STATEMENT BY MR. BRIAN CROZIER, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT, LONDON, IN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000300100029-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: May 14, 1975
• Content Type: TRANS

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14 May 197 5
Statement by Mr Brian Crozier, Director of the Institute for
the Study of Conflict, London, in testimony before the Sub-
Committee on Internal Security of the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate.
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
I am going to be .yin with definitions, for I believe that it is important
that we should know what we are talking about. You will notice that I use
the term:-ii "transnational terrorism' , rather than "international terrorism".
The distinction between the two in ay seem pedantic to some people, but to
my mind it is a real one. "International terrorism" might imply the
existence of a "terrorist international" in the sense of an international
body coordinating the activities of terrorists in different countries.
There is really no such thing, although a number of terrorist groups are
affiliated to the Trotskyist Fourth International with its headquarters in
Brussels. However, a striking aspect of the new wave of terrorism that
faces us today is that the great majority of the proliferating terrorist
groups deceive help of one kind or another across international boundaries,
either from other terrorist groups or from. governments that support what
they are doing or the objectives which they claim to be furthering. With
these few preliminary remarks, I propose the following brief glossary:
Terrorism: motivated violence for political ends (a. definition that
distinguishes terrorism from both vandalism and non-political crime).
Terror: measures of extreme repression, including torture, used
by States to oppress the population or to repress political dissenters (the
converse of terrorism).
E, xtremist: prepared to break the law, with particular reference to
political violence.
Subversive centres: countries that provide assistance, whether with
money, training, arms or various facilities, to extremist movements
engaged in challenges to the security of other States.
Guerrillas (urban or rural): groups or individuals practising guerrilla
warfare. The term "urban guerrillas" is often a misnomer for "urban
terrorists".
Revolutionary war: a form of warfare in which the ultimate objective
is the total destruction of the society in which the conflict is occurring,
and of the government and administration of the area.
Subversion: a systematic attempt to undermine a society with the
ultim,.ate objects of bringing about a total collapse of the State by bringing
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a regime into disrepute, causing a loss of confidence on the part of the
ruling establishment, institutions and government, and provoking a
breakdown of law and order.
Subversion and Terrorism
It is very important to understand that terrorism, which is our main
concern today, may or may not be a phase in a subversive campaign or
in a revolutionary war. The relationship between subversion and terrorism
is the same as that between the whole and the part. A revolutionary war,
essentially based on the pattern developed by Mao Tse-tung in China and
by Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap in Vietnam, and later practised in
Algeria and other countries, usually goes through various phases. It will
begin with the creation of a subversive apparatus ; the second phase will
consist of terrorism; there will be a third phase of guerrilla war; and a
final phase of full-scale war leading (if the-revolutionaries are successful)
to the "revolutionary final offensive" - of which we have just witnessed a
tragically successful example in Vietnam.
Now the point I want to make is this, that terrorism is in the final
.analysis much more grave and important if it is a phase in a process of
subversion or revolutionary war than if it is practised for its own sake
as an isolated phenomenon. It is a very -important element in the counter-
action to terrorism to be certain in diagnosis of the challenge. If the
terrorists have ultimate revolutionary objectives, they must be prevented
from reaching Phase 3 and at all. costs Phase 4.
One of the most striking and curious aspects of the contemporary wave
of terrorism, however, is that in a number of cases there appears to be
no discernible ultimate political objective. Terrorism becomes a way of
life. I am not making the mistake of suggesting that such. forms of
.apparently unmotivated terrorism are unimportant. On the contrary,
they contribute to the erosion of liberties and of the fabric of society.
They must not be allowed to go on, but it must be borne in mind that the
ultimate beneficiaries - if any - of such terrorism are unlikely to be
those that actually practise it.
The Objects of Terrorism
I think it is fair to say that there is no absolute unanimity among
specialists on the aims or objects of terrorism. I myself have always
distinguished between two main categories of terrorism: disruptive and
coercive.
