CIVILIAN CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000600020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 20, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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II. North Vietnam produces virtually none of its
military hardware. It is equipped with Soviet
weapons, or Chinese copies of Soviet weapons.
A. The Soviets have the principal responsi-
bility for supplying the more sophisticated
weapons--the surface-to-air missile system
and most of North Vietnam's aircraft and
helicopters.
1. The Chinese supplied the first regiment
of jet fighters sent to Hanoi when the
bombardment of the North began. These
were the older MIG-15s or 17s. Since
then jet fighters have come from the
Soviet Union, including super-sonic
MIG-21s. 110,
2. The Soviets have supplied abet 65 older
MIGs, and at least ~4.?MIG-21s--possibly
more which are still in shipping crates.
3. The Soviets have supplied the bulk of
4' Io
the 5-;anti-aircraft guns in North
Vietnam.
B. Chinese military aid consists primarily of
small arms and ammunition---along with some
military manpower for logistics, construc-
tion, and engineering, and two to four
anti-aircraft artillery divisions.
N'tIN2 A t n
SECRET
1967
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Ocean Shipping in 1966
[Complete shipping F; cargo
info,'?Foreign Shipping to NVN
in Dec.,1966, ORR IM 67-5]
III. Foreign ocean shipping to North Vietnamese
ports dropped sharply, to 379 arrivals in
1966 compared to 530 in 1965.
A. There was a 71 percent decline in calls
by ships flying Free World flags, attrib-
utable in part to restrictions imposed by
Free World governments as a result of U.S.
diplomatic demarches, and in part to short-
ages of Hanoi's principal exports.
1. Average monthly calls by Free World
flags dropped from 21 in 1965 to about
six a month in 1966.
2. Of the 74 Free World arrivals last year,
50 flew the British flag, 12 had Cypriot
registry, 7 Greek, 4 Maltese, and 1 Italian.
Most of these were under charter by Communist
nations.
3. Most of the British-flag ships in North
Vietnamese trade are under Hong Kong
registry. Some of them are operated or
even owned by Hong Kong shipping firms
known to be controlled by Chinese Commu-
nists.
3
NVN AID
SECRET
19
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JL' UAL' I
B. Soviet port calls rose by more than 50 percent,
from 79 to 122. There were 138 ships under
Chinese Communist flag; 44 from Eastern
Europe--mainly Poland; and one Cuban ship.
Imports and Exports
IV. North Vietnam imported about 1.5 million tons of
cargo in 1966.
A. Slightly more than a million tons came by
sea--and about 90 percent of this came from
Communist countries. Some small arms and
ammunition may have come by sea, and six
helicopters came as deck cargo, but otherwise
sea shipments were commercial. Items like
petroleum products and vehicles, of course,
contribute to the military effort.
1. Major bulk deliveries were 220,000 tons of
fertilizer, 200,000 tons of P.O.L., and
90,000 tons of foodstuffs and timber.
2. The remaining 570,000 tons consisted of
coal for Vietnamese steel production,
metal products, machinery, and transportation
and construction equipment.
B. About 115,000 tons of the seaborne shipments
originated in Free World countries.
4
NVN AID
SECRET
1 3 FEB 1967
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,NE (.,'KL' E, I'
1. Japan led with about 50,000 tons, more
than one-third fertilizer. The rest
was mainly metal products for con-
struction, and miscellaneous manufac-
tured goods.
2. Cambodian foodstuffs and French metal
products, fertilizer, and spare parts
for vehicles accounted for most of the
remaining shipments of Free World
origin.
C. All of the 420,000 tons that came in by rail
probably originated in Communist countries.
1. Soviet transshipments across China--
about 60,000 tons last year--probably
consisted almost entirely of military
equipment.
2. Chinese rail shipments of about 360,000 tons
included large quantities of coal, as well as
other economic aid and military shipments.
3. For the past two years the Soviets have been
flying in air cargo at a rate of about one
transport aircraft every two weeks. These
probably carry critical spare parts and
other high-priority small items.
5
NVN Am
SECRET
1. a FF R 1967
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D. Seaborne exports from North Vietnam were
down sharply in 1966.
1. The principal export, coal, fell off
about 20 percent in 1966, to a little
more than 900,000 tons. More than half
went to China; about 350,000 tons to
Japan, and 60,000 tons to West Europe.
2. Apatite ore, normally the second biggest
export, was down to a mere 10,000 tons,
because of the disruption of rail
transport from northwestern North
Vietnam to the ports.
