TURNER 'VERY OPTIMISTIC ' ABOUT CIA S FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 5, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040006-2
ARTICLE. AYY_:Wti
03 PAGZ,_5____
But unics uespair.
That Spy Age acy:-
C>'t Do Good ob '`..
Second of twoartides
By Henry & Bradsher
Wasbingte StsrStaff Writer .A.=x
Looking casual in: a navy blue-
cardigan but speaking. intensely,.
Stansfield Turner gazed out the'glass,
wall of.his office, atop. the CIA head-
quarters at Langley, over the bare
dusky woods toward the distant:
lights of Washington and: exuded'
confidence about his organization. '
.. "I'm just very optimistic, these
days," Turner said. "I've been very.
impressed by the. quality.: of our-
human intelligence activities, the
CIA director said. And.US. technical..
intelligence is superlative; he added'
In other government offices in the
city.: most. of them looking- across
concrete courtyards at other offices
instead of having spacious views, in :
the private: offices of people- who-
have left the government; in small=
restaurants, in telephone- calls from-
coast to coast, others talk about thee.
CIA, too:. 4
Some, like: farmer CIA . Director'
William & Colby and former Deputy-
Director Enno. Henry Knoche;-talk.
for quotation about.things like re-.
strictions:on-the=agency:,Biit iabst.`
prefer-'to discuss the agency's--prob;v'
a~N~
lems fro m =the=:-. protectioi4;rbf;.
anonymity.'
Turner, understandably is-angered
by this,especially on :the most emo-
tional aspect of his three-year tenure::
at Tangley;;the forced retirement of
people from the.cIandestine_serV--;
ices. He argues that.he rejuvenated
an aging agency
"The. next time someone :tells-
you," ,he said, "that.Turner i? the '
stupid bastard'*ho cutahesize of"'
the agency out'.here .look?:.at.the.;
color of his hair. . -. This ?is-a-young'
man's game, and we are.better equip-
ped today than we were three years
. ago':. for clandestine operations
s
5 February 1980
The CIA is composed of three main
branches. The-clandestine or opera-
tions branch handles spying and
covert operations, like' intervening
secretly in other countries'. affairs
or organizing guerrilla movements
"Another branch supervises techni-,
cal intelligence, including recon-
naissance satellite photography- and
communications intercepts. An ana-
lytical'.branch' pulls information
together for government policymak-
ers. ' .
e ntroversy that' has marked
Th co
:.Turner's almost three years at the
agency focuses on the- operations
branch. There is also widespread but
less., .publicized*. distress around.
Washington about analysis.
In both cases, Turner inherited
problems. His critics say. he exacer-
bated them; his supporters contend
that he:has done much to clear them
Once Was Twice as Large- r . -
The Vietnam war and-the'CIA's
"secret army in Laos, added,_to
worldwide spying: pushed the num-.
ber of agency operatives to 8,500 in
the late 1960x'- roughly double its
present-size As the Nixon adminis-
tration began to reduce U.S. commit`
inentsin Indochina,'personnel had
to;bereduced. by attrition, transfers.
and other means.:Y
During. his brief tenure- as.CIA
directory James R= Schlesinger:
speeded up a cutback. Colby, his
successor, .continued the program,
'and so: did George Bush during his
year-as director: Most sources agree
that they were handled sensibly:
Then - President Carter- took
:Turner from his.navy admiral's com-
wand and sent-him to, Langley:-He-
arrived with what the old CIA hands
considered -to be:a skeptical, even'
Iostile, attitude
'
This set a chilly tone to his take'
overt despite -his. own explanations
} that he simply wanted to-bring bet-
ter management: to -a sometimes ?un-
,-coordinated. operation.. His -suspi-
cions of the need for drastic,changes
were, quickly' reinforced by the. resignation of -John Stockwetl, a 40-
-,.year-old agent in the unsuccessful .
in
CIA effort
Stockwell charged that. a clique of
burned-out, old clandestine services .
officials was running the agency
into the ground. Turner heard this
and other grievances, rejected ad-
vice on alternatives for dealing with:
them and launched the "Halloweenti
massacre,.. y.-
After announcing inAugust.1977
-that - 816 jobs -in A he operations
branch would be cut by 1979, Turner.:
sent out the"fir. st 212 pink slips on
Oct. 311977:? . " w- I
Although-smaller than-previous`1
:.cuts, this one was handled differ--l
Aently. and: hit harder at lifetime.
professionals in the spying and para-
military trades..
Says Cuts Helped Agency
"The cuts in personnel that every-
one still complains to me about have.
strengthened the agency's covert ac-
tion capabilities;' Turner said"'
- . "You don't run a good, strong
paramilitary or covert action: pro-;
,~
-gram with a bunch of 55-year-olds"'
he said. ."What I've done is-cut out'
high-grade superstructure ...,and
doubled the input into the clandes-_
tine services.. ,.--.'so that we have a
group of young tigers, and there's
enough 'accumulated experience
and. expertise- around : to-. guide
them.'.