The aims of disruptive terrorism are: self publicity; to build up the
movement's morale and prestige; to discredit and demoralise the
authorities; to provoke the authorities into taking excessively harsh
repressive measures, likely to alienate the population and force a rising
spiral of official expenditure in arms, lives and money, resulting in
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public clamour for the abandonment of counter-action.
The aims of coercive terrorism are: to demoralise the civil popula-
tion, weaken its confidence in central authority, and instil fear of the
terrorist movement; to make an example of selected victims, by torture
and/or death to force obedience to the leadership of the movement.
There is an important observation to be made at this point: terrorism
is a weapon of the weak. This, at any rate, was the normal experience
in the recent past. Usually, terrorists graduated to guerrilla war and
then to outright war when and if they felt strong enough. If they abandoned
guerrilla war to return to terrorism, this could normally be taken as a
sign of returning weakness. It must be stressed, however, that the con-
temporary wave of terrorism provides many examples that do not conform
to this facile rule; and it may well be that the readiness of terrorists to
stick to terrorism even when they are visibly growing in strength, may
help the security forces to determine whether the prevailing terrorist
situation represents an end in itself or is a phase in a wider revolutionary
action. There are many examples, but the ones that have struck me most
forcibly are those of the Red Army Group (the Baader-Meinhbf gang) in
the Federal Republic of Germany; and the prolonged terrorist activities
of the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) and the Montoneros in
Argentina.
Two more observations are called for at this point. One is that
terrorism is a barometer of success or failure, and a fairly precise
indicator of public support or its absence. Whenever terrorists find it
necessary to kill more people on their own side than on the enemy side,
it must be presumed either that their cause is widely opposed, or that
at least it leaves the population indifferent. In many situations I have
studied, the terrorists normally killed more of their presumed supporters
than of the supposed enemy. The other observation is that terrorism, in
general, appears to be a useful auxiliary weapon rather than a decisive
one. It may even be counter-productive, by alienating the population.
The Main Strands of Terrorism Today
Any classification of terrorist groups is bound to be arbitrary, in that
overlapping is inevitable. In recent study groups and conferences of the
Institute for the Study of Conflict, we have been in broad agreement on
the following classification of the main categories of terrorist groups.
We had Western Europe primarily in mind, but these categories are
operative all over the world, including the Western Hemisphere:
1. Ethnic, religious or nationalist groups. In general, these are
minority groups which feel themselves different from the majority of the
population, on ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural grounds. They
include the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the
Palestinian group Al Fatah with its extreme terrorist wing, Black
September, and on. this side of the Atlantic, the Front de Liberation du
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Quebec (FLQ). At different times, of course, you have had Black
extremist groups in this country as well. You will note that these
ethnic or religious groups may be either "right-wing" or "left-wing".
Initially, both the Provisional IRA and Al Fatah were to the right
rather than to the left. On the other hand, the FLQ and the Official
wing of the IRA, which is Marxist, are of course left-wing.
2. Marxist-Leninist groups. I should like to emphasise the im-
portant point that although a number of revolutionary groups of the
extreme left, such as the Trotskyists, are often at loggerheads with
each other and usually violently opposed to the Moscow-line Communist
Parties, they are all nevertheless branches from the same mother tree,
in that they are all. Marxist-Leninist. The same obviously applies to
the so-called Maoist groups, which may or may not be affiliated to the
Chinese People's Republic. The Guevarists and Castroites must also
be considered in this group. The Official wing of the IRA certainly
belongs in this group as well as in group 1; along with the Portuguese
Maoist Reorganisation. Movement of the Party of the Proletariat (MRPP),
the Basque ETA (VI Assembly) and the Maoist Brigate Rosse in Italy.
It should be remembered that most of the orthodox Communist parties
are more or less responsive to the current Soviet line in favour of a
.''consitutional path to power". Nevertheless, there are a number of
striking examples of Communist parties that have latterly been involved
in violent action. These include the Portuguese Communist Party (for
about two years until May 1973, through the terrorist ARA); the North
Vietnamese (Lao Dong); the North Korean and the Cuban parties. Nor
should it be overlooked that Moscow, while in general advocating
"constitutional" methods is nevertheless engaged in clandestine assistance
for a number of terrorist groups, not limited to those of Marxist persuasion.
