PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT FOR AQUATONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000100430002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 8, 1955
• Content Type: MFR

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8 March 1955
SUBJECT: Proposed Organizational Concept for ACUATONE
1. Need for Advance Plannin : Although the earliest operations
under this program will pro not be mounted from overseas bases until
February or March of 1956, some urgency attaches to the development of
firm plans for the organizational structure which will then be required.
This urgency derives most of all from the need to select well in advance
during the procurement phase the individuals who are to be assigned to the
more important positions that will be needed in the subsequent operational
phase. Moreover, the period when the aircraft are being tested and pilots
are being trained should be one in which the operational organization itself
is tested prior to the comaencement of activities overseas. Finally, it
roust be emphasized that the working out of organizational details can be a
time consuming process even after the basic concept has been determined.
The purpose of this paper is, in the light of these considerations, to
outline a proposed organizational concept.
2. Ass tions Concerning the Scale and Technical Character of
Operations: There are two c cums, ces either o which singly., or both
o which in combination, will ultimately compel the suspension of operations,
and which may do so long before even the higher priority intelligence
targets have been covered. These are, first, the development of counter
measures so effective as to render overflight missions unacceptably hazard-
ous and, second, a political reaction by the energy' after his discovery that
overflights are being conducted so threatening or carrying such menace to
the political position of the United States as to result in a political
decision to halt overflights. The probability of one or the other or both
of these responses will increase with the passage of time after operations
have commenced. Accordingly, it is assumed in general that operations will
not be undertaken until a considerable capability (in the form of both
aircraft and pilots) has been accumulated and that once undertaken, missions
will be flown with the greatest feasible frequency at least until high
priority targets have been covered. The following are a number of more
specific assumptions which depend in part on this one:
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a. Operations will be conducted from two to four rear bases,
at each of which there will have to be provision for maintenance of
aircraft and of photographic and electronic equipment, basing of 25X6
personnel, flight planning and possibly other functions. Such bases
may be needed in northern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean
the Philippine Islands, Alaska and Thule, although it is
highly doubtful whether operations will ever be conducted out of more
than three, or at the most four, bases simultaneously. It is possible
that one rear base in Europe rather than one in northern Europe and
one in eastern Mediterranean will suffice.
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be As a rule, actual missions will be flown from forward
staging bases, or else reconnaissance aircraft will be towed or
carried by other aircraft and released close to the enenW's border.
Provision will have to be made, therefore, for the operational use
of suitable large cargo aircraft and of other aircraft capable of
towing or carrying the reconnaissance vehicle,
c. It will be necessary to transport eventually as mater as
fifteen reconnaissance aircraft, together with sizeable numbers of
personnel and considerable maintenance equipment from the ZI to rear
bases overseas. Moreover, different rear bases will be used at
different times and there will probably be a net movement of recon-
naissance aircraft from certain bases to others (especially from west
to east) in the course of missions that traverse enenV territory from
one base to another. Accordingly, there will be a heavy and continu-
ing requirement for air transportation between bases.
3. The Clandestine Character of the Operations In general, actual
overflight missions are be conducted as clandestine operations. There
is little possibility, however, that these overflights will not sooner or
later be detected by the enemy, although in the development of the aircraft
and in flight planning every effort will be made to maximize altitudes
within the eneny's radar frontier and thus to minimize detection. Not
only is it possible that specific missions will sooner or later be detected
but, if and when th are, the one will certainly be aware that they are
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Under these circumseyces, the operation as a whole can be clandestine
only in the sense that the U. S. Government will at all times be in a
position plausibly to deny that it has undertaken this activity. So long
as the only evidence that the enemy could adduce to support a charge
against the U. S. is a record of observations of its own radar or visual
search installations, plausible denial will still be feasible. Accordingly.,
the two basic security requirements are:
a. That neither enemy agents nor unauthorized people in third
countries should acquire arW evidence which would indicate from what
bases missions were being flown or which would demonstrate any kind
of official U. S. support, and,
b. That, in the event of the loss of an aircraft over enemy
territory,. enemy authorities should be unable to prove U. S. official
support for the operation.
