CINPAC/MACV DISSENT TO THE CIA ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000100020003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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CINCPAC4'IACV DISSENT
TO THE. CIA ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS
SOUTH VIETNAM
This document represents the views of the' delegations
of.J-2 CINCPAC and J-2 MACV. While the position was approved
in general, all details have not been accepted and are subject
to command approval.
PACOM review(s) completed.
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CINCPAC/1'IACV DISSENT
TO CIA OB ANALYSIS, SVN
1 (S/NFD) CINCPAC and MACV do not concur in the CIA analy-
sis of enemy strength in South Vietnam. CIA's presentation
portrays, in effect, an enemy force of a half-million or
more -- about twice the size previously estimated by USIB.
The presentation exaggerates the threat conceptually as well
as numerically.
2. (S/NFD) The attempts to affix numbers to specific ele-
ments of the.broad.base of willing and unwilling popular
support of the enemy in SVN, or even to quantify that base
in total, are fruitless and very misleading. On the one
hand, harmless individuals are added to the hostile elements,
exaggerating the threat;. on the other hand the true size of
the very-large population base still subject to enemy exploita-
V1
tio -1
attacks on 17-18 February was rather feeble.* An enemy document
captured in May '19,167 states that the total enemy., strength in
SVN (probably in mid-1966) was 285,000. MACV's.retroactive
reasonably accurate and a more valid estimate than the CIA
analysis. We note that the CIA analysis is essentially
the same as that presented and rejected prior to the pub-
lication of the SNIE, with the exception of new minor dif-
ferences with MACV concerning details of enemy order of
.battle. We believe that evidence acquired since publica-
tion of SNIE 14-3-67 attests to its general validity. In
particular, we believe that enemy behavior during and after
Tet offensive argues strongly against the general magnitude
of strength. indicated by the CIA analysis. We know that
administrative personnel, political infrastructure., con-
valescents from VC hospitals, and even innocent bystanders
werethrown into the Tet attacks. This suggests that VC
manpower reserves were limited, i.e., not available in the
large numbers indicated in the CIA view. Further, enemy,
forces were under the heaviest pressure to continue attacks __
after Tet, but were unable to do so -- a second wave of
s grossly understated;
.. 3. (S/NFD) We believe that the description of the enemy
strength in late 1967 contained in SNIE 14-3-67 was
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adjustment of strengths based on the SNIE 14-3-67
figures gives 286,300 for about the same period. We
have strong evidence that North Vietnam is hurrying
large numbers of personnel to the south to replace Tet
losses. We believe that all the evidence above indicates
that the previously agreed estimate of enemy personnel
strength was probably about right, and argues strongly
against the proposition that there are a half-million
or more militarily important personnel now available
to the enemy in SVN.
. (S/NFD) We believe that the CIA analysis relies
much too heavily upon extrapolation from enemy documents,
most of which are neither current nor complete. MACV
figures are based in part on documentary evidence and
extrapolations therefrom, but where possible also upon
reports from US and Allied officers in the provinces
and districts of SVN. This basic difference in approach
to available evidence is fundamental to the'differences
of analyst opinion as to enemy strengths.
5. (S/NTFD) We believe that the field reports are unduly
denigrated in the CIA approach. The MACV order of battle
figures are essentially the sum of numerous small estimates
of enemy strength in each of the units, districts and
provinces of SVN. As such they almost certainly contain
errors, but in the aggregate constitute the basis for
the best estimate available for US planners and policy
makers. Recognition of possible margins of error in
the MACV estimates was the basis of the September 1967
agreements in Saigon to range figures upward toward the
CIA views. However, we believe now as we did then that
'MACV estimates are not likely to contain errors of the
6. (S/NFD) We believe that enemy strength including
political cadres in SVN as of October. 1967 was about
300,000-335,000 as indicated in SNIE 14-3-67. Since then
the enemy launched his Winter/Spring Campaign to include
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magnitude implied- by. -the-- -IA--an.a1ysia__-_-
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the Tet offensive which has been enormously costly to
him in casualties. During the same time period he also
launched a campaign to impress or recruit large numbers
of. South Vietnamese especially young teen-age boys and
women.. The enemy also infiltrated two additional divisions
and a separate regiment during the period. We are especially
uncertain as to the results of the enemy's recruitment
drive. This tends to increase our range of uncertainty
in strength figures. However, we estimate with reason-
able confidence that enemy strength is now somewhere in,
the range of 278,000-328,000 men (including political
cadres).
7. (SS/NFD) The following is our position on the strength
of various components of enemy strengths:
a. COMBAT FORCES (Maneuver and Combat Support).
(Commmpist "Main and Local Forces" in CIA order of battle).
The C analysis attacks MA CV order of battle on the follow-
ing three bases: (1) MACV collateral Order of B ttle does
not consider enemy units 25X1.
(2) MACV OB omits large numbers of small units
subordinate to echelons above village level; and (3) cer-
tain MACV?accounting procedures tend to minimize the number
of soldiers carried in units held in OB. The total of all
.these, CIA holds, would add as much as one-third to the MACV-
held enemy combat forces.
(1) We accepted the obviously true contention that
MACV's OB does not contain enemy units 25X1
However, it should be-noted that normally i.s
has little effect on total enemy personnel strengths. CIA
has built its case based mainly on the one obvious exception
.-- the entry of the 3024th and 320th NVA Divisions into SVN
in January 1968. evidence of the presence of these
units-iri SVN was not available until February 1968.- Never-
theless, to arrive at the CINCPAC/MACV current estimate for
-this. category of enemy strength, every additional unit sug-
gested by other conference participants was 25X1
accepted for strength accounting. At the conclusion o the
conference, all participating agencies agreed with the CINCPAC/
MACV holdings of enemy combat units.
(2) CIA contended that, in addition to the agreed
enemy combat units referred to in the preceding paragraph,
thepe are an additional 10-11,000 combat personnel not carried
25X1
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in MACV OB. This contention was based on a review of 1966
and 1967 documents all of which have been available to and
considered by MACV analysts. CIA analysts have interpreted
certain of these documents to imply that many sapper, engi-
neer, special action, and intelligence/reconnaissance cells,
squads, and platoons exist on a country-wide basis and are
not carried in MACV OB. It is interesting to note that the
CIA analysts had interpreted documents pertaining to only 33
of the 225 VC districts and then had extrapolated the figures
thus arrived at to give them their 4,000 additional persons.
The same methodology was employed to arrive at the CIA esti-
mate of 2,000 to 3,000 persons in specialized units at VC
Province level. MA CV analysts maintain that the majority of
these small specialized units are, in fact, presently carried
in MACV OB holdings. Some of these special units are actually
a part of an existing local force battalion, company, or pla-.
toon with its own unique designation. Others are directly
subordinate to a district or province. committee and are
carried in that area's administrative services strength.
CIA further contends that "all significant urban areas main-
tain city units -- although only two city units are identified
in MACV OB." CIA analysts again extrapolate this belief
country-wide and arrive at the estimate that there are an
additional 3,000 enemy personnel not carried in MA CV OB.
MACV contends that there is no evidence to indicate the
presence of a city unit in each and every province capital.
Further, if CIA analysts had studied MACV OB holdings they
-would have discovered that several enemy local force companies
with a numerical designation are., in fact, city units. Some
examples are the 480th LF Co (AKA Phan Thiet City Unit), C165
Co (AKA C Mau City Company) and, the C207 Co (AKA My Tho City
Company). Additionally, MACV holds indications that some so-
called city units are in reality political/military administra-
tions and control-type elements and are carried 'within the
political infrastructure figures. One example of this is
.the Da Nang City Agency which controls the 402d Sapper Bn.
(3) The CIA order of battle analysis further con-
tends that there are an additional 11,000 to 16,000 enemy*
-personnel that are missing from MACV OB totals because. of
faulty MACV accounting procedures. Six thousand of these
are attributed to the belief that MACV probably carries
enemy units at "on board" strength rather than at "assigned"
strength. An additional 5,000 to 10,000 personnel are at-
tributed by CIA to "unlisted service support personnel prob-
ably integral to divisions." The CIA analysis asserts that
every enemy division in SVN must have a certain number of in-
tegral support units. After making this assumption, another
mathematical extrapolation is used to arrive at the CIA '
figure. Evidence available to MACV indicates that no similarity
or standard TO/E can be applied to every division. A good
25 1
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example of this can be drawn from the 3011-th and 320th
Divisions which entered SVN at the same time and place.
The support elements organic to these divisions vary widely.