3. Anarchist groups. These are neither as numerous nor as important
as the groups in our second category, but Anarchism may now be on the
increase. In Spain, which has a strong Anarchist tradition, the Movi-
miento Iberico Libertario has emerged recently in Catalonia. The
German security authorities classify the Baader-Meinhof gang as
"Anarchist", but this is arguable. The "ideology" of the gang is con-
fused and eclectic. To the extent that it possessed an ideology at all,
the Angry Brigade in the United Kingdom could be classified as "Anarchist".
4. Pathological groups or individuals. Where group violence appears
to be a way of life, in that the political objectives are never clearly spelt
out, it may be helpful to regard such groups as pathological rather than
political. Some experts would hold that such American groups as the
Weathermen or the Symbionese Liberation Army, are organisations that
may be considered analagous to the group responsible for the Manson
killings. The motivation may have more to do with personal inadequacy,
hatred of family, or a specifically white middle-class guilt-feeling than
with an acquired ideology.
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5. Neo-fascist and extreme right-wing groups. In Latin America in
recent years, a number of groups that may be regarded loosely as "right-
wing" and that appear to have enjoyed the tacit support of the authorities,
have sprung up in reaction to left-wing terrorism. Examples include
the Eye for an Eye (Ojo por Ojo) in Guatemala and the Death Squad
(Escuadrao da Morte) in Brazil. There has in fact been very little true
right-wing terrorism in most Western countries, with the important
exception of Italy, during the past two years or so.
6. Ideological mercenaries. This is a true "transnational" phenomenon.
Traditionally, mercenaries sold their military talents for money; the
ideological mercenaries are ready to cross international borders in pursuit
of an ideological cause. A pioneer in this field is the Japanese United Red
Army (Rengo Segikun).
The Subversive Centres
Relatively few terrorist movements are entirely home-grown and self-
sufficient, although it is equally true to say that unless a group has roots
in its home territory, it is unlikely to flourish, regardless of foreign
support. The point, however, is that foreign support does enable such
groups in many cases to increase their effectiveness and pursue their
efforts until final victory. Recent history has brought dramatic examples
of this proposition. For instance, the victory achieved by the North
Vietnamese forces and the Vietcong would not have been possible without
massive supplies of sophisticated armaments from the Soviet Union. This
was equally true, incidentally, of the Vietnamese Communist victory over
the French forces at. Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Again, the anti-Portuguese
terrorists and guerrillas in Mozambique and elsewhere would probably
not have achieved their final political victory without substantial support
in money, arms and training from the Soviet Union, China and certain
Western countries, among them Sweden.
As my earlier glossary puts it, countries which provide such assistance
for movements in other countries must be regarded as subversive centres.
By far the greatest subversive centre in the world is the USSR, which is
actively supported in Eastern Europe, especially by East Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The Chinese People's Republic is also
involved as a subversive centre in support of groups in South and East
Asia, in the Middle East and in Africa. North Vietnam is similarly
involved, in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. North Korea's involvement
in subversive support has had a bizarre geographical spread, including
Mexico and Chile. Cuba under Fidel Castro has likewise exported
subversion and terrorism to most other countries in Latin America, on
a very minor scale in the United States, and in certain African countries,
and even in the Middle East.
It should not be supposed that the activities of these Communist
countries are necessarily coordinated. On the contrary, they are often
conducted in rivalry with one another, and I have termed this phenomenon
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"competitive subversion". There has been competitive subversion
between China and Russia, especially in Africa and the Middle East.
But it would be a mistake to suppose that these rivalries are entirely
to the benefit of threatened countries. The Russians and Chinese may
currently be pursuing policies of mutual hostility, but all Communist
states that are involved in subversion are aiming at the same objectives
-the elimination of "colonialism", "neo-colonialism", "imperialism",
and "capitalism". The proliferation of revolutionary groups, regardless
of their allegiance or the degree of their autonomy merely complicates
the job of security forces and intelligence services in the target countries.
