ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO DISSIDENCE IN CAMBODIA'S RATANAKIRI PROVINCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070015-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: July 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Economic and Military Factors Contributing to
Dissidence in Cambodia's Ratanakiri Province
NGA Review Completed.
Secret
ER IM 68-90
July 1968
Copy No. 1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1968
Economic and Military Factors
Contributing to Dissidence
in Cambodia's Ratanakiri Province
Summary
The economic development of Ratanakiri Province
has been spearheaded by the improvement of roads
and the development of the state-owned rubber
plantation at Buong Long. The indigenous highland
tribal groups -- Khmer Loeu -- resent the govern-
ment's intrusion and view the program as a threat
to their domain and their seminomadic existence.
The result has been a number of armed clashes
between Cambodian military units and the local
tribes and a marked increase in the number of army
units stationed in Ratanakiri. The military buildup
apparently is not directly related to the Cambodian
Government's attempts to investigate the use of
Cambodian territory by Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese forces. The Vietnamese Communists are
probably encouraging the unrest, however, in- order
to divert government forces from investigative
activities into their base areas by tying down a
number of army units in anti-insurrection operations.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of National
Estimates and the Office of Current Intelligence.
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Introduction
1. Ratanakiri Province in the northeast corner
of Cambodia has experienced armed rebellion in the
early months of 1968. The Cambodian Government has
been pursuing a program of economic development in
the area, has taken steps to tighten its controls
against smuggling there, and has sent out patrols
to investigate the presence of Vietnamese Communist
troops in the province. The patrols have located
some evidence that foreign forces had bivouacked
in the area, but have reported no contact with Com-
munist forces despite abundant evidence that their
combat forces and support units are in the area.
During the same period, security posts and patrols
have been harassed by attacks by the indigenous
Khmer Loeu and several additional battalions have
been deployed to cope with the situation.
Government Construction and Development Projects
2. Cambodia's legacy from French colonialism
was a largely subsistence economy. The little
economic development undertaken by the French in
Cambodia, such as roads and rubber plantations,
was as an appendage to their administration from
Saigon. Since independence, Cambodia has developed
slowly. The major economic investments have been
made by the central government, most often with
foreign assistance. Development has been concen-
trated in the heavily populated areas of the south-
east -- for example, the construction of port
facilities at Sihanoukville with road and projected
rail connections to Phnom Penh. Economic develop-
ment in the sparsely populated frontier provinces
of the northeast, north, and northwest has been
left largely to the military administration in
these areas. Their work has been focused on the
construction and improvement of roads in conjunc-
tion with the establishment of new army posts and
some civic action programs.
3. The Cambodian Government has been slowly
developing Ratanakiri Province for many years.
Roadbuilding has been given first priority in
order to open up this backward area for coloniza-
tion. Ratanakiri has rice growing areas, and rice
culture is to be expanded along the Tonle (River)
San and the Tonle Srepok. Colonization by ethnic
Cambodians has been slow so far, and has been
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concentrated in the four main towns -- Lomphat,
Buong Long, Virachei, and Andaung Pech* -- which
have a combined population of about 15,000. The
Khmer Loeu, who constitute the bulk of the popula-
tion outside of the towns, are estimated by the
province chief to number about 48,000.
4. Road construction and maintenance accelerated
during the past year in Ratanakiri Province. Some
road projects have been completed, but, since March
1968, most of the remaining work has been curtailed
because of the Khmer Loeu insurgency. The 4th Con-
struction Battalion, assisted by the 11th Battalion
and some local elements, has had the major responsi-
bility for road construction in the province. Much
of the maintenance and construction involves grading
and the application of a laterite surface to improve
the all-weather capabilities of the roads.
5. During the past six months, road improvement
work has been concentrated on National Route 19
from its junction with Route 13, eastward through
Buong Long to Pak Nhai (see Figure 1). Route 19 is
the main artery to the state-owned Preah Sihanouk
rubber plantation at Buong Long (see Figure 2).
