TURNER INTERVIEW WITH THE MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 29, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

ApProved For Release 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP99-0048R0003 00 004
III
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
29 January 1982
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director, Office of
External Affairs
SUBJECT: Turner Interviews with the
Media
1. Here are the clips you requested
of Turner's interviews with the media.
The first batch are with news magazines
such as "U.S. News and World Report,"
the second are interviews on major T.V.
shows.
2. Notice that by 1980, that being
an election year, Turner refrained from
granting any such interviews.
a.
avon 8. Strong
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SPECIAL REPORT
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1
Scandals over assassination plots
and spying on Americans are a thing of the
past. But new troubles now are cropping
up to plague the agency that is Washington's
eyes and.ears around the world.
President Carter in March of 1977 plucked an Annapolis
classmate out of the Navy and gave him the job of reviving
a battered and demoralized Central Intelligence Agency. '
It was a daunting assignment that Adm. Stansfield Turner
took on?to repair the damage caused by revelations that
the 32-year-old intelligence agency had spied illegally on
Americans, planned assassination attempts against foreign
leaders and experimented with mind-bending drugs with-
out the knowledge of the people involved.
Now, two years later, a new controversy is raging around
the CIA. The basic question: Has Turner set the agency on
the road to recovery after five years of turmoil?or is he
plunging it into an even more crippling crisis?
On one side, critics charge that, under Turner, the agen-
cy today is in deeper trouble than ever before, with plum-
meting morale, a large-scale exodus of key officials and
serious strains in the CIA's relations with the rest of the
nation's intelligence community. They point out that Presi-
dent Carter himself has complained about the quality of
political intelligence, particularly in connection with the
revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran.
On the other side, Turner and his supporters contend
that the current turbulence is insignificant and, in effect,
healthy. They maintain that it merely reflects an overdue
basic reorganization that is adapting the CIA to cope with
vast political and technological changes in today's world.
What, in fact, is happening to the agency that is this
country's eyes and ears around the globe?
Why have there been "intelligence failures?" Have there
been any recent successes?
Have restrictions designed to avoid misdeeds of the past
emasculated the CIA, rendering it impotent to gather infor-
mation and influence events abroad?
Over all, is the CIA on its way up?or still on the skids?
? To find answers to these and other questions, staff mem-
hers of U.S.News & World Report talked to scores of persons
in this country and abroad?veteran officials at the agency's
headquarters in Langley, Va., CIA operatives overseas, for-
eign intelligence experts, military commanders, members
of Congress and White House advisers. Here, told largely in
their own words, is how these insiders see what has hap-
pened to the CIA and where it is heading:
Turner Triumph or Disaster?
Comment from within the intelligence community be-
gins, and often ends, with one man: Stansfield Turner. He
took over the CIA after a brilliant career in the Navy?from ?
,Rhodes Scholar to Pentagon "whiz kid," from innovative
commandant of the Naval War College to commander of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's southern flank.
"There were some misgivings about Turner from the
beginning at the CIA," says one intelligence professional.
"But he came in with as much good will as he could con-
ceivably get. No one had more open doors around town."
Many of those doors, this associate adds, are no longer
open to Turner. "He wants very tight categorical control
over the entire intelligence community and the CIA," the
expert reports. "He gets frustrated by any resistance. When
there has been resistance, there has been instant outrage,
great trauma. He is abusive, abrasive, autocratic."
Early in his tenure, Turner moved to consolidate his
control over the intelligence community?something none
of his predecessors had succeeded in doing. He received a
_major boost when President Carter signed an order giving
him control over the budget not only for the CIA but for all ,
the intelligence activities of the Pentagon and other gov-
ernment agencies. - i
"Amateurs" at the top. -Turner has built a separate i
corporation with a deputy and four senior vice presidents,"
says a military-intelligence official. "They operate as though
they feel they are entitled to run the whole intelligence
community. All these six people are new guys on the street.
There isn't a one who knows anything about running an
intelligence operation. It doesn't work." He
adds about Turner: "He's the busiest direc-
tor of central intelligence I've ever seen?
and the least accessible. He has three of- '
flees?in the Executive Office Building, an-
other near the White House and Langley.
What does he do with three offices?"
Reports another inte ligence execu-
tive about the CIA chief:. "Turner moves
from one event to another with quickly ;
assembled fact sheets. He is prepared to
be very glib. But ask three questions, !
and you've exhausted his knowledge. If
anyone tries to tell him that, he becomes I
intensely angry. You then see his essen-
tial- and basic arrogance and ego. His I
judgment of his own capabilities is not
shared by close observers."
Mass exodus. Within the CIA, frus-
trations over criticism, new restrictions
and Turner's style of operating, coupled
with government incentives for early re-;
tirements, have contributed to a flood of
departures: 400 retirements in 1977,
650 in 1978, nearly 200 just in January of It.
this year. Typical comments by those ;
getting out: "The mystique is gone." "Our teeth have been
pulled." -We've become pussycats in a den of lions."
One man with a good vantage point in the agency took a
ItSok at the names of those retiring in January and termed
the situation "a disaster."
"The best people in the organization, the new generation ,
of leadership that Turner ought to be building and relying
on into the 1980s, are fading out because it has just gotten
flatly intolerable," he says. "I would say half a dozen of the
best people out there who should have been at the very top
of that agency in the early '80s have left
within the last six months. I know of at
least six more who told me they might
That's an indicator of how bad it is."
Frank Carlucci, Turner's deputy and a ;
career foreign-service officer who has :
served as ambassador to Portugal, argues 7
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;gat most of the early retirements are caused
b?quirks in the pension law, not unhappiness
with the CIA chief or with the agency.
"This is not to say that the problems involv-
ing the CIA have not had an impact," notes
Carlucci. "But relatively few seem to be be-
cause people are unhappy with our manage-
ment. I have gotten one bitter letter; Stan has
gotten two or ?three."
One persistent rumor in the intelligence
community is that Carlucci has come close to
resigning in the year since he came to the CIA.
Carlucci says his relationship with Turner is
"evolving well," and adds: "We all have our
ups and downs in jobs. It is fair to say! have not
contemplated resignation."
A remote boss. Part of the problem at the
CIA is blamed on what some see as Turner's
remoteness. "He has acted like a Navy captain
,
Philip Agee, ex-CIA man,
now attacks agency.
isolated on the bridge," comments an intelli-
gence veteran. "Communications have been appalling."
Another insider tells this anecdote: "In the summer of
1977, Turner finally went down to the agency dining room
one thy. He expected people might stand up, maybe clap.
They didn't do anything. It finally dawned on him that they
didn't know who he was. He was a stranger."
Not everyone in the intelligence field is criti-
cal of the CIA chief. One recently retired spe-
cialist gives Turner some good marks: "The
advantage Stan had is that he understood the
necessity for operational support to the tactical
commanders. Intelligence came out better in
the budget this year than the Office of Man-
agement and Budget wanted it to. It is one o,
the best budgets I've seen put together. He has
done a creditable job. He is very intelligent,
confident and self-assured, and he has the con-
fidence of the President."
Legal straitjacket. A CIA veteran who has
moved into a top position under Turner cites
two laws that have "heightened the anxiety
level the operators must contend with." They
i
are the Freedom of Information Act, which has
opened many agency files to the public, and
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974, which
restricts the agency's covert activities.
Says Deputy Director Carlucci: "The grimmest side in its ,
darkest form is that our people see the most essential tool of !
their trade being eroded. The heart of this business is
protecting your sources and methods. It is increasingly
difficult for our staffers to look an agent in the eye and say,
'I can protect my sources.' That, to me, is the most serious
A Spy's Life Means Long
Hours, Lots of "Contracts"
Working as a CIA operative means long hours, frustra-
tion, some danger?and very little actual spying.
"I wouldn't walk down the street past the Kremlin,"
says one intelligence official, whose open Irish face
would be an instant giveaway in any event. "We get
Soviet nationals to do that. We don't steal documents; we
have someone else get them for us."
Says Frank Carlucci, deputy director of central intelli-
gence: "It is a misconception that our people spend most
of their time moving around trying to pick up informa-
tion in bars and photographing documents with secret
cameras. Actually, their mission is to establish what is
essentially a contractual relationship with people in key
positions who might otherwise be inaccessible to our
diplomats overseas?'
From chauffeur to administrator. CIA officers in-
volved in espionage work for the Directorate of Oper-
ations, headed by John McMahon, who has spent his
career with the agency. Overseas, CIA operatives are
almost always under cover. The thickness of the cover
depends on the sensitivity of the assignment. In some
foreign capitals, the station chief is widely known as
such. Other CIA personnel work openly for the U.S.
government in roles ranging from chauffeurs to foreign.
aid administrators. Many work under even deeper cover
in occupations that have no obvious connection to the
government.
"Our man is a case officer or staffer," explains a CIA
official. "The agent is a foreign national, a spy."
The CIA staffer receives intelligence targets as the
result of a bureaucratic process that may begin with the
President himself. He or she is told what information is
required and who is likely to have it. Sometimes the
requests are urgent, perhaps involving information
needed to make sense of something seen by a spy satel-
lite. It is the staffer's job to develop sources of informa-
tion, provide them with tools of the trade such as minia-
ture cameras and recording equipment and to serve as
their clandestine contact for getting the information
back to Washington.
Basis for policy. Much of the data obtained overseas
goes directly to top government officials. It also goes to
the CIA's Directorate for National Intelligence, headed!
by Robert Bowie, a former Harvard professor. There, .
hundreds of analysts, working in an atmosphere much
like that of a university, search for trends and write
reports that often serve as the basis for long-range gov-
ernment policy.
Because they have to put in enough time at their
routine jobs to make their cover appear plausible, CIA
case officers often work long hours in the evenings mak- I
ing contact with their strings of agents. Says one CIA
insider: "Running agents takes a lot of time; you have to
be very careful."
Some operatives who work in sensitive positions even I,
keep the nature of their jobs secret from their children. !
Others can be more open. One wife of a military-intelli-
gence officer tells of the time her husband was assigned
to a Balkan country. On rides through the countryside,,
the family would play a game: The prize went to the one
who spotted the most radar sites.
For their work overseas, CIA staffers receive the same
pay and allowances as other government employes. Base
pay ranges from $17,532 for a beginner to $47,500 for a
station chief. -
Few CIA operatives enjoy the satisfaction of public'
recognition for a job well done. There may be a medal
presented by the President, but it will be pinned on in
secret.
For others, the end may simply be anonymous death.
One wall of the entrance lobby at headquarters in Lang-
ley, Va., bears 35 stars in memory of CIA employes who '
lost their lives in the service of their country.
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Gathering Secrets?a Crowded Fiel
A dozen separate agencies. spread throughout the government 'make up the U.S; intelligence community'? " .
en ra De ense
Intelligence Intelligence ?
Agency - Agency.
Collects ' - Provides military.
gence overseas, intelligence, pri-?
coordinates work manly for Penta-
of other agencies -. gon officials. ? ? -
and disseminates .
._?:: ?
rrn r Es Z..
National
Security
Agency
? Monitors radio,
- telegraph and ra-
dar traffic of oth-
-er countries,
cracks foreign '
codes.
Air
Force
Intelligence
Gathers intelli-
gence of special
interest to the Air
Force, including _
bombing targets..
Army -
Intelligence-
Gets intelligence
of interest to the
Army, including -
order of battle of
potential foes. _
Office
of Naval
. Intelligence
Gathers informa-
tion on foreign
navies. ?
National,,
Reconnaissance
Office
A secret agency
that operates the
country's spy
satellites.
Federal
Bureau
of Investigation
Keeps track of
foreign spies and
collects foreign
intelligence in the
U.S.
4.-r4TES ?
. Bureau of
Intelligence -
and Research
Arm of the State
Department that
gathers foreign
political, eco-
nomic and politi-
cal-military data.
Treasury
Department
Collects foreign
financial informa-
tion and, through
the Secret Ser-
vice, protects the
White House.
Energy ?
Department _
Monitors foreign
nuclear-weapons
tests and collects
data on foreign -
energy matters.
? or."'"'"
Drug ?
Enforcement
- Administration
Collects and dis-
seminates intelli-
gence on foreign
? and domestic as-?
- pects of narcot-
1
problem we face." Carlucci adds that the agency has three
employes working full time to provide information de-
manded from his personal file by Philip Agee, a former CIA
official who now is writing books and articles disclosing
names and addresses of agency personnel in foreign cities.
Agee, however, is not the only problem for the agency. A
CIA official who recently completed a tour of agency of-
fices aoroad Complains of leaks of sensitive information. "I
have never seen leaking like this," he said. "You pick up the
newspaper, and you see things directly out of the NID?the
National Intelligence Daily. Just quoted, verbatim."
As a result of one recent leak, the official says, two
sources were lost in one country?one of them presumed
killed?and another source was lost in a second country.
\ Intelligence Hits and Misses
? What do CIA "cuSiomers" think of its information?
A top Pentagon official says: "I have to say they do a good
job, although never perfect. They're great on current
events. The problems come with long-range interpreta-
tions. There, they don't do as well. Some of the fault may lie
with policymakers like myself. Maybe we should be smarter
in asking our questions in the first place."
From an influential White House aide comes this com-
plaint: "We get lots of facts and figures and not enough
interpretation and assessment of what they mean. It's get-
ting more and more difficult to find people who.can write a
good, clear analytical sentence."'
Turner himself admits that the agency must bear down
on its long-range forecasts, saying: "I think the U.S. has got
to play its role in a longer-term, more subtle, more funda-
mental way than putting a finger in the dikes?to antici-
pate problems rather than react to problems."
Gun-shy agency. A top White House official offers this
overall assessment of the CIA: "Sixty to 70 percent of the
problems over there have nothing to do with Admiral
Turner or this administration. The CIA has been through a
very rough period the last five years and as a result they are
gun-shy, less willing to stick their necks out on forecasts."
Despite these problems, he adds: "What they give us is
good; it's very good. They were right on top of the China-
Vietnam thing, for example."
A ranking military-intelligence expert reports another
agency success: "When Argentina and-Chile were disputing
over the Beagle Channel islands, Argentina was all ready to
go to war. But we had that covered. We passed the informa-
tion on to the State Department, which was able to get the ?
Vatican to mediate and settle the dispute. This-was a case:
where good intelligence prevented a war."
From a key administration official: "The CIA does a i
remarkable job on strategic intelligence. The whole techni- 1
cal intelligence side, while not without some problems, is /
remarkable. We couldn't even think of having a SALT
agreement without this capability." The same official corn--
plains, however, about the cutback in covert activities by ;
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the CIA to influence other governments rather than to
gather information. He contends: "The CIA's capability to
execute covert maneuvers has been largely neutralized.
This reduces by one whole dimension the community's
ability to effectively do its job."
Spies vs. technology. Does the CIA rely too much on
satellites and other gadgets and not enough on people
that is, spies?
Senator Daniel P Moynihan (D-N.Y.) thinks so. Noting
that the CIA needs permission from the President and must
report to seven congressional committees to launch a co-
vert operation, he argues: "It means that what you have is a
place in Langley, Va., doing research?research that might
well be done by the Lilarary of Congress." And a top Penta-
?
?
.7.?-? trite ,
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204 Wha Peer Over CIA's Shoulder ? The CIALIritilt 'report On its'activitfes to no. fewer-than -
eight congiessional conitnittees;-;?::'' '
- ,
. _
- ?
House BA embers Staff -
I ntelligence:-.-1,_-;
Armed --
Foreign Affairs:.
'
Intelligence - -
Armed Services--
Foreign Relations _V.'...111-;;;Al.';'?',.''.715.:?::`-T.
