotton first advanced last
December and schedules an in-
crease in total value of in-
dustrial and agricultural output
larger in absolute terms than
last. year's.
Speakers at the congress
have cautioned that many im-
portant materials, energy
sources, and transport lag be-
hind the demand, and that, de
spite the fact that efforts
this year are to be concentrated
on these shortages, it is impos-
sible to bring about a quick
and radical change.
Chou En-lai, directing his
remarks to one extreme of party
opinion, argues that it is
"quite impractical" to expect
that the percentage increase
in output must be higher in each
succeeding year. He warned that
in the course of continuous
leaps Toward there might even
be decreases in production,
particularly in agriculture.
He insisted, as far as the 1959
plan is concerned, that if every
worker, peasant,.and.intellectual
is mobilized;:"ideologically and
politically,." the .1959 plan will
"certainly be fulfilled"
NORTH KOREAN - JAPANESE
Representatives of the
Japanese and North Korean Red
Cross societies have been en-
gaged in talks since 13 April
on the Japanese plan to repa-
triate Koreans in Japan to
North Korea?
The Japanese Government
on 13 February announced its
decision to act on the
The 1959 budget, described
as "bold and well founded" by
Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien,
schedules expenditures and rev-
enues balanced at a record
$21.4 billion. Even so the
increases do not appear to re-
flect fully the levels of pro-
duction and construction said
to :have been achieved last year.
Li said that most of the 24-per-
cent increase in revenues would
come out of increased profits
and taxes on state enterprises,
They will account for almost
90 percent of revenues this year.
Budget spending will go up
27 percent. Direct allocations
for defense are to increase by
only 16 percent but constitute
11.x; percent of total expendi-
tures, the smallest percentage
since the Chinese Communists
came to power. Additional
spending on defense is of course
hidden in other budget cate-
gories. The largest increases
in spending will be a 26-percent
rise in construction investment,
a near doubling of the budget
outlay for bank credits, and
an increase of more than 200
percent in allocations for
foreign aid. The budget also
sets aside some $400,000,000
for investment in communes with
"poo:rer economic conditions "
REPATRIATION TALKS
repatriation question, in re-
sponse to mounting domestic
political pressure and in view
of lack of progress in normaliz-
ing relations with South Korea,
Some 117,000 of the 600,000
Korean residents in Japan sub-
sequently signed petitions stat-
ing their desire to go to North
Korea, but the majority of sig-
natures were apparently obtained
by leftist coercion,
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23 April 1959
The International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
wary of Japan's initial propos-
al that the ICRC screen the
Korean residents to confirm
their wishes, invited repre-
sentatives of the Japanese
and North Korean societies to
confer in Geneva. North Korea
accepted, probably seeing in
the talks an opportunity for
enhanced international standing
and a chance to exacerbate
Sleuth Korean - Japanese relations.
At the conference table, Pyong-
yang initially rejected the
Japanese Red Cross proposal
for even limited !CRC screening,
and by 20 April a Japanese
Foreign Ministry spokesman had
decided that agreement was
unlikely. Since then, however,
the North Koreans have dem-
onstrated a greater flexibility
on the issues to be negotiated.
While it is probable that
North Korea will eventually
modify its position on ICRC
screening, it may not seek an
early settlement, since im-
plementation of any agreement
would reveal that contrary to
Pyongyang's claims, only a
small proportion of the Koreans
in Japan wish repatriation to
North Korea. It would also
settle a grievance which North
Korea has long used to berate
the Kishi government.
For Toyko, the crux of
the matter apparently is to
devise a formula which would
overcome repeated North Korean
objections to any screening
procedure and yet not contra-
vene the Kishi government's
assertion that none of the
Korean residents would be re-
patriated involuntarily. Kishi
is anxious to demonstrate to
the Japanese public prior to
the upper-house elections in
June that progress is being
made toward an agreement.
The Japanese public has
long sought the removal of as
many as possible of the Korean
residents, who are considered an
undesirable minority. Somewhat
in contrast to the seeming fle1zi-
bility of the Japanese Red Cross
negotiators in Geneva, Japanese
Vice Foreign Minister Yamada
has reiterated that ICRC screen-
ing remains an "absolute condL-
tion" for a repatriation agref.-
ment and has indicated that
Tokyo may break off the Geneva
talks unless Pyongyang drops
its opposition on this point..
South Korea claims that
the status of Koreans in Japan
can be resolved only through
bilateral negotiation for an
over-all settlement of out-
standing differences between
Seoul and Tokyo--negotiations
which Seoul broke off when
Tokyo announced it would permit
the 'voluntary repatriation of
Koreans in Japan to North Korea.
Seoul has called for a resump-
tion of the talks, but it has
since insisted that Tokyo first
break off the Geneva talks.
Should Tokyo permit the re-
patriation of Koreans to North
Korea, Seoul might be provoked
into rash counteraction.
Prime Minister Kishi has
indicated that a way could be
found to shelve the repatria-
tion plan indefinitely, pro-
vided South Korea adopts a
reasonable position on the
problems of the "Rhee line,,
and detained Japanese fisher-
men, but President Rhee has
given no indication that he
is prepared to modify his
conditions for an over-all
settlement.
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23 April 1959
The USSR is carrying on
a campaign to convince the
Japanese that a "neutral" pol-
icy would bring Tokyo substan-
tial trade and fishing benefits
and greater security against
the threat of nuclear war.
Soviet Premier Khrushchev on
20 April reiterated earlier
Soviet proposals for a denu-
clearized zone in the Far East
and offered to "guarantee"
Japan's neutrality. In a letter
replying to questions by a
Japanese newsman, he said an
agreement to this effect could
be negotiated by Communist
China, Japan, and the USSR,
and that the USSR would not op-
pose the entry of the United
States into such an arrangement.
The Soviet premier's pro-
posals, which support Soviet
propaganda efforts to arouse
concern in Japan over the cur-
rent US-Japanese security treaty
negotiations, are in line with
Moscow's vague proposals over
the past several years for a
Far Eastern conference. Prime
Minister Kishi commented on 21
April that he found "nothing
new" in Khrushchev's statements,
and Tokyo thus far is ignoring
the proposals.
Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko,
with a view to influencing the
important elections impending
in Japan, is attempting to build
up Soviet prestige in Japan..
In an effort to counter the un-
popular effect new Soviet-im-
posed curbs on Japanese fishing
would have, he is attempting to
divert blame to the Kishi gov-
ernment. Fedorenko has sought
every opportunity to extol the
benefits of neutrality and
has breathed new life into the
Communist-dominated Japan-Soviet
Society.