In other cases, hard intelligence shows that some divisions
have only company-size support units where other divisions
are supported by battalion-size units. MA CV feels that
allied forces in SVN have had sufficient contact with all
enemy divisions to have established division headquarters
holdings far more valid than could be reached by mathematical
extrapolation.
b. Administrative Service Forces: We believe that the
description and strength estimate of this category as stated
in paragraphs 26 and 27 of SNIE 14.3-67 was based on the
best evidence available. There has been some attrition to
this category of enemy strength since the publication of
the SNIE. We now estimate that there are 30,000 to 40,000
for the CIA analysis exists which if included in their sampling
ld si nificantl lower the ratio Further the small sample
enemy forces in the DMZ and the Western Highlands. The CIA
view holds that VC/NVA administrative service personnel are
present in SVN on a one-to-one ratio to infantry troops.
This idea is based on a small sample of documents which we
believe to be incomplete and outdated. For example only
five documents, covering a small geographical area, are
used by CIA to support the 1:1 ratio (infantry to admin/
.sere) at province level, none dated later than December 1966.
More documents are used to argue the 1:1 ratio at district,-
but only six of these documents are of 1967 vintage. These
would indicate'a lesser ratio of administrative services to
combat forces, i.e., about one to 0.8 (infantry to admin/
serv). If the documentary evidence since mid-67' were applied
the ratio would be 1:05. Later documentation than that used
.25X1I
administrative service personnel in SVNN. We,agree that
there are some administrative service personnel not counted
in this figure outside the boundaries. of SVN who support
wou g J 0 .1 1
._do-c ment-s __us-ed.._in the_C A _ar_a_l a1s_._:L_s Pertinent almost--ems-- _.----
c. Guerrillas
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. elusively to III and IV CTZs. Because of obvious differences
between enemy forces in. these and the northern two CTZs We.
do not accept the view that any ratio is applicable country-
wide. We do not believe that there is any standard ratio
of administrative personnel applicable throughout the enemy
force structure.
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I
25X1
25X1
(2) MACV's determination of guerrilla .streng s
based on a study of captured documents and interrogation
reports both at the grass root level where they are used in
the preparation of the RITZ reports, and also by MACV analysts
who verify and utilize these reports. Each district is
treated separately and not extrapolated from other areas.
A third element in the system which serves as a check is.thej
derived guerrilla. figure which results from the application
of recruitment and attrition estimates to previous figures.
We remain convinced that the MACV utilization of these
methodologies to estimate guerrilla strength provides cross
checks not used in the CIA extrapolations and results in
more valid figures.
(3) We believe that the estimate of guerrilla strength
contained in paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of SNIE 14+.3-67 was
essentially accurate. Documentary evidence and .field reports
since that time show a definite further drawdown of this
category of enemy strength, through both direct battlefield
attrition and the upgrading of guerrillas to the enemy's main
and local force units. The wholesale, countrywide upgrading
of guerrillas was particularly evident just prior to the
enemy's abortive Tet offensive. Considering available evi-
dence, we estimate that the current strength of the guerrilla
force is 50,000 to 70,000. If the enemy's recent recru-iting--
efforts have been much more effective than current evidence
indicates, the actual figure could be toward the high side
of the spread. Even the lower end of our estimate assumes
double normal recruitment since Jan 68.
d. Political Cadres: We believe that paragraph 31 of
SNIE 114.3-67 adequately describes and accurately estimates
the strength of the VC political organization in SVN. The
higher CIA estimate includes in its total typists, guards,
and other low level personnel serving in a support role to
the infrastructure. While MACV acknowledges the,existence
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of these support people and their possible necessity for
the internal functioning of the political apparatus, we
do not consider them to be in significant leadership posi-
tions or in professional positions that may influence either
the enemy's political decision making process, or his over-
all effectiveness in directing the insurgency in the south.
They are therefore clearly in support of and outside the
definition of the political infrastructure threat in SVN
as interpreted by MACV. Although the VC political or-
ganization suffered some casualties and probable depreciation
of cadre quality during the recent Tet offensive, we continue
to believe that the SNIE estimate of 75,000 to 85,000 political
cadre is valid.
e. We believe that the descriptions of other VC or-
ganizations contained in paragraphs 32-36 of SNIE 14.3-67 remain
generally accurate. We support that document's essential con-
clusion that the size of Self-Defense, Secret Self-Defense,
Assault Youth, and other such organizations could
not be estimated with any measure of confidence. In an effort
toward providing some estimative beginning, the SNIE noted
that some documents over a year old had suggested a figure
of 150,000 as a Self-Defense total. Other documentation,
however, indicates that two-thirds of the people are to be
organized as Self-Defense Militia. The CIA position ignores
many people whose local support -- willing or unwilling,
organized or levied -- is of great significance to the enemy
insurgency effort; for example, the'VC "Foster Sisters' Asso-
ciation" performs the necessary military function of caring
for large numbers of enemy wounded. The Communists organize
and use everyone with any capability, as was clearly pointed
out by paragraph 32 of the SNIE. If any estimate of the
number of people providing significant aid to the enemy (i.e.,
an "insurgency support base") were feasible, it would be a
far higher figure than CIA proposes, and even less meaningful
.in terms of enemy threat. We believe it remains impossible
to provide any meaningful quantification with_._respec_t to. such
elements as Self-Defense Guerrillas/Militia, Assault Youth,
Secret Guerrillas, etc., and we consider that CIA's presentation
inflates the enemy threat.
a. We believe that the subject of attrition must
in this paper for the following reasons.
e addressed
(1) The subject of attrition was incidental to discussions.
of all categories of enemy strength.' .
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(2) CIA insisted, throughout the conference, that non-
military.ellements (self defense, assault youth, etc) must
be quantified in;order that they can be attrited. Their
argument insisted that MACV had been assessing significant
losses against enemy armed forces strength which should
properly have been assessed against the non-military elements
such as self defense, secret self defense, and assault youth.
.We note that in CIA's 68 paper addressing attrition, no
attrition was ascribed against these non-military elements
during the period 1 January-31 March 1968.
b. MACV/CINCPAC views concerning attrition are based -on
the following inputs and losses to the total enemy armed
forces.
(1) Enemy losses consist of KIA (body count) died
of wounds/disabled, PW, Military Returnee (Hoi Ch.anhj, and
non-battle losses. We do not believe that any significant
number of these losses should be ascribed to any but armed
forces elements. We do not attempt to deny that the body
count includes some civilians, self defense, assault youth
and the like. On the other hand we know that large numbers
of military personnel are killed by air and artillery strikes
and are not included in body count figures. We believe the
latter to be a significantly larger figure than non-military
personnel included in the body count. Even if one could
quantify the numbers of non-military personnel in the body
count, he could not separate the innocent civilians from
self defense, assault youth personnel and other persons
from similar elements.
the last few months, impressment has been on a scale that
might merit consideration separate from recruitme t It
n
.(2) Enemy gains come from recruiting and infiltration. In
month period actual infiltration exceeds the e t x
figure is. used in adjusting enemy strength. estimate
estimatesctual
of monthly recruiting and infiltration have been re is d
v
should be noted that all enemy gains are estimates for-at
least six months. The estimate of infiltration becomes
hard data after six months; however if durin the i
upward to reflect evidence of increased enemy input
since the
first of the year from impressment and infiltration.
co" The following tables illustrate 'in detail the MACV/CINCPAC
i
_v
ew,s of attrition to enemy forces for the period 1 Jan-
31 Mar 68 .
25X1
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Enemy Gains lst Qtr 1968
(Infiltration and/or Recruitment)
59.,000- 743000
Enemy Losses 1st Qtr 1968
KNOWN (KIA, DOW/DIS,PW, Returnee - 80,000
excluding 10,000 Tet KIA ascribed
to civilians, porters, etc)
OTHERS (non-battle losses,estimated 6,000
at 2,000 per month)
86,000
NET Enemy Losses, 1st Qtr. 1968 ...... .._12,000-27,000.:__._..........
Recruitment/Impressment
(est 7,000 per month)
21,000
Infiltration (est 7,000 per month)
(plus 3014th and 320th NVA Division)
38,000
Possible Other Undetected Gains 0 -
1.5,000
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w p 0
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.9 MAY !0F8
I. Tut
DqrAj Director f IatsUlSeaae
l suite - f C- it r Ie ttstIm*
euvme~ to $Mtk Tletas
iatc1Ugen e c Jere
the vtrength of **my
2. Ax dir*c ted by yu the CIA
rtrengUw, vas p te4 to a cWtrerwe
f DIA, *ACV, CINCIU, State.. WA sad
.6 April 1,,
with =A.* The TIe of
length and the CIA draft
,astir v re b.4
diiar-ed at
ft is1., , biro the CIA del ti t e ea ral Ct ges
its estimate.
and t . Web Jf the Brit ict
3. spite that* c the diftroccatt1 1. Our reviavd and beat eatl to
in F utb Viet for t3 tv: dstse dUmewed a
is ebj in the t b1. on P*V Ii .
