BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Publication Date: March 14, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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BI-IVEEKLY
PROPAGA..kDA G[IDAiICE
NUMBER: 35
ov
DATE: 14 March 1960
TABLE OF CONTENTS
214. Plebiscite for Germany.
215. Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet.
216. Current Stresses in the Soviet Union.
217. Moscow's Friendship University,
218. Disarmament.
219. Latin American Economic Cooperation.
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214. Plebisc or -many
In his talks with Italian President Gronchi (Feb nary 1960), Khrushchev
rigidly reasserted the original maximum Soviet position on Germany: German
reunification is an impossible concept; there could be a confederation of the two
Germanies with which a peace treaty could be made; If such a solution were not
possible separate treaties should be concluded with each of the two Germantes; a
free city of all Berlin would never be accepted since it would entail the liquiriation
of the socialist regime in East Berlin; Berlin in its entirety should be incorporated
into East Germany; however, as a real concession to the West, the Soviet Union
had persuaded the East German regime to agree that West Berlin be made a free
city with access routes under Soviet control; the East German state exists and
should be recognized. On his trip to the Far East, Khrushchev reiterated the
Soviet position: if negotiations with the West on the German question are not
fruitful, he would be obliged to sign a separate treaty with East Germany. He also
reasserted the Soviet, plan for a free city of West Berlin within the context of a
German peace treaty. Khrushchev's remarks seem to indicate an increasingly
intransigent attitude. Whether this attitude really is as uncompromising as it
appears or whether Mr. Khrushchev, for tactical reasons, is seeking to convince
the West of his firmness, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, in late February 1960,
the US press reported that Secretary of State Herter favors a plebiscite in which
the German people would have an opportunity to register their preferences for the
Western plan (promulgated as "internationally supervised free elections for all
Germany") or the Soviet plan (to be characterized as "separate peace treaties for
East and West Germany"). Willie Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin, in a December
1959 speech to the $erlin Parliament, stated that "the Senate would be ready at
any time to support a four-power agreement concerning a plebiscite in Berlin".
While there is little likelihood that the USSR will agree to a plebiscite, the result
of which would almost certainly favor the Western plan, the advantages, from the
point of view of arousing sympathy and support for the Western position, of
encouraging such a plebiscite are considerable.
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SE'C R E T ?- 14 March 1960
215. Afro- Asian Convention on Tibet
On the initiative of the prominent Indian Socialist J. P. Narayan, a
Committee for Solidarity with Tibet was formed in India in 1959. Representatives
of this committee visited Southeast Asia, Japan, and the Near East to promote
interest in the formation of an international group to concern itself with the plight
of Tibet. Religious, cultural, and lawyers' groups were approached and invited to
send representatives to an "Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet", originally
scheduled for February. A number of acceptances were received, and in some
instances the delegations were to come with the sanction of their governments.
The date of the New Delhi meeting was subsequently changed at the personal
request of Prime Minister Nehru, in deference to the visit to Asia by Soviet
Prime Minister Khrushchev during February. The convention was accordingly
rescheduled for 8-10 April. The organizers have explained the postponement to
invitees as due to the elections in Burma and Ceylon and have urged them to plan
to send, in April, the same delegations or ones "equally strong". The US
Government has had no direct hand in planning or guiding this activity, and we will
continue to exercise caution regarding our interest in it, to avoid tainting it with
Western influence.
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Si CB E T 14 March 1960
216. Current Stresses in the Soviet Union
The loud Soviet propaganda about sputniks, the Seven-Year plan and
?peaceful coexistence" has driven less dramatic problems into the background.
There is no doubt that there have been many changes in the Soviet Union since
Stalin's death. Most of these have been favorably received by the Soviet masses
and the exultant propaganda is to serve the double purpose of discouraging
remaining internal opposition and convincing the world that the Soviet Union is
riding high on the wave of the future. The main stresses of the Stalin era -
forced labor, police terror, severe shortages of food and consumer goods -
have been somewhat relieved. New tensions, due mostly to Khrushchev's
policies, have arisen. On the internal front we can distinguish two categories of
reforms, those primarily involving personnel and those which aim at transform-
ing attitudes. When in June 1957, the anti-Party group was removed from the
center of decision making, many followers of those leaders were hurt. This
applies in particular to Molotov who was respected as an old Bolshevik and who
was popular in his Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also applies to Malenkov whose
announced policy of increasing consumer goods had been very favorably received.