This is strongly challenged by peo-
ple in a position to know:>
"Whatever Turner says, they can't
put.on a show'says a Pentagon offi-.
'cial who is very familiar with the.
CIA'spresent operational capabil
ities ."W et know, that. over dix this,
building:::
Other sources spell 'this -out in;
more detail. One says the CIA's corps,
of paramilitary specialists who could
help' organize; for instance, :a:moree:
effective Afghan resistance. to Soviet'
control has.declined from' about 200,
to.80?,_and many:of the 80 lack the
broad experience needed_for.effec--
But Colby comments that; if: the:
people: in an operational area .*feel,
CIA help is vital,.they will=find ways
to-speed it up.:;; ,..
The'sworst-part 'of.; Turners,
changes, numerous preseni. and're
tired officials say, is what they did to
CIA. iaiorale; While. he, recognizes
that morale suffered; butcontends it
now coming7back up, :Others.say
that,it is 'at-best bumping. alone side--
.wavs_~''.
CONTI
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got in trouble taking risks that were
known and accepted by the agency
in advance as normal for the job.
Knoche, who was the deputy CIA'
director. when Turner arrived and
worked for him a few months, says
that "the premium has been in the
last few years on not rippling the
water, on being non-controversial
and not getting in trouble. In this
profession, that's the wrong attitude,
and now the chickens may have -
come home to roost" as a result both'
"A spy agency is always going to
have some people who bend rules or
play close-to , the, limits of them,"
Knoche added. "In peacetime they
can be a bureaucratic nuisance, but
they may be just the kind of people
you need'','when you. run, into. a`'
They are'the.kind 'of people who
have. not fitted into Turner's desire
for, managerial.tidiness and career.,
regularity..The"result, many sources
say, is*that the CIA is poorer without
"them,-; andsoisthecountry' ,;,?-
.The picture derived from exten,
sine inquiries is. iif" a?. deadened,'
demoralized ;:-organization... But.
Turnercoiltendsothe'rwise:.
"When.I:got here,:' he said,"the
agency was just about maturing'in-
the end ofits.first working genera-
tion; 30' years :roughly, and..a lot of,
the procedures: were still geared to.
the small Ivy League club that came-.
:.out of the.OSS.(the World: War II Of-
fice _of Strategic Services); and'a.lot
of the procedureswere stultified
after' 30 years, and' if' there's one,
thing you have to have in this kind
of business it's dynamic, 'imagina-
tive, forward-looking people. _ .v
"The princpal things Lhave tried
-to do-havebeen to instill that sense:"
Turnersaiti'- net
T urnei.went'to,theoldIvyLeague
club in an effort to improve the qual-
ity of-CIA analysis; He put:the anal-
ysis,branch under. Robert R.. Bowie; _,
who at,the;age.of 68 ih.1977 had been '
the head. of:the=Stite_Department's'.
policy planning .and.then.had run.
Harvard's Center for Inte'rnational'
Affairs forl5 years.., y, ~ ~.~. ,... .,:
Bowie:. expected:;"to: be; a, senior,
intellectualir.residence to advise-
Turner. Instead; he had to supervise- I
some. 1,500-.'analysts: -By" most: ac r:
counts, it.was a- bureaucratic failure,
that did nothing.to sort out organiza=i
tional:probleims.in.analysis orim-
prove, the-qualityY,:::;: ~~ ..
Vr" cola V11J111110 u .aJ .+.v u. v. intelligence officers (NIO), with,'
each NIO responsible-for final judg
ments on.a particular country or,
area, If the system ever worked, it is
working poorly now, a number of ex-
perts in the intelligence community
In'some cases the NIO's lack the
background. for making final iudg
ments among conflicting interpreta-
tions.. The present NMO fora very
important country, for instance, was..
distinguished several years. ago,
when he was.a .diplomat..in that.:
country. for being totally wrong,-
about its political developments.: '. ? ,
Sometimes all of the experts from-,
around town on a particular country
.or subject are assembled by the CIA-,
to discuss it. But what the NIO later..
writes up bears little resemblance to;
the collective. wisdom, some experts.
complain. And Turner..himself,has'.
been. known. to change analytical!
conclusions before sending them to.
the White House.,. . : , .
The result is worse 'than'frustra!,
tion for many experts. It. is a feeling;
that the kind ofmyopia that led.to a
1978 CIA finding of the shah's being
solidly in control.can be too easily...'
repeated -, although there. now?
seems to be a developing tendency at
the agency. to adopt a protective posy
.ture of'leaning over the other_direc-:'
tion by being free with warnings of
trouble. _- -_ - , ". -Is,
'?STANSFIELD TURNER'
.~ , Defends actions' .
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