4. Ass tions as to the Political Arrangements and Cover for the
eration: sic fact
for this operation is that three out of a possible five rear bases will be
in the territory of foreign nations Whose sovereignty has been recognized
by the United States and that any advanced staging bases likely to be
employed in Europe or in Southeast Asia will be similarly situated. In the
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light of this fact, the following are the political and other arrangements
assumed to be necessary in order to maintain the possibility of plausible
denial:
a. The rear bases will in all cases be USAF installations
where the facilities and personnel required for this operation can
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be installed and maintained without the
necessity of special additional arrangements with the local govern-
ments. In the case of any rear base in northern Europe, however
assibly of a rear base in the eastern Mediterranean
and
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be difficult or impossible to keep all
e t
ill
t
o
prov
w
i
knowledge of the project from intelligence officers of the local
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orward or staging base in northern Europe
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could used without the knowledge and consent of the
local government. Even with the consent and cooperation of the local
government, it would be difficult to conduct operations unobtrusively
at such forward bases (which is one of the mein reasons for using
them only briefly as staging areas.)
c. Virtually all of the foreign governments in whose terri-
tories either rear or forward staging bases will be located would be
sensitive about any operations conducted from their territories
overtly by regular U. S. Military personnel. There might also be
legal and/or policy objections on the part of U. S. departments to
such employment of regular U. S. Military personnel.
5. Assumptions as to Procurement, Personnel and Processing of Data:
Although arrangements on ese matters are far from complete,' they will have
an obvious bearing on organizational structure. Accordingly, the following
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assumptions have been made:
a. Airframes, photographic reconnaissance equipment, and
electronic equipment, together with spares are being procured and
financed by the CIA. GFE including especially engines, spare parts
therefor, and certain standard photographic reconnaissance equipment
(which will be modified for use in this project) is being procured
by the Air Force.
b. The CIA will procure specialized
supplies such as photographic film and electronic tape. The CIA is
also procuring specialized field maintenance equipment from the
suppliers.
C* All primary mission pilots will be civilians recruited
and employed by the CIA.
d. Personnel for the maintenance of primary mission aircraft
and of photographic and electronic equipment will be recruited and
trained by the suppliers. In the field, they will be contract
employees of the CIA,
e. Operational supporting aircraft required for towing or
carrying and for transportation of personnel, equipment, and primary
mission aircraft to and from staging bases will be provided and
maintained by the Air Force.
f. Air crews for such operational support aircraft and arty
maintenance personnel especially assigned to them will be U. S. Air
Force personnel.
g. The Air Force will supply supporting technical and logis-
tical services where it can do so more readily than the CIA in
accordance with detailed plans to be developed,
h. Responsibility for the procurement of current non-specialized
supplies, notably fuel and maintenance personnel, will be divided by
the Air Force and the CIA on the basis of convenience and security.
--.The costs of these supplies will be borne as may be agreed.
i. The CIA will secure and equip special laboratory facilities
in the ZI to process all photographic film.
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7. Proposed Organizational Concept: One possibility for AQUATONE
would be to 0 oar essen is . the same organizational pattern that has
been developed in connection with other CIA air activities, with modifica-
tions to take account of the character of this project. This would involve
CIA units at overseas bases paralleled by supporting Air Force units and
in Washington the centralization of authority over project activities within
the two agencies in offices which would cooperate intimately with one,
another. Alternatively, the pattern could be varied to provide for a more
closely integrated structure. This would be a joint task force with head-
quarters in Washington and units overseas; it would include all CIA and
Air Force personnel assigned to the project. Although there are consider-
able theoretical differences between these two patterns, they would amount
to nearly the same thing in practice. The main positions to be filed will
be about the same whichever is adopted. There is, therefore, no pressing
need to choose between them at this time. A proposed structure is outlined
below on the basis of each alternative. The two following considerations
will apply to either:
a. Since operations at the several bases will be closely inter-
dependent (notably in the case of missions which originate at one base
and terminate at another), a considerable degree of control will have
to be maintained at a central project headquarters. This operational
necessity will be buttressed by the need to maintain close and continuous
policy control over the project by the senior policymakers of this
Government. Both considerations point to a central project headquarters
in Washington. This would in any case be the logical location so far
as the CIA is concerned. In the event that the concept finally adopted
is that of paralleling but not completely integrating CIA and Air Force
organizations, it will be essential that the officer immediately in
charge of Air Force participation be stationed in Washington and that
he have adequate authority to deal directly with the CIA (and with other
Government agencies) on the project.
b. In the interest both of operational efficiency and of effective
control of overflight activities, lines of command should run directly
from the joint, or the two paralleling, project headquarters in Washing-
ton to operational units in the field. It will presumably be necessary
to establish liaison with theater commanders but the activities here
contemplated are peacetime clandestine intelligence gathering operations
which are not subject to theater commanders' direction and control, and
the considerations of policy involved extend far beyond the scope of,
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and have little relevance to, any single theater. Apart from a
liaison relationship with theater commanders, security considerations
will probably forbid the use of established command channels in either
the CIA or the Air Force, It will be necessary to limit to only one
or two selected individuals within each organization unit from which
the project draws support, knowledge of its nature and purpose.
8. organizational Structure with Separate, Paralleling Organizations:
Under this con-"" cept, re l ~e a project organization within CIA to
personnel will be assigned; and there will presumably be a Special Activities
Group established in the Air Force, either within one of the operational
commands or reporting directly to the air staff, to conduct, or as appro-
priate to arrange for, all Air Force activities on the project. Specialized
personnel in such fields as aeromedical and meteorology who can best be
furnished by the Air Force for service both in the ZI and at overseas bases
can either be assigned to the CIA for the duration of the project and serve
in the CIA project organization or be assigned to the Air Force Special
Activities Group and work in cooperation with parallel CIA units,
a. The CIA organization will consist of a project headquarters
in Washington together with initially two and later three Air Sections
in the field, each assigned to a particular rear base. The organization
will have its own T/O apart from the operating divisions at CIA head-
quarters and the regular CIA field stations. The line of command will
be directly from project headquarters to the Special Air Sections and
will not run through either divisions or field stations.
(1) The project headquarters will have general control
over the project and will be responsible specifically for
continuing liaison with other departments, for the clearance
as appropriate of operational plans, for the direction of
continuing CIA procurement and recruitment, and, in conjunction
with the Air Force, for operational planning. The headquarters
will have three major sections:
operations., will perform its major functions jointly with
the a quarters of the Air Force Special Activities Group,
with the equivalent section of which it will constitute a
joint planning group. It will have responsibility for opera-
tional planning, weather, intelligence, targets, and medical.
The senior CIA officer will also be responsible (outside of
the Joint Planning Group) for personnel functions with respect
to civilian pilots.
Materiel, including design and development, procurement,
and ego and. financial functions with respect to procurement.
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Administration, including organizational planning, security,
fiscal procedures, personnel functions with respect to all regular
CIA personnel and civilian contract maintenance employees, and
Headquarters to rear base communications.
(2) Each CIA Air Section will be organized in two principal
sections, operations and administration. The Operations Officer,
who will also serve as general deputy to the Chef of thermion,
will have responsibility for civilian air crews for primary mission
aircraft, operational commamications, and, jointly with the Air
Force Special Flight, mission planning and intelligence. The
Materiel and Administration Officer will be responsible for the
maintenance of primary mission a craft, security, communications
(Message Center), CIA financial activities, and, jointly with the
Air Force Special Flight, supply.
b. The Special Activities Group in charge of Air Force partici-
pation will presumably have its headquarters in Washington and will
include initially two and later three Special Flights, one assigned to
each overseas base at which a CIA Air Section is located. All Air Force
personnel on the project will be assigned to the Special Activities Group.
(1) The headquarters of the Special Activities Group will
be responsible for all Air Force activities in support of AQUATONE.
It.wil.l give direction to the Flights stationed at overseas bases
in the performance of the functions listed below. Its main task,
however, will probably be to arrange for support from a number of
other Air Force components in the ZI. Specifically, it will have
to provide for continuing Air Force procurement,.Air Force logistical
support for both Air Force and CIA units at overseas bases, the
assignment of Air Force personnel to the Special Activities Group
as required, and any continuing Air Force developmental activities.
The headquarters of the Special Activities Group will also have
important liaison functions with other parts of the Government.
It will collaborate with the CIA project headquarters in opera-
tional and organizational planning. The Special Activities Group
Headquarters might well have three sections corresponding to those
in the CIA Project Headquarters. The 2perations Section would
consist of either the Chief or the Deputy Chief of the joint
operational planning group and those members of the group to be
contributed by the Air Force, probably including a meteorologist
and intelligence officer. The Materiel Section might be limited
to one or two officers concerned wit 'he remaining development
and procurement activities. The Administration Section would be
responsible for fiscal procedures,, pei onne1 -function with
respect to all Air Force personnel and other appropriate activities.
(2) Each Air Force Special Flight will man and maintain the
operational cargo aircraft required at each base. It may be required
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to furnish other kinds of support in the field and will be the
channel through which the CIA Air Section obtains logistical
support and such supporting services as weather information
from the Air Force. Each Special Flight might be organized in
a manner parallel to the CIA Air Section in the two principal
sections Operations and Administration. The former will be
responsible or Air Force a 'r crews or operational cargo air-
craft, and, jointly with the CIA Air Section, for =mission planning
and intelligence, The Administration Section will be responsible
for the maintenance of operonal cargo aircraft, adjutant
activities, Air Force administrative and financial matters,
housekeeping for both the Special Flight and the CIA Air Section,
and, jointly with the CIA Air Section, for supply.
c. The CIA project headquarters and the headquarters of the
Air Force Special Activities Group in Washington could be housed
together. They should, in any event, cooperate closely so as to
provide unified direction of all phases of the project. For planning
purposes, appropriate individuals in the two units will form a joint
planning group. In the field, too, certain activities will have to be
performed jointly. The Operations Section of each CIA Air Section and
Air Force Special Flight would in fact have to establish a mission
planning group made up of the two operations officers and including
perhaps a weather officer from the Special Flight and an intelligence
officer from the Air Section, On the administrative side, joint action
would similarly be required on supply matters.
d. Detailed supply and logistic procedures will be developed
as required. In general, however, they should be along the following
lines:
(1) Each CIA Air Section will requisition directly on the
CIA Project Headquarters for supplies, personnel, and services to
be procured by the CIA. This Section will, however, requisition
on the Air Force through the Flight assigned to the same field
detachment for Air Force procured equipment, specialized personnel
and services including transportation.
(2) Each Air Force Flight will follow usual Air Force
procedures and Air Force channels in arranging for its own support
and in obtaining Air Force procured items requisitioned by the CIA
Air Section in the field.
(3) Procurement and recruitment by either the CIA or the
A.ir Force for the purpose of this project other than that under-
taken in response to requisitions from the field will presumably
be initiated by the CIA Project Headquarters and the headquarters
of the Special Activities Group, respectively. They can arrange
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between them (as at present) for procurement to be performed
by one agency for the account of the other.
( 9. organization Structure with Integrated Organization: Under this
concept there will be a joint Project Headquarters Washington and initially
two and later three Detachments overseas, one stationed at each active base.
The joint organization will be staffed in part with CIA personnel (including
Air Force officers on assignment to the CIA) and in part with Air Force
personnel on active duty with the Air Force. It will presumably be necessary
for the Air Force to constitute a Special Activities Group as a unit to which
all Air Force project personnel can be assigned, but this unit will. have no
separate organization and will in fact be merely a designation for Air Force
personnel serving in the joint organization. In general, the functions of
the project headquarters and the detachments in the field will be simply a
combination of those already listed for the paralleling units that, under
the alternative concept, would make up the two non-integrated organizations.
a. The joint headquarters will control all project activities
and will be responsible specifically for continuing liaison with other
departments, for the clearance as appropriate of operational plans,
for the direction of continuing procurement, recruitment and development,
and for operational planning. It will have three major sections:
(1) Operations, including operational planning, weather,
intelligence, medical, operational communications and personnel
functions with respect to civilian pilots.
(2) Materiel, including design and development, procurement,
and legal and ncial functions with respect to procurement.
(3) Administration, including organizational planning,
security, fiscal proce es, personnel functions with respect to
all regular CIA and Air Force personnel and civilian contract
maintenance employees, and headquarters-to-detachment communica-
tions,
b. Each field detachment will be organized in roughly parallel
fashion with an officer in charge, a general deputy who could also be
operations officer, and a third senior officer in charge of administra-
tion and materiel, The Operations Officer will be in charge of air
crews, mission planning, weather., medical (specialized), intelligence
and targets, and communications (operational). The Materiel and
Administration Officer will be in charge of maintenance, supply.,
communications (Message Center), personnel, security, adjutant activities,
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finance, and housekeeping as needed,
co With a joint organization, it should still be possible
for each Detachment to requisition locally from Air Force installa-
tions for items available in the field. Presumably, requisitions for
all items to be supplied from the ZI would be drawn on the joint
project headquarters which would arrange for procurement (or supply)
by CIA or the Air Force as appropriate.
d. Financial procedures would have to be developed. Probably
the pay of personnel and virtually all other disbursements would be
made by either the CIA or the Air Force, although small joint cash
accounts might be useful for certain local expenses overseas. There
could, however, be centralized accounting for expenditures made on
project account by both agencies so as to permit proper budgetary
control and distribution of costs on whatever basis is agreed.
10. Phas : Development, procurement, recruitment, and training
for AQIIATO are proceeding satisfactorily at the present time with no
formal organization in the Air Force and none in the CIA other than a
centralization of responsibility for project activities. Although some
similar centralization of responsibility will very soon be needed in the
Air Force, it is probably unnecessary to establish separate project organiza-
tions with their own T/Os (or a joint project organization with its own T/0)
for several more months. The timing of this step will be determined largely
by the desirability of bringing into the project well before tests start in
August 1955 most of the individuals who will occupy senior positions when
the organization is fully established. On the other hand, an organization
built along the lines of either of the two alternative concepts outlined
above will not need to be fully staffed with three (or more) detachments
in being for about eighteen months, that is, until at least twelve recon-
naissance aircraft are operational (in addition to any held in the ZI for
testing, training or modification.) Within these limits, the following
tentative phasing is proposed:
a. Centralization of responsibility within the Air Force by
1 April 1955.
b. Activation of CIA and Air Force Headquarters units, or of
a joint Headquarters unit, with definitions of functions of head-
quarters sections and assignment of specific individuals by 1 May
1955.
c. Completion of organizational plans for overseas detachments,
selection and assignment of three senior officers for each of the
first two detachments by 1 July 1955*
d. Majority of personnel of first two detachments to be recruited,
assembled and trained at test site by 1 December 1955.
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e. First detachment to be activated at East Mediterranean
base 1 February 1956 with operations to begin 1 March 1956.
f. The second detachment to be,activated overseas 1 April
1956, to begin operations 1 May 1956,
g. The third detachment to be activated overseas by 1 August
1956, to begin operations 1 September 1956.
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