SHIPPING TO CAMBODIA IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070090-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: May 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Shipping to Cambodia in the Second Half of 1966
25X1
Secret
Secret
N9 150
RR IM 67-23
May 1967
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Or,u1cr, I
FOREWORD
The data in this memorandum are preliminary and subject to
modification as additional information becomes available. Significant
changes may occur in data on ship arrivals and cargoes from Com-
munist China and, to a lesser extent, in data on cargoes carried by
ships of the Free World. All data on cargoes carried are expressed
in metric tons; because of rounding, components may not add to the
totals shown. Data on Soviet and Eastern European ship arrivals and
cargoes and on Free World ship arrivals are not likely to be changed
significantly. This memorandum updates CIA/RR EM 66-45, Shipping
to Cambodia in the First Half of 1966, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
As required, changes will be reported in subsequent memoranda. For
the purposes of this memorandum, Yugoslavia is considered to be a
country of the Free World.
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Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
1
I. Cambodian Seaborne Trade . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
3
II. Shipping via the Mekong River to Phnom Penh . . .
3
A. New Shipping Restrictions . . . . . . . . . .
.
3
B. Arrivals and Cargoes . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
5
III. Shipping to Sihanoukville . .v . . . . . . . . . . .
.
6
A. Arrivals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
6
B. Cargoes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
C. Military and Military-Related Cargoes . . . . .
.
8
D. Unidentified Cargoes . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
10
1. International Shipping at Sihanoukville
and Phnom Penh, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . .
.
11
Ship Arrivals and Cargo Discharged at Sihanoukville
and Phnom Penh., by Flag, Second Half of 1966 . .
.
12
3. Cargo Discharged at Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh,
by Country of Loading, Second Half of 1966 . . . .
.
13
Figure 1. International Shipping to Cambodia (map)
(UNCLASSIFIED) frontispiece
Figure 2. Soviet Freighter Millerovo Bound for
Cambodia (photographs) . . . . . . . . . . .9
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International Shipping to Cambodia
---- --- Road
-+--,+- Railroad
?Sihano k
From Singapore
and Europe
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
Tan
Chau
Port Data
River, and until recent years, has beenCambodia's only major port. The
old and poorly developed port facilities are inadequate to serve Cambodia's
present international commercial needs. Draft limitations on the Mekong
Riverprevent shipslargerthan 6, 000deadweighttons (DWT) fromreach-
ing Phnom Penh.
in 1960 to give Cambodia direct access to the sea. Sihanoukville can
accommodate large merchant ships up to 15, 000 DWT. The completion of
two new piers sometime this year should enable Sihanoukville to handle
Overland Transportation Between Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh
Roads - - all cargo traffic between Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh is hauled
by trucks on either of two roads, Route 3 and Route 4, that link the two
cities. Althoughboth roads are well surfaced and all-weather, they have
deteriorated over time because of poor maintenance.
From North Vietnam, Communist China,
104 Hong Kong and Japan l06
VIETINA M
glen
Hoa
SOU
CHI
SE
From
Hong Kong
andJapan
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SHIPPING TO CAMBODIA IN THE SECOND HALF. OF 1966*
Summary
Shipping to Cambodia in the second half of 1966 was marked by slightly
fewer ship arrivals than in the first half of the year, a 26-percent de-
cline in overall seaborne imports, and a sharp increase in seaborne
imports of military cargoes. The decline in imports (which affected
principally POL, cement, asphalt, and pyrites) stemmed from reduced
earnings of foreign exchange in the first half of the year, as a result of
a decline in rice exports. Imports at Sihanoukville declined much more
than those at Phnom Penh despite the costly delays imposed on shipping
to Phnom Penh by the South Vietnamese convoy system, which was in-
stituted in November. More than three -fourths of the cargoes discharged
at Sihanoukville originated in Communist countries, and most of these
cargoes were delivered by Free World ships under Communist charter.
Imports of military cargoes were more than twice as great as in the
first half of the year. Three Soviet and two Chinese Communist military
ships delivered MIG-17 fighters, heavy artillery, small arms and am-
munition, and other military end items to Sihanoukville, in accordance
with military aid agreements. There were no shipments of military car-
goes to Phnom Penh. In addition, large amounts of military-related
cargoes were imported, such as explosives and medicines at Sihanouk-
ville and communications batteries at Phnom Penh. Some of the military-
related goods may have been smuggled to the Viet. Gong from Cambodia.
Most of the ships arriving at Cambodia flew flags of Free World
countries. Communist-flag ships made a regord number of calls but
accounted for only about 20 percent of total ship calls at Sihanoukville.