The rubber plantation now covers almost 3,000 hec-
tares,** and by 1969 is to be expanded to 4,000 hec-
tares. More than a thousand houses for workers are
scheduled to be constructed in 1968-69, bringing
the total to 1,300 by the end of 1969. The govern-
ment has budgeted 20 million riels*** for the im-
provement of roads serving the plantation and
another 20 million riels for the purchase of land
and equipment and for additional road and water
development within the plantation. The development
of Route 19 eastward from Buong Long will facilitate
* Formal town names are used throughout this
memorandum. In some cases, however, popular varia-
tions enjoy more widespread usage. Some of these
are listed below:
Formal Name
Popular Name
Andaung Pech
Bo Kheo
Buong Long
Labansiek
Virachei
Voeune Sai
Z hectare equals
US $.Z equals 35
2.471
rieZs.
acres.
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F-.g ut e I
Route 19 -- 15.8 mitez east a4 Andaung Pech, neat Pak
Nhai, 1967
Ftigute 2
Pteah Sihanouk Rubbers Hantation neat 13uong Long,
1966
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the movement of defensive units and supplies to
border areas where several new military posts were
being constructed and troop strengths were being
increased.
6. In January 1968 the 4th Battalion was
working on Route 194 between Buong Long and Virachei
and from Lomphat southeast to Takok Phnong in
Mondolkiri Province. The most rapidly implemented
project, however, involved the construction of a
new road, designated Route 1944, extending from
Route 194 just north of Buong Long northward beyond
the Tonle San. Some 30 kilometers of this road
were completed in January, and by late May it had
been extended about 19 kilometers to the northeast
from the Tonle San. Such rapid construction is
unprecedented for Cambodian road projects, which
normally progress only about 8 kilometers per month.
Although this road is being extended from across
the Tonle San to the northeast within a few kilo-
meters of a Vietnamese Communist supply area, there
is no evidence to link Communist interests with its
construction.
7. In addition to the road improvement work,
new military camps and barracks to house additional
troops are under construction at Andaung Pech and
Buong Long. Several security posts apparently are
being constructed or improved at points near
Route 197, northeast of Andaung Pech.
Tribal Dissidence in Ratanakiri Province
8. The Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) has
been faced with armed dissidence by tribal groups
in Ratanakiri Province since early 1968. The dissi-
dents are indigenous highland tribal elements
referred to by the Cambodians as Khmer Loeu.* Many
of these natives practice slash and burn agricul-
ture, which results in exhaustion of the soil in
about three years and necessitates a seminomadic
existence, although within a limited area. Surpluses
from their principal crops -- dry rice, corn, cotton,
and tobacco -- are sold or bartered. The Khmer
Loeu supplement farming with hunting, and some are
reputedly excellent weavers and ironmongers. On
* The Khmer Loeu are essentially the same ethnic
elements referred to by the South Vietnamese as
Montagnards.
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occasion they also are hired as guides or porters,
by Cambodians as well as by the Vietnamese Communists.
9. The Khmer Loeu attacks have been concentrated
around Route 19 from Andaung Pech to Buong Long
and Route 194 from Buong Long to Virachei, with the
greatest incidence of violence in the area of Andaung
Pech* (see Figure 3). Most of the attacks have
apparently been made by groups of 100 men or less.**
F.tgutce 3. "Main SVneet", Andaung Pech
The most frequent targets have been ARK patrols,
although several outposts also have been attacked.
The rebels also have attempted to interdict roads
by burning bridges, establishing numerous road-
blocks, and planting mines. Cambodian. sources
reported that, in some instances, automatic weapons
were employed in addition to rifles, crossbows,
poison arrows, and axes.
10. The trouble stems primarily from RKG efforts
to develop the area economically and strengthen con-
trol over it. The Khmer Loeu, over the years, have
developed a resentment for the superior attitude
that the people of the lowlands traditionally hold
toward them, and view the developmental activities
as incursions into their domain and threats to their
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seminomadic existence and livelihood. To them the
programs for economic development mean increased
government control, possible relocation, and a
decrease in the area available for slash and burn
agriculture and hunting. Their ingrained fears and
resentments probably have been played on by the
Vietnamese Communist forces that maintain base areas
in close proximity to some mountain villages.