The industrial reorganization dissatisfied many industrial managers who were
reluctant to leave the capital for the duller life in the economic regions. Others,
taking too much to heart the new policy of decentralization, were accused of the
sin of "localism" (putting local interests ahead of the fulfillment of the national
plan.) The reforms in agriculture, particularly the abolition of the Machine
Tractor Stations (MTS), former centers of political control over the kolkhoz
population, dismayed many local political chiefs. The peasants themselves do not
generally relish all these reforms since they have included attacks on their
private plots and the threat to transform the peasants into paid agricultural
workers and to force them to live in city-type communities (agrogorods). On the
whole the agricultural population is the one group that remains today as reluctant
as under Stalin to accept the blessings of communism. The liquidation of Beria
and the abolition of the MVD as an All-Union Ministry has affected numerous
officials who had started their career in this service. Khrushchev's consistent
efforts to eliminate the deadwood in the higher Party cadre involves many
individuals whose main qualifications as bureaucrats rather than as production
managers served them well under Stalin but not so well under the new regime.
Belayev who was made the scapegoat for the trouble in Kazakhstan is only the
most recent example of this continuing purge. Almost every week transfers and
demotions are announced, frequently involving First Party Secretaries in the non-
Russian regions (see also Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 15, Item #84).
Probably the largest group of people affected at one time is that comprising the
250, 000 officers whose careers have been interrupted by the latest Khrushchev
move to reduce the armed forces. Strains between the Party and the army, still
smarting from the removal of Zhukov, will be due less to the problem of
relocating these officers than to the manner of their "selection-out". Shall the
army retain the best military leaders or the leaders of Party propaganda inside
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216. (Cont. )
the army? Among the population, generally, Khrushchev's efforts at creating new
attitudes have not met so far with any marked success. The new Soviet man, more
interested in promoting the welfare of Communist society than his own career,
has not materialized in spite of a few well propagandized cases. (For instance,
Gaganova the admirable woman who left a flourishing kolkhoz to devote her
efforts to raising the productivity on a backward kolkhoz.) One of the most serious
problems has been connected with the attempt to adjust the outmoded ideology to
the new programs. As revealed by the recent propaganda directive (see Bi-Weekly
Propaganda Guidance No. 33, Item #204) there is a wide gap between the Party
and the people. While the propagandists continue to rely on quotes from Marx and
Lenin instead of drawing mainly on "the heroic deeds of the present", the people
remain completely apathetic, The youth, in particular the sons of high Party
,officials and students, have often shown little more than contempt for Party
propaganda. (For further subjects, see Attachment, Moscow Dispatch No. 412,
in particular the list of potentially disaffected groups. )
Guidance
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Text of Ambassador Thompson's Dispatch, 29 January 1960
SUBJECT: Current Strains Within the Soviet System
The transfers of Belyaev and Kirichenko, the recent meetings of the
Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet, and the Central Committee's
resolution on Party propaganda have thrown new light on some of the problems
with which the Soviet Union is faced and make this a convenient time to attempt
a review of these problems.
A. The Leadership
There is no indication that the personal position of Khrushchev has been
shaken, and on the contrary he has probably consolidated his power even
further. Since coming to power Khrushchev has instituted a number of reforms
and inaugurated policies which, as I have frequently pointed out, have generally
appealed to the public at large although they have at the same time alienated
small but inpertant categories of individuals who have been adversely affected
by these policies. The addition to this group of around a quarter of a million
military officers who will for the most part find it difficult to adjust to civilian
life will bring the total of the incipient Khrushchev opponents to an appreciable
figure and could in the future be a real cause of concern to him, particularly
if added to by further drastic moves or by the conspicuous failure of one of
more of his major policies. There is appended hereto a list of the principal
categories of people believed to be more or less opposed to Khrushchev. In
general, however, most of Khrushchev's policies appear to have been well
received by the public at large and he has constantly shown himself to be
sensitive to public reaction and has constantly cautioned against undue haste in
carrying out new policies.