Apart from the Communist countries, a number of other countries,
mostly of left-wing or revolutionary tendencies, have also been involved
in the export of subversion and terrorism in recent years. These include,
or have included, Algeria, Tanzania, Zambia, the Republic of the Congo
(Brazzaville) and Zatre; the Popular Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY),
Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon (the latter probably involuntarily). An important
newcomer in the field has been Libya under the Ghadaffi regime, which has
involved itself in terrorism in many places, including Northern Ireland,
Chad, and even the Philippines.
I am now going to tread on more controversial ground. The terrorists
of yesterday quite often turn into the respected citizens of today. This is
clearly happening in Mozambique, and in Guinea-Bissau, and will shortly
happen in Angola. It is a curious fact, nevertheless, that during the
period when such movements as FRELIMO were involved in terrorist
activities against the Portuguese authorities, a number of private organisa-
tions - most prominently, the World Council of Churches - and various
Western governments provided financial assistance to the terrorists.
These included Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Norway and Finland. In all
cases, the aid provided was said to be "humanitarian" in character (that
is, destined for medical supplies, schools, etc.) and not military. To the
extent that such assistance relieved the budgets of FRELIMO and other
organisations, they were enabled to increase their purchases of military
material.
I end this section with some remarks about Soviet bloc involvement in
support for terrorist movements. The year 1968 was a turning point. In
that year, three major events focused the attention of Soviet ideologists
and policy-makers on political violence and in particular on the so-called
New Left. These events were: the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia,
which in a sense brought a New Left government to power, forcing the
Soviet armed forces to occupy the country; the TOt offensive in Vietnam
and President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election, which could be
attributed at least in part to the protest movement; and the disorders in
Paris in May and June, which almost brought down the government of
General de Gaulle. A new policy and attitude towards the extreme left
or. ig;inated .in Moscow at that time. It was a very sophisticated policy,
'which amounted to this: That the orthodox parties everywhere could denounce
the extremism of the left and advance their own credentials as the alternative
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government and the party of order; whereas Soviet assistance to
terrorist groups, including some ideologically incompatible with the
Moscow line, could continue on a clandestine basis. A striking exam-
ple of this came to light with the seizure at Schiphol airport in Holland
in the autumn of 1971, of a large shipment of Czech arms destined for
the Provisional (that is, non-Marxist) wing of the IRA. The Russians
have also been involved in support of terrorist activities in Portugal,
in Mexico, in Colombia and in Chile, among other places.
The Portuguese example is particularly relevant. I have already
mentioned the Portuguese Communist Party's involvement in violence
through the ARA. The point is that the PCP has always been entirely
responsive to Soviet directives. It has never questioned Soviet policy,
even on such traumatic issues as the Nazi-Soviet pact, the invasion of
Finland , the occupation of Hungary or the occupation of Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet Union was also involved for many years in the training of
terrorists and guerrillas from African countries, including the Portug-
uese territories.
In addition, Soviet weapons have reached the Palestinian groups and
the Turkish People's Liberation Army some year s ago. In fact, the
USSR offers courses in terrorism, sabotage and guerrrilla warfare in
two distinct streams, according to whether the candidates are members
of a Moscow-line Communist party or of a "national liberation movement".
The Communists attend courses run by the Lenin Institute, otherwise
known as the Institute of Social Sciences, the Institute of Social. Studies
and the International School of Marxism-Leninism - the terms being
interchangble and all referring to the same organisation controlled by
the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Each course
lasts about six months and at any given time between 300 and 600 men
and some women are enrolled. The largest group is from Latin America;
next come the Arabs, but Europeans, Asians and Africans are present
in smaller numbers.
The second stream -- national liberation movements - is channelled
through the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, and eventually finds
its way to training camps at Tashkent, Odessa, Baku and Simferopol.
I should add in fairness that the Russians hold ambiguous views on
terrorism. They are on record as opposing the hijacking of international
airliners, for instance - not least because this kind of action has happened
in the USSR itself. But they are in the terrorist business on a large scb.le,
and this fact should he remembered at a time when "detente" is supposed
to be the order of the day.