3. Total exports by sea dropped from
1,700,000 tons in 1965 to 1,150,000
tons in 1966.
(Re import and export of coal: DRV imports soft coal
for steel mill, exports hard coal.)
6
NVN A1D
SECRET FEB 1967 25X1
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a ULBRIGH BRIZ IN7. NOTES
1 . SIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM
e attached #1, relevant charts from D,/RR briefing
notes, plus a new statement on the role of UK flag
ships.)
Related questions: (a) What strategic goods are being
shipped into DRY? See chart SA in-
cluded in above briefing notes. It
contains a complete breakdown of all
cargoes delivered by sea, both bloc
and free world.
(b) Estimate relative proportion o
deliveries to DRY by ship and by rail.
overland deliveries (almost all by
fail) are estimated to have totaled
310,008 tons in 1965. Overland do-
liveries accounted for one-third and
ass shipment two-thirds of all deliver-
ies. About 160,000 tons of Coal era
delivered by rail, and military ship-
ments (all arriving by land) are esti-
mated at about 100,000 tons last year,
including SAKs, AA, FA, tanks, amno and
area. (This data from the It study
ring prepared for Secretary McNamara)
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(c) What aid is USSR providing
Military aid is believed to have
totaled about $150 million in 1965.
The USSR provided about forty jet air-
craft (more than 30 MW fighters and
jet light bombers), equipment for some
15-20 SAN sites, artillery, radar and
several thousand trucks. About three-
fourths of the estimated 10100 million
in bloc economic aid was extended by the
$SR. Moscow is continuing economic
development projects under its long-term
aid (see tables appended, attachment #2)
but aid extended in 1965 probably cove:
materials and equipment related to the
war--the restoration and maintenance
transport, power and, construction efforts.
AN-12 25X1
transports have flown to DS.V from USSR
since the outbreak of hostilities last
year. No cargo details are available,
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but their total cargo capacity is limited
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2. HOW MANY RUSSIANS ARE IN 1)IRV AND WHAT ARE THEY DOING?
In addition to the estimated 1.500 Soviet military tech-
nicians in 1V,
800 Soviet civilian personnel are
estimated there working on a variety of economic programs.
ESTIMATE OF US DOLLAR AID TO SYN THAT WINDS UP IN FRENCH
HANDS. HOT MANY DOLLARS 83" TO 8VN WIND UP IN SWISS AND
FRENCH HANKS?
an eligible source of procurement for US
aid commodities supplied to South Vietnam, and trade
between the two countries is small--about $30 million in
1985. France has a small unfavorable balance of trade with
South Vietnam, but probably more than covers this by legal
capital repatriation from French investments. This trade
and capital repatriation is financed by the GVN from its
wn foreign exchange and does not involve AID financing.
d co ities can, of course, be purchased by French
Lonals in South Vietnam.
)roba.bly the greatest source of US dollars going to French
or Swiss banks are dollars exchanged by US personnel on the
black market. These dollars are then used for illegal
capital flight and for illegal gold or smuggling transactions.
The destination of these funds cannot be determined, but
parently include France, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore,
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10. WHAT PROPORTIONS OF SUPPLIES SENT TO VC ARE INFILTRATED
BY SEA AND BY LAND RESPECTIVELY?
Only a small trickle of supplies appear to be arriving
from sea. Overland deliveries, the great majority through
little through Cambodia, account for most of
the supplies reaching the YC.
i6. WHAT PERCENTAGE of S Ti Vi ETNAME IMPORTS END UP IN
THE HANDS OF THE VI BT CONG?
Viet Cong needs for imported commodities is probably
very small in comparison to South Vietnam `s total imports
of about $300 million in 1965. VC needs probably do not
exceed I to 2 percent of these Imports, and it is doubtful
that they acquire more than this. it consists of such
commodities as pharmaceuticals, petroleim products, im-
rted foodstuffs, and such machinery as sewing machines,
printing presses, and lathes. The VC acquire these goods
by seizure, taxation in kind (during transport), or dis-
creet ourchase.
