REAGAN'S PLAN TO 'RECLAIM' LAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01137R000100130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 163
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 22, 1980
• Content Type: NSPR

---=~~_~---- Approve:df~sr Retease 200"f/flT/g7 :CIA=RDP90-O'F'F37R000100130001-4
~-~ - ~ - -
LONDQ~ DAILY TEL~GRAFA
22 D~C~II~ 1g8Q
C
"' li~;ence:s?rviees, ca-operation
d
'
`~
: an
bet~v~en :the .Iranian
~~ 3. ~LL.~.t7J1~ri.c,%v ~r~~ i.
~OLrFCiS close ?to? ]'resi-_~~ ' ?~ ?:==Syrian secret services has.re=
?. dent-el?ct Reagan say?,~ _ - .-.- . . -. - _{.~ - - - ?- t -: suited in important . ex_
- t;~at? lte *, pri~;ately deter- ?I ?+ ~ - 7'-?"' ~ _.,:ehaa~es-bl ? irfnrrnatiun coa-
=-`farce 'of a,OCO m-n to set.uF ---?_. . -_ . -: -? ;. Di~~isians>in~-?~Ipsto~r-?,, and.~ihe-- Saud,3-~,^.,r-:-a~?,::,;::-_:c~-_:..
-.~?It~.`_l?~iatil:C_~?I~Ban~iiC.f:F..t:1? C,rnlta~has also."Captured tW0 pre~'ailing~ l:RCGX~21ni~?.:O~C.r.?.7 lyz~'Demuciatic=Front For
=-Sahara" ? nnder.? his'?crrnt;al: ~ -~ 1;ca~ianS a -\iig. pilot` and an' :Presic'eat-???Brz-illr~zv's ? .hcal;lt =the. -Liheration nF ' Pair.=tine
''-'Cliff; pupp?t?-repub?ic would' =`--air?fclrce-en,ineer.-who-maY- :znd-th..?shapa,_gf-'.the:suc-:? '~:(t7F-tiPJ, an opzniv~;iarxist-
`-~-embraceareaa'oEC~ad,~~1a1; - -be'?able-to-provirJe-first-bond- ?ces=ion-'tn hi:n,.-3nipro~eahe?-~= Leninist- ~rnup tiwitnin [he
- - testimony -. to the ,role that
-?~igerad:Sez:?_ga~._::?_:';`:.--':, : ;; .prosp4ct~.for...a st:atFaj- nf.:~;'PL~?that ma{;e> nn-secret
?I`. ~-;ta 'Presidect.Sada~_see5."a' := Soviet personnel are playing ? -Iznd. .:re.clarrztiv~l"- .=.und*.~r;.; - u6 its~p~~o-Soyi~'.t luyalt:Ps. has
g.?
'ti?reat ~f;,Lihtian-aad;GU?vi?t '-~n-'the???repression_=of-black-?~
r , the ? Pearari_?~d;ni?nistration. - begin % diaributing anti-Sa!!di
_ - C- d.. ti~aiast - A,ricans- '- - ~ ~ - - -- - - - -
?a
_ ,~`~~pe, - to = -u=e - a-? specia_H ~= _ ..- _ - - -_ '.,,~ `; `?: }..~~ - : - _~ of the 1?i.l~naarian. ~uarisiriy id-; `_ _the ' `Teheran.:: redir:ierc into
-.'trained (2n3' =Savi~t-armeu) _;~ ~_pII55iatts?:Capl:urQ ? ,? :_~ ' 135:) , - _ - - - direct - -action .. against ...the
- ~-? _
t
. I
,
e
arm
. Ju_ a..:. -e S r
e~l ~n.. ,. , ?---te .t?,enc_; ? -zn- .-. u a
a
=-C,ou[:~vai .C}seddei to?: estab-?'i Iu~the:Casa.-of?'Cuba,..the pros- I ? ttudropov;_ the. Chaff-Wan ?of-~= zl-Iibouli~=and `the- Iranian?
~?-'%sh his-ss~rernacti.:in'a'.civili :. ~ pP~s for: an'e~ceetive?~cuvart: ?~the.??ICCrB;?~lar. )3oris Porrr~,~c:~-secret=~~service~.--chieF; ?-Gen.j
"=war' ag~?ins?'tl:e Follol:?ers vF ~.. action programme ?to red:lee -marev,?tite head oI; the l'nter-:`:::.Ditssei;l =Fardoust= (forme,-ly'
?' -the-forma ; Deieoce'l~finistzr. ++ r~Dr . C;~=tro's =-appetite ? for.l , i:ationzl ? I7enartin~nt of .tn~ :=~-"en-ployed?shy the .Shah),? the
:sse^e-.FI~Srr -:? Chad? as_ofl _=.-: foi:ei~?.wars have boea high Soviet-- . Cnrnln,~nist ;.party',.-,~;-Syirian ? ofrciat` claimad`tlzati
-- -=major intere~rto l:ibya'; dic-. f! ~,)iaElted by evidence.aF.-recent ~ ,C~htral -Con:mittee, and ;cJr%~:~-the:'?Eadana?"air'?'base= in;
~=?ta,or; CoLGaddaa,'bec;u7e of ~ successes-,by?.the=:anti-Soviet. ?1Iiiilail ;.Suslov; :.the--Posit-:_?~-nortlt~astern Saudi tlrabia?is~
- -its?uranium?re~err-es.?~ which -` Unita-._3tterril.ay is:AnBo[a:- ~.- burn's..-tvp_ ideologist,. rrz?ail '.-=baiug -used by:=Soviet BIucI
-=:hP?hore~;-to:_e~crlox:;irsue~ _? Publication' 'note,: -_?~are :the-~
`a. -.Public-. statement (Perhaps; :_ only_in~titutions,ia.the? coon.-
a-?`Dedaration of ~Ii~eui," bt: ?_- try--. =possessing: ;the ?~actnal'
cause -. uf.. 'the,- large -Cuban ?-mzaiis ? o;'.: a.. revolu"ionary
.:,.~migre_'co'rsimun'ity- Chore) de= ?? change,'..;' Soto.' propaanda-
' =i5riiig'';11asliingtoa';'? refusal =- activities-:are ??signlficant,-be=
` to'tale:ate .So.?iet Elpc acti- -~ rouse:they.segect.an? effort to?
L-:bya'~ ~ ioup.;in?-'Chad-?-.couid -l : curbin~ahe :process af= Soci=t.
?: easi'~-- }rave ?- been - averted', ._ elpansicn-:that:' was - allotired:
~~ accordir.? io_ ~~estera -p?ili- ~ ?_to .-,:bo.-,_unresisted:= by - `Cite::
'- =tart'. ai~a~ysts:.'l~a.~=? F'rep.ch ;:,Ca,_-ter.:Ad.*nicistration.::~:?:.:."
_~''.~been' ,Prepared to: -Play ~ari,: S1'hil -~. the.';-; gccupation: ~ : of:
.'`active, role: '$ut_-Presideixi .Af~anistan~.;::lost-?:'sllcscow:
- r?~:G`lacard -d'Estaing. repv'tedlv.,? ._ , frieads??in ihe.I~lamic- u?or:d_
?_reiected .xhe - advice.=;:?of?_liis , Lhe ~worL?ers':revalt? in l'alard:.
- '. -senior intelligznce?advisers:to ; _ .has-:;;ex.'ubited -.t}ie_=::vulner-;
~?`use: French. lane;,ka-;strafe _.
p -. ;-ability--and.'-fragility' of .ihe?
-'-::tha,Lihyaa; calumns,.~ ~~;r~_: 3._-_ ? - :Soviet .empire .in.~he face of .:
~io~'r~:thy::mosE,.'e[feetire ~re- 2internal g,re3suresr: -~?--~ =: -
-~;spanse -ta---Col.; .Gaddafi'3- If the Aussians?irivade'Polanir;'
-~' ~forei~n= adventure3 = may' - be - ??iliey-?= will -lose allies and
-min'- direct , sup~wrt:. For.;:the -.- sympathisers throug:tout the'
:; e!+~ments ? inside: ?):.ibya who - world: -and deal-'?z -death blow
` are opo~?e[ti.[uiltis?reairrrz.---.,.' = S.n?:"`the =re~?th ?of Eurocom-
.It'is. reliab{y reportad that the ~ munissn-" in the run-up to 'the
Gar[e~?' Adrnirlis[ratian niter- -_~ neart;F-rench_elecdons.~~%=~ ~'_`_-~
~
.
?'vened duriaa a- revlvti,; G-l~i~ _. _ . , _ _
~
~
"= rriavin; - a~aiast' Libya;. the
'- Reagan 1ldminist: atiori, in a
?_=_~` dramatic chance. of ;rolicy, is
_ 'li4:ely to. ~:ork-?in close con-
{- ter*_ with the E;yp[ians ?to
' ._ ~~ end Cot- Gaddafi's CarreY as
--a-1? ~~ In rrrr9laaaai crvuv,e- - ? -~"ma[:er_~~?pCc?ugd'~o~:Rg1e~as~?11~s: ~C~~F~D=~'_'~
_?=vi:ies:.-in'tire -Ccntrai Ameri- I -;.1adoc:nnate -:Saudi ?- ? o~cer-?
:-'can re~ion? ---;- a'-..sort ??of? --cadets. wha.?are-sentcto.?the-
- ` ?. - ~ - voh'ps the- recent_,ste ing-u
:Srlrrr;Yit 'firm . _ - --- --' -- ? - - - - PF F?
? - - _ - _ `- _' ~1 ? ? the. culture and' traditions of~
S7l~L'87"SlOlx.... - -- _ ~ ~( _-~_the_Uirllnr_people,-who--live
,... - ~. . ?
- -?
.:..~__ _.... _.: ; I VERSH~DUb4~D_-~'b-^?.~ they
~?or: the >-moment, ahe Soviet' ~ .~
'leadership ? appears-.'- to - .bc - ;: 'Iran-Iraq . ~viir -~ and `-the:
~loCl:ed -in. the aalne .kind. of:: ~ ~1.fibstage~nrablerlr-in ?Teneran,~~
- ,internah? -".debate.:..`that-- prE-' l more'.: crtidence hat- coma. -to-
Ceded the invasiun-of ?C~echn, +~ ~' light' of Soviet-backed= efforts
_,_.:-.,-:_ __ ,~~~. _-.L_-? --._,_.: - Ito.:dastabilise- the monarc3y
''Asia and China but. in tight-
?_ knit ?COmmutiities : in'' :Saudi
. Avabia .too,: ~rhere? many" leave
made careers in the_Armed.
? Ponces and ,the. civil adroinis-
 -=passed .;;,that =:;outlaws.:.pubtication~vf'~
:: independence.' ?of =: the--rtiews?_~media?
~'~'ir~tegrity of thoseitiatitutictss?._;: ~~ ``- ;r
~~-~ n*Because'of.therecent_orgyoi~vela-a
- ~-.tlons~arnd restraints;-xhenerrr_admini~-
__ = traeivrt wlli+:be te~tptedTio,~]~ter~se
_ .~s#ccantriunity!s:;visibiliryFand;.lva~rti~e?
-~_restrictions_,5ocie'at bath is regvit'ed.::
~' 1`Ieither :will=substitute..foc-tbe.,public~
-.
~~'uadeirstandin$~-and support?riecessary f
?->i~to-sustalxt a.long-term program-to-ta=
~=';~baild.thi$ most critical.itmction of gov-~
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R0001d#~ ? ~ ' ~= "~'4"?`~~'~~~'.?" `'`'~~`~""`" ~ .
' ?.~1;. sham A lfson; deavt of Harvard-Uni-::
~:veraity's Ke~ririedy: 5choot?oJ'"Govern
010013000 ?
App~-~ved For Release~3001/07/27 :~CIi4=RDP?90-O'I'~~7I~00 1-4
~,'~S~CLy ~,t P:~` x NEB YgRiC TI'S
~..- 21 D~CEItiI~~R 1985
Q~ p,~G~ .
~?: t" GA.~IBRIDGE; Mass:"-=.`Tlie central."- -_"~ ,
how well its analyses. and estimates in-
- fortnpolicy-makersof proYaable'devel- ;
optnents abroad= More Than any other,
: it~is_ihia test that the United States in-~~
r
n
,
ate..un e g _
'?I978 and.29'T9; : American? intelligence ?..'?:::;tiorrforced.by are autocratic; repressive _ x
~;profotutdly.~mi8assessed "the -ievolu- .:. ruler: Instead, acceding to'the.:5halt's '.-~ sstuation, and the receptiveness of in-.i
. t3vnary'iorces opposing the? 5Yiah:-x'or' : ?:_, demand,:.-.American . -intelligence ~: re- .. telligence users to such analyses-,.
-e~tatnple, in August-1978, a Central In- :-~`-;stricted ~i~ .activities 'to liaison. with - .~ .What-into be done?-The problems, i
`telHgence~ Ageacy estimate. conclud~~??~ :_:Savalt;theShah'ssecreCpolice.,~; :: ?. .. -.._,' ,~ deep-rooted,-are nor, susceptible to f
edz "Iran .is fiat in a revolutionary~or':,;`- =.::.second, ..'America ..?Iacked a :.small, quick? fixes- The? Reagan administra- ~
'even?prez'errolutionaiysftuation." 'The:.`; dedicated group. of experts focused. on '= tion.will be eagerto get on with the job: ~
'' its would Have:: a Same thins can be done without de-
: intelligence community's lailure to il-:-.?~, Iran.. Such 'exile ~ ;:. -
~~Iuminate'' these. events= . exasperated'~~~; :proached the extraordinary. develop-. ~,bate~ But -the first item on the agenda
.'President-Carter;:provoking?hits-to~=_'.".merits:of~:19711+.wtth-'deep understai~d?r~g :;,_-should_bexo=join+with-tlie=i:ttelligemcQk
:.;se>~,~?memorandutnto.theC.I.A:de~;-~:'=of Iranian society. The inadequacy of :-;'.,:committees of the new Cou~~reSs in.
daring: "I-:atii`not`-satisfied with the~_?-. dtrrent..arial}rxic expertise results;pri- _;`;, consolidating a-broad bipartisan eon-
' `~ ?w~ warily:.from the lack of commitment to ~.: senses >;iehiztd a =major prop" ?am of
.quality of political intelligence."; =.:, .:: ,;-r;~_ .. .: .
=~:=: geneatlt thaavrface of this case; one:~~;`_: recruiting;' developizig, and sustair~in$ . .~..:._ xecanstru'ctian. The feces pf that coo-~~
..fu:dscharacteristicfailingsof:-thecti~`---.:. _?connpetences,:of~prvfessionaT..analysts.::-?:..'_.;.senses-:should-.be:a:coramon goal?`:tti-.
rent:rarnmututy:irE?the:ihree':keyele~..'=" ;'But, the'deterioratian of recent. years ---=; -~give-~America:. the ..best-'inteiligencs~
:wants :-?~ai ~_performance~'~~ collecxion;-;:-`"also'reflects`the:estrang"menE:beween . rapabilityinthewarld::;.:.~ :;---:~;~ :: -`.
`>::,amalysis; and service topolicy-makers.: `= ;the intelligence community and the in- Ta promote. understanding of whax
- ~~'~ `stitutiorsa~that'maintain our..;society's , :?_`-will be required to achieve this obje~
"~,'-First,: in contrast to-remarkable ad=,."'~.
."vances irr technical-colleciiotx':capabil-' ;`._~. storehouses=.of.: snowiedge..especially ; ' tine, the..intelligence..conamittees of-I.
!'.-.......ccc_~'nrn.lA_. rirrrEw.~.: rli ria'fly t[]-{
-LC111~[jF-C t?4Y+iu~aaaa ~J a.a acuu..9 ---.~.,. ~ - - -- `
-`` -_Consider__the case: of Iran.-Through : -' - - d
~ ~ of Iran's ~nternai
sta
di
-
it~2S; :-C.Ullectlpq -; at %:~lIIIOInl'e1L10T1~; ? Del ..-:: _auxsrciaiuc.~cuau.a.v y............... _ .-... - --- - - - . _
..~?ageuts~--~s~eroded~.signii[antly:_~Th~. ~~:~::-::Third;'.the:lranian:ca_~2highli~its the hold'.'preparedn~shearings."?~mong.~
-causes. are?tua.uy-:[uts ? ixt positions'-far: `:. _;". problem: of-'interaction=beEween?.intelli- .:. :the q~zesttorsio bR addressed-ar?:
-?intelligence?offlcers.abroad;`dedicated - ''. getice:", analysts' and policyma'ters: .- =" I. How important is first-doss inteI-
'efforts liy enemies to expose Ainerlcar- ''"=. With aur,:increasing dependence' on the-: Iigence in the period ahead? Given t.':e
=:'agents, -and. Heightened .uncertainties '-:., Shah,.top officials came to regard liis;' ~ increasing. tiurtber -and . variety of
about the security of agents'. identifies: ~ 'stability as apremise ofAmerican poll- events abroad that, threaten our, inter--
In? Iran, -America: had: no-network-: of ," -`.cy. As a~:Iouse.Intelligence Cammittee? ... ests, the premium an-accurate assess.
clandestineagen-stoseawhatwasaa~'~`.%:'report::coneluded:=So stable. was the : ~mentafforeigsdevelopmentsisstead-.!
"tuallybappenine to`the~tt;ullahs? trier.-:-. y -"'premise'of:tHeShah'sst:rvival tHat this. fly using.'-. .... ... ...; -
:c}rax-ts, a.~~colonels under moderniza-',=.V'~,"limited-:both.fhe'.search far.an: accu-: ,.:: 2. How can: the :intelligence. cow-
.... . -. - ' ? ~ mrlnity's analytic competence be soli-~
.- stantiallyenhaneed? Protaisirg reme-.
Fdiesincludes:establisbing.car?~rpatits ~
? -',;that?.~,encaur2g~..analysrs',to ;deepsd i
-''their; PXpertise `far decades;:: dew. 'lop.. ,
? - : ;.frig relations with Outside institutions;
?-`and creating asystem-of well-struts l
Lured' cdmpetition 'within::Life inte}1%
=. ge;nce coramutrity:. ~ r: ~:?~: ?:::.:-. ;?r ~ ?: ~ .
- =-3.:'How,should #mde-of~sbe~weerriir%;
- _ .~telligeicce:~'and:~other.-:.imppr~artG.~ru~.-
- -';, tior~I vaIiies'-;be made?`,Should`; Eon=:`:
:''press declare specific'categoxies of itr'
- '~ fortnatfon (for example; about agents)
 STATI NTL
For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137800010013
NSW Y'QP.K TINS
9 DECrs~BER 198a
~u~~ians fit
Coil-Data Lack-:
Sovietofficials said' in Mvsww yes-
terday that they knew"nothing so far" .
to aonfirnp[. a. Swedish consulting con- .
tern's report of a huge oil discovery in -:
western Siberia. ~ - - -
The report was challenged by Ameri-
can.oil industry sources and the Cen-.
tral Intelligence Agenry; when it ap-.
peered Friday. But the Swedish can-
cern., Petrvstudies, defended : it yester- .
..day::; According..tD -the report, the
Bazhempv:. oilfield contains. ;an .esti- ._
mated:4.3;:trillion barrels~:of,:oil. re-
serves; ; ,which :.,would no~ake, ,.,it. the
world's largest. ..:
Marilio. Jermol, director. of Petr~.
studies, said. yesterday in Sweden that
the report had been misinterpreted but _
was substantially correct. The Bathe-
nov field isnot anewfind, he added:'.
A C.I:A:: spokesman,: Dale Peterson, .:.
sai in : .as- on n y a e
field. ap~~? to a im`g
o s ea
"T , ee : own.: useo a epth
o e e ~ an e a a i is
"s a-hTe,^Se said; "-any a f~y ~ra^ctlon of
`- fhe o c recove~a~ari eiz=
'or - vs.-- -
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 Approved For Release 2001/07%27: CIA-RDP90=011378000100130001-4
~.rt 1 ~ ~. `i''
~~ pcec ai~tr w~,e~e _=r_--'-_ :~~: ~::;...--., -. analysts =believe , he would not choose
- -
wnlvement
- - -- --
--
.-.,: --_
,
... ;. ~ - -__..__, - ~ a~ivu wcLC awu~ w x,c ucKU~^+cu. vw.-
on the-heels. of what?-informants>say :was a.j
t~ie: Soviet .Union _ appears to=_have:completed':-' ers
think the Brerhnav trip
`however
.
,
,
Brun, dust:-comp e . intE Bence estunate
_~preparations foc :passible'zxulitary interdentiion-_' `. might be n2eant to play down any joint-
a . e' yvtets apparent y conc u ate m
;iri Poland"and underscored its earlier .wax"~ ? military operation in his:. absenee.:' -
grave .corigequences.;,~ __ ~??;~~`x~ asmall--"crisis management committee
wa , ----- neces.~ry to stem a ristnn enge -I
- -
--ter-
` ~s%oit:'here and _ abraad;President . Carter'sum-= Zbigniew ~ Brze~inski...Later, _ the presi-
':White House ofricials..said ..yesterday`..thejr;
h
h
ith
t f
our w
or mare t
an an
,~~~ :. ~ gip. national : set~arity ~~~; ~.; ? dent me
- .were still in no positions"to saythat`a Soviet'mil-
~meEt with him twice. over the brewing cns~s._ tn.'~ the top-level National Security Council,
itary, .move: against Poland:::was. imminent and
d
Ed
t
r
f St
t
di
i
l
S
mun
a
y o
a
e
ecre
nc
u
ng
Poland and then called in"ional leaders;"
,others said they were ngt absolutely sure ~vhat'.
. _ S. Mug{ie.and. Defense Secretary Har-
lYloscotir?s intentions were.- B.ut there was` wide.
~forr:a~special ~3Thite:Houce brieFing?'-_:;:_.:---: ::.-? ;=old Brown..-. ;:. ~:::
,; s:~lrind. the he"~ tened concerns. here werE =_ ~'.. -.Aso called to .the White House for
aa~reement that the assessment of.the situation
__ . b~ --
`'several. potentially .omiinous developments, ac-. a special 20-minute briefing were House
here had turned increasingly. pe.9sitnistic in re=
cording to informed,US:=offz~ais:..:.;`:- . ~:;:~: =~ ,Speaker'l`hamasP. (Tip) O'Neill Jr (D-
cent days..,-: : :.:.~:: -.;:=; .'_~..:: _;.:. _... -.::?;.::~. .
,r~..,oo a,..,,...m a~;,l-+l,~t.f},a~-'else ;znw-:"a ~lblass.l.-House Minority Leader. Jahn
t
tainty`ahout whaClcincl'~
l
o' c
Th
':lot~of movement" involving 5cnrie~ and ;o ~ Rhodes (R-Axiz.), Senate Minority
but a number ~
the Soviets might take
ofactian
,
.
Warsaw. Pact military.. un~s throughout cam=: Whip Ted Ste yens (R .~laska) and Sen-
of officials said the Soviet;'intervention~might.1
-'' muinist Eastern Etirope_-.'~+Iore. Soviet`divisions ate NTajority `Vhip Alan Cranston (D-
-not came,~orstart out, as`afuil-fledged. invasion `
n~ its thewestera Calif.}-;;= :`._:. - .:-._
but rather. might come ixi: the,guise of, a:joint~.
.have "come out_oft}.seeir-gang - -- -: -
districts of the Soviet Union closest to the.PoI~.~ ~ At a hastily called news,briefing later;
military, exercise involving, Warsaw:, Pact forces:
ish border. iVlore: Soiriet .resPxvista-have' .been ;the :White House issued a terse state-
- ~: Intelligence estimates here reportzdly indicatz-
called. up-~ at an `axeIerated' pace-=~ iri. the: - mentt~at`-`preparations far possible So-
.the a vtets sno nn rvene, ey xru~'. t
.lastfew days Commandand casnmunicatian fa-: ~ . viet intervention in Poland appear to
o so nnon o nngs, m part; ,,
.~~ ~ ~ ~auarte~ ~ .~ ~ have been completed. Xt is .our. hope
are oua t ta. e.,a :concern-to:Moscow.'One'
that! -uo- sach-.intervention will takE
is: the .anniversary, on Dec.; 16,- of . tvorkei: riots-
~_=`:tiriet:_Union to other lsarters ~xr l~ Ger....
~..rpan~and Cxechaslaval~ which-- a_ =F~Oider. 4 _place:-Tfie~United States govemmenl
m-1970 in the port city-of. Gdansk.tl+.at-,even=_?
- .. - ~_~ + reiterates: its statement of -D.ec.. 3 -re-
- ._ w. Got,
tuallytoppled- the government of Wladisla
?-on'Poland; issue also base .broe~~t-~ . . _ . _ ~ garding~ the very adverse consequencE<
estate of readines~:.'I'laese_~mmancl, pastg~!ouId
-'~ mulka. The second is a planned review'
f,-,...._ _ _. - :-. __.~ _ _ -,,,~,:,-;;:~-..:... ,,~. ~ ?.~ for U.S:Soviet relations of Saviet'mil.
=:bytlie, independent labor.unnons of re__I
`coordinate~any rates?vention~tl,atinvolvedBaviet"~ itary intervention in Poland." : - -.: ;_ ::.:- ? , ?.seserves had been found in the the area
A repart''jresterday that the Soviet ! . ,
..
of the alle
ed discove
Mr
rhoff and othe
ail indust
des
ite the
Me
,
,
g
ry,
.
ry
p
ye
r
-Union had-discovered by far the big? ="observers said. Petrostudies had fre- ??- drillingofmorethan100wells. -
gest oilfield.in historywas ridfeuled by ~ .. quen[lycountered pessimistic portray- ?,; ~? 1=or his part, Mr. Meyerhoff, who has
industry:' and: ? Government ? experts. ~ ;., als.of the Soviet oil industry by the Cen- frequently visited Soviet oil?ields, be-
Plevertlleless; :it~ sparked selling,of pil ! .?tral Intelligence Agency- and ot~ier ::'; ~ lieves that the Soviet Union's reserves
stoclcsbynervous investors:`'`"-~ ?' , 5 rtes. r... eyerhoff chsr- ::~:~ .fatal X70 billion barrels, farhigher than
The field,-said to be in western 5ibe- ;=
via, was estimated to total 619 billion _;?acterized its owner, M.bi..Jermal, as a ?._. the C.I.A. estimate, but considerate
I: Stalinist.. exiled. from.,Yugoslavia be-. _-~~?~'l'fi`ari- et`n' repo-2ton"EFe?aTi~-tnd. -.
tons, mare than twice. the world's esti=' i.-_? causeof his political beliefs.-~:-_ - -; ?;.-? . e of field petrostudias appar- _
mated recoverable reserves of??300 bil- - ? -_? According toPetrostudies, e~cperts at ? =_ ently is referring to is a huge ail shale .
lien-tons ~4 find this size would equal -. _?, the Soviet geology ministry called the : ? deposit. at a depth of al;out IO,COD feet
about4;500`billiori harrels~~; . ~~',_ ' - - ~ discovery "a..unique...and..sensati~nal,..:.,.....and has ,been known_fos_ a-.long time,"
T~:rretivs~ sen[,:prices, of bit stacks ? " natural phenomenon,''. -asser'ang that the C.I.A. said: "Because of the depth '
plungirtg.~:;fixnong~the?issues that fell. ;--.the vast quzntfties of ail supposedly, of-"~ie~epasit,and the fact that: it is .
were Litose'a[ the. Exxon Corporation, ;=: found were of the hi ualit.
-..ti:~ a....:.:e.~ ~ ..,,:.,.~ = r.; Qna~ ?~ ^reY~_ gh-q y, low-sul- ,shale; .only a tiny:.fract_an of the oil
-
~v ~c4'r.1lP4G LfilILY ]l~sl~ -_~ J
l..VlTij7allJ. Yl ygl~lY1\l1Q, YV Tai ~rW }.w? - /\~
? __ ,' ~,,;.:-The widespread'bewilderment'Over .
Ohlo Staadai+d Down 3'/a ~._' ?'.>y:' . ~ - ~':,`?-~ ~: ~~~ ' Petrostudies~ further asserted that - . - the report of the huge size of the alleg~3
The~stock? a# the Standard Oil Com? _~~:. the Soviet experts believed 50 percent discovery Was -perhaps best summed.
pony (Ohio), which hasgyrate&cansid= of the oil could be recovered_ A United __":" tap by the fact,-that.tre C.1.A. and sev-.y.'
erablyrec~ntly,:iell3?v4,to?iB..At one`. _;States-oil company official pointed out -;. eral analysts: suggest'ertT~ in? the- .
point in:the.day's tradingit dropped to _ittat only eight fields.in'the word, all'in` ,-';-:.course of translating the report from
.,,...
75. .::?:'- . v.,.-r= :- =: - ` ~ ~,'-'~:: `: - ~e United States, had attained such a `Russian to Swedish to French to ;rng-
The" i^eptirted size of the discovery .- high recovery rate. --.~: -.--=.-=.-~- a~-.-.:-- . ~-:.lish; a decimal point might have been
would.be enough '?to float the entire The C.I.A. which says .the Soviet _ misplaced, thus vastly increasing the
state ai Texas an 200 feet of p?ue oil," -Union as on y about 30 billion to 35 bil- -?. order of.magnitude.-_::- ~._ . -- _ - - _ _ _
said Arthur.. A_ 1l+Ieyerhoff,- ?a_, Tulsa-. ---' - _. _.. . _ . .
based petroleum consultant and a Iead- '-
ing expert, on.: Soviet petroIeum_: He
called.ateosznts of the find; circulated
on leadingfinaricialwires,."preposter-
- "It.'saiiabsurdity;ariimpossiBiIity"?
said Rob_ ert I.eY~e, an analyst for E.F~
Hutton: Alvfrit].:5flber-a!.Dean Witter ?
Reynolds- call,-.the` report'_'.'aff: the
~~~~~.
Nonet2feless? -.-numerous _ ~'investars
. -rated to sell their 3sigh-Dying. oil stoclta,
fearful [hatlargeprafi4s resulting from
shor'tages.wval~be:eglacedbya sftua?
.lion oiolesG,'~he z=taritet ftrr. alI..sLotlcs?? -
has been so pavrerfui on ti-.e sip side Shat:
~ investors az~ vulnerable to any kind of.
news," said ~lerz -iL. Pete_rs of 3r'awri
BrothersETar.~irnan.?;-~^,1.: _;;:,_ -r.-
Swedl.4h Content the Sosnx ~ ~ ?r ='
s ~ .,:
' Reports a! the Soviet discovery ema. ;!
.Hated fmm a Swedish research corsce;n ~ .
.called I?etros:.uies, which Srequently_'. .
reports on Sa+net.petroleu~?.develop-.,
''ments;:,alarest. always.zitt,~ favorable -~
light. It-was reported in the i3ulletirr de ?`~ r
1'Industrie?PEtraliere a:?Frenc:s?trade -
journal; and jolted the- stock;markst
after.:it alas carried vn the Dow?Jones.,~ ~ ~
P1E*~J- YO1~iC TIa~~S
6 ~ECi~'~1Hr.R ig$0
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 App~t-cq~.,$4C:`FI?c~~ 2001/07IT~: ~~~~d~1~$~~~~?~~0130001-
o.l P.1r,.~ / 6 December 198p
SI`OCKH01.r~[; .: 5wedet?,
vrgrld's largest kna1~'t>w
petrostudies: - a four year-old = Swe~_
dish consulting tirmspe~ializing:?in?
SovieC oil ;and= gas .resources, said`: it'.?
would issue;a.detatled~report on.the;'
digCOYeryMonday-, :}:.~.~..,.;,Y,::-:;;,,.;s->':
-;. "Qur, study .isibased:~vn:-.very. reli-:
able : iniormatiotl .-from'--the:-.Soviet
geologq~..ministry,'`.:said:.Manlio; Jer?'
tool; Petrostudies'.dtrector:.:_,-~`=:" ~=
'. owever U.S:.-oil ex rts? said- the -
amount o oil in the:l3azhenov to
~~ robably " . ossly' eza , erated "- .
an a -o tcta sa t e tscover .
was revtous re rt as of s a e -
whicb s i . tcult.toex loit..-..:: -. '...:
e tan as. ournal,'an itidus:
tr}{ magaxine,' itz` Janiiary:;estimated.
tlYe=vrorld's proven--;:oil .reserves at`,
6421 billion. barrels,: iiYCluding 6T'
billion barrels iti-.tlie Soviet Union;.