Soviet spokesmen have
vigorously stressed the oppor-
tunities for trade expansion
and have repeatedly held out
the possibility of Japanese
participation in the develop-
ment of Siberia. Fedorenko
stated on 27 March that the USSR
is ready to sign a long-term
trade agreement with Tokyo in
order to place their trade re-
lations on a more solid basis.
Fedorenko's personal cam-
paign for "neutralization" was
launched by a Soviet note of 2
December which advocated Japa-
nese neutrality and warned that
small countries with dense popu-
lations would be annihilated in
case of atomic war, a warning
repeated in Khrushchev's letter
of 20 April to the Japanese news-
man. His renewed references to
this note are probably designed
to provoke a reply which could
be exploited by Communist prop-
aganda during the current se-
curity negotiations with the
United States. On 21 April,
Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated
that for the time being Japan
does not need to reply to the
note.
Fedorenko's emphatic af-
firmation of the Kremlin's
firm position on the territorial
issue and a peace treaty, how-
ever., as well as his solicitude.
for the Japanese Socialist party,
are clearly intended to illus
trate that Soviet concessions to
the pro-Western Kishi govern-
ment will not be forthcoming.
Moscow can be expected to
follow Khrushchev's proposals
with further moves designed'
to contrast Kishi's policies
with the advantages of a neutral-
ly oriented regime.
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23 April 1959
TITO PREPARES FOR LONG SIEGE IN DISPUTE WITH BLOC
Yugoslavia is digging in
for a long struggle with the
bloc. In a recent speech to his
central committee and in a press
interview, both commemorating
the 40th anniversary of the
Yugoslav Communist party, Presi-
dent Tito laid out the future
course of the party, confidently
assuring its members that their
struggle with the bloc "will be
recorded in history as a shining
example of the party's obliga-
tions toward its own people and
the international labor move-
ment."
Tito has claimed that no
real efforts have been made by
the bloc to discuss its theoret-
ical differences with him. In
fact, both sides have further
justified their positions in
terms of Marxism-Leninism, which
has widened the breach even fur-
ther. Khrushchev declared at
the Soviet party's 21st congress
that "socialism cannot be built"
in a country outside the Commu
nis"t bloc and that Yugoslavia's
separation from the bloc endan-
gers its socialist achievements.
The Yugoslavs, who believe that
all nations are moving toward
socialism but away from blocs,
aver that "socialism is nobody's
monopoly," and that Moscow's
aliti-Yugoslav campaign damages
only "the Communist camp."
The Yugoslavs do not, how-
ever, take a negative view to-
ward everything in the bloc.
They believe that all socialist
countries are facing common prob-
lems of breaking away from the
methods of state bureaucratism--
Stalin's perversion of Marxism--
"which have continued ... in
other ... people's democracies."
Thus they interpret Khrushchev's
decentralization program as a
positive step, but complain that
the bloc has unjustly labeled
as "'revisionism" Yugoslavia's
solution of tiese same problems.
While Belgrade denies it is
proselyting, its position implies
that the bloc countries should
study Yugoslavia's road for so-
lutions, to their own difficulties.
The Yugoslav leaders are
using the bloc's anti-Yugoslav
campaign and their own "prin-
cipled positions" as a rallying
point to bolster flagging party
unity and enthusiasm. This
tactic has been particularly
evident in recent weeks at party
congresses in the various repub-
lics, where party leaders have
claimed that Yugoslavia's program
"has thrown new coals into the
ideological fire of Marxism which
has been dying since Lenin's
death." This theme probably will
be emphasized further at the four
other congresses scheduled be-
tweeri now and June, as well as
in the various celebrations of
the party's 40th anniversary
which, will take place throughout
the year.
Tito pledged in early March
merely to answer the bloc's at-
tacks "blow for blow," but in
recent weeks Belgrade has fre-
quently been taking the initia-
tive. Yugoslavia took Nasir's
side in his dispute with the
Arab Communist parties, and it
charged Communist China with
causing the Tibetan revolt and
thus causing damage to the
"cause of socialism." Tito him-
self reportedly urged Nehru to
take it strong stand against
Communist China's suppression
of the Tibetan revolt. Belgrade
also criticized Khrushchev's
21st congress thesis on eco-
nonIc competition between the
two "camps" as a call for con-
tinuation of the cold war.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
OPENING OF THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT
The first legislative ses-
sion of the new French Parlia-
ment, which convenes on 28
April, will confront Premier
Debr6 with several major is-
sues--particularly Algeria, eco-
nomic austerity, and the church-
school question. Any of these
could disrupt several parties
and imperil the premier's coal-
ition. President de Gaulle's
threat to dissolve the assembly
if it threatens his program,
however, will probably discour-
age any early move by the dep-
uties to reassert parliament's
traditionally domi-
nant role.
Composition of
the new Senate is
still to be -doter-
mined by elections
scheduled for 26
April, and some re-
grouping of party
alignments in the as-
sembly is already be-
ing discussed. A
number of deputies
will probably shift
affiliation as party
positions on the ma-
jor issues become
clearer.
Although assembly action
on economic matters is limited
both by constitutional restric-
tions and by President de Gaulle's
recent warning that he would dis-
solve Parliament if any serious
efforts to undermine his economic
austerity program are made, the
Socialists are planning a strong
attack. The Popular Republicans
are avowedly uneasy over the
effects of austerity on labor
and the peasants, while numer-
ous vested interests hurt by
the program--such as the
winegrowers--are powerfully
FIGURES ARE TENTATIVE
PENDING FINAL ALIGNMENTS
as sua
a11STS (SF10)
UNION FOR A
NEW REPUBLIC
* "Administrative formations" (for purposes of participation
on assembly committees).
fl) Mostly Radical-Socialists and Democratic Resistance Union.
(2) Mostly conservative Radicals.
(3) Includes Georges Bida,ilt (formerly in MRP) and overseas deputies.
90421 3 23 APRIL 1959
The Algerian is-
sue may be posed early in the
session if the deputies from
Algeria and the Sahara disregard
Debre's warning that his govern-
ment cannot accept a strong res-
olution in favor of integration.
Early returns of the Algerian
municipal elections of 19-26
April are inconclusive, but
whatever the final results,
they will be interpreted by set-
tler representatives and ele-
ments of the army as reinforcing
their contention that the gov-
ernment's failure to adopt in-
tegration endangers France's
ability to retain Algeria.
represented in the Independ-
ent party.