Although the Vietnamese generally distrust the
mountain tribesmen and subject them to strict
security controls, they have conducted agitation
and propaganda campaigns among tribes along the
South Vietnam border, and have formed a few armed
irregular units composed of these people.* Incite-
ment of the natives would serve the short-run
objectives of the Vietnamese Communist forces by
necessitating a withdrawal of ARK units from search
and border patrols to combat the insurrectionists.
In the long run, however, such activity could only
strengthen the RKG's resolve to bar the Communists
from Cambodian territory.
The Deployment of Cambodian Troop and Security
Forces in Ratanakiri Province
11. Of seven ARK battalions** based in Ratanakiri
Province as of 15 May 1968, two arrived there in
the first quarter of the year and three had been
transferred to Ratanakiri in the last quarter of
1967.*** Growing unrest among the Khmer Loeu since
* Prince Sihanouk, in a speech at the Royal
Military Academy on 13 June, asserted that some of
the Khmer Loeu rebels were "equipped with machine-
guns and automatic weapons" and were "wearing
classic military uniforms."
** The table of organization for an ARK battalion
calls for about 700 men, although effective strength
is between 350 and 500.
**.* The 23d and 27th infantry battalions were sta-
tioned in Ratanakiri Province prior to mid-1967.
Three additional battalions were sent to the province
in the Last quarter of 1967 -- the newly formed 4th
Construction Battalion, the 11th from Kratie, and
the 24th from the general reserve. In April 1968,
the 29th Battalion was transferred from Military
Region (MR) I to Ratanakiri, and the newly formed
49th Battalion was assigned there in May. In addi-
tion, the 2d Paratroop Battalion was stationed in
the province on a temporary basis during the month
of April, and the 21st Battalion is scheduled to be
transferred there in the near future.
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mid-1967 prompted the bolstering of ARK forces in
the area. Two of the five battalions stationed in
Ratanakiri prior to 1 January 1968 were engaged in
road construction. By early May, construction work
had been curtailed and six of the seven battalions
operating in Ratanakiri were engaged in sweep opera-
tions (see the map, Figure 4). Four battalions,
the llth, 23d, 29th, and 49th, were based in or near
Andaung Pech; the 4th and 24th battalions were
operating out of Buong Long; and the 27th Battalion's
headquarters was in Virachei.
12. Security forces occupied at least 26 posts
in Ratanakiri Province as of 1 May 1968 (see the
map, Figure 5). The principal posts are at Andaung
Pech, Buong Long, Lomphat, and Virachei. Five were
located at various points along the border and most
of the others were situated beside principal road
and water routes. The posts were manned by various
combinations of the ARK, Provincial Guards, Royal
Police, and Municipal Police. The functions of the
various units include law enforcement, maintenance
of border security, and customs control. The uni-
formed military and security forces were supported
by at least seven active units of irregular para-
military forces, called DLDS -- Detachment Liaisons
Defense Surface.*
Vietnamese Communist Base Areas**
13. Vietnamese presence in Ratanakiri Province
has been concentrated for several years in three
base areas that have been designated 609, 701, and
702 (see Figure 4). Base Area 609 extends out of
Laos to encompass the Cambodian triborder area and
portions of South Vietnam. It is served by a net-
work of trails and from Laos by Route 110, which
North Vietnamese troops have extended eastward and
southward through the base area into South Vietnam.
It is an important transshipment point for military
supplies from North Vietnam and rice from Cambodia
h For a list of the Locations, composition, and
strength of the various security forces in Ratanakiri
Province, see Appendix B.
** A base area is an area which contains numerous
semipermanent facilities for bivouacking, storage,
and defense, and which is frequently occupied by
one or more Communist units for sanctuary, resupplying
or regrouping, or any combination of these.
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(via southern Laos) destined for Communist forces
in Kontum Province, and for supplies moving further
into South Vietnam. It also serves as a sanctuary,
command area, and a major way station on the line
of infiltration to the south. The area contains
numerous bivouac areas as well as medical and
storage facilities.