27,1_-billion.. barrels ~itr' the United-
States and -163.4? billion :.barrels irr
Sandi Arabia: - ~~__:a;'-'.: ?:,,:'=??-.`':?.?.:, .'. ..
"Our liotfom=ki`ne conclusion'is that
there is a~low probability thattoday's
news release will prove accurate as
stated," the firm said. It said that?the
report, based on a-translation of Sovi-
= et~documents, may have-been exag=
gei'ated' because of a. misplaced deci-.:
mal`point;;and that the correct esti-:.,
~mate.:is ;probably 6.19 billion., tons??'4
rather than 619 billion tons: ';, :: ;? : _. '.~
'Y'he..Soyiet:Union last: week pul} i
lished;: 'a ~.: draft:: ffve~year ?~economic
plan'.that ??icakls for production of
anywhere,;from 12.4 million to T2.9
million. barrels of oil a day iti 1985:. ;
- ....~:.~~ ..-....:~JMr... ~-~~::..:. =4~
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 ~~T-~~'~ Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
8~ PAC3~ Ned YORK 1 TMES
6 ~~c~rl~z~ 1g3~
:ready volatile=heating' ail futures priced '
down as much as the limit yesterday,`..
market.analysts said:.
The report' by a Swedish research
concern was widely discounted by ana-
lysts on Wall ,$treet and at.the Central
Intelli ence ncy:.:.::_:; -::: _ .
u an -ys sai that traders:at the j
New York Mercantile Exchange re- ~
..acted almost immediately to the report j
of the find; "'Itput the market on the de-
fensive most of'the .day," said Andrew
I:el)ow .of.'. Shearson Loeb Rhoades.
''Some pepple just started bailing out of
positions pn that news."~ -
Oil prices had been moving upward
=from around 80 cents a gallon to al-
most $1 a:.gallpn --;since September,
when the war .between Iran and Iran
broke out, threat nine g oil supplies, Mr.
Lebow said- But prices have bounced
around in the last week or so amid a
number of .untertainties, including,.
.speculation air; what will happen at the
scheduled midmonth meeting of the Or-
ganizafion of Petroleum Exporting.
.Countries; analysts said.
On the New York:lVlercarctile Ex-
change, heating oil closed at p.95 cent
- to 2 cents Iower, with January at 93.8U
cents agallon. -
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 ~~
pal Pr1G~~~d.2
6 December 1980
STATI NTL
se 2001 /07~/~~ : ~~~~-IQ~~ 378000100130001-4
";'A Swedish research f1Tm reported >rt:~s_ -The s
okesman
id th
fi
d w
s
~~~
p
sa
e
n
a
.
Friday-thatthe~Suviet?.ITnion has.: confirmed by the Soviet Geolo~r;;
;~....
=x~iscoverecLa giant oilfield inwest-~`~;_Ministry, whzclz-.called it "a unique
'r.ern? Siberia -with_:reserves. -sevens?and'sensational.xiatural phenomen- :~~
_~_times: greater=than.~the,estimaLed::on":.since about half'of..the._,oil.,is
:vrevanurnrl~ivr.rlo;.~.,ca?o~- ". _'-ti_,__,__ ~ _
;,,;However,.the report was=greefed:? much difficulty.;f _ - - -- - _ --
~~'~ Such a =,confirmation
:with`skepticiszn~b~. officials:.o?
..would ~-bed
;the~
.
:
.
:~~$xnerican-gop~inent...and,the::oil~:~_'~~Y unusual,-since::the,.Soviets..
' -industry ~Y~=;:~~ ~,~=~~;};-;~ - " ,:;-r.~R;~t: have traditionally.=viewed. infor>aaa~ -,
_- ,-~ ;: _"? -"+iii?:w7~..:~:::ain7t~:ahM,Y;-t17 o;,. .,;1 _ ._
gas-industries;:said?th~=reserves.:iiY-~ ~ for the. entral < Intelligence ~ _;
~yahe "oil field of Bazhenov" consisted; ~-~A?enc ;._said?` Petro ? Studie a
~~-,.;-a
.of:.4:55 trillion barrels, or.619 billioli,~: arentl -was: referrin to a hu a ail':,
~'iaetric tons of hi '
,~, _ gh=qualityoiL:;'This'~-_sha a 'de osit'=at- a~de th': of: about :..'i
s:~s~the.biggesi:oil;fin~,in'historyay~;;;: O feet:"Oni a tin fractibiZ of"_:'
:` fd>?r':- a?,Petiro~~-Studies.:spokesman~~~~cou d be recovered and at an '
`~~afd....... -... ~?-_ ,.~, ~,~~; 2i~it cost " Hetu said
.. -...._.ro,.:.-=?.`~;::sue='`"...-.~~:n~~.c-~-:.;.,, . -. _ .~._.....~?~'?- -.-..~~'~~:_:::~_
Approved For Release 200107/27 : CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 ATpproveFor Release 2001/07>~(~P,~~~(~R000100130001-4
~~?ICLls ~?~. '
~~~ ~~a;;~ U . S . ARMY 4TAR COLEEGE
~..~,...-r rr,~-... ~ r,Q r.
~he US intelligence community has
evolved into a vast conglomerate since
_ World War II: th_e Central Intelligence
Ag_c>?cy, with groups of analysts working
with virtually every region a :d functional
.area of international relations; the Defense
Intelligence Agency, which provides support
to the Secretary of Defense and point Chiefs
of Staff; the National Security Agency, which
collects and disseminates communications
intercepts; the State Departmont's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research; the Federal Bureau
of Inv-stigatian; the int:lligence agencies of
the -separate services; and the intelligence
components of the Troasury and Energy
Departments.' Th4 bulk .of the comtinPu
effor4, in terrlu of cost, goes into collecting
raw information from open sources (such as
the foreign press), photographic reconnais-
sance:, Communications monitoring, and
clandestine sources (espionage). The ultimwte
product of this massive array, however, is
finished analytic intelligence for the use of
operational officials throughout the defense
and foreign. affairs bureaucracies. The
Dr. 12iK1[ard K. Beta is a Research Associate in
Fereian Policy Stadia aQ [na Brookings Institution. He
reexived his H.A_, M.A_, and Ph_D. in Government
from Harrard University, where he served on [he
_ faculty in 1977-76 before}aiming Brookings. A Former
s~aif rramb"cgr ~Dta[ional_Seetut~tnuLand`Qf
~lx Serrate sleet Committee on Intelligence. Dr. Betts
teac~gnNurses on defense policy a[ Columbia
_ Universlrty and [he ]ohm Hopkins UniversitySchool of
Adraneed lnternaiional Studio. His Fvst book,
?' SotdierS 5tatesnrur, and Cold War Crises (1979), won
. the Harold 1}. iswweU Award for tht best book on
dvt7-military relations in 1977-78. A[ Brookings he has
coauthorzd The /sorry of Vietnam: The System 4Yorked
(1979), wltiKlt won the 1980 Woodrow Wilson Prize for
[he bat book in political science. and Nonprolijeratian
and U.S F'orelare Policy (1980)_ He has eompkted a
fershcomin; Brookings book an surprise attacks and
-_ US defextte planning, and is editing a study on the
straeegic impliaeons of ctvise n[isaie development. Dr.
Be[q has a>,o published drtieles ,- - -
Saewrry, Asian Slaver The
Washinatnn Qaarterfy, aad
[ite+v!tere. ]"hs present amide is
_ based ~ on the author's
sratrrnmt before the House
-. ... _ T i
finished product Comes in various forms. !
Mast numerous are ."r_urrent" i~atelli$ence
analyses. The basic jo:y of the intpil~?erice
community is to digest iricrrtation daily'and
pass unfamiliar :acts i:rlmediately ~ to ~
policymakers so as #o ~ alert them? to new k
developments or frz.~~:`ly e:rrr$ent problems.
The National Intelligence Daiiv, warning ~
bulletins, al-ld anc~'~t ~~ytic me:s.-t*acda~are
t'.'le products most- relevar..t to -.rig ~?tncti~n. ? '
This kind of intelligence does w?'^t high-level
officials like; i! simplifies their j!?bs.
National I?.t~lligence Estimates of $oviPt
strategic capabilities and objec"ivzs, on t::e f
other hand, are quitz different from current i
intc'l~~arce repsrtagp. N1Es are t~n.e collective ~
result of coztr'-.buttons by analysts in various ~
intelligence _yercies, and the; ere ncrmzlly
produced a~*]uaLy. Draftir_g is coordinated
by National Intelligence Officers uzau~r *.he {
xe~is rg the Director of Central Irt~ili$ence. {~
The Tina! estiynate is discussed and debated in I
the National Foreign Intelligence Board, and
disse.^_ts to t}:t: prevailing view arz noted
v.~ithin the do^.ument.' '?'`.e al7nual NII;s on
Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives
are, in principle, the most irnpr)rtaat
intelligence documents used by high-level
authorities. But becase the issues in this area
are so vital and controversial, the strategic
estimates aiOnA,_, with their appendices of
supportii $ data grew longer and mare
detailed over time, so that lay the end of the
197D's they had become book-length, The
rare president w:lo actually reads a lens~thy
NIE trlay b? use;u-ly educated about the
fundamentals of the rtit.cl:ar balaxncc, Soviet
programs, and t:he ba:.kg-ound of deterrercC, ii
But the primary audience for these estimates
is the group of officials somewhat lower in
the chain of command,-the l~ders of the
State and Defense L`eps*tments, the Natiq,~.al
Security Council Gta;f, and. senior officers ai
the milt?ary services and th- Artns Control
and ?.7isarr-.lament Agency. Since strategic
nusl~r matte, are :Ili central elements of the
def~.se debate, t: ese officials already know a
lot ab~rlt s:tch matters arld .usually have
Appr~~~`~QO ~IA f2DP90-~ 1 'I-3~R9A0-1 t}E~3t~6{~9 =~--=' ~ ~--~---~_ _ _._
 Approved For Release 2001/07/~~5-~C~9~A-011378000100130
McGRAW-HILL PUBLICATIONS
_ Inside DOE Special Report; 2~ NOVEMBER 1980
NEW ORLEANS UTILITY MEf;TING COVERS 4YATERFRONT ON EFFICIENCY, ENERGY ISSUES
:Inside DOE's coverage of the fast annual utiliry conference co-sponsored by DOF,, foFlows an the next
few paged The conference,' titled `Extra Energy and Ef}`rciency"and also sponsored by the American Gas
Association,-the American Public Po wer Association, the Edison Electric Institute and the National Rural k lec-
tric CoopemtiveAssociatian, covered a variety of topics, includingDO.E'sResidential Conservation Program
and tha CentrallntelligenceAgsncy's most.recent forecasts for world energy- The conference wad held _ .
Nav. 16.19 in New Qrleans and was attended .b}! Inside DOE's Lynn Stevens. .
CiA ENERGY;FORECAST FOR ;19$Os BLEAK; COAL.WO111"T,OF~SIrT OIL USa; AS PLANNED _-_:,~,_~_,e
-_-~ =- ~i;A high?1eve1 Central-Intelligence Agency (CIA) official this.week painted an extremely bleak world ~...
- ..?....~'r.......~ L= ~..G 1~0~3, ~u~wung Lnar increase.u coal prouuction will. not really of#set oil use as planned_ _~ .
Th
afP
i
l
l
t n
e
a
ic
a
so said..tha
ev_r'energy-product;on.will.probably notmake adentnin demand and that Persian ,..-.
- ~-:... .
Gulf countries will probably continue to:lawer;production, thereb_ y-reducing oil supplies even if demand could
~Y.o Im..a-e-1 -'-T'_'_ __--__-_ - .... - _ _. _ _ _ - - - ...
- =~,;;This.forecast~.was'made;against-the backdrop of the;current; gloomy ens{gy picture, in~which-.there is _.
CIA that world oil.production reached its all-time_-peak last year.and is now on-a steady decline. ;_- .. ,.:...;~ ~~
conscrve.gur. way out'or,trus~~energy dtlemmaf;~ Thablaak-forecast was made by 3ames.~.ochrane, spacial,-_
~_____~L _~ ~L_ ~~ . ~ fit- r _ _ -
anon scanty Council. - - = =-- ._----~~_' _-..."?.:::e;,,.~'- - - - - -'- _ _ - ,:~ ;,:;,~ :'.'
"
;_~Cochrane-made his predictions at a Nov.
1 CrI9 utility conservation conference sponsored by DOE and
four-utility organizations iri New Orleans: Zri luricheon'remarks at the conference; Cochrane also predicted
that theSoviet Union iri the nezf twoto tliree`ye.ars'will, far the first time, surpass the~U.S': in natural gas pro-
~
duction.~.a fuelhe expectsalie_Soviets to
heavily export to Western Europa in the 19$Os. The CIA official
said the Soviets will have ta_expor"t natural'gas_by necessity
'because they can't use it curren
tl
-in thei
` `
~
,
.
y
r
'
industrial-sector:' ...- .:. -- -. - - v- - - -- -- ~- - s~-.,::.:~_r-, ::~~~_:;:- ":~ ;.;
Cooperation & Development (OECD) and developing Asian
countries plan on an increase in the demand for. ~ '
"
_
. coalof
ihe-rate_of.600=million tons/yaar by-1990 -- the oil equivalent of more than 8-million b/d::Cochrane
said`tFat of the'600-million'tons', :470=million tons are plarined'for use in new or retioftted electric'potiver~ ~ ~~
faciIiries~i60 ~ of~the facilities~iri the U.S.) arid_ 70=million tons in'metallurgical coal for use by the steel '-` ~ "
'
~
industry, vv~tIi
other industries accountin4 for: the
resf in steam coal. ~ . - _ . _ "
'According to Cochrane, estimates for. coal demand may be way off because in rnany of the countries' ~~
requirements for vil imports have-adversely affected the economy which has in turn dampened growth in
-._
electric:aitd-steel industries;. and-therefore'the need`for coal_~`"CoaI~use; rather than acting as a substitute'for``~~
oil durS~ g;,t3te 19$Os:may'actually;turn out to_be'a complement,"~he told the conference- = -. --' . .. _
.:.,i~IFOrldwilshortager,Cochrane=said.1979 was,a peak.year for world "oil production-despite_thz 2-million
_
-~'
.-
,
b/d Ions ittlranian oil witi~, overall output; by.the Organization".of Petroleum Exporting Coun tries.(OPEC) increasing
~
by_1-mo31ioQ,~/d, F~lost: pradncers operated class. to maximum
capacities.toschieue thisaeveh.of.production _ _
. f , -._?
he said:-contrast, Cochrane said; world oil production in: I9$O,has fallen by more tliari-3-million _b d, to a..
24md.Iion bjd -production'leyel this month. -This level reflects losses from~the Iran-Iraq war, he said.`Cochrane
said the Ioss of oil from the war -especially the 4million b/d of Iraqi crude exports -will continue~ati leasf -'
well into I9$T~ `7Fie.a6ility.;of Iraq to:bring-ezp~rt~_capabilityr`ori=Iine~should the Itpstilities ceaseis'becoming
-
an increasin~y deep cdncern
to us;_'."Cochrane said; adding that substantial damage to Iraq's aSl exporting
`?"'Cochr3ne~noted that Kuwait and.United Arab Emirates'hnve cut production nearly 2=million bjd and'"~`
that Saudi Rrabia wants to cut back to 8.5-million b/d. The CIA believes OPEC oil production will fall by = `~ =~
of - - - ~::-_~:.:..a_-~s~.;::~::F ~s.srrc~~.s ~~...i~;;c::c1a~:~ar3 :u;r '' ~~~~ ,: ~~, ~-. ~r ----- --- ..
its'off.$e~s.~ u~.-r~: ,-:.~~b=_~ i':: ~c.:ic~..-
-
- rr-. __.._~..~. -~ ?-?
offsetiticreased.oil production el?ewhere; such as Mezico`or~the.North Sea: Additionally,-new prodt~ctioit ==?_:~=
- _ on We"sl ' co t es will r..~, m .. t ,,'...~.,-_:, _.. ._ ; , .. -- . _ . ~ ..'..;;~..~ ,',`: = - - -
and 6y'the loon-'?~~..-".~
'`'=~ ~?~~,,,, ~ r'~~e~se~~r~~./b1}`i~~"..~:I~~t-er~a~$`~6-1~'9~6?.~ts'R~4 w:.1a.;~~ -:; __ _
~; l~d~e ~e~de~ to eve op new covenes an a desue to go slowly with new-production~w;..--, ~~~~ " - ="_~
- :S+-; ;:s~:.-.~ ". . r....t.~.~._v'yrc?. _.~i.!+~2.'SttF-".~':.: rPSS~,.~siisvz::,,':,,,M.;_ .w_,.,yre-, .,.f.ur ,.;~;~.. ~ ... _- _ : ~~. ; ~y =-;~.~
 Approved For Release 2~1~~7Q~Jr4~F~~0~~R0
i i3 /UDU. !~~?"J
f+"Pi,i:ii_ii.-- li~!!!9~ ~~ 's.=}a~ii.:~ -.: iti? ---.: -. ?-~i~~.: ~.~ _ --._-- =~.?..
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- ?-. r r. - _ _ _
1?~ :LF';id~~ iii rLi[!:d Li =ai'ii~~{a1~~iii~,~i r~~t~~~=^? -.. i??'~~~ ~T:~ _~-~_ i-i w?'-
~-`y.~ L=?=. 5l~`+L. ~w~~t~ ~{{i'ii,. i =~~ ~.2=i?~. -' -'T? .-.. _ ~;i l^ i --.ii_:i:_~ ! __ "' .-._. _~
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fir. -:~'.~ -7 L~= 3~. `ice. ~1
.. a-?z iii..3 ??~. Si~~ ~ ~ ..~-.. ~. ~. "F .r ..w~ _ ?-r:- ~~"~ :ice ~!i ri_~ Wit:...... .__. .
=i :-.~ -?'! F'3 ~.~ ~2j_ ~ iS ii ie~~ --.-~?~=-~~.r ie~~? ~i~. ~i~?~_~ .: .. ~-: _.-- ~~:..-~.
~i?=- :-:...._ rsy~ .iii -- ... -..~....~~ ~- -.. -_..:..--..--~ =~:._a....=
i~-'f?i.. -..?.4 =__.-. ~-.. .. .. his r:-?wi?'~~ ~~- :--r:~i -..~ -~- .. .:!?_ mil ~~-. ~~.
1? - -' -' - _ v _
~is3~ 33. Vii: ~?'}~.~a
T _ -~ -- r -_~''r -- -- -' roc: _~i: - - _-" i? .. ?.t .-.? ~.._
~?}~~ tZ 1 }'6~ ~ ~1 ~ .. ~.-.- .. .-~~ ~t .: t1 }rte .... ~w _ .. -
t S.}ti ~~kif .~.-i:. ?i -e~?i?"rl '~~ .=a~ zz'~y'_y_n rl~ _ ~ ?r. _:~'~_ :i? _ ... _ ..is - _ - -
i i. ~~ :~. ~ .. ~ ~ ~l~' ~ ~. ?.~ f.j~ ...: ?. i s ~ ~ - ~ a _ :ice .. -:
y,~ _ r ~ ~ r. _
ll.. L. .~'i :mil i- ~a isti- i.' I T: t1 i ~. i~ i'F3~ - - r ?~ - - L
r~. ~~
}1"}~ ~.5i}.iF.~ .'}::--~.. 1'k-~i?ir sr~'i~~~~ :r Li~.~rsi~%i ..i~~.~ iiCYii ~ _ .._~.."=~^,r
i i9 F'F . ?~ i . :? i~ , i i? ~ ?~* ~~ i 1 i ?7 . 3 ~ - .r =7 { i. i .. iY: }' ~ ~ ~ .: ~:~ " j':.. , .. _ ~. - -.:-. -. ~ .. _ -
~ti~~~~ Li}"ii-''ssj ; '~::r3 ~'.. f iii}~~ i L ?~?~P'ri~1~ ?:': t~a~~ rfr -.~..- ---r-. w, .__ -
.. ~ ~ "J:. :1 .. _.f l
stu ~=~;
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 STATI NTL
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k'r'T 4:; ~F A:'r.t.i~.G:ii
THE NEW 12EPt1BLIC
=' t "~`J ~} 8 November 7 9ij0
b~ ~'ad ~~u~c
1'or the first time since the 1950s, the possibility of
nuclear war with the Soviet Union appears to be
seriously accepted by key figures inside and outside the
U5 gavernment_ What long have been unthinkable
thoughts now are entertained by influential men and
women in Washington. Meanwhile the Carter admin~
istratian is moving apace with measures designed to
prepare the US~--and LTS public opinion-for the con-
tingency afmajor wars. It is a new phenomenon, based
on the hardening conclusion that the Soviet Union's
overwhelming concern, aside from a determination to
achieve strategic superiority over the US, centers an
assuring itself of military endurance and survival as a
functioning satiety after a protracted nuclear ex-
change. Asenior White House foreign policy specialist
says: "In 30 years, I never thought war was really
possible: now I think it is possible-if not necessarily
probable." _. _~
. -What does it all clean and where does it lead? 7s it a
question of .correct or incorrect perceptions held by
officials in Washington and Moscow? What are the
implicit dangers of such attitudes? There are no pre-
cise answers to these questions: But certain realitie7
are observable_ In the US, the military response to the
perceived Soviet threat includes the go-ahead for
the R/I7C mobile missile system, the work on the "invisi-
~le' Stealth bomber, a controversial shift in nuclear
'.targeting strategy against t:`~e Soviet Union, recent
_ decisions tq accelerate the production of weapans-
.= grade plutonium, and the restoration of US chemical
warfare capability. These prepa.ratians are developing
in a new psychological climate that has evolved steadily
since early 1980 and goes well beyond the (arum; of
the presidential campaign_
The new climate, dampening the euphoria of the
Soviet-American detente of the last decade, can be
traced to the mounting evidence of the build-up of
Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan last December, and, most
recently, the dangers surrounding thecurrentPersian
Gulf hostilities. Thoughtful analysts at the Pentagon
and the National Security Council staff emphasize
Soviet advances in the accuracy of their huge SS-1S
missiles (plus the fact that their throw-weight greatly ~
exceeds that of US intercontinental missiles); the
deployment ofinedium-range SS~20 missilesin Europe, ;
and the direct involvement of combat forces beyond
Soviet borders, from Angola and Ethiopia to Afghan-
istan. "The grand development in recent years by the
Soviets is the projection of their power into the world,"
says a senior Pentagon expert_ And frequent and i
unexplained movements of Soviet troops have wor-
riedEheadministrativnandhaveledtasecretalertsby '
US armed forces this year.
The result of all this is that the hawks and doves in
and out of the government nowadays speak in strik-
ingly similar language about the inexorable deteriara- '
tian in Soviet-American relations and its long-range,
consequences-although theirpointsaFemphasisvary_
~f course nobody in Washington desires or actually ~;
predicts a nuclear war. But the Carter administra-
tion-and the Reagan team--are proceeding along a
.:,1
_.._.
_ w
.. ...
CU~irTrj~~
D
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
LONQON pAILY TELEGRAPFf
6 Octpber 1980
IT is almost unpos~,~ble to:
-; -::&nd _ an_~.?iateliiaenc~
Drie.fcase CZ]eCl:s ? ~ I The I D .. ? deploys ' its J own ~ E~.rly orE, he snotten the use
In recent efforts to ,tighten operatives ~ ?,in Soviet " em- ' ? ''that could be made oE"'tlie
secarity at-. Langley, : Adl ~ bassie9 . abroad;, where._their,l Cubans, the Vietnamese,
acti4itiei run: parallel to=tha
: and'-other ~?Iarxist regimes
.
;
~ ( Turner has im osed a_ system
- ~?iri~tdn cod '~vhv has?'a.:-, ? = ~+?ork- of the K G B..' Rezideti` -; 'in ? the 'T'hird. World in ord~ri
of random . br1'zfcase checi:s.
- ? good -word to say about:-? n?a' ~,-atorsr: - C T A ? .~FSrer i cures. - -. _r:y;.;` ~~?'-' to gain acces to.- and in:~u-;
A d m i r a-l Stlttsneld ' masaes.vto get the ? wort of
Tu;tter. It is no~v widely ? both worlds. ?-'The system is
believed that even tf ? ' ' offensive ~ -= to ? loyal C I A
President Carter is re- people, ~~-but. also gets' you
.,ie..~~ >,v ..:;tr a,a` thinkin~..'abort how much
_ -Cdnid~ -`De- 'SmU~$IP.R 071[: auvic7, i?a7~~a.:ar iu r~ume, one
_: _~~replaeed~._::~-_? -_~_ : ~?,---??'. "~ - wrapped - inside a shin nr . in hondon, one in 1l~exico ;
AdmlTnrnzrhas~drawh'particv-j ': 'stuff'ed=?'dnder?. a='-'brassiere' ~ City, and one at the So~?iet
-lac. critip_~n from within- the strap." -:: ? - I T4ission to -_ -the . 'United
'- American irstelIi;ence cem-~ ;tleanwhile; the CIA remains ~ : R?atioris in I~ew York-'
?munity for-.allowing- asses. Cripnled,?by-legal=inhibitions I tine of their spr_cia] funs`ions
- is to or
anise the cl
f
t in
k
d t
d
ti
o l
g
i
ewe
o -
an
es
ne
:e s
meats- t
I - in mounting foreigrx opera-
with 'the -- rldmiziistration's ( ?. tioris- ?-? Recently; '~ the .-FBI 1 funding of. Left-~~?ing lob5:es
_ political needs and prejudices.
-'rrvv anal=t, from the CIA's
national forei7a assessments
'?. ? centr~- era sari . to have re-.
signed in a _fury .over- the'
?falsifCation=of .troop-;.counts
'= for-worth Iiar~a-the delibe-
rate- downolavir.~ of Pvort?L-
asked the agency.to,arranye
the Coverage of a meeting by
tPd dcabie a7an`
a sns
ec
Diplofttstic cover ,. - . _ ence_ aver. ?-- CYester7a hb-
? erals who would shy. away-'
For example, t1'e~ern an?alcsts framing direct identifiCation?~
17ave- identified three senior with ~ipscow-
i ID. ..men- H?orking under -Tba ?.m~ricas Department of
dhat further Soviet po]ic~?
f~vals by pz?each:nzi unilateral
p
_ - - Tha?.I D i~4 believed by 1,Vestern?'
s+~[h his.-I~GIi case handler ~ the ~?ast.,..complez of- t$o~:iet
in llezico Citv. 'T'he-CI~.'s = -front organisations. such as' analysts to?have assumed a
? gene*'zl counsel oh.iected the". - the ttiorld Peace Council, the ~ leading role in Soviet plans.
sun'eillance -could not be World Federation of .Trade ~ for-industrial disruption in
? ',nnr~-~rPd le,*ally a~!airtst a ~ -. iJnions, and the International ~, ?Data-countries. -Sigx7yficantly,.
deli;ged to justify .~ policy j The li CG $ kept its rend=z-
? ?of disensaaement from Seoul- - - ti?ous: rr.thaut the intruding
8ut_ what one -former senior; eve of'the C:A:
GfA official describzs ? as'
" unoelievavle ?' -vas .: the I ?~~-~~~~)' n~
l '
circulation of an interna
mernoranCnm ~.arning the
stall' a[ Langley aoout . an
intensiaed campaign- by? the
h G B to penetrate the
_ aaenc~- -_ -- -
?
?
91fereci ~~__
_~ryoa,aoa
The .. memorauducu repaired
~ that tae price ? now beuna
ohered by .the lk G 13 -for a '
.-- C.[ ~, case otticer who is will:
-- iaa to v:orl: for the Russians
?_? as: an ? - agent-in-place - ?- is
_ X00,000? (FG08,000): - For ' a?~
.'Cipher dent ar cnmmuniCa- ~,
_- tions o~cer, the figure - is
double.
"You don't sgread tt~t~kind .
of news in a climate- of (
general demoralisation;" my
? source gloomily observed:-.
7'he eFrort to penetrate CIA ~
anti other. America,; intelli-
gence agencies. as noted in
_ _ a previous .column, is the
special task 'of Pavel Bess- ;
'- merta~l;, the high-ranking :.
'-KGB oFncer=whose status KGB) to impose a -reign of He set . out. with -notable- suc-
is hi ;hpr than that of ' ttie ; ~ terror in Budapest ?aftzr the' ? cess: to expand the range of
??KG.13 R ide?nt and wh t ~
o D er a t ~ppri~~Y~k1u661i't~elea',~~Q~~~JO~O~o~e4?x'~~d~~~~d~t~
_ Asscriauon__ of--_ I)e:no~2SC ( the Caret of the >ortn Amen-:.
T,at.~ers operate uneer the ?', cari .department of ,[he T T)
'? guidance-of?-Poaomaret's ID__ (which rovers the- United
-Ponomar~ev's main achievement States, Canada and the Eng-
? has stemmed 'from his belief : -. lisp ~~eaking Caribbean, .in-
that the Sor?iet Union should Ci.uding' Belize). _- ?~Tikoria:
responsible for 'subversion
and ? covert action . in thei
l~Ve,-tertr hemisphere, and- its'
more recently farmed sitter-~
oroanis7a?ion, the' Africa De-
partment, there developed
under -the guidance-of? the
'ID_ . ?
-=Dzsrupti,y~ cola .
?'.radical and Left-r.?ing organi- -tabour- specialist:-.tvho:.has'
.cations in the \1-e?t that arc ~ ?-written. a? boon on: United
- ?. not -subject- to Communist ~ States trade unior;a. '-_
- party discipline
llostovets travelled' to ~Vaslt-
.
Soviet undercover operations :q'his srt'him at odds with nrore.?! ingtoi '-vith Ponontarev 'in
_ a--e. not the preserve of ~ ~ doetrinaire_ thinkers such as . January, 1978, . to. attend- a;
the I:G $ _ and. its ~Sis,er= ; - _. 'Mif}hail : SusloY,;' the-- vetecaiz. Conference of the tiVor]d`
-service, the G Ii U,-?:~vttt~se:I =::.ideologue and Politburo. mem- Peace GouriCil, "Daring :their
initials stand for.: Chef ~ =::;,her-%~rpo. hasp long- remained stay, the.Y?-)tad talks with'
Into?ligence Directdrate of. -:-''-'suspicious of ahe, reliability of several American 'publishers;
the Soviet Generate Stafr'".- r;;.=?uon-Commun;5t,=-.movements and with a panther of anti-__
defence a~tiYists_ ~ ? ?=
Fquallk - impdrtant,::especiallg?: =.' :ad ;the~:Left_- _ _;r_'=: : _._. ? :. ~ Tlie I D i> believed to bz. taking`
iu. den}ins- : ~r?i[h Left-~+?zn~; .:; ~ ' j an ? increasing' ?. '
oliticaI-groups in the'SVest,~ - COI7L?dii3 C3 a71(1CCl ~,:?.'.~.: mterest:'_in
= p = ~ ? - campaigns - directed , a~'ainst
'. -~s -the ?International Depart- As early as 1961; when he first r
=meat (I D) ,of ? the- Sur-let' : attaiaad the rain.- of .party }~ o-tern ? trap>-nationah car-
: Communist party;-,~ which' secretarc, - - . ? Ponamarev ,'-_ porattons, which offer` the`
c deserves its owe share of the ': '=?=preached the need to [hsnnel r?, ?ttradive'dtial oppdrtunity-to
i_ lime}ight_ ~_. ?_;~ - .- :--t ?~ y-?- ~ .?.- ?larbestale ?~apport td -groups fa) :practice industrial espion-
'? a,~e ivhile (b) helping- : to
Founded-~nrider I:hruschev: in : - ~?that~are dPscr:-bzd, in Soviet - T
_~ I9a9: -the' ?I D'' 'has?"'been ~--;`parlance, as "healthy forces'.' `? tiadet-lstine, the' performance
individuals. and of ZVestern economies: . -
I3cris ~--meaning
ded since then by
h
?