Debr6 may also introduce
proposals designed to settle
the church-school issue, the
traditional left-right political
divider in France. Even though
a majority of the assembly now
appears to favor state aid to
church schools, a government
bill on the subject would auto-
matically alienate many other-
wise conservative Radicals and
drive them and the Socialists
closer to the Communist party.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
BELGIAN POLITICAL CRISIS
King Baudouin last week
took the unusual step of veto-
ing the Belgian cabinet's nom
inee for a new governor general
of the Congo. This move has
undermined the prestige of the
generally progressive Congo min-
ister, Maurice Van Hemelrijk,
and increased the problems of
the Eyskens government in carry-
ing out the policy announced
last January for increasing the
territory's autonomy by definite
stages.
Van Hemelrijk, who has had
the strong personal support of
the prime minister, has been
pressing ahead with the new
Congo policy--at times quite
independently of the cabinet.
Liberals within the coalition
think he is going too far too
fast, while the opposition So-
cialists attack the policy for
not going far enough. His at-
tempt to replace the present
governor general was part of his
effort to strengthen his own
control over the Congo adminis-
tration and expedite implemen-
tation of his program.
Van Hemelrijk's reform
policies have stimulated wide-
spread political interest in
the Congo': the white settler
minority fears for its future
position, while the Africans
expect rapid evolution. If Brus-
sels seems to waver in support
of the new policy or if Hemel-
rijk is eventually forced to
retire, it would convince the
natives that the Belgian Govern-
ment is incapable of living up
to its promises and increase the
danger of African nationalist
disturbances. The first "Afri-
can Political Congress," in
fact, recently called for a Con-
golese government by late 1961.
A government usually re-
signs after a royal veto, but
Eyskens did not do so in this
case, and apparently.'persuaded
Van Hemelrij.k to withdraw his
resignation. The antimonarchist
Liberals and the Socialists,
v
howeer, may stir up further
political controversy among cab-
inet members.
Former governor general and
Conga Minister Petillon, a palace
intimate, Who was "dumped" last
year and who has since been dis-
pleased with Van Hemelrijk's
independent course, evidently
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23 April 1959
persuaded ex-Sing Leopold to. use
his considerable influence on
his son to intervene. Although
constitutional, the royal veto
in this case appears political-
ly dangerous. Hostility toward
the monarchy has been only
slightly below the surface since
1950, when the Socialists and
Liberals forced Leopold to
abdicate because of his
World War II record. They
have remained suspicious
of his influence over
Baudouin.
THE EUROPEAN COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY
A major test of the su-
p?anational powers of the Coal-
teel Community (CSC) may oc-
cur at the meeting of its coun-
cil of government representa-
tives on 4 May. The CSC High
Authority--the executive body
of international civil servants
--is determined to press its
plan for a community-wide solu-
tion to the present coal glut
--a plan which requires major-
ity approval by the council,
including the vote of either
France or West Germany. A de-
feat for the High Authority
would encourage those critics
wishing to revise the CSC
treaty, and possibly reflect
adversely on the EURATOM and
Common Market commissions as
well.
The High Authority's four-
point program would cut commu-
nity production by 3.5 percent,
reduce imports by 45 percent,
freeze stocks of unsold coal at
existing levels, and support
miners' wages during the cur-
rent recession. The High Au-
thority claims that otherwise
member countries will act uni-
laterally, and that further
'mport restrictions not linked
to production quotas would jeop-
ardize the standing of the CSC
in international trading circles.
Critics of the plan contend that
the problems of the coal in-
dustry are largely confined to
Belgium and West Germany, and
that less drastic remedies are
provided for in the treaty.
In recent weeks, however,
opposition to the High Author-
ity':s program has become increas-
ingly nationalist and political.
At the 10-16 April session of
the European Parliamentary As-
sembly, one faction, spearheaded
by the French Gaullists, intro-
duced a resolution which recom-
mended that the High Authority
invoke only those provisions
of the treaty which require unan-
imous consent of the council.
Vigorously opposed by President
Finet, this motion was defeated
at the last minute by the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Social-
ists when it became apparent
to the former that the Gaullists
were attacking the supranation-
al. concept as a whole.
An inkling of what could
happen if the High Authority's
plan were rejected by the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 19,519
ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN COAT.-STEEL COMMUNITY
MEMBER COUNTRIES
LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS WEST GERMANY
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY*
124 members chosen by national
parliaments, later to be popularly
elected.
? Debates annual report of High
Authority, passes advisory
resolutions.
? May censure High Authority by
two-thirds vote and force its
resignation.
CSC HIGH AUTHORITY
8 members chosen by agreement
among the governments, the 9th
member by the High Authority itself.
*Responsible for fulfillment of the
objectives of the treaty.
? Levies taxes, issues decisions and
directives, makes recommen-
dations, imposes fines.
CSC COUNCIL OF MINISTRIES
6 members representing the
member countries.
? Harmonizes High Authority and
government policies.
? Makes decisions by simple or
qualified majority, or unanimously.
? Empowers the High Authority to
act in certain matters.
L
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
51 members, representing
producers, workers, con-
sumers, dealers, chosen by
the Council.
? Advises the High Authority.
COURT OF JUSTICE*
7members chosen by agreement
among the governments.
? Interprets the CSC treaty.
? Hears suits or appeals by member
states or enterprises, may
require redress or indemnity.
*Preforms similar functions in EURATOM and the European Economic Community.
- Selected by -Responsible to
----Gives advice to ----Acts as "watch-dog" over.
council was contained in a speech
during the assembly session by
the French minister of industry.
Referring to recent statements
by Premier Debr6.on the "need
for European unity transcending
national states," he urged that
the CSC treaty be revised to in-
elude escape clauses such as
those in the Common Market treaty
andto give the member states con-
tinuing jurisdiction over im-
ports of non-CSC coal. Such
changes would weaken the CSC.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
RIGHTIST REVOLUTIONARY OUTBREAK IN BOLIVIA
The revolutionary attempt
on 19 April by Bolivia's peren-
nially plotting rightists may
have been prompted by the deep
division of the governing Na-
tionalist Revolutionary Move-
ment (MNR) over the protracted
economic crisis. The rightists
have tried repeatedly to over-
throw the MNR government since
it came to power in 1952. The
19 April attempt, which resulted
in several dozen deaths includ-
ing that of the rightist leader,
appears to have been better or-
ganized than other recent ef-
forts.
The group evidently hoped
to profit from the split with-
in the MNR caused by President
Siles' efforts to carry out the
economic reforms--particularly
in the tin mines--which have
been a prerequisite for further
US aid. About half the armed
miners had refused to accept
the reform decree, and the situ-
ation became more serious on
16 April when government oil
workers--employees of the only
relatively solvent major eco-
nomic enterprise in Bolivia--
also defied the government and
declared a strike.
The rightist threat tended
to reunite the government party.