ALL TOLD,-163 Merril:4n' .of Convivial and 41. co- rnmitte:
employes-have regular access to CIA secrets.--;:,'7...s:
gon official says: "Our technology is far better than that of
the Soviets. But human intelligence is so very important.
Technology can tell you about capabilities, but it takes
human intelligence to 'mow intentions."
Another defense expert disagrees that too much is being
spent on technology at the expense of human intelligence,
declaring: "The charge that we are relying too much on
machines is a red herring. The hardware always looks like
it's dominating the intelligence operation because it's so big
in the budget. You could pour as much as you could into
analysis and human intelligence, and it still wouldn't
change the percentage' very much." .
Turnaround on Capitol Hill
"Congress is in full retreat from the notion that it should
impose strict and detailed restrictions on the activities of
the CIA," an experienced analyst reports.
A key Senate staff member slams up the feeling: "With
the almost daily revelations of ?vrongdoing by the agency a
couple of years -ago, there was real doubt up here about
whether we should even have something like the CIA. But
there seems to be a feeling now of trust in the CIA by
people in the House and Senate?that the agency is being I
run in a manner that won't allow abuses to occur."
Congress is still debating details of a new CIA charter
that will outline what the agency may and may not legally
do. An influential House staff member says of the legisla-
tion: "In the short run, it will free up the CIA in an oper-
ational way. Right now, because of the abuses of the past
several years, the agency is hunkered down, afraid to do
anything. It is being overly conservative, to the detriment
of our interests. We've seen the effect of this in Europe, '
with our capability to collect data about political terrorists. ?
And, in the long run, absent a charter bill, the CIA. could
slip back into ways of the bad old days."
Representative Charles Rose (D-N.C.), a member of the
House Intelligence Committee, says: "There's no doubt
about it?the mood, the pressure for curbs is not at all what
it was a couple of years ago. Most of us?and I've been a
real skeptic?were ready to throw a few babies out with the
bath water. But they are keeping their skirts clean these
days out at Langley."
Senator Malcolm Wallop (11-Wyo.), a member of the Sen-
ate panel and an outspoken critic of the CIA, reports:
"Sentiment for restrictions?at least the closely detailed
kind?is ebbing fast now. The idea now is to help the
agency get back on its feet, not discourage it from doing a
more competent job."
The View From Overseas
Europeans are dismayed by the damage inflicted on the
CIA by public criticism in the U.S. and exposure of agency
operations. The Germans call it Selbstzerfleischung, which
means self-laceration.
An analyst in the Mediterranean area reports: "Senior
foreign security men have complained privately to Ameri-
can officials, and at least one European agency chief react-
ed by starting to hold back certain information he had
previously shared routinely with the CIA."
One European official says: "We are also worried about
all the books and magazine articles by former CIA officers I
in which they spill the agency's secrets. Such expos?can
compromise our sources and embarrass our governments."
Another European expert on intelligence makes this ob-
servation: 'The disclosures in Washington seriously weak-
ened effectiveness of the agency. The security services of
other countries and individual contacts have been much'
more reluctant to cooperate for fear of themselves being
exposed."
No one minimizes the importance of what U.S. intelli-
gence chooses to concentrate upon," reports an Allied
spokesman. "It is what it misses, or in the end dismisses,
that worries foreign governments. The U.S. has yet to show
that it fully understands the importance in today's world of
'soft' intelligence?the reporting and analysis of not only
political, but also social, religious and economic develop-:
ments affecting ordinary people." -
Overage agents. Cutbacks in personnel have changed
the way the CIA operates overseas. In the Far East, for'
instance, agency manpower was slashed by nearly half
shortly after Turner took over. Part of the gap was filled in
Japan by increased cooperation from Japanese intelligence
?
agencies. ,
Despite reductions in manpower, a top CIA official in '
Washington asserts that the agency still has the world well
covered. He says: "We can do the job With the resources we
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have. There are lots of parts of the world that make me'
nervous, but not because we are absent from them."
Of more concern to CIA executives than the number of
agents overseas is the fact that many of them are relatively
old for the cloak-and-dagger business. Twenty-seven per-
cent of field personnel are over 50. Says one agency official:
"Where we are short is on young blood. We let the pipeline
dry out. But we will remedy that."
What's Next for the CIA?
With all its troubles, most American and Allied intelli-
gence experts rate the CIA as the best in the world at what
it does.
From a senior European security officer: "The CIA works
hard and digs deep. Probably nobody else, including the
Russians, amasses a greater volume of information. Yet
there appear to be specific gaps and weaknesses in the final
product."
The CIA's Carlucci says: "I don't think there is any ques-
tion but what we are the foremost intelligence operation in I
the world?over all. In technology, we're ahead. On the
analytic side, we're clearly ahead."
A top Pentagon official notes: "Our intelligence is still by
far the best in the world, far better than the Russians'.
You're never as good as you would like to be, but we're the
best in the world?better across the board."
A ranking military-intelligence specialist has some reser-
vations: "We clearly have the best intelligence-gathering
technology in the world. But I think the Soviet Union may
have the most effective intelligence apparatus in the world.
Their leaders know better what we are doing than
we know of what they are doing."
From these wide-ranging conversations with in-
telligence "producers" and "consumers" in the
U.S. and abroad, what overall conclusions emerge
concerning the current health of the CIA and its
prospects?
The intelligence agency under Turner has re-
covered much of the trust Congress had lost in it.
The lawmakers are less interested in imposing new
restrictions to guard against excesses than they are
in preventing any further weakening of the na-
tion's espionage capabilities.
But there is still no sign that Congress is pre-
pared to allow the agency to engage again in the
kinds of covert operations abroad that a decade
ago constituted a major U.S. weapon against Soviet
machinations around the world.
Recapturing the confidence of potential agents \
overseas and of foreign intelligence organizations
is a tougher proposition as long as former agency
staff members, as well as members of Congress and admin-
istration officials, continue to leak CIA secrets.
The jury is still out on the long-term impact of the
"Turner revolution"?whether it actually will lead to a
more efficient and effective intelligence operation. But
many doubt that the potential benefits will justify the con-
tinuing turmoil throughout the intelligence community.
There is a consensus that controversy will dog the CIA as
long as the former admiral remains at the helm. But the
prospect of a change is widely discounted. For Turner still
seems to command the confidence of the one man who
counts most?his former Annapolis classmate now in the
White House. 0
This article was written by Associate Editor Orr Kelly,
with assistance from other staff members in Washington
and overseas.
?
?
Aooroved For Release 2007/03/01 ? CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040004-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 : CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040004-4
Interview With CIA Director Stansfield Turner
Alifilirai S
UMW: 'IMMO soHas
Been Worffi it"
Sagging morale, mass resignations, too
many leaks, failure in Iran. To understand the
charges, says the nation's intelligence
chief, it's necessary to grasp revolutionary
changes in the business of spying.
Cl Admiral Turner, has the CIA been emasculated in the past
several years, as critics allege?
A Actually, I think it's much better than in the past. The
technological collection systems have come along, and
they're constantly growing in capability. And our sophisti-
cation in utilizing them is increasing.
There is more productive activity in the human-intelli-
gence field today than there was last year or the year
before. It's just as important to us, and it's being empha-
sized more and more.
a. You have been criticized for filling most of the top jobs in
the agency with outside amateurs. Why
have you done that?
A I brought in a group of sea-
soned people, not amateurs. Frank
Carlucci, the deputy director of the
CIA, played an intelligence role as
an ambassador, as head of a country
team. John Koehler, who's in charge
of budgets, came from the Congres-
sional Budget Office and from the
Rand Corporation. He's well famil-
iar with the budgeting process. Gen.
Frank Camm, who is in charge of
tasking, is a man with 30-some years
of military experience. No military
man ever has been in command
without commanding intelligence
assets as well as combat assets. So
my "vice presidents- are not inex-
perienced in the kinds of things that
are needed here.
But the operating elements of the
CIA?the clandestine collection, the scientific collection,
fields where you need people who have been there for
years?are run by CIA professionals.
In addition, I believe that it was a good time to give a
new perspective on intelligence because there are pro-
found changes that affect the intelligence world.
Cl What are these changes?
A First, the U.S. role in the world is changing. Second,
technology is changing in the way you do intelligence.
Third, the American public is much more interested in what
we in the intelligence community do than it was 10 years
ago. And fourth, the CIA is maturing. It's graduated its first
generation. We're coming into a new era in the agency.
In light of these changes, I think it has been important at
this stage to have people with an open mind.
(1 Why do we hear 30 much about morale problems at the
CIA and early retirement of Co many of your people?
?
- -;
poi:1'21513E1D
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Approved For Release 2007/03/01 : CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040004-4
A "I've tried to point out there are a lot of frustrations as
you make substantial changes. And, yes, some people get
discouraged because they just don't know how to adjust to
these chancres.
One of 'the factors is the maturing of the CIA that I
mentioned earlier. Twenty-seven percent of our clandes-
tine professionals are 50 years of age and older. We can't
tolerate that, because there's going to be a gap somewhere.
That's why I peeled some off a year ago?because I wanted
to start filling that gap sooner, instead of letting them all
stay another three or four years and then suddenly finding I
have over 30 percent who would be leaving within 2, 3 or 4
years of each other.
We've got a real problem here in that we've matured
without bringing along the replacements in adequate mea-
sure. And because of that, there are a lot of people leaving.
And, lastly, let me say that our government induces peo-
ple to leave. Take one of the fellows who retired last Janu-
ary 12?that was the magic date around here for a lot of
technical reasons. If he had stayed another year and a half,;
his annual retirement for the rest of his life would have
been a couple of thousand dollars less every year.
Q Your critics say that you've created a great deal of turmoil
in an agency that already was demoralized. Was it necessary?
A Oh, no question it's been worth it, in my view. You
don't adapt to the forces of change that I've described
without some unsettling.
Take, for example, the greater openness and control. I
don't think any public institution can thrive that doesn't
have the support of the American people. We lost a great
deal of that support because of a strong suspicion that we're
doing things we shouldn't be doing.
We've become more open?publishing more, giving more
interviews, answering press responses more?so that the
American public will understand better what we are doing.
On top of that, the country has established a set of con-
trols for intelligence today such as has never been exercised
before in any intelligence operation in the world of this
magnitude. We have to expose much more of what we do
to the intelligence-oversight board, to the National Security
Council and to the two oversight committees of the Con-
gress. These are very traumatic experiences for intelligence
professionals to go through.
0. Can you run an effective Intelligente organization with 30
much accountability and openness?
A I think we can,. But it'll be two or three more years
before I can say we are doing it. It will take a refining of the
procedures in our dealings with the intelligence commit-
tees, with the oversight board and so on. In my opinion, this
is moving in a healthy direction.
Q Are foreign intelligence agencies, such as the British and
Israeli, reluctant to cooperate with you for fear of compromising
their secrets?
A There's do question- that people are nervous about
that. Where we are most vulnerable is in what's known as
covert action?influencing events, not collecting intelli-
gence. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment requires us to report
to seven committees.bn covert actions. We would like to
see that narrowed to the two congressional oversight com-
mittees. That would help.
But let me suggest that other countries are beginning to
face the same problem. In Britain, the Official Secrets Act is
now on weaker ground.- The Germans have a Bundestag
committee that came over and talked to rue about what we
are doing. The Italians have moved part of their intelli-
gence out of the military into the Prime Minister's office.
In short, democracies are no longer as comfortable with
unaccountable intelligence people around. We're blazing
the trail in finding out how to get the right balance be-
tween necessary secrecy an accountability. I trims( we re
coming out well.
? With so many congressional committees in the act, have
covert actions become impossible?
A No. But it is most difficult to undertake a covert activ-
ity where there's a high probability of a lot of controversy
ova s
over it.
, for all practical purposes, potentially controversial co
vert actions have been turned off?
A Yes. On the other hand, what this means is that there's ,
more likely to be a national consensus behind any covert I
action undertaken today than there was in the past. I think -
it should be that way.
0. Turning to the criticism of the agency's political analysis:
What do you say to charges that you are devoting too much of
your resources to day-to-day developments?competing with I
daily papers?rather than working on long-term trends?
A They're right. We've been working for two years to
start shifting it. But it can't be done overnight. The intelli- ?
gence community?more so in Defense than in the CIA--
has a culture that's oriented toward current intelligence.
The rewards go to the quick-response people.
It's taking a while to shift that emphasis, and it's causing
turmoiL Some people are unhappy because they don't want
to get shunted off in what they think is a closet where
they'll be doing long-term research. That is just one of the
fundamental changes that must be made in the way we
handle the analytic process. And, of course, it's disconcert-
ing to people.
Q. Wasn't President Carter expressing dissatisfaction with
the job you've done by writing a memo complaining of inadequa-
cies in political intelligence in the Iran crisis?
A The memo was addressed to three people?Cyrus
Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and myself. The thrust of it
was: "Are you guys bringing it all together?" Most of the
information that was lacking was available without a spy in
the system or a satellite. I'm not trying to absolve myself or
the agency or the intelligence community. This memo isn't I
the first I've had that's been critical.
Critical memos are not the only ones I have received.
I've received handwritten memos in both directions, over
and above this one that got blown up unnecessarily. And I -
would hardly think that I could go through two years in this
job without some constructive suggestion from my boss.
CI Where did you go wrong in Iran?
A It wasn't as though we were sitting here and saying to
the President, "Gee, it's sweetness and light in Iran." We I
were reporting there were all kinds of problems. But most of
us felt they wouldn't coalesce into a big enough problem I .
that the Shah couldn't handle. I think most people felt that ?
here's a guy with a police force, with an army, with a one-
man government. What inhibitions does he have in sup-1
pressing these things? The Shah himself didn't judge it right.
So the fact that we misjudged that the situation would
boil over is not a true measure of whether the intelligence
community is serving the country properly. I don't guaran-
tee that I'll predict the next coup, the next overthrow of
government, the next election surprise.
More than making those predictions, What we're here for,,
is to be sure the policymakers see the trends that they can
do something about Even if I'd told the policymakers on
October 5 that there was going to be a major upheaval on
November 5 in Iran, there was nothing they could do.
0. We've been hearing a great deal lately about a "mole" In
the CIA?that is, a KGB agent who has penetrated your agency.
Does that worry you?
A Well, it's an annoyance. I have no evidence that makes
me concerned that we've got a mole. But I'll never say that
we don't have one, because I don't want to be complacent. Cl -
Aooroved For Release 2007/03/01 CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040004-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 : CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040004-4
For Agents in Moscow,
Snooping Is Risky Work
_ --? . ' . MOSCOW
Here in Russia, operation* of the CIA are- shrouded in
mystery even more than usual:
Identities of CIA employes working out of the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow are a tightly guarded secret. It is
doubtful that most personnel in the embassy, let alone
outsiders, know who the CIA officers are..
Nevertheless,
......: . .
Nevertheless, incidents. in recent years have disclosed
enough about the-nature and scope of the agency's activi-
ties in the to- make it possible to Put together this
partial profiler- -',-_,-,:,--,----.1,-;.--; . '-:-. :-:;:z:z -
at Much -of U.S.:' intelligence: here involves. electronic
surveillance and interception of Soviet communications.
s CIA agents are routinely assigned to the U.S. Embassy
under .cover as-Tolitical? defense and:consular officers.
Estimates- of just how:inanylof the embassy's 98 staff
members-work for the-CIA range; from-10 to 45 percent;
? - Ciss-sic cloak.and-dig,gei...espioni,ge is still. part. and
? parcel. of the work done kir Moscow-based. CIA operatives.
: In one recentcase; ampules of Poison.were involved.