:
-.
ea
movements that ? can be re-_
l`ikolaevich P a u o m a r e v, -'
whose 'previous' services to ''lied.upon to cacryout actions
the _: Soviet:: 5fate '.included that ? favour- Soviet policies
assisting Yuriy Andropov -_' without necessaril_v..beina suh-
-r?~
Ca-~,Z i~il>s
-. from- tae' rest of the: K GB , I D is suven?ised,by its First ,- member-parties,. with 1?Vestern
.?.-station--'who holds the-cover ; neputy~-.Chief. Vadim Valen- trade unions, and with "pro-
job of_l~linis:er-Counsellar,,at . r tovicb .Zagladin. ?',. .- -, _ eressive" lnbb_as- in' the
 ~Cer~ir~ .~~st~ "
~-][ow R,obert ~Al~en ~Put1
.._. - ~
~'-~..r1 ~nen~at ~nzg gi.ing~
P>reha.nd ~Ba~s in the U.S.
- -
By :Charcoal, ;Charlie Wu
For"'I'liree ;ears; ~~Ielped
exit Posed ,as .Yob .Figure,
A~:~TCY,r ~'~'L~-~' THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Ap~ro~~-f~efea~se 2001 /07/27 6 ~~~R'9d ~Q 378000100130001-4
Supplies ~'roin Southwest Asia ~ .=1
.-; But despite such efforts, heroin recentl
?lias been moving into the U.5. in .increasin
-. amounts, according to U.S. narcotics offi
cials. The East Coast cities of New York,
-Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, 13alti
?rnore and Newark, N.J., are- particWarly'i
Hard hit. In Boston, the purity content of;
;heroin sold to addicts has risen 10% in the
cask six months, an indication'. of its in-i
creased availability, Robert Stutman, in
".charge of the drug-enforcement agency's
Boston office, says.
The gmwth. in the heroin ,supply is
largely+~e.result of. a bumper opium crops
-last year in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.
?After the -substantial local consumption,i
:more than a third? of the crop-60 tons of
heroin=was available for..export to Euro-
pean,.U.S_. and Canadian markets; according
"to U:S; intelligence. estimates.
=. Because :of.?the ,heroin influx;.': many.,of
' New-:York. State's: 416? drug-treatment ;cen-lI
? fer5_are :being forced to operate beyond thei~l
'capacity,' a? state official. says.- heaths from,
heroin::':ovecdoses,~ in;-:N.ew York City'. alone!
may?;exceed 6M)?.this:year, against 471 last
:year.and.Z4(r.in.1978,-it.is estimated:.. ;;. ;.:
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 ~KiIC ~~~or Release 2001/Q7/~7~~~A 1, ,.~0-0113780001001300
? ~i]~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .ti I i gic-early warning a :;i crrmmunica?ion ;
?~'1~~~~.~L.~. ~-'a ~.f 3~ ~~ "`~ ~. t.'~~-'"_~~.l.y~~ I yeas computf cq~atttha h~ddqua tern f'
! ~ ; the North r'1t^~?r':can Air Defense Cam-.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i mand in Choy*:anz ~lourtai,-t, Cola, t.av}
~~~ ~ ~ q~ ?j'~~~ ~~, ~~~ ~~ ~ ? ~ ?~ malninctioned, trlgeerinb false alarms in !
which missiles and ~*ztbers ?xere tnade !
ready for take-CrfL Cong.~i~nal audi- I
- By IiACI~Rfl BURT tors, meanwhile, reported ~~'ier. [his !;
Sp.cat to A" teetinn York TlLe~ - ~ year that a new generation of c~ ze~utars
? - . !for the military's worldwide car.Ztttand
NASAINGTON, Sapt_ 21--~ The United ' - - ?- and control system would : of be aple tv
States military, long used to having a ~,re becoming increasingly vulnerable..~~ boodle the demands created by a major!
clear edge over the Soviet Union in nu. ~'or the first tim?, nSr.-Brown said last 'i military crisis. The existing sys[?rn; j
clear might, is being forced *.o adj ust to a? ~onth' L':e Soviet Union might now ba ~; moreover, is considered :r'alnerable and?~
new era in which the American strategic ~hle to destroy all 1,053 of the Air Farce's ~! inaclequate_ -
__-_-_'~~-:-. rhoir l~nl?1PY(.1?'(Sllnd .t ~'f ar.9i?Ity PA r~Y.t31iat8
arsenal is becoming- outcated and ever
morevulnzrable. -
ln recent statements, President Cat
ter, Secretary of De;ense Harold Brawn
Viand vkher senior officials Have asserted
-'that, in the area of nuclear weapony, the
United States is still "second to none" At
the same tir.-:e, however, ;~1r. 3rcwn ard
his top aides have started to contend th~[
if Dresent trends iri the miclear balance
-cont;naa; thz United Sia[zs, by the mid-
1990's, could find itself vulnerable to nu-
clearblack,-nailbyMoscow: _
= Mr. Brawn, for example, told a group
-last :aonth at the United. States Naval
. - i~3efense.
silos in. a surprise nuclear "3irst strike." _ penta~ori aides stressed that,while 1
Under Secretary of T7efense far resaarch ;meant the 1: nited States was in dangzr of
and engineering,-told a Hvuse,:Arrned !losing its capa,ity to retaliate titer a
Services, subcommittee that Soviet? i Soviet nuclear attack. 'they said, mores ~
bom'a2rdefenseswererapidlyimnravinp aver, that intelligence rapo:ts indicatedi
and that over the next 10 years :Moscow I that American nuclear farces, a> a whole,
'could find a means of detecting and de- were still superior to the.Soviet a _-sen.;' ~n
terms of readin2as and :eliabisty, a:
carrying
ile
i
'
-
ss
s ~1 m
straying the Navy
submarines.
9Components ~f the nation's nuclear
arsenal are weang out- Tna mainstay of
the Air ,rorce's nuc'.ear bomlJer forces,
the 8-52, is about 20 years old, and off.i-
cialsreportthat the planes suf'.'er from an
iricreasein expensive mairterance prob-
?lems. The service's 53 Titan 2.:nissiles,
~mPanv?aile. have also been in place far
I ' ~~ 1=he U.S. ~-`-'rep red?
Second of seven article3_ ":. ? _-
tiVar Colle;e in Newport, R.1_, that, with-
out impmvemeats to the ballistic tuts-'
I'siles ard heavy bombers that make up
j the country's deterrent force, VJashing-
ton could face "at best a perception of in-
feriority, at worst a-real passibility of nu-
clear coercion
"
? "
.
.
they manufacturing nuclear weapons are said
hout the 1950's and 60's
Throu
,
g
United States lzd .the Soviet Union. inj I to be in bad repair_ A confidential report
nearly every measure of strategic power
including numbers of missiles and bam
performance. But Moscow; spending as
=much as three times more than Washing-
'.ton on nuclear forces during the 1970's is
ranalysts call "rough parity".in strategic
power. - -- - ... =a-
- :par y t e entra n~~nce ~enc~t
oscow can surpass .e nit to es
two decades and have rECenLly pea; I cruise missiles in the naXt few years
planned by a series ofwell-publicized ac- : would ~~uarantce the Air l=nrce's ability
cictents The problems besetting the Titan . to peretrlte Soviet air de:ensue t:nrouah
2 were vividly demonstrated in Dames- ts1e 19b0's. ~ 1 .
ct~, Ark., last week when a fuel, tank of The 1,CC~rnile range missiles, which
~ one of the missiler, punctured by a falling fly at treetop altitudes, vrould permit
socket wrench, exploded and sent a cloud B~2's to "Stand ofc" from Soviet air de-~
I fens, a less demanding role that offi-
aftoxicchemicalsint9the air.. ~ ~ 'als bel~ev? will sa're wear and tear and
~ ci
`" -
. g'Ihe Government's facilities for
t the aging bombers.
`prepared recently for the.Department at
Energy; the agenty assigned the task of
producing nuclear. warheads;. concluded
that "serious deterioration of equipment
.several yews whic.`t could seriously im-
__- - _ _~ _ ~___,___...o,-,_
--
---- -
-
~ons. [requirements] forecast -for the
gear the last 15 years. several Govern-
=nent plants producing critical materals
ard components for nuclear.' warheads
thauglt Soviet forces were considered
n:orepowerful. ?
In adc'ltion, they said that ,~lr. Carter
had approved numerous p_oaratns over
the last +hree years meant -o remedy the
em?rginb nuclear deficierc;es_ Althou~t
in 1977 the ]?resident canc~iad the B-1
bomber, tivhich was propped zs a r~
olacemenr far the i3-52 force, afticials
said that :dlr. Car`er's decision to enuip
Farther in the future; Secretary Brown
I and other senior Pzntagan aides are ex-
cited about the prospects for deploying a
:Stealth bomber, which would be nearly
''Submarlne;teallg~ment - : ~,= _
At sea, the Navy this year deplayed'.he
first of a new class of Trident missile sub-
.marinesthat will gradually replace the 10 ~
Polaris vessels built in the 15~511's. Bachaf )
tree new submarines will Carry 2~ Trident '
1 missiles, a ;1,f,C0-tulle-ra.,-tpe rr=issue that I
had been .shut, producing ,significant.
ro rzs One offi-
ra
t tri near y every measure o nuc ear caps-I
" Administration 6fticials maintain that;
~.urider Mr. Carter, Washington has begun
to counter Moscow's ? growing missile
power. Nevertheless, military specialists
acknowledge that several serious Arab-
- lems in the nuclear arsenal need to be
- -
delays ui weapons. p g
:cial,far example, said the deployment of
"
a new version of the Army's Lance taco-.
cal'missile had slowed by 18 months be-
cause of a shortage of plutonium far the.
system'swarhead. -? ? ~ ?~-- ?_ ? -
. ri~EiSi?d in the next few. years, includln 1
chese~" ~4p~ro;~er~~For Rele~se~?~Q~/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
.- 9Amen must a and borb t' orcea
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100
~~
Q*i PAGE- l -~
TtwE PIATICPIAL GUARDIAN
17 September 19E0
>ay x>uv~ti .l. xELL;vY . .
Gzmrzliun Cnrre.~Ft~nc%er. t -
F_irsr u~rtrn aerie/es
1ashington, D.C
lYho's ahead in rnifitary strength---the U.S.
or U55R?
The majority sentiment on the U.S. political
spectrum now stems to hold that Washington
is at best a precarious equal to Moscow in
military might. _
A smaller but quite vocal section of the
ruling class even maintains that the Soviet
military build-up of the parsevrral years ha;
reduced the U.S. to second rate status- "
The election-yearprescrip[ionbringaffered
fram moderate, Democrats to hawkish,
neoeonservatives is a crash = "r:armamrnt
program? by the U.S. Viriual(y all thespecific
steps advocated- to build the Pentagon's
'military machine this -year. are? now being
implemented= registration fpr the draft;
-deployment of.tht hlX mobile=missilasys[em;
assemblage~of .a-Rapid'Deploym~nt'fiord;
~develapment ofa new'fleerofnuclear~rmed
bombers, `and a bolstering of .sea warfare
capabilities: All of this is to br. financed. ;y
-multi-billion dollar increases in the Pentagon
budgee-.thalYran- only be-: obtained by
_preipe~rtiiinai cuts in social spending_ .--
-%-This-unrest'ained.militarism also?inval~rs
_ somesignifitantshiftsin U.S.nnclearwarpolicyr
and ageneral- lessening of the chances for
avoiding\Vorld 1?Var 3. Talk ofarmslimitation
' -and detente is rarely heard herethrsedays.Thr
drive to "regain ?U.$_ 'superiority" is well
underway, itsconsequences both ominousand
. unconsidered_ . - - . - __ - _
--Onlya courageous few novr question the ;
'Central rationale on which this build-up is
'based. The terms acid tenor of debate have
shifted so far in Favor of the hawks iq the. past.
_ couple of years that thz undtrlyi rtg premise of ;
an all-out Soviet military effort isseldom even
. ~-questioned ?any more. 1[ therefore seems
-.essential to scrutinizeswhat has become an `
-:axiom for-all bourbeois politicians and for
.many liberals and'a-few leftists::- . ~ -
BASI.SOFCL,AiIvIS .--_ _ -fi-
? What; first of all? is the basis For the claim
_ chat the .Soviet Union has outspent the U.S. j
significantly~in the last few years? '
? It-is certainly not the-Soviet government;
which consistently. maintains that it is not
engaged iti ~ any push to become the top
superpower, An claiming that it seeks only
_parity and=thus security; the~oviets paint to
their published-figures on defense spending
which represent, in dollars; about one-fourth
of the U.5. annual expenditur:_ Allegations ~
that the USSR isactuallpspendingmorethan
the '. Pentagon- are routine]y denounced by
Tv1oscow as "malicious falsehoods:'
~? Confirmation for the claim of enormous
'Soviet military outlays does not come fram
somewhatimpartial -analysts'-such as the
London-based Institute far Strategic Studies
and the~Stockho{m International Peatx !?~= j
search lnstitutr (S1PR1). The Br`.tish research '
institute refuses to affix any firm dollar figure
to the Soviet defenseprogram,explainingthat ~
any estimate would he based on lasgeamounis
of guesswork. SIPR1 meanwhile acknowl-
edges that "the scale and momentum of Soviet
military activities are scarcely modest" But, ,
the Swedish groupadds,precisecomputafions
-are "very uncertain" and "lack credibility:"
Oren sections of the U. S. government?are '!
reluctant to certify tht huge sums that have
been attributed to the Sc>virt mili:arymachinr_
In an October 1979 report an world armament
expenditures, for example, the State-;
17epartment's Arms Control and Disarma-
mentAgencypointsouttha["estimatesofthis j
type probably overstate the. relative size-of ;
? _. ~
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'3 ;_~'~=t~r~:;~r 1900"0
eg.innir!a in March I97$, Carte:, taking
Zbi~tiew ~3rze~rski's cry, used the C_I..
figures in speeches warning that the Soviet Uui
.was outspending us. Typical was this exchar~g~
VIC ~ OR PERLO
The "Soviet menace" has been the Iei~otif pf
U.S. foreign policy and the prime accelerator of
the milita.-y budget-far thirty-flue years. Jimmy
Carter and Ronald Reagan are playing it double
fortissimo nowadays, while commentators warn
of the Russian bear armed to the teeth looming
over..the defenseless American eagle.
In the early 196()s John Kennedy's "missile
gap" was the? pretext far: a big U.S.. militar
buildup; the gap was ultimately shov:zi to be
fraudulent.-Now there is-a new "gap"-and it
can be-shown to be equally spuriaus_ The Soviet
Union, it is alleged, has been rapidly increasing
its defense budget while we have bee^ reducing
ours and is spending SD percent more than the'
United States for military purposes_ This was the
main argument used by Carter iv raise the mil-
itary budget3 percent per-year above therate of .
~inflat7on and, last fall, to .prepare a .new budget
calling far a growth rate of S_perc:nt. Now, past-
- Afghanistan,.it's up to 7, dr 8 percent. -
The alleged Soviet ~"military buildup" remains
the central theme of the campaign for defensein-
creases: The claun of higher Soviet spending
mainly rests an statistics compiled by the Central .
Int~.Iigence Agency. (Friar to 197$ the source
was not given but now -the? Agency is credited
and, with a little perseverance, its reports* can
be purchased.) - - ~ ~ - -- -
The theme ?was first sounded: back in -1974
when the -Pentagon launched its campaign for a
fresh post Vietnarti military buildup. At the !
time, the U.S. Arms Control and Disa.~ritaxnent ~
Agency reported that the U.S.S.R had outspent
the United States far defense in 1972 and 1973.
Then in February 19'76, ~'urtune showed Soviet rrzilitary
spending in 1971 soaring ahead sa ihatF by 1975, it surpassed
LI.S. spending by 43 peroent. -
-a press conference an 7anuary 26, 1979:
Q: Since Secretary [of.Defens:. Y,arald] Brown told tt7c
? Congztss yesterday that the U-S: _arsrnal is fax and avray
superior io that af.the Savi~t Union . __. why did y-ou not sw
fit to ke`p your Cwrnpaign promise ta? raluct the dtfcctse
-. budget irLSt~d of raising it? ~. - -
- A: I t'~~ni: we art atilt .-.. to match any military capahili-
ty that the Soviets have.... But in the last id or 1S yed'epending?;on the final ~tgure
t~et~,spendtng; asYthe Untted States
t~ie'Soviefs froia.doing-ps much with -";
n',;::.;exaggerated;.=Sovief.; stretigfh .:,
_--~_ _ _y _c ~~ ~- .. -.. _
turned-the Congress and the.cotintry
around and: persuaded us' to waste._
literally-b>1lions=on military--spend- ~
ing on the mistaken assumption-_that:-
_ ,_,: the:5oviet. Union spends mpre.,?.
ands in ahe.:.process builds a more:
powerful. military-;;force-: ihan..ati.e~
'United States.t';~'=`._ ~ '=~_>~~,::'..; .' '-',;';.;,
',Huffstutler-_said:=the :Soviet Union;;,
spent thz equivalent=ofabout' 5165':.
tiilfiot iii==='Y7:5 =dollars :'oil'. ritilitaiy ~_~
egt?ipmeztt;?~;wages and'development;~._
last year;=pr,about:50 percent.'more.'.
tij~'aii5b'U~:~outlaysYiates, the CTA`tries to learn, .projected decline-.in~:5a1viet' economic: growth :
amongotherthings'; what :weapons the Soviet - ..; raises:questions:aliout.alie;U55R's.ability to con-
. - _ r,.,nc,nrrcaeinoli PfPnSP'finP_n(I1T1 E7~-" .-
-
-
....,. .,.
vAiavu.ao.vuuu?u6,_.. ...~j.....,....... -. ... ~~. ___r___v.
'. - ... s._., :?: ~`_(.. `;i,'''fy" ~:.:.:
,.k'.'~ -
:what wages,itis,paying~.its soldiers.-then de- T ''f~~~y..` .. ..---::~~ssocia~ea.~'ear.'._~::~s:''+.;,.;~~-~~~~:..: ..: _
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ATZT~~::~? AP ~:.A?^~
Gl ~'RGit~~
"_~~ ~ ~~~, a ~~ar
~~~~~ ~~~~~s~ ~as~
-:. : RY .George C: "5~ilson? .
:. Thy CZ?a yesterday predicted that the Soviet Un- I
:lon will keep increasing .its~:.defense budget 5 per-
~,cent ayear; the same percentage.Gangress approved
;for the?United States this year_~.-; ?? :? ~-_~ `
The agency,- at a hearing- before a House Tntelli- -
Bence subcommittee,. did .say;, its is possible that- Sa.
` 1-iet military spendinc will slow down because of de-
clining'overall economic groR-th. -
"The current and projected decline irl.Soviet eca-
nomic growth. raises questions'about- the .US-S.R.'s
}abilfty to continue increasing defense spending,"
:Robert:, I~uifstutlez,~ director of CIA': strategic' re~
`search, told the subcommittee: ` -
` ~i'hile foreseeing little. slawdown~~before -1983;
;Huffstutler added; "In the longer term; growing ecp=
: nomic._difficulties-may: push the Soviet leaders to
`reexamine their plans with-a?view to-reducing the
-growth of defense-spending."' ; --.,- -
`~.Two-possible,economies?would be-,to~.reduce;.the
r.production -rates..of some weapons and ,agree to arms
:control==agreements providing .direct :savings, the
'CIA specialist.said: ,- __ - __- - .. -
:Fie cautioned, however, that "we think: it highly
.unlikely'.'. that. th~* Soviet leaders a-ill:reduce mili-
;tary.spending to ~?the point that it reverses "Iong-
=s.taxiding policy oi;continuing to_ improve their milir
tary capabilities.'.'.': ; - _ -. - -
=.:$e said=Soviet defense spending, after allowing-.
,3or.inflatlon;,.has-gown "an average of 4 to 5 per-
`cerrL. a ,year.: since : at least 1963:' In contrast to this
;steady.. growth..US. defense. spendinc=has been: up .-
'and down in: that same period; with the ? Vietnam .
war pus- hing,the totals-up during the late 1960s. ': _ .
>2=-~Vho:has__been responsible,'for=the-declineit~tiU.S:=.~
.rnilfta`ry spending'since` Vietnam is a'hot issue in'
=pubIicans:blamin4: eachot erg:;; ~ ~-,;-~- . .:. _ -_ -
THE WASHINGTON POST
4 September 1980
The:GIA estimates how much. it 'would cost the
United States and the Soviet Union to duplicate ,
'each-other's military establishment, with'one com-
parison expressed in rubles and another in dollars. '_~
' -The GI ?,'s cumulative estimates in= dollars from
197U.through 1979 were $1-.133 trillion for the United-
States and $1.4ii0 trillion for the Soviet Union, a.dif-. ;
ference of abput.30 percent, In 1979 alone; -the CI=1 ,`
'estimated, the Soviet.Union-spenty165-:-pillion on its
military;.about:50.percent;=more than:US~espendi=-:,_
~~Aspin said during a break in. the hearina:.that'CI'r1':
dollar coinparisoris-are distorted because tiie agency..:
puEs Soviet.soldiers on U.S:.salaries..,~-:_ .'`__=:: ~= -- -::
.? -lTnder. that.l.-ind .of figuring; `.Aspin said, "the .Chi-
nese K?auId be"'spendinv-us' into ? oblivion"- if .their
axuge.: army'was 'considered 'to be ? paid U:S: mili- ,
'-? A:related issue fs whether the CT_'1-has been pro-
viding accurate comparisons of U.S. and Soviet mili-
aary spending; a topic Chairman Les Aspin.(D-~Yis.)
said.the subcommittee .would question.,the agency
;about in closed session. ,..:... ?; ? -
~-'.`The GIA provoked a flap in 1976 by announcing
:the . it .was.:nearly doubling its estimates of how
big- a:'slice- of the Soviet gross national product
.was going for defense- Instead of the. oid 6 to 8 ?.
percent: estimates, the CI A; said, the new, estim_ ate 1
was between- 11 and 13 percent.- `. ~ =-'-:
`_~ However; i_n 1978 the C1:0. attributed much of the
increase to the fact that the Soviets were vetting
less bang:-far the buck because "Soviet defense ~
.industries: are.far- less efficient:.than formerly be-
;;:Yesterday? the agency stuck-:with- itsY li to 13
.percent. af. G~iP for the 1963 through: 1978 period,
but.raised the estimate to between 12 and 14 percent
.:For;, 1979 because the :Soviet economy sagged that
year- .-. _ --
The-estimated annual 'growth. rate, after allowing
fpr '.inflation, i-n the Soviet defense. budget was
`estimated at between 4 and- a percent'.izi rubles.
tart' salaries for making dollar comparisons-- .
t
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C f7_[1.1.Jn ~~~J t] lei 1.~;: V ~ A~A'~JiV .L 1lJR
0d P~~G~~~..~~ 4 Se j?t~mbPr ? 98Q
USSR-to keep"passing up .
US in arm outlays -- CiA
- -- - Washing#on
Despite growing economic prob-.
lems, the Soviet Union will continue to
outspend the United States heavily on
all major elements of defense, the CIA {
I-.. forecast Wednesday. Robert
. Huffstutler the agency's director of , 4 ._
research; told a panel of the Housa ' .'`.";
- Permanent Select Gdrnmittee orti Intel-"
ligence that the estimated dollar vafuef
of Sovietdefense activities has.ex-., :;,;.,,
-_ ceeded US outlays by a widening. ,:,; -~~.,
margin since.1971, and by 1979, the`; w'.
:rx.
Soviet total was about $165 billion -;:,`_~
about 50 percent above US outlays;:;:~F
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 ~~. Approved. For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137800010013
01=FIDE ~F GURRE~T C~PERATI~~1S
~lE~JS SF~VI~E
DISTRIBUTION li
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130
-
TfiE WALL STREET JOURNAL
22 August 1980
?:{~ - y~~~ In tie '~~in~a ~~
- - - - -i:..~:::- _
- ,.
Aver. the last dec~/ade, -while the ~In the 19?Os, U.S. intelligence failed
United ~ States -has beem~reining in = to -predict accurately.. the size and
spending_ on new strategic. weapons -- speed': of: the ~ Soviet .missile buildup'
systems, the Soviet i.Fnion has..been ex- - and; thus; to foresee the time when the ~~
pending huge sums to~ enlarge and to Russians would achieve strategic par-
modenniae its missile arsenal::Having, ity: ~Ir:~Brown's latest pronouncement.
achieved parity-irr~strated c farces in suggestsa further failure.;:::^--_,-.; - -~.;
the late 1.97os; it-eras "inevitable that :.- ..: It canbe said on behalf', of the Intel-
the Soviet .Union-{would ~-eventually. -, ligence: professionals that even .when:
.reach a position nf- superiority if we~, their estimates are accurate::.they,do,
?failed to boost spending substantially:- -not always `control policy:. Political`:
The Russians are now opening that so-::~"leadeis.factor:in other considerations
called "window":'~~ ab~~ ~~oppottunity; `;. ,=budget': constraints, their efforts; to-=
-meaning: the period ;when:..they.are:in;;. 'win..approyal.for aSALT treaty their=
an exceIlentposition-to~use their stra- ~ .own_:;concepts::,of .the..nature of :.the
~_: -
tegic superiority~:ta'..try'to intimidate nsks ;Interpretation-~~ af:~ intelligence.
the U a.- and a_thei=non-Communistna--.. - -data becomes, at the end;. apolitical-
tions. -- ? ~~ --;:~~ . ~ --- = .~ - - task-iza--the- very broadest sense~.`If:
Defense Secretary Harold: Brown there is a miscalculation, the political..
said tiVednesday that the potential of leadership must be held uItimately.re-:
the Soviet Union to destroy many or sponsible_`? -* - .. _ - ~ ~ - - -`
mast of our land-based intercontinen- But. that does not mean that ~accur-~`
tal ballistic missiles "has been real- ate intelligence gathering is not vifaI
ized or close to it~;~Only-seven months to the process. We can hardly develop-
before,:h~r:_Brownsaid:_tl'iat iL=would '~=a ~pru~lent'defense policy .if we-.don't
take the Russians`a.-year;or~.two":;to . .know foiaure what the,Russians.are:.
achievethaa capability_"The Russians, doing.-1Ye cannot budget: wisely....-for;
- it would appear, have :again caught new~;weapons deieIopmen_t-.,-and.-pro=:
our intelligence=analysts:;off`guard:_,.. -=-;ciatement. ~Ve cannot,'or should not;.,
Congressional {_lieadhunters ;_vir =negotiate arms limitationtreaties: _,
.'hially gutted our~~intelligence -ageri= ~ ~ Good intelligence- assessment' lies
:cie~, notably, the CIA, in_ the_197os..irr. ~_ at_the heart of our defense policy.: The
;their quest to "expose" alleged abuses ]atest revelations show: that, we-.still
----which in the ~ end didn't~amount ~ to ~ `' are maland the old mistakes.- Instead:
-very much. While thatproc?ss weak-; j~: of lobbying for an intelligence charter
ened severely our ability to~ gather?~ni=~:_~ telling the CIA what it_caii't,do, the:
formation and fv-act _covertly=abcoad;y=;~ administration- should, be'' addressing-
it also..helped=:create= anyobscure-=but: ~the~ agency's shortcomings, ,particu;:
equally grave=weakness-~ nameIy' 'tli-e, ~ _ lat'lY .-tie ;problem . of accurately , as-y
lnadequacy:of o__ur=intelligericetassess.,~; sessing..-the Soviet~:~ilnion's_ military;:
-meet operati - - .-- .~.: ~ - - - .. ~ - ~t'. beams could . r?Search afficial_
destroy targets... -- -- '. _ - ? Both countrieb have been working
- ~ for years an hi,h~nergy-laser.con-;-,
Such an achievement would be a CePts. - ~ - --
-ra~olutionary development, putting .Although such potential weaponry
the Soviet Unian.ahead.af.theU_ nited has been labeled by some as "death:.{
States in a key weapons race. - ?. rays,", military' scientists thin'.i' of _'`
? .Defense officia~s who declined m lasers that could be used to destroy i.~
l;a identified-said the..CIA's position hostile .satelli~es, incoming missile-:;.
in the recent.iVational Intelligence warheads and etteniyplanes-rat?z2r'~?
Estimate -was fa.r sham of a conclu-.., thanpeople:.:.:- ?.... ~:: , _ ~;=:- -
sion that the Soviets already had a . .Defense Secretary 1?arold B~wn;. ~
` ~ laser weapon__ "~. - -- who holds a doctoral de~rae in phys- _ j
ossibtlity~-
ed the
l
d
'
-
p
ownp
ay
has
'. ''We say it.is a possibility, but no ics;.
raore than that," said a senior de- that a practical layer weapotx-could:'.
Tense afficial.. - - - .. be. ;achieved .anytime: saaa: for=: de-.,: _
The CIA also reportedly said in the- fense'against attacking missiles. `~ ~':-^--:
foo-secret intelligence`estittrafe that ' ` ~t'one.heat?ng ia.FebrizaryBrovia-=:
the Soviets may " be?;:. developingY.a= ? told Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D.; S. G). ,
space-based-.laser.-weapon_ tiizith. an-. that,`'you.are not-gain, to ].ivylong
all-out effort. and complete-suwcess,-- enough to see that in your lifetime." =
the CIA indicated, suclra?laser weap- ??
on might become available to Soviet - Tn-I~iarch; Dr. Arden L p32m.ent Jr~. ~;
forces by thelate-1980x.: atop administrator of aduanced tecix---
Senior defense scientists say there?~ nalogy,' testified-:that the: Defense ..
are sa many complex technical prob- ._ Science ? Board had .concluded: last < ?
letris to conquer that they believe= it :year that "data da not exist mat present.-=.
itz devel? `:
to tie
i
i
d
o
s
on
ec
may take upta-lQ years to reach the:;_to support a
stage of producing laser.weapons- opment of any particular laser weap-y
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 d~~ r'A~~Q lease 200'F~~7~2~~: ~I~,~DP90-011378000100130001-4
;;y i3IC.i-L~~D i3li'.rtT
.. :S;xtiai to i:c ~yY~rt llm~n'i"
- r,~,'ASi3 (:`~]GTON, tiiay wl ._.. ~1.n authori-
'~tativ*~' llioe^ce~timate raducedby
~-i?':e Car'er Acimi-r'srratio~as =.:o~nelucl-ed
That the Soviet ilnion has developed i
.?,rC'unc'~Lv_'r~tl l%+aar *vapon ilzat could be
,: ,.u~ to ctzsuav American space satel-
hies- -
G.~vernment oi,icials .laid the est.i-
z: nate,.rrhich'r: ~ sFm to l~r?~ldent ('arter
-,last wee;c, alp regarts ttlat American in-
r tail?genre has fcxttxi evidence tllaC rilos-
~~#~'- ;1g~I~ en an antlsatelPtte laser-
__ ,., ,
~~~ ~.
.~..~.c~;J~,_
j ,veapnrl *:?a[ c~zld ~ dePloYc"[l in
bvthernic.l~l's_ r
space I a Soviet laser. ~.veapcrl cased in saace,
Lh ~ d
d
l
'
~Ie w~~~v~iet development is not view~cl
as?al[?r. g Abe overall Soviet-rmerican
milita; ~~.alance, ';ut it is safd to have
aresen[2d the Pentagan',ylth Sorlle i7'OI.F-
Ming que;tivfisbecause the L'.nited :hates
~ has :~cently becoma more defxndent on
tiorLS arld ret'onnaissanca. I4ioscmv's dev?fop laser weapors. The estima~u
t2'
grour:d-based laser, the aiiicials said, is sals~Ereis"evideaceoiaSmrietoaa'e~
probablyeffectiva pnly against low-0rbi't- `o dc'~elop a space-bared laser weapon
my American satellites, sila;tly; those that ;ve believe may have an antlsatellit2
used insurveillaacesystems..._. _.? ;;~applicatian."' ~?