Oil workers called off their
strike. Militias of factory
workers, progovernment miners,
and the La Paz party organiza-
tion appear to have been the
primary defenders of the govern-
ment, but at least some of the
uniformed forces--whose loyalties
had been considered doubtful--
were also used.
The coup attempt also per-
mitted the government to declare
a state of siege which gives it
powers of summary arrest for a
period of 90 days. Rightist
plotting and leftist defiance
of government decisions had in-
creased notably since the expir-
ation of the last state-of-siege
decree on 19 January.
80 percent of their salaries.
The critical economic sit-
uation, however, is likely to
continue generating tensions
which may be reflected in new
outbreaks of violence. The
Central Bank's foreign-exchange
position shows a deficit of
about $2,800,000, while the
country's export earnings on an
annual basis are not running
substantially above last year's
$65,000,000. Because of the
virtual suspension of US aid dur-
ing the past two months, the
administration since 1 January
has paid public employees only
Nepal's first government
under the constitution proclaimed
in February will soon be formed
by the left-of-center Nepali
Congress party, now greatly
strengthened as a result of
winning a two-thirds majority
in the recently completed parli-
amentary elections. The new
government, guided by the ex-
ample of the Indian Congress
party, is likely to pursue modi-
fied socialist policies internal-
ly and to take a neutralist po-
sition in foreign affairs.
The Nepali Congress has
won 73 out of 108 seats in the
new parliament, with only one
seat remaining undecided. The
countrywide support received
by the Congress--Nepal's oldest,
largest, and best-organized
party--probably resulted from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
its reputation as leader of the
1950-51 rebellion which over-
threw the autocratic Rana re-
gime. The party's chief leader,
B. P. Koirala, will most likely
be called on by King Mahendra
to form a government, although
the King might nominate General
Subarna Shumshere, Congress
leader who headed the 1958-59
interim cabinet.
The parliamentary opposi-
tion will be dominated by the
conservative Gurkha Parishad,
which holds 19 seats. The Com-
munist party was able to secure
only four seats and may concen-
trate its future efforts on in-
filtrating the Nepali Congress
rather than operating independ-
ently.
King Mahendra probably will
find the Congress government,
with, an overwhelming mandate
from the people, more difficult
to control than previous coali-
tion cabinets. Party unity is
likely to be weakened, however,
by internal rivalries and policy
conflicts. Moreover, the King
retains ultimate authority under
the new constitution.
Despite long-standing anti-
Indian sentiment in Nepal, the
new government probably will
maintain a close and cooperative
relationship with New Delhi.
The Indians apparently backed
the Nepali Congress in the elec-
tions. Furthermore, general
reaction in Katmandu to events
in Tibet continues to be highly
critical of Peiping. Reports
of border incursions by Chinese
troops in pursuit of fleeing
refugees are likely to intensify
concern in Nepal over Peiping's
intentions and to increase Kat-
mandu's reliance on Indian Run-
port.
INDIAN CONGRESS PARTY LOSES POPULAR SUPPORT
Prime Minister Nehru's
ruling Congress party apparent-
ly is losing popular support,
despite the major economic ad-
vances India has achieved since
1951 under Congress leadership
of its First and Second Five-
Year Plans. This trend, which
appears in by-elections to the
national Parliament and the
state assemblies, is best illus-
trated by the results of recent
municipal elections in various
parts of the country.
In March and early April,
the Congress party lost control
of Madras city and most large
towns in Madras State,although
the party organization in that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
area is one of the most active
and imaginative in India. Apathy
on the part of the middle and
upper classes apparently was
the major factor which resulted
in large gains by the Dravidian
Progressive Federation, a Hindu
communal party of the lower
classes. This party opposes
domination of South India by
the "Aryan" north, attacks rule
by the Brahmin class, resents
imposition of Hindi as the na-
tional language, and reflects
south-north racial friction.
In Punjab State, in north-
ern India, where the Congress
party had done well in the na-
tional elections of 1957, the
party recently won less than a
third of 391 seats at stake in
municipal elections. During
1958 the Congress lost heavily
to various opposition
groups in municipal
elections throughout
Uttar Pradesh State,
in Rajasthan State,
and. 16 of 18 munici-
palities in the north-
ern part of Bombay
State. The party now
has lost control of
three of the four
largest cities in the
country--New Delhi,
Bombay, and Madras--
and controls the
fourth--Calcutta--by
a bare majority.
Congress party
leaders have been
aware since 1956 of
the need for rejuve-
nating the party or-
ganization and for
restoring grass-roots
contacts. Continued
awareness of the
problem is shown by
the fact that, since
the most recent elec-
tions, party president Indira
Gandhi has postponed a sched-
uled trip to Mexico and declined
an invitation to London. She
reportedly intends to tour In-
dia on an urgent basis, presum-
ably to urge an end to factional-
ism and apathy among party
workers.
Despite the exhortations
of the party leadership, how-
ever, the Congress rank and
file is not yet "running scared."
Neither is it captital.izing po-
litically on the Nehru govern-
ment's major achievements in
economic development. In Madras
State, where the trend toward
the opposition was most recently
illustrated, the Congress party
government has the best record
of any state in the country in
implementing economic develop-
ment plans.
AFGHANISTAN
KASHMIR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1951
President Sukarno's formal
request on 22 April for a re-.
turn to the "1945 constitution,"
which would increase executive
powers and reduce those of parlia-
ment, may meet with obstructive
tactics in the Constituent
Assembly. Sukarno has departed
on a two-month tour of Europe
and Latin America, leaving the
army to act as his watchdog.
If significant assembly opposi-
tion to his plans develops, Su-
karno with army backing may im-
pose the constitution by execu-
tive decree.
Sukarno's?departure has
given rise to new rumors of po-
litical changes and maneuvers
which would take advantage of
his absence. Army Chief of
Staff General Nasution has
stated that although various
groups may attempt action, he
believes the army is sufficient-
ly alert to prevent any develop-
ments. He strongly implied to
American officials that he is
still working closely with Su-
karno and, although continuing
controls on Communist activi-
ties, has no immediate plans
fora decisive move against the
Communists.
Indonesian purchases and
aid programs from the Sino-
Soviet bloc continue. An army
purchasing mission, which has
been shopping in the West and
Yugoslavia since early March,
is believed now in Czecho-
slovakia. Since the mission
probably could not obtain in
the West either the liberal
credit terms or the quantities
of materiel it was instructed to
request, the bulk of its pur- 25X1
chases probably will come from
Yugosla is Czechoslovakia, and
PolaLnd .