- * Contrary-to generaLhelief,:the CIA. does., appear. to,
have a:number of Russiaiicitizens Working for it as agents .
inside the Soviet system.., -,.-i-., ,-;4-...--:;-.,:::.....,:-.-- ,?...:,-L-7:-'::-...-;-:: . ,
__. In theo;y4 the .enorranusdiverSity- of the, p.ss.R., the 1
strains between Russians and Soviet minor-,
ides, the tens. of thousands of disgruntled;
Jews who wish to. emigrate, the ruthlessi
nature of the Soviet state and the suppres-
sion of many basic human rights argue that
there should be plenty of scope here for
foreign intelligence services. .-;,' - ---
In practice, the CIA and all other_ West-
em agencies here operate under enormous handicaps?'.
far greater than those limiting KGB activities in the U.S.
All travel and contacts between Soviet citizens and
foreigners are tightly circumscribed. About 85 percent of
the U.S.S.R. is effectively off limits to foreigners. The
Soviet KGB employs- unlimited resources to keep tabs on
Closed-and secretive by instinct, Soviet society itself
acts as. a natural barrier to. the-eyes of prying outsiders.
What evidence there is-suggests that the CIA tries to get
around this-problem by recruiting -Soviet citizens while
they are abroad and by befriending potentially anti-Soviet
Eastern Europeans stationed in Moscow. - --7_,,
In at least one-area-of life in the Soviet-Union, the CIA
has been embroiled in controversy .for some time..This is
- the matter of dissidents--; .i.:...f-lz:i...i-2....-
Many dissidents have' had access to valuable info
tion on closed scientific-research institutes. Soviet authori;,
ties frequentlylaccuse the CIA. of trying to subvert dissi-1
-dents to obtain such data, and the CIA just as often denies
it has-infiltrated the movement. Whatever the truth, thei
allegation that the CIA has been in-
volved with the dissidents has helped
to destroy them as a real force in So-
viet society, since they have become
linked in the minds of Russians with a
hostile foreign organization.
Twice in the last two years, the U.S.
Embassy has been publicly embar-
rassed by revelations--neither confirmed nor denied in
Washington?of CIA activities here. In July of 1977, Mar-
tha D. Peterson, supposedly a consular official in the em-
bassy, was caught delivering espionage equipment to a
Soviet citizen. She was subsequently expelled. Two
months later, another-embassy employe, Vincent Crock-
ett, who was listed as an -archivist," was expelled after he -
was caught trying to collect material left at a "drop" in I
Moscow by a Soviet citizen later convicted as a spy
In the nature of things, it is the failures of the CIA
rather than the successes that become public knowledge.
But confidence that his identity.will not be disclosed is
essential before any Soviet insider would come forward to
help the West, as did Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in Soviet
military intelligence, who gave the British important in-
formation in the early. 1960s?before being found out and
shot. After all that has happened _in the last few years, it -
-would take a brave Russian to emulate Penkovsky-
This report was written h.!, Robin Knight, chief of the '
magazines Moscow bureau-
_ -
?
AnnrovPd For RPIPASP 2007/03/01 CIA-RnP9q-00498R000300Ci40004-4_
Approved For Release 2007/03/01 : CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040004-4
For Agents in Moscow,
Snooping Is Risky Work
_ --? . ' . MOSCOW
Here in Russia, operation* of the CIA are- shrouded in
mystery even more than usual:
Identities of CIA employes working out of the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow are a tightly guarded secret. It is
doubtful that most personnel in the embassy, let alone
outsiders, know who the CIA officers are..
Nevertheless,
......: . .
Nevertheless, incidents. in recent years have disclosed
enough about the-nature and scope of the agency's activi-
ties in the to- make it possible to Put together this
partial profiler- -',-_,-,:,--,----.1,-;.--; . '-:-. :-:;:z:z -
at Much -of U.S.:' intelligence: here involves. electronic
surveillance and interception of Soviet communications.
s CIA agents are routinely assigned to the U.S. Embassy
under .cover as-Tolitical? defense and:consular officers.
Estimates- of just how:inanylof the embassy's 98 staff
members-work for the-CIA range; from-10 to 45 percent;
? - Ciss-sic cloak.and-dig,gei...espioni,ge is still. part. and
? parcel. of the work done kir Moscow-based. CIA operatives.
: In one recentcase; ampules of Poison.were involved.
- * Contrary-to generaLhelief,:the CIA. does., appear. to,
have a:number of Russiaiicitizens Working for it as agents .
inside the Soviet system.., -,.-i-., ,-;4-...--:;-.,:::.....,:-.-- ,?...:,-L-7:-'::-...-;-:: . ,
__. In theo;y4 the .enorranusdiverSity- of the, p.ss.R., the 1
strains between Russians and Soviet minor-,
ides, the tens. of thousands of disgruntled;
Jews who wish to. emigrate, the ruthlessi
nature of the Soviet state and the suppres-
sion of many basic human rights argue that
there should be plenty of scope here for
foreign intelligence services. .-;,' - ---
In practice, the CIA and all other_ West-
em agencies here operate under enormous handicaps?'.
far greater than those limiting KGB activities in the U.S.
All travel and contacts between Soviet citizens and
foreigners are tightly circumscribed. About 85 percent of
the U.S.S.R. is effectively off limits to foreigners. The
Soviet KGB employs- unlimited resources to keep tabs on
Closed-and secretive by instinct, Soviet society itself
acts as. a natural barrier to. the-eyes of prying outsiders.
What evidence there is-suggests that the CIA tries to get
around this-problem by recruiting -Soviet citizens while
they are abroad and by befriending potentially anti-Soviet
Eastern Europeans stationed in Moscow. - --7_,,
In at least one-area-of life in the Soviet-Union, the CIA
has been embroiled in controversy .for some time..This is
- the matter of dissidents--; .i.:...f-lz:i...i-2....-
Many dissidents have' had access to valuable info
tion on closed scientific-research institutes. Soviet authori;,
ties frequentlylaccuse the CIA. of trying to subvert dissi-1
-dents to obtain such data, and the CIA just as often denies
it has-infiltrated the movement. Whatever the truth, thei
allegation that the CIA has been in-
volved with the dissidents has helped
to destroy them as a real force in So-
viet society, since they have become
linked in the minds of Russians with a
hostile foreign organization.
Twice in the last two years, the U.S.
Embassy has been publicly embar-
rassed by revelations--neither confirmed nor denied in
Washington?of CIA activities here. In July of 1977, Mar-
tha D. Peterson, supposedly a consular official in the em-
bassy, was caught delivering espionage equipment to a
Soviet citizen. She was subsequently expelled. Two
months later, another-embassy employe, Vincent Crock-
ett, who was listed as an -archivist," was expelled after he -
was caught trying to collect material left at a "drop" in I
Moscow by a Soviet citizen later convicted as a spy
In the nature of things, it is the failures of the CIA
rather than the successes that become public knowledge.
But confidence that his identity.will not be disclosed is
essential before any Soviet insider would come forward to
help the West, as did Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in Soviet
military intelligence, who gave the British important in-
formation in the early. 1960s?before being found out and
shot. After all that has happened _in the last few years, it -
-would take a brave Russian to emulate Penkovsky-
This report was written h.!, Robin Knight, chief of the '
magazines Moscow bureau-
_ -
?
AnnrovPd For RPIPASP 2007/03/01 CIA-RnP9q-00498R000300Ci40004-4_
Article appeakipprOved For ReleMei200Z.E3/919 CIA-RDP99-004.
on page 41-44
I
1
he Central Intelligence Age i
ncy s secrets. Some foreign intelligence agen-
under fire once again. For years, cies are holding back information they
the CIA was accused?often recklessly? once freely shared with the CIA, and their
of doing too much, of hatching too many chiefs complain privately about the p0-
plots against too many foreign leaders and tential for leaks from the eight Congres-
violating the rights of too many Amen- sional committees that oversee the CIA.
cans. The abuse-of-power issue is rarely They are also claiming that former CIA
heard anymore. Now, in the aftermath of men are able to publish books containing
intelligence failures in Iran, Afghanistan sensitive inside information. B eyond that,
and other countries, the CIA stands ac- the theft of a highly classified manual by a
cused of doing too little. -We don't have a young CIA employee named William
lot of good intelligence," charges one of - Kampiles last year, and the apparent sui-
the government's highest ranking intelli- cide of John Arthur Paisley, a veteran
gence officers. "The value of what we specialist on the Soviet Union, have raised
have to analyze in almost any part of the-;-new concerns over security at the CIA.
world is far less than satisfactory?and far.-1 , . CIA director Stansfield Turner, 55, gets
less than most Americans think we have." a large share of blame for the agency's
The most critical failure came in Iran. problems. In his two-year tenure, Turner
In August 1977, the CIA reported that has presided over the most thoroughgo-
"the Shah will be an active participant in ing shake-up of the CIA since its creation
Iranian life well into the 1980s." A year in the cold-war days of 1947, and the
later, an agency study said that -Iran is mood in some corners of the agency is
not in a revolutionary or even a 'pre- bitter. Soon after taking office, Admiral
revolutionary' situation." Once the ex- Turner sent pink slips to some 800 veter-
tent of the debacle was clear, President an employees, and since then, hundreds
Carter and a House committee sharply of experienced agents have taken early
criticized the CIA's performance. The retirement, draining the agency's clan-
agency's top Iranian analyst and his two destine operations of veteran spies. Some
immediate superiors chose to retire. sources inside and outside the agency
"When people hash- over what has been agree with Turner that the house cleaning
known about Iran, the most significant was beneficial, clearing out an intelli-
things were in newspapers?and not nee- gence Establishment too set in i ts ways and
essarily our own," complains one Admin-. finally permitting the advancement of
. istration - _ younger people. But others, like a veteran
? ? - station chief in Asia, say Turner has "gut-
HAMPERED BY POLICY ted" the CIA's operational division and
In part, the CIA was hampered by - created a "disastrous morale problem."
America's support of the Shah, which pre-:- In his shake-up, Turner decided to ap-
vented CIA agents in Iran from inffitrat- - point outsiders?from Harvard, the Rand
ing the opposition. Policy also interfered Corporation, the Congressional Budget
with the analysis of intelligence; encour- Office and even the Social Security Ad
aging experts?at the State Department,. ministration?to run almost every CIA
the National Security Council and the division. "It goes down hard when a
CIA?to underestimate the Shah's vulner- whole new sot of guys comes in with, if not
ability. At one point, the CIA even dis- :-: hostility, at least deep skepticism about
missed direct warnings from at least one. the CIA's capabilities and good sense,"
foreign intelligence agency that the Shah _says one displaced agency official. And
faced serious internal unrest and the- the newcomers generated more hostility
threat of Soviet destabilization. - - by farming out some important assign-
There are also serious questions about
Washington's ability to keep intelligence
Making maps; analyzing radio signals
..4is gence service, is very well
organized, ruthless, dedicated, all but
impossible to infiltrate. Excels at infor-
mation gathering and counterintelli-
gence, is weaker on political analysis..
Major target: Arab countries, naturally.
_a Britain.. Its Secret
;eel gence Service is tops at an- -
alytical work and political judgments.
Good on the Middle East, less impres-
sive on Africa. Master Spy Kim Phil,
by's exposure as a KGB agent in 1963
- was a blow, but SLS has overcome that.
- -
-Czechoslovakia and Poland,
oat Their services are best in the
East, after the KGB. The Czechs' main
target: Britain, where it has 50 spies in
London embassy. Poles tend to move
and mix better internationally. ....-
4-21-..11:42,1West Germany.. Bonn's Bun-
iii?Csiidesnachrichtendien.st is su-
perb on East Germany and on analyz-
ing other Warsaw Pact. countries.
Reputation tarnished by penetration of
'Soviet and East German spies into gov-
ernment ministries. -
estlt. France. The SDECE has some
bright leaders and operates
well in certain areas,. notably former:
= French West Africa. Suffers from inter-
nal squabbling and is thought to be pen?-? ?
etrated by Communist agents. - -
- ?
Japan...Tokio's Cabinet Re-,.
se-arch Office aims to gather
information about foreign -countries' -
. economic-policy intentions and indus-
trial secrets. Political analysis is weak. -
" 7 ?
".4%. aeiChina. The General Adrninis-
tration of Intelligence oper-
ates mostly in Asia, Africa and in cen-.:
ters of Overseas Chinese. Technologi---,-,
cally . weak, but sound on analysis....
Especially concerned with Soviet indus-
trial development in Siberia.
._ ? t
ex. a Norway and Sweden,. Bothsound
had on Soviet Union, but Norway has ?
- edge, with access to NATO intelligence. j
Canada and Australia. Minor league:I
51.1 worldwide, stronger regionally-
Mommasuar
_ _ ? -
?
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f
: Approved For Release 2007/03/01 :-CIA:k012)99
os
?
- The 43y named Hook 'slumped into an averstirfte.d -chair in the Old
Mamounia Hotel in Marrakech to Wait for his contact?and think things
- - through: His best Arab sources seemed to be ducking him these days.
Even the British weren't talking to him more than they had to?not that the
bloody Brits had much to say anyway. Beck home; the President and
Congrep were.watching the CIA more_ closely than ever before. .Young
. guys were gettilig out of The company and heading for fara-dvandoS frorri
. ?? publishers in Ne. York. Old guys, /Cis friends, were getting Pink slips right
?
. and left. And theysaid the new directorseern ed to trust electronic gadgets
- in the sky more than men who knew how to keep an ear to the ground. "How
_ ? the hell are we gonna stay ahead of the KGB?" Hook thought. He wafted,
. but his man didn't show up. Strike three. Finally he got.up, walked slowly
back to the station filed yet another no-news-is-good-news re-
?
? port to Langley?and started thinking about his wretched pension.
ook is a fiction, but his prob-
lems are ver g teal facts of life
around The Company these
days. "For the first.time in my
experience the CIA is demor-
alized," says former. Deputy
Director E. Henry Knoche, a career man
who resigned last summer. Some nor-
mally light-lipped spies now charge an-
grily that the CIA's director, Mm. Shins-
field Turner, is an abrasive martinet who
doesn't understand the first thing about
spycraft. Others around the agency's_
Langley, Va., headquarters maintain that
squeaky-clean new rules set by Carter
and Congress to control the old and often
dirty business of espionage are seriously
hobbling the CIA's covert operatives,
weakening its network of foreign spies
and straining its relations with friendly
intelligence services. Said one worried
spook: "It's a total disaster." -_
That damage assessment was -
probably exaggerated, but the Turner meets with top aides at Langley: T
Carter, Turner and their, critics alike. m.unity--were making.things better, not!
How much harm has three years' of unre- worse. "ibis place is producing,- be said 1
lenting public exposure of CJA misdeeds ? (page 29). ..-
and mistakes doneto the agency? Has the Outwardly, at least, there seemed tobe
intelligence community got its sensitive ample evidence of that. As usuallast . .
.rnachities and Sophisticated staff pulling week, .sophisticated U.S. spy satellites.1
together or against one another? What can scanned the remote corners of the earth, _
be done to cut deadwood from e
And, most important, how .should Car-
ter?or any President?square legitimate
needs for espionage and_covert capabili.
lies with the country's fundamental
democratic values and processes? "We
want an accountable ,structure," Vice
-. President Walter F. Mondale promised
? recently. And Turner told NEyVSWEEK
that tighter controls and. rriore.coordina-
.
d h t f th
deeper issues it raised troubled
giant electronic "ears" drew signals and
secrets out of the airwaves, computers at
CIA headquarters purred and the agen-
cy's daily intelligence briefing landed on
Jimmy Carter's _ desk each morning
around 8 o'clock?right on time. To give
the President a cloak-and-dagger capa-
bility, NEWSWEEK learned, the CIA-1 -
keeps in reserve a skeleton crew of 30 ,
covert operatives and 50 paramilitary ex-
lion aroun e pertS. And there were signs -that the 1
nation's supersecret intelligence corn- agency maybe working to build a new,
_
?