. - Intelli,zai?nce o:[ficiais~are in general
[ agreement that ire $aviet Union has a j
laser system that is capable of destroying f
]ow-0rb.iting...:;e1t:Ierican, satelites.:~.B~*t.
`some e.~rts e.-cpressedskepticism aboui;~
whether ;`Moscow would be able to-deploy
an antisatel'Lite laserHweapon. ~ space I
durirz y this decade_~=::
While the inte,tligence es`~mate:epores
that ~Ioscow must still arork cut ;eves.} ,
technical problems before it: can, placa~
. laser weapons in'sPare,: iC~adds. thar_
` suca weapons mays be available ior'
ox.ratianal use. in ilia mid- to the..late
t 198~s.' _
:Che estimate has ~ttrrzd , a debate
~ ti-ithin the?Adlzlinistration and on Capita}.
} I~iil over the adequacy of American tixo-~
grams#o ?develop laserweaPgns- 771e Ad-.
TMlinistxation plans 'to st~el;d abraut $200' .
million on d?velop.irig Iaser weapons this::
? year, liat::most- of ?this is earmarked iar~
~reseaa'ch on short-range-~s'eapons that
:. f co~.z;d be Used to defend ?ships .and air-~
Tr ~ tl:ai4?e+d' States: Al'3' Faire;. ofticfaIs j
aid; has ~'~~m.te?examinethelbssibility
of build,?rg a laser-power antisatellite :~
`NeaPan, but Pentagon sPec~alists. believe
~ tha t such a. system is willkelp to be avail-
i a i71 ebefore the 199p''s:" ? ,
T. ere is growing ixter?st=in't+~chnical ~
!circles aver?the Potential of-laser.weap_'
ohs because sorrze experts believe they
- coulcltzansfortnwarfare.,,:,.~ _ ~,_?
~~ In oixYer space I'aser weaapotts vtipuld be
I Particularly eitfeccdve i:7 destroying satel 1
:.liter. Some sFecialists aIsv believe that at
some future time-laser-">sa~~~tions"~
could provide-the Soviet Uraon with the;
txleans o.f defending itself against Amen-
. cart ballistic missiles. -
The A Iew York Timesreported an Feb, ~ .
1D tltai a secret ?eport t~nsmitted Ca Cote-~
:grass last yeax.-concluded that- Moscow
`"probably" had.developed ~'cund-teased
laser a'sapons.? Intelligence e~cperts have:
'also assumed that Moscawwas e_,tplaring
ways to develop-. a..,laser ~~~ that
would be deployed in space.: __ -
-:., ? ? ,
e~ a
el
,
.could ~ able to strike :,iy: .
altitude cz-aft, suc2i as corrarn~;Iticatipns
~ate111[es- ,
- lilE' OffICi31s said t,~at t_.,-?;:p~~.. ~.:}?'..`;s ~''r.~?separate service br:tnchest-in-civilian~aeici eccinpmic prepar~ticrns, ing in?its"
;;teflecttd in-its military preparations (which?_rniist also be?identified in the
encompass a wade-range of tls activities and, ~+roblems.-Naliorral decisions;.
~lective~and c~inr/iirltrFtcive annlysis;?`$otinti'-~:italysis:nf:a given ~rnuntry`must':
~perts to the.same subject:~_ _ -` :_:__ ~-- ?~"-`` "~a'- ""-"=~ r - - - -_'_=::
~E't-The intelligence anilyst's~main ?advantage lies iii-the?}iri~cedure of?~o}~=
=his'd"isposa};`'the greite'r the~intehigen~e-`final st's ~dv_arit~igc'over vtlierex~
-. - - - - - .X--
xknowledge of a given a""r~a_~ Theobvious_`s.ignificance of this-diaracteristic`is'?
.
~_ .-:'A[ress-tospeeial intimate;?and~;ensitive dafa complements auth~vritatiye.-
;or journalists are in na`way inferior to-the`average iritelligence_arialyst:_ail
have?acquired expertise throtigli a~aden-ci~ ?studies,'military'_sdiools;-or'long
eper?onal experience;_Nevertheless;~ther?e-are three major'd-iracteristics-that
;distinguish
the intelligence arralys(:~from=?ot}ier'observers of world afF~ie's-~~-
:sus hes advantage over any other expert Highiy'cleialifiei:i academic researchers
aWhat?distinguishes: the intelligence ~professiona! from other analysts?..What!
_.~ ?In brief,-ahi4 artide discusses how a better understanding of the complex
-relationship between intelligence and its "clients," the derision-makers, tan
lead to more satisFachory,?tivelt-integrated }ierformance: ~?? ..
:ante}lipence analysts For bad dedsions based on speculative estimates.
- -J' __---..-p...__ ..... .. .~ ........ -
ing`moi-e fhati a`straight-forward scientific and technoloP cal disc7p}ine that
``should--serve distinct analytical-needs. Inte}liPence certainly has capabilities -i
.crag advanta?es that should be understood and exp}cited; but ono should be ji
_,eclually~ware~of its limitations. Derision-makers--both civilian-:znd troll- !I
,tary-~who`do not understand this, must often share responsibi}ity with thsir
Irate}ligence.professionals obviously never ctairrted that they could read the
,Approved For Release 200'F/07/27 : CIA RD~~7R000100130001-4 -
1q
 v
i~.RTICLE ~~~~~% r Releaser200~1~0~/2m~ CAA-RDP90-011378000100130
QN PAGl a'~.. ~~.?~~ Lll"i4~V
~~ r~lar~c;~ i98o
]iy RICl-l:*:sides are permitted tawork on developing
;new systems. Mascow,is said by-intelli?~
gence analysts to spend about $1 billion
~?year on ~arttiballistic: missile research
? while. the ?=Pentagon's budget==for-_fisca:~
.'year~1981 includes about $265 tnillian.~q
workinthisarea_~ ~,~ - . = --~?x,,,.r-~
~~_.._..._ ,- -. .. _ _ w, ... ~.
Apphoved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
ROCKY MOUNT TELEGRAM (N, C. )
19 January 1980 ,:~.~ . ,
Despite assurances from the
`administrationthat U.S. intelligence
operations are adetluate, the crisis
in Iran and a string of other U.S.
foreign policy setbacks indicate that
U.S. i.~ate]ligence capabilities have
been "degraded to such an extent"
.that they are no longer an effective
arm of U.S. foreign policy.
.That's the assessment of sec.uity
analysts writing on the intelligence
-gap in she currant issue of 1Yational
Security record.
The analysts blame the break-
down an the--internal reforms within_
the Central Intelligence .Agency in
the early 197gs and. the external
.exposiu-es and resulting-limitations
placed onthe agency in the late I970s
in, the wake of congressional in-
vestigations. -
These reforms resulted in the
forcible rQtiremerit of some ~2,G00
mostly senioir ~ 'officers, and the
discharge of another 820 officers
from the super-soeret Deputy
Directorate of. Operations, which is
responsible for cavort actions.
Throughout the past war era the
U.S. has relied upon - foreign in-
telligence .activities to support U.S.
interests overseas. Clandestine
collection, counterintelligence and
covert operations have all been
essential .elements aF the U.S. in- "
telligence ei;art.
Yet today, as at no- other time
there is a growing consensus that
U.S, intelligence .capabilities .have.
been degraded to such an extent that `
the U.S. is increasingly incapable. of
?: carrying on intelli;ence activities.
- In addition to Iran, which caught
r this country totally off guard, there;
are several other examples of in_
. telligencefailures.
U.S. intel]igerice consistently]
~. rnisinteipreted the intent of Soviet'
policy in Afghanistan. Downgrading;
of intelligence capabilities led to a;
failure to moxutor the. Soviet;
.military buildup in Cuba, and Cuba's;
support of revolution throughout
_ :Latin America. _ . -~~
In 1973, U.S.intelligence inac-
curatelypredicted that Israel would
not be attacked by the Arabs.
l~/lore recently, underestimating
Nvrth Korean troop strength by 25
- percent lad to President Carter
having to reverse his previously-
announced troop withdrawal policy_
. The U:S. has .been unable to
? confirrrx whether a nuclear explosion
actually occurred aver the Indian,
Ocean lastSeptember, and i? so, who
was responsible.. - -
This~country was not able to an-~
ticipate the rapid shift of Soviet
support from Somalia to Ethiopia.
In 1977 the CIA revised its in-
tellig~r,ce estimates an Soviet oil;
'. production, concluding that 14loscow!
would. be a net oil importer through
the I980s. Yet the Defense In-'
telligence Agency, and many
Western petroleum experts,
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
POLITICS TODAY
January/February 1980
.~.o.ti.;.x-,.:_?.+~" ;.~~'kr~::~.we.~_r_.._ zr: u*~.,Kk~ _~xt~:-~ wy~^^w...~,~.~_..n.~x.s~v~ - -- --- . _ -~~.z..-,.....ti..9~..?..~ .
il?~i~t~~.~"t~~~3~~
d~-7'~'1H~ ~~G~-
~~ When they are bad, they
arehvrrid. But-though the
possibilFty gets little atten~
tian these days-CIA
agents can stilt be .very,
very good at what they do.
Arid right now, behind. its
many closed doors, the
agency should be congratu-
lating itself on three sub-
stantial successes:
Since I_T_S. relations with
China have improved, the
CIA, in its awn gesture of
recognition, has stepped up
its surveillance of Chinese
military developments.
This led mast recently to
the discovery of a super-
secret program to build the
first Chinese intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile. Called
the CS$X-4, the missile is
part of a vast military mod-
ernization program under-
taken by the new: Chinese
leadership and. inay be
operational in two to live
years. At this paint,
China's military capacifies
are still relatively back-
tivard. But the CSSX-4,
with a '7,500-mile range,
would be more than capa-
ble of reaching the U_5.--=
to say nothing of changing
the equation oA power be-
tween China and Russia.
a -
In 1972 the CIA was
caught una~x~ai'es by the
Russian food crisis. Since
then the i7krainian wheat
fields have beer, on the.
agency's list of top priority
surveiliances_ U.S. farm-
ers, economists and
generals are all interested.
The army, even in this tech-
nological age, still runs pn
its stomach, and if the Sov-
iets suffer a large crop
failure, chances are good
that they won
't plan any ~
military forays
that year.
The Arn.erican
economy is
also affected
by Russian
weather. In
i
1972, poor
crops in Russia led to unex-
pectedly large wheat pur-
chases Dn the .America~t
market, which in turn
drove up domestic prices.
But this Decembar when
the Russians announced a
179 million metric ton
shortfall in their' grain crop,
it was no surprise in the
U.S_ CIA experts earlier
this year had tracked
"sukhoveys" (hot, dry
winds) blowing across the
steppes and accurate}y pre-
dicted that the winds would
take out 25 percent of Rus-
sian wheat.
Only a year ago the CIA
somehow missed all signs
of the Shah's incipient
overthrow. But the agency
has now honed its intelli-
gence work in Tin to a
highly sensitive point. one
month before the attack on
the American embassy in
Iran, the CIA warned the,
White Mouse that security
in and around the embassy
needed to be tightened and
recommended that the
number of marines sta-
tioned there be increased
from 16 to 200. The agency
also prophesied that the
Khomeini regime would be
highly erratic and that "acts
of violence" against Ameri-
cans in Iran could be ex-
p~cted. For a variety ofrea-
sons that history will have
i410~e~the White House
did not act immediately an
the agency's advice.
G~ `/.fit
C U s ~~
.s~c~k
 Approved For Release 2001/b7/27 :CIA=RDP90-01137Rb0011)0130001-4
sy~-raornrgajta~w - the Kremlin aver the nation's siuggislk.
dtn,eco,uat?enuoJT+esu? - `-, > economic performance is unmistakable.
? Moscow-The Soviet Union has? 6eeu .. Mr:, Brezhnev delivered a harsh critique
forced to scale back its economic growth.r;~~ the economy in a?speech Tuesday be- '
targets for the coming year ns a result of .fore the Communist Party Central Com-
generally disappointing industrial per-~?.: mittee:~.:;",'~`:~:=-.- ~ . - - - .~ - _ .. ,
formances that Gave. brought unusuallx.-;~:.;.~, abridged version of lthe speech~?.
sharp criticism from .Leonid f. Brezhnev; _ -S~g.~~-~ itself-was released'late -
theSoviet Communist pariychief..: ? -~ ;4x;k-=-~:Tuesday;,night>_by_the-official Tass.news
Figures presented:..yesterday ':toy the::~r agcy..- , '; _~';:.:._'_ _%::~ -. , -: . - - -
opening session.oi_ -.. iir~i i_LiiF3LFA n?'i ~1 1,.? .: r?.?Ce
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.Approved For Release.200T/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137.ROOfl~:OQ'~30001=4~:-
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/27.: CIA-RDP90-0113780001001300
~i~CLP: L,L'P
A
x
CN P:iGE:~ ~_~
19 Nov1;rl~~ 1979
'-' _ w ? _milita -spending. Academe ex-
~? ~ +, ~ } perts such as Messrs. Lee and
. - -. ~.~:=::__:...- ~__ _. __._ _.... --._~o-w-~ _; authoritative checks on CIA
-- Last week an imposingprocessioni- + In itsfirstpresentationtothesub-~::= analyses, since no institutional
~of tanks, missiles and troops rum= 1 com~pittee, a CIA official testified,'; check on CIA calculations is carried
.bled through the snow in Moscow's . ~ that the Soviets devotel5 percent of ~? on by the U.S. government.
?Red Square to.commemor~t~e the their?.military budget' fa personnel. ~ .The rate of .increase in Soviet
62nd anniversary of the Bolshevik -" .compared with 30 percent=by the j military procurement, adjusted for
revolution..Reviewing the. parade - ~~ U.S:-After Sen. Byrd objected that ~ inflation, is galloping at 11 to 13 per-
"from atop Lenin's tomb,?-Soviet . ; the 30-percent figure didn't jibe with - cent, said 14ir..Lee, while President
defense minister Dmitri Ustinov::--. -congressional and Defense Depart- . Carter is seeking only a3 percentin-
denounced what- he called:?"false~~:t-ment calcul.ations,? -
"Mr. Duncan stressed that the vu]-
nerability of OPEC production-was of
great concern to the Administration;'
:one source said. , --._ _?
` The degree of seriousness was evil
dentin the testimony b1r..Kahrt gave
today to the Subcommittee on Energy
and Power of the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce: -Committee. dI
said the Iranian situation was not only
endangering supplies but also driving
up spot prices for. oil and thus cantri
uting to inftauon_ _ '-"'`:: ` - ...-_ -- -
' Fo>?-this reason; lze added, Adtrt9sti f
-eying a wide range of options to reduce
energ}r consumption in such a way that
Approved For Release -2.001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011~7R000100130001-4.
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
A.~~xcl~ APP~~
ON PAGE~~
THE WASHINGTON PO5T
7 November 1979
?-_ ~F- ' B J. P. Smith - -
'r ? -.. Y -
' WaaL-nRton POat Stott wTItCY ..
The CL'4 has told sepior Carter ad=~
1T"-1S3:.S l,~d L:V (1 i,l.[Z1C;1Q~] ~ii1LL .L'~1141 `. J~+
t at Azar is haltiAs its niI -exports to
the [Tnited States:.., .':;:_;: ~. - , = -
- -The -report, if confirmed:..eould be'?~
the be.ginnin~ of the cutoff. o? Sranian:?-
oil. that the State 1]epdrtment- uad: pri~...I
'~; FFowever, one major~oil compa.nyex--~'
ecutive-said that:as recently as noar~~
? yast~rday one of its tankers had left'
.Kart-Island, lran's main~oil..shipping
= terminal.: without- dif#iculty.~ That ex-
ecutive said that'if ?"Iran.: lzas-.cut=offs='
(exports), we're not':aware-of i,_?~ ?,:-~ ,
-`O`ther oil company`-'officials-- said
they were aware- of some~intemtpkion =
in oil. deliveries, but;wexe .not sure--oi;
-. viould not"mean'`an immediate'return"
to last summeYs gasoline .lines; but.--it-%
would result in:. anothex--wave of- stiff '
oil price. increasesr according-to':some-;
_~ ~ Publicly,; the Carter- administration
-
' has continued to
downplay the~dikeli
hood that' Ayatollals. IShomeini's - re~
gime would ban shipments to America
or. sltarplY cut back e~coorts_ > '. ~ _,..: ? `
- .~"die ezpeet.that:ouroil suPPly will.
npt lie cut off,""Nodding Carter, the-
State??Department s? _spoisesman;.: said .
- Privatelyr ~State~`~Departnient office
- , cials==have~'a. more~pessimistic~giew:?-~.
United S.tates.:or:a.,--drop ?in exports is7L
~~ cause Traix?now-has`~~S`~bt~]ion~in?'offi"~'
;year with a $4-billion surplus'?-:..~ ^~ ~ ^
":.a :'Sunday,' Ali . NIontifar; head .of
the -Iranian :~Natianal~0i1- Co.; `was,:
`' ]Khaumeni:orders-=~t:__This_-and.;pther'.:
beeni~issuing .
suchweiled: t~reats~have
,
_
from'Tehrabsince.the tatzeovex of then
_;J=U:S:~embassY._~tFlere~-by. students de-
: rz~anding the extradition-of-the shah:'
`' with.400,Q00.barrels a day..or_more, ac~?
troleiun Indust~y'Researelt:,,Founda-
A p p ro~vti dn1~8~Re~ ~ ~`T
~:-_ural-gas hecause,af:the..upheava2.~+
-.:.. ~~~,ichtblau said:: acutoff :would- npt
cause gas lines in the'near future.. ':: -:
-. -:The.Tnternatianal?Enery.Agencyir
,Paris . said. r~inei?.icans ?,vi11. _ `lave
enoi;gh-.heatinr:;:.pi1'ca~':asOline.~ to..
ia;t tlimugh..tixa .?~yinter-if.-lran, does--,
cut shipments:-Lastr.week the.Ener;y~?
Department. said the oil industry: baaj
~~~~c~aed President'Cartex's 2~mi1=
lion-barrel heating oil inventory goal-.~-
Cil.roen-suc'n as: r\tlantic .?~icafieid's.:
` chief; international = analyst,,.'David-
Sterr-li~ht;:also:pointed aut?-that-?iL?.
"Iran did ston.U-S': shipments, "natktin:. ,
s would really-happen_far 30 to EU days ;~
=:because of :==;tankers ~-: alread9 -under., ;
Stexnlight ~also~ said:.other }?I'ersianw
Gulf-praducexs;:,such:_ as Saudi ~srabia : .
=_. and Auwait;~might be induced `to in
'' crease' their ail-production to makeup ?:'
-~ for'Iranian cats:' :. --. :- -~`"; ,
~wfiile, there . ~vould^--definitely- be _ a..
?; shortage in the U.S:," Sternlight said. '=.
~~~?ceiSable: that .they would.. cnt- off eic_
-~` exports to ttie "U..5.:.it. vrould-just triq-
+~~ ger a reshuffling i1t the. oil market-"- .. .
- Like Sternlight; Eck a.nd-other indu-;
-?. stry executives? interviewed -said that.
if Xran. announced a ban on e_~cporCS to
the- United States, it would force an-
t_ ether quick...increase, in, prices on-that
>'~nearl,}! twice- the?~ Orangization Hof.-Pe-
E~.,troleum Exporting_Cauntrizs'.;official
~`_? _TheIraniari-~-oil'~squeeze.earlieir.tliis;
the shah?.,touched- o_ff..,the._massive._oik
pace increases this t'ea`r.-Since: tiie be-
~` ginningof-the=year,OPEG-price_have:
eel, ? the-. ?lacgest?-:increase-~: since ; this;
=? ucing al;out.~3.8'million?barrels _a day,
refs aday=under?:the. sha1~.,Tehrau-:is
.,..~ _r
.~~':= The lUioirieir~?'regime lias;?a3so cre~
?~~ Gently .to~Con,gress "The-r Ovigt~
1F short term- frorrr the cutoff''pf.-eiiergy
RDP90-0113~1~6~E~~6~~.'~1?n Soviets-were
-: very co e? outh.Caucasus last
 ART.
T? IS 1983 The~A,yato11a1t.Khomein!
has-died, .leaving Iran. ur:political
turmoil. In the confusion, the Iranian
Communist Party claims toe have seized
power: Challenged by the army and Shia
Dloslems,? the Communists- call on .the
SovietUnion,foraicL - .. - -- - __,_r
- Eight divisions of -5oviet''airborne
troops are swiftly flown to Tehran.andta
the oil fields. at.Abadan in the? south. A
Marxist-Leninist government ? is-? prate
laimed and??Iran's daily--exports of .six
million barrels of oil are withdrawn from
the world market, diverted tb -fuel- the
Soviet Union and its allies. The United
States is powerless to intervenes -- ; ;
but some of -the ingredients are already
apparent: _: -- -_ -- -
? Iran is already in?political_turmoil;
and thus is a source of instability: on the
Soviet Union's southern border,: ? - :.: -.-;,
o In the early 1980s; the? Soviet Union
will become dependent for therfirst time:
on foreign oil, Because it will?be short of
hard currencyrit may not be able to pay
forit... _...._.. ___ _~._.~ .- - __
o What the.$oviet Union ivaK have~is a -
Sophisticated? military- machine;: built- up -
over 20 years; to_ the point where it can
carry out a majorforeign military.inter~~
vention, especially-close to its.borders.
o The onset-of. Russia's-oil-shortages?
. and the new strengtlrof its-conventional,
militaryforces~will.coincide.with a tem-
porary, thearetical~but psycholagica}lp
important.`=_--missile..gap.~In the_. early.
1980s, -America's: land-based b7inuteman
missile force, hitherto protected is under
ground- silos,.will become vulneaable to
scoring -direct -lots. Thee United .Staten
could? find. itself outgunned not- only in
nuclear missiles, but in planes, tanks.and
manpower needed is a conventional War:w
This = is,::='of ;~couxse;~(?a--.worsGcase~
. governmenE assess thaconsequencesof_a_'
gore's Andrew` Marshall can writes=?As th
? Soviet-Uniox-becomes-bolder.iut pushin
involving. hex: Pw~fo_cesr.aiore~openIy
_ thereiathepossibilityo4a.inajo>r.eonfrc?=
fation~so_me time inyth~:t9$0 _'~ `;;i
~_N_ P~1GE~~~ ,,,,~,~ 6 No~rernber 1979
Eease 2001/: ~~~F~~~I,,'tj~34+09i0013000
...__ - _-- - - _ _-- - Y .--~:~w:.~
--'""""`-"~-'~. -i - --`~ Emulating a?U.S:?capacity;the $n3~~
'rent U-S ~ weakness' and Soviet
might ? tempt . the ~ Kremlin into ? such a
confrontation are behind the demands ln:
Washington thatthe United Staten embark
on a $4B-million .crash program over the
next five years to-modernize its convene
tional armed forces: -- - . - - -- -
? w~goneressional committee w,~s tol
b the Central Intelli ence A e v lac
wee. ,I,hat? oviet military exner.~li _ i es
are currentl 50% hi her than America's
and wi continue !o-rise at east t roue
1983. A former CIA anal st asserted that
even that estimate was 50%o too low. ~ ? ? -~
ere is an a ement o . quac cry in
estimating Soviet defense-expenditures;.
which are a state secret: The basic method
is to assess how much it would-cost the
United States to duplicate a?S_ oy-let grog-
ram. Little ore no allowance is made for
- the fact that Soviet labor costs; for exam
?ple, are only one-tenth as high,as prevail.
irg American wagesi _ - ~' ~= ? ~' - - -
Regardless of how much?the Russians
-actually spend; however, it is indisputable
,that they have built up a modern military'
machine -with an array of sophisticated
weapons?for'the army, airforce and navy,
that rank with the best P,merica produces.'
_.Speaking of"Russia's'defense?'effort; Aire-'
-Force Gen: David? Jones, chairman ai'?the
_:Jaint Chiefs of Staff; told Congresa?last'
':. own borders, The-.1.$?millioh??men`o# the
=:.Red Army . arB:.;stationed :either. =in the
~~~Saviet Union itself--with half a jnillion
men ~ itr ? 44 ?divisions-along th`e - hostile-
: =Chinese fxontier-? or in Eastern Europe,.
4 confronting the- xlorth Atlantic..Treaty_
`' by-~.U.S. - standards;' ~ but ;nonetheless';:
unprecedented: _-~_ _ :-:~ ~: ~-_ax ~ ,.._ _.,
~,by-:a[- headquarters' in? Vladivostak;_.has
~?capable _of interdicting Pacsfic' sealaner?
;-'and the?~key oil~routea.to Japatt:`This
_~ Qceagthrougb the Straits;of Malacca~~y^
2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
-suns have crea~ea?a~smau maruxz ~vrp.s.-
-` It currently numbers or~ly~about' 12,6UD
?, men, but in many Third R!orld situations;
=: a shock'assault by a small:for_ce would be
decisive: - -- - i4'` `.
-' s The Russians have built.?up eight
=_ airborne? divisions, and though they still
lack long-range lift. capacity,-geography
~.. is such that the Soviet Union can outstrip,
-_ the-United States.in_moving large nutxH..:
_ hers of men and weapons into the tiliddld;
? East-thePersian_Gulf an~Korea~:?~~=
- '--?- _.
?.-` According to Pentagon. analysts. this
extensive, coordinated .and obviously
-planned buildup of all categories of
economic benefit and na readily apparent:'
purpose. The Russians have poured bill,
_ ions of dollars in cash ark weapons-ixtto
?Cuba,?Vietnam, Syria and smaller nations
around the world -and they are neither.
off as the result. _,=_.. _._~ ~--~___-: --=__r_ -?~
The United States has always had at
-least the pretext that U.S. military forces
-are protecting visible American interestsr
-.Since Adm. Dewey sailed-into:4Yanila Bay.
in 1898; Americans have become accus-
tomed to seeing their young men sent off
?'North Atlantic ?shipping`lanes,?.~diddla
~~East oil, or the Lever:Brothers coconut-
plantations on Guadalcanal.- _=-.- =:-=;=-'w
---Historically: the:Soviet:Uriion has-had
=no-similar,. vital: foreign:'interests, It has;
-.metals, growing its owz~food and dev_e_lop=
=ing its own industries. ;~..~ -~~; r_ _~ ~~;
`~~Soviet-buildup-are:a~mystery; but there:
??'a.g;eat power,_as_they-hare_seen tha?
`United'?States~behave~~around' the world.'
=of woi3d?conquesb~au=idea favored by'-
- -some-~coaservatives~`?but''scoffed ? aC--by-
;~nast'ga'Vi~+_~tent:"officials : Third;_: they=
CoNrxNUE~
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
APTICLE 11PPE 4P~D
OPEC cut
O`I P=1GF ~--.----- 5 November 1979
ILIA defends
CHICAGO TRIEUNE
Fi'ASHI:VGTON [UPI]~The-- Central.
Intelligence Agency has ?defended the-.
L~:?IrC oi: ^a;zl', cuts io petroleum aac-,
nazis as conservation. measures similar.
k~? rzo~es z:,zri~r study in the ?linited.
States, it was disclosed 5unday_ +I
Te.,tifying at a closed~loor congres-
sional heari-cg, CL~? analyst John I;ck-
?land~ said the prganization of Petroleum ? .
L:cporting Countx;es is "doing the same?~
thing that the State of Alaska is doing:"
Ecslard, u=.e chief of Cr4's petroleum
supply analysis center; told the Rouse
Intelligence Committee's- oversight panel
that-the OPEC cuts could?ba compared
to conservation -studies ordered by~ Alas-
kan officials. _ .. _. _ _.. - _ --
He said the State of Alaska has Called
in consulting? firms ta- determine how ? .
fast oil tan be pumped from Prudhoe' .
Bay without causing damage to the
field. - - - - :. _ ... - _
?
~
"ALL'. OF TAUSE
studies? say?.
thatY
Prudhoe Bay .starts to decline ~ around _.
1986," the analyst said.
He said production can lie kept at
about 1.5 million barrels a day: unti~?
about 2D per ? cent of .the oil liar been .
pumped, but "is boing to inevitably_fall',':.:
from then on. ' ? -
"Diow,-?OPEC- countries ale ~getting~'~-
these sorts of -answers: on their oil `.
=fields," EckIand said: "They are #acing
a need to try to preserve?aad stretch out .
this resource." ; ._ .- ..- :-~. ..-..._ ?
- A transcript of the closed~oor= heart .
ing, .which _ was ? held.: UCt..17, was re- . -
leased 5unday_ ~ Rep. Les? Arpin Cl).,; ,
Wis.], chairman- of .the: aversi sulk:.
Committee. _.- ?-
~~bIAURICE ER:~TST,. the CI.~'s econora l
is research director; said the Soviet TIn- !
i~~n i~ not to blame for OPEC's cuts_ ~
L^~st. told_,,i.'tr crommittee tm~ Soviet :.~
tinion has energy problems of -its. own -
and would made them worse by increas.
inn the pr.?ce the lsxenzlin must nay .for-
imparted oil. - - - . -- -
In addition, he said, the Soviet Union -::
doesn't have the clout to get the oil-ex-
porting nations to cut back export, even
if it decided such a move would be in its
. hest interests:- .. .. -. _ . ? ~ .-
"I .would say so far; the Soviets rim-.
ply do not. have the influence over? the
oi!-producing countries .that could-~ ena=_
ble them to ? reduce or to affect: the oil
,supplies,: even if-they=. wantedto;" -be ,?.;?
said. .. .......:. .:.:...:.. ... _ .
~. Ernst told the sulxommittee that Savi- V ,
et oil. production was. expected to peak :.
this year or- next and to start declining
"within a year_or~two aFter that." -, _ ~? ..
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP9.0-011378000100130
~r~cx~ ~>'EaR~~n
Ott PAG~~~,-,
7HE WASNIPdGTON P05T
3 November 1979
. ~-:.'.?-,.:~t: ii,:~ ~..u:.~l~i~r~.a'Ilil'~l..tr:~:~~:~~.rY~.'s_~
~~` ~resldent~ Carter's belated threat to- :?
~~ ~iinlsli'tlis: oI~ com~anie9 fv~. turning
~'~th: e~worldwide: oil ';crisis".into ~uncon.'
,~ sc~onably higli~'pofits'may Qnce a~aln:l
:Y-..... , . .
,: turn out to be a case of too little, too`
~` ~afe'.The sad trutb:~ls:tliat ii the preSi
}dent wanted to be~iair about it, he'd.=
'~ hays to march himsali out to the wood:,F,
`~ shed along with the oil Aioguls. _ ~;; :.; `
,~;ck'A-wealth a[ information was avails-
~~l~.:to; Garter ~~and~ his.: advisers.;that';
;~ showed: Big .Oil's: excuse ? for =the ? goal
~llnes and price jutnpa;- a.worldwide."
roil shortage caused- by-the cutoff'oi:,
~.Iranian`r~roduction`=_'was in fact~af
,1~,, -. a . , a al~-s.
~:~
hat-e ose t e Iranian sca a oat as.
:'.;a;.mylh~:; Other. oil-producing.. nations.
more .than made : up : #o~.: the Iranian,
~~ shortfall,,: and, ; T-J,~~; impgrt~ : actually;
4'? ;
,~~:'.=:Both the oil.ltidustry and-the Carter
~??~:
:t administcatiori knew this. Yet lhen~n-
4 ergy :czar: James :Schlesinger .? stead=
y lastly ~ insisted. that ~ our ~ imports were
dowtt,2=;nlllion-.barr'els a=day because=
~of the Iranian situation, and that,. ac=
~.cordi;ig ?; to - the:: ~ administration; -.was
,: yvhat was causing the gas. crunch.: _ _-`-t:
>-~tVe have-uncovered other. reports;
? ~~.-. ..
:''same r: still ~ suppressed! ~:-which shot:
;down-the. Big Lie~about'Big~ Oil. The
-way the reports were handled has con;.
r. .