Pir
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TOP SECRET
The Rolling Thunder Program
Number
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ECONOMIC DAMAGE
1965
36.2
1966
93.3
1967
Jan- May
53.4
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture,
Fishing
Exports)
9.4
11.2
POWER-
PLANTS
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture, Fishing
& Exports)
36.9
POWER-
PLANTS
6.3
EQUIPMENT
5.9
-PETROLEUM 1.6
-MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 1.2
29.8
PETROLEUM
5.6
-RAILROAD YARDS 1.2
MARITIME PORTS 0.8
Figure 1 . Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966,
and January - May 1967
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MILITARY DAMAGE
1965
32.5
1966
19.1
1967
Jan-May
31.0
BARRACKS
2.5
AIRCRAFT
8.0
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam by Sector 1965, 1966,
and January - May 1967
CRAFT
2.0 ,
AMMO
DEPOTS
4.5
SITES
1.9
COMMO SITES 1.8
NAVAL -AMMO DEPOTS 0.2
CRAFT SUPPLY DEPOTS 1.0
1.8
MISCELLANEOUS
ARMED RECCE
\SITES DAR ad
OMMO SITES 1.0
--NAVAL BASES 0.4
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X
p 1000
SORTIES FLOWN
1965 100*
SOUTH VIETNAM
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M
1965 1966 1967
Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1965, 1966, and First Five Months 1967
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Figure 4. Index of Ordnance Delivered in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in
Each Area, 1966 and First Five Months 1967
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THE LAOS PANHANDLE
Vinh T
~Khong Sedone
Ban Lang
Khang
Ban Xam
Kang
Road
Bypass road
Pakse
Figure 5
Servireable road during
1967 dry season
New service facility observed
along road Jan-May 1961
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EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING JCS TARGETED BRIDGES
IN NORTH VIETNAM - FEB. 1965-JAN. 67
BRIDGES
0 20 40 60 80 100
I I I I I
JCS TARGETED BRIDGES
JCS BRIDGES BOMBED
BYPASSES BUILT TO JCS BRIDGES
BOMBS
0 100 200 300 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 11,000 12,000
BOMBS DROPPED
HITS ON BRIDGES
COSTS (Million Dollars)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
EST. COST OF US PLANES LOST
Figure 7. Effectiveness of Bombing .JCS Targeted Bridges in North Vietnam
February 1965 - January 1967
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Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
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TOP SECRET
16 January 1967
J= s r.' ira Casualties in North Yictuam
Jauury I net gitb the CIA E'ubcomittee
of the Senate to, present one of +aur regular briof ings
on current . n .ttc of intelli ?-uce interacto to you
Senator K sell invited B n.atore Mantioxd,
i`ulbright, and I1ichenlooper to attend this aesnjen,
in my rroeentation, I dwid not dues bombing
in north Yiott, b'st en this eubjeet, was rata.d in
the questioning, I sae ke from the paper attached as
Tab A. This paper is a gist of t e conclusions reached.
Jointly by CU and the Defense Intelligence , tacy in
the latest of a ries rf monthly asses ents of the
bombing prepared for Secretary UeNamara.
3. Further ejuoat o s from the Senators attendi
led to the a abjoct of r...lvilian casualties from bombing
in the North. To rc- Vond to these questions,, is used
Cr Ro: a
t
iJ ar s:rd y.~ec~
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0
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FOP SECRET
104i at rm.-m-1 sit i03 Proftead.
Sequent of $wwmtar7 i c"- art's. to
Ind g3, La " o o ued, s m r E
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to t drt1t**, if re .r, d otbov ear 1ste
mmetirittee. It. zoom t#cuft adds to about c
njure2
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~QP R~CRET
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OC2: 16 Jan 67)
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.J n'Uttr,1
1. The cumulative effects of the air raids on
North Vietnam continue to limit the capability of
the North Vietnamese forces for overt aggression,
but they have not reduced the ability to support
military activity in South Vietnam and Laos, either
at present or increased levels of combat and manpower.
2. The bombings appear to be having some dele-
terious effect on public morale. We have reports of
consumer shortages, and the extensive evacuation of
civilian personnel has caused some economic difficul-
ties. There is no good evidence, however, that the
leadership's resolve to continue the war has been
weakened.
3. The bombings have forced the diversion of
major resources and work forces to repair damage.
North Vietnam has been denied the use of :Larger
coastal carriers, and is severely limited in the use
of established port facilities. Measurable losses
to the economy and military establishment are esti-
mated at $184 million.
4. On the other hand, POL supplies have not
dropped below 60-day levels since September 1, and
attacks on rail, highway and waterway transportation
have reduced efficiency but have not stopped move-
ment. Energetic construction of.replacement and al-
ternate bridges have rail capabilities at their high-
est level since the bombing stand-down a year ago.