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3
Stanley Treelek--Sysnin ?
Bill Ray
?
Outsider at the helm: Turner with - national
security adviser Brzezinski (left) and in his office,
C/A equipment analyzing Soviet radar signals
ctiestion was whether the agency needed a clean sweep with a stiff broom ? _
<
_ -
even more secret service desPite,in-
.. deed, because of?all the recent scrutiny
, and criticism. "We are dealing with our
? cover impediments by creating a truly
? clandestine corps of operations officers," _
notes one section of an ambitious five-
year plan drafted at Langley Jost year.
"[This will be] an extremely delicate
undertaking with many complex oper-
ations and support ramifications that will
require adroit handling by our most ex-
perienced people." _ - ?
Both Congress and Carter. are casting
about for adroit ways of their own to exert
more quality control over the CIA's
"product"---;.a blend of military, econom-
ic, political and scientific intelligence
that aims to be this nation's best window ?
on the world. "Their intelligence is
lousy," says New York Rep. Otis Pike, a
critic who belieVes it costs more than it's
- worth. And a top White House strategist
concedes that CIA reports are often too
tame. "Technologically, we're awfully ?
good," says another Presidential confi-
dant. "But when it comes to foreign poli-
cy?what other governments think of
you, what they think of themselves, what
. their strategy is and wharthey think your
' strategy is?our intelligence is not very
, good." -
- . ? .
SUPERS0dOK ? -
. In the hopes of improving things, the
CIA is importing Ambassador to Portu-
gal Frank Carlucci. 47, a tough-minded
administrator who ran the Office of Eco-
, nomic Opportunity for Richard NixorL,
as Turner's top deputy who wifl take
charge of day-to-day operations. And
last week, the President signed an Exec-
utive order giving CIA boss Turner
broader responsibility for the U.S. intel-
ligence "community"?including the i
Defense Intelligence Agency, National ?
. Reconnaissance Office and the electron-":
ic wizards of the National Security "
Agency?a development that may ulti-
mately make Turner the most powerful
- and controversial sitperspook since Al-'
len Dulles in the Eisenhower era of
cold-war brinkmanship. . '
- :. Turner steamed into Langley last
March under full power and a somewhat
vague 'mission from Carter to take bold
action. His credentials looked impres-
:'.sive to liberals and conservatives: An-
napolis:and Oxford, chief of the Naval,
War College and a combat command on a
frigate off Vietnam. The CIA itself wel-
comed the admiral, if only as a contrast to
Theodore Sorensen, Carter's first choice
for the top intelligence job. The liberal
Sorensen dropped out after it developed
that he had exploited classified docu-
ments in writing his memoirs of the Ken-
nedy years. "When Sorensen lost, every-
body was so relieved that they never
i
asked, 'Who's Turner?' "said one former
agency man?a bit ruefully.
?
It turned out that the admiral was a
:salty outsider who made no effort to I -
adapt to the traditional pinstripes and I.
gelignite image of directors like Dulles,
Richard Helms and William Colby. Nor
did he follow the pattern set by onetime
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Republican nifty chairman
George Bush--,anotheiA
who came to Langley viffta man-
date to shake things up but man-
aged to replace much .of the CIA's
top management in 1976 without
1 drawing too much blood or ink in the
process. "My attitude was going
to hunker down," Bush said last
week. "This idea of openness?I.just.
don't buy that." Turner seemed more
suspicious. "I said to myself: 'I've
read about the accusations against the
clandestine service'," - -he recalled. "1
don't believe them all?but I don't
know which are fact. an whiCh are
fiction." -
-? He decided to find out. "The para-
mount question in his mind?and .quite
rightly?was 'How do I control the
placer" said former deputy director
Knoche. "The trouble was, he allowed
this question to exist his.rnind.for trio
Icing." TO get the clandestine Directorate
of Operations (DDO) in. hand, Turner
'hited Robert.D. (R-asty) Williams from
Stanford.Reseatch Institute to be his free-
lance irivestigatoo. Williamsrattled a few
skeletons and set qiiite a few teeth. on
edge around Langley. To some, he
seemed more concerned about investi-
gating booze and sex play than foul play
during a tour of CIA stations in Asia. Old
hands at headquarters and in the field
disliked Williams's aloof moralizingand
resented his prying questions. "Having
endured the process of external cri tieiSm
and the
slhce 1975," Knoche said
last week, "the CIA and particularly the
- Deputy Director forDperations found it-
- selfgoing through it all again?from their
own leader. The place buckled."
PINK-SLIP MUTINY
ilLsd For
? ?
? ?
? The most crippling blow to the morale
of Turner's 15,000 employees has been
his method ofcutting back the clandes-
tine staff. The operations division had
already been whittled down to 4,730
employees from a peak of 8;000 during
the Vietnam war, and Turner inherited
from the Ford Administration a recon2-
mendation to slice another 1,200-to 1,400
officers, virtually all of them at headquar-
? ters. He chose to cut only 820, but speed-
ed up the original, six-year timetable.
That made it impos.sible to achieve all
? the reduction by attrition?and a flurry of
pink slips was inevitable.
- The .firings and the ensuing uproar
were the first, outward signs that some-
'.thing was amiss in the CIA. "It was the
CIA's first mutiny," recalled one ex-offi-
cer last month. Many victims of the firings
? broke the agency's tradition of: silence
? and went out talking. One fired agent told
NEWS%VEEK: "To receive the grateful
- thanks 'ofa grateful government for serv-
ices rendered?sometimes overseas at
great hazard?in the form of a two sen-
.(- tence message, without any recognition
of past performance, was insulting and
humiliating." Turner argued that he was
only being cost-conscious and efficient;
he also hoped to spare victims the sus-
. .
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ps-es101---NT
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0*-'14
Bad press: A critical report, Allende's fall, Vietnam's collapse
pense of wondering whether the ax was
? going to fall. But when he told NEWS-.
WEEK later: "You really heard them cry-
ing, haven't your' he apeared to some
rather like Gen. George Patton slapping
? combat-fatigued GI's?.-.and apologized in
writing to the entire agency. .
Even so, the unhappy mess gave the
impression that Turner had a short fuse
and ,a hard heart. In a gesture of lese
majesty that would have been unthink-
able under Dulles or Helms, one muti-
nous wag posted an "H.M.S. Pinafore"
Parody called "A Simple Tar's Story" On
the CIA's staff bulletin board. Lampoon-
ing' Turner, it read: "Of intelligence I
had so little grip/ that they offered me
the Directorship/ with my brass bound
head of oak so stout/ I don't have to
know what it's all about./ I may run the
ship aground if I keep.on so/ but I don't
care a fig: I'll be the CNO [Chief of
Naval Operations]."
When pressed, most intelligence ex-
perts conceded that the cuts were need-
ed and that the agency could absorb
them. But one unsettling fact remained:
Turner had chosen to cut only the clan-
destine services, leaving the rest. of the
agency untouched. Some agents won-
dered whether Turner was something of
- a stubborn naif who failed to realize
how tough the game against the Rus-
sians really was. _
? - - THE .CLASSIC JOB"
? To make matters worse, Turner left
the impression with many people that
he thought he was simply phasing out
anachronisms of the sophisticated new
technology Of intelligence. "There's no
technology invented vet that can read
minds," snorted one first-rate fieldman
in Western Europe-last week; he ex-
plained that the classic job of the clan-'
destine operative remains indispensa--
ble: to cultivate .sources and collect
"human" ? intelligence -(HUMINT in
spookspeak) so political leaders can an-
swer questions like "Who is going to
push. the button?and when'?"
- "Intelligence used to be poker?what
did the other guys have," reflected one
top agency man in Washington. "Now
-
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it's chess: we know his pieces and where
they are located?we need to know his
intentions." Finding them out takes a
peculiar breed of person. "They won't
say: 'Aye, aye, sir, and salute Turner,"
said one retired agent. Even Campbell
James, a Company legend in his time,
failed to pass muster in Turner's no-
nonsense shop. A distant relative of Ted-
dy Roosevelt, James is American but
speaks with a British accent. He wears a
chain across his vest with a caviar spoon
fixed to one end, a large watch on the
other and a tiger tooth dangling in be-
tween. "When We got into Laos; he
would go right up to a tribal chieftain
sitting in a tree hut eating betel nuts and
present his card," recalled one old mis-
sion mate last week. "When we went into
Laos in 1960, he was the only guy Sou-
vanna PhoUrha would talk to."
?
By most rules of 'thumb, HUMINT
accounts for only about 10 per cent of
the U...S..intelligence product. And with
the Diwtorate of Operations also being
man fed the CIA its first solid report that
China was about to set off an atom bomb,
thereby scooping the spy satellites and
U-2 reconnaissance planes that had been
overflying China's nuclear-testing range
at Lop Nor for years. The HUMINT man
got the story from the foreign minister of
a small African nation, who got it from
the Russians during a trip to -Moscow.
"When the information got back to head-
quarters," one analyst laughed last week,
?
everyope said, 'What the hell does that
guy know about an A--bomb?' But it got to
Dean Rusk who used it in a speech?just -
before the bomb' blew." ? -
' . COVERT ILLUSIONS
In addition to gathering information
clandestinely, the CIA's Directorate of
Operations has traditionally been re-
sponsible for covert operations, the.
sorhetimes dirty tricks- used to shape
events in foreign countries. But the agen-
cy's covert-action team was reduced to a
bare minimum evert before Tamer an.-
-
.? Auth 01911 Ptuladelpitla Inquirer
- Mind bending: Can the government?or ;he public?overlook. past mistakes?
? ? - ?
?
'the source of many escapades ernbar-
.rassing to the Company in recent years,
? it was understandable that. Turner.
- looked to the operations division as a
safe place for cuts. But he has had to
assume the risk that real, if unusual,
assets might be lost, too. One of the last
? men at the agency who spoke Albanian
reportedly fell to.a Pink slip not long
? . ago?and even Jimmy Carter knows the
difficulty in finding good interpreters
7...;;;.:. these days. In one East- European coun-
.:. *, try, in fact, there are reports that an
i.:Rntrzgrung number of dissident Commu-
..-. nists would like to talk with CIA officers
? but can't because all the station's lin-
- guists have been recently fired.
HUMINT experts have scored a share
of victories over their counterparts in
signal information (SICINT) and com-
munications (COMINT). A HUMINT
rived, and there is no indication now that
it will be significantly expanded. That -
may be just as well. While the CIA did
score covert victories in Guatemala and
? Iran in the 1930s, it is better known for its
covert failures in Cuba, Chile and else-
where. In Africa, for example, eager-
operatives subtly prompted the govern- -
ment of Burundi to send home a bum-
bling Russian ambassador. To the CIA's
dismay, however, the Russians then -
posted a crack diplomat, and relations
between the Burundis and the Soviets
grew more cordial than ever. "I am for-
ever overwhelmed by the number of -
very fine people who have been deluded
into wasting their lives in this business,"
said one very candid covert-action man
in Washington.
. Even so, neither Turner norlhe Presi-
dent intends to give up covert action .
. . .
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Bookmanship: Former Company men Agee (left),
Snepp and Marchetti with their controversial critiques
13SIBETHECINKIThi
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? entirely. "It's got to remain an arrow in
our quiver," Turner said last week. The
CIA's small crew of paramilitary experts
can be used against terrorists, for exam-
ple. Any such action, Carter maintains, is
? now subject to Presidential approval and
Congressional scrutiny. His goal is to do
away with the CIA's old doctrine of"plau-
sible deniability, a euphemism for the
cover stories that hide links between the
President and illegal operations.
- The new policy has astonished a few
old-timers. One West European intelli-
gence chief who met Turner- recently
said in surprise; "He told me that the
? only difference now is that all covert
operations henceforth will be conducted
? legally. He doesn't seem to realize that
the whole point of covert operations is to
be able to do things that aren't legal."
-1 MATTER OF TRUST
The warning was cynical but well
- meant. Openness, legalities and moral
imperatives tend to put off intelligence
professionals whose ruling passions, of
,necessity, run to guile, deception and se-
crecy. Sources in Europe told NEWS.-
? WEEK'S Arnaud de Borchgrave that
? friendly intelligence agencies such as
Egypt's well-wired Mukhabarat now-
I.::: Worry about their best secrets falling into
?the wrong hands around Washington.
Smith Africa's Bureau of State Security
(BOSS); the best intelligence outfit in
Africa, has reportedly become stand-
? - offish?in part, no doubt, because of
mounting political differences with the
U.S. Iran's SAVAK is irked by the CIA's
refusal to turn over tips on Iranian dissi-
,- dents in the U.S.; the Iranians charge that
similardetails about anti-Castro terrorists
have been supplied to Cuba. And the
French complain that their reports on Cu-
bans in Africa have been ignored. "The
Dutch, th e Italians, the Greeks--even the
. British don't trust us any more," said one
-.American operative in Washington. -
Trust has also become a pressing ques-
tion around Langley. Defectors to the.
:publishing world like Philip Agee have -
called names and named names, arguably
jeopardizing plans and even lives. More
. thoughtful critics like Victor Marchetti
(in "The CIA and the Cult of Intelli-
gence") have poked fun at the CIA's cult
figures--and holes in its mystique. And
former officer Frank Snepp 's charge (in
"Decent Interval") that The Company
ran out on thousands of its Vietnamese
employees did little to improve the re-
cruitment of local spies elsewhere. With
hundreds of defrocked spooks on the
beach, some now worry that more
. books--or even more serious defec-
tions?are on the way. "It's a red herring
to say someone might go over to the other
side,"insisted oneretired CIA executive.
Then he thought a bit and added philo-
sophically, "But with a slap in the face,
strange things can happen."
Turner believes firmly that such fears
are exaggerated. He may be right.
Ousted veterans and their supporters
tend to be furious at him, not their coun-
try. And few ex-CIA scriveners have tak-
en their true confessions as far as Agee ?
did. "Even Snepp was very circumspect
in writing his book, as far as I can see,"
Turner told NEWSWEEK, a concession
That may prove bothersome if the agency
ever takes the case to court.-
Rattled or not, the CIA seems to be
pulling itself together. The Domestic
'Contact Division is expanding to inter-
view more Americans, particularly sci-
entists, technologists, economists and
-energy experts, returning from "points of
interest" abroad. And the Foreign Re-
source Division, which recruits foreign -
sources in the U.S., may grow. The Di- .
rector of Operations is also redeploying
its officers abroad. It may expand oper-
ations in Africa to cultivate sources there ?
who travel in and out of China and the
Soviet Union, two "hard targets" that
American operatives seldom manage to
penetrate directly. It is moving, though
slowly, to meet the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act?and to declassify more of its
less sensitive secrets. - -
To head a leaner, m eeker Directoratkof
Jam Gt./ aux. AP. Jill litcmenli
?
- ?
. ? ?
Operations, Turner picked John McMa-
hon, a veteran of the Science and Tech-
nology division. The choice alarmed
some critics who fear technological prog-
ress will alter the CIA's traditional mis-
sion?and replace Nathan Hale with
R2D2. Calmer bands pointed out that
McMahon was a superb m h h
ad
learned much about clandestine affairs
from the years he had spent developing
exotic doodads for the CIA operations.