An Indonesian mission to
Communist China left for Peiping
on 21 April to discuss utiliza-
tion of $20,000,000 of a $40,000,-
000 credit extended by China
last year. Approximately $11,-
500,000 of the loan has been
spent for textiles, and the
amount now under negotiation has
also been earmarked for the
textile industry. Prime Minister
Djuanda plans to visit the Soviet
Union in late June or early July,
at the invitation of Moscow.
Although this appears to be pri-
marily a courtesy visit, Djuanda
is reported planning to discuss
present and future aid programs.
In Sumatra, the Atjehnese
rebels--a long-standing Moslem
guerrilla group--are being wooed
by both the army and the so-
called Revolutionary Republic of
Indonesia (PRRI), with both
groups claiming to have extracted
promises of cooperation from the
Atjehnese. Complicating the sit-
uation for both the army and the
PRfI is the fact that Atjehnese
leaders are involved in a power 25X1
struggle among themselves which
makes an early decision on over-
all Atjehnese alignment unlikely.
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UViV I IYfT '
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU tY
23 April 1959
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOCIALIST AND SOCIALIST-INCLINED PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA
Socialism has considerable
appeal in Latin America, where
widely supported national par-
ties have made prolabor legisla-
tion and extensive state par-
ticipation in the economy a
major part of their programs.
In five countries, national rev-
olutionary parties have gained
the allegiance of almost all ele-
ments which the Communists seek
to cultivate, and most of them
have acquired a decided anti-
Communist orientation. Only a
few small parties are formally
designated Socialist, however,
and these--unlike their Euro-
pean counterparts--are fre-
quently Communist aligned.
Colorado and Radical Parties
In Uruguay, Argentina, and
Chile, there are important so-
cialist-inclined parties which
had for many years a generally
laissez-faire attitude toward
social and economic questions
and adopted a socialist orienta-
tion only in this century. In
part because of these parties'
historic position, they have
been accepted politically by
the national armies, which have
a conservative bias and tend in
Latin America to be the arbiters
of.the political process.
Uruguay's Colorado party,
which controlled the executive
power for almost a century, is
generally pro-West and anti-
Communist but determinedly "in-
dependent" within this frame-
work. The party advocates
elaborate labor laws, generous
pensions, and government owner-
ship and operation of enter-
prises serving the public. Its
failure to provide for rational
economic development, however,
caused a general deterioration
of the country's finances, and
the party was recently ousted
by its conservative opponents.
The Radical parties in
Argentina and Chile theoret-
ically advocate a socialist
policy but neither on reaching
power has followed a strongly
socialist program. The Chilean
Radical party, the largest
single party in Chile and dom-
inant there from 1938 to 1952,
has advocated evolutionary state
socialism since 1931. These par-
ties draw considerable support
from the middle class, and their
efforts to gain labor strength
have been largely nullified by
extremist groups, especially the
Peronistas in Argentina and the
Communists, who have effective
parties in both countries.
The Radicals--like other
long-established Latin Amer-
ican political parties--have
accepted support from the Com-
munists to win an election, but
as victors have broken with
them and cooperated with the
United States. The Argentine
Radical program, for instance,
has since 1951 stressed nation-
alization of the petroleum and
meat-packing industries and
public utilities, and President
Frondizi accepted Communist elec-
toral support. Since his inau-
guration,however, he has turned
on the Communists and stressed
the need for private enterprise,
increased foreign investment,
and reduced state controls over
the economy.
National Revolutionary Parties
The national revolutionary
parties draw their support mainly
from the lower urban and rural
classes, although most party
leaders come from the middle or
upper classes. They are parties
based in part on a body of prin-
ciples and a program rather than
exclusively on a "cult of lead-
ership" which is often the case
with Latin American political
parties.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
Although they
recognize affinity
with one another,
there-is no common
"party line," other
than that elections
should not be so
fraudulent or the
franchise so limited
as to contradict the
will of the great ma-
jority of the people.
They seek to learn
from each other's ex-
perience, but each
is based on a strong
sense of national
identity and does
not necessarily copy
another's strategy
or tactics. The na-
tional revolutionary
parties, either by
use of force or by
threat of force, have
compelled the army to
accept civilian au-
thority.
Bolivia and Mex-
ico: The Bolivian rev-
olution of 1952 and
the Mexican revolu-
tion beginning in
1910 gave a virtual
monopoly of polit-
ical power to na-
tional revolutionary
parties in these coun-
tries. Unlike the
typical Latin Amer-
ican revolution,
these upheavals al-
tered the way of liv-
ing of all classes in
Revolutionary socialist-inclined parties
Other socialist-inclined parties
Formally Socialist parties
am c. "
7 Lii?,aragua
National Liberation'
Party (PLN)
SOCIALIST AND SOCIALIST-INCLINED
PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA
9`-nttoo
Brazil
the country. In Mexico, civil
war was almost constant for ten
years, while in Bolivia the ac-
tual fighting was over in three
days. In both, however, the
leaders had the same object: to
integrate the largely Indian
rural population into the life
of the nation by giving it land,
education, and the vote.
In both countries, the
single most important economic
enterprise--tin in Bolivia, oil
in Mexico--was expropriated as
politically suspect private
investment. Nationalization
was limited in Bolivia but was
far more inclusive in Mexico.
Both foreign and domestic
private investments have been
encouraged in Mexico, however,
since World War II and have
played a large part in its re-
cent rapid economic progress.
Both regimes have empha-
sized economic development,
although economic expansion
came in Mexico after virtually
all the fundamental social trans-
formation had been accomplished,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
whereas in Bolivia economic de-
velopment activities have been
carried on concurrently with the
work of redistributing the land
and rewriting the country's con-
stitution.
Both the Bolivian and the
Mexican revolutionary parties
initially emphasized the dangers
of rightist subversion far more
than the dangers of Communism.
The leaders of both parties
have recently become alarmed,
however, by the apparent success
of Communist labor leaders in
breaking government party dom-
ination of key labor unions.
Both Bolivian and Mexican party
leaders are as opposed to So-
viet as to any other foreign
intervention in domestic affairs.
Costa Rica, Peru, Venezu-
ela: Costa Rica, Peru, and
Venezuela have national revolu-
tionary parties which play key
roles in these countries but
they have no monopoly of polit-
ical power. The three parties
are friendly to the United
States, although all have crit-
icized alleged US support for
Latin American dictators. The
Peruvian party in its initial
program in 1924 was strongly
opposed to the United States;
this position was reversed dur-
ing the 1930s, in part because
of a common antipathy to the
rise of Nazism in Germany.