:winced -those. who. knew what-was In
;:them that there,was indegd a conspir~_
~:acy-by-the-oil companies to extract:
:huge-profits from, the American pu-:
~;~blic's. peliel; iri ~, shortage that..was jul
:.. act a 4antom.~ ~~~:iis:j"~ ~:. ~~: ~ ~~
~~~~~On~ ital pieSe`ott'evide>tc~.whici~?~
~;detiii~iked theNtpytli'-oi -the shoriage`~
j;,was~ a~s~udy-?.prepar~d ?i'ar Rep;'?~lbert
Gore Jr: lD-'I'erinJ 1iy the Congressional.
Research::Service's~ top'?:internationalj
,oil analyst, l?arlo $cu$a, fast j~'ebruary
.Core made same at;.the,~Ggnclusions
public,in; i`Iarcli;;including?a;gredia:
..lion. that world oil product4gn.. would
be the same iii the f jrst, nine months of
1979 as'it`-had ?aee~t a year eai~lier,;dz-
spite the Iranian cutb~ek,:'r ,yc.~ > = _~f:.,'.:
-~ ~ Gore dream denials and ridicule~fronr~
fhe'oil moguls,~the'admiriistration=and-
the ; media.: The Scuka . predictian9;
thoughr turned. out'to- b~.`right Qn,;ttie
money::.-t"-.'i:.;;:?~:~;`:~z.~~ ~,:4~;-~:.ia~~,;-
:~. Meanwhile;.I'.Scuka :;asseuil~led:~; 60.
papes'af backup data. 5ouirces told uur-
associate;Dale Vast ~Atta? the report, ,i~r
~released,~in~ .April.: when ?it'tvas ~~corri-
`pleted would have been'`devastationg~:
~to~~Carter's:and Schlesinger's'eredibfl-.?
ity. ~ But" its was buried. 'According' fa ~a ;
source cIosa to fhe probe, the CRS ana--
1?yst . "`was :raked:: over. tha (- coals ? by ?
higher-ups-.;: and~,~they-1=stonewalled
;Gore;'., who.neyer did get the-tuu:;e;
~~~~'As,for the man:whotold~the truth?
Dario Scuka is also tieing punished. Nis
bossses :are;. threatening : to ` transfer.
'him-out of his field of -expertise,-r:in;;;
xernational petro]euni;~'-~-~to. ~a ~-job
where?his honesty. wil; be less embar=~~
rassing:~... . -;~ ? ~ - ,-;~3:: ?.ri.:~~'..,:..;.t.,~t
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 ~~;~;.I~r ~ or Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-0113780001001
3'i Pary
~
~
..~
- 2 Nov~;~F~ Y 979
_
-
-
-
~,__
~-._ -..c~~ 1 1.1.iU 1 V:
:.
}~:~._ sY : _. ? _?
~~ - r.a.4__ _." ~ i
~a `` -: ` --- ??. '"'''' sp2ndin "are~'often'CdnzrOV
~
- r- g?~~ ersial:?because:tlte-I~remlin_!
i .~ ~'?
~~ ~~~
-
? ~?
,
. -1 " - ~~"'
: _.._ ...._.eense;~ng
eepsits
~~
:dfbd
k
'
:- et-secret;_forcing:U-S,:anaIysts:to~'
,. _ .? _ - _ >` ? :' ?_ , y~. ~, ~ ~~ ~ estimate':th : ;
~,r. _ =~:~~:- ~~ `~ ~~ :.r~',. ~ ~ ~costof;7nilitary, p ograms:t t_ can -be'ob-::
-.r~-__.._.:, ?:
. - ..~ _- '?-' - ~=.- strvedb? satellites andintelli
nc
th
ds
e
eme
o
::~
,~,. ~~'~~~_Y -'=Burton estimated the 5vviet defense bud et for- `~
- ~~~~~;=~ .._.~ this year;,'
_ - - - _ '8t-betweeri~5S-billion.and 63,billion=..rubles-gxn,:Ce
, rasa of theta
..,
` ~~ . "~_~ : SY ~+D Me'1,3~i~S~t+itiSTE . -'~i ~"`~-':~'' ~:T; v
_ -
: ~ =~? r R R ~,-~ '
buyin
o
~?
~'
-~
~
ri
,
,
.
~
g p
970: ~., *:
a ruble ,
~
:~
-
-- -?
:,. - ... ~;' - i
'~~' sa=~ rJ:~ tx'' Tinwi STHf !Mh-llr,....a:: :: t;': y.... -k%, y ,.~:_;} ~-
~ _`~~ >~:_ ;L ;
:-t~-~ ~.--~: :Based orr
7 .~
the official`excha
e
rat
# ?
7aa
?~
-
~?
~
~
~
.:
n
~
?
t
i'~ii:3 g e.
gcire,svoul
}f
~_ _._, __ .-...,.;.-;~.;.I..,r~~r: =~"'WASHINGT'UN=-Defeiise~speitdinghythe$oviet?Union.`' ~ua1 between S&i billion:and-S92~illioir~;Sitt:the:L"fA're=":~
- t~]-increase~steadil~?for: at? ]east'the-next five vears?iie~~ ' its such astraight-line conversion'from rubles to-dollars,
]wavy binden of isms an that nation's ec:onotny,.the Cen ~.: ~ ~n~~ met far~ce~:domestic pricuig system-doesi'
'~alIntzlli;.once-Ageacy.vradicted~'ltursda -~-;,y=>.;;.~~Y:.',':=-:=;F :.-. ._~~:-_.:
}? Far instance: ?Lee said, mditary hardware will account ~:
'for more than half of the total output of Soviet machinery .
next year::A.s recently as 190"5, he said; the:military.share ?
f machmery:production was 25~.r,~.~:~s:act .of. farsighted.
much: as the most. greedy "statesmanship forthe Saudis
Arab..,~~ .-'.. _ to have-temporarily uPP~
` We' are fortunate~that the - praductionto give the W
largest OPEC producer,. time ta?adjustto lower coa-
Saudi Arabia, has been pre- suznption levels. They are
pared to hold its price below ? motivated by the' stake they
the new OPEC ceiling and to have in Western prosperity
increase production- from and -by their.. well-founded
8.5 to 9.5 million barrels: fear o? the Soviets. But they
Fulfilling a promise~made to .sometimes despair of a fair
this reporter on Jung; 9., ., hearing_:ia ..the ~Ameri:caa
Crown Prince ,Fahd..ex-. znedia.-...._-;__,,;: ::_._; .;___..~'~.:-
plained to Carter's envoy, When ~:=`the . ?
In?addition to Saudi :~rabia's? reluo-
tance to increase its production: nuw
about S.~ -milli.on ban-els a daY, pros-
pects for higher world o.il prices are -
fed by. the UPEC nations rising inter-
nal financial demands.:. -
Last year some cartel members, in-
cluding Saudi Arabia, its richest mem-
ber, had financial difficulties. : ? ?
The CIA analysis says, "The current `
account of all the member countries ?
will improve;-easing many. of the' fi- :_
nancial burdens plavuine the?cart~l." ?.
Even with higher ou prices, however;..
the CIA says that~? three.cartel znem-~
bers=Algeria, Ecuador.and Venezuela '
?-will have.. deficits :in? -their: current
accounts this y ear:_ - . - - _ -
The current account is a measure of ?
Fahdil.Chelabi. OPEC's deputy-.sec=. a nation's income.after totaling- ~earn-
retary General, recently offered a sim- lugs and payment for trade,: services,
ilex ~ icw_ suGsesting that 519,5p a bar. tourism and.- earnings . on ,#breign in-
rel was "a rational price" for-oil: " ? ~= vestments.. ' - -- - --
- :lieanwliile~ the: cartei's?-benclrmarir The CL4'sprnjectlon~Jof a_?,$29 billion
price of SI~aS~a barrel for-Saudi Ara- current,-account?? surplus. for UPEC
bia'a light-. oft~nce considered the ? met~abers assumes that Ixan's spend
standard indet far world: oiL-prices--- ing'on imports this pear will drop to
bears: virtually no -r~semblance? ?to .oil $11 billion, 5o pereent below last
yrices:anymore...: .. , :- .- .:: year's level. - - - _
- ? ~4 orld, oil prices have risen a ~ total Individual current account. balances
of ~l.percent since. the 13-member car. are expected to range from a pro-.
tel?aset in Abu. Dhabi last-December, jetted deficit of $?~.2.billion in? Vene-
according to Treasury Secretary lV. zuela to a surplus of $1().2 billion for
Michael Blumenthal; and -further in? Kuwait:.:--.:. - __ . -: ?--.~-.., -.-... - ,' -
creates are likeIy_ _
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 Approved For ~elease 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R0001I
ARTXCLE APP~1; THE ECONOMIST
ON P/~GE,~,~"~.r"X ~.2-18 T~1ay 1979 ~ -
~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~'~ ~~~~~ ~~s
Washington, DC
American intelligence correctly predicted
that Vietnam would invade Cambodia,
that China would invade Vietnam and
that the Soviet Union would not invade
China. But, reassuring as those recent
successes were; the Central Intelligence
agency's record elsewhere has been less
good. Iran is the worst example. In 1953
tc:e C1A helped restore the Shah to his
throne, but in 1978 it had scarcely a clue
that he was about to be-toppled. Before
that, the Shah knew that a communist
coup was brewing in Afghanistan, but the
CIA did not. -
- In Nicaragua, Zairc?and Yemen, ac-
cording to American officials, intelli-
gznce on insurrections and invasions has
been late and inadequate, with the result
that subsequent American policies have
sometimes seemed dangerously make- .
shift. Inter-agency 'reviews after- the
Shah's fall have concluded that American
intelligence dpes not know much, either,.
about what is happening In such places as
Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia or even
next ddar, in Mexico. -
.What ails the CIA? One-problem is the
tendency for-poliryrnakers to ignore in-
telligence that does _ not support their
preconceptions. _~~ - Israeli intelligence-
warned the Carter administration about
the Shah's peril months before his fall. So
did law-level members of the American
embassy irr Teheran, but the White
field Turner, President Carter's Naval
Academy classmate and director of the
CIA. Appretiated at first as a mart who
shared the president's fonhright and
businesslike attitude, he is nbw accused
of arbitrarily switching people around
and of trimming agency reports to suit
White House political views." Morale at
the CIA has fallen so far that more than
1,000 of its men have left in the past two
years. - . __ ..~_ .
'.? But undoubtedly the diagnosis most
often made is that the C1A: is'suffering
from a surfeit of democracy-Irt'govern-
=ment circles it is now frequently argued
that there has been too much cortgress-
ional' oversight, newspaper exposure, le-
gal restriction and public accPSS, and that
the black arts should be restored to
dimmer light, or to darkness; where they
can thrive. -- " ' -
"The mast serious problem we face,"
according to the CIA's deputy director,
Mr-Frank Carlucci, is an inability to
protect. intelligence sources from expo-
suce.='. According to ?CIA -officials, this
means that foreign intzlligenbr~services
'are reluctant to share information, poten-
-tial'agents refuse to work for`the C1A and
?.merican businessmen decline=]:o report
back after their travels because they-fear
that =Their ? actions might -later' become
known through a congressional leak or a
lawsuit undo the FreedortTof lnforma-
Hause did not want to hear bad news , tiori' Act." ?- "~ ' "-'-~' ~` '
about its ally. A further difficulty is that '`~~`Another'special target of~;criticism'is
the administration, in order - to avoid 'tlie~. 1974 Hughes-Ryan-=',aitiendmeni,
offending allies, has forbidden its agents - which~~holds that before ?the'=C1A~ can
in )~gypt and Saudi Arabia, as it did in 'undertake- covert political-actfoii in an-
lran, to make contact with potential other country, it must notify eight sepa-
subversives-
A more :intractable problem is that
a{though American. intelligence ' is
capable of gathering vast quantities of
infatmatian, especially by technical
means, it lacks the skilled manpower to
make sense of what it collects. And then
there is deep unhappiness in the intelli-
gate congressional committees consisting
-of 163 legislators and 41 staff~members.
''The `requirement; according`' Senator
Danicl-Patrick Moynihan of` Ne:~rYork,
'-virtually eliminates the pos5ibilily of se-
crer American intervention'-in?= athar
countries and limits the CI'/~'to-"doing
research that might as well be done in the
gence community with Admiral Stans~-: Library of Congress". ? - '~''n:~~'-?"'="' -
American officials confirm that 'they
C1A now engages in only a few minor
covert operations.- Legal restrictions are
not the only reason, however. President
Carter has openly declared his distaste
for in*.erference in the affairs of o[her
countries.
The president's attitudes and congres-
sional restrictions on intelligence are
born of America's bad experiences in
Vietnam and the disclosures of excesses
by the C1A and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation-assassination attempts
against 'VIr Fide] Castro, efforts to "de-
stabilise" the Allende regime in Chile,
infiltration of American protest groups
and illegal surveillance both af. radical
political parties and of private citizens.
But' now Republicans, conservative
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 Approved For Release 200~~ts~~e~e~~~'~i~j~gp0130001-4
~ are mina o argue t o t o
errors of Vietnam ought not to afflict ~
American resolve far ever; they think
that misbehaviour by intelligence agents
??as exaggerated and has been more than
corrected. And the Soviet Union's inces-
sant probing, they say, is proof that the
United States cannot stand back from the
dirty-grey world of espionage, subversion
and counter-intelligence for ever. I
Some liberals in congress and in the
administration still dare to hope that the
United States can have both an effective
intelligence system and adequate con-
trols. For more than two years, they have ~
been trying to draw up with all concerned
a legal charter for the CIA, the FBI and ~I
other agencies. -
A 1978 draft bill failed to win approval ;
because the intelligence agencies regard-
ed it as too specific in its prohibitions of
certain of their activities. Progress is now
.being made towards a new draft.. Liberals
acknowledge a need to reduce the num-
ber of committees to which. the CIA
needs to report its .activities. They also
agree that new measures must be taken to
?punish those who; without authority, dis-
close important government secrets. De-
spite their misgivings,:.the .intelligence
agencies stem to accept the principle that i
congress has the right to oversee them,
and that some legal restraints should bind ~
Yet there is still no agreement about
standards for government spying on
Americans who have information that the ,
government wants, but who are not sus? ~,
petted of committing a crime or working'',
for a foreign power. The liberals, joined
by Vice-President Walter Mondale, want
to ban surveillance, investigation or other
intrusions on such citizens' privary except
in the most extraordinary cases when ~
the president. would have [o authorise ~t
personally and report it to congress.
Members of the CIA, backed by Presi-
dent Carter's national security council,
believe that they need to collect and
analyse lots of information in order to ~
achieve. results, rather than rely on spe-
cial operatiaris. 5o they warit to investi-
gate Americans whenever.-the. head of
.their agency deems ii in :the national
interest... - - --_
:,- These differences over basic.,principle
may prevent agreement on a charter. But
without a charter, in the words of Mr Les
Aspin, a member of the intelligence tom- i
mittee of the.-house-of representatives, ~
'the agencies in the short term will let
matters drift on in their bad way, and in
the.long run will simply do as they please. ',
"If I were a Machiavellian CIA man," he ~;
says, "1'd do everything I could to pre-',
gent agreement on a charter; and then go
back to doing the old stuff." -.
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
r'lrticle appeared TIME
an pale 9 5
~~~~~~~ h ~~~~~ ~~ ~
tzlligence senice. -^~ ~.~~ _ ~ Y--_
Ladies acct Gerrle.nen_ demoralized CIA
Tl:is is a rrottb!erl world? Threatening forces continue to chat- peep secrets. Sa}
/ercoe res. For rl:is reason, we must have a reliable intelligence sec- happened to the
ti?ice--she President's eyes and ears. Yet we are seeing and/rearing U_S." Chaim He
dimly because ojrite present condition ojthe Centro! Intelligence telligence, warns:
~;g?~r:cy_ In the past, the agency engaged in some practices that were the U_S. has des
nor rcceptahle in America, but those days are behind us. The CtA world. You can't
i:as reformed; now rre must stop punishing it. We must remove agreement on bet
Borne ojrhe.constrainrs that keep itfrom. duing its job. We must re- has been occurri
store the confidence of its members and treat them ns honorable mine and demoi
men in an often perilous profession. A great power like America their shoulders
tmmy Carter may never make
a .speech like this, but he
should. A combination of events
has seriously disabled the CIA at
a time when its services are need-
ed more urgently than ever. To
guide its foreign policy, to help
its friends and restrain its foes,
the U_S. must have adequate intelligence from those areas of
the world where information is suppressed, confused or con-
flicting. The nation cannot afford to be caught off guard by sud-
den hostilities in the festering arc of crisis or in the vast arenas
of Asia where Communist giants collide. With weapons tech-
nology advancing more rapidly than ever, the U.S. must keep
abreast of the latest. Soviet developments, since an undetected
Russian breakthrough could jeopardize the ever fragile balance
of power. In a world of turmoil, frequently erupting in anarchy,
the U.S. must be able to exercise its inRuence to maint=1in sta-
biliry_ Where the U.S. fails to do so, some authoritarian pawns
can be counted on to fill the void. Thal, for better or worse, is
the way things are.
Today the CIA is not equipped far its role because it con-
tinues to operate under a debilitating cloud of suspicion. Until
iha early 1970x, its mission was pretty much taken for granted
and its methods were seldom questioned. Then a series of rev-
elations deluged it with hostile publicity for the first time. The
agency was implicated in assassination attempts on foreign lead-
ers~nly a very f w, but a few too many- Other abuses were
also uncovered by a press seemingly ravenous fur ctA misdeeds;
inevitably there were gross exaggerations.
A punitive attitude toward the agency lingers on when there
is no longer any real justification far it. The White House seems
determined to keep reminding the agency of its past transgres-
lions. Vice President Walter Mondale, in particular, has been. the
moralistic champion of a highly restrictive charter to govern U.S.
intelligence agencies, though the legislation will probably be
much modified before it is approved by Congress. CIA Director
Admiral 5tansfield Turner has responded energetically to a se[
of problems that did not confront his predecessors, but vride-
spread Washington opinion holds that he is not the right man far
the job. He may bring too rigid an outlook to what is, after all, an
art form: the collection of educated guesses from incisive minds.
Though the reduction of budget and personnel began before he
took office, his critics charge that hundreds of senior off vials with
experience, dedication and language skills have been forced out_
Turner feels that new blood is needed, but younger recruits may
not be able to fill the vacuum far years. Ray Cline, former deputy
director for intelligence, thinks that the "core of continuity has
been destroyed. By and large, the historical memory is gone"
Foreign intelligence services, whose cooperation is essen-
tial, are bewildered and increasingly wary of dealing with a
ment brings few ~
not even tell thei
closely monitore~, -_, _ _ _ . _. .
Much of their undercover work is far from glamorous and numb-
ingly routine. "Nobody who ?aorks for the cIA is going to have
a statue erected to him lake the one to Nathan Hale," s~~~?
12 Aiarch 1979
i~las~iragtc~n M~G~o~pc~r~r~,
Associates of the President say bis
chiefprablem with intelligence from
the CXA is char he receives a moun-
tain of facts and figures bur not i
enough inrerprerarian and assessment
of what they mean. Said one aide: ;
"Xt s getting more and more difficult
co find people who can orrice a good,
clear, analytical sentence."
A battle is raging inside the adminis-
tration over whether to release spy-
satellite photos that pinpoint Soviet
missile fields. Intelligence officials
oppose the move for feax it would
reveal how precise U.S. recontiais-
sance methods have become. But
Carter's political aides argue that
showing how closely the U.5. can
monitor Russia would gain support in
Congress for the SALT weary.
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-0113780001001
A~iICLE APPFA~D
0~1 PA~.~
~' BY GEDRG~E I41eAItTHUR. `~
_:. ~VASHINGT.ON--As the revalutiorr~
in~~Iran continues to squeeze Ameri-._
can-oil = suppLies_ and ,send:, shack''
waves through the 14liddle East,:U.S.?.-
diplon?,a[s and palicymakers 2re~ la'=~:
horir:; under a severe handicap.-but.
it is a.problam they are familiar wil,'~;
~~They knave almost nothing about:
the, Lioslem .religious leaders,. t'adical
leiiis~ and :others;contending: for;
power in- Iran, governrtlept; officials ,
., conczde--'largely, laecause?.U.S: jntel-..:
ligence~ agencies estahli~hed .virtually.
no contact. with opposition faction; in
the tronths and years before the fall
-, of Shah' biohammed. Reza' Pahlavi.:;,
_ ~! and,.a survey~of tiVhite House and ;
intelligence sources:indicates, the in-
formation -gap .;n .Iran is far- from
unique.. In a dozen. or more countries;
_ around the world, including same+ol'
the. nations, mpst. important toy the:-:;
:--United States; American intelligence-'-';
_ gatrering efforts are subject to re-~;~
siraints? or :inhibitions, th~~; could.,,
again leave ~Vashingtori.flyin.p almost.-.~
blind in a crisis.. - `
-'The CIA and ; otligr:, iritelligetiee?
-agencies deny that there, are. w~?ilteri
.agreements or' farrrial ~areaties're;.;.
=striating the scope of U.S,~intellgenCe_'
efforts in other cpuntries.._~ . c: `
~- Officials ackiowledge, ~` hgwever;:
tF:at .intelligence -operations-espe- .
cially collecting political=intelligence;
or establishing contai:t.~with dissident.
~_?factions siteh as .those.in Iran-are
limned by a tivide array of unofficial
:="understandings;' .secret warking-
level agreements; and policy priori, i
.ties. : .
` bforeover, it appears thai the col-
' lectian of political intelligence con-
corning opponents of a regime is like- ~
' ly to be most inhibited in nations '
where it might someday be needed
most, strategically important states 1
'with autocratic,-potentially unstable.)
regimes-. .. ~ _
LDS AITGELES TT~iES
11 March 1979
_: Among the countries in which tl:
CIA and other intelligence aget:cit
;are understood to operate under sip
nificanl restrictions are Saudi Arabi:
lsrael, Irgypt, ltaty, Singapore, Tai
?tivan, Sauch Africa, Nicaragua an
othcr~parts of Latin America.
` i~ Some inhibitions appear to be mat-
ters of broad, if unwritten, palmy.
?"~Ve would never peneu?atz Eng- ~
land's opposition party, tar examplz,"_~
one govermnent official said. "They :~
are good friends. bVe share alL kinds
of intelligence information ~ and re- i
saonsibilities with them." - . -
141are often, the limitations an U.S.
intelligence grow out of lnformal lists`
of. "don'ts" compiled in- individual
Copntries by the U.S. ambassador and.
Elie CIA station chief. These limits ark'
based on such considerations as U.S.
and local political, conditions and the
nature of the relationship that exists
betweQn U.S. intelligence agencies..
and intelligence officials of the' coup-r.
try itself. .... -
:~:Implicitly, what goes an is a kind of
Cost-benefit _ analysis-what might
the United States gain from a particu- -
la>? kind of intelligence effort in a
foreign country and what might it.
lose if the effort were discovered?
:'"If the CIA had infiltrated Iran's;
religious movement and -got caught;
imagine the outcry by the liberals in=
t}ie United States," one American af-
fi~ial said in defense' of the CIA's
airoidance of anti-shah factions there.
f'~'urther complicating the decision
oil what to do or not do in a particular;
Country fs the fact that nations such ?
as Iran have been important bases for:
'intelligence operations against the
.Soviet Union as welt as important in-:,
tehigence targets in their own right. =
"A foreign nation may permit the ;
CIA to operate relatively openly
~ratwan ~s a .troubling example of;
that problem, :officials say. since;
President Carter ended diplomatic re-
Iations with the island, the CIA has,
been hastily restructuring its opera-,
lions there....,- .:' ..- ' - _ .: i
The previous focus had been.aImost
entirely. on the activities of the Cam-.'
munist regime on the Chinese mzin-_
land. Caoperatian from Taiwanese to-!
tellioence authorities was almost total ~
-encompassing ~ everything from ~
=elecrronie .eavesdropping to cloak-~
:and.dagger . parachute ~ drops- ~_ and
lanflings along the China coast.: ~ - -
?`_': ~'~orking closely. with intelligence,
agents of the ruling Kuomintang Par-:I
ly,. the CIA for more than..30 years ~l
paid almost no attention to factions
apposing. the Kuomintang among the
].5 million native. Taiwanese and 2
trtillian refugees from r;iainland China..!
' =During that time, officials. say, the
.CIA did not feel that it was operating
nnifer`any significant restrictions or
inhibitions. The ~pr%oi ity target was
mainland. China and all,else seemed
secondary.: ~ ` ~~ - ~ ~ -- - ~~ -_- ;~~~
Nave, the internal politics of the is-~
land have suddenly becairte,'a matter,
of concern. : _ ' ' : i ; ~ '," - ~ "'
~~ Intelligence, sources say..the: CIA"s
situation in Saudi Arabia parallels the j
previous situations in lean and .Tai;.;;
wan. .- ',." ~ ,.? .,: .. . -.::.,~
? ~ .Nobody, but nobody, is goingaa do~
anything to upsek the royal [amtly.:It~.
may not be spelled ottt; but that's the'!
way it's going to be; ':ono intelligence
:. - . ,.
source said. ;, : ~: -:-, =-: _ ,~, _ .:: ~ _
Sometimes ~ the limits are inposed::
by U.S. officials themselves. In Italy::
last year, the .1J'-S..ambassadar or_
dered a vii-tual end to covert actions;
in that . country.. ~ (Technically,' the'.
ambassador has Control aver the CIA~~,-
in any country;;-this authority is not-
.often strictly~:,etifotced, btitrstrong--'
1 d amb ' ad
d d - n' - ?'
'
n
v~e ass ors can a o ma 1-:,
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o and restrict: CIA activities; i"ntel`=
Jigence sources say,)< - ~ - _
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THE CHRISTIAN SCTEP7CE MOVITQR
G,: Pr1JP~ 21 February 1979
~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~v~~~~i~~ ~o~s ~~~ .r~~~t _
_ - By Curtis 1:. Jones - - - -- -. - _ _ ?. _
T'?e~ say the F'resideni is unhappy 'with the Israel took in June, 1967, there would be war in ??? icanr money and perhaps some Lebanese-li~?e
ClA _`or not alerting him thak Iran was about to the Biddle East by fall. In the summer of 1978, Here a3ain, however, personal predilect
alovr- Spada; of-19;3. when Kissinger. took eva- . some analysts accurately predicted the early intervened, ti5 leaders were not about to
sire action against critics by putting out word. collapse of Pahlavi absolutism. = -. .~ pouse?a cause dominated by Lebanese pan-
that C.'S intelligence had failed to warn him.. ;- Why didn't- the policymakers ac[ on these abists and their Palestinian allies, and tl
that the Arabs were planning a surprise attack --warnings? - _ could not bring themselves to participate in
an I~-ael-' - - ?? First,- because every leader; being human.- -demise of a friendly regime:- - - - ? ?- =- ~ -
R?2 could di~:ni,;s these phenomena with the,: filters his data through the screen of-his.own .-: Some problems are so intractable; and th
passing observation that the L'S intelligence= prejudices and predilections... - - _. _ _ -__ . _.: implications so- apocalyptic, thaE 'the- wis
community seems to be useful?both in sueeesshcials went, they -
got a different reading on Carter's intentions_ They reported
home that the US. "apparently has no clear or positive policy
ready, either for Mexico or the rest of Srranish-speaking Amer- ;
ice.'' Indeed, same aides thought Carter's final decisions on scv-
eral major matters might actually have w be r~de?during the ;
~ 4%-hour flight to Mexico City. Nonetheless, the broad outlines
of what he will seek arc known: I
- A promise to keep the US. as Mexico's No. ?1 foreign cus=
tourer (the U_S..now buys 8570 of Mexico's oil exports). Schle-
singer estimates that by 1985 Mexican wells will be able to
match Iran's prc~tisis output of ~ million bbL per day. The
CtA i____s even more bullish. Its experts forecast that ire tan years. ~
Mextcv cool pump milliard bbl. per day, which is slightly
more than Saudi Arabia's currc~pt produstion_ Brat 1.dpez Par- .
tilio prtabably will not budge an Mexico's plaits to increase
production more slowly, to Z25 million bbl. per day by 1480,
including 1.1 million bbl. far- export. {Present U~ oil can-
sumptionper day is 18.7 million bbl.)
- Resumption of n baatiataons on the sale of natural gas to the
U.S. Lopa2 Portilld has already indicated to Ambassador
Lacey that he wants to strike a bargain on gad ii a way can
be found without in,8,amiag his politigl appesitian. For the
moment, however, Carter is expected to propose atilt' a gen-
tlemait's agreement that Mexico Promise to begirt selling gas
to the. LIB when dcrraart+d a?atstrips dbrttestic supplies, perhaps.
within a decade. The prioa ueould he hagotiated is tkte 6utura
According to Mexican ofncials Lopez 1'ottilto~ will tell
. ogtuzes ac
s
Mexico's touchy new self-
canSdence ste#1as from the fact
? rhos -for -the firer time in ~his-
would. ba greatly steed.. But other nati~s .also are ; a ~~ tls~t he is willutg to bargain on ail and gas, but only if
begg to ,Cptt1't -the. now Mexico. , Japanese taclsniciaAp ~ the U.S. is willing to negotiate qn two issues the; xtiatter mast
have been exploring, $(s~l? is megataattttg.. and France's .Pros- . to Mtsxlcv:
ident valery Gisrard~ d'~taing ci7mes calling later this rrinnt)t, .._ _ . -~--
The basic purpose of Caite~ ttzp is to over,..crmc years .of' ~. -- -
bittemess and persuade the Mexicans that tits US. is not ~ ~~~~ '
grily their best customer but oleo their best friend His itin- ~ .
erary is very businesslike. ARer landing at Benito Juarez Air- ~
port and offerirt$ some good wishes in his Craergia-accented. '
Spanish, Carter will go straight to the Mexican National Pal-
ace for the first of two private sessioes with I.opcz Porti,ila.
He will 1 eh with ~i loraa th
f ~ ? G~r4 ~~
~
hosts expecting to be treated with faz more
respect than US.. Presidents
~'.~~~ L...o ..ass.-.11.. .. L....,.~ ... 4Ln
j~ = os~ Lopez Portillo meet as
.2 - ,? _Y:. _ . _ 90-011378000100130001-4
S~vii
embassy st~$~8~~~thE` ~~n
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,~i X OTrx. Ai'P~.~7 V . S . NEGTS & k'ORLD REPOP.T
pit PAGw,~ 19 February 1979
~s~~~G~~~C~: ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~
By Marvin Stone
Our ill~lisguised hunger for I~iexica_n ail,
President Carter has scaled, will not move him
co interfere in decisions that are far Mexico
alone to make.
That apparently means that during his visit to
biexica Ciry, February 14~1G, Carter will not
seek of President Lopez Portillo anything that
infringes on Mexican sovereignty. By the same
Token, he should nor offer any Concession that
infringes on our own_
We are referring here to the problem of
illegal aliens from 1~iemco.
In this light, leaks from the White House are
disturbing because they seem to indicate that
sorb concessions have -been under consider-
ation. The W/afhington Port, sting the draft of a
National Security Coundl study, reported sev-
eral possible results the drafters saw from a
"redirection" af.U.S. polity. Among them, in
the Pon'.r words: - -- - - -
"Ii could ravide an alternative to increased
de endence on Arab oil and access to some of
what the CIA esrirnates could be as much as 10
million barrels of Tyiexican oil~roduction a day ,
by 1990- ~' -.._
"It could mult.ia a sanctioned program for
Mexican aliens now immigrating illegally to
.the United States at the rate .of hundreds of
thousands a yeas." -.
Is that the deal, then...-~to e~ntioe Mexico into
supplying us with oil in return for the official
opening of America's-borders to millions more
illegal aliens? ~, - - - - : - - - . _ '.
The most widely ~dced estimate far illegals
crossing the southern border is $00,000 a year.
Do these people, as afrc~ts crated; take Daly jobs
that Americans would not do? - ' -- -
This claim is open to carious dispute. A for-
mer commissioner of the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service found that two thirds of the
illegals identified were "working in industry,
service and construction jobs that pay good
salaries-jobs that might be filled by ... job-
less American teen-alters ar by ... black
American youths who are put of work"
The United States generated some 3 million
new jobs last year, leaving almost G million of
--the. nation's growing labor force unemployed.