"He'll have the Directorate of Operations
eating out of his hands in 60 days,- pre-
dicted one unruffled colleague. -
-
FERRETS, BLEEPS, BIG EARS
Even traditionalists now concede that
the main burden of collecting intelli-
gence has fallen to machines. "Ferret"
satellites 200 miles up in space record
electromagnetic signals from ships, air-
craft and ground stations. Fifty miles
closer to the earth, photo satellites circle
watchfully, dropping film packs and
bleeping messages back home. Their
photos are so good, Turner has told
White House aides, that the CLA. Can
distinguish Guernseys from Herefords
on the range and read the markings on a
Russian submarine. Even clOser in, U-2
and SR-71 photo reconnaissance planes
snoop at altitudes of 70,000 to 90,000
feet. Apd far below, mountaintop radio
receivers scan e airwaves while the
electronic devices of the National Secu-
rity Agency, the nation's "Big Ear," pick"
up everything from chats "between for-
eign leaders to-enemy orders of battle.
Without photo evidence f missile.
sites in .Cuba, John F. Kennedy would .
never have gone to the brink of World
War III with the Soviet Union. Lyndon
Johnson made a point of giving Third
World leaders satellite photos of their
capitals--to show he had his eye en
things. But technology can also produce
intelligence as mindless and worthless
as anything ever concocted by human
bumblers out in the cold. CIA scientists,
not cloak-and-dagger men, took on Op-
_ L.. (Continued on page 30)
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eration Midnight Climax, an inquiry into new demands on the CIA to improve its
min41-bending drugs in which unsus- predictions and its analysis of econo_nic
pecting men were given the drugs in and political developments. "When you
finally get to the edge of where the facts
are?that's where the stuff gets weak,"
. said one Carter strategtst. Turner' S ef-
forts to push beyond data grubbing has
.probably led to the most serious criticism
leveled against him: shaping intelli-
gence analysis to please the President.
"He orders the intelligence estimates to.
be jazzed up," said one exasperated CIA
analyst last week. "The facts aren't al-
ways exciting enough for Stan."
To his defenders, Turner is providing
just the kind of excitement the. CIA
needs. "We are talking about a tired,
middle-aged bureaucracy and we should
be rubbing their noses in the billions
they have spent to make bad calls on
major events," says Congressman Pike.
And in signing the Executive order that
broadened Turner's powers last week,
President Carter said evenly: "I want to
express thy complete appreciation and
confidence in Admiral Turner, whose
responsibilities . .. will be greatly
magnified."
At one time Turner had hoped to be-
come an intelligence czar. The reorgani-
? _
CIA-run brothels and then observed at
play. In another effort that didn't pay off,
tht CIA managed to plant seven bugs in
the Chinese' Embassy in Burundi in the
early 1970s: five failed to function at all,
one burnt out in three months because
the "off" switch wouldn't work?and the
one in the ambassador's office produced
nothing new because the ambassador
assumed his room was bugged.
BRAINS OVER BOMFOGGERY
The real issue is not whether electronic
spies are better than those who wear gum-
shoes but how to master the glut of data
and improve the bornfogging reports that
make up the "product" ofthe U.S. intelli-
gence community. "Rather than finding
that increased technical capabilities di-
minish your human intelligence require-
ments, it's just the opposite," Turner ob-
serves. "The more information you have
from technical sources, the more inten-
tions you want to know. ... and you go to
the human to find-the intentions. You
must make them dovetail."
Top priority is still? military intelli-
Carlucci (above), Koehleei-:'
New faces, new game rules' -
Dirks, Camm, Blake:?haking some dust off the untouchables
o cow pAgp9,4,4 a more modest role:
Carter did not grant him Cabinet rank or
sole authority to speak publicly on intelli-
gence matters. But he did give Turner an
empire: a new National Foreign Assess-
ment Center, to prepare the CIA's most
important strategic assessments; a -.Na-
tional Intelligence Tasking Center, to
distribute missions and cut waste, and a
Directorate for Resource Management, tci
supervise a budget estimated at more
than $3.5 billion.
Turner has also assembled his own
team of new and old hands to run the new
units and the traditional CIA structure.
Among the most notable are Robert Bow-
ie, at the NFAC; John Koehler, at the
DRM; Lt. Gen. (ret.) Frank Camm at the
NITC; Leslie Dirks as the CIA's deputy
for Science and Tech.nology and John F.
Blake as .deputy for Administration. Old
pros around Washington last week also
predicted that Carlucci, the CIA's new
Deputy Director and a man who under-
stands Washington manners, would do
much to smcioth some of the feathers
Turner has ruffled among his own peo-
ple at Langley.
NEW CHARTERS AND RED TAPE
Turner's new-style intelligence corn-
munity may run into the same kind of
Controversy as the old one. To civil
libertarians, Carter's new restrictions on
various clandestine 'activities seemed
too tame; former intelligence officials,
on the other hand, called them crip-
pling. The Senate is considering new
charters for the entire intelligence
community that would require written
opinions from the Attorney General on
the legality of every operation, a re-
form that could tangle the agency in red
tape. And Rep. Edward Boland, chair-
man of the House Intelligence Commit-
tee, vowed to demand More Congres-
sional access to secret operations. "It all:
comes down to the fact that since we are
going to be in on all the crash landings,
we must insist we be in on the take- I
offs," he said. .
Whether such open exposure is really
practical remains to be tested. The CIA's!
plan to open its headquarters to carefully!
guided tours on weekends died uh-!
mourned around Langley when it turned
out that almost nothing of interest could
be seen _without breaching security
.Turner himself believes it will take an-
other year to tell Whether the reforms are.,
taking hold and the product improving.
The best judgnient now is that the over-
all quality of. U,$. intelligence has not
dropped dramatically and that it may 1.
indeed start to go up. "We ought to knock
off criticizing the changes at the CIA, /et
it settle down and do a good job,". urged ;
one level-headed former officer last
week. In the meantime, Turner has
shown at the very least that he can shake
iome of the dust off a bureaucracy that
once considered itself untouchable.
?TOM MATHEWS with DAVID MARTIN, EVERT i
CLARK ELAINE SHANNON and JOHN UNDSAY In
. Washington, ARNAUD da BORCHGRAVE in Geneva
_ and bureau reports _
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4' ? .
6 February 1978
gailiner
Theie seems to be a penchant for
equating instant popularity with
leadership," Muses Vice Adm. Robert ,
Monroe about the CIA uproar over his
friend and tennis partner Stansfield
:Turner. Monroe doesn't think things
-necessarily work that way. A good lead-
er, he says;"sees what needs to be done
when the issues are not all that clear,
and has the strength to carry them out
whatever obstacles exist'
Though the jury is still out on the
? clarity of Turner's vision as he turns the
inside out, hardly anyone doubts
to perform. A marked star as
;-:.long ago as his - Naval Academy days in
'40s-,-"so far ahead; of us that we
2.riever considered him a competitor or
- even -a peer, according to classmate
JinnnY Carter-,Turner, ;IOW 54, went
__
t'an to an ever-upward Navy career that
:earned him four -stars at 51. Unlike
,
. many hotshots; _Timer distinguished
. himself in a Variety of dissimilar jobs?
battle command, systems analysis, stra-
tegic planning; budget and manpower
'management, Pentagon infighting,
even academic administration To his detractors?in the Navy as
? well as the CIA?this elegant resume
merely cloaks a' man fired with ambi-
tion, an arrogant egomaniac who takes
blustering charge before he knows
-what he's taking charge of. His adrnir-
1_ ers see something- else working?an
abhorrence Of conventional wisdom,
'an overriding passion for fresh thought
. and new ideas. "His strongest point
was his unusual ability to get people to
produce new ideas, says a ranking
Navy' colleague. The traditional ways
of doing things can get trampled in the
:rush, however.. During Turner's time
_
as head of the. Naval War College, he
:l
picked pcked up on n student's idea of hold-
, ing meetings between Navy brass and
'!..? newsmen, who. had become mutually
embittered over. the:Vietnam war.
.1.1`There wana lot of blood on the floor
some tempers exploded," recalls a
War College associate, :but both sides
:learned something,.7,-.-
THUCYDIDES FOR. STARTERS
- With his zeal for' stirring the pot,
Turner- has always had trouble with
"those who abide by the old ways and
-the old ideas. At the War College?the
Navy experience that most resembles
Turner's embattled stand at the CIA?
the admiral took over a snoozy, stagnant
lecture society that required little read-
ing or writing and no exams. At his first
assembly, at 11 a.m. on a warm August
day, Turner woke up his students, all
middle-rank officers with high career
. expectations, by ordering them to read
Thucydides's history of. the Pelopon-
- nesian War:"The gripes and grumbling
got louder," recalls one who was there,
"as they found out that they would have
to read about three shelves of books, ,
take examinations and write papers and
a thesis."
The admiral hung two signs on his
office door?"Call me Stan" and "I
need one good idea a day"?and set
about fermenting the intellectual
juices. "Turner liked the Socratic meth-
od," says a former student, "and he
would ask 'Why do we need a Navy?'?
'Sturdy Stan': At Amherst (front row)
with Webster, as Annapolis guard,
with wife Patricia- leaving NATO
-
'What made the nuclear deterrent de-
ter?'" As usual, says a civilian profes-
sor' "he had a lot of people upset"?butt
by the time Turner left in 1974, the War
? College-was a country club no longer.
. _
? - BUDDIES AT THE TOP
A teetotaling Christian Scientist from
a well-to-do suburban Chicago family,
Turner put in two years at Amherst
College in Massachusetts before opting
for a naval career in 1943. He is still
remembered at Amherst as "Sturdy
Stan," a soberly prankish BMOC and,
as it happened, a classmate and close
friend of William H. Webster; Carter's
new choice to head the FBI. Turner
believes that the long-standing friend-
ship will facilitate cooperation be-
tween the FBI and CIA?a goal not
necessarily shared by civil-libertarians.
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"I anticipate I'll have no prob. Transport Association of America.
lern whatever in calling up and
saying, 'What the devil are you.
?doing, Bill?'" Turner has said. "And
he'll call me and say, 'Why in the world
did you do that, Stan? I'm looking
forward to it."
At Annapolis, Turner became bri-
gade commander and graduated 25th in
his class of 820. As a Rhodes scholar at
Turner moved on to the ),Var College in
1972, became commander of the Sec-
ond Fleet two years later, and then
commander of NATO forces in southern-
Europe. That was the job he held..1.uhen-
jimmy Carter, whom he had never
known at Annapolis, had his celebrated
4"wakin'-up thought" one morning last .
spring about putting the admiral in
charge of the nation's intelligence.
When he flew from Rome to Wash-
ington, Turner did not know what job
the President was going to offer him.
Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff
was his fondest dream, but Chief of
- Naval Operations also seemed likely.
He worked out a telephone code with
his wife, Patricia. If it was the Joint
tie:swore
Oxford, he studied philosophy, politics
and economics. Turner served on a
destroyer during the Korean War, then
alternated between shore and ship as-
signments before putting in three years
asasystemsanalystatthePentagon. He
commanded the missile frigate Home-
during the Vietnam war, winning a
Bronze Star and an enhanced reputa-
tion as an innovator. ? -
Turner won equivalent notices after
he took over the wholly different job of
aide to Democratic Navy Secretary
Paul Ignatius in 1968. "He had to or-
ganize the work, advise on budget mat-
ters and programs, manpower prob-
lems and a host of other tasks," says
Ignatius now president of the Air
-Chiefs, he would tell - her, "major -
league." For CNO the code- words
would be "minor league." In the event, ?
Turner called to say, "Ies the bush
league,"- a slightly pejorative pun On:;
. the name r of his CIA predecessor,
George Bush.-
In Washington, Turner enjoys an
casional night of opera. but he is too:;.!
busy, even on weekends, to take Patri--;::
cia on a promised museum-hopping :-
expedition, "I think he's a little over-
board myself," says his wife- "He:
needs to have contact with more peo-
ple." That's what they say about jimmy.4
Carter, too, a man with whom Turner
shares a certain faith in management--
systems, a broadband intellectual in-
terest--and a terrible impatience with
those not similarly saturated in the job
-.. at hand. . .
. ?RICHARD BOETH with DAVID C. MARTIN raw! U.C3113
NORMAN in Via.Oington,
?
?
?
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.
62.Ni PA GE .2q-AO
6 February 1978
r atm is Frotkril
To get the view from the top at the
CIA, Washington bureau chief Mel Elf-
in and correspondent David Martin
talked with director Stansfield Turner.
Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK:Every single person we have
talked to, without exception, says morale has
never, ever, been lower than it is right now.
TURNER: I categorically deny that.
There is not a morale problem in the
CIA today ... This place is producing.
The President of the United States is
pleased with it. And the product is high.
People work twelve-, sixteen-hour days
out here. I have people, at the drop of a
hat, working all day Sunday, coming
over to my house Sunday night with the
results. They are dedicated, wonderful,
inspired people. Now, there are com-
plaints. There's griping. There is in
every organization of the government.
And when you're in a period of transi-
tion to new objectives, new methods,
new management systems, new styles of
openness, of course there are people
who are complaining, because it isn't
being done the way it was yesterday..
0-Your dismissal o1212 persons obviously
hurt morale. Would you do it again, and in
exactly the same way?
A. What I will do differently the next
time is spread the notification out aver a
longer period of time But! did what I
think was the only honest, proper thing
to do for the agency and for the country
... There's just nobody around here that
doesn't know that we're in a time when
we have to improve, we have to change,
we have to adapt. - _
? ?
0. Do you have confidence in the Clandes-
tine service, or are you afraid that there Is
something else hidden there? ?
A. I took a skeptical attitude and I
hired [Robert D. Williams] to come in,
and I gave him a carte blanche [to inves-
tigate]. At the end of six months, I said to
the clandestine service, "I am well satis-
fied with the way you are doing things. I
have no concern that you are doing
things deliberately without orders, or
contrary to orders." I also told them there
were going to be 820 of them less, you
know. The good news and the bad news.
?
0. Can the United States still take action
covertly In a national emergency?
A. Yes. We're scaling that down in our
objectives.. . but I will fight to the last to
retain an arrow in my quiver to do politi-
cal action. But not thousands of people to.
do paramilitary things like we had in
Vietnam?a small paramilitary capabil-
ity. Modest, tuned, honed and ready to
go. It's very important that it be there,
particularly to combat terrorism.
0. Have such things as the Congressional
hearings, allegations by former agents who
have written books and the fact that many
people are leaving the CIA in a disgruntled
mood caused any sources to dry up because
they are afraid of leaks?
A. Oh, that's just balderdash. I have
such confidence in these people who
leave. They're patriotic Americans.
Now, some of them have shown a very
unprofessional stance in running to the
press, but, you know, even Frank Snepp
was very circumspect in writing his
book, as far as I can tell. There is appre-
hension around the world as to how the
Congressional thing will settle out. But
we haven't had, to the best of our knowl-
edge, leaks from the Congressional side
that can be pinpointed.
-?
sk01,
one of the benefits [in] oversight now is
that the Congress is really getting to
know what intelligence is about; they are
recognizing how much of a responsibil-
ity they're shouldering. .
0. Have any of the friendly services around
the world shown reluctance to share informa-
tion with the CIA because of leaks?
A. I have heard that foreign services
are questioning how our procedures are
working out under these circumstances.
I have zero evidence that it has, at this
stage, resulted in a degradation in the
quality or quantity of information we get
from them ... What's changed in the last
decade is [that] technical-intelligence
collection has become so sophisticated,
" so expensive, that in all areas of the
world we can do better in many of these
technical areas than anybody else.
0.1s it true the CIA had to contract out to
the Rand Corp. forth. first draft of this year's
-c;
e!"-10alimp.
r
he Whlie house
Turner with Carter, Brzezinski and Mondale: 'The President is pleased' _
0.A retired CIA official told us recently that
If he had been a Russian working In the Soviet
Embassy In Washington, he could probably
have all the documents and information pres-
ently given to the Congress of the United
States within a year.
A. I don't believe it. I really don't The
documents we give to the Senate Select
? Committee on Intelligence are held in
one series of closely guarded rooms, 24-
hour guards on them, alarm systems,
locks, the whole works. They're not
running around in congressmen's offices.