Each of the three parties
is hostile to the Communists
and has defeated them for dom-
inant control of organized la-
bor. The Costa Rican and
Peruvian parties have consist-
ently refused to work with the
Communists on any level and the
Costa Rican party fought Commu-
nist-supported forces in the
civil war of 1948. In Venezuela,
students linked with the party
cooperate with Communist stu-
dents, but nevertheless the
election of the party's chief,
Romulo Betancourt, to the pres-
idency last December has pro-
duced a significant stiffening
against the Communists.
The parties believe that
an underdeveloped country
requires substantial state guid-
ance. Their basic concern for
economic development shows it-
self in realistic modifications
of socialist programs. In Peru,
the party has long emphasized
nationalization, but supported
the 1952 petroleum law--which
favors foreign investment--when
conservative landholders op-
posed it for fear it would drive
wages upward.
In Costa Rica, party prom-
ises to gain considerable con-
trol over the United Fruit Com-
pany were modified--after the
party came to power--~to.increas-
ing the government's income
from the company. In Venezuela,
the implementation of the na-
tional revolutionary party's
plans to set up a government-
owned oil company has been
postponed until the economic
drain caused by the government-
owned enterprises set up by the
preceding regime can be min-
imised.
Attitude Toward Communism
The national revolutionary
parties have attracted most of
those who were strongly dissat-
isfied with a semifeudal social
and economic organization in
their countries and who might
otherwise have been attracted
by Communism. Those parties
which achieved a near political
monopoly--as in Bolivia and
Mex:Lco--were so successful in
this, at least until recently,
that Communist parties were very
small, and specifically anti-
Communist activity appeared un-
necessary to the national rev-
olutionary governments.
In Costa Rica, Peru, and
Venezuela, where the parties
have been somewhat less suc-
cessful, certain opponents of
the national revolutionary
parties look on the Communists
as allies. The national revolu-
tionary parties have, consequent-
ly, acquired a strong basic anti-
Comununist orientation through
bitter infighting in such polit-
ical groups as labor and student
organizations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
The similar orientation of
the parties in these three coun-
tries is highlighted by their
cooperation in the Latin American
drive against dictators which
received new impetus with Fidel
Castro's overthrow of Cuba's
Batista on 1 January 1959. Their
anti-Communist slant is indi-
cated by the known concern of
Costa Rican and Venezuelan party
leaders--probably shared by the
Peruvians--over Castro's dem-
agoguery and his support for
pro-Communist groups of anti-
dictator revolutionaries.
Avowed Socialist Parties
In seven Latin American
countries, there are political
parties which are formally
called Socialist and inscribed
as such on national electoral
registers. All are essentially
European in ideological origin,
and two of them are affiliated
with the Socialist Internation-
al. Except for the Chilean and
Ecuadoran parties, they are of
minor political importance.
In both Chile and Ecuador
the Socialist parties, in coali-
tion with other political par-
ties including the Communists,
backed the runner-up in the
last presidential election and
have significant congressional
representation. In both coun-
tries Socialists and Communists
together in recent years have
dominated the country's only
important national labor
SECRET
orgELnization. The small inef-
fective Socialist parties of
Brazil and Peru also tend to be
Communist-aligned in labor, stu-
dent, and political affairs.
In Argentina, the Socialist
party is anti-Communist. It has
no congressional representation
because of peculiarities in the
Argentine electoral system.
Socialist influence is strong
among urban skilled workers,
although the party's former
dominance was reduced by the
Peron regime's dictatorial
labor practices. The Vene-
zuelan Socialist party, which
tends toward anti-Communism,
polled less than 1 percent of
the total vote in the December
195EI elections.
The Uruguayan Socialist
party is badly split on the
issue of cooperation with
Communists in labor; it agrees
in international affairs in ad-
vocaLting a "third-force" posi-
tiort, showing considerable hos-
tility to the United States.
The party tries to attract the
Montevideo working classes, but
a practical program to appeal
to these groups has always been
a monopoly of Uruguay's long-
dominant Colorado party. Here
as in most of the Latin Amer-
ican countries the political
parties which owe their exist-
ence to European political
trends seem likely to give way
before parties able to empha-
size a sense of national iden-
tity.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
CHANGES IN THE USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The USSR Ministry of For-
eign Affairs during Stalin's
latter years was keyed to the
negativism of cold war diplomacy
and was a poor instrument for
influencing nations and making
friends for the Soviet Union.
The process of refurbishing the
diplomatic machinery began al-
most immediately with the dic-
tator's death. A drastic re-
shiiffling of ministerial per-
sonnel was carried out, and a
large number of former party
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
and government careerists from
other departments were assigned
to leading posts within the min-
istry. Efforts were also made
to expand diplomatic relations
with other countries. These
measures have proved generally
successful, and the ministry
has become an effective agency
in extending Soviet 'influence
throughout the world.
Organizational Structure
The headquarters staff of
the ministry consists of 13
USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1 MARCH 1953 15 APRIL 1959
Deputy Minister
Ya. A. Malik
Deputy Minister
G.M.Pushkin
Collegium Member
V.N. Pavlov
Deputy Minister
F.T. Gusev
Lati_; A':i,rica';
Cou-tries
D.A. Zhukov
Collegium Member
F.I. Elaranenkov
Collegian Member
.ecretariat
FUNCTIONAL
DIVISIONS
Press
Yu. P. Frantsev
Treaty & Legal
G.I. Tunkin
Consular
A.P. Vlasov
Economic
A. A. Arutyunyan
T Administrative
I ? I
Personnel
?
2nd European
V.M. Pavlov
4th European
P.F. Strunnikov
Deputy Minister
V.A. Zorin
Deputy Minister
B.F. Podtserob
Collcgium Member
N. T. Fe:'orenko
FOREIGN
MISSIONS
Balkan Countries
V.A. Valkov
Southeast Asia
N.V. Roshchin
28 Embassies
(3 posts vacant)
14 Legations
(3 posts vacant)
High Commission
(Austria)
Political
Representation
(Austria)
Control
Commission
(Germany)
Diplomatic
Mission
(East Germany)
FUNCTIONAL
DIVISIONS
Protocol
Treaty & I
"Finn
Press
M.A. Kharlamov
1st Deputy Minister
V.V. Kuznetsov
Deputy Minister
V.A. 2orin
Deputy Minister
G. M.1usbkin
Collegium Member
M.V. Zimyanin
Collegium Member
A.A. Soldatov
International
Or anizations
Collegium Member
I.I. Tugarinov
Collegium Member
8Tsarapkin
International
Economic.Orgs.
P.M. Chernyshev
American
Countries
A.A. Soldatov
1st European
?
2nd European
N.D.
Belokhvostikov
3rd European
r ---------i
Economic
?
Administrative
?