14. Base Area 702 is cradled in the bend of the
Tonle San just north of where Route 19 crosses into
South Vietnam. The river, Route 19, and numerous
trails provide ample lines of communication. It
is used mainly as a staging and bivouac area, but
also serves as another way station on the line of
infiltration, and apparently is used to some extent
for the production and storage of foodstuffs. There
are many prepared areas within the base, the majority
being designed to support bivouacking combat units.
The enemy has made frequent use of the area.
15. Base Area 701 lies almost immediately south
of 702, extending roughly 30 kilometers south from
Route 19, and about 20 kilometers west from the
border with South Vietnam. The area, in the main,
is a storage-support base, containing numerous
storage facilities -- principally for rice and other
foodstuffs -- in addition to a number of bivouac
areas. Base Area 701 also is served by Route 19, a
secondary road running to the south of the area
from Lomphat, and an extensive system of trails.
Several native villages here, as in the other base
areas, apparently have been taken over by Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese forces for billeting and
storage. Enemy activity has been concentrated
around the numerous villages in the northern portion
of the base area.
16. In addition to these base areas, there are
also a number of Vietnamese Communist infiltration
support stations along Cambodia's eastern border in
Ratanakiri Province whose sole purpose is the pro-
vision of supplies, medical care, and shelter to
infiltration groups.
Supplies Obtained by the Vietnamese Communists
in Ratanakiri Province
17. Since the Communists positioned significant
forces in the rice-deficit areas of South Vietnam's
highlands in early 1965, these forces have been
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obtaining foodstuffs and other commodities from and
through Ratanakiri Province. Although the Vietnamese
Communists reportedly receive Cambodian rice under
a quasi-official agreement with the government,
part of the rice requirements for these forces has
been obtained from outlying villages, sometimes by
Communist "taxation." Rice and other supplies have
also been purchased through local officials and
merchants who diverted to the Vietnamese Communists
some of the commodities intended for local distri-
bution. Although the volume of Cambodian goods
reaching Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces via
Ratanakiri Province has not been established, avail-
able evidence indicates that it is substantial.
18. The Cambodian Government has exerted in-
creasing efforts to stop smuggling activities,
including the smuggling of supplies to the Viet-
namese Communists. By the latter half of 1967,
the government's efforts had succeeded in some re-
duction of the flow of Cambodian commodities into
South Vietnam. In Ratanakiri Province, in early
September 1967, government antismuggling investi-
gations implicated several officials, including
the province chief, and all apparently were removed
from office. Continuing investigations resulted
in additional charges of smuggling against lower
level province officials in December 1967. In early
1968 more effective controls, including the estab-
lishment of checkpoints on the roads, continued to
reduce smuggling through Ratanakiri Province although
certainly not stopping it.
19. The government's efforts to reduce smuggling
have had mixed effects on the tribal groups. For
some, the availability of commodities should be
improved, while for others, their income has been
reduced. In any event, the effects were less sig-
nificant in instigating the Khmer Loeu rebellion
than longstanding grievances.
Investigation of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Use of Cambodian Territory
20. If Vietnamese Communist elements have, in
fact, promoted the Khmer Loeu dissidence, it would
indicate the deterioration of a tacit live-and-let-
live understanding which they apparently have had
with local security forces for several years. The
existence of such an understanding is suggested by
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in the vicinity of two of the Communist base areas
any contact with
Vie namese communist units, have 'not until recently
patrolled into the base areas, and apparently have
not hampered the activities of the Vietnamese Com-
munist forces. On the other hand, captured docu-
ments show that Communist units have standing
instructions to be circumspect in their contacts
with Cambodians, and they have, for the most part,
limited their activities to the long-established
remote base areas. The mere fact that Cambodian
security posts have long existed in such close
proximity to areas used by Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese forces strongly suggests a certain
amount of cooperation, or at least mutual restraint.
21. Higher echelons of the Cambodian Government
have become increasingly aware of the extent of
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodian
territory. Knowledge of the situation has antago-
nized Prince Sihanouk, as evidenced by his frequent
public declarations against such activities. On
22 April 1968, for example, Sihanouk claimed to
have "considerable evidence" of Vietnamese Communist
presence among the tribal dissidents.
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