I went to see a senator the other day,
just to pay a courtesy call on him. We got
discussing something, and he suddenly
told me, "Write it down." He was so
security-conscious. His room hadn't
been debugged for a while and [when] I
slipped into saying something classified,
we started exchanging notes, just the two
of us sitting in the room there. . .1 mean,
National intelligence Estimate on the Soviet
Union? if so, does this reflect in any way on
the most Important job you do around here,
which is the estimate?
A. We contract in a number of areas. I
don't want to discuss that NIE in particu-
lar, but I see nothing wrong with getting,
in specialized areas, the very best talent
the country can bring to bear on a nation-
al intelligence estimate ... This is only
one little piece of the Soviet estimate..
We went out and hired a fellow who
worked for us a few months ago. He was
working on this before he left.
We [also] go outside when it is, in our
opinion, to the government's best inter-
ests ... to make sure all the divergent
views are represented. And if you don't
happen to have hawks and doves on
some particular situation or you don't
have specialists on this and that, you
complement your in-house talent.
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4
U.S. NEWS & WORLD E? OT _ ,
Approved For Release 2CIEOPOSKilir1159-RIDP99-00498R000300040004-4
Cmitroversy
ver "Czar" for
Intelligence
A sweeping reorganization of Ameri-
ca's crisis-ridden intelligence system
gives unprecedented powers to a con-
troversial Navy officer.
Adm. Stansfield Turner, an Annap-
olis classmate of Jimmy Carter, gets
wide authority over all spying activities
overseas in the reform plan unveiled
by the President on January 24.
As Director of Central Intelligence,
he will supervise spending on foreign
espionage activities by all Government
agencies?the Central Intelligence
Agency, which he heads, as well as the
Defense Department, Federal Bureau
of Investigation and Treasury.
Also, Turner will co-ordinate the
overseas intelligence-gathering oper-
ations of these agencies and play a key
role in setting priorities?for example,
whether American spies and recon-
naissance satellites should concentrate
on China's economic and political pros-
pects or its military potential.
Turner's new deputy, Frank Car-
lucci, a career diplomat, disclosed at a
January 27 confirmation hearing that
he will take over day-to-day running of
the CIA. -
Ironically, the new reorganization
scheme that strengthens Turner's role
came amid speculation that the 54-
year-old Admiral actually was on the
skids as Director of the CIA.
The speculation surfaced the day be-
fore Carter announced the new setup.
The Detroit News published a Wash-
ington report to the effect that
Turner's ouster was being sought by
National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinsld and Defense Secretary Har-
old Brown with the tacit co-operation
of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance.
Praise from Carter. Denials came
from all sides?Turner, Brown, Brze-
zinski and Vance. And the President
himself went out of his way to reaffirm
his confidence in the intelligence chief.
After signing the order expanding
Turner's authority, the President
praised the CIA Director for his "su-
perb" performance, adding:
"I want to express my complete ap-
preciation and confidence in Admiral
Stan Turner, whose responsibilities un-
der this executive order will be greatly
magnified."
Despite the denials, informed Wash-
ington observers say there is convinc-
ing evidence of a strong effort in the
Carter Administration to undercut the
CIA Director. The challenge first ap-
peared inside the central Intelligence
Agency after Turner initiated a far-
reaching plan to tighten discipline and
shift emphasis from covert activities to
analytical intelligence. CIA veterans
complained that he was aloof and inac-
cessible and that he was surrounded by
a "Nay mafia," a small group of offi-
cers appointed to his personal staff.
The grumbling reached a climax at
the end of last year when the CIA Di-
rector delivered dismissal notices to
820 officials in the Directorate of Op-
erations. This unit handles all clandes-
tine activities?both traditional spying
and "dirty tricks" of the kind that led
to a protracted scandal and a series of
official investigations.
Disgruntled clandestine operatives
charged that Turner was relying exces-
sively on technology at the expense of
traditional espionage methods. In the
interview appearing on these pages,
the CIA Director his views on the
purge and his new
The controversy?and the "dump
Turner" movement?extends beyond
the CIA into the White House and the
Defense Department. Key members of
Brzezinski's staff have put out hints
that Turner was alienating the Presi-
dent by attempting to act as an adviser
on policy as well as intelligence.
The strongest but least publicized
challenge to the intelligence chief has
come from Defense Secretary Brown.
For more than six months the Penta-
gon boss has fought a running battle to
limit Turner's control over Defense
Department intelligence operations. In
private, Brown argued that demands
made by the Director of Intelligence
would seriously impair his ability to dis-
charge his responsibilities for the na-
tion's defense, especially in a war crisis.
Top Pentagon officials say that the
President's executive order gives
Turner much but by no means all the
authority he sought. Carter himself
spelled out this definition of the ex-
panded role of the intelligence boss:
"Admiral Turner will be responsible
for tasking or assigning tasks to all
those who collect intelligence. He will
also have full control of the intelli-
gence budget and will also be responsi-
ble for analysis of information that does
come in from all sources in the foreign
intelligence field."
? That seems close to the job descrip-
tion of an intelligence czar. But Penta-
gon officials say that is not how they
interpret the executive order reorga-
nizing the system. They predict a con-
tinuing battle if Turner attempts to
take over functions that Defense Sec-
retary Brown deems indispensable. 0
Carter's man at the CIA is
under fire for purging ?
the "dirty-tricks department"
and reforming the whole spy
system. Here he explains what
he is doing?and why. -
Q Admiral Turner, how do you answer
the charges that you're emasculating intel-
ligence operations overseas by getting rid
of 820 officials in the clandestine services?
A We are not cutting the clandes-
tine service overseas. We are not emas-
culating its capability to collect
intelligence for us.
The 820 cut is coming out of the
headquarters. Reducing overhead and
reducing unnecessary supervision of
the people in the field will, in fact,
have the reverse impact: It will in-
crease productivity overseas. , ?
Q If you're merely getting rid of super-
fluous overhead, why have the clandes-
tine services become so bloated?
A Because the mission of intelli-
gence in this country has changed over
the last 30 years, we have to adapt to
the change. ,
Thirty years ago, we were interested
primarily in collecting intelligence
about the Soviet Union, its satellites and
the few countries. around the world
where they were trying to establish a
position. Today, we're interested in in-
telligence in a wide variety of countries.
Also, for most of the past 30 years, the
Central Intelligence Agency was called
upon by the nation not only to tell what
was going on overseas but to help influ-
ence events?forexample, in Guatema-
la, Iran, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola.
Today, we don't think that kind of
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Ws 7
EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW
Adm. Stansfield Turner;:54,'.:
? an Annapolis classmate of President
Carter. left as commander in chief'
of NATO forces in Southern EUrope-i-,
to take over the crisiridden CIA
in February:1977..-A"g4duate-:,---
of Amherst College arida Rhodes
-.:Scholar at Oxford UniifeisitiiiiTurner
headed the Naval:War.C011pgeli:
? from 1972
commanding a-ca?itiee!ta:slc.'forcEt"--,-
,_
interference in other people's govern-
ments?politic-al action?is as useful a
tool for this country. We're not es-
chewing it completely, but we're
downplaying it.
These changes require a shift in the
way the operations of the directorate
of operations is organized and run. I
believe that we needed to reduce the
size of that organization?and I find
7-'nobody out here who's informed who
disputes the fact.
' Q Are you "going overboard" in your
reliance on technology rather than tradi-
tional spying to do the job, as some critics
have complained?
A Quite the reverse. Everything I
am doing is designed to emphasize im-
proved human intelligence collection.
One of the things that I have done in
the past year is to stimulate increased
interest and attention on the part of
the top policy makers in the Govern-
ment in what human intelligence col-
lection can do for them. And they're
giving us lots of support in that direc-
tion, and more guidance as to what
they want. - ?
? That's what helps to make good clan-
destine intelligence collection. You
want to collect what people need, not
what you think is important.
Now, the advent of new technologi-
cal means of collecting intelligence is
one of the factors that is creating
change in the process of intelligence
in a very substantial way. The trouble
- is that, in a general sense, technical -
intelligence tells you what happened
? yesterday.
Ever since the Battle of Jericho in
Biblical times, the human intelligence
agent has helped you to find out what's
likely to happen tomorrow. I find that
the more technical intelligence data I
'give to the policy makers, the more
often they ask me what is going to hap-
pen tomorrow--the intentions of the
WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
other side. And I must turn to the hu-
man intelligence people of the CIA for
those answers.
So, contrary to the implication of
your question, the advent of better
technical collection has led to greater
demands for the kind of collection
which is done by the human intelli-
gence element.
Q What about the allegations that you
are destroying morale in the CIA by get-
ting rid of so many people in such an
abrupt manner?
_ A There have been lots of com-
plaints because nobody likes to be asked
to leave.
My measure of basic morale, howev-
er, is that I see no drop in the dedica-
tion, in the quality of the work of these
employes. They're a most dedicated,
capable lot of people. I have not seen a
drop in the quality of the work. When
you make as many changes as I believe
are -necessary in our over-all intelli-
gence operations today to adapt to the
times?to modernize?you're bound to
have grumbling.
I am totally convinced that there is
wide consensus in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency that these changes are
generally needed_ I don't say that ev-
erybody agrees on the exact form and
the exact timing and so on, but the idea
that we must move forward into a new
concept, a new age of intelligence, is
universally accepted.
Q But aren't spies and people operat-
ing undercover abroad a special breed
who require special handling? -
A They certainly. do. They're a won-
derful group. But we must have a new .
and modern personnel-management
system here?and this reduction is part
of a move in that direction. Very frank-
ly, it's long overdue.
We have not in the past planned a ca-
reer progression to insure that we will
have new blood coming in to replace
these dedicated, marvelous people who
are leaving: We had a wonderful influx
in the late '40s and early '50s of most-ca-
pable, dedicated people. Two things
are different today:
First, these people have gone
through the system, and we've not pro-
gramed their replacements.
Secondly, they came into the Agency'
in a period of cold war?a period of
great dedication after World War II? -
and they were willing to sacrifice and -
work. Today I think you have to give
better incentives, better rewards to
young people in their early 30s to get
them to stay in this career. I am trying
to remove enough at the top to create
more opportunities so that there will
be young people coming forward with
adequate training and with an added
incentive to make this a career.
I would rather have a short-term
morale problem among these disaf-
fected people whom we have had to
ask to leave. I'd rather have them dis-
gruntled for a very short period of ?
time than I would to have a long-term,
gnawing morale problem existing in :
the bowels of this organization, where
the future lies.
Q Are you at all concerned about the
possibility of any of these disaffected peo-
ple compromising theCIA?or even engag-
ing In work with hostile groups?
A I'm not at all concerned about
- these people who have been dismissed
being traitors to their country. They're-
dedicated, loyal people who have
served well for their country. Two
thirds of them have served long enough
to retire, and will be pensioned imme-
diately upon leaving the Agency. I can't
imagine those people being disloyal or ,
subjecting themselves to the danger of
conducting treason.
- I am most disappointed, however, at
the lack of professionalism that some of
them have shown by going to the me-
dia with their personal complaint
against .me and against the fact that I
have had to bite what is a difficult and
unpleasant bullet in carrying through a
retrenchment. That is unprofessional,
and it reflects the worst fears of the
American public about the Central In-
telligence Agency?namely, that its
operators will not respond to duly con-
stituted authority.
And I am pleased that, if we had. .
people like that in the Agency, they
are gone, .because I will not tolerate
_people who will not follow the duly I
constituted leadership. This organiza-
tion must be under full control at all !
times. Before thisplanned reduction, I
fired five people because they were
out about
under control. The minute I foundut about it, they went out the door.
There's no mincing words on that one ;
with me. . ? _
0. As you see it, Admiral Turner, how ?
does the reorganization announced by the
White House on January 23 strengthen
our intelligence system? ?
A It's a major step forward for the
country. It emphasizes that the policy
-
r,31110.-.
? A nnrnvpri *Frir RPIPASP 7or7Ioltn1 ? niA_Rnpqq_nuqsRno1rinnunno4-4 -
Approved For Release
makers must get involved with the in-
. - telligence process in terms of setting
the priorities for what we should do.
Beyond that, it gives to the Director
of Central Intelligence enhanced au-
thorities to insure the adequate co-ordi-
nation of the entire intelligence
apparatus of the country, because there
are a number of agencies and quite a
few people involved. Particularly with
the changes in the ways we collect in-
telligence today, there is a great need
for better co-operation.
Under this new executive order, I
will be permitted to task all the intelli-
gence-collection agencies of the Gov-
ernment that are funded in the
national-intelligence budget.. This will
exclude intelligence activities funded
. in the defense budget?such as an
Army lookout on a bill, or a tactical,
? airplane, or something like that.
Secondly, I am given authority to
put together and present to the Presi-
dent the single national-intelligence
budget and to make the recommenda-
? tions to the President on what we
should be buying, how many people
we should have, how much operating
funds that we need for the entire in-
telligence community.
I think that this new authority will
still leave independence where it's
needed within the intelligence com-
munity, but provide centralized con-
trol where it's been lacking.
CL Under the reorganization, will you, In
effect, become the "intelligence czar"?
? A As Director of Central Intelli-
gence, I will have greater authority
than that position has had before. At the
same time, there are clear limits on that
authority?particularly, there are limits-
over the interpretation of intelligence.
? - The last thing that any of us want is a
-
single individual who can determine
?.. what the interpretation of the intelli-
gence data is to be. ? -?
When it comes to interpretation of.
_- intelligence, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the State ? Department's
?' Bureau of Intelligence and Research
- are quite independent of the Director
? of Central Intelligence. We meld inter-
:..pretations together and see where we
? differ. But I have no authority to tell
them how -to interpret?how to ana-
- ? ,lyze the information.
? .?? CI What Is being done to guard against
the kinds of abuses by the Intelligence
community that have been so widely pub.
licized in the past few years?
: A Well, I think abuses have existed
-.but have been grossly exaggerated.
. Over the last several years, we have
, established. in this country some very
fine controls. They amount to what -I
,.: call -surrogate public oversight Thee
? problem is that the public cannot over-
1. : 1A-FIPP99-9.0498RO.
?
Admiral Turner listens as President Carter announces an executive order that expands
the CIA Director's control over foreign-intelligence operations. ? -
?
see the intelligence agencies as it does
the Department of Agriculture or the
Department of Commerce or other
agencies that work in a more or less
unclassified atmosphere.
So, instead, we have oversight in the-
executive branch by the President and
the Vice President and by the National
Security Council, which, under the .
new executive order, has certain over-
sight responsibilities?for instance,
preparing - an annual report on how
we're doing and what we're doing.
Then there is the Intelligence Over-
sight Board?three distinguished
American citizens?appointed by the
President to look into the legality and
the propriety of our intelligence ac-
tivities and to report directly to the
President.
? Outside the executive branch, we
have the oversight of two committees
of the Congress dedicated just to intel- ."
ligence. They're a big help to us. They
keep us sort of in tune with the Ameri-
can public. I think that's where the
intelligence community has gone ,
astray before: They were a little bit too _
isolated. Going up and testifying on
Capitol Hill regularly keeps you from.
being isolated. - . .
CL Can you run an effective Intelligence
organization when you must tell so much
to congressional committees?
A Yes, I believe we can.
... The committees have shown a tre-
mendous sense of responsibility?a tre-
mendous sense of restraint?in not
getting into such operational detail
that would endanger lives of people or
the ways we do things, but still getting
into adequate detail to conduct the
kind of oversight that they need. . -
The next year or so will be very im-
portant as we and the Congress work
- out the next step in this process after
the executive order?that is, legislative-
? charters establishing statutory controls
over our activities. The degree of detail
in those charters will be very impor-
tant to our future. ? ? -
. I anticipate a spirited but friendly
and co-operative debate with. the Con-
gress over the next few months in just
how those charters are drafted.