If half of the 800,000 illegal aliens found em-
ployment here, then 400,000 of the increase in
jobs went to them.
In facx, there are economic writers who be-
Iieve that, since a very large part of deficit
spending is aimed ac reducing unemployment,
illegal immigration plays a substantial role in
the country's budget imbalance, .inflation and
financial difficulties-
Will these worries soon abate,,now chat Mex-
ico's immense discoveries of oil promise wealth
and increased employment south of the bor-
der? This is a badly mistaken impression if
applied co any solution in the next 20 years.
Lopez Porttllo is planning to take out the oil
and natural gas at the rare that will.:be -most
beneficial to his country.
As he himself says, in an interview elsewhere
in this magazine, "Mexico's job problem will
be solved only after we have invested income
we will receive from expartg of petroleum. I do
not believe that will happen before the end of
the century." ~ - - .
Before That point, if immigtatioti across the
Mexican border should Continue at anything
like the present rate, the.U.S. economy could
be seriously threatened.
Winking at illegal immigration is nor a prop-
er trading card far Mexican oil. The United
States ran offer various. Combinations of busi-
ness cooperation- credits, border industries,
lower tariffs and other aids. It may even be
possible to work out a better arrangement for
legal admission of limited numbers of tempo-
r~.ry workers, where there is mutual benefit to
both nations.
Keeping out illegal aliens is nor anti-Mexi-
can. It is a-matter of observing our laws. The
laws are there for good reason. - -
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 ___. Approved For Release 2~QH1/~Q7/~~.7~~~~~~0~~3~~0C~~1~(~~(~Q0~1 ~E ~
article apaeared 13 Februax?y 1979
on page ~,?-~
~~ ~~~~~~
"prospectively more serious than the;
7~'7~ embargo." ~
TREASURY S.ECRE7'ARY tiV, l~fich- j
eel Blumenthal tore in behind Schles- I
finger to say it wasn't that bad. Schles-
inger's apocalyptic predictions had
produced a run on the dollar, making
things worse on the inflation front - .
a side-effect that might have been i
avoided.
The president in his press confer-
ence took a stance roughly in the mid- '
die. The situation is "not crucial now'"
and we could offsat'the currenf reduc- ~
lion in the Iranian supply if we
heeded 5chlesinger's call for volun-
tary conservation.
The handling of the revolution in i
Iran also was the. result of divided
.counsel within the administration.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sum -'
Bested that we not panic at the l
thought of the shah's departure -- a.
view subsequently espoused in the se-'
cret report af. George Ball -but when
it mattered, Zbigniew Brzezinski
clamored successfully for all-out,
unconditio3al support of the shah. ~
After the.shah left for his winter
vacation, we. endorsed the regime of ~
his chosen successor, who also bit the
dust. We seem to have proceeded not i
with a thought to energy but only to
maintaining Qur right to interfere, as
we always have, in the affairs of Iran. '
The result is we have no friends
among those who have their fingers
on the spigot. ..._. .~~. ..:_ _ , ~
-THAT of COURSE, leads us-to
another current embarrassment, the
CIA and the performance of Carter's ;
handpicked director, his Annapolis
classmate, Stansfield Turner. The CIA,
drawing on Its Incestuous relation-
ship with the shah's secret police,
SAVAK, gave the White House bad
which rational foreign-policy deci-
sions can bemad~. -
i~o intelligence shortfall h.as pro-
duced the crisis with Mexico. Here
the failure has been one of common
sense. -
The discovery of oil and gas re-
serves next door has been treated by
Schlesinger as a calamity. He has
given it a wetbac'_~c's welcome. He has
practically cold us we would not want
our homes heated or our cars run by
stuff from a neiglibor that had been
vulgar enough to nationalize its treas-
ure: .. .
~yHEN THE `.iEXICA~S calae up ~~
here last year to make, a deal he ip.-; a
suited them. ~i~'1'en they cazte back tq
try anain, he ref used to see tllem_
First he told us that their supplies
were tco expensive. Then he.said they .
were .too cheap and might create i
havoc among our o?,vn producers.
- The result of his advance work has
been to unleash a wave of anti .4meri-
canism "on the eve of the president's
visit. - -
.Carter's press conference statement
that he was "proud" of `iexico's
bonanza sounded a bit odd. That's E
.what he said about Bert Lance. j
If he's going to convince the. coun-
try to cooperate, he has first to con-
wince people that he' understands the .
situation. People will walk and shiver
if they're sure it's necessary. Sv far,
they have no evidence that the:
energy crisis exists anywhere but in -
the boardrooms of the oil companies
-and in~the SV?hite House, where the
.man in charge doesn't seem to have =
made any final decisions about haw
important energy really. is. '
dope ?-net to worry, they kept saying,F..
as millions iitarched in the streets- I
We have becotue-accustomed over
recent years tc hearing of the botch
fine ~Ir~ mane of things it was not sup-.
up :he spectre of grass growing in the : posed to be doing. Iran provides the'i
erects. ;'hen our client, the shah, ,
f I' ? ~ t
-- The way thins are going, Jimmy,;
.Carter would have trouble getting j
-people to turn off the lights in the in-
tercet of conservation.
The energy crisis - if that's what it'
.is -bring; together a number of
blunders and etnbarrassmen5 that;
has~e brought hint to a new crisis ofi
:esteem and a sharp plunge in his job
?rati=g, which is down to 28 percent in
:the fates*, polls. - -
Asking people to make .sacrifices
.when they can see for themselves
'what the trouble is is one thiag_ But
`asking thetz to be "patriotic"?when
~_they suspect i?hat they haven't been
told th e whole story is quite anoth er. ~
Septicism about oil shortag4s was'
;born in the wake of the 1973-74 oil
-embargo, which was handled with f
.good cheer and resourcefulness by .
-many citizens who later learned that f
-the "crisis" had been greatly assisted
'in it; development by oil companies'
=withholding supplies in the interests
cf hi gher prices.
r 'f'H-'~T SKEPTICIS?lf haunted the. 18- '
.month struggle over the energy bill,
the passage of which was supposed to
avert the kind of problems we may ar'
may not face as a result of strikes ini
,__-
Sut at the heart of the problem fief
the president's totally a>nbivalent atti-~
-trade toward what he once called "thee
moral equivalent of war." if it is of the
paramount, overriding concern, why.
did. he conduct relatiaas with two I
.major oil-producing countries, Iran'
and 3iexico, with such frivolous disre-
Bard of the effect an us? ?.
The closing of the oilfields in Iran
Gras greeted with something like'
ecstasy by Energy Secretary dames
Schlesinger, who is ever on the watch I
for something that can be taken as a I
green light to rush out and tell us that I
the sky is falL?'ng-so he can raise oil
prices. -
D
uringthe tarntousprogress ofthe
energy bill, he periodically conjured
Ina ~~ p~~o~Fe~o~~I~ager~001/07/:th~l'1{~'ib'iS''"c~~a~e~t6a~~~0001-4-
rushed forty a to warn us of a-crisis ,
which is collect information on
 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
Art1Cl$ ~77$~TBd
an ~a~e r1-21
THE ~~ ASHZNGTGN PGST
10 February 1979
,Terry ~: ~Iorig~i _: ~~~~ -
This catcntry~ engaged is a Widespread pass;
morteza on the gavermmeat's failure to aatici-
pate the course of event in Iran, bxtt our intelii-
~gence pmbleat now is nar in becoming alert to
change in Iraq, but m avoiding.a simflar =`= -"-
tiviry w change is other cauatrie~ Tb a speeial-
ist on the Soviet Unio4 there are distvzbing
parallels between onr enrr~tt efforts to uzider-
stand the Soviet Z"il~om 2~ad-our eatlaet~ imtelli-.
genceeffortialr3tL - - ~'= = . ~~ _
The US. government and faitraahsts have,'of.
course, bad a great deal of _..contact with
? representatives of the dissident" m~etnent in~-=
- bioscaw However, the di~denss .themselves
Tice xvritar ss o pra~essor ?t l?ukt UeraFi}::
- pave i~erome very d~scoaraged abou ~esr owe
-chances for sntcess; and cantact~with.them }3as
led Lo the conviction that therSoviet regime is
unchanging attd unxhaageable.in the..near~iu=.~
tune. - - __ ~ ::=~~ns~.~~:M~::.~
- But what It tile: dissidents are- not' -the real-
force far change is the Soviet Union?"What if.
there are forces within the Soviet establishment:
itself that lsave the- potential: of :-praduang
major evolution:withia the Soviet Union?;= -' 4~ "
If tktis is the ~-~ the United States will be-as
surprised by events as it was la Iraa.:;The sad
-fact is that t>ze.U.S~ government is allaaat totally
=unequipped to assess lang~erm palitit~il= dev
_ lopments with,iA the Soviet establishmeatv:Zhe
American embassy fA iidasCow has anlyfaur
'sans in the palitiral section who study~tnte~l
Soviet developtneats,-two of wham concentrate:
- on Krsmlinologicai gttestionsand two ~vho:hasi==
cai.ty fangs on rise lesaisit and disdd?nt~:,gues~
~- tiozzs a mafa_fotaa of Lire CIA -- tit~al
sis of the ~ system seems, i?_praet6ee, _
flo~tprimarily from itsregnire:ae~tt~ep
ute to the morning ae~wa briefing [rkthe-
deat. Hence, it- too: tcnceatrates an. cttrreat-ai'
f airs and the amble
As a result, the LiS govez~et~t=devvt~
tremely little attention t4 the vigorot~:dehatea
on policy aptioua and as changes im the poIi "
. system that are psiblfshed in the Soviet Umo
For example. the:Svviet ~urnal:deatmg.
Latin America has carried most uiterrsting an
important debates on_the ittttu-e ai Latin Amer
ica and on which desreloptiientY"ia.that reg~
the Soviet U`nioa~should support. It:ls a trontin
ing debaie .with -important impltcatians ..tor
Soviet riews~~~dpr~
Yet, the Jo dst never.- in the,
1LLG JL?MaL1V11 A1L111G%JFlGti.^ W L14111 GJ L1L. 1..~VLL. =I
discussions is worse:' The Commerce Depart
tnent does a good job in f_ollawiag the debates {
that relate to the growing Central Asian popula-!
,: tion. But no. one is trying to map out the eco- !
_< nomic debate as a~whole and the positions of the
major institutional actors in?it-and this at a
_:: time w]aen Soviet policy utteliectuaI.s are giving
enormous attention to the implication of the?
"~ labor shortage impending in the 19$Cts. - -
_~=-. Indeed. although almost all tlxe major Soviet
economists are loudly arguing for greater wage_
,differentials and a reversal of the long tread
: toward wage egalitarianism,~a great.many re-
sponsible Americans -are-convinced that, the
` Brezhnev em has featured a grawt]a in the.rela:-
tive.pri4ilege of the elite. Hence we ds>aot even
know one of the mast elemental az-d basic #acts j
about the nature-oi the Soviet economic prob-f
lem, and we have no awareness of theresulting. i -
;pressur~es far.:major reductions in military ex-
pendirures if the international situaQon were `
more aPpmPria'te-- -
_ The time to improve om? intelligence opera-
tcons is nqt"after the disaster, but before. Re-
torm. is Russia has traditionally came from the
;.top, but .leaders' actions. are normally_ in-{
~ fluenced by their apparatus and the currents of .'
r opinion among the po]icy>ateIlipent~ If we do
'..not lruow what those persens are saying (often.
- quite openly we will continue to be blind to
major currents for rh~e -that _eastR .Even
? worse, we inevitably wilt 6e afiet~tfng.Saviet ice.
~. ternal deveiopmenb.:by our.: policies without
~. any awareness of the nature of the efiecrt.:Ia
- fact, leading liherals~withia the Soviet establish
meat insist that American policy has beea.seriy
ausly harming their cause:: ~' _:.'- ... `~ ;~': -
~' With the amount o! money tttat-is spent o ~.
:` trying to find oui about the Soviet Union,. it=~
absolutely inexcusable that we knoaras little ax'
;:we do-about its. politics: It is even more in -
~.able_and.dangerous.that our ideolagic~k blia
:.=ers dead ux to smugly .assume. that there-is na
- ?~ middle-level politics worth studying and that it'
?cannot=have an impact ast the future. It was
`such an attitude that led to. our Iaiiure of under_
standing in Iran. -;': -.- - : - .. . -.i
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137800
~,~-I%L F~tPr.n,.=~D AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
Div' ?AGy~ January -- February 1979
vvo~LD ~~A~E A~~
THE SOVIET N1lLITA~Y
THREAT
Captain Steven E. Cady
EW THINGS iri this world are as
certain as change, and certainly our
world has changed irzeversibly since
World `Var II. Yet, as the Frenchman said:
Plus ~a change, plus c'est la rneme chose
("The more things change the mare they
are the same."). -
World peace, far example, continues to
depend on American supremacy, and that
supremacy is a function of the develop-
ment and deployment of highly advanced
weapon systems. A possibly moot point, in
this connection, is the nature of the Soviet
threat to world peace. What are the
intentions of the Soviet Union? Has our
assessment of its intentions and capa-
bilities been realistic? If the Soviets, as a
result of their intentions and massive
arms buildup, pose an active threat to the
United States, will our present stockpile of
-nuclear bombs and "conventional" mis-
siles be sufficient deterrent to Soviet
power? Are the current SALT talks leading
to a weakening of American military
power relative to the Soviet Union, and, if
so, will such a weakening act as a stimulus
to Soviet aggression?
These and related issues are discussed in
three recent books about the Soviet Union.
Fox a realistic insight into the nature of
Soviet thinking, Marshal A. A. Grechko's
The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: A .
Soviet View provides a detailed picture of
the ~vorldwide goals and ambitions of the
Soviet Union in relation to its military and
political policies. William T. Lee, a U.S.
specialist in Soviet military and economic
affairs, published two similarpublicati.ons
in 1977: Understanding the Soviet 16Ii1i-
tary- Threat: How CIA Estimates Went
Astray and The Estimation of Soviet
Defense Expenditures, 1955-7~: An Un-
conventionad Approach:
Soviet intentions
The true intentions of a nation can be
assessed in terms of its stated intentions
and its overt activity. Grechko's work, i
which was written when he vas Minister
of Defense of the U_S.S_R., serves as a
major source far stated Soviet intentians.T
Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko
joined the Red Army in 1919, took part in
subsequent civil war campaigns, and
became a memberof the Communist Party i
in 1928. After graduating from the Frunze
Military Academy in 1936, he entered the
General Staff Academy, graduating in j
1941, just as Hitler attacked the Soviet
Union, tiVhen hostilities ended, he was
General-Colonel (three stars) and cow-
wander of the 1st Guards Army. Sy 1953,
Grechko was General of the Army, soon
becoming Marshal of the Soviet Union ~
(1955). He later became Minister of
Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet ,,Ground Forces, First Deputy
Minister of Defense, Commander in Chief
of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw ;
Pact nations, Minister of Defense, and
finally a member of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. Grechko
died on 27 April 1976, but his statements
f 14larshal A. A. Grechko,ThsArrned Farces Qf the 80Ui8t
State: A 5oaiet View, translated under the auspices of the
United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1975, $3.20), 349 pages.
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can still be considered as fully represen-
tative of Soviet thought.
Grechko viewed all mankind as moving
inevitably toward socialism and com-
munism. He felt that only a socialist
system, such as that of the U.S.S.R. could
have an army with a just goal: the defense
of "the revolutionary achievements of the
working people." (p. 2) He regarded the
Soviet armed forces as possessed of a
"great liberating mission." According to
Grechko, the army fulfills an "inter-
national duty," and the goals of the Soviet
army are also adapted by the ,armies of
other socialist states, all of them assisting
the peoples of nonsocialist nations in
"fighting for their social and national
liberation." Countries such as the United
States are pictured as controlled by
"reactionary imperialists'.' who have "not
given up Their aggressive schemes."
Various nations are accused of hindering
the policy of peaceful coexistence by
differing social systems. This is a curious
assertion in view of Grechko's unqualified
condemnation of alI systems that differ
from That of the Soviet Union. The
capitalist nations are charged with
disseminating lies, slandering socialist
countries, and unleashing anti-Soviet
hysteria at any cost while continuing the
arms race. Grechko concludes that the
U.S_S.R. must, therefore, strengthen the
combat pov~?er of the Soviet aimed forces,
supplying them with "modern weapons,
combat equipment and other supplies."
His sequence of chapters documents this
viewpoint.
1 T IS HARDLY surprising, then, that
~'Villiar:~ Lee, in Understanding the Soviet
IY.filitary Threat,- depicts the Soviet Union
as pursuing a policy o? political expansion
based on military forces that are develop-
ing more rapidly than those a? the United
States. As its title implies, Lee (formerly
with the CIA) finds fault with certain CIA
estimates of Soviet military power. The
U.S. formerly relied on these estimates in
reacting to the Soviet military threat. In
the Foreword, Eugene V, Rostow points
out that Soviet spokesmen frequently talk
of a projected military expansion program
designed to achieve complete superiority
in every category. On that basis, the
Soviets feel that they will "determine the
direction of world political development."
(p? 2) .
Rostow emphasizes that the American
intelligence community has resisted
accepting these facts. Its conception of the ~
Soviet Union is interpreted by R.ostow as a
government seeking paxity with the
United States rather than dominance. i
Thus, the U.S.S.R. is seen as a developed
nation interested in maintaining the
status quo, and the usual strategic and
conventional weapons, sufficient to deter
Soviet expansionism, are adequate for
U.S. defense.
Defense i=xpenditures
Lee cites Soviet defense expenditures
that have grown steadily since 1958, with
14 ar 15 percent of the Soviet gross
national product allocated to defense. The
love-Year Plan for 1976$0 continues the
trend, with perhaps 1$ percent of the 1980
budget allocated for defense. Included are
an increasing number of weapon sys-
tems-much more accurate MIRVed
ICBMs/SLBMs, for instance-able to
1'William T. Lee, Understanding the Sv~iet Military
Threat: .lYow CIA Estimates Rent Astray (New York:
National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1$77, $2.00),
73 pages.
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reach U.S_ targets from Soviet coastal
waters, as are new aircraft with larger
payloads and greater potential for pene-
trating hostile airspace. These capacities,
Lee feels, are consistent with the "~vell-
documented Soviet objective of achieving
superiority over the United States and its
allies in military power." The Soviets have
achieved, or will soon achieve, numerical
parity or superiority in almost all impor-
tant types of weapon systems, Lee asserts.
Although they may still be lagging
qualitatively in weapon technology, their
intention of becoming both quantitatively
and qualitatively superior in all weapon
systems is potent.
Lee believes that the continuing power
buildup can be accounted far partly by its
political utility: the Soviet Union holds
that peaceful coexistence, or detente,
exists largely because of its superior (or
supposedly superior) military power.
Increasing Soviet military budget outlays
through 1950 indicate an expectation of
further political gains resulting from
military power.
Lee contends that the current trends in
Soviet priorities are made possible with
the help of the Western nations-techno-
logical and otherwise.
ClA Estimates
William T. Lee's The Estimation of
Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955-75: A. n
Unconventional Approachf was pub-
lished in collaboration with the General
Electric Tempo Center for Advanced
Studies, which solicited the cooperation of
Soviet analysts and economists in its
preparation- The author describes the
uncertainties and data gaps existing in the
CIA's direct-costing approach to esti-
mating U.S.S.R. defense expenditures.
Because of various hidden expenditures
suited to the political "cosmetics" prac-
ticed by Soviet leaders, the CIA adopted
the direct-casting method, which esti-
mates the amounts in each military ;
program, then applies estimated indi~zd-
ual prices to each quantity. Only recently
has the CIA admittc:l that it under-
estimated the Soviet dense budget by a
factor of t~vo in 1970 and possibly by a i
factor of three at present. Lee analyzes this
error in an in-depth review of various i
methodologies used to estimate U.S.S.R. ''
national security expenditures (1\TSE),
providing an alternative ~vay of esti-
mating NSE "based entirely on published
Soviet industrial output, budgetary, and ~
national income data, while accepting the
limited coverage of the `Defense' and
`Science' budgets." (Tr'ce Estimation, p. 2)
The author lists the advantages of this i
approach: itis derived directly from Soviet
data, in rubles; it is not subj ect to the index
number effect of applying U.S. prices to ;
Soviet weapons and technology; it does not
depend on estimated ruble-dollar ratios; it
reveals resource allocations in each Soviet
annual and Five-Year Plan; it is an
alternative to the direct-costing method ,
and provides an aggregative check on the
results of that approach; and it provides an
approximate picture of U.S.S.R_ NSE as'
Soviet leaders see it. While admittedly not .~
perfect, Lee offers his approach as one ~
resulting in a better estimate of the Soviet
NSE. _
As to why the CIA estimates went so
wrong, Lee lists a' number of reasons in
Understanding t]ze Soviet 167ilitary
Threat. The first was its emotional rather
than analytical response to the initial ;
overreaction to the intelligence communi-
tWilliam T. Lee, The Estimation of Soviet Defense ;
Expenditures, Y 955-75: An UnconventianalApproach (New ,
York: Praeger, 1.977, $25.00), 358 pages.
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ty's early overestimation of Soviet heavy
bomber production and Soviet ICBM
deployment, Some consequences were U_S.
expansion of heavy bomber production
and ICBM/SLBMforcesfarbeyond what
the U_S. might otherwise have considered
necessary. A second reason was the fear of
strengthening bureaucratic Soviet mili-
tary forces and nuclear overkill on both
sides.
Lee points to the Cuban missile crisis as
proving that the U.S. advantage in
bombers and missiles was effective in
curbing Khrushchev's adventurism, with-
out risk of war. Lee maintains that,- in
response to the bomber and missile "gaps"
of one kind or another existing between
Soviet and U.S_ forces, "The prevalent
reaction was some apparent institutional
guilt for having contributed to a perceived
overreaction by the United States, plus a
widespread belief that the Soviets had
opted out of the intercontinental missile
competition, and a determination not to
overestimate again." (Understanding, p.
29)
The Soviet Union envisioned the threat
to itself as being through Europe, so that
Eurasian strategic requirements came
first in its priorities. The United States,
according to Lee, expected the Soviets to
manufacture several hundred heavy
bombers and first-generation ICBMs in
the 1950s. Instead, the Soviets manufac-
tured several thousand medium bombers
and 700 IRBMs. When the U.S. produced
41 strategic missile submarines, the
Russians constructed some 57 (41 of them
nuclear-powered), but many of,these
carried cruise missiles designed for
operations against naval targets. "We
simply did not understand Soviet strategic
concepts; hence we misjudged Soviet
priorities." (Ibid., p. 30) Lee concludes that
Soviet political leaders want a great deal
more than minimum deterrence and that
they have made no secret of their aspira-
tions_
Lee mentions another error in American
strategic thought-the so~alled "mirror
imaging" based on the implicit or explicit
assumption that Soviet aims are similarto
ours, that they react as we do~ to common
problems and experiences.. American
strategists equate "strategic" and "inter-
continental," whereas the Kussians inter-
pretstrategic considerations to encompass :.
their very borders. Lee feels that the threat
of civilian and city destruction is no
deterrent in Soviet thinking; they think in'
terms of the destruction of military,
industrial, and administrative targets
rather than worrying about how much of '
the population will die. "All the indicators
suggest that the Soviets will not accept
assured destruction in the future unless
there are stark changes in the political
leadership." (Ibid., p. 32)
What many observers in the U.S. do not {
understand is that the Soviets have their
own brand of propaganda, difficult for ;
Westerners to comprehend. "Actually, it is
probably more ritual than rhetoric as we :;
now use the latter term. Such ritual does
not really involve factual or intellectual
credibility; it is required dogma in the
Soviet system: ' (Ibid., p. 34) One must look
beyond the ritual to find the real message,
making distinctions between Soviet doc-
trine, strategy; and "operational art:'
Failure to do this has caused some
American analysts to dismiss genuinely
informative statements by Soviet leaders
as pure rhetoric-statements that are
factual and which are taken seriously.
Proposals for the future
In view of CIA and other underestimates
of Soviet military strength, Lee makes a
number of proposals for improving intelli-
gence studies and estimates. First among
them is giving credence to the obvious:
exploiting unclassified information_ Not
,only should the statements of the regime's
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spokesmen to their people be taken at face
value but also greater use can be made of
the large quantity of unclassified infor-
mation leaking out of Russia. Despite the
great secrecy surrounding military mat-
ters, the Soviets have been willing to
discuss their objectives and various of
their programs. "The time of these
programs, the choice of system designs,
and the integration of the new weapons
into the forces, all suggest a well~onceived
plan guided by doctrine, strategy, and
lessons drawn from the Vietnam and
Middle East wars." (Ibid., p. 39)
Lee also suggests that efforts be made to
simulate the effectiveness of Soviet
weapons and forces and that a more
realistic historical perspective be adopted.
Knowledge of past trends can help us
understand how new trends in Soviet
planning reflect Russian objectives and
requirements. Ranging from the opportun-
istic tactics of Russian revolutionaries in
the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies to Grechka's updated statement of
policy, every added bit of historical
evidence helps American analysts acquire
a realistic view of Soviet thought and
ambition. The evidence suggests strongly
that the U_S.S.R. understands and re-
spectspower. Negotiations are not likely to
succeed unless U.S. representatives can
speak from a position of unquestioned
power, especially military power.
The U.S. has engaged in disarmament
or arms limitation conferences with the
Soviets for decades, and may continue
doing so at the cost of tempering military
preparedness in deference to the seeming-
ly interminable but hopefully fruitful
negotiations.l'n the meantime, the United
States has been weakened militarily in
relation to the Soviet Union. In view of
tiVilliam Lee's analysis of the situation,
realistic thinking suggests that American
negotiators are not likely to impress the
Soviet planners except from a position of
military strength. `Vhere social, political,
and economic vacuums have existed, the
Russians have usually moved in to fill
them. A major reason for their retreat in
the Cuban affair was their unwillingness
to test American military might at that
time. - ,
one consequence of such realism is a
military program costing many billions of
dollars. Such a cost may very well be the
price Americans must pay for the survival
of their institutions. Skimping on pro-
grams on which our survival depends
could amount to committing national
suicide.
However, an adequate defense program
need not increase the overall United States
defense budget alarmingly. At the present
time, more than 60 percent of our defense
budget goes for financing personnel costs.
Cutting manpower is not inconsistent
with maintaining a defense posture. A
manpower reduction would leave us tivith
sufficient conventional forces, permit
greater recruitment selectivity, and re-
leasethe funds needed to finance the exotic
new weapons required to countex the
Soviet threat.
In any case, a crisis in decision-making
now exists. One realistic alternative is to
develop, manufacture, and deploy weapon
systems an a scale the magnitude of which
will impress the Soviet Union. if this
alternative is pursued, the stagnating
arms limitation talks will become maze
meaningful and likely to produce results
much sooner.
i
Loring AFB, ~~Yrairie ~I
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~9 ~~~rrA;~Y x9T9 ,..
~.- ~ __ -
syRICHARD BURT ? ~ =- - ?? cials? said they- included Saudi-- Arabia, Bence'' that he zvas getting and told his
' s~si c~~~:e~+~or~cr~-~~s ' ::`;,:',';' Turkey, L'~a P:~ilippines, " Indonesia, aides to worlc:On,together to upgraue such
':~ ASiI'L`;GTON, San. 23 -The Carter Egypt, South Korea and 13raail_ ? .:, ?- ~- information. .
j Ac,~i,^..i;tration is assembling a comprw- Some officials believe that opposition t " Shortly tt;ereafterr gf`icials said, Mr_~
' ~.,. ~ ~ve plan to upgz-ade-its ability to fore ?~u~ -in each ?oE these. countries could) Carter's aides formed the task force and j
cast pc?itical turbulcncc arvtmd'. the threaten the, viability o: their .govern- put eaclI ofthei~top assist3n[s in charge: ?
j a-or?d, a step that setnvc Gvvarrtment of- zYients, which. are friendly to.: t1te.Unired ~ They are:` David- L_ Ramr., .:vlr. Baezi.-t-.
,icials said today could restttt insweeping. ,Stotts. In, assetice; the intelligence aide ski's deputy' David -fY-Newsom, Under
.changes in existing methods of intelli- -said, t:5e_Adniinistration.wanes to.,-know j5ecretary~af_State for political affairs,
T"ue officials said t~sat. since ? early-,
Dacember, a higi3-level interagency task
farce has been examining ways for Intel-?
ligenceagenties to improve tbeix ability
to aredic~ political instability in cauntries-
of critical 'importa~c+.ce~ to ? the- United
---The tacit farce, they said, was created-
af:er ?residen~Caster expressed.his dim
pieaa~re irrNovembar about the failures
of L'~e agencies,to anticipate the,crisis.in:
Iran.-.. _._-:w_---- _-- ?~;c.--
TLe . task~orce ~+as~not_-expeetec,to
iss~:e its formal reGOmrt:endatio~s to the
Presiden[.until next?month, theofficials
said, but a hies-ranltinn intelligence aide
in L`:e State-Department said-.that the
Ce^*sal Intelligence Agency andthe.State
-partment had already been'ordered to
t'e-?: rnine if other. strategies- natior:s
r_zgat b? susceptible'ta events similar [0
L':ose. in Iran; and to-.suggest-_.ways_'in
~rhich the United States ttugl'it respond to
s.:chfut+ussituations:~ - -..`~` -? ;
Try intellio race aide declL~ed to~name
the countries-under study, bur other.offi-
suchappositiairgiaups sal thatttie iI>ii.r~d
States will not:'be .surprised by events
similar to taosein Iran.. - - - -
?'-Efforts to enhance political forecasting
have been given special priority by: the
Administration:Zbi~niew Brzezinski, the
,
,
;
have.. stressed that military intelligence ~ American diplorrisis ?? and = ititelligenee
alone was no longer adequate: - -"~~~= ? ~ agents have ignored social changes insey
-?-The- intelligence? aide=said that :the' eountriea:,duiirib th`e la~?t-"decade, and
United States%t'Can no longer.:just'bludg_ ~ have focttse~instead oi~`a~hat the ruling
eon:its way intirsituations:: ~ ~ ? _--~- _ ~~: _ ~.:., > elite;vias. fliiiiking: `?" ' -i`tw : ' - _, ~ - .
"As our`relative'potver d"eclines;-~-'t?1e ~_;,: This-has meant; +rffic"r~s said. that in
aidesaidr;'we Inu~t.lEarn, Like the.Bzibish , contrast'to fhe~earlj+'19b'0's; ?,merican of-
nating; alen and skilled in political hitel-
ligence." - -
? _ ~,=~: Memor2~tdum From Carters ~Y7
Ot1?er officials traced the. task force's
origirt?to? a handwritten memorandum:
stnt by Mr.. Carter,in November to tiir.
Brzezinski;'Secrefaiy pf .Stafe'Cyri:5 ~,
Vance and Adm_-. Stansfield Turr:er;'the
Director of Central Intelligence: In-the
and Frank-C. Carlucci; the Deputy Direc-
tor of Central. Intelligence_ According to
the officials; the` task force-has met regu.
larlysinie?December: ? . - ~ ' ".- . . -
~heintelligence?aide?said thafi the task
force has identifie& several shortcomings
of- existing intelligence practices. Ore
such problem
the' aide
said
vas' that
ficials abroad have had little contact with
forces outside -governiients_ =sacra ~ as ~
youth groups, intellectual; and reli~ot:s
leaders. !WiL'turthe,Central Inte'ligence
Agency; the-officIals-said, ihis'tTerd was )
reiniarced in the 1970's crhen more re1i-
"ancewas placed,ozi technical means of in-
telligence;, .cgilect',ion,. thanr..orc_ human]
- - ~
? note, Mr. Carter said that he "was dissar--~
isfied with the quality'of'political intell;=i
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 Ai~TICLE AYi'r.A.;~;~ THE NEId YORK TxMES
ON ~pEo~elease 200'11~~7LP~t~t~~90-01137R00010013Q
-.- .-~r.y~,-~+'DREIC.x.I1Ta4.~+'I'A.I~ZS -W
ng ~'eace a~~ ~e~~inglt.