8E cRET
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"1 UY S.F:UKFJ' I
CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM THE BOMBING OF
NORTH VIETNAM
I. Total Casualties
1. The cumulative killed and injured attributable
to the bombing of North Vietnam, estimated
through September 1966, total about 29,000,
of which 18,000 are believed to be logistics
workers and other civilian personnel. Some
13,200 of the total casualties occurred in
1965, of which 6,000 were in the "civilian"
category. During the first nine months of
1966 we estimate total casualties of 15,700
of which about 11,900 were civilians. (See
Table I). On the basis of sample data through
September 1966 the total casualties in 1966
are estimated to have been about 40 percent
killed and 60 percent injured. This division
is based on averages derived from the sample
cases for which we have hard evidence.
2. The composition of the casualties resulting
from the 1966 air campaign differs notably
from that in 1965. Over 75 percent of the
casualties in 1966 were logistics workers
and other civilians, compared with 45 percent
in 1965. Armed reconnaissance against mili-
tary supply routes, which accounted for only
52 percent of the casualties in 1965 accounted
for an estimated 93 percent of the total in
1966.
3. The increase in casualties during 1966 is a
function of the growing scale of the air
campaign, the greater emphasis on armed re-
connaissance against lines of communications
and the selection of a few fixed targets
located in more heavily populated areas.
Despite the increase in casualties, however,
the number per mission has remained about
stable.
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4. The preponderance of civilian casualties
resulting from the acceleration of armed
reconnaissance has in large measure in-
volved those civilians working at military
targets or directly engaged in the mainte-
nance and operation of the logistics system
which moves supplies and personnel into Laos
and South Vietnam. Hence, it is heavily
weighted with transport repair crews, truck
drivers, and personnel operating logistic
craft on the rivers. The bombing campaign
has generally been quite selective. The
few official North Vietnamese statements
protesting the extent of civilian casualties,
while vigorously presented, actually cite
very small numbers of personnel. The May
1966 North Vietnamese letter to the Interna-
tional Red Cross claimed only 239 civilian casu-
alties since 31 January 1966, although implying
many more. The Education Ministry in October
1966 stated that 300 students and 30 teachers
had been killed since the bombings began.
The well-publicized propaganda statement on
the attacks against Nam Dinh, where heavy
casualties would be expected, indicated that
37 percent of total casualties were innocent
victims of the war--women, children and the
aged. One would expect this propaganda
statement. to make the maximum claim possible.
Even if the specific casualty claims for Nam
Dinh were accurate, this percentage would not
seem unduly high. Nam Dinh is a heavily de-
fended population center subjected to heavy
attacks and with many of its military targets
located in densely populated areas. It is
hardly a typical case, and this percentage
should probably be regarded as the upper limit
for casualties sustained by so-called innocent
victims.
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1 V 1 U? L V 1\ ? -L 1
Casualties Resulting from the Bombing of North Vietnam
1965
January-
September 1966
Total
_
_
T,7-00
1-1,900
r7
,9
00
Attacks on fixed targ
ets 2,000
700
2,700
Attacks on armed reco
n-
naissance missions
4,000
11,200
15,200
Military
7,200
3,800
11,000
Attacks on fixed targets 4,300
400
4,700
Attacks on armed recon-
naissance missions 2,900
3,400
6,300
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EVIDENCE OF THE GENERAL ACCURACY OF US AIR STRIKES ON
NORTH VIETNAM
1. Post-strike photography provides good evi-
dence that US air strikes have generally been ac-
curate. There have been some occasions when ord-
nance was off target as a result of aircraft being
hit and misfiring or because of some other accident,
but the evidence indicates that such mishaps are in-
frequent. Eyewitness reports on the accuracy of US
air strikes on North Vietnam are hard to come by be-
cause of the relatively few impartial observers in
North Vietnam. The foreign diplomatic community is
restricted to the Hanoi area, with the exception
of an occasional trip to Haiphong
and Hanoi is careful to allow extensive travel only
to those foreigners it believes will swallow the of-
ficial propaganda line.
2. Despite these limitations, there have been
some first-hand reports on the accuracy of the bomb-
ings in the Hanoi-Haiphong area
These reports have provided
evidence of the generally precise nature of the air
strikes as well as information indicating that ci-
vilian casualties from these air strikes have been
low.
He has stated
that US pilots `were very courageous in pressing
home their attacks and in "not unloading their bombs
on civilians by design."
nam have volunteered similar observations.
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015Vd%_L' I
that "Haiphong and its suburbs
have been attacked a dozen times since June, but
there is no sign of damage in the city center."
epot reported that the foreign community in North
Vietnam regarded that strike as "a technical master-
piece." He noted that "no civilian areas were
touched."
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the strike on the Gia Lam petroleum
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