Q Admiral Turner, given the enormous
amount of money that this country pours
Into intelligence activities, why did the CIA
underestimate the Soviet grain crop by
such a wide margin? ?
, A First of all, we're not perfect, and
? we're not Avis?we're No. 1. but we're
still trying hard. .- . - .
It is not unusual for the Department
of Agriculture to miss the, long-range
forecasts of the American grain crop by
5 per cent We missed the Soviet crop
by 10 per cent. Because of reasons of
classification, I can't tell you all the
reasons we missed it by 10 per cent. -
-2,- But I can assure you that getting de-
tailed information in a country that
hides something that is really of global
importance and impact?as the Soviet
grain crop not easy. It is particu- ?
larly difficult when, in the last month of . ?
? the season, they had a very bad weather
situation there, which we think is large-,
ly what tipped the difference.
Let me say, though, that we did pre-.
dict that the Soviets were buying grain
'and would continue to buy grain, and,
. as a result, the market did not jump
markedly, or significantly after the an-
nouncement was made of what their
harvest was going to be. So we think
we did serve the American public even
though our prediction was wrong. .. .
- We'll always miss one here or there. -
If those are the worst that we missed,
I'm reasonably happy. But I don't want
to say that I'm happy that we didn't do
well on this.. We are certainly going to
try harder and harder, -
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.6.1\ 1 .1 Li-c
NEWSWEEK
7,ACOrnvoref.gnr--Release 2007/03441 NGWEsrepg599498R000300040004-4
THE CIA:
Out in the Cold
Even granting that there is no humane
way to fire somebody from his job, the
two-sentence pink slip that went out two
weeks ago to some 200 CIA officers was
brutal: "This is to inform you of my
intent to recommend to the director of
personnel your separation in order to
achieve the reduction ... ordered by the
DCI [Director of Central Intelligence]
..." The memo was signed by William
Wells, head of the CIA's clandestine
service, but the brusquely impersonal
tone belonged to the DCI himself, Adm.
have only two or three years to go until
retirement, the agency insists that the
first wave leave by . March?and it is
trying to hustle them out even faster by
promising not to make the pink slip part
of their personnel file if they resign im-
mediately. "That implies blackmail,
doesn't it?" says Smiley. "That's deeply
resented."
Hardware: Like almost all his col-
leagues, Smiley agrees that the CIA has
too many people, too much deadwood.
But he questions the decision to make all
the cuts?a total of 820 in the next two
years?in the 4,500-man operations divi-
sion while leaving the analysis, techno-
logical and administration branches un-
touched. In essence, this
means a greater reliance
on hardware (satellites
and such) and less on
spies?a tilt thatcould turn
out badly if the Soviets
perfect a killer satel-
lite. And Smiley wonders
about the susceptibility of
out-of-work spooks to Rus-
sian blandishments.
But what really rankles
Smiley and his cohorts is
the meathook methods of
Stan Turner. "He doesn't
know what is being el imi-
nated,"Smiley says, allud-
ing to a pink-slipped spy
who has -better and deep-
er contacts in the govern-
ment of Israel today than
anybody in the agency. I
believe that the admiral is
aware only of grades and
numbers."
? Bloated: "You really
heard them crying,
haven't you?" Turner re-
torted when told of Smi-
ley's complaints. "'Often
at personal risk!' I bet you
there isn't five of them that?
had personal risk. ..1 told
themright to their faces .
there is going to be a high-
erpercentage ofcuts in the
senior grades than in the
Susan T. SIcElhinnes?..Newsweek - junior. 'Vhat do you do
The CIA's Turner: Showing the door to 820 spies when you've got a bloated
? - agency on your hands?"
Stansfield M. Turner (NEvvswEEK, Sept . Turner does not dispute that he made
12). By last week, the rebellious mutter- no attempt to humanize the pink slips,
ing in the corridors had reached the but he insists that he knew the names
spillover point, and one high-ranking and skills of the senior people he fired.
officer threw regulations to the winds Faced with pressure to trim up to 1,200
.and aired his grievances to NEwswEEK. operatives over six to eight years, he
"To receive the grateful thanks of a collapsed the timetable to two years, on
grateful government for services ren- the ground that "I waste the taxpayers
ered--sometimes overseas at great haz- money by keeping people on the payroll
ard?in the form of a two-sentence mes- I can't justify." But agency sources ques-
sage, without any recognition of past tion whether the economies will be that
performance, was insulting and humili- great, since some of the fired people will
ating," said the defrocked spook, who catch on with other CIA branches. 0th-
will be called George Smiley. Spooks are ers may sue for settlements. One way or
no more frugal than anyone else, and another, the already troubled CIA may
given the esoteric nature of their skills be in for a long period of bitterness in the
they generally have trouble finding civil- clandestine ranks. -
Ian jobs. But even in the case of men who --FICHAAD awns with MVO C. MARTIN 14 Wastington
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A
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aiv PAGE ..10( ? THE WAStliNGTON STAR
17 JULY 1977
CIA Chief Gave Carter Pros and Cons
Turner Cautious on Korea Pullout
By William Beecher
?1977 The Boston Globe
President Carter not only overrode
the warnings of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that fulfilling his campaign
promise to pull all U.S. troops from
South Korea might increase the risk
of war, but also the cautions of his
intelligence chief. _
Adm. Stansfeld Turner, director of
central intelligence, said in an inter-
view: "My position is that we have a
balance of deterrence (between
North and South Korea) today; when
you withdraw forces, that in some
measure diminishes it. Whether it
diminishes it below the level of stabil-
ity is another question that's very dif-
ficult to answer."
Turner denied that in a private
meeting with the President he di-
rectly recommended against the
withdrawal plan. "I laid out . . . as
expressly and as frankly and as
objectively as I could ? from an
intelligence point of view, not a
policy point of view ? the pros and
eons of withdrawal, what I thought
the reactions of various involved
countries would be. . . . I did not
make any recommendation."
IN AN HOUR-LONG conversation
in his seventh-floor CIA office,
Turner also made the following
points:
It is not assured that if South
Korea attempts to develop nuclear
weapons that the United States could
detect a clandestine effort.
OThe Soviet Union appears to be fol-
lowing a different strategic philoso-
phy than the United States, planning
extensively not only for what is
necessary to deter nuclear war, but
how to fight it and recover from its
effects'.
0He does not share the reported
view in a niajor Carter administra-
tion study that the Soviet military
threat is "leveling off."
Off the United States cuts formal
military and diplomatic ties to Tai-
wan, China could militarily take over
the island fortress only at great cost
in lives, and would have to be willing
to incur the animosity of a number of
trading nations if it decided instead
to impose a blockade around Taiwan.
Carter's Korean withdrawal plan
came under increasing fire in Con-
gress last week after North Korean
gunners shot down a U.S. helicopter
that strayed into their territory, and
BOTH GEN. GEORGE BROWN, I
chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and
Gen. Bernard Rogers, Army chief of
staff, testified that the top brass had ,
recommended that only about one-
quarter of the 32,000 American com-
bat troops be withdrawn over five
years, lest the risk of hostilities be
heightened. Mai. Gen. John Sinalaith ,
earlier had been called on the Whitel
House carpet and reassigned from
Korea after he told a reporter the
larger pullout could lead to war.
Turner's interview was the first
clear indication that he, too, had con-
cern about Carter's plan, which the
President announeed at an early
White House press conference before
a National Security Council study of
the proposal could be completed.
But Turner was quick to point out'
that there: are many ways to make
the U.S. commitment to help defend
South Korea against aggression
"pretty persuasive."
He said these include the mainte-
nance of strong American fighter-
bomber squadrons there, military aid
to build up the South's combat capa-
bility, more American military train-
ing exercises in Korea and strong
statements from the administration
of its continuing resolve.
WITHOUT CONCEDING that the
United States has about 1,000 tactical
nuclear weapons in Korea and in-
tends to pull them out along with the,
troops, Turner declared: "When you
withdraw any kind of military tool,
you've got to weigh how credible was
it that it would have been committed
by the owner country." -
Some critics of the Carter plan
have asserted it may induce the
Seoul regime to secretly attempt to
develop its own nuclear weapons to
deter attack. A number of adminis-
tration planners pooh-pooh that no-
tion on the basis that the United
States was bound to discover any
such attempt and might cut off vital
military and economic cooperation
with Korea in that instance.
But Turner, whose CIA operatives
would be depended on to discover
any such covert effort if it were at- I
tempted, was hesistant to predict
success in spotting it. Getting I
bulky gaseous diffusion process
weapons-grade uranium from thei
would be relatively easy to discover,
he said, but certain advanced tech-
in the face of revaluations that the nology, such as the centrifuge proc-i
Joint Chiefs voiced strong doubts ess, would be much harder to dis-.
about the size of the President's pull- cern.
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RECENT NEWS stories about a
major new strategic analysis, called
Presidential Review Memorandum
No. 10, suggest administration plan-
ners feel the Soviet military threat
after several years of buildup has.
leveled off. Asked whether he had
seen any leveling, Turner said in the
last year or two he- had seen. "no
slackening." -
But an impending shortage in oil
and an expected falling off in the size
of its labor force, he said, raise legiti-
mate questions whether the Soviet
Union "will be able and willing to
continue to devote (substantial)
quantities of resources to the mili-
tary effort."
Turner said that unlike the United
States, which bases its strategic doc-
trine principally on the ability to
deter nuclear war by being able to
ride out a surprise attack and retali-
ate overwhelmingly, the Russians ap-
pear to be planning not only to deter
war, but to fight it and recover if
deterrence fails.
"I don't think that means they in-
tend to start a nuclear war or that
they feel it's inevitable that they'll
have one. But in a country that has
been invaded and decimated and had
to recover several times in compara-
tively recent history, there is more of -
a tendency. . . to take into account
the possibility of conflict on your own
territory." He cited a comparatively-
large-scale civil defense program as
an evidence of what he was talking
about.
Asked what would happen to
Tai-
wan if the United States cuts its for-
mal military and diplomatic ties,
Turner said much would depend on
China's words and actions. An inva-
sion could be successful, but at a
very high cost in lives, he said, and a
naval blockade would 'risk strained
relations with a number of important
trading nations. ?
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8 JULY 1977
By Martin Schram and J.im.--Klurfeld
Wasilington Bureaq',
- _ - .; ? -
.2- This is the second: ciftwo:.aiticles on- the-US:
.. ? intelligence
. .Washinton?Central.AgenCy
? ? - ,
Di-
rector Stansfield Turner has begun working with
. top Carter policy-makers to-bridge the intelligence
gap and solve what he concedes are "very real"
problems in the way the system Works..-i ? . ?
- "There has been too much emphasis on what I
call intelligence by committee by consensus: the.
new CIA director said this month in his most exten-
sive- interview since- assuming office four months
ago. . .The system. has had ton.m.uch_emphasis
on having an agreement, so you can.. . come up
with a. corry-nunity_ solutiozmi:;;
bite more bullets myself.',-_ ?
- The trimi:gray-haired adatirai;,-he-tetaini
active duty rank?.spoke candidly and on, the record:
t as .ha-ackncrwiedged- critii-iSM.41 that had: been-lev,..,
at-the inte1lig community by a ntimher of.
J.current
Those -corments of, dissatisfactiopi,
:.Nevisday.yestArday;included.coniPlaintib3i
:.makers that they- areideltiged by raw.intelligence
---,that is Poorly lyze&-..that the espionage experts.
often eo tait;tell thedeCiiioiwriakers., what-the in-:.
Jbrmatior ineen.s.and.hOyr:Amak.affect. present :Ella_
?..futzirepiIices-
Now; for the first president and his top
-iolidy:makets?.villl:- begin: telling the Intelligence-
..:,Cornmunityon. a regular. basis?specifically what:
they expect them to prordelm mibtary;.pobtical,
-.arid economic':
-ciacision-makertiale been- foci preoccupied
to give [the intelbgence conuirunity) the attention::
Fn?d.We-.?- now actively ...engaged.
with.the 'President and; top people , sorting-
-but thepricititieSthat;Will be orderecniune to do.":
ge, said be had 13.%eitit setting-up a procedure in diS:.
Cussiona;with.:President..Carter, Secretary of State
-,Cyriis Vance, DefensepSearetarY ? Harold Browii,1
-:National Secriz#Sr.AdVi:sersZbignie*Brzezin. ski and
- G-err.':Geargei Brown;:fchacithian.ODthe;tIoint Chief*.
-.!.a.Staffi
Turner- Sp-oke.v.i.illiler.iittingai;ilie:heid--Of
-:-.dark:-.malioganY."-ieenferenteqabliii,inati seventh-,
9or.*-PIAI. pffeethati--b1eicttldand-WO4-Paneling
a.p.a.ati:e#ansiyg:;:wAE.of:wilidovIti:Overlooking_the
v'oodlands of I
a2.o.:;? ntitig-soke-eiickU
*alYSEI: of thi:rap.....s..S. of haid:
- - ?
-V8liirLtieied- perhaPithre-beat rertieay`forl
this is for, the CIA director himself to 'bite the bul-
let".more often .and offer-his own analysis and pre-
diction of Major *events and trendii:-.--tt
^ ??' - ? ' ?
0 Outlined the in -Which: intent.:
gene& communi ty is -beginning
cc
.!!current . assessment?the 'Audi. of Soviet .sErategiC.,
Capability and strategy;.:;;,..:7.1"--c.'f,t. -
? Criticized. the controversial. Teani;:iBti
Team" approach.to- assessing Soviet strategic capa,
and strategy, whichvias initiated by his pre-
:?decessoi, George Bush; and pitted a team of agency
tynsatsly;sts
,
? , _0 Conceded that maiay?CIA analysts:need more-.
-training and experience because they are not &rail-
iar with the countrie:? they are in charge of assess;;.
- -
Analysis Needed -7.
1.7:: Turner -agreed with complaints of top officials
'such as,Brzezinski that the policy-makers are not:
.' Provided with-enough good analysis of the masa- Of
hard -information that-is fed to thern.by, the
-.Another problem, be conceded-;:ii.that the
. ? . ? - -
cyz-Makers.. are ? siniply:.:.fed.i.toOr;much information
)?;from.tneiyariou*sourcs in :the: intelligence-corn:
? c-- There is; tOo.nnichL'information.'arid they'
anuse it?that is a : very'. real. problem," Turner
IfIbsd a complete throttle on all of thee,
,l? nfOrMation going ....aroinid town: from-intelligence:1
f? agenciesil could- pteveut:sOme of that. Mut) to do '
so would- be dangerous in that -I obviously ..-could
aire'Imiy:151aSfifi,a/Id;0111d leave something out Soi
is a-riskyou take: in to- have multiplicity- of
He added: :.WiliaTorturiate,that. one of the.
gamesin Washington:is:1%o Has the Lates-t
;-..ligelice?':-And-..that-puta too much emphasis on-cur-
rent
tritelligence.-;?..-.The; problem is as soon:, as
t.soinetbing. happeiz1;!- somebody; runs in ' and. says,_
' YOU,. hear What has happened? Hot
offthe press;' ravrintelligence- has - just arrived!'
Three - qays -.later we find -out. it was a bad report
Or. put. it in context
that Pie' director of intelligence has-I
.?.- . .
spiii"esiiggestions of his. owt for the. policy-makers:I
? ,who -r:..el3r,? on-m- !If the co: nsumers- Wouldfi
ba little:morepatient and let u:s.put.it inl
context fOr:thenr,. I'.ci
- Still,. he concedes, the. criticisms I of a lack:54.