The Response to Terror. ism
In all advanced industrial countries, there are wide and deep divergences
of opinion about the nature of society and the desirability of change. But
there i.s a broad consensus that terrorism cannot be tolerated. Even if
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change is needed, it cannot he change imposed by the force of a
fanatical minority. If society tolerates the assassin or the bomb-
thrower or does not react to terrorism with sufficient awareness
and determination, then by degrees the terrorist may appear to be
the spokesman for legitimate pressure groups. Terrorists act in
defiance of the law and of the social consensus; the rule of law must
be enforced against them. It may well be that the terrorist group
has fastened on a genuine social or minority grievance. Any intelli-
gent. counter-action must take steps to remove the grievance that is
exploited by the terrorist group, as well as to suppress those practi-
sing terrorism.
Inevitably, the terrorist has the initiative, since they can attack
places of their own choosing and in their own time. It is essential,
therefore, to penetrate the terrorist organisation or acquire reliable
intelligence about its plans. The terrorists must be isolated, by being
denied the essential aids they need, such as food, money, medical
treatment and safe houses.
A successful counter-action must be coordinated. The brunt of it
will fall on the national police force and on the internal security and
external intelligence services. But paramilitary organisations of the
state, and other state organisations - such as immigration control,
frontier and coastal guards, and any official information services that
may exist - will also be involved. In the last resort, the armed
services may also have a part to play, when the incidence of terrorism
has escalated to a level that is beyond the competence of the police to
deal with. In terms of organisation, the various ministries and agencies
involved must be brought: under a single authority, who may be the Prime
Minister or the President or Head of State.
The role of intelligence is absolutely crucial. All intelligence gathered
by separate agencies must be pooled, computerised if necessary and
centrally assessed. In any anti-terrorist campaign, it is desirable to
set up a national task force drawn from the various agencies involved,
and dedicated to research, investigation. and the coordination of counter-
measures. One of the most successful examples of anti-terrorist action
in recent times was the incident in 1-Tolland on 31 October 1974. Fifteen
hostages held by armed criminals in Scheveningen gaol were released
by a commando assault by a Dutch counter-terrorist squad. The psycho-
logical methods included noise, flares, smoke bombs and sirens, and
skilled marksmanship played its part.
A particularly important aspect of a counter-campaign is information
and publicity. Especially in an open society and a representative demo-
cracy, the public must be fully informed about the need for counter-
action and - as far as is consistent with security - the need for certain
measures. In practice, he med i.a, especially television, have usually
provided a one-sided account of terroriser; and the response to it - one-
sided in favour of the terrorists. This is not; entirely the fault of the
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professional media people, hut is inherent in the nature of television.
All counter-measures can be presented, with a special focus on any-
thing that may be described as police brutality, or excesses on the
part of the authorities. The terrorists, on the other hand, do not
normally invite television teams to witness people being beaten up,
or tarred and feathered or (as in Vietnam) the disembowelling of
recalcitrants. Certainly, television interviewers have been known
to present terrorists in a sympathetic light. But if society is to be
protected from terrorism, it is incumbent on the authorities to make
the extra effort needed to enlist the cooperation of media personnel -
not to present a distorted view in favour of official action, but merely
a fair present ation of the need for counter-measures in the common
interest.
Much remains to be done in preventing terrorists from gaining
access to explosive materials and to weapons. I realise that in the
United States you have a special problem because of the wide availability
of guns. But the availability of explosive materials can be limited.
Companies entitled to stockpile such materials should be required to
guard their supplies.
? As regards such crimes as the hijacking of passenger aircraft,
very inadequate progress has been made in international law. The use
of new technology and the rigorous enforcement of security measures,
especially in the United States, has drastically reduced the incidence
of hijacking on internal flights. On international flights, no real progress
will. be made until countries offering a safe refuge for hijackers are
suitably penalised.
This statement does not, of course, pretend to be exhaustive. I have
sought to analyse the problem in its principal aspects. It is a problem
that is still growing in scope and danger. And it is a problem that can-
not be solved in one country alone: international as well as national
action is required.
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