No Communist-flag ships called at Phnom Penh, nor did any ships with
cargoes loaded at Communist ports.
This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office.
of Research and Reports, and information on ship arrivals was coordi-
nated with the Office of Naval Intelligence; the estimates and conclusions
represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of May
1967. For details on ship arrivals and distribution of cargo, see Tables 1,
2, and 3.
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Cambodia's total seaborne trade in 1966 was considerably less than
in 1965. Although imports rose from 544, 000 tons in 1965 to 575, 000
tons in 1966 (see Table 1), exports declined by almost 40 percent, from
803, 000 tons to 493, 000 tons. Imports, which had grown in 1965 and
the first six months of 1966, fell off to 245, 000 tons in the last half of
the year, compared with 330, 000 tons in the first half. This drop re-
flected a decline in foreign exchange earnings, resulting from poor
rice harvests and reduced exports of rice. Total exports for the year
fell short of the planned goal by about one-third. Ship calls in the last
six months of 1966 fell to 295 from 305 in the first six months, because
exports rebounded from the very low levels of the first half year. The
port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Siam and the port of Phnom Penh
(including nearby subsidiary river ports such as Kompong Cham and
Tonle Bet) on the Mekong River handled about equal shares of Cambodia's
total seaborne trade in 1966, and both were affected by the reduction in
imports and ship calls in the second half of the year.
A. New Shipping Restrictions
More than half of Cambodia's seaborne imports in the second half
of 1966 entered the country via the Mekong River to Phnom Penh. As
in the first half of 1966, no deliveries of military equipment, explosives,
or cargoes loaded at Communist ports were made to Phnom Penh. .ti
Additional restrictions were adopted in late 1966, because of the
growing concern of allied military authorities that some supplies were
being offloaded from Free World ships into Viet Cong sampans along
the Mekong. Since the middle of November 1966, all international
freighters transiting the Mekong River to Phnom Penh have been re-
quired to sail in convoys escorted by South Vietnamese gunboats. Four
round trip convoys a month operate between Cap-Saint Jacques and Tan
Chau (see the map, Figure 1). The South Vietnamese scheduling of the
convoys permits a maximum turnaround period of only 72 hours in
Cambodia.
* In late 1964 and early 1965, the government of South Vietnam intro-
duced several decrees which essentially prohibited the transit of ships
up the Mekong to Cambodia that (1) fly flags of countries not recognizing
the government of South Vietnam, (2) have called at Communist ports, or
,(3) carry weapons, ammunition, or commodities of military significance
without advance permission.
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Except for temporary disruptions in November caused by adjust-
ment to the convoy system, the additional restrictions have had little
effect on the volume of shipping at Phnom Penh. The number of ships
and the volume of cargo arriving at Phnom Penh in December cor-
responded closely to the monthly average for 1966. The most severe
dislocation occurred in the movement of POL. Two tankers missed
the initial convoy in November, and POL reserves in Phnom Penh
became nearly depleted during late November and early December.
To prevent a recurrence of this situation, at least two extra tankers
were permitted to sail in December to Phnom Penh without escort in
order to build up reserves. The oil companies believe that if adequate
reserves are maintained in Phnom Penh, they can meet that city's POL
requirements with the four convoys per month. However, the costly
delays inherent in the convoy system and the fees charged by the South
Vietnamese naval escorts are pushing the freight costs for delivery of
POL to Phnom Penh to more than double their former rates. This
probably will cost Cambodia more than $800, 000 in additional payments
of hard currency in 1967.
Freight costs for dry cargo goods also have increased substantially
because of the convoy system. Some ships en route to Phnom Penh have
been delayed as long as a week while awaiting convoys, and additional
delays have resulted from the slow progress of the convoys and the need to
wait for a return convoy. Because of these delays and escort fees, the
Japanese have levied a $3-per-ton surcharge on dry cargoes carried
by their ships from Japan to Phnom Penh, and other shipping companies
have levied a 20-percent surcharge (also about $3 per ton) on many of
the cargoes from Hong Kong. The increased costs of shipping dry
cargoes to Phnom Penh in 1967 will probably amount to more than
$200, 000. In addition, two Malaysian-flag liners have terminated
their services between Singapore and Phnom Penh.
The convoy system has apparently not caused any significant
diversion of international shipping from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville.
This can be explained by (1) the considerably greater distance from
the ports in Japan and Hong Kong to Sihanoukville, (2). the lac`: of POL
unloading and storage facilities in Sihanoukville, (3) the limitations in
overland transportation from Sihanoukville to the principal markets
in Phnom Penh, and (4) the inability of Sihanoukville to accommodate
much more shipping until additional port facilities now under construc-
tion are completed.