B~rnunawor~ue~ ~`
I.US ANGFIES ~ For. mare than a-
decade, tthas been plain that of ail the
-disasters of the Yietttam War the
'vrorst might. be. the lessons ire wipu]d
draw fmm it: Our political Mites, rsr
coiling from that remote atabiguaes
struggle. cvtaciuded that impr'o'ving-.
our ability m project force into distant
plates was a danger oo the world and
to us. If we improved our tarce.~we'd
be more .apt to use it and become.
Arms spendinS. Sa the lesson rams, Ls
worse thaauseless. It provokes adver~
caries to spend more in- turn in -aa
unending. spiral- ]]~staat ~~ ~=
largely iadigenoris, $ ~ iaCSl
in justree and corrarption acrd, in
case, ~ part of some Soviet or.ot>1er-
Communist coaspiratY: We ate not eta
gaged in a: simple bipolar contest with ~
the Soviet Union. Neither superpower I.
can dominate the -world. - Instead af.
playing poliaennaa m the erstire wvrid,
we should - uz the President's Phrase
-. be making peace for the vrorld...: .
But is that the lessa~n2 Caa.~ve make .
peace anywhere if we cannot reliably .
promise the necessary. force m keep
Secretar3- of State Cyrer~ R Yanaa
'was right to reject the stark bipolar..
picture recently: But if we are not
locked iri a simple duel with the other..
superpu+rer;. its interests doh appose
ours in marry essentials- Nar are dreg -
liltely m be reconciled is nay forrsee- .
.able arms agreement, least of -all in ~-
.SAI.? II,- which iras preoccr~red? the:
Aamiaistrattors as one apparently a~
diet .disaster after
~aofltierhastalsenit.bysurprtsG? = 'a~t threats of further dis-
- membermeat. ibis time by a Baluchix-'
tan liberation movemeaL sided by the
Afghanis and the Soviet Unioa:.Oman
:bad the Shah's help im putting dawn a
'Yemeni and Soviet~upported rebel'`
.. lion in Dhotar; trouble may start there
again. Both the Saudis and the Israelis
have beca,distwrbed, not only by. the
turn of events in-Iran but also by the
patent American inability to do gray-
. thing about it. For the Israelis, the giv
stag of boxier territory in return for an'
American guarantee lacks amsider-
ablyrislrier. ... - -.. : _~, ..~ ,
~- According to Pres3deat Carter: "We
have ... neither ability nor desire m
lnterfera in the internal affairs of Iran.
Azad we certainly have m intention of
permitting other nations tb-interfere,
But if we have eao abilitq to intervene
ourselves. can we prevent others from
intervening! ii we are unclear about
Soviet intetierence in these ambigu-
ous deadly quarrel9, the Russians are
not. Their military? guarantees, em-
bodied in "Friendship Treaties" with
India cad with Yitetaam. assured India
that it could dismember Pakistan and
Vietnam that it could invade Combo.
din. free ox concern about China. And
that Ls hardly the end of the matter. An
extension of Soviet intervention or coo-
.trot !ar chart of "world doaainatian"
tnaald do us and out allies grievot>3
halm. And even where Mbacnw is not
gaining control, we seem to be lasing,
it.
Our major intelli~eecs failtues t
coma en kee their a es ~
s ut t to unp easant trends- Two
ago. a usstaas no abil?
itg+ to match American or Britislx
forces in the Persian Gulf or Mediter~
ranean. They could not overfly Yugo
slavia, Turitey, Iran of Paidstan.
:Today, tive have the problems with
Tights and the use of overseas
tiases. But this is nA inevitable "da
cline of the West"
we have the resources to reverse
these treads and -the technological
base to do it eftideatly rather rhea by
merely multiplying armies: We and ~
our allies have had otter priorities.
'Between 1960 and llt'Tl we more titan
doubled the perrestta$e of the Boss
national product made up by Federal
outlays as "social welfare." while cut.
ring almost in halt the fraction devoted
to the common defense --which could
mean we shall all fair badly.
But to choose to reverse the decline.
` we need at least torrotice it.
Albert Wohlstetter, University Prates-
sor at the Uruversity of Chiccgo, is_a .
guess colwrtnisi. .
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r~ AI~TiCLL ~~~`~' Tvc T.rn cuT~Tr_rnu cTeu ((_u~R1T 7 7NR7"k
U.S.: !n#e~ligence Predicted Suez Crisis '. ~~
U.S. intelligence agencies correttly:predicted Is- I
rael, Britain and France would take military action
in 1956 to keep the Suet Canal open but wrongly be-
lieved Soviet leader Nikita Khrushclaev was, on the.
. verge of falling frompower. - "~ `- ..
,Publication- of once. classified transcripts:of?se? .I
cret sessions of the? Senate Foreign, Relations
Committee -in 1956 yesterday- provided.the? histori?
cal notes.._ .:._.. _:: ~ .,:......~..... .. . .
Intelligence predictions-on Khrushchev's fate,
and af.the-draaxatic.Hungarian-uprisings of the
same`year, were notably off-target :, .~ _ L,.,,,,f. ~_..-" ..,
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 Approved For Release 200/,~2~,t~gp1P~~~~~`00130001-4
Z3 January 1979
_ -~1 -~.. - .. ~.._.. k, .r _ - _ _. ~
Flas U_S. forei l - ~ , , - ; .
gn policy-ever` before :;::Afghanistan. and Iran sneaked up ort tlz
been as badly splintered or as disorgan- ~.: United States. The CIA gave litti
ized as it is now? - ~ warnin~_ -?--~ -
For starters, take U.5 relations with ~ ~. For years
the CIA has been pilloried
,
,
Iran. The outcome of the turrnpii in I~ ry~u,,,', its morale shaken, its capabilities deg
is far from clear. But already it is clear '~: creased. In each: foreign country, the
enough that? any,. likely -outcome .will. ,; :CIA reports tQ the ambassador, In both
pmbabl~- damage United States' ?inter- Iran and Afghanistan; evidently. the
-sets. Unfarizmately in~the face.:of this?CIA's contacts with non-0fficial sources
challenge, American policy seems hard- p!ere severely circumscribed: =::. =~- ~ _:
ly more intelligible than Irar-ian politics...: ~?'' '1'1ze charter vihieh Congress is IikeIy
-The U-S. will:. probably= :loge'. the' r'to acceptor reject this session was. bo
listening posts it. has .used tt- moaitar .of concern with CIA ab
~erira
Soviet strategic--. weapons::' Access :-to 1 That's an import~mt'problem, to be sure,
Iranian oil could well be cut :o#f. And a -? rout so is~ the ability of the CIA ?th do its
communist ,or ?~radical-Islamic-~ - ~~
Iab =abroad. In ? discussing the charter,
nationalist government could y~,e~ ~ a
force for fin'ther-r disniption in that.
Congress should pay -more attention to
_ Nor ?s the trouble confi~d to: Iran,' -?:: They second chance. Congress will
The pro-Russian government that seized ~ : ~~ : to .Pass orr the administration
pov~er . receatly~ in .Afghanistan:. is har- .. foreigrs. policy will be the SALT treaty.
boring gueriitlas ? who ?,8re~= attacking with the SoiTiet Union. Russia views the
Pakistan.. The radical Yeniejni- reg9-fie .. ; -vorld as ~ a "correlation .of . forces,,'?
hosts guerrlllas-who-wish to take aver ire : ~:, seeing inva$ian in ~:.ambudxa, s;:bversion
Saudi Arabia..'-::=~` ~ -~. _--.~ -_ ~ _..=: ...-.
Across the Persian Gulf, Russian and .._, ~, ~` "uaaue~ as steps wwara a lamer
Cuban advisors,-are .?esconced-. iii ;:igeopaliticalobfective. - - -.- _ .: --.5
Ethio ia. Far the -West, these develo "~ It is the .idea of - an overarchkng
p p" ? ~ geopolitical goal` that official American
menu threaten oil supplies; peace in the
~
. -;
_
Middle East; and many, ather^:strategic
'
~ '
dmo
p
e
e
' -::
a
inlstratl
on rejects
interests: :.-?= - - ,.
th
id
a ofr
During the copying session,' Cairgress :~ ?`Ltnka~E? continues to insist that Soviet
will probably leave at least two' c}iances .;' advereturisrn in Ethiopia should mot-
to try to help untangle the mess That the .~ enter our thinking about our t~ ubles in
adminictrat;n.,i,~a.,,eae,se:rte r_~____._:? 1zanoranagreementonstra~e carets..
First Congress-is uxe~y,.te vote-on a~~,
ch
~~
arter for the CIA. It' time for another'
?
close look- at th~nization: Events in
? _ Congress would ~ well to question:
the fraetui^ed policy- the administration?
serves lip.. Fok~ it is increasingly appar?
ent;that ~, politer is not serving the
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/~~ 1 1i \~~\J 1 ~ 1 I~~O ~~~, iNC.
Fog PU3L l C AFFA I PS STAFF
PAOGRAI~1 Face the Nation
DATE January 21 , 1979 I I :30 AP~1
suB.lEC7 Interview with Senator Frank Church
1JDV~~1-TV
C[3S Network
ti~lash i ngton, Q.C.
GEORGE HERPAAN: Senator Church, U.S. policy towards
Iran seems to have waivered.between favoring the Shah, favoring
the Bakhtiar government, and, most recently, some hints of
favoring the Ayatollah Khomeini. Have wa had any adequate,
appropriate Iran pal icy at al I?
SENATOR FRANK CHiURCH: ~Jel I , our policy, of course,
was to support the Shah as long as the Shah cou Id stay i n Iran.
But the chaos that developed there, the inability of the army
to keep order, the overwhelming protestations from the streets
fiinally fiorced the Shah to leave.
After that, I think it was a bit premature for us to
endorse the Bakhtiar government. Bakhtiar.stands an a banana
pee I , and h4' I I have to be an adroit acrobat i ndead to keep h i s
fiaot i ng. I think we might have refrained unt i f we had a better
i d.ea of what ki nd of government wou I d emerge. from the present
chaos.
ANNOUNCER: From CBS. News, ;~lashington., a spontaneous
and unrehearsed news interview on Face the Nation with Senator
Frank Church, incoming Chairrnan of fihe Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Senator Church will ba questioned by CBS News con-
gressianal correspondent Phil Janes; but Richard Burt, diplo-
matic correspondent for The New~York Times; and by CBS News
correspondent George Herman.
HERP4AN: Senator Church, your first answer was at
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ARTICLE APP'' ~. NEWSj~EK
OH PAGE~Q g ._,~ 22 January 2979
@~~' hen, as lately, America's decline ac- evidence ofreality, because ifyou accept
R~~ celestes, it is useful to look back that the Russians are. embarked on an
along the dmvnward, crumbling path.. imperialist course far the indefinite fu-
Eugene Rostow has done sn in The Nash- tore, i? you accept that their military,
ington Quarterly, recallingthe 1.968 Sovi- economic, educational and cultural poli-
et invasion of Czechoslovakia. -He was Gies are all geared to the reduction ... of
Under Secretary of State, and was struck, the ability of the United States and its
then as now, by the attitude prevalent allies to resist, then you have to do some-
~vithin government that "soviet action . thing about it." -
must always be given the benefit of the- - Whatthe-United States has done since
doubt." That summer, officials resisted the mid-1960s is invest its hopes in arms
the idea that Soviet military maneuvers. control. It has based arms-control policy
presaged an invasion. When senior Sovi- on the hope that the Soviek buildup is
et.afFcialsinterruptedtheir2,ugustvaca merely a reaction to U.S. arms, and can
tions to convene in l~ioscow, President be restrained by unilateral U.S_ restraint.
Johnson assumed they were preparing So U.S. arms-limitation efforts have
Hat an invasion but an invitation (for him ~~ limited . - . U.S. arms. i\'ow The Econo-
to visit _ldoscow to begin strategic arms .mist of London warns that the SALT II
limitation talks). Significantly, they were treaty, designed to run through 1985,
preparing both. They wrongly assumed . "could be the beginning of seven singu-
what they reasonably assume today, that lazly dangerous years." - .
the U-S. Administration would mute its.. _..- 'A HALF- HOUR CATACLYSM'
reaction to Soviet conduct, however erg- _ _
gressive, sther than jeopardize SALT .. The cosmetic equality in permitted to-
negotiations. (Johnson immediately can-~ tats of launchers conceals, The Ecano-
celedthetrip.) mist says, "a large imbalance in Russia's
With today's satellites, U.S. ofncials - favor." Given existing U.S. arsenals and
would have seen unusual markings on procurement plans, "by 198a the United
tanks and other vehicles in the Soviet Slates will be behind Russia both in the
maneuvers. Evidence that these were .over-alI total and in some of the most im-
about to go into action against identical. portantsub~ate ones,"including"mod?
tanks and vehicles--those of the Soviet- ern large" missiles: the Soviets will be
supplied Czech Army. But many officials permitted308(aforcethatcancarry3,000
would have resisted any upsetting evi- wazheads), the U.S. will be permitted
deuce about the Soviets. Rostow recalls none. And SALT II "may leave the Unit
this from the preceding summer: ed States itself vulnerable to a surprise
... The first time. '1~gyptian' MiG Russian attack. ~ - -
fighters appeared aver our Sixth Fleet "By the early 1980s, the growing num-
shortly after the 196' Six Day War, oux ber of increasingly accurate warheads
monitoring sources reported that the pi- Russia can pack into its huge missiles
lots of these `Egyptian' planes were-talk- "will put- it in a position of being able to
ing Russian ...Well, for two weeks our destroy virtually all .of America's Iand-
' Soviet experts were explaining this away .based missiles in a single half-hour cater
.. [They said] that these were training clysm, while still keeping quite a lot of
flights, that the pilots were Egyptians -its own missiles in reserve, ready for a
who had been instructed in Russian by ~'seCOnd blow :.. [A] counterattack
Russian personnel .:. and so on. Of against the Soviet missile system would
course it soon transpired that the pilots have to depend mainly on the aircraft
were Russian and those arguments col- Carried Cruise missiles permitted under
lapsed. Sut for two weeks they were ~ SALT II, which would take ten hours to
stubbornly held .. _" .... - ... trundle toward their targets-and even
then would desuoy not :ouch more than
'STASILI7Y' IN IRAN .': ~ half of the Soviet launching silos."
Today, the pattern ofstrikes andunrest . To say that the Russians would pmb-
in Iran strongly suggests Soviet finger- ably not push the button "misses the
prints, but whit a the Soviets broadcast point of nuclear mathematics:
instructions for manufactaring gzenades - "The point is that the Russians would
and bombs, U.S. "experts" suggest that not have to. If they know that [an] ex-
the Soviets are priml~arily interested in c~hapny gcepaf Soviet first strike~I,a~,nyd~,,A~1m~ ear-}
explarlln u~~~l~illl~i i~~~gt'n1`~01~fEl~i2fno~~ii~~~~~~ii~?,"`I~HzY~H1
"The answer is: fear. The American ~ would then hold Americas cities hos-
political class is afTaid? of living with the tage, they would know that the Ameri-
can Presidentwould
know it too- and that
he would be para-
lyzed by his knowl-
edge ...This is the
political reality be-
hind the apparently
abstract calculations
of who-would-have-more-missiles-]ek."
On the crucial question of how the.
United States sank to this danger, The
Economist is too charitible: "Americans
were so mesmeri-zed by Vietnam and
tiVatergate that they failed to spot the
danger." Nottrue- The political days had
sufficient evidenceall along. italso hada
desire to disbelieve, and with a few ex-
ceptions (such as Sen. Henry Jackson)
has shrunk from leadership.
Fred Ikle, former director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency,
writes that we: aze in a third postwaz
phase. From 1945 through 1950, the
period of "nuclear motiopoly," the U.S.
actually had few ready nuclear weapons
and was substantially weaker than the
Soviet Union in terms of ready land-
based power. After North Korea at-
tacked, the U.S- immediately tripled its
defer:se budget, building up air and
naval capabilities. After the Cuban mis-
sile crisis, the Soviets.began a sustained
buildup, while Vietnam sapped Ameri-
ca's material and moral resources.
_ {GNOAAiVCE AS A S7R{4TEGY '
The Soviet. Union has doubled its
military budget, in real terms, in the last
__ fifteen years. The- U.S. budget in .con- .-~
start dollars is less than it was in 1961.
And as Ikle says, this "third-phase shift ,
in the Soviet Union's-favor is still under
way: ' In 1965, Defense Secretary laic- _
Namara said that "the Soviets have de-
cided that they have lost the quantita; ?
five race ..?. there is na indication the ~I
Soviets are seeking to develop a strate-
gic nuclear farce as large as ours: ' Ikle !
blames a huge "intellisten a failure n `r
e s or sue in in an
armtu persistence in unilateral re-
strains as a o icy or inauc:ng 5ov~et ~
restraint, or a even veers in a roj w_ t~
annu U- inte}li ence 4recasts un-
derestimate the number of missiles ~
Russia would de ov.' ? - i
But I ? e, - e T e Economist, is too !
charitable. When people are so wrong For 4
so.long on the same subject, in the same ,
3~~~~ti~n, the failure is not of intelli- i
ut of will. For such people, igno-
ran~e is a strategy. Their pxoblem is not ~
in finding the truth, but in facing it.
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---.~0.RTICLE APPE~~ THE C?l4?~LL STPEET .~dUR`dAL
QN PAGE,~~ 18 January 1979
~nt~lli~~ncc ~'a~lur~ # ~Z~2~ ~~
It sometimes happens that events :
~~ Qon's intelligence capabilities, or lack
_
bypass purposed Iegislation before it thereat, to come out before Congress ~
can be enacted into law. Something could pass a bill and claim to have dis-
like this seems to have happened to posed of . the. intelligence problem.
S?52~, the Intelligence Reorgani2a.tion That an analysis of Soviet open-
and Reform Act reported out of the source material by a single outside r~
Senate Select Committee on Intelli- searcher could force the CIA to double
gence, a new committee created in its estimate of ~ Soviet military spend-
19Ti. This bill, designed to protect our ing? that the CiA could grossly under-
civil liberties against the "invisible estimate the size, scope and purpose
empire" of an omniscient CIA, is the of the---Soviet strategic buildup;..,thaf
commttee's response to public fears the CIA' could
not perceive the brew-
.
and images of wrong-doing created p
ind?instability-yin .Iran-these?,enor-
back in 1976 by the- accusatory hear---- inous -intelligence failures are ~ what
ings of the Church committez, the Se-'concern the American public today
,
lect Committee's predecessor. ~ The Intelligence Committee's bill does,
The committee has been busy these not address this concern. Indeed, to
years fine-tuning the bill in search of this day the committee has never held
an appropriate mix between civil lift .- hearings on the fundamental issues of
ernes and the Attorney General's pz~ what intelligence-does the U.S. need
mgatives on "intelligence intrusion." ...;and how is the U.S. to acquire it- . ,:
And now Vice President Mondale and ~":;"the hearings sponsored by the Pike
the American Civil -Liberties Union
axe-completirgtheir negotiations aver .. and Church committees were. them..
which circumstances permit what ir.- selves intelligence failares. These cir-
formation to be collected in which way cus-like performances bequeathed a
on which individuals, thus ermittiin _ one-sided concern to their successor
p g''~--cozi'imittees, a concern`.that. has ra~
the committee to mark up the, bill: for :--~ p
presentation. to the Senate. ..- ~-_:r_~: ~:-Y ~~bited them: fiom dealing~;wiih the
In the meanwhile the public has:=--: real-intelligence problerr~,:.;;~ ..
been learning of a long string of Intel-::,: ~:., _-. Toda}r the.~crediliility ot..the U.S. is
ligence failures, of which the unantici-'"'~, strained;' both with- its allies and its
pated collapse of the shah's position in ~ enemies. W~,cannot afford any. more
Iran is the latest; and is wondering, , extravagant: misperceptions.. There
why the CIA's intelligence is so far off. ;~_: will always:,be=~intelligenc~;faitures,~
the mark. The public's concern has n-...=but the . goal=~should be to~-minimizE ~
shifted from fear that the agency's. ac=:~~~em- Before.-the Senatepa$ses a bill
tivities will pre-empt civil liberties to _~:,~.reflecting,~outmoded concerns; it ought
fear that the agency lack. s compet,~ to nvestiga.te- they requirerrients of an
ence. -.. ~~: ~: effective intelligenice senvice:'Perhaps
The time spent fine-tuning the bill some hearings in this direcrion_would.
has served apurpose- It has permitted be-an appropriate new venture for the;
more Important facts about the na Select ,Committee on Ir~telUigenee- .~-.
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~FiE. DALLAS l'1QR'~ItiG N
14 JanLary 1979
RICHARD NLYON, trying to - government. But how it makes I
rally support for his yiernam us look in the world's eyes is ~
policies, once admonished only to be imagined.
against this nation's ever giv- Some of this is the Carter
ing tine impression that it was administration's fault, but not
"a pitiful, helpless giant." It is :.all. _ The adm inistratian's lack:
easier, some years later, to see of a coherent foreign policy, its
what he meant. ~. -inability to articulate . clear ;
. -With respect t0 at least two international aims ~ such.
current international traumas, things have hurt. But- in fact a
the U.S. image has in truth sense of purposelessness has
_. been one of .helplessness, .afflicted our foreign policy for
whether of pitifulness or not: -the past. decade. We cannot
~Nezther in Iran. nor in Camboa seem to make up our minds
dia?has the United States had - what our. interests abroad are.
any- leverage - to exert It has --The old Dulles-Eisenhower pot-
been_ reduced to hax-d-wring icy of opposition to communist.
ing, - _ hardly . _ an -..edifying .expansion "had its drawbacks,
exercise for one of-thy globe's ? but, at least it was coherent. It
two superpowers.. _ ~~-=- provided the rationale for the
In Cambodia; the problem is ;-beefing up of our defeiases and
-twofold. It is not just that there ~ the extension of U. S. inflsence
was little we ~ could do about.- = .throughout the -.. globe... But
~Jismam's..-successful invasion -:. ,.detente and "the China card"
of its communist neighbor.' We : ~ have canceled out anti-cammu-
actually got on the wrong. side nism as the basis of our policy.
that of -Cambodia and its We still feel vaguely that
genocidal rulers- by Publicly . there ate causes we should be
p;ratesting ~ the invasion,' ?p;amoting around the world --
although it was Cambodia that .. ;such as .human rights ~ but . i
commenced hostilities in ?the ..with Realpolitik out the vvin-
~irst place.. ~-. "-: _ - ? dow we have cut bacl~ our ~
_ - ~ " in Iran, we announced early ,armed forces, mangled the CIA
- on-(and correctly, in The News' .:. and withdrawn from many of
view) our;,support far .the ~> our advanced outposts: We lack
embattled shah. But as it devel- ~~ not: ust the motivation but the
oiled, our support meant,troth- `` mea~s io make as big an impact
in.g... The CiA= :had -lost- ,touch ~ as we formerly made in foreign
- with-:the _oppositiox~- and,'-: as it ~ affairs.=-- -:. _ ~=.. _ : - __. : - .
-now -= appears, .~"had ~-failed" to ~::,.-~ ~_ And .as _i~t. all-this were ~~ot--
apprise:., Washingtoa;~of_..whow damaging?.,.enaugh,. we- have
really desperate was the- shah's-.. begun "to..~ake a mama. for: ours
plight Adjus-timents- that might. selves .whezt it .comes to sabo-
have been- made?-in our policy . "caging: allies. =First Cambodia;::
years back went unmade:' '? -=-~- _ then Vietnaza. (Is it any. wan- .
_ Sa.nov~ the-United States has - der we lack leverage in South- `
laeen obliged to-~ backpedal,. east Asia?) Most-recently~the~'
making latown that it' thinks Republic of China on Taiwan. --.,,?.
its old. friend-the shah.=--~so=?_ ~' A pitiful; helpless giant?
- Jimmy Carter.has~often enoughY' ;Vlore confused than helpless;
denominated .him ..- should ,..~ iii our view. But the time- has
clear out for. awhile. It is a pru- ?~ come for~clearing up the confu'-
dent policy, perhaps, given our ~; sion:? dust what is it after all ;
dependence- on the gpad will that : we ,stand far? -And. ovhat'?~
and the oil of the new Bakhtia~y-...are we going ^. _ abo.__ ...
:.i.~.
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~ase 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001
~
O~i YriGiJ
THE NI;W YOR?C TINS
]2 January 1979
aynREw;YII~nz.~.Tarl
More than 170 retired generals and ad; . '~,~tQ ~ Areas Accord -
. mirals have waned President-Carter of -
what they describe as an "increasing
Soviet challenge" to the United S totes.
In a.*a open lettef, taay said a National
Intelligence Fstirtsate that is described as
the most authoritative . U.S.. Gaverra-
- .meet evaluation of itatelligetsts data" had
- finally acluaowledged that; the=Russians
were "heading for superianr~ ~a;nt parity.
in the mi]itary ar?...tsa.",. ~ - ... _
The Ietter said an -Amerieass Intera-
gency study arc the global Iailitary bal-
ance conciudedrecently that "iu a nonnu-
clear conflict between the Soviet Union
? and the United States in the 2-liddla Easy;
Israel alone might deter Soviet combat
forces' inter~v-ntian ar prevent the_ co
pletian of such deployment" ' : - '- ~-
R~ere it not for the ability of Israel's
ground farces, the officers declared, the
United States would haves to station sig-
nificantforces and equipttieat in the ii~ild-~
dleEast.. - -... - -~'
Soviet ab~ves Describ~e~d .
? The signers, among whom were fi
generals, 151ieute~+ant generals and 4 ad-
mirals, included Adm: >w1nlo R. Zumwalt
Tr., farmer Chief of Naval Operations;
Ctn. Paul L Fr2emaa Jr., farmer Arm
commander in Europe; Geri-'T'? w- Park
er. former Army chief of staff in Europe;
Gen. ,Albert C. Wederueyer, who w
commander of the -~ China theater o
vpzratinns at the end at world -wax II'!
Maj. Ctn. John K Siaglaub, former chief
~' of stmt, United States farrxs, I{ot~a~aru J
chief of intellig~. um? Jwwc~
..~ ~p~-_
reel's value as an ally that can defend it
to avoid seadin8 Arrlari~ foss to th
- tivz5' were'deserit:ed as the neutraliz~-
- ing it access to oil.. the encirclement of
Ctliata and. tllr: isolattcoa of the. United
Sta-r~ tecrar said the?Soviet faGVS cm Ili
?_ ~ ". ~. - ~. ~ a threat
res~enied a. _gm~a e.:_Fl,~
ence and power had expatsded in the east-
ern Mediterranean, the Red. Ses and tl;e
Persian Gull, Afghacistan ~ad cores
under Soviet control and "anu-American
forces" were lsarassin$ the Governments
- ~? ----- ---- - ea were described as
- Cuhan mercescari htzee in Angola.
earryiag out Soviet po ~, y _`----- -
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100
~~TICT,iE APP~..~2~1,-
O:i PAGP. l ~
AIR kORC:E I:?IAGAZTNE
January 1979
i3Y FDGAFi LL SAiti1~f~, S~MtoR t~oITDA
Washington, D. C., DEC. t3
Space Treaty Rift?
TherE is evidence of considerable
ps!ariza:ion within the Administra-
t:c?n c:,ncerning national policy on
spice vreapans and electronic war-
fare related to military spacecraft.
T'^.e paint at issue is a treaty that is
being negotiated between the US
U^d the So?:i2t Union barr;ng the
d~?ployment of aniisatellite intercep-
tors. or ASATs. Several sticky,
gravely consequential paints are in-
vo;ved, 5eg~nnir.g with the fact that
t?-:e Soviet Union has fully o~~ra-
tional r.SATs that clearly are capa-
iia of blo~.ving u~---by nonnuai2ar
r-rsans-spacecraft at low to mAdi-
u:r ?!titud~s.
The US has no such systems in
being although there can be no
doubt that launchers 4vith nuclear
warheads ere readily available to
destroy So?:iet spacecraft, if, in case
of vier, the National Command Au-
thorities should .decide to disown
iti? 1 ?~7 Outer Space Treaty that
prohibits racing in orbit objects
that carry nuclear weapons.
This prohibition probably be-
comes academic in case of nuclear
war between the superpowers. But
there are operational drawbacks to
using .nuclear ,veapons--especially
those meant to protect US military
spacecraft from attacking intercep-
tors-since nuclear effects in space
pr.apa~ate over great distances and
don't differentiate between friend
..~d `ee_ ~?~en relatiaely lo?ro-yield
?:,arhgar_'; :would disables most if not
at; c;~-:a:~e,^.ed soacacraft within a
. ~~`:;; c:` several hundred miles.
ii~~8. tr:a ?E~tri:CtluR Of a SOVIEt
AS~?.T at :"'E cost of dooming the US
sp?Cr:cra`E that is to be protected-
~t least until US spacecraft can be
:`:::;~ r'~ar,~ned-'Mould be a Pyrrhic
victory.
A stron~~ case is being made by
t~~ bc`n^se Department and other
obviously is tantamount to granting
Moscow a fundamental advantage in
perpetuity. Such a condit;on vrould
enable the Soviets to break out from
the agreement since they have all
required technologies, if not oper-
ational hardware, while the US
would Head years to reach that
point.
Arrayed against the reservations
of the Defense comr:~uni!y is a loose
liaison of Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency (ACDA) and too-
level StatE Department officials,
tacitly supported by the National
Security Council's Victor UtgoiF_ The
latter group seeks to di{ute Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter's guidelines con-
cerning the US position an a space
weapons treaty-such as the in-
struction not to perpetuate existing
asymmetries and not to agree to
terms that can't be verified-by urg-
ing that Soviet promises and good
will be taken at face value_
The State Department/ACDA
group has proposed further that the
US commit itself to a policy of com-
prehensive "noninterference" with
Soviet military satellites. The term
"noninterference" in the context of
an anti-ASAT treaty tends to take on
extremely broad meaning. At stake
are prohibitions against jamming
hostile satellites, inspecting them by
visiting Space Shuttle crews, hinder-
ing their operation by placing for-
ei~n objects in the paths of their
transmissions and their fields .of
vietiv, incapacitating them in various
~,vays-such as overheating or over-
loading ;I'~Eir sonsors ?.vith ground-
bas~d high-energy lasers-and
either "pirating" there through e~ec-
tronic means or causing them to
"self-destruct" through spurious
command signals,
The Defense community--whose
views a this writing seem to have
greater leverage in the 4Vhite House
than do ACDA's views-believes
for the second, permanent phase of
such an accord,
The "Sullivan" Affair
The New Yvrk Trmes's November
13, X978, revelation that Sen. Har,rf S
M. Jackson (D-1?Vash_), chairman of `
the Senate's Arms Control Subccm-
mittee, was furnished a bootl~~ggod
copy of a secret, highly Inforrnative
CIA report on Soviet SALT tactics
and duplicity leads to a story behind
a story.
Attributed to "Administration and
intelligence sources," the re;~ort ;
Contains misstatements and orris.- .
sions, the latter including in(orma-
tion disclosed in our December "In
Focus .. ?" (p. 25) under a November 'i
3, 1978, cateline. A good case can
be made for t;,e proposition--widely
circulated on Capitol Hill-that Ad-
ministraticn sources leaked the story
to Seymour Hersh of the Nevr York
Times in order to embarrass Senator
Jackson, one of the Congress'
pivotal and most unccrrlpromising
and knowledgeable SALT experts,
and his inf!uantial staff advisor on
SALT matters, Richard Parle.
Well-connected congressional
sources also view the leak as part
of the opening round of a brass-
knuckle campaign-patterned after
but far morn energetic and refined ,
than the setting of the Panama Car.al i
Treaties last year-to ram SALT Il '
ratiF.cation through the 5enatP, tCsy
protaconist in the Naw Yortc Trrrre~
Story is FOrmer ~i.A StrarwntC 7?r'a''- ~~
D_lvid :i. S;.;i',iv.ar., a fanner !tnn?^.~?
Corp; captain who ssrv?d in Vi?'-
nam and is the son of retired Air
Force f~"aj. Gen. Henry R. Sullivan, -
J r.