Personnel
((F.I. Baranenkov?)I
5th European
P.S. Dedushkin
Near East
Countries
,_. x e y
South East Asia
V.I. Likhachev
=Br-ought into ministry since Stalin's death
- -- Presumed to exist
Acting head
SECRET
U iA
G.P. Arka:lyev
1st European
M.G. Sergeyev*
3rd European
M.G. Gribanov*
5th European
P.D. Orlov
Near & Middle
East Countries
S.T. Bazarov
Deputy Minister
N.P. Firyubin
Deputy Minister
Semenov `
4th European
A.I. Gorchakov
Scandinavian
Countries
Middle East
Countries
A+: Pavlov
Far Eastern
M.V. Zimyanin
FOREIGN
MISSIONS
United Nations
A A. Sobolev
53 Embassies
(1 post vacant)
do
19 Ambassadors
4 Legations
(1 post vacant)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
25X11
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
DESK
E
UNITED STATES
MEXICO -Jd='`+Y.'`-~
E
ARGENTINA
-Embassy
-Legation
-High
Commission
Political
Representation
-Control
Commission
-Diplomatic
Mission
0413
GEOGRAPHICAL DESK RESPONSIBILITIES - 15 APRIL 1959
(Countries with which the USSR has diplomatic relations)
SAN ESK( -..,
N1.EARY/
GREAT
BRITAIN
;'
K RESPONSIBILITIES -
GEOGRAPHICAL DES
FIRST
EUROPEAN
DESK
E ARGENTINA
E MEXICO
L URUGUAY
E BELGIUM
E FRANCE
E ITALY
LUXEM-
BOURG
E NETHER-
LANDS
SWITZER-
LAND
SECOND
EUROPEAN
DESK
E AUSTRALIA
E CANADA
E GREAT
BRITAIN
L NEW
ZEALAND
THIRD
EUROPEAN
DESK
H&P AUSTRIA
C&D FASr
GERMANY
geographic divisions or'.desks
with responsibility for specific
groups of countries or inter-
national organizations; several
functional divisions dealing
with such matters as protocol,
legal questions, and press re-
lations; a secretariat; and the
collegium, or directing staff
of the ministry.
The collegium, chaired by
the minister, includes all deputy
ministers and a few of the more
important division chiefs. Over-
all supervisory chores within
the ministry presumably are di-
vided among the deputy ministers,
with the first deputy acting in
a general capacity as the min-
ister's right-hand man.
Specific responsibilities
of the present deputy ministers,
however, cannot be determined.
In fact, the critical importance
1
MARC
H 1953
FOURTH
FIFTH
BALKAN
NEAR AND
SOUTHEAST
FIRST
EUROPEAN
EUROPEAN
DESK
MIDDLE EAST
ASIAN
FAR EASTERN
DESK
DESK
DESK
DESK
DESK
E CZECHO-
L DENMARK
L ALBANIA
E AFGHAN-
E BURMA
E CHINA
SLOVAKIA
E POLAND
L FINLAND
L ICELAND
E NORWAY
E BULGARIA
E GREECE
E HUNGARY
ISTAN
L
EGYPT
L ETHIOPIA
E IRAN
F INDIA
E PAKISTAN
L THAILAND
E MONGOLIA
F NORTH
KOREA
E SWEDEN
E RUMANIA
E YUGO-
L IRAQ
SLAVIA
L LEBANON
L SYRIA
of the Berlin crieis may have
made the usual delegation of
supervisory responsibilities rel-
ativelly.. meaningless. At least
three of the four deputy minis-
ters are probably concentrating
heavily on the German problem.
Both Pushkin and Semenov have
specialized on German affairs
for many years, and Zorin has
been ambassador to Bonn.
The few organizational
changes that have taken place
within the ministry since Sta-
lin's death reflect for the most
part the expansion of Soviet dip-
lomatic interests. The only
net contraction was the merger
of the US and Latin American
desks. A separate division was
created for international econom-
ic organizations; Scandinavian
affairs were separated from Aus-
tro-German affairs; responsibili-
ty for Near East and Middle East
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"~? SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
countries was divided; and there
is a strong possibility that,
with the recent establishment
of diplomatic relations with
Guinea and Ghana, a new African
division has been created.
The Soviet Union now main-
tains 53 embassies, four lega-
tions, and permanent repre-
sentation to the United Nations.
The sharp increase in the num-
ber of foreign missions was the
product of a coordinated cam-
paign, instituted shortly after
Stalin's death, to regularize,
improve, and expand diplomatic
relations. Ambassadors or min-
isters plenipotentiary were ap-
pointed to countries where So-
viet intransigence or strained
relations had left the top diplo-
matic post vacant, and existing
legations were upgraded to em-
bassies wherever possible,
At the present time the
only vacancies in top Soviet
diplomatic posts are in New
Zealand and Australia--a result
of the defection of Vladimir
Petrov in 1954. Relations with
Australia have been re-estab-
lished, however, and the appoint-
ment of an ambassador, probably
to hold both the Australian and
New Zealand posts simultaneously,
may soon be made.
The Soviet Union has almost
abandoned the legation form of
diplomatic representation. Le-
gations are now maintained only
in New Zealand, Uruguay, Yemen,
and Luxemburg, and these would
probably be upgraded to embas-
sies if agreement could be
reached with the countries con-
cerned.
During the past six years
the Soviet Union has added 14
countries to those with which
it exchanges diplomatic repre-
sentation. Most of this expan-
sion has been among the newly
independent countries of Afri-
ca--Libya, Sudan, Morocco,
Guinea, and Ghana--and in South-
east Asia--Indonesia, North
Vietnam, Cambodia, Nepal,and
Ceylon. Very little progress
has been made in Latin America,
where relations are maintained
with only three countries--Ar-
gentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.
Soviet officials reportedly are
expecting diplomatic recognition
from Costa Rica and possibly
several other Central American
republics.
The Ministry in Politics
Basic foreign policy and
the principal tactical moves in
implementing that policy are de-
termined by the party presidium.
The Foreign Ministry is only the
executor of the specific policy
tasks assigned it, although it
presumably has certain advisory
functions as well. The intense
personal interest of all members
of the top party leadership in
foreign relations has served to
keep the ministry under close
scrutiny and helped to isolate
its operating personnel from
factional pressures. Apparently
few, if any, of the ministry's
personnel became embroiled in
the political maneuvers of
either former Foreign Ministers
Molotov and Shepilov.
Unlike his two predeces-
sors, Andrey Gromyko is a
foreign policy technician
rather than a policy maker. He
is not a member of the party
presidium and has apparently
stayed aloof from factional poli-
tics. His role in the formula-
tion of basic foreign policy is
probably limited to technical
advice and information. In this
connection, Gromyko is known
sometimes to attend presidium
meetings.