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B. Arrivals and Cargoes
In the second half of 1966, 168 ships called at Phnom Penh, com-
pared with 171 ships in the first half of the year. Imports totaled 134, 000
tons, a decline of 18 percent, compared with the first half of the year,
as shown in the following tabulation:
Thousand Metric Tons I/
Second Half
of 1966
First Half
_ of 1966
POL
94
108.5
Metal products
13
15
Asphalt
5
7
Foodstuffs
3.5
8
Jute
4.5
5
Chemicals
4.5
4
Dry cell batteries
and
radio equipment 1
Other identified cargoes 7.5
14.5
Unidentified
1
1.5
134 163.5
a. Rounded to the nearest 500 tons.
Fifty-eight of the 168 ships that visited Phnom Penh in the last
six months of 1966 were tankers delivering bulk petroleum, and they
accounted for two-thirds of the total volume of cargoes received by
Cambodia via the Mekong River. More than half of the POL deliveries
were made by French. tankers; the remaining deliveries were made by
tankers flying Panamanian, Cambodian, and Japanese flags. Ninety
thousand tons of bulk POL were discharged at Phnom Penh. (some of
which probably was delivered at Tonle Bet) in the second half of 1966,
compared with 105, 000 tons in the first half of the year. Sixty-nine
thousand tons came from Shell storage facilities at Nha Be near Saigon
or at Pulo Bukom in Singapore, and 21, 000 tons from an ESSO storage
facility on the Indonesian island of Bintan. Slightly more than 4, 000
additional tons of POL came in drums.
Of the 110 dry cargo ships calling at Phnom Penh, 41 percent were
of Panamanian and 26 percent of Japanese registry. The other dry
cargo ships consisted of small Cambodian, French, Malaysian, and
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Dutch freighters. All dry cargoes delivered to Phnom Penh were loaded
either at Japan, India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, or Singapore. Japanese-
flag ships, most of which operated liner services from Japan to Phnom
Penh via Hong Kong, carried more than 25, 000 tons, or about: 60- percent of
the total dry cargo imports -- largely metals, chemicals, and machinery.
The imports from Pakistan and India consisted entirely of jute, part of
which was carried in the two shipments made by a Dutch ship, Small
Malaysian, French, Panamanian, and Cambodian liners arriving from
Singapore discharged asphalt and drummed POL. A small amount of
cargo loaded at Hong Kong or Singapore could have originated in Com-
munist countries, but the total volume of such shipments is negligible.
No military cargoes were identified aboard ships discharging at
Phnom Penh, and it is unlikely that such cargoes were discharged clan-
destinely. The information available permits the identification of all
cargoes by carrier and port of loading, and more than 99 percent of all
cargoes by type. Some military-related goods, however, were included
in these shipments. Japan exported 900 tons of dry cell batteries to
Phnom Penh from the first delivery in June to the end of 1966. This
quantity is substantially in excess of Cambodia's annual requirements,
and batteries of this type are widely used in radio communications
equipment employed by the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Of
the 4, 500 tons of chemicals discharged at Phnom Penh, 65 tons were
not identified by type. It is possible, although unlikely because of the
risks of violating Mekong shipping restrictions, that some of these
chemicals included explosives. For example, Japanese exporters,
who normally ship their wares to Phnom Penh, dispatched two ship-
ments of explosive chemicals to Sihanoukville in the last six months
of 1966. In addition, 10 tons of medicines and medical instruments
were shipped to Phnom Penh from Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore,
of which at least one ton may have originated in Communist China.
One hundred and twenty-seven ships called at Sihanouk.ville in the
second half of 1966, a few less than the 134 which called in. the first
half of the year. Because exports recovered from very low levels dur-
ing the first half of the year, shipping activity at this port remained
high despite a 34-percent reduction in imports. Twenty-six of the
arriving ships flew flags of Communist countries, and 101 were from
Free World countrie-s.
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Communist-flag ships hiked their participation in the Sihanoukville
trade from 8 percent of arrivals in 1965 and 16 percent in the first half
of 1966 to more than 20 percent in the second half of 1966. They carried
about 31 percent of the cargoes imported through Sihanoukville in the
second half of the year. Ten were Polish liners, which have been
operating regular liner services to Sihanoukville since early in 1966.
Nine were Soviet ships, which. either discharged military cargo or
carried commercial cargoes to or from North Vietnam, and the remain-
ing seven were Chinese Communist ships. Most of the Chinese Com-
munist ships were in a liner service that is operated between Sihanouk-
ville and South China ports by a Chinese Communist-Cambodian shipping
company established in 1960.
Free World ships under time charter to Communist countries
accounted for 21 of the ship arrivals at Sihanoukville. These included
10 calls made by Greek ships, 5 by Norwegian ships,. 3 by British, and
1 by a Danish ship -- all under charter to Communist China -- and 2
calls by a Maltese-flag ship chartered to North Vietnam. Large French
liners accounted for 42 arrivals and Yugoslav liners for 9. The remain-
ing arrivals included large tramps registered in Western Europe (plus
one from Haiti) arriving to load rice, timber, or rubber; small
liners carrying cargo to and from Singapore; and Japanese ships
with special chemicals that could not be carried on the Mekong River.
With one exception, the ships arriving in Sihanoukville during the
last half of 1966 were dry cargo ships. The exception was the
Panamanian tanker, Cherry Blossom, which was sent in early December
to relieve the severe shortage of fuel oil in Phnom Penh caused by the
new restrictions on Mekong River shipping. This is the first tanker
known to have visited Sihanoukville since the port was opened,
B. Cargoes
Seaborne imports via Sihanoukville in the second half of 1966
totaled 110, 500 tons, almost one-half of which consisted of cement
and coal. Imports declined by 34 percent from the level of the first
half year. Imports of cement, pyrites, and asphalt declined substan-
tially, but imports of military cargoes increased, as shown in the
following tabulation:
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Thousand Metric Tons _a/
Second Half
of 1966
First Half
of 1966
Cement
34
61
Coal
17
1.6
Metal products
8,5
6
Foodstuffs
8
5.5
Chemicals and explosives
2.5
5
Rubber (for transshipment),
pyrites, and asphalt
8
POL
1
Military
1.5
0.5
Other genera]. cargoes
7
6.5
Unidentified
31
58
Total 110.5 166.5
About 73 percent of total imports (81, 000 tons) was loaded in Com-
munist ports -- 52, 000 tons in Communist China and 27, 000 tons in
North Vietnam. All of the coal came from Communist China and more
than 95 percent of the cement came from either Communist China or
North Vietnam. Less than 600 tons of cargo was delivered directly to
Sihanoukville from the USSR, but more than 2, 400 tons of general cargo
of Soviet origin, mostly metal products and chemicals, was transshipped
to Sihanoukville via Asian and African entrepot ports. Some additional
Soviet and Eastern European cargoes may have been transshipped by way
of Western Europe or Yugoslavia.
C. Military and Military-Related Cargoes
Two military shipments from Communist China and three from
the USSR were delivered to Sihanoukville during the second half of 1966.
The largest delivery was made by the Chinese Communist ship You Hao
in October. The shipment consisted of more than 500 tons of the follow-
ing: 76-mm field artillery, 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 14.5-mm machine-
guns, disassembled aircraft, and small arms and ammunition. This
materiel was trucked overland to the Cambodian ordnance depot at Long
Vek. The shipment probably included equipment ordered under the aid
agreement signed by Cambodia in late 1965. In December the Chinese
Communist ship Heping brought about 450 tons of probable small arms
and ammunition to Cambodia provided under the same agreement, as
well. as under a new contract signed for ammunition in October 1966.
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In July and August, Cambodia received its initial deliveries of
military aid under an agreement signed with the USSR in March 1966,
when the Bryanskiy Rabochiy and the Millerovo offloaded six MIG-17's,
MIG spare parts, and some 100-mm antiaircraft guns at Sihanoukville.
(For photographs of the Millerovo, see Figure 2.) Another Soviet
ship, the Polotsk,discharged 192 tons of arms and ammunition in September.
FIGURE 2. SOVIET FREIGHTER MILLEROVO BOUND FOR CAMBODIA
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France was the only other country to ship military cargoes to
Cambodia. In August, 25 Simca 4. 5-ton military trucks were delivered
on the French liner Tanagra. At the end of October, another French
liner, the Tchibanga, discharged 8 tons of small arms and ammunition,
ostensibly hunting equipment, from Switzerland. The French liner
Moonie brought a similar cargo in November, consisting of 60, 000
round-s of . 22-caliber ammunition.
Numerous military-related cargoes were also unloaded at
Sihanoukville. Explosives and other related chemicals probably
were included among the sizable unidentified cargoes arriving from
Communist China.. A French liner discharged 25 tons of dynamite in
November. Also shipped were chemicals which could be used to manu-
facture explosives, such as 46 tons of potassium chlorate, red phos-
phorus, potassium bichromate, and nitric acid unloaded from a Japanese
ship in October; 3 tons of aluminum powder offloaded from a French
liner in August; 4 tons of potassium nitrate delivered from Hong Kong
by a British ship under Chinese Communist charter; and 3 tons of nitric
acid discharged by a Polish liner in September.
More than 75 tons of medicines and pharmaceuticals from the
USSR and over 175 tons of pharmaceuticals from Western Europe were
imported via Sihanoukville in the second half of 1966. Nearly every
cargo arriving from Communist China during the last six months of 1966
also included medicines.
It is unlikely that very much if any of the military equipment
imported from the USSR and China has been transferred to the Viet
Cong. However, it is likely that some military-related cargoes,
such as explosives, chemicals, medicines, and communication equip-
ment, have been smuggled to the Viet Cong.
D. Unidentified Cargoes
About 22 percent of the cargoes on Communist ships and 32 per-
cent of those on Free World ships discharged at Sihanoukville were
unidentified. Most of the unidentified cargoes were general cargoes
loaded in Communist China (12, 000 tons), Western Europe and Yugo-
slavia (10, 000 tons), and the entrepot ports of Singapore, Hong Kong,
and Bangkok (6, 000 tons). The unidentified shipments from Communist
China include some cargoes which are identified by type but for which.
the weights are unknown.
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international Shipping at Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh
1965 and 1966
Cargo
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Port
Ship Arrivals
Discharged
Loaded
Total
1965
1966
1965
1266
1965 1966
196
1966
Sihanoukville
275
261
265
277
490 273
755
550
Phnom Penh
423
339
279
298
313 220
592
518
Total
6-8
600
75
803 493
1,347
1,068
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Ship Arrivals and Cargo Discharged at Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, by Flag
Second Half of 1966
/
Ship Arrivals J
Cargo Discharged
(Metric Tons)
Fl
Sihanoukville
Phnom Penh
Total
Sibanoukville
Phnom Penh
Total
ag
26
i
t
t
0
26
34,661
0
34,661
es
coun
r
Communis
Communist
China
7
7
16,605
16,605
Poland
10
10
1,828
1,828
USSR
9
9
16,228
16,228
Free World
101
168
26,
75,887
134,150 J
210,037
Cambodia
5
30
35
2,950
10,515
13,465
W
Denmark
3
3
l04
104
France
42
42
84
18,221
55,563
73,781+-
Greece
13
13
23,945
23,945
Haiti
1
1
Japan
2
32
34
175
32,068
32,243
Malaysia
10
10
3,605
3,605
Malta
2
2
11,144
11,144
Netherlands
2
2
1,879
1,879
Norway
6
6
5,397
5,397
Panama
4
52
56
786 J
30,520
31,306
Switzerland
1
1
United Kingdom
, 3
10
13
~~
o 074
'/Y-1
4 _ Q7)
Yugoslavia
9
9
4,091
4,081
127
168
7205
ll0 48
134,150 b/ /244,698
a. Including only arrivals of seagoing ships from foreign ports.
b. Including cargo in transit for Laos and POL deliveries to Kompong Cham and Tonle Bet.
c. The entire amount represents a delivery of bulk POL by a Panamanian tanker, the only
delivery of bulk POL to Sihanoukville by any tanker.
? ~ s
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Country of Loading
Cargo Discharged at Sihanoukville
and Phnom Penh, by Country of Loading
Second Half of 1966
Metric Tons
Communist countries
Communist China
North Vietnam
Poland
USSR
Free World
Belgium
France
French Somaliland
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Netherlands
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
South Vietnam
Thailand
West Germany
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia
Unidentified Europe
Unidentified
Total
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Sihanoukville
Phnom Penh
Total
80112
80,912
52,065
52, 065
26,820
26,820
1,475
1,475
552
29,636
134,150 b/
1686
181
181
2,812
2,812
224
224
1,762
10,247
12,009
834
834
477
20,866
21,343
212,
211
175
19,099
19,274
170
170
329
329
3,638
3,638
108
108
6,555
14,455
21,010
1
65,011
65,012
795
795
1,037
1,037
822
822
1,656
1,656
10,001
10,001
2,320
2,320
110 48
1341,50 b/
244,68
a. In most cases the country of loading is the same as
the country of origin. In some cases, however, it is the
country at which the cargo was offloaded for trans-
shipment. In these cases the country of origin is often
unknown.
b. Including cargo in transit for Laos and POL
deliveries to Kompong Cham and Tonle Bet.
- 13 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/15: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070090-6
 Approved For Release 2008/04/15: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070090-6
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/04/15: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070090-6