The efforts that have been made to develop Khrushchevrs cult of
personality in recent months, and particularly since his return from the United
States, have been striking. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev does not appear
personally to feel the need of praise and adulation, and this strong emphasis on
building up his personality suggests that the regime has some concern which
they believe necessitates these measures. The most likely hypothesis, in my
opinion, is that it is due to the unsatisfactory state of Soviet-Chinese relations
and the fear that these difficulties may come out in the open. Were Khrushchev
concerned about his personal power position, he would certainly not carry
out his present plans to absent himself from the country for considerable
periods of time.
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With respect to the rest of the Presidium, it seems clear that Belayev
has been found to be inefficient and in any event has been made the scapegoat
of the failure in Kasakh agriculture and industry. It seems unlikely that he
will be able to stage a comeback and he will probably eventually either be
dropped from the Presidium or at least reduced to the rank of candidate
member. The case of Kirichenko is probably more complex. There would
appear to be real need for a troubleshooter in the Rostov area which has
suffered from drought in the past year. Moreover, part of the failure in
Kazakhstan and elsewhere was due to lack of spare parts and unsuitable farm
machinery, and Rostov is one of the most important centers of agricultural
machine building.
On the other hand, there is no question but what Kirichenko's new
assignment represents a denotion it reduction in influence, 1:he German
Ambassador informs me that he had received a report, before Kirichenko's
new assignment was announced, that Khrushchev and Kirichenko had had a
serious disagreement. The Ambassador said he did not know what the issue
was, but later informed the Japanese Ambassador he understood that Kirichenkc
had advocated a hard foreign policy. I suspect this is guessing on the part of
the Ambassador. I think it likely that they did have a disagreement over policy
but do not think that Kirichenko, who has always been a Khrushchev man,
aspired in any way to challenge Khrushchev's power. It will be recalled that
last June when Averell Harriman saw Khrushchev the latter seemed to resent
Harriman's assumption that Kirichenko might be a possible successor to him.
It is also interesting to note that at that time Khrushchev specifically mentioned
not only Koslov but also Aristov, Brezhnev, Mukhitdinov, Pospelov and
Polyansky as outstanding members of the Presidium. These six, together with
Mikoyan, Suslov and Ignatov of the older generation, appear to be the dominant
figures in the Presidium at the present time. Brezhnev and Polyansky in
particular appear to be rising stars. On the other hand, candidate Presidium
member Kalnberzin, who was demoted from Party First Secretary in Latvia
to Ci airman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium, might be dropped from
the C. C. Presidium if any re shuffle takes place.
The Swiss Ambassador had several reports from Soviet sources, one to
the effect that Kirichenko opposed reduction of Soviet armed forces; the other,
and more likely, that the basis of their disagreement was incompatibility of
temperment of the two men. The Polish Embassy has informed us that they
have heard that Kirichenko was accused of violating collective leadership by
making decisions without consulting Khrushchev or his other Presidium
colleagues. This sounds quite plausible.
So far as I can judge, collective leadership continues to exist in the
sense that issues are probably freely discussed within the Presidium, and
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merely an examination of Khrushchev's daily schedule proves that he has
delegated wide responsibilities and powers to his colleagues. There is,
however, no question as to who is boss and whenever he considers an issue
of sufficient importance he insists upon and gets hL3i own way.
B. The Party
Although Khrushchev is a fanatic Communist and although he has
concentrated on the Party as his instrument of power, in the past year there
have been some indications that he considers himself in a sense above the
Party and the representative of all elements of Soviet society. It is natural
perhaps that upon his assumption of the role of chief of government he would
be drawn increasingly into working with and through the government apparatus.
Moreover, with his concentration upon efficiency and increase of production
as his primary current objective, he is frequently brought into a position of
supporting the generally more efficient technicians or managers against the
Party careerists who are often not technically qualified. There was a striking
passage in Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech in which he chided a regional
Party committee for having appointed an efficient director of a collective
farm as a district Party secretary. While perhaps too much importance
should not be attached to a single incident, this seems to reflect Khrushchev's
present line of thinking, that production is the thing and the best way to get
it is to put the best people directly in charge of production.
The Central Committee's resolution on propaganda was a most
revealing document and in my opinion clearly indicates a division of opinion
within the Party. There would appear to be both a malaise within the Party
and a growing split between the Party and the people. Khrushchev has, of
course, advocated invigorating the Party cadres by cleaning out deadwood and
bringing younger members to the fore. It is clear that a number of steps have
been taken to this end, but they do not appear to have been wholly effective.
The widespread purges of Stalin's time resulted in a kind of unnatural selection
of those least endowed with initiative, and it has doubtless been difficult to
interest the more capable members of the younger generation in straight
Party work.
There is probably also a division within the Party as to how to meet
the various problems which are described below.
C. Current and Future Problems
1. Ideology
From the long range point of view the problem most likely to set up a
serious and possibly eventually even fatal strain within the Soviet system
is that of adjusting Communist ideology to reality. The present ideology is
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outmoded, in some respects contrary to human nature, and contains many
patent absurdities. Now that the regime has declared that socialism has been
achieved in the Soviet Union and that they have entered the stage of building
Communism, they feel obliged to fit current decisions into this framework.
On the one hand they are reluctant to fiddle with the ideology any more than
necessary, and on the other hand failure to do so tends to expose the
absurdities and widen the split between the Party and the people. Although
the Soviet Union is far from having achieved the abundance of production which
the Party considers necessary before the stage of Communism can be achieved,
they have already found it necessary to begin theoretical discussions in
preparation for the next Party Congress at which time they apparently feel
compelled to block out more concretely the specific goals of the Communism
stage. These decisions, once taken, affect policies and actions on current
problems. Among recent policies which appear to have been affected by the
necessity of keeping within the framework of the ideology are a series of
measures designed to restrict the development of "the new classes. " The
educational reform to some extent comes within this category, as does the
reduction of ministerial salaries, and price and wage adjustments. Although
it has been made clear that the ideol~agy does not call for equality of
consumption in the Communist stage, it would not permit the existence of
bourgeois tendencies or the development of classes which has already become
evident.
The "new Soviet man" has not developed as his creators had hoped, and
it is clear that human nature exists even in the Soviet Union of today. As is
true of any new society, those people in the Soviet Union who have achieved
status are extremely proud and jealous of their position and will make strong
efforts to retain it. For this reason the educational reform has probably
created more opposition than any of Khrushchev's other policies. As the
Soviet Union prospers and the standard of living rises, class distinctions
will tend to become more pronounced and this problem will be exacerbated.
Much attention has been given in recent years to the issue of
dogmatism versus revisionism. As a result of developments in East Germany,
Hungary and Poland Khrushchev abandoned his earlier position that dogmatism
was the greater danger and supported the campaign against revisionism. He
is by nature himself a revisionist, however, and there is some indication that
he is swinging back to his earlier attitude. This problem of course has
important ramifications in Soviet relations with the rest of the Communist bloc.
Almost any question in the Soviet Union could be discussed within the
framework of the ideology, but for convenience I have divided the remaining
problems under the headings of internal and external affairs.
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. Internal Affairs
The most serious internal political problem, apart from those mentionec
above, is that of the role of the Party. There are some indications of a
widening fissure between the people as a whole and the Party, and this was to
some extent reflected in the Central Committee's resolution on propaganda.
Party propaganda has always been dull, but in the days of Stalin and the use
of mass terror it was assiduously studied by every Soviet citizen who wanted
to know which way to jump next in order to survive. Although the Soviet people
are still aware that Big Brother has long ears, the memory of the terror is
fading and the public in general no longer feels it necessary to wade through
reams of boring propaganda. Although the people as a whole take great
nationalistic pride in the accomplishments of recent years, they appear to
take credit for these accomplishments themselves rather than attribute them
to the Party. This must be of concern to the Party hierarchy.
The conflict between the bureaucrats, including the technicians and
managerial class, and the Party careerists has not been resolved, As was
indicated above, Khrushchev's concentration on the increase of production
may be leading to an increase in this problem rather than its resolution. One
interesting aspect of this problem will immediately arise in carrying out the
reduction of Soviet military forces. The professional military men will of
course wish to use the criterion of military capability in selecting the
personnel to be retained, while the Party will certainly insist upon retention
of what it considers the necessary complement of Party-minded and trained
officers.
Probably the most serious internal problems in the Soviet Union are
economic. Khrushchev's goal of overtaking the United States in per-capita
production within a comparatively short time was said to be one of the issues
upon which he broke with the Molotov group. In any event his intense con-
centration upon this goal to the exclusion of other objectives has undoubtedly
set up strains within the system. One of the most important of these is that it
means further postponement of the achievement of a high standard of living.
It is clear that the regime recognizes that a gradual increase is necessary,
but the problem is the rate of this rise. Basic to this issue is the problem of
operating the Soviet Union without the use of mass terror. The function of
Khrushchev's economic policy is to build up Soviet production rapidly through
the use of.persuasion and incentives. This has widespread repercussions and
it is not yet entirely clear that it can be made to work satisfactorily in the light
of other regime objectives. It is already clear that the appetite grows with
eating, and I suspect that the regime is going to be obliged to develop the
production of consumer goods faster than they had planned. An example of
this is the housing problem, which will now be increased by the granting of
priority for housing to demobilized members of the armed forces. In the
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period when almost no one had adequate housing there was great dissatisfaction,
but the pressure for improvement was probably not as great as it is now when
almost every Soviet citizen has a friend who has obtained new housing and
this adds greatly to his own discontent. Moreover the Soviets will find it
difficult to allow living standards in the satellites to get very much higher
than in the Soviet Union itself.
One of the most serious economic problems is that of farm policy.
The peasants are still probably the most dissatisfied group in the Soviet Union
despite recent improvements. It is probable that the regime will have more
difficulty in meeting its Seven Year Plan goals in agriculture than in industry.
Probably more serious, however, than the drive for increased production
is the dilemma facing the Soviet regime in its basic farm policy. In addition
to the discussion of the problem in Khrushchev's speech at the plenary
meeting of the Central Committee in December of last year, an extremely
interesting article by Zaslavskaya was published in issue #11, 1959, of
Vaprosy Ekonomiki, From these statements it is clear that the regime is
faced with the dual problem of trying to raise the level of the backward
collective farms and at the same time deal with the fact that members of some
collective farms are now receiving compensation that is too high. It is
apparently intended to deal with the latter problem by variations in prices paid
for agricultural products in different regions, by payments in money which
will not be allowed to rise above wages on state farms, by siphoning off
collective farm indivisible funds for community projects and for assistance
to backward collective farms, and by income taxes. The direction of policy
is clearly toward gradually turning the peasants into paid workers and
reducing the distinction between state and collective farms. Whether these
measures can be carried out and the incentives necessary for increased
production still maintained, remains to be seen. Although Khrushchev has
indicated that such measures must be carried out with caution, they are
certain to arouse resentment on the part of the peasants adversely affected.
Other farm p!ilicies likely to arouse resentment are the attempt to reduce
individual holdings, and Khrushchev's pet project of the development of
agrogoreds with centralized farm housing.
In the industrial field the regime is faced with serious price and wage
problems. Here also Khrushchev is trying to develop individual initiative
through material incentives and has to a large extent recognized that the goal
of building Communism is not enough to secure a high level of production.
The problem of maintaining a classless society while yet rewarding initiative
is a difficult one. Moreover, although the decentralization of industry has
not proceeded far, it has already given rise to problems of nationalism and
localism. As the Soviet economy grows in complexity the problems of
centralized control are increasing and will probably force further measures of
decentralization with their concomittant problems,
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3. External Affairs
Undoubtedly the most serious problem within the Communist bloc is
that of Soviet relations with Communist China. I am convinced that the
differences between the two countries are profound and will probably worsen
rather than improve over the long run. I would not expect any complete
break in the foreseeable future but I do not think such possibility can be
excluded.
A. problem on which there is undoubtedly a difference of opinion within
the regime is the degree of conformity which should be demanded of the other
Communist satellites. In relations with the free world, Khrushchev's drive
for coexistence has not only raised ideological problems and set up strains
within the leadership but has also had repercussions within the Soviet public
as a whole and has set into motion developments which will not be easy to
control. Khrushchev's effort to develop and portray friendly relations with
the United States in particular has struck a most responsive chord with the
Soviet people despite the years of intense anti-American propaganda. The
opening up of cultural and technological contasts, the diminution in the jammin?
of our broadcasts and the increase in thepublication of foreign news with the
increase in knowledge of foreign points of view have already had an important
effect, and the longer this is continued the more difficult it will be for the
regime to reverse its policies. As merely one example of the widespread
effect which such policy can have, might be cited the fact that it is now more
difficult to convince the Soviet people that a foreign threat makes it necessary
to postpone the satisfaction of their desire for a better standard of living.
One of the most unpopular of Khrushchev's foreign policies is that of
aid to underdeveloped countries. Particularly unpopular is the program of
aid to Egypt. The public in general feels that the money could better be
spent at home and they dislike Nasser as a dictator. Communist Party
members resent aid to a country which has persecuted Communists, and
there are doubtless many who do not understand or support Khrushchev's
game of playing for higher stakes.
In the foregoing discussion I have in general not touched upon Soviet
successes and strengths nor have I attempted to cover all of the problems
which the Soviet Union is facing. Instead I wish to underscore the principle
that in any society there are inevitable pressures for change generated not
only by unsatisfied human desires but also by unsolved operating problems.
These pressures are necessarily intensified in a planned and goal-oriented
society where the leadership reserves to itself the exclusive right to
introduce changes. Paradoxically, the efforts of the regime to solve current
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problems by attempting new approaches inevitably creates a new set of
strains. To be sure, Khrushchev is intent on preserving the basic forms
of the present Soviet system, and the changes that he has introduced can
be described as being more within than of the system. Yet as he moves to
make the system more productive, Khrushchev must weigh the demands of
pervasive political controls against the demands of productivity. His
record to date has been one of seeking a safe compromise between these
two requirements. By seeking to induce greater effort and discipline on
the part of the population through persuasion rather than coercion, Khrushche,
has committed himself to a course where retreat becomes increasingly
costly and where the changes already introduced, if successful, tend to
encourage additional changes leading in time to a rr.ore normal society
within the U. S. S. R. The pace of this evolution is difficult to gauge but I
believe it is developing rapidly due In part to the fact that Khrushchev at
65 is a man in a hurry. I believe it to be sound American policy to
facilitate this evolution in every way practicable.
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Categories of Soviet Citizens Believed to be Opposed to Khrushchev
and/or the Present Communist Regime
1. Certain members of the KGB as a result of liquidation of Beria and
reduction in role of the secret police.
2. Friends and followers of the Molotove-Malenkov group. Cavalier
treatment of Molotove resented by large numbers of the general
public who respected Molotov as an old Bolshevik. This group
includes the incorrigible Stalinists,
3. Those in Moscow Ministries and others adversely affected by the
economic decentralization program.
4. Many of the technicians and Party personnel whose status was reduced
as a result of the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations.
5, Armed Forces personnel resentful at treatment given Marshal Zhukov,
at insistence on strict Party control of armed forces and those
opposed to troop reduction in principle or adversely affected by it.
This latter group will probably include the great majority of the
250, 000 officers to be demobilized.
6. Those opposed to the educational reforms both educators and those
having status they hoped to use to gain privileges for their children.
7. Those opposed to the New Lands program either on policy grounds or
who have been exposed to hardships in implementing it.
8. The writers and intellectuals who resent Party control and who in
general lack respect for Khrushchev whom they consider too crude
to be the symbol of the Soviet State.
9. Many higher students who resent restrictions on their activities and
who generally lack conviction in Communist ideology.
10. Many peasants who resent the pressure toward greater regimentation,
the reduction of their private production activities, the attempts to
level remuneration, etc.
il. Factory managers and workers adversely affected by bonus and wage
policies.
S E C R E T
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12. Nationalists. This is not a problem peculiar to Khrushchev's regime
but it has probably been ?.ncreasc-d by his decentraa.zation policies.
13. Religious believers who resent: the fact that li.beraly.zat.on. in other
spheres has not included concessions to the churches.
14. The Jewish community who also resent continuing diseri.miration
despite fact that Khrushchev's attitude toward thx.m better than
Staiin's. No indication as yet as to whether menr..on of cosmopolitanism
in C. C. resolution on propaganda presages new anti-Semitic measures,
although this might be inferred.
15. The growing group with bourgeois tendencies and tastes who resent
Khrushchev's policies pointing toward a leveling process.
SECRET
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217. Moscow's Friendship University
With its usual paean of self-praise, the Soviet Union announced on 23
February that it would soon open the University of Friendship of Peoples in
Moscow. Generally referred to as Friendship University in the West, the school
will handle primarily Asian, African and Latin American students. The university
is to have an initial enrollment of 500, eventually expanding to 3, 000 to 4, 000
students, and will offer specialized training courses of from four to eight years.