The average Soviet career
diplomat not only has steered
clear of top party politics, he
has also been generally success-
ful in adapting to the demands
of the regime. Most of the im-
portant career diplomats dis-
placed in the post-Stalin shake-
up and subsequent reassignments
have been appointed to other
posts within the ministry without
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
apparent loss of status. Career
developments, routine reassign-
ment, and the shifting locus of
problems requiring depth of dip-
lomatic experience appear to
be among the most important rea-
sons for these transfers of ca-
reer personnel.
On the other hand, the in-
flux of outsiders into high-level
positions in the ministry which
accompanied, and in some cases
may have precipitated, the trans-
fer of career diplomats, appears
to have involved somewhat dif-
ferent reasons. During the past
six years about 40 former high
party officials and government
administrators have been assigned
to top diplomatic posts over the
heads of career workers in the
ministry. Some of these sub-
sequently left the ministry for
other work, died, or simply
dropped out of sight. The 27
who remain, however, constitute
a sizable bloc of the ministry's
top personnel.
No single explanation cov-
ers all the cases of party or
government careerist turned dip-
lomatic. A few, undoubtedly
victims of high-level inter-
nal power politics or policy
differences, were assigned to
the ministry to get them out of
the way. On the other hand, re-
vitalization of the foreign serv-
ice probably demanded new
bloods
The regime also appears to
have re-evaluated its bloc dip-
lomatic requirements and to have
instituted a policy of assigning
to bloc countries men with party
or government administrative
experience rather than men trained
in the diplomatic service. In
a number of cases the necessity
to exile some party or govern-
ment figure from the arena of
power struggle and policy con-
troversy coincided with a need
within the ministry for someone
with party or government experi-
ence.
Most of the "outsiders", were
assigned to bloc countries or
the headquarters staff of the
ministry. A few, however, have
been assigned to nonbloc coun-
tries, notably Menshikov to
India, to the United States;
Pegov to Iran; and Ryzhov to
Turkey.
Revitalization of the min-
istry has been accompanied by
an enhancement in the prestige
of diplomatic service. To a
certain extent this was a by-
product of the assignment of
high-level party officials to
the ministry, but it has also
been fostered as deliberate pol-
icy by the regime. In Stalin's
time comparatively few Soviet
diplomats were members of top
party bodies. At the time of
his death only eight were so
honored, and of these only
Full Members of the Central Committee
A. Ya. Vyshinsky Minister
Candidate Members of the Central Committee
Ya. A. Malik Deputy Minister
Member of the Collegium and Chief of
the 2nd European Desk
A. S. Panyushkin Ambassador to China
A. A. Gromyko Ambassador to Great Britain
G. N. Zarubin Ambassador to United States
Auditing Commission Members
B. F. Podtserob Deputy Minister
V. S. Semenov Political Advisor to the Chairman of the
Soviet Control Commission in Germany
Full Members of the Central Committee
A. A. Gromyko Minister
V. V. Kuznetsov let Deputy Minister
P. F. Yudin Ambassador to China
I. T. Grishi Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
M. G. Pervukhln Ambassador to East Germany
I. A. Benediktov Ambassador to India
N. M. Pego, Ambassador to Iran
A. M. Puzanov Ambassador to North Korea
Candidate Members of the Central Committee
N. P. FiryuDin Deputy Minister
V. A. Zorin Deputy Minister
Ya. A. Mali ...c Ambassador to Great Britain
Ye. I. Gromov Ambassador to Hungary
A. A. Yepishev Ambassador to Rumania
M. A. Menshikov Ambassador to United States
1. K. Zamchevsky Ambassador to Yugoslavia
Auditing Commission Members
G. M. Pushkin Deputy Minister
V. S. Semenov Deputy Minister
M. V. Zimy inin Member of the Collegium and chief of the
Far East Desk
S. A. Vinogradov Ambassador to France
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 April 1959
Vyshinsky was a full member of
the central committee3 At the
20th party congress in February
1956, six full members were named,
and today 19 enjoy the prestige
of high party rank, eight of
them as full members of the cen-
tral committee,
Personnel Policy
Major personnel assignments
within the ministry are the pre-
rogative, not of the ministry
itself, but of the party, exer-
cised by the foreign departments
in the apparatus of the central
committee. The most important
assignments undoubtedly receive
the direct attention of Khru-
shchev and the party presidium.
The usual procedure is for the
minister to propose a candidate
to the central committee for
consideration. If the candidate
were unacceptable to the party
department concerned, Gromyko
could appeal the decision to the
party presidium. Ambassadors and
ministers plenipotentiary, since
they are legal representatives
of the Soviet state, are formally
appointed by decree of the Su-
preme Soviet Presidium. Decrees
on other top assignments in the
ministry are issued by the Coun-
cil of Ministers.
The Soviet diplomatic serv-
ice has apparently been divided
into two parts--bloc and nonbloc.
Personnel rotate within each
service but seldom go from one
to the other. All top positions
in the bloc service are staffed
by former party and government
officials, and all but two of
these--Molotov, ambassador to
Mongolia, and Yury Prikhodov,
ambassador to Bulgaria--entered
the Foreign Ministry after Sta-
lin's death.
Desk chiefs and in some
cases deputy desk chiefs have
the same rank as foreign mission
chiefs, and it appears to be a
matter of policy to rotate top
personnel from one position to
the other. Soviet career dip-
lomats are generally trained as
area specialists, but an effort
is made to broaden their experi-
ence. During the course of their
careers they may expect assign-
ments in several different
parts of the world interspersed
with varied headquarters respon-
sibilities.
There does not seem to be
any standard length of time for
a. tour of duty for top diplomats.
Appointments terminated during
the past six years ranged from
a few months to nearly nine years.
Ambassador Malik, who has been
in London for six years, is the
diplomat currently the longest
in his post, but six others have
been at their current posts over
five years. Present Soviet pol-
icy, however, seems to call for
somewhat shorter tours than was
the case under Stalin.
Soviet diplomats carry their
ranks with them and collectively
form a pool of talent available
for specific assignments as the
need arises. Quite often a high-
ranking diplomat will be reas-
signed to Moscow and not be inden-
t if :ied for many months or even
several years, only to reappear
subsequently in a new post with
no apparent diminution in sta-
tus, It may be assumed that
their services have been uti-
lized on special commissions, ad
hoc committees, or in other ways
which do not normally receive
press attention. Ambassador Push-
kin, for example, recalled from
East Germany in February 1958
and appointed deputy foreign
minister in March 1959, in the
interim quite likely helped chart
Soviet tactics on Berlin.
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CONFIDENT IA
CONFIDENTIAL.
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