Structure.
c~rantz d 1 nstsrFtaC7
f 450- v . + pa s .
aceept the ec cept . f a n t rnc1 bee..
? A roprt ; t --caft
:t1,d f=at
r
P. itt"L Cal
to thx enerey
to b+ in the
do as=
ftarra-;;n
ie a.ttae as Am" A..
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of :n r'
mtltves,
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5. i difS*renc 'xe tea the
telttgenee yimter vary tr-.a c*teaviry.
a't rated t jr by our ht r to Pcr a*tstroU r i .e
and G rrilla& as abcAu in d s-1 'i tiat1Oa;
rt O3- ;i, moo, Within e R S a "t ;t dli' '+ rmdd
Wj.%E PAC
Cabut ? r s
main and LIC01
Adainia taati rvt
Werri3 tat
A:it;h~: gh MA dsp stn with the K$CY tiga r*r =t.ra:ttvt
t harp itedi a.t ! that at least IC-VO0400 pr3beb nit ewhtu1d
t tie ad that t tber e=a1darati..4m
rutty, demise pie -i locottd is
er air s 4f mot, CmmUdia ba4 the ddb.
C
f rce r and 10-20,000
t :t # forces tomm
1 t a deQ4 i ;m t-, t
tt.h a deCisiware sa
bert ectfaat s,.
fw*er t,,) be
Tutting W-120,000 Soli' D ,t ry
T5-85,0',15 pr ~:~taaeior*i Spar r* ad 10- , c rj fall tuft Vo rk err is
r*, p,,rtitag staf is . XACVa CZNCftC and VIA eoneur with the CIA
R 1 s; A for pr ee i 1. cadre but to neat bole" that . ie
is l u d o - , -r z as of 31 hr.1h lam,
pr ray tn1 in sue: rtl
the p 1i+,ital wmztmc,
W1
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tbar+ Piers
so p e titig ue
r 4w*v tr
taeeargnry
1. Mae t
str Pr"m
qthat it beingdostAl
Litt # Wob _..
Fri g t Viso t tt. s n
es oh ei : tt at=* Uwj* ems" Sast"t"l Quit'
among thm. Mic f is tied tbeft f stmt e
c r t3CCIU9iOW Of S&rtiCVUW +tRt g r t *r > yzx
ra d; In any .itc seta 4. i e=
Atto t s
Ctmttr c, Bert vi
Distribution:
Cy 1 & 2 - Andreae x
4-WI Matt.
fib-Cap/li/att.
7 - Ch/DA vi/att.
IV I~ j t
W. A 8 -t.
i 1tg 68)
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{J it l:+u Diu Y
Strength Estimate of the Organized
Insurgency Base in South Vietnam*
Combat Forces
Main and Local
Administrative Services
Guerrillas
Sub-total
Irregular Forces
Self Defense
Assault Youth
Sub-total
Political Infrastructure
Professional Cadre
Supporting Staffs
Sub-total
1 January 68
31 March 68
120-140, 000
125-145, 000
60- 8o,ooo
60- 8o,000
80-120, 000
80-110,000
260-340,000
265-335, 000
80-120,000
80-120,000
10- 20,000
10 20,000
90-140, 000
90-140, ooo
80- 90, 000
75- 85,000
10- 30, 000
10- 30,000
90-120, 000
85-115,000
440-600, ooo
44+0- 590, 000
* The methodologies used for deriving these estimates are presented
in Annex B.
- 4 -
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1~1.u t hl. 1.
Report on the Conference on
DCI Assessment of Enemy Strengths
10-16 April 1966
I. Purpose of the Conference
The conference was convened at the request of the Director of
Central Intelligence as a result of increasing concern that current
estimates of the strength of enemy forces are understated, are too
restrictive in scope, and do not properly account for enemy man-
power losses.
As a result of both his concern and that of the White House
Mr. Helms had directed his staff to prepare an assessment of enemy
strength that he, as the Director of Central Intelligence, could
issue as a formal statement of his views. This conference was
called in order that this assessment could receive the full benefit
of the advice and comment of the responsible components of DIA,
CINCPAC, MACV and other concerned services and agencies. It was
the hope of the Director of Central Intelligence that in this
process the conference would be able to develop an agreed community
estimate. It was also anticipated that the participants would be
able to devise an acceptable definition of the elements to be in-
cluded in the assessment and a satisfactory method for determining
their numbers.
II. Participants
The principal participants in the conference were representatives
of the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, COMUSMACV
and CINCPAC. Observers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller, and the military services were also present. A list
of the delegates and observers is attached to this report.
III. Conference Results and Recommendations
The conference provided a full opportunity for a frank exchange
of views by all representatives. As a result of the evidence pre-
sented at the conference all parties were able to make some adjust-
ments in their pre-conference estimates. Nevertheless, the conference
failed to reach, an agreed community estimate of the strength of
enemy forces.
11"i-LB .
Exc!ldCG f..:. szlcrialic
*I it c d
dr isacltic~':1:a
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The differences in estimates of total enemy strength are shown
the following table.
Estimates of Total Enemy Strength a/
MACV/CINCPAC/DIA CIA b/
1 January 68 305-340,000 440-600
,000
31 March 68 278-328,000 440-590,000
The MACV/CINCPAC/DIA estimates do not include all categories
forces estimated by CIA nor would they add the military and
itical elements.
The Department of State concurs in the CIA estimates. The
Tonal Security Agency agreed with the CIA methodology and
ition but feels it lacks the data base and research staff to
vide an independent estimate of the strength of enemy forces.
The positions of h element of p
each a their estimates are re-
ad in Part IV of this report. A DIA position paper follows
he end of this report.
The question of methodologies for attriting enemy forces and
base that should be attrited were discussed at length by the
erence. CIA and the other Washington-based delegations ex-
sed reservations about MACV's method of accounting for gains
losses and its adequacy for providing current estimates of
l enemy strengths. Because of the complexity of this problem
greement could be reached at this conference. MACV did agree,
ver, to provide the Washington community with a pilot study
nstrating how losses and gains are handled in Saigon. The
ington community will examine this study and then enter into
ussions with MACV of any apparent problems in the methodology
possible means of correcting or improving the model.
The discussions during the conference were particularly fruitful
dentifying problem areas that account for many of the differences
g members of the intelligence community. The following recom-
ations were unanimously agreed by the conference and their
ementation
mentation should facilitate elimination of some basic problems
aifferences in estimates.
1. Need for an All Source OB - The unit holdings gs in a 25X1
aced on rigid acceptance criteria will always lag behind those
OB. Over the long term these differences tend to
imi.na a ut they can be highly significant in terms of current
mates
mates of enemy strength. Although'they_amounted to only slightly
2
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in
a.
of
- I
b.
Nat
pos pos
pro
sent
at
t
the
con
f
pre
s
tot
a
no
a
w h0
a
Was Was
h
disc
and
in i
anon
impl
in
be e
esti
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more than 4, 000 troops or the two dates considered by the conference,
the differences have been well over 20,000 at various times during
:.he first quarter of 1968. The conference recommends unanimously,
here-f re, that MACV undertake supplement to
As OB holdings and that this supplement be transmitted to Washington
on a periodic basis. The conference also recommends that effective
procedures be established so that both headquarters and field
commands can make inputs to this supplement.
2. Out-of-Country Threat - The conference also agreed that
there is a continuing need for better and more timely estimates of
the threat represented by enemy forces located in areas contiguous
to South Vietnam. It recommended, therefore, that MACV undertake
steps to define this threat and to provide recurring estimates of
its size and significance.
3. Infiltration - The conference agreed that present methods
for handling infiltration data account for much of the lag in OB
holdings and consequently in estimates of enemy strength. It
recommended, therefore, that M.ACV, take
steps to provide more meaningful an timely estimates of infiltra-
tion and their incorporation into estimates of enemy strength..
!. Publication - Much of the confusion and apparent inconsis-
tencies in OB holdings and estimates of enemy strength result from
requirements that these data be published on a monthly basis in
great detail and with unwarranted specificity. These detailed
monthly reports are invaluable to working analysis and for briefing
purposes. Their publication, however, creates unnecessary problems
and leads to erroneous judgments, because of the frequent and sharp
fluctuations in end-of-the-month figures. The conference recommends
strongly that these publication practices be discontinued and that
consumers be requested to settle for reasonable spreads in Order of
Battle and strength estimates.
IV. Summary of Positions Taken on the CIA Draft Presentations of
Enemy Strengths in South Vietnam
All conferees agreed that the assessment of enemy strengths
is a difficult estimative problem. The information base is spotty
and'varies significantly for each category of the estimate and the
methodologies which must be used do not permit extremely firm and
narrow-ranged estimates to be made.
All conferees agreed that any assessment should include a
careful and deliberate identification of the relative hardness and
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softness of each element of the assessment. Moreover, the conference
agreed that any assessment should carefully describe qualitative as
well as quantitative trends and that the relative quality of all
elements should be clearly described.
CIA presented its draft assessment of enemy strength as an
approach that was more suited to national intelligence needs and
the requirements of policy makers than the conventional Order of
Battle figures now in general use. In the CIA view a more meaningful
assessment of the enemy's strength is derived from the use of a
concept of an insurgency base that includes all of the principal
organized groups that most directly determine the enemy's strategic
capabilities. This base is estimated by CIA to be in the general
order of 450-600,000 persons. It includes regular combat forces,
organized irregular groups and the political infrastructure.
The CIA concept of an insurgency base includes forces that
have long been present in South Vietnam but are not presently
quantified. With the exception of the force increases resulting
from the recent surges in infiltration, the CIA changes to con-
ventional OB holdings resulted from intensive analysis of intelli-
gence data on the existing force structure and from efforts to
offset the lag in MACV's acceptance of units.
With the exception of the MACV/CINCPAC and DIA delegations,
who have submitted independently a statement of their position,
the conferees were in general agreement with the CIA approach toward
estimating enemy strengths. The derivation of the CIA estimates and
their differences from previously agreed estimates were considered
in separate discussions for each element of the insurgency base. A
brief summary of the conference positions follows.
Main and Local Forces
CIA: In the CIA view the existing estimates of Main and Local
Forces require several adjustments. These adjustments should include
the incorporation into OB holdings of units
not listed by MACV because the have not met the MACV acceptance
criteria the inclusion of estimates for
small units omitted from the OB; an estimate for TDY personnel who
are not included in the OB because units are carried at on-duty
rather than assigned strengths; and the inclusion of an estimate of
unlisted division support elements. The sum of these additions for
an OB as of 1 January 1968 totalled from 25,000 to 31,000 persons.
-4-
C' y2^ra.
LL i
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As a result of the conference discussions the following adjustments
were made to the 1 January 1968 estimates of Main and Local Forces:
a. All representatives agreed to the addition of 4,100
persons in units
b. CIA reduced its estimate of the forces in small units
from a range of 10-11,000 to a range of 5-10,000.
c. CIA dropped completely its estimate of 6,000 TDY per-
sonnel when assured by MACV that units are carried at assigned
rather than on-duty strengths.
d. CIA reduced its estimate of 5-10,000 troops in un-
listed division support elements by 2,000 troops because this
number had been picked up by MACV.
combat forces. In view of this discussion CIA, in order to avoid
an upward bias, agreed to reduce the lower end of its range and to
revise its estimate to 120-140,000 persons.
of 21-27,000 persons to 8-18,000 persons. This yielded
an estimative range of 130-140,000 for Main and Local Forces.
In their discussion of the CIA figure, the military representa-
tives pointed out that the CIA estimate might be overstated
because of the many problems inherent in attributing losses to
s, CIA reduced its initial proposed add-ons
for the month of January were picked up by MACV in its 29 February
adjustment of the end-January OB). CIA also reduced its estimate
of troops in unlisted division support elements by 1,000 to reflect
additional units picked up by MACV. These adjustments resulted in
?a CIA estimate for Main and Local Forces of 125,000-145,000 troops
as of 31 March 1968.
MACV/CINCPAC/DIA: The MACV/CINCPAC and DIA representatives were
in agreement that evidence warranted the inclusion of about
4,100 persons in the Main and Local Forces OB, thus increasing
their estimate for 1 January 1968 from 118,700 to 122,800. They
also acknowledged that these figures contained some general areas
of softness but that any upward biases probably would be offset
by a downward bias. They would handle this by using a range
around their revised estimate and express it as 120,000-130,000.
In the discussions of the strengths of Main and Local Forces
as of 31 March 1968 the conference agreed onadd-ons of 25X1
4,150 troops (some 19,000 of the add-ons estimated by CIA 25X1
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MACV/CINCPAC and DIA felt that the other additions proposed by
CIA were in large measure already included in the OB or were not
justified by the evidence. Their estimate for 31 March 1968 is
123,000-133,000 troops.
STATE: Agreed to the CIA position.
NSA: Agreed with the CIA assessment but does not have an
independent capability to make estimates.
Administrative Services
CIA: The proposed. CIA range of 75-100,000 represented a rounding
of an estimate of 85,000 Administrative Service troops. This range
was adopted because of the tenuous nature of much of the evidence
and uncertainties about some of the components of the estimate. The
CIA estimate also includes a number of troops serving out-of-country
but subordinate to headquarters elements operating in the South. In
the discussion of the estimate a case was made that CIA might well
have used too high a ratio of Administrative Service forces to Combat
forces. For this reason and because of the fact that its estimate
might include some troops out-of-country and not subordinate to in-
country headquarters, CIA agreed to lower its estimate to a range of
60,000 to 80,000 as of 1 January 1968. CIA estimates that any net
gains or losses during the first quarter 1968, are well within its
estimative range. CIA also estimates that any losses during the
period were probably made up by the heavy infiltration observed
during the quarter.
MACV and CINCPAC: Both MACV and CINCPAC believe that their
current estimates are the best that can be provided for this category.
They also estimate that these forces suffered a net loss of 5,000
during the quarter.
+ DIA: DIA observed that Administrative Services might be in-
creased by 10-20,000 troops for a 1 January estimate and have set
forth their views in the attached position paper.
STATE: Concurred in the CIA position.
NSA: Concurred in methodology for the estimate but has no
independent estimate.
Guerrillas
CIA: The CIA estimate of guerrilla forces was 110-120,000 for
January 1968 and 90-110,000 for 31 March 1968. The CIA estimate
also -1.?-..:ludes about 10,000 secret guerrillas not included in the
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MACV numbers. CIA agreed with all representatives that the guerrilla
element was one that particularly warrants further study. Because
of the discussions of the many uncertainties in handling attrition
of guerrillas, and a lack of data on upgrading of guerrillas and
VC recruitment, CIA reduced the lower end of its estimates, yielding
final estimates of 80-120,000 for 1 January 1968 and 80-110,000
for 31 March 1968. These estimates imply a net loss of about 10,000
guerrillas during the quarter.
MACV/CINCPAC and DIA: All representatives stood by MACV's
1 January estimate of 70-80,000 which they would reduce because of
attrition to 50-70,000 for 31 March 1968.
STATE: Agrees with the CIA estimate.
NSA: Does not take a position on the estimate.
Political Infrastructure: This estimate was discussed in two cate-
gories:
Professional Cadre - All parties agreed with a MACV estimate of
8+,000 on 1 January 1968 expressed as a range of 80-90,000. All
parties also agreed with a MACV estimate of 75-85,000 as of 31 March
1968. In addition all parties agreed there were additional personnel
serving the professional cadre in a full-time support role at
district level and above.
Support Personnel
CIA/STATE/NSA - All agreed that this category belongs in the
political infrastructure and should be quantified. With the exception
of NSA, which did not take a position on the actual number, CIA and
State agreed on estimates in the range of 10-30,000 persons.
o MACV/CINCPAC and DIA: All representatives did not regard this
group as members of the infrastructure as defined and did not wish
it to be quantified.
Self Defense Groups
CIA STATE - CIA and State agreed that self defense groups are a
proper component of the insurgency base and should be quantified.
State concurred in a CIA estimate of 80-120,000. All parties at
the conference agreed that Self Defense elements are qualitatively
inferior to combat forces and that their quality is probably de-
clining. The CIA representative concurred in a conference request
that any published assessment of self defense forces would highlight
the qualitative inferiority of these groups.
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DIA: DIA agreed that self defense groups exist and if quantified
the CIA figures appear to be a reasonable best estimate.
MACV and CINCPAC - Both representatives acknowledged that
these elements exist and that all conferees could agree on a
definition of them. MACV and CINCPAC feel, however, that they
cannot and should not be quantified and that it would be misleading
to quantify them.
NSA - Agrees with the CIA but does not have an independent
estimate of the numbers.
Assault Youth
These elements were estimated by CIA at 10-20,000 persons.
The positions of each delegation were the same as those taken on
Self Defense Groups.
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 SUBJECT: Enemy Order of Battle, South Vietnam (U)
1. (S) The Defense Intelligence Agency generally supports the
CINCPAC and MACV Order of Battle figures for 1 Jan 1968 as
shown below: .
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Position Paper
Military Forces
Combat
120,000-130,000
Admin Svcs
35,000- 40,000
Guerrillas
70,000- 80,000
-
-
-
_
Total
2
2
5
,
000-250
, 000
Political
.
80,000- 90,000
At the conference, MACV provided an estimate of strength figures
for 1 April 1968 which DIA supports as follows:
B
tl
at
e as warranted. In addition, DIA believes that in any
.estimate that is computed on the basis of the need for a
particular level of Administrative Services support, con-
sideration must be given to those substantial numbers of
adddtional personnel who are located in the border areas of
Cambodia, Laos, and the DMZ, and who are primarily tasked in
-administrative type---support of--enemy elements in SVN. -These
personnel are not carried in MACV's In-country Order of-Battle,
since they have not been located in South Vietnam; and do not
normally become involved in MACV's attrition computations,
3. (C) The MAW 1 January 1968 estimate of guerrilla strength
in SVN -- 70,000-80,000 -- is based primarily on the quarterly
RITZ reports developed by US advisors in the field.. The RITZ
c.~;.,lection program is closely coordinated between the US ad-
visor and his Vietnamese counterpart at district and province
level, and reflects an ever-improving effect to measure both
the numerical strength and quality of the guerrilla organiza-
tion at the "rice-roots" level. The RITZ report concerns it-
self with the guerrilla within the village and hamlet
w
h
o
s
i
Military Forces
Combat
123,000-133,000
Admin Svcs
30,000- 40,000
Guerrillas
50,000- 70,000
Total
0 0002 000
Political
75,000- 85,000
2. (S) DIA makes the observation that in MA CV's figures re-
garding Administrative Services there appear to be from 10,000
to 20,000 personnel which cannot be identified in the OB. DIA's
rationale on this subject is being forwarded to MACV for further
study and comment, and subsequent incorporation into his Order of
considered to constitute a military thre:az.,_ q ;ew_Communists
.~ L:+ V .. rJ:l..'j, l'l!1e1 jl ~?nj1'? ~ nom` i
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themselves describe guerrillas as being comprised of full-
time and part-time personnel with a large percentage of women,
youths, and over age persons in the part-time groups. Since
the armed personnel constitute only a portion of the total
z_errilla force, it is believed the 70,000-80,000 carried bj/
:"'' CV adequately quantifies the elements of both full-time aria
part-time groups
avA constitute a military threat.
t
alt
4. ( S) In the event that a policy decision should be made to
quantify the Assault Youth and Self Defense Organizations, the
figures proposed by CIA appear to be a reasonable best estimate.
However, it is to be noted that there is very little firm evi-
dence upon which to base such a quantification, and only a low
level of confidence can be ascribed to these figures. DIA also
notes that for planning'purposes, the appropriate paragraphs of
SNIE 14.3-67 do describe the role, functions, and composition of
these elements together with a general order of magnitude for the
self-defense organization.
SECRET
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List of Delegates to Conference on DCI
Assessment of Enemy Strength
10-16 April 1966
Colonel Daniel 0., Graham, USA (Chief of-Delegation)
Colonel Paul Weiler, USMC
Cmdr. James A. Meacham, USN
lst Lt. Kelly L. Robinson, USA
Lt. Colonel George M. Hamscher, USA
Lt. Colonel James S. Wilson,.USMC??
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER
Jerry E. Bush*
ARMY - Major Joseph R. Dinda
NAVY - Cmdr. Roy L. Beavers
MARINE - Lt. Colonel Edward W. Dzialo
Lt. Colonel Neil B. Mills
AIR FORCE -:Lt. Colonel Scott S. Porter
Captain. Richard L. Bohannon (alternate)
Daily representation from among the following:
Louis G. Sarris
Richard W. Teare
James H. Cheatham
Stephen R. Lyne
Joseph H. Weiss
SEC"ET
d3 :r ir,; ,.A
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METHODOLOGIES FOR ESTIMATING
ENEMY STRENGTHS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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A gull review of MACV's method of maintaining the Main and
Local Force. OB and of available intelligence information indicates that
the strength of these forces may have been 132,000-142,000 or higher on
1 January 1968. The retroactively adjusted MACV OB estimated
the strength of these forces at 118,700. The higher estimate includes
the following components:
The 31 December Collateral OB
Small units omitted from the OB
Unlisted Service and Support
Personnel Integral to Divisions
118,700
4,100
5,000 - 10,000
. 3,000 - 8,000
131,700 141,700
There are additional factors which have tended to-minimize the
number of men carried in the OB, but to which estimates were not assigned,
so that this estimate is believed to be conservative.
The Main and Local Force OB omitted large numbers of cell through
company size units subordinate to echelons in the Communist organization
between the village and the national levels. It was initially estimated
that approximately'.10,000 to 11,000 such soldiers were omitted from the OB.
On the basis of the evidence offered at the conference, this range has been
reduced to 5,000 - 10,000. Such a range is undoubtedly conservative. These
units belonged to the following formations:
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Specialized units (sapper,
engineer, intel/recon,
special action etc.)
subordinate to districts
Specialized units (same
as above) subordinate to
provinces
4,000
2,000 to 3,000
City units 3,000
Small units subordinate
to unusual echelons
1,000
Total 10,000 to 11,000
The Main and Local Force OB carried virtually no small specialized
combat units subordinate toidistricts. These include sapper, engineer,
special action, and intelligence/reconaissance units organized into cells,`
squads, and platoons. A review of captured documents written in 1966
and 1967 that pertain to 33 of the Viet Cong's 225 districts (as of late
1967)* suggested the average number of soldiers assigned to such units in
each district was 18. As far as can be determined, none of the specialists
in the reviewed districts was carried in the OB. If 18-man contingents of
specialists were present in 225 VC districts in South Vietnam on 1 January
1968, the number of such soldiers serving at district level was then slightly
over 4,000.
The OB also omitted large numbers of sapper, engineer, special
action, and intelligence/reconnaissance units'subordinate to the 33 or so
VC provinces (as of late 1967). As of 1 January 1968, the OB had identified
only one sapper battalion (the 36th in Binh Dinh) and a total of eight smaller
sapper, engineer, and reconnaissance units subordinate to a total of six VC
provinces throughout the country. On the basis of captured documents, which
suggest that the average number of soldiers attached to specialized combat
units subordinate to each province exceeds 100, it is estimated that there
were as many as 2,000 to 3,000 such soldiers absent from the OB as of.
1 January 1968...
All significiant urban areas maintain "city units," generally
# The Viet Cong reorganized their administrative boundaries ;
countrywide in South Vietnam in late 1967. ?MACV now carries 244
VC districts in Vietnam .instead of the 225. Because most documenta-
tion in this memorandum is dated prior to the reorganization, it
uses the older number.
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subordinate to the provinces in which they are located and on an organi-
zational par with district units within the provinces. Only two city units
(those of Nha Trang and Hue) are identified in the MACV OB, although captured
documents and POW reports indicate they are common and have been in existence
at least since 1964. City units vary in size from a platoon (reported in
Nha Trang) to units in excess of battalion size (in Hue and Da Nang). On
the basis of available evidence, which suggests that the average city unit
consists of a company with some additional support troops and therefore
has a strength of about 100, the number of city unit soldiers absent from
the OB -- if it is assumed that such units existed in each VC province
capital -- was on the order of 3,000 on 1 January 1968.
Small units assigned to unusual command entities seldom appear
in the OB. Examples of such formations are plantation units, certain vung
(area) units, and units assigned to American bases. On the basis of
fragmentary evidence, it is estimated that there could be at least a
".thousand .soldiers in such units but not listed in the OB on 1 January 1968.
The quality of the soldiers in the omitted units is generally high.
Sapper, engineer, intelligence/reconnaissance,'special action, and city
formations, which have an unusually large percentage of party members,
undergo rigorous and extended courses of instruction in their specialties.
Captured documents and field reports indicate that these types of soldiers
were heavily engaged during the urban phases of the Tet offensive.
D. Unlisted service and support
personnel integral to divisions
Most divisions in the OB appear to have unrealistically small
numbers of integral service and support troops accounted for. Such troops
are usually carried in the OB under one of two categories:
a. "Headquarters and support" troops, which include
the military, political, and rear service staffs of
divisions, and in some cases (for example, the VC 9th
Division) soldiers subordinate to unidentified integral
support. units, and
b. Personnel subordinate to identified integral
support battalions (such as engineer, transport, signal
medical, sapper, air defense, and artillery units).'
The number of soldiers in both categories totaled 1.0,255 in the
1 January CAB, including 3,475 "headquarters and support" personnel, and
6,780 belonging to 25 identified battalions.
An inspection of the divisional totals, reveals certain anomalies:
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a. The NVA 325C and the NVA 5th Divisions are listed
as having only 100 headquarters and support troops each, with
no integral support units.
b. The NVA 7th and VC 9th Divisions, although heavy
on "headquarters and support" personnel (900 and 750
respectively), are listed as having no integral support
units.
On the basis of what is known about the organizational structure
of a Communist division, the complete absence or near absence of integral
support units.(as opposed to infantry regiments) is unlikely. A recent
study by the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) G-2 carries the TOE of a North
Vietnamese Army division as having -- in addition to three infantry
regiments -- an artillery regiment, an antitank battalion, an antiaircraft
battalion, a signal battalion, a.medical battalion, a training battalion,
a transport company, a reconnaissance company, a chemical company, and
a security guard company integral to the division echelon -- that is,
some nine battalion-equivalents.
It is apparent that all Communist divisions in South Vietnam
do not have all the integral support units listed in the USARPAC study.
Divisional support structures - - will also vary from area to area; for
example, a division on~the DMZ may not be organized identically to one
operating near COSVN headquarters. However , every Communist division
needs a certain minimum number of integral support units to operate
effectively.
A recent document indicated that on 24 September 1967 the VC
9th Division had a signal battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a
training battalion, an artillery battalion, an antiaircraft battalion,
a mortar battalion, an engineering company, a transportation company,
a medical company, and convalescence company. None was identified in
the OB. Some of these formations had probably been with the division
for a considerable time. The artillery unit, for example, had been
attached to the division at least since April 1966, some seven months
after the 9th Division was organized.
In the case of the VC 9th Division, the 750 "headquarters
and support" troops carried is unusually large and includes soldiers
attached to integral, but unidentified, support elements. Even taking
this into account, it would still appear that the 9th Division has more
than 750 support troops. If one assumes that the support battalions
listed in the document have 270 men each* and the companies have 70 men
each (and that the division has an additional headquarters element of
250 men), then the number of support troops integral to the 9th Division
The MACV OB lists the average division-level support
battalion at 270 men.
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is 2,150, or some 1,400 more than are listed in the OB.
Because full evidence on the support and service structures of
Communist divisions is lacking, their size must be estimated.. On the basis
of available documentary evidence and TOE's, it is estimated. that the seven
three-regiment Communist divisions carried in the OB had between six and
eight battalion-equivalent integral support and service units. It is
further estimated that the two two-regiment divisions carried in the OB
had between four and five battalion-equivalent integral support and service
units. In addition, it is estimated that the three-regiment divisions each
had 250-man headquarters contingents and the two-regiment divisions each
had 200-man headquarters contingents. Thus, on 1 January 1968 there were
an estimated 16,650 and 19,970 service and support personnel. subordinate to
divisions listed in the OB. A breakout of these personnel is as follows:
Seven three-regiment divisions with
between six and eight 270-man
battalion- equivalents each, plus
a 250-man headquarters contingent
each.
13 , 090 to-16,870
Two two-regiments divisions with
between four and five 270-man
battalion-equivalents each, plus
a 200-man headquarters contingent
each.
2,560 to 3,100
Total
15,650 to 19,970
The 1 January OB carried only 10,255 men subordinate to the nine
divisions listed, indicating that there were between 5,395 and 9,725 divi-
sional service and support troops missing, or,,rounded to the nearest
thousand, 5,000 to 10,000. This add-on has been reduced to 3,000 to 8,000
as a result of the addition at the conference of 2,100 support troops to
the 325C Division in March.
E. Other Factors Suggesting the Main Force/Local Force OB Was Low
Additional factors make it probable that the Main Force/Local
Force OB was low prior to the Tet offensive and suggest that the range of
132,000-142,000 is conservative. They are:
a. Soldiers'on TDY from their units are often not included in
the strength of their units or picked up in other areas of the OB.
b. In adding gains and subtracting losses from units listed in
the OB, the methods used by MACV have favored losses over gains.
c. Large numbers of upgraded guerrillas were added to Main
Force/Local Force units just prior to the Tet offensive.
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On the basis of assurance by the.MACV representatives at the
conference that units are carried at assigned rather than on-duty strength,
an estimated 6,000 troops were withdrawn from the CIA estimate. It
should be noted, however, that this procedure has not always been followed
and that the number of TDY soldiers is often high relative to assigned
strength.
The process of adding and subtracting personnel from formations
in the OB to take into account gains and losses seems to favor the latter
over the former. Soldiers are customarily deducted from Main and Local
Force units on the basis of body counts. On the other hand, strengths of
units are adjusted upward on the basis of captured documents and POW
reports. Body count reports are current and provide coverage of most
actions in which Main and Local Force units are engaged. POW interrogations
and captured documents which provide information on strengths are available
only sporadically and in the case of the latter contain dated information..
In the absence of a reported reinforcement, or new strength figure, unit
strengths are often increased as a result of battle action reports which
give estimates for the size of opposing forces. When the enemy's replace-
ment capability is great or when the reported KIA figures are incorrect,-
the differences between estimated and actual strength may be substantial.
A case in point is the experience of the 273rd Regiment of the
VC 9th Division, which was engaged in battles in the Loc Ninh area in late
1967. As a result of battlefield body counts, MACV attrited the 273rd from
1,750 (as held in the 31 October OB) to 1,200 (as held.in the 31 December
OB). Yet a captured VC report dated 27 January 1968 indicated that the
strength of the 273rd was at that moment 1,802. It is likely that in
subsequent OB's, the document will be taken into account. Were no such
report received, however, the OB figure probably would have remained low
for some time.
Finally, variety of reports from the countryside indicate that
prior to the Tet offensive unusually large numbers of village and hamlet
guerrillas were upgraded as individuals or attached as units to Main and
Local Force formations to bring them.up to strength or to expand them.
The number of such guerrillas has been estimated at 20,000. Because it is
not clear how many of these guerrillas were to stay permanently with the
higher level units, this methodology did not take guerrilla upgrading into
account.
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II. Administrative Service Troops
The term "Administrative Services" was adopted at an intelligence
conference held in Honolulu, Hawaii, during February 1967 to include
all "military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military
subregion, region, province, and district staffs and rear service
technical units subordinate to these headquarters." Support and
service troops subordinate to divisions, regiments, or battalions are
not included in this definition. MACV lists such troops with the Main
and Local Forces.
Administrative Service personnel are engaged in staff and command,
transportation, clerical, courier, training, medical, financial,, and
ordnance activities. Combat support units such as artillery and anti-
aircraft are excluded from the concept. Although the quality of such
personnel varies within units, available evidence indicates that the
bulk of these troops are high caliber. Their quality is reflected in
the relatively high proportion of Party membership among their ranks
and the extensive training many of them receive.
In addition to estimates of the numbers of these troops, there are
at any given time many thousands of laborers supervised by them. These
laborers are used for a number of duties but transportation -- acting
as the enemy's wheels -- is their primary function. Less than 10 per-
cent of Administrative Service troops are in transport units. Laborers
augment these troops; they do not replace them. MACV tends to view
laborers as substitutes for low caliber service troops and consequently
excludes large numbers of administrative service personnel identified
in documents as being part time or ineffectual. The evidence does not
support such contentions. MACV also has not yet made estimates for
Administrative Service troops subordinate to some in-country and border
area commands. In summary, a full estimate of all elements has not been
made, and the elements that are carried are understated according to
the evidence.
The 1 January.1968 OB carried 37,650* Administrative Service troops
subordinate to the following echelons:
National (COSVN)
10,100
Region and Subregion
8,150
Province
9,900
District
9 500
377,650
Evidence collected from documents captured during the past two
years indicates that for most areas of South Vietnam on the order of one
* The MACV OB holding for Administrative Services dropped from 37,650
to 33,725 as of 29 February 1968. The decline was apparently justified
by an estimate of losses suffered during the Tet offensive.
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support soldier is required for each main and local force combat soldier.
In light of this evidence, the estimate of 37,650 Administrative Service
troops would appear to be considerably below the actual number required
by the Communists to support their insurgency in South Vietnam. Even
if some 25,000 of the 130,000-],40,000 Main and Local Force soldiers
in South Vietnam were performing' administrative service functions, the
ratio of combat and combat support to service troops would not approach
1:1. If, for example, 25,000 is deducted from the 130,000-140,000 in
the Main and Local Force OB and added to the Administrative Service OB,
the resulting ratio is 62,000 service and staff troops to 105,000-115,000
combat and combat support, or about 1:2. Where evidence is available,
such a ratio is not supportable.
Based on a recent review of the evidence, it is estimated that
there are at least 60,000-80,000 Administrative Service troops and
that of these, about 15,000-20,000 are located out-of-country in border
areas of Laos and Cambodia and in-the DMZ. Most of these out-of-country
personnel are judged to be subordinate to the border/area fronts, COSVN,
and the Military Regions, but some may be subordinate to other entities
providing close-up support to these commands. The MACV estimate con-
ceptually includes a few thousand of these border area troops.
Although this estimate was calculated to reflect the situation as
of the first of the year, it is believed that it is also a reasonable
estimate for 31 March (1968). Losses amongst these troops are light,
relative to the combat elements, and should be well within the range of
60,000-80,000. Further, the losses were probably compensated by new
Administrative Service units moving into the country in support of the
approximately 22,000 men who arrived in identified new combat units.
The overall estimate is based on a rather narrow evidence base,
but the methodology, nonetheless, provides a reasonable order of magni-
tude. The evidence is best -- in fact quite good -- for the estimate
of support troops at the district level. With somewhat poorer evidence,
it is estimated that the relative number of staff and support troops to
combat-type troops at the province level is about the same as that
found at the district level. These district and provincial level support
troops number about 27,500 -- somewhat less than the 30,000 Local Force
troops which they support.
Local Force Service Troops Subordinate to Districts and Provinces
A review of captured documents pertaining to 29 of the 225 VC
districts indicates that the ratio of service and staff troops to
soldiers attached to infantry units is about 1:1. This ratio, when
applied to the 15,000 district-level infantrymen carried in the 1 January
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1968 OB suggests that the number of service and staff personnel serving
at district level -- assuming the infantry figure is correct -- is also
15,000, or some 5,500 higher than carried in the MACV OB.
A review of captured documents pertaining to five of 33 VC provinces
indicates that the ratio of service and staff troops to soldiers attached
to infantry units was about .9:1. This ratio, when applied to the 15,000
province-level -- assuming the infantry figure is correct -- is about
13,500 or some 3,600 more than carried in the OB.
It can be argued that although the ratios in the above paragraph
were relevant in 1966 and in 1967 -- the years during which the documents
were prepared -- they no longer pertain, because of evidence that the
Communists have attempted to draw down on staff and service units to
maintain combat strength.
The Communists have been only marginally successful in obtaining
combat personnel from staff and service units. The principle reason
for this failure is that their Administrative Service units were hard
pressed to service past regular force levels. As the level of combat
and enemy force size increased, so did ammunition expenditures, signal
transmissions, and food and medical requirements. Under such conditions,
it would appear almost impossible to provide more support with fewer
people. Some Communist documents even suggest that the ratio of staff
and service personnel to combat troops may have increased in certain
areas.
Service Troops Subordinate to COSVN, the Military Regions, and Fronts
To estimate the remainder-of the Service troops -- those who support
the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong Main Force combat structure --
two basic methodologies with some varying assumptions have been utilized.
These estimates, added to the Local Force estimate, fall. within the over-
all estimated range.
Separate estimates within this category can be made for COSVN and
soma of the military regions in III and IV Corps. There is little
documentary order of battle data on the situation in the North --
Military Regions V, VI, and Tri-Thien, Hue, and the B3 and DMZ Fronts.
To indicate the adjustments which need to be made in the MACV
estimates from some of these commands in the cases where good evidence
is available, the following comparative. data are presented.
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on Documents
MACV Estimates
Region IV (and its subregions)
3,500
600
Region VI
750
500
Rung Sat Special Zone (SR 10)
250
150
COSVN Level
15,000
10,100
For the first of the two methodologies mentioned above, a north-
south concept was utilized, with the southern boundaries of Military
Regions V and VI as the dividing line. With the reasonably good sub-
estimates available in the south, a ratio was developed between the
figures carried by MACV for Administrative Service and combat elements
for the South. This ratio was applied to MACV's figures for combat
strength in the North to complete the estimate. The calculations are
shown in Table I and Table II. The result of this approach is that
approximately 12,000 Administrative Service troops would be added to
the OB.
MACV Administrative Service OB,
northern half
5,000
MACV Administrative Service OB,
southern half
13,250
Added to northern half OB to
equalize ratio
12,300
Subordinate to district and
provinces
27,500
Total
Administrative Services
58,050
Table I
Southern Half
Main Force and NVA Strength 37,000
Less estimate of staff and support troops subordinate to
divisions and regiments 8,300
Infantry-type and fire support' strength 28,700
MACV-carried Administrative Service strength subordinate
to subregion, region, front, and COSVN which support
the above troops 13,250
Staff and support troops listed above 8,300
21,550
Ratio of su port-type strength to combat
strength (21,550:28,700)
.75:1
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 Northern Half
Main Force and NVA Strength
62,000
Less estimate of staff and support troops subordinate to
divisions and regiments
16,700
Infantry-type and fire support strength
45,300
MACV-carried Administrative Service strength subordinate
Ratio of support-type strength to combat
strength (21,700:45,300) .48:1
5,000
16,700
21,700
Additional troops needed to relieve support to combat ratio in the
southern half of the country - 12,300.
If the CIA estimate of 24,500 Administrative Service troops support-
ing Main Force troops in the South is utilized in place of the 13,250
carried by MACV in these calculations, 30,000 troops would be added to
the northern OB and the total strength would exceed the upper end of
the 60,000-80,000 range somewhat.
The second methodology consisted of utilizing the ratio of Adminis-
trative Service to maneuver troops at the province and district levels --
1:1 -- to calculate the strengths of elements supporting the NVA and
VC Main Forces. This methodology produces an estimate of 76,500 when
the CIA estimates for Main and Local Forces are assumed. Where necessary
the calculations used mid-points of ranges.
Component I - Subordinate to province and district level
38,100 - CIA 1 January Local Force OB.
less 7,500 - CIA added small units at provin
ce and
district levels.
30,600 - CIA 1 January 68 Local Force infantry-type
strength. (30,000 used in Admin. Service
estimate)
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to subregion, region, and front which support the
above troops
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15,000 X .9 = 12,500* - Province level.
15,000 X 1.0 = 15,000 - District level.
27,500 - Administrative Services subordinate to province
and district levels, 1 January 1968
Component II
137,000 - CIA 1 January 68 OB.
less 38 100 - CIA 1 January 68 Local Force 013.
915,900 - CIA 1 January 68 Main and NVA OB.
99,000
less 25,000 - CIA estimate of staff and support troops in Main
Force and NVA OB subordinate to divisions and
regiments. (Projected from 21,000 identified
in MACV OB of 84,000)
74,000 - CIA 1 January 68 infantry-type and fire support
Main Force and NVA OB.
Combat Side Support Side
of Ratio of Ratio
Infantry-type and fire-support
OB 74,000
Staff and support troops 25,000
Admin. Services identified by
MACV in Main Force-NVA OB 189000
Subtotals 74,000 43,000
To achieve 1:1 combat:support
ratio, add Admin. Services 31,000
Totals 74,000 74,000
18,000 - Identified by MACV as associated with Main
Force troops.
31 000 - Added above.
9,000 - Administrative Services serving Main Force-
NVA and subordinate to subregion, region,
Front, and COSVN.
plus 27755000 - Subordinate to province and district levels.
76,500.- Total Administrative Services estimate.
*Conservative estimate used at province level. The calculation
yields 13,500.
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III. Guerrilla Strengths
It is estimated that there were about 110,000-120,000 village and
hamlet guerrillas in South Vietnam prior to the beginning of the current
Winter-Spring campaign (Nov 67). This number is 30,000-40,000 higher
than MACV's accepted guerrilla OB for 31 October, but the evidence
substantiates the higher figure.
MACV carried an end of year estimate of 70,000-80,000. The CIA
estimate of 110,000-120,000 was reduced to 80,000-120,000 for this date.
Substantial upgrading of individual guerrillas and reorganization of units
had taken place, and recruiting into guerrilla ranks had also intensified.
The adjustment in the range of the CIA estimate reflects an uncertainty as
to the relative. magnitudes of these personnel changes.
The problem with the MACV base figure for the last of 1967 is funda-
mentally methodological. MACV bases the estimate on quarterly reports
submitted by sub-sector J-2 advisors. The MACV estimate for the end of
the second quarter of 1967, based on these reports, was about 65,000. When
these reports were examined during the September 1967 conference, they were
found wanting in several respects. For some provinces, documents which
indicated higher figures had been misread or disregarded. For others,
hamlet guerrillas, which usually outnumber village guerrillas by at least
2-1, had been omitted. By making adjustments for the omissions and by
taking into account other discrepancies such as the omission of an esti:y
mated 10,000 "Secret Guerrillas," an estimate of 110,000-120,000 was
calculated.
MACV representatives contend that the reporting system admittedly did
not work well when first instituted in the second quarter of 1967, but
that the results of more recent reports are valid. A systematic comparison
of the provincial figures carried by MACV with evidence from documents has
been continued. The comparison shows, by and large, that MACV's overall
estimate remains understated. For example, MACV estimated the guerrilla
strength in Pleiku Province to be 430 for the third quarter of 1967. A
recently captured document states that the guerrilla strength in Gia Lai,
the VC equivalent province, was 8,803 in March 1967. A document dated
January 1968 reveals the guerrilla strength to have been 11,355 in GVN
Quang Nam Province. The MACV OB published in November 1967 carried half
this number -- 5,150.
Two additional methodologies have been used to check this estimate.
More than any other VC force, the guerrilla force strength shows a close
relationship to the size of the VC population base. The more hamlets and
villages under VC control, the greater the number of guerrillas.
A reasonably good picture of a general decline in guerrilla strength
over,the,past two years can be developed from documents and prisoner
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testimony. It is clear that upgrading requirements and the loss of popu-
lation base were the primary causes of the decline. A few of these
documents have provided numerical fixes from which crude trends can be
calculated. Documents showed guerrilla strengths of 170,000-180,000 in,
early 1966, and 150,000 in early 1967. Continuing this decreasing trend
and relating it to the decline in the VC population base, the guerrilla
strength would have been about 120,000 in the fall of 1967.
A third methodology for estimating guerrilla strength has been
developed recently. The results of this methodology should be considered
preliminary because the formulation of the model is not complete and
additional data are being compiled. Nonetheless, initial calculations
suggest that more refined estimates produced by the method will fall
somewhat above 100,000-120,000 for the first three quarters of 1967.
The method correlates guerrilla strengths of hamlets, villages, and
districts obtained from captured documents with a number of factors. These
are, in addition to time, population, population density, degree of VC
control, military activity, political activity, terrain, and rice availa-
bility. Utilizing the correlation co-efficients obtained, the model is
used as a predictive devise to estimate for the entire population over
time with appropriate weight being given to the other factors. Strengths
given in documents and those calculated for districts and provinces can,
in turn, be used to check the results obtained from the hamlet and village
data.
The quality of guerrillas varies widely and the military threat of
guerrilla forces is. uneven. A mcre accurate representation of guerrilla
strength may be to divide them by functions. Based on an average ratio
of village guerrillas to hamlet guerrillas, the 80,000-120,000 estimate
can be broken down to 30,000-50,000 village guerrillas and 50,000-70,000
hamlet guerrillas. Although there are numerous exceptions, typically,
the village guerrillas are organized into a platoon, are fully armed, are
composed of reasonably good personnel, serve full time, and generally
`;constitute an effective combat force. In many cases, these platoons are
comparable to district level Local Force infantry units. This group of
village guerrillas could be placed with the Main and Local Forces and
Administrative Service troops in a concept of Regular or Combat Forces.
The 50,000-70,000 hamlet guerrillas are typically organized into
squads and cells, are not usually fully armed, and serve part time. More
importantly, the quality of their personnel is low, and in many cases,
resemble the Self Defense Force rather than village guerrillas. The
hamlet guerrillas could be placed along with the Self Defense and Assault
Youth in a separate category of Other Irregular Elements.
Because of continuing uncertainties concerning attrition, upgrading,
reorganization, and recruiting, the 80,000-120,000 range has been reduced
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to 80,000-110,000 to produce a 31 March 1968 estimate. MACV's guerrilla
estimate for the end of the quarter now stands at 50,000-70,000. This
estimate is thought to be even more unrealistic that the estimate for
1 January. It is low because an unaccountably high attrition rate has
been ascribed to the Guerrilla Forces, the original base figure going into
the quarter was too low and insufficient allowance has been made for
recruiting.
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IV. Self Defense and Assualt Youth
Self-Defense and Assualt Youth elements should be included in
any assessment of the enemy's strategic capabilities. Estimates of their
numbers can be made which provide a reasonable order of magnitude. In the
case of the Self-Defense Forces'the estimate is based in part on a September
1967 MACV study which estimated that there were then about 100,000 Self-
Defense and about 20,000 Secret Self-Defense. For purposes of this estimate
a range of 80,000-120,000 has been used.
The Self-Defense Forces is usually organized only on the hamlet
level but in some areas village units are formed. Their primary function
is to provide support to the parallel Guerrilla structure. They provide
lookout guard and general hamlet security duties, provide labor for LOC
interdiction missions and to construction of fortified hamlets and other
defensive positions. They often join with the Guerrillas in the defense
of hamlets and occasionally join in light offensive missions such as
h.rassment of RF/PF posts.
In terms of quality they are the least effectiveofiallof the enemy's
irregular elements. They have fewer arms than the Guerrillas, Oft the average
only about 10 percent are armed with individual weapons. This varies by area.,
however. As is the case with the Guerrillas, units deep in VC territory are
more lightly armed than units that'are more likely to come in contact with
Allied Forces. In addition, small arms, grenades, and mines are often issued
to Self-Defense units when they are to be employed in actions that warrant it.`
The majority of these people are women or males outside the prime military
age group.
The strength of the Self-Defense: Forces is difficult to estimate with
precision because of the fragmentary nature of the evidence. Some documents
suggest that the ratio of Self-Defense to Guerrilla components averages
slightly better than 1 to 1, which is well short of the goal of about 2 to 1
indicated in other documents. Self-Defense strength will tend to fluctuate
widely with the ebb and flow of the war in rural areas, since it is closely
tied to the matter of population control. Figures cited in a document of
mid-1966 indicated an over-all strength of about 150,000 for the Self-Defense
forces. The loss of Communist control over the rural populace after that
date would suggest that the figure declined through last year, but this
population loss was not sufficient in itself to have brought Self-Defense
strength below about 100,000.
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The Assault Youth serve full time at district level and above, and
are organized into companies and platoons. Although some are armed. and they
are an integral part of the military organization, the Communists do not
consider them an offensive combat force. Their primary mission appears to
be logistical, frequently in battlefield areas. This organization also
serves as a manpower pool and provides a training program for youths who
later go into the VC Main and Local Forces. A number of Assualt Youth
groups are permanently attached to maneuver units.
The evidence indicates that about 10., COO-20,000 is probably a
reasonable estimate of the strength of this element. This estimate is
based on the number recruited during the first half of 1966 when the Communists
achieved a recruiting goal of 15,000. In addition, other more recent
documents, which give strengths of individual units or groups of units
suggest that they have been maintained at about this level.
Although the Assualt Youth are not primarily combat troops, they
sustain significant casualties. Of the 1,840 Assault Youths listed in a
September 1966 document covering certain units in the Delta, 62 were killed
in action during the first part of the year."
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V. The Political Infrastructure
The size of the Viet Cong political infrastructure depends largely on
how it is defined. If the definition includes only those in comprand
positions at the various echelons of the Communist apparatus, then it
numbers, only a few thousand people. If the definition includes every cre
who performs some political or administrative function for the Communists
in South Vietnam, then the size of the infrastructure is substantially
greater than any estimate yet advanced.
This estimate is based on a concept of personnel in full time service
and in accordance with the following official definition:
"The Viet Cong infrastructure is defined as the political
and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong
control or seek to control the South Vietnamese people. It
embodies the party (Peopells '.evolutionary Party) control
structure, which includes a command and administrative
apparatus (Central Office of South Vietnam) at the national
level and the leadership and administration of a parallel
front organization (National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam), both of which extend from the national through
the hamlet level."
Using these criteria, CIA estimates that the political infrastructure
numbers on the order of 90,000-123,000. This estimate includes the
80,000-90,000 estimated by MACV plus an estimate of 10,000-30,000 for the
number of full time supporting personnel such as guards, clerks, and low-
level administrators, most of whom are valuable to the daily operation of
Viet Cong bureaucracies not included in the MACV estimate, These
personnel should be considered an integral part of the infrastructure as
defined.
In a MACV Combined Study entitled the "VC Political Infrastructure
Strength," dated 1 September 1967, MACV took into account:
a. All members of the party echelon organization (emphasis
supplied),
b. The leadership only of the parallel front organizations, and
c. The leadership only of the Military Affairs Committee in
each organization.
The study concluded there were then 84,900 members of the infrastructure
in South.Vietnam. The current MACV OB carries their numbers at 84,900.
In arriving at this number, MACV has taken into account the common Viet
Cong practice of officials wearing two hats. if a person wears both a
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military and civilian hat, he is ordinarily counted in the military OB,
The above cited range of 90,000-120,000 is compared below by echelon with
the N1ACV data.
COSVN
1,200
2, 000
Regions
1,100
5,000
Provinces
4,500
10, 000
Districts
6,400
17,000
Villages
34,400
37,000
Hamlets
37,300
40,000
84,900
111,000
The 84,900 is expressed as a range of 80,000-90,000, the 111,000 is
expressed as a range of 90,000-120,000.
It should be noted that the largest differences are at district level
and above. Personnel were added at these echelons for two reasons: first,
because MACV's methodology for arriving at'their numbers -- a combination
of name counting, and a tallying what MACV called "identified positions" --
had an inherent downward bias because of incomplete information; second,
because captured documents strongly suggest that the size of the infra-
structure is substantially larger than UAACV estimated. Most of the
additions, as noted, consisted of low-grade Viet Cong bureaucrats (who,
incidentally, are always counted when they are "eliminated" or when they
defect).
The higher CIA estimates at village and hamlet levels reflect evidence
that the Viet Cong gained control of large areas of the Vietnamese
countryside during the recent Tet offensive.
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