Sullivan improperly but not it- ;
legally furnished to Senator Jack-
son's staff a copy of a highly classi-
lied CIA report--authored princi-
eL~r;;ents e. the Executive; E3ranch that aspace-v;s?apons treaty should pally by him-that demonsL-ales the
3 ~a:r- hn:t;ng the embryonic US be treated as a two-stop process. nr~,ir-absolute: cnn'rc?! ov?~r Sovi?':
ASr' ~.~~?-}ypr9r~~?~~tottf~&ll~a6ie-200~d07rf~7!tteCh~PttR~R?A-~rk371~13U~100`~~310~0~?~4oies exerted by that r.a_
s!ra?Fd ~~:urcr:pt capability. Agree- protocol period similar to the one lion's military hierarchy, as r: el! 23
i-; t,? ., -=,z~' the SoviF?t and US envisioned for Sl,LT IL--a certain P.toscovfs elaborate deception; a`.
. ... - -~- -___-_. ~_--_'- -_-""---_~ ncnT .,,..t.-...r.~~lrl F.,~nnr_ 11, fiQIT n~a:]'13:0r5_ The SLIIIiL?a:'{
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~RiTCZ,E AP ED" AID FORCES .70URN,',L
Q~1. PAGE JAt`IiTARY 19'(9
~? The US must revise its policy towards Moreover, in Iran's case there were
N BEND QUESTION of the
THERE C?
-
1
strategic importance of Iran to the United ._ assisting developing nations in educating exceptional long and short term warning
States and its major allies. Iran shares a. =.' their youth. Virtually without exception, indicators_ The U5 has been intimately
1,?50 mile border with the USSR, and is ar:_~?. half the population of every developing involved in Iran since 1943, and it literally
critical chick and balance to the expansion _.- nation is now under eighteen. The U5 must should have had a quarter century of
-
'
.
- -
of Soviet power in the Near Ease and' =help its allies to ensure that their students warning.
- - - - - - - _- __ - "r~~ 7 ...... Tom.-?. R........n l.,.i:raf.,ra -
modern military equipment, .and. armed -
forces of over 420,000_ : - - ?- , : ` .
Iran provides the West with oil exports
of approximately S_S million barrels per
day. has a total production capacity of b_8
:v1ti4BD, supplies roughly 9~Jo of US oil
imports, and is a key supplier to Israel and
Japan- Its gas exporu to the USSR and
Soviet Bloc reduce communist pressure on
the world's oil supplies_ Iran also has de
facto military- control over the West's
jugular vein-the Straits of Hormuz-
through which the free world must get
roughly twenty -million barrels of oil per .
day, or 3790 of its oil production..
There also, however, can be no question ''
that the United States must now rt-think
how to best preserve Iran as an ally and -
strong strategic forte in the Near East.- - .
Specifically. the upheavals in Iran-during
the last year have demonstrated the US
must re-think five critical aspects of its
strategic relations with lean and other key
allies, such as Saudi Arabia: - _... -
? The US must accept the risk ofbroaden=
of their eeonomy to absorb such student t[ nos peen clear for more mart two I
populations, and must re-structure the US -decades that Iran is a society which is
educational visa program to reduce the undergoing massive internal strain and ~
radicalization and alienation of foreign culture shock. Its development, in-
students studying in the US. dustrialization, and "westernizaiivn" have
e Finally, the USmust re-think not only its been achieved at the cost of pressures
approach to intelligence, but its entire which have alwa}'s been capable ofsudden-
reporting process on developingnations. It ly and unpredictably exploding
must introduce a new emphasis on realism ? Exploding Population GrowtFr: While
in country team reporting, and in the policy demographic estimates are uncertain,
analysis of the NSC, Stag Department, iron's population almost certainly did not
and Department of Defense. It must treat exceed 13 million in 1945. Ithad risen to 26 ~
the crisis in Iran as a failure in policy million by 1970, and is variously estimated
leadership, and not as a failure in in- as being from 33 to 37 million today,
telligenee_ presenting incredible problems for any
These are demanding requirements for 'Iranian government_ - - ,
changes in US policy. However, even a ? And Exploding Youth: Iran has an
broad reviewafthepressuresthatledtothe extraordinarily young population.
crisis in lean, and of U5 policy towards. Something like half thepopulation is under
Iran. indicates that such changes are vital if 16. and two-thirds is undzr3D_Thisensures
the U5 is to maintain and improve the a high rate of cultural instability, problems
security and stability of its key strategic in education and in creating new jobs, and
allies in-4he developing world. an inevitable "radicalization of moth of
A QUARTI?R CENTURY OF WAR1~lI,i lG the population. '
- It is ironic that events in ]ran could have ? Unmanageable Shift to Urbanization:
ins its contacts with all the pro-Western taken the US sa much by surprise. There sy the late 195Ds, it was clear that ]ran was
elements in developing nations. It must .have been countless examples of similar facing the inevitable problems of a massive
accept the unpredictability and- ` in- - -situations producing cultural and. and continuing shift of its population from
_,
dependence of such elements. -~. `.? -=? -, . economic explosions since World War lI. peasant agnculture to "urban'~obs. ran s .
? The US must adopt a new realism in There havealso been countless examples to urban population leaped from 5 million in
1956 t l0 "ll~ n 1966 and will
o m~ w
o
analyzing the economic development of
allies, and its control of the impact of
tiVestern sales and activities.
? The US must improve its approach to
,
t
providing military advice and sales. prove that authontar~an regimes cannot
1"d I' - 1 ' tabilit that when a roach or exceed 20 million by theend of
ns
t
Aboui the Acithar. Abu! K{{Q~~Sini ~arlsu
is the ~CCt?i~?i~~~~
Departrn t~aa tCrul?:wtr Y`tn mate^
~ -K
experience in'lrarrurrt.affain:~-~~'~
y; pp
ica t
put a i on po i
they try, the pressure builds-up to the this decade. Much of this population
breaking point; and that in the process of growth has concentrated in the capital city ~
repression, such regimes cut.themselves off of Tehran. It, and its satellite towns and
Pram the contact wish their peap{e that give cities, have grown from SOO.ODO in 1940 tot
them warning and time to react. The million in 19b?, over 3 million in 1970. and
Savak, afterall, followed in the footsteps of 5 million today. Something like 500 of
/~i~t~ ot~~i Qs~1~e~t6~1t6fb'l3~'k-copulation is now "urban" versus
ultimate impart was to cut off the regime 3$~'o in 1956, and 5~'o in the late 1940s.
they served from the people it governed. Roughly 150 of the total population lives
 ~~F~c~se 2001/07/2731~1?~~~~~~-`1~~000100130(
To Hell
With the
Old Year
By James Reston :': ~-_.
PARIS. Dec: 30 - At the turn of the
year, officials in WestPra Europe
seem less anxious about the problems
of the Middle East and military arms
control with the Soviets than- about
political opinion in the..United 5iates_
Tney are more relaxed he.-e_ To-hell
with the old year, they seem tasay. ~ : .
_ Though they live=?*+~~*?~shadow
of Soviet'missiles that ixaye ihe? ca-
paciry mdestroy everyaarieritcapital
of western Europe; and axeconcerned
about the turrnoi{ in Iran~~.Turkey,
and the Lang delay in. react. SALT.
agreement' with. biosccsv~rsofne
kind of compromise' betweeu.lsrael
and Egypt, there is no.sense of crisis
among officials herc.~ . ' .;_ -:
They don't think success~~of."Lhe
SALT negotiations;which theq ezpecr,
will mean very much, but they believe
that failure of these negotiations
might lead to another expensive round
in the arms race, with more billions
spent an new interrnntinental nuclear
weapons and therefore less available
far weapons that might defend them.
0ffitials here simply don't under-
stand the debate on these issues in the
United States. They are openly suspi-
cious o1 statistics on the re a 'v
strei7 of U.S. and So
w ich the debate proceeds; which_they
aCLYi'6aL~I a of on acid C.I- -
caa wit a su jective interest 1.[t rais-
ing e _ m1 it - _ _ ?~;;;
Why, they ask, is the debate'sa sofa-.
tional and polarized?-IE is clear'ly' iiot-
an argument between extremists who'
favor unilateral disarmament'oriirst-:
strike capacity by the; United' States;
Nobody in the forefront of the debate is
suggesting arms control without tnili-
tary balance. trust in Rtt~ia without:
reasonable verification ~ major cuts
in the Pentagon' budget without. equal.
cuts on the other side- Yet the nar-
rower the issues the ersatz.bitter che.-
debate, leading to the fearhere that:
,SALT II may be' dei~ted-making
everything [Wore dangertxes for all:-.-..
Even before the SALT II negotia-
tionsare finished, indications are that
President Carter is not reducing the
military budget for fisca1.198D but in-
creasing it to $122.$ billion - $1D.8 bil-
lion more than this year -- despite his
cries for austerity in other areas.
For the moment, the turbulence
along the"Saviet Union's southern bor-
derand the prolonged differences be-
tween Israel and Egypt seem to favor
hoscow's opportunistic.. politics; but
;there.is'.little.eviden~e_ that the Soviet
Union had anything to do with this de-
stablization from Pakistan to Turkey,
with the possible exception of the rise
of a pro-5oviet'reb me in Afghanistan.
Officials in Western Europe are
more impressed at the begituting of
the new year with Moscow's problems
than with its successes. The Soviet
Utuon is. clearly concerned with the
emergence of ..,China,' now -formally
recognized by the 1Jnited,.States;:and
with China's efforts to drag its billion
.people into the modern world. '
It has made same pi-agress in An-
Bola and in Ethiopia, but-i[ has been
squeezed out of the Israeli-Egyptian
negotiations, defied by the major Com~
monist parties af.Western Europe and
challenged . by Rumania- and other
restless allies in Eastern Europe:
Looking to the 13D's, the Soviet Union ~
-also faces the hard facts of a stagnant i
economy and population, a decline in
its oil and energy resources, limiting_
its ability to pay for expensive modern
technology from abroad. - ? ?
Meanwhile, it is in trouble not only
with China and the United States, but
with japan and the major industrial
countries of Western Europe,.and that
is not all: How to finande massive mili-
Lary forces both along the.China fion-
tier and Europe while trying to satisfy
increasing demands for abetter stand-
ard of. living for its people at .home?
How to deal with its own ethnic tninori-.
ties, some of whom, along its southern .
border?-are susceptible to the funda~
-mentalist counter-revoIutioris -in Irani
and 1~rrkey? This is what the Soviet of ..
ficials would like to know. - - -
So it is hard for officials in Western
:Europe to believe in the-argument so
prevalent in the United States that
Moscow is again on the march, purse-
ing a ~ well-0rgatuzed ~ plan-: for.' _ the
achievement of world hegemony in our
time, with the will and military- Ca-
pacity toachieve this ambition:?~ : ?-
,, ;.Instead, the view here?is. the[ they
-are opportunists who..will take advan-
_? tags of any chance to expand Their in=
fluence, provided the frisk is not too
'great, and that they have even more
problems than the Western. nations, i1
such.can be iatagined:..~??_
from; the Soviet I,'ition; where the' task: iS.irii
~~-- -
harderbiit.~the:;pay-0ff. greater~:~rtather;is?!
pmblem'of harzngrUS'"contacts ;witty opposit:
groups eyets.,more-~dominated~by.:eIandesfJ'
i?eTationships:_FinaIly; there is ",tlze'llneomf
table _-question "of'just._,howrmuch,=spying~
want. to.~d'v'in'?fizendly-countries:'~~'`~'`? ~" ?'
-- ?;11Mr~,''lrepertnrt is-:axsista~r~~director-:oj
'=- the.Internationvl 7rrsttture,_for~:Strategit
~-'Studies in I.mrdan:and editarnf-Sw~iir;al:?r
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 STA~TINTL
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COI~iIOI~iW1;EU.
22 December 1978
Of seve~a~ :minds: T3ZOnzs 'Power~s~=
His a lesson to bix learned from
the troubles of Iraq, but it doesn't
Iook as if Presidant4Carter and his
principal advisors are going .W grasp'
what it is..The-aoubles. eight them by -
suiprise, as troubka tmd to do: _Czrtcr is
apparently in a mood to blarioe~the'suty
_- prise..on the CIA; .whicls?sattt him a piece
~_o?hopeful papeslast~suinarer saying tlnai
the Shah ~ of Iraa~ bad everytliitrg~tittder
=control.- The paper was~?it>~ Grzor-:"-13e
Shah has theamry~uiider eon~ol;; fo~thu
~momeat; but not?rnuch else: Zhis is wor-
eying the President: Iran is supposed?to
be~ the bulwark of "tlia PGisian Calf: ~ On
`November-lrltl~ Carter~_addte"ssed a
bandwritten note to three of his principal
. advisors-Cyrus_.:Vance;=:Zbigniew
~Brzezinski; and Admiral 5tansfield
-Turner the'- Director. of~-Central -
? Intelligence--telling them, :"I~am ~dise
'satisfied with the quality of political-in-?.
.-= The burden of this message naturally
fell heavieston Tt~, sines the CIA is
_ su~posed~tn be at least one jump ahead of
the gamma when it comrs~ to domestic
troubles tbreatening important allies.
After~iaceiving Carter's note, but befots
its message was otirtfided to-William Sa-
~~of=the New Park Tirnes,..Turtier rz-
spondeii~rith an aanouriceatertt he.was
settin~;up. a new crisis-prediction-caite~
irlthC~:' When iII d0t16rCtGatG $CQI'nr
nutt~_~Ise. President ~ ttsay-; nvw- ccnfi-
.:, j .-~ .
_ deritIyezpest.a flood of newrpaperciting
potential troubles threatening important
allies ~~ a~pralifGrativti 'af the-condi
lions]'; tense which -is=the-. cur3e~ of
intelli4ence~the maybe', .could bc;.
would;be's~a-ith whiciranalyats atterrtpt
ta=iris`tiIate their?prrdictions'frvrrt the
sheercussednesa of the world: ? '_':;_-
- - Of course the CIA has best through all
this before:' The ~ Agency ? was severely
criticixed~pFtli' Seb~(
?'Bogotaza" in. Colombia itr ~ 1948, the.
entrance of the Chinese into the Kore~n~.
took power in Cuba, the building of the
:Berlin Wall; the Tet Offensive: in~Viet-
Ham in ~9b$ the Arab-Israeli war in oG
,~.... }
toter, 1.ggC3, The files of che? National
Security-Council are rlsock full of Paper
the surptise`of the moment; of endless
.special. studies of the intelligence carte:
muniry? and of the QA's voluminous;
response~tounhappy officials. TbG cure.
for wrongYpaper is more paper. Bitter.
experiencc'txas taught CIA analyst to
- writs an~essapa hatch into every -ester:
mate,, a;~stibotdinate clause or string of
`cunditioiialYverbs,vvhith, in reirospecf,.:
? might bewcited.as a.w_arning flag. :~-=
- = :. In they course of time the thickets of tli~ -
conditionaLgrow so dense they begun tp-
tesemble tiselate novels of Henry James.
Busy.' officials. have -not got ,time far
the thickets;-a paring back of the. undert
g~wthta:;eveal what.thepaper, afterall;,
is supposed; to be about-'the autline~f =
~' ~.
resd,=bui+~it'doesn't make-it any more
1,7cely to~be?right. Eventually a surprise{
. comes along and the. old charges are rem.
Hewed: Back and forth it goes.. Kissinger
- was a weeder; he insisted the CiA have;
the courage of its.convictions, and stag:
them' clearly.. Carter's note ? will .bring
-back, tbe~cotrditional undergrowth, be-
,.-: -:
.cause hcis asking the CIA to da the one
thug it rant da-tell him what is going to
happenz:There is a reason why the Oracle
. at DelpUi-~poke in riddles, -: - - -
.. .All ttti~s::is.part?of the eternal give and
r. -_.- -
.take of'~government It's not surprising
that Cartar should be , distressed by the .
~CiA's ntismadin$ of events m lean, nor.
? that tb~ClAshould defcted itself against
...
? a requestto dv, what rio one tan da. The
~problem~s~not analytitai -timidiry,~;nor
presidential iritportunity, nvr even the fu=?-
's ill The real reason for:_
01 /07/~''~C~~~i~t~0~i~t4y3f
troubles;:lie the reason why no metban--.
the furuieis to be found in the gag~whicb -i
separates?~Iran ? as -American policy-?;
makecs.waat it to be, frorir Iran as it ise_ j
The one=is abstract, lt~cr the geopolitical .
strate~of which it is a part, while for
othet?isconrrete; various and teal: Thh_~
'one exists onpapa; wht~e-thec"rtlrcc
is the warld_ The one is a{r iirraiigement,
~,while_the otheris~locvs~iifu~runlyFfac~t:.
-The central illusion of policy-rnakers~~
~the'reason-fnr-?the.suicprise~~isrt~? ~~~,
found itr the notion that -tbese. rivo 'very=
different things arc the?sa ;=~-"~`~~; :::~
-- ~~This?- may'sourd-'deliberately:;even';:
`-gratuitously=obsctiia_~Eui go:'baclca bi%
.? A fevr- years~ago the Shah held an elabo=.
_ tatc~ceremony in thr.ancieet'city~6f Pert;
?sepolis??tp Con7mCmprdtG_ ihC 25f10t1i? ~'
nivarsary of the founding af?the Persian -
empire: From all ovei thc.vworld t~re_pov~=
erful the rich -and the#amous:-_werc ~in_=
:_vited to-attend:'Ilie~world had nof~wit`
nesscd;~: acf'of stith"nalced=imprsial--
inching since Naaoleon'~placed an ?em
~pecoi?'s~ sown oti Iiis owii~li~Gad: Ttie?r
:?r
-.suits bf"that earlier."arstiire shoirld~have:
served"the-shalt-as?a~warrting;-riot he-
those to trust the panoply cif power;_ltisr
secYet `policy;_ his billions"of'batit~sjof'
proven?oil reserves; Arrierican aiins?and.
the'force bf his?owtt ambition.`The?oiI ?
would pay -for the= panoply;' the~%arms=
would ~ protect ? the oil, 'SAVAK ~ would
Secure the?]oyalty of t~}ic?Aimy;-and the:
Crown' would~'direcf tlierri: all: It is nut'
easy io grasp thecrrormiry bf the Sha'h's
-ambition: He did-noiintcnd rnerel}%to bey
his'country's'lradet`every_ courtt~-"car%
have brit over aftecall: Noidid he stop at = .
a~claim-of ~unrestrict~d=sovereignty.;'
,~.
which- is also common` enough: He`jn-=
tended?to'astablish~?a dynasty which'
?" _
would piss. his power undiriiinisKed to.
. his son;aptacticG~.~ icti had disappeared .:
from all but a feai Dist-of-the-way eoiner5'
of the`w6rld centuries-ago: =? ?' - =f=
D01-4 .. .. - ... __ .__,_
 Approved For Release 2001/07-~~'~~bi4P0#~~Rb~~(T0130001-4
~.rticle appeared la December 1978
on pale A-Z2 -
e.,Price of Intelli~eiice ~'riz7ures~
Recent news reports concerning gathering, intelligence failures corms -
.' widespread rioting:~in Iran spurred,. time and bear drastic consequences;,
_- by apposition to continued ru}e by -far the United States in its foreign
'the shah, ones again aze serving to c: policies and; in the case of Iran and .
point oat.that; despite the billions of. oil imparCs, :its domestic policies.
dollars ~ spent by the United. States-~ Now we, are faced with the potential.
.everyyeariapurs~it.otintelligeace~.toppling of?:aiiegime--3>z which:we
-;'our inte}L'gence.
agenaes:have re=r`have invested. heavi}y,;a=med to the-
.
~_^=_peatedl}~:failed-~ ta.. perceive;; at:.an: teeth,-. anti relied upon; for: oil ii~w
_Se}ecC~Comimttee~on:~ ~Intel}igedce feted"a se1L deception,. byrwhich~,wer
.~ tY;:...:: ~ .~:::~.:,:::;~
- fa~1m~;3nclndirig;.tatabl~r the o~?_ I=aniari;politieal stabili w~~~ ~+`''"" -''p"
:
~
monist=-rise~to*paw~i~porttigal~` =TlYenafortaaate~IessoA~ of`this'ezr~-~-
rwheteim.our~at~lligence,~ersoanel fire experience. is that isathing ever.
~
'
"
. =
S~niprX =~ored~~as~t~atsavor.. ; feally ehaages~Intelligence
is gaEh=
.--:withthe prevailing~'regime;~'he-paw -eyed in- aYfau}ty~-maio.~aer. distorted
-.failure in Iran;isobvi~us- =~ =-poredInsteadnf howling.~ve~:wliaC
r:``~ ::.
.~
The
U.~;~~int~lligea~_.COmmtmit~, =_ultimate}y,'has.constituted an:iacpn ~~_
-'quicktoconderrin:the~l'ea}png_ai?_the+ U.S:"intelligence~agencies:.s$ou}d.:
..-publicatiamiathe-Yil)age Voice-su1;::committee to heartZ-Iu?tbat tliey.dbr--
-it'As is the_t~sa.:tyith-any..
lea}c;:cor~ .can-taxpayers continue to spend.bil
_ -
.
?..
;:-cern;yeas vented.;not?over~the:can'_'liozisof.dollarsfoc-faLse;distorted'or:;_
_ ~ -gents failures; but with the `methiod. t - - ~``':~ST4IYI~Y'11~ )~T`~-
highpriority- placed op intelligence =~ Fa}is Ghwreh _ ~ ~:=..~.%.~='v ~ ~_ .. t` :~'- ~;~ K
.-_.-?..~ ..-~r"yr.i.,s2viR ~~.w,'+otL3:av ~:S-.: ~. - .~.L..-.x~-..-~ ica~-.aAS.+=a}-fR~:'Tn.'~i'~'-Y ~~:
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
It was embarrassing enough
when the CIA was forced
to concede to former security
officer William Kampiles's
lawyers that 'twelve other
copies of the top-secret satel-
lite manual Kampiles is ac-
cused of selling to the Rus-
sians are unnccounted for,
including one signed out to
former CIA Director George
Bush in 1976. But a prelim-
inary check by the agency's
Office of Security. sources xe-
port, has revealed a signifi
cant number of equally sestet
documents which have been l
signed out and never re-
tuxned. Among the missing ,
are: a highly classified CIA'
estimate of politburo in-
triguing among Bre~linev's
potential surcessars, an evac-
uation ~of Soviet :submarine
tactics designed to evade L7.S.
detection systems, personnel
and pay records which in-
clude the actual names of
case officers, and a report
prepared for President Carter
on the extent of CIA invalve-
ment with Soviet dissidents.
Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-011378000100130001-4
 STATI NTL
~-.. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 :CIA-RDP90-01137R000100130001-
THE tiYASH~NGTON POST
4rticle appeared 1D December 197$
oxi page C-b
--~?fi~~i~rrianY~~zerif~zn .~~zfe~'~igelzc~~~a~h:~n/~~~~y.?,-
-- Reg:Same,eltiS~-Sizsttpxr~x~.~'I3~ttDncrita]eatAtth~tlr~extzvas :.~
his lette~'!a-'They-drat' ~"Anie~SC~'S Spy,'"~3riOSt. nril7ersailg pe~~?d~'~Tit}ltd.. t1~.Z
_Gap.:_De~ij,_hisaonr:?~*?;f~+~r-?^ageQCY't1fa.:~t~se~am, ate.'
our. intellig~~co~?eflozrk~: a~?~to ~ pravida: i_ ar ~-. cnmtinn~g? hirm~
-naw? .alcxst.~ exrins t?e}iaicax;;and;:? :~aad training arf x operational perso
.that rope: haves ciit a#i dassio;~ person:~e3~ as averstafted~Operatia~ Dire~?
persca-'hnmari,~~3]igestcacallectiaa~~toraLe~-4ha~; tarb~~arad:_dasrrr: and
agexation:~.ca~assnra.you:t$at ~i;ia?,_.: - r~'._.. ~ ~ ~=} ~~
~~r,; af~ _r~ 7. eT ~a T L v` +!r?^~,,.._~?_..~-~=!~.Y:t^~',=?~~M1.r_-.r~
scy+~ u,La ~ 44{4 ~++~I~. ~.~.C3~~ P'P~~~~1t7T~A~r7~ iy$IIC~e? i~cp:' S ?d~~~~~~n~. Llla.t".
gap~~e? an~a~:iYC.Lheap~th~UD,iCe+d. States IZd~thebestanld masC;
t1o~~IIOWd~dO'oYT1gY"dd8w~~~-LaL8111~2DC~:.~ 727SDi~3~17n-
:the`ccat~niag:aad.vital?~tporcaaea:oi ~~p~bj~;:{~.~,~,~~ this,;;~re $3LSt~~ .
What; lit ~~!~?S`~L~~'~'-t!"dCt`~Vtd'TCi31II_YhB )~ ~113t8lllte~-
tientart~T.,,~~'~`=~'a'gffice=a#ff~~a,.suPpl~art#h~?~.
~' W3te~2repntti?~ tirEang~ aad' to ~p~e~oaai'~tasks;: and. ses tbaL th ..
the-age~ra~ thy'rieed~and--~#ianale^.~-~av~,t?a.eunderscandi~~and: appre~s-;
"forredz~ctsons-ia.t2~Opesa~riasD~:~-tiDn"of'tlxei~emplo~,:#ha=Amari
torat~~saide.`_"W'eiteed.#h~~~-~ ~enp1~:-Sanrari- intellge~~?colleetioa~
of ths::dir~ratee~'as aiuclr-tadag-as` "i~ a.~riaeaactr ~~~ and relies heavily-
=even.~'~IthongIsna~f.Cnieso9,e~::__-omt]ie`:comage aad:ingenuirg:rn'L=
troIlectia~germit=as to e~en~ou~ce~: operafaons= ozfic~r~..Give . thera.~ ay
Iection:efterts~the~an7Y:~~?m~~ ;mateof'pnS~li~opiaion..that` is supper--
- they: datin?~'s~ge~sed~aamaarcoTie~r~~;.wi~tTiin-~
_ _ _ _ _ ^' Y ~~m, I write severaleveryclay; -j
,.-. _ .. _ a--_ -- ?_. {.~._ -...7r'1' ~~~~ _fn fhn~hhf:nw~l Ca....._~. ~~~~, -
ods they were usigg, and noyo siiace the ~ = ~ , ~~ ?-the . qualtty of our. 'assessment ~=.-
=Iran thing thtre's a gaud deal of cr'iti- ?; ;. ~ Program and also. particttlarty; polio-
cfsm; it seems. about their evalriatia~~=t`: cal assesstaents.;;:~ ;.~z._;_:.;~~; 7 .. -}"
,`-:-Haw caatxraed wcre.you about-ihe i~ .- . ..: - -' '?{- s ` ?: ~ c--? ?-~a=.: -.. '
. -Since~I've'beeti iti oifica~re have sul~ ~-'~
telligen~>;ewaluatiaiis ,in: Iran? .And .:..: stantiallymodified the order of priori- :?.
=. could you give. ns a general commept =:': ties:addressed b}-the intelligence cnm- -.r
about what y_ou think the state of the in?.'. mururyry in its totality. When I 'because -
. _,~.Y~.-sue r-:5.. ...~~.t: ?n_1._":-..
_ -;~;~:~ ~`Bjt~Cl`iAAD?BURt~= ''$?`~~~~`:..- ;`.n-:.'~s'= :Far all the.ccmplaints, thrnig)z, iherear~reasanstabe~.'
- _ rt ~ ~~.____,._,...?._- -:.: _. - ..- , .,.., ...: ~._ ~?s ~';~~ ?:~. ' _'" ...,^"-~~ that the worst is over for both Admiral Turner and hts.'
- ? . - ? --r~=~-.~:= -.-;?:, ~:?.. ~ _ : _,+...~ a en Mordle'atthehead uariers in Len Va. seetns?=
the 'pvarsliipS her
Cam-
WASHII~iGTOI~~Lilce
used
to
": ~''
o
e
d
.
:--
-
-.
.
: t
hav
improved, in part, the. director's ai
es~ay, because-"
mand,.:Adm: Stansfreld:Ttimerhas.come throug>t an ardu-,'~"
ffa
ts~ t
f
t hi
t
e
ith
t
ff'
b
H
~~
.
'
o
e
r
o ge
m
o- mee
w
s
a
mem
ers.
e naw
" "
ous shakedawrii czuis~asiheCaxt2r:i4 +~+;rt~~tian's direr=.
for of: CentraLIntelligestce. It is too early.tosuggestthat he== :~' `. ~~ to have lunch with members at various atfices once or^ =~
- ? - ?-?,.,;..e ~ 'n,mtr : e.t,,,:ht .T..=,.e~ ~"~ f.n. a.,,t,,,,,.,. ,w~~..,...,,:,~
--- When he was appointed 17 manth~f ago - ? ` " - -'1=~_ start aglad-handing campaign just to make people feel bet- ~,
_ to head the Cen--; _-, L_ ,. - _
.""'.."". "'. "' ? "'6 """' ' ""'?`.?"."""`"""' . ~ `:; that has.taken place in the criticism directed at the agency.?`
been.shakea?byrevelationsof.illegal.activities:at.homeand:_:=`~ ?,-,.,,:~.,,,,,-,Ls,.a...:_...L:.._,__.......L:_-_---?_--_.___.
_._-~ __~ __-__._ .-~-. ~_-~ _-----_-,------- ,? .. exactly thesamethatthemilitarytookafterYietna.m.'' -.}:" :'
that had been alIawed to fester. for years undermined rhe?:
:?;
.
,
.
,It also helped that Frank Carlucci`taak over eariy?thisx
agency's eifectivere~=Admiral. Turner talks Canflaently;~~_~ as depury: director. handling- the day~a.~day-manage:
as he did itf?att intesvie~wIast week; abou6how under him the. _
:
aQen/.~~ is' an its way L~ back ~}~ v ?? tttent of the agency. Mr. Carlucci had done well insensitive--"
b J. J ^....'..'fl ~.. F^"'.'. 111J manner':... _-r ~waw.rw n`.r :nY.c .....~f. ..s..e~sl....~.. .L.s 1T~:..~A'C._. ~..- ~.-
r..~The agencyyhas?,aome under.attack,'-especially from~`~~ cal role?in-helping establish a? democraria gaverttmenr ia?~
- 1MC V-_~-----~L-.L .L-.~---_~.._~~_t _~-__i-.~_-L
]em fundamentallses who are challenging the power of Shah ~ _' knawledged that his depury had' .'taken a?tremendaus load?
r offmyshaulders.' ~ ,_: .-:: ?- :..:..:_:~ _;.: - .-. =.,?:.~;
I~iahammed Riza Pahlevi~ Less crtucial?perhaps, but still dis- - `' ~-? Even if operations are smoother at J.angley,.the admi- -
tracting, is: the way Admiral Turner has been embroiled in :; *, ~ remainsa controversial figure within the Carter Admin-
disputes involving former agency emplayeesr .-_.; ' __;,. ,- _ .
One that could affect the ageney'sfuture dealings with . ~,Y.estratian at large. His relations with members ai the White
former workers was the suit a Frank W. Sne House staff are tense, and he is known to have lacked hams
8~t PP ~.E;:~-~uentlyt with Bavid Aaron, deputy. to national. security
whose book. "Decent.Interval,'. chrnmcled,GIA tvttgling?:?:_.'.adviser Zbi
in the- United Staten evacuatiotf of South Vietnam three.. , ~ ' ~~ 13tzeunski and a key intelligeszct aide. As
a one-aimestatf member fob the Senate 5elees Committee on
years ago. Last week? William Kampiles, a former~agency =;,-Intelligence, Mr. Aaron as well as~the Senator he had
Clerk. was found guilty of selling [he Russian. a manual on . .
the KH-II- reconnaisance satellite.. Aa'expert on_strategi~=' ,-worked for; Walter F~ Mottdaie, became a keen skeptic of _?
arms; David S~ 5ullivan,. was dismissed after-tie?was-sus::- ~eagency'scapabilitp- ~~; - -. F - -- - - - _ -
pected of Passing secrz~Es to?an aide ,to Senator Henry: