DUTCH MILITARY ACTION IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A006000030008-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 22, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/09/27: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06000030008-0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Special Evalnafiion No. 98
ument No. 612
Copp No. 5 0
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Date:
Approved For Release 2006/09/27: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06000030008-0
 Approved For Release 2006/09/27: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06000030008-0
22 December 1948
DUTCH MILITARY ACTION IN INDONESIA
Dutch military action was instituted In Indonesia on
18 December, one half-hour after a Netherlands Government
representative in Indonesia had informed the Chairman of the
UN Good Offices Committee (CCC) of his Government's in-
tention to terminate the Renville truce agreement with the
Republic. Dutch forces are now establishing military control
over Republican areas in Sumatra and lava. Members of the
COC In Batavia (US Representative Cochran and the deputy
Australian representative) immediately forwarded a report
which asked for prompt Security Council action. They charged
that the Netherlands Government had not. fulfilled its obliga
tions under the Renville agreement because it had failed to
inform all members of the GOC of the contemplated action
and, by cutting telegraphic communications, had made it
Impossible to inform the Republic. The Security Council. is
scheduled to hear the case on 22 December.
Dutch Motives The Netherlands Government has described
its military action as a move to reestablish
peace and security in all Indonesia and to eliminate terrorist
and Irresponsible elements. Actually, the Dutch are moti-
vated largely by the conviction that an interim Indonesian
government under firm Dutch control must be established as
soon as possible. They do not really believe that the Corauau-
nist movement In Indonesia represents a threat of such mag-
nitude as to require action on the present scale. However,
in order to establish an Indonesian government under Dutch
control,the Dutch must forcibly eliminate the Republic as a
do facto government in view of: (a) the apparent impossibility
of settling Dutch-Republican differences on Dutch terms; (b) the
Dutch fear that the Netherlands Government could not maintain
control over an interim government in which the Republic was
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SE T
0
represented; and (c) the difficulty of establishing such an
interim government without Republic representation. More-
over, the Netherlands Government believes that maximucn
ec: inonnic benefits can only be realized by restoring Dutch
control over Republican-held areas.
Guerrilla Warfare The Dutch have already captured the
Republic capital and practically all
Republican leaders. Despite this success and the apparent
lack of effective Republican resistance, US security interests
have been seriously threatened by the Dutch "police action. r,
The removal from power of they prop US moderates in the
Republic has paved the way for the rise of a resistance move -
ment led by militant Communists and by extremist elements
formerly held in restraint by the Republican regime. In the
Initial stages, the Dutch can be expected to have considerable
success in.m aintaining law and order throughout the Republic.
The nationalist aspirations of the Indonesbas however, Will
continue to conflict with the Dutch desire to retah! a maxi-
mum amount of control. Guerrilla warfare and sabotage will
increase and compel the Dutch to continue the commitment
of substantial military forces in Indonesia. These commit-
ments will delay full Dutch contribution to a western European
defense system and will constitute a continuing drain on the
finances of the Netherlands Government.
Soviet Reaction The present si'tion in Indonesia will be
exploited in the Security Council by the
USSR, which will champion the aspirations of colonial peoples
and accuse the US of complicity in the Dutch action. Further,
the USSR can be expected to capitalize, throughout the Far
East, on the decline of US prestige which will follow the
collapse of GOC mediation efforts in which the US has had
a leading role.
Approved For Release 2006/09/27: CIA-RDP78-01617AO06000030008-0