Students will have all expenses paid, including transportation costs to and from
the USSR, tuition, monthly stipends, free housing and medical care. This
program will provide foreign students more generous financial assistance than
is accorded Soviet citizens. There are now about 1, 500 foreign students at
Moscow University and several hundred more at other Soviet schools. In contrast
to the announced peak of 4, 000 students at Friendship University, there are
50, 000 foreign students from 131 countries studying at 1, 680 institutions of higher
learning in the US this year. A portion of this number receive financial help from
the US Government, while thousands more are assisted by the states, universitief
foundations, and benevolent and fraternal organizations of all sorts. Additional
thousands of foreign students are studying in universities in other free world
countries.
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14 March 1960
218. Disarmament
A 10-Nation disarmament conference will hold its first meeting in Geneva
on 15 March. The five Communist nations are expected to rely on the Khrushchev
plan while the representatives of the five Western powers will probably present
a variant n# the Lloyd Plan. Both the nuclear test ban and general disarmament
measures will also be discussed at the Summit conference set for 15 May in
Paris. Disarmament negotiations with the USSR have been conducted since 1946,
but the first noticable progress is in the work on banning nuclear tests, which
has been going on at Geneva since October 1958. Two comprehensive disarma-
ment plans have been proposed. One by Khrushchev presented in his speech
before the UN on 18 September a plan for total disarmament. On 17 September,
Selwyn Lloyd presented another plan leading to total disarmament but which made
explicit provision for the development of inspection systems and for the creation
of an international police force.
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4 March 1960
219. Latin American Economic Cooperation
rHeartening signs that Latin America is embarking on a program of mutual
assistance is demonstrated by the establishment of two free trade areas (common
market) in Central America and South America. In February 1960, El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras signed a treaty which threw open the doors to free
commerce among the three countries, called for the consolidation of their customs
organization within five years, and created development and aid fund for industry
and agriculture. On February 18th, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru and Uruguay signed a treaty for a free trade zone linking their economies.
The treaty has yet to be ratified and in any case will not go into effect until 1961.
Its aim is to increase trading within the seven countries by lowering customs
barriers among member nations while presenting common tariff walls to outside
nations, thus broadening the market beyond national boundaries and achieving
-tariff protection from outside competitors. Problems involved in establishment of
the common market are geographical barriers and lack of transportation facilities
between member countries with consequent limited trade between Latin American
countries. Although the actual trade covered by the agreement is very slight, the
potential for expansion is large. A leading spokesman for the "doctrine of self-
reliance" is Mexico's President Lopez Mateos who recently toured six Latin
American countries. He took the line that the United States is not to blame for all
of Latin America's economic and political ills and that there are active and latent
spiritual and economic resources within Latin America which can be harnessed
for the common good: "each country should make its own effort to promote
development since that is the only sure way of success". The importance Peking
attaches to this first step in self-help is illustrated by their broadcast of I March
which not only deplores the common market as destructive to Latin America
economies, but states it is only an imperialist scheme further to infiltrate US
monopolist capital into Latin America.
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ADDENDUM TO BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE
NUMBER 35
14 March 1960
The attachment to the guidance entitled Khrushchev-Gronchi
Exchange (Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #34, Item #211) is a
translation of an article which appeared in the Milan paper
Corriere della Sera on 9 February 1960, It was written by the
prominent Italian journalist, Luigi Barzini, Jr. who was present
during the reception in question and claims to have reported the
dialogue verbatim.
Item #215: Reference Iii-Weekly Guidance No. 33, Item #208,
"Self-?tetermination for Tibet" dated 15 February
1960.
Item #217: * Reference Ai-Weekly Guidance No. 23, Item #144,
"Non-Communist Foreign Students in Soviet Bloc
Schools" dated 28 September 1959.
CROSS-INDEXING
214. Plebiscite for Germany - C, C, P.
215. Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet -. A, F, G, J, K, M, S, U,
216. Current Stresses in the Soviet Union - E, H.
217. Moscow's Friendship University - E, U.
218. Disarmament - R.
219. Latin American Economic Cooperation - D, P, J.
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