.are.:-."3talik7-_-.7.urnei:, offers hiif..e..*
taw*
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-1;,:-.,:i-,..1,?,,...-;.!,,..,..::":..f...,..,..,)..?.?_., .,......:-....?,,,..,0..?;?_1,-,.. .....?.,-.,..,... ?..?4-- _ Harvard political scientist who, serv. '.ed:Ori tile. Statei?
er6 .f.i.a:.'b-e-en.-to.'crrriiiCh,empbns.i.on what..1;1 ' Department's policy planning -staff in.- the Eisen-.:1
hovver administration, 'to select the. consultants.-'
-:."We are selecting .them to. complement - the .back-'?
:ground, biases, theologies, and the philosophies of-
:the .people we are assigning," Turner said. .?.-:.i; .,....--'
:. Turner also plans td consult with-a board ? corni,'.
PoSed of all the key members of the -intelligence .
community, asking them if there is "any strain, of ,
opinion that ought to be represented." ,..-- -...".;:-- -..,:', _
: He said: "I've told the board that.l..don't want to
find out we left something out after it liSS been
published." ? ' : . .i ...--,. ...,:;i.-
..?:T.Turner said he planned :..ici'..uSe basically: the*
'tame approach in organizing the. riational iritelli.
.-
. guide, estimates of other nationS. He also has ere...
ated a special board composed of, members .f. the
. intelligence agencies that:Will *help hirrideterinine;A
i- which countries and subjects Should -be :Studied. ...........:1
- .-..Top past: and present policy-makers have criti-. 1-
cized, the CIA, analysts for not being sufficiently
..-...' kno-wledgeable about the countries they are assess- t '.
Tui-ner?Said he is determined to avoid thepublie.:4 ing...IVIany analysts have not even been to the couri-_,
-..controversy that has surrounded the most .vital -- - _11 tries to which they are assigned, the officials
.L.teffigetice .estimite.that the ageri.cy_in,k0.. the it-si.: . charged. . ?
.,..seSsment-. of Soviet strategic :strength and ..inten....:,1.7.
?Ition.s.. --..-.:.' ::-..':.!.:'?,,":,, _.7:-. - ...--.-
In.;1976; bush, then the CIA" direCtor;.took the
:Internal CIA estimate* and ? brought. it before:a?,
;?-board of experts from outside the government:.That:
.,.vias called the A .Team, B Team approach......----::'
-But 'Bush. purposely .loaded, the outside learn-,
.with hardliners,: who prediCtablY.said the _Soviets'
-: had a much greater military capability -.than 'the'.
-,CIA 'estimated _and that the -Soviets .were pUrsuing.'.
(?,,superiority in. nuclear Wearions.'.t'-';,-3--V.,::.:- . ? . ..-7:-.?---:
\-1:-..,..-:::-The hardliners leaked theifirersion td, the prgs,i
and started a publidtontroversyraiihe Carter adz?
.., ministration came into.. ofrice-77'.;'?-i.:`t-.2..f.:.:?:-..;?! ..- . -?:? . -,-..!PAi',
.idush- defended ithe;A:,teatc-B4eams . ? 'appriiich,.:'-,f3
....._ .
saying- Yes, if you 'pick hardline guys, you're 0;71
.,.:-ing.to get A hardline.responseso what?.This.wa.V..7
1
-::
to have been :done. in. private. The ,. .'-':.'":".'1'be question' --we."
.....!?were 'Posing Was:if You piCk hardliners, would theki
:!,..ncc,..ssarily come iip.,..witlf-. analySia ; that. was more
? -,:12ardline?".,..... 7..':'?-0::::?,...,:.:?;;;!'??,--.?-.:?%.11:::!..;:....,?!,,,,-..:5-1-..:,'.-.,-.--i..-....
.-.',..:Turrier.Said :Of *the.xTeam":-B?....Teara aPproa?chil;.,
.The Concept of hailing a .tearif,With-art ideological
f.: polarization is one I.woUld:Up_e with caution"
:,::.lie..tidded.:.".? .....But there?-?conldsoine. cases ii.;,.
-Which .I. would ,want tO! dr; It.", .,.:?:-.:. ? - : .....kr::::
..:.. -
-. = --F-T.Tunier.says he is--iising ii.'-iiiferent4roceclure. I.
Ay...,
:..71Ye are approachinglhe next -estimate .with a sin:: .
:lee. team' and a single- adviserY:group rather than ? j
"..the-A-B team approach,": Turner said. -:`:-... I don't- ?'.
':ever Avant to get into ari.A-tearn.,B-teani [dispute)
e'-ll intelligence byiecomrrcitt:by--consens:4V
*.group- gets together and 'they' can't agree, they. try;
,to find a common MiddliTienoundand the middle.;
k ground is probably never the4rolind. on. which you.
? ovant..,:to
also offered- One' Sollitian-M.-think I haVe-
More btillets,:myself.--.WhenrAhe Community:7;
'car.k7t agrm,?:itis the DCI [director of Central intelli-'...1
gence] estimate [that must-be:T.-ma P), I've -d-m--e jt
'once since 'I've been. already.,I -bit the .bulleti:i
tbiiak-Yon-have.waffled this one': .
an .external positioia--7.44
.(Turnei?-woli1Ct not .-gcOnto: detail an just what
4his? position was' in the example he. cited: But .11e;
:said the case...inVolved.an:aS.seis-ment of the
(i-ary ? Cap ebilities7 of. fcirCetL'One-.4.vai?numerical
larger Ithan.theisither; said lie took;
thua.thOuld:be considered superior)
? e etun .
:in public again." -; -
plan on-the new Sot'estimate is to
_bring in outside experts with a diversity of opinion
?'Ito, work with agency personnel within the analysia-...?
, -
He is relying on top assistant Robert Bowie ICI.
,,?_
_ .
Turner concedes that that is true. "We need
some improvements in the training and education
and. diversity and experience of our analysts,"_ he
said. "We need to give our analysts more opportuni-:1
tiesletting.'some of:Ahem: go to'. vario?as courses,l,
posts overseas, and With more interplay withathe
7,academic community and think-tanks."-;; ? '
Officiala?Ahrotighout the executive b-rancht arid.;
on Capitol. Hill currently are debating various-pro--;
pcisals to reorganize the . intelligence community.
f. Reorganization -has become= a topic of...major dis-
pute,. especially-between -Turner -and Secretary of-,
Defense Harold Brown . Jr. ? - ?
?" ????? ? ? :?-?
The subject has become so sensitive thaurner
wouldn't .discuss'it in the .interView.,But according,.
to
otherintelligente officials, Turner wants to crei,-
? .
ate a director Of malarial intelligence-Who Wouldz-
t have.broadPower over the entire intelligence cam',
munity.
The director Woiiid Set the budget, - Make the ai:Zi
:":81gnment6 and; -possibly, directly control the anply;--:.
;?. Sis of all .collected inforinationjle would bean, jn
te.1Iigenc6.. czar, I; ).?;. 11: ? ? ?
Brown' is- oliPbied 'to relinquishing adminiStra,..i.
/,'-tiVe control of the huge National Security. AgencyM
.the agency that does most .f the electronic .co1led,.4
flan and 'currently is run by the ? military..
. OtheemeMbers.of?the intelligence- corriinunity?9
say they fear that the director would be too power.41
ful and that dissenting' opinions -would .note. get]
through to policy-makers...-- -
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'.:Proponents ot the reorganization .argue..- that it?
??...,yvould make the agencies more aCcoUntable,,elimi4
nate duplication and inter-agenCy, rivalry and iin-k
Prove the prove.tne 'production and, quality, of intelligenCe4.
the.fornier. CIA director, is against.the
eiganization.- . He Oppose ..the, concept. of 'a rl
? if it means that he would.be removed freni
ingt'n head of the CIA-. and would-not have a CIA;ti
. base;?Isden't think the CIA- should be just one com4
.?ponent in a- military dominated intelligence net-,i,
?,;:: Joseph 'Biden (D-Del..);-si. member, of :the Senate'.1
intelligence Committee, sa$,s he favors the c_oncep01
'a single director with broad powers. .
hnhere has get to be, one. person a president can-,t
iturn.,to -and. say, Where- the stor7?'4
We- need one person:?a director Cf intelligence-41
44Ver CIA,- DIA, .NSA and .all -the iest,". Biden-Said.,?_A
P.resident'is expected to make tkdecision on:
reorganization before the end ;of the sumrmr:7.4.:.--t1
.with all the ControVersiei. and problems,
officials in' the intelligence 'Corhenuhity
hope'Turner IS the Man who can bridge the gap be-
tween the needs of the decision-niakers nd the c&
Of the intelligence commdnity. ? -1
-c.r.n:?-.")tou? see, have -am-interesting .perrpeetive
here,"-!:Turner said. ,March..9?.I had been
'nothing :but -?consumer Of ? inthlligerice 301/2
*. . -
.ye
sympathize with the consumes.'
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?lvT7
;-_
Nit
???
" ? ?-?
()to, tOt.4./.;.?wmg.Fr...4.fo ig,miur,s7Irkt..t2httno ine. comp' a in la not limited ttneci
Similai,coriCern was espies*. bY.
-.11114,./i0t it 'Pewit -We 4terg. nor (king -oilr ficiali-of the -Ford and, Nixon years, eapeCially pa
: if uas'Wi int4ligence gap: , ? intelligence concerning such areas as Angola,: Chi41
? ? . ? . tie Oyprus 'Portugal- the Mideast and -.Vietnarrit?Wilhan1 Colby, former directo of tne CIz;
o the mvnisf.publiay critical of, those former
- This is *he first ortio0:04k4s-olijiitgrals-_1:1tg--.2..
10.44.Wa.4211lich4rd
Jigence community -- ;i2 4 Ni-con hun.elf, who said in'his
teleif.ised interv,ews 'with David ros.
?.- intelligence agencies at ..the StateBy Martin Schram and Jim Kiurfeld nd :;,,
Defense DePartinenti; as well as the ca,.. had:.
e.wsday Washington provided poor i information in Indochina ;-arid:had
va?hirigtoq4qop policy officiali,in1;th.e'...Carterfailed to predict the start :Of, the 1973 Yarn Kippur
admistration say they. are dissatisfied , witkAhel..:;'1=;;War,in the Mideast;
i:;?caliber :of informationnot.surpriied.to..See'.8.tir'ilitelligence'drop
..tialV Nixon said, initalking about the -Mideast!
Thosenfficials; including White Houk plittional-..Ft".WaiTI thought basically that our intelligence. coin--?..
Security'Adviser" Zbignie
tary of State Cyrus Vance,'belktilii.f.:tha'aidtgr.--11.i.a 'series of interviewa Y4th:: Nevi44
ri reaching their aeska often is not well analyzed telligence' e-'cpeir's cited several-major reasona cr
md at figwi has 1ailed to alert them to major de-. -the problem - - -
.elopmenta in the world Their concerns There is too mich emphasi,7pn Othering in4
clear during. it ..series."*;of;.NewidaY interviews with foqnation and not enough emohasis on anal]? g'
:1;leading-policy-itiakerstheir7assistanta-,-dirreatic";what.: it
a'id former inteliigence officials, and-intelligence- :_...The freatrierited;b?CireaTiCiatiC'StrilCiirigiif trel
experts : on Capitol intelligence community Often p?FeVentsital infor
- "The United States from?reaching.decision-rnakerijaliOielY.
Jar iascnpation with technology and uSab'
f_zinsliF,SaiVj*iuld say 1110 tkle:Arn6ribin;.infor,-1-;::??:-*:"?.4.4:".Intelligenee'iagencieS-'dn:'ifotknew what tha
-
niation-gethering-.!t.echniques-4ire:-the'::heat'.;:ln!thtf45'Yec'iSion-inakers eipect of them, in part beCaUselhel
world-the;cequipment.',-ja-f'abielutely.Wetiiiirkigil.---..7ideCiaiori??MakerS:do not a.,sly the 'right "queiticinal-0.41
But it is the analysis Pr-the:-.inforniatiOikliiit;44-:00ninake; the right' iiquasta of the a gencies:-..P-7;4:':,-9
iniportiiiiiiAnd.j think-;lhereq0:10v00-0.:::vt.t44.-ezi, At times decision mukers receive goodjnYelli4 ;
ti on giVeirtd abilitY.:tolay...iyhafall:thi:;tilfot.;'-::_ltialiee'imit disregard it for their reasoni of .0010
? :?.? ? ? L- - 5).74???? 4::?;?,?:..:5, ? ?? ? ? ; : - - ? ?? .r
"Mat is coliectea 71PeafLi5???"...,::';;t- cy. and/or s ?,?;
=7;:;?: aSecretary of, State Vance also
tnat there is aIprob1ern7FNance :Says -hers:.js::09'....3-Cammittee on Intelligenceifirst-PtilDlielY
inforthation, and. there'iS'a-need to decide thi.quality-pintelligence,--defined,,thej
plioritieslagd.the#:tg?(.4. a better job on the uriority ' proolem this way 'The tedl question is Are v,e
'natters 4.'. ;riff getting:' timely : knowledge in the- proper;-:fashibri?.?,-.4,
Officials of the: Carter White Ilouse-sar-they Are the Cost and the risk justified by the -end .prod
ere not able to obtain-timely:or adequate inte1.11.-:,.qt:,uct?'!'-.-.' ' ???
F,gence"tinalyies. on -sualf-inatters'.;.of. 80 per cent of the U.4:: intelligenCii.hild_41
'?;...significance..a.s.the recent invasion of ?Zaiip;'. spent on military affairs, according to an in-'
of Soir,i6fPreaidant.Nikolai Y. PedgornY; and',' formed source. 13at now decision-makers are SayinV
rthe strength of Likud Party in:thk.:-.?there must be greater emphasis in the intelligence
.fllsraeli-election-'eanipaign,::forecisting.the poSsib.lt'..:;,-,i;:eonimiinitYloa political analysis 'They hate ?like1
i:ity of a new hard line era in Israeli leadership hell to predict the future,".- one Carter national.:se71
.-:, ? . ? ??-.. f ? ' * ???-? -?? ? ?
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- - knowledge that there was a major shakeup under I
CUflt?.,OThc:al said!.`TheY?:don't.Want to 1-gceptli;:-1 'Way in the Kremlin 'While it quite pOssible that-1
'4.1-iiici:thati la- theirjah:::_That ii what,We exp.ectv knuwled4e of those events.would not have- changed
1hem? -?
::.Two of the staunchest .defendsra of the capabill.
of.: the ,.. in tell igence community,.7George Bush
Colby,ad .Wiiliarn i both' former QtA-dif&tois:POii.
there are major shortcOrnings in -the
eing-btit'add that-there-are real problems in' tryidel
to a fiSfY: the demanda.of decision-makers. .
"There 'is a desire that we have a crystal ballt
';'coliy; director Of the CIA from May, 1973, to Janu'
'said. !.`The problem is that there ere' $iy
?t_.-ineny-'variablesif You understand That, Oka.-
the agency does; not predicL..somethiiigtli?
Oiapperisithat is an intellrgencelap. I told iny-Pe-o-41!
ple I wanted to know :about -;Soinething,:before",-.1*
happened. When I:did. floc-it -meant wei-Vefe- riot
doing pur-job'?
';.Ceorge Bush, CLdfr?o?om'Jahuar 1976f
toi-sJanuaFY;: 1977,,, acknowledged. one problem:
intel1igence information :collected is so voluwinoua.-
ff. cannot.. be-properly 'analyzed, and liseil;by:-
4oliey-rnakers.::".! -don't think the highest level" pOlii;?
4,ty.4rilikers get ..swamped,"!-Bush the
rnid-
diejevels have nhelluva lot, of-informationAt's--
ot..t.O.:sert and
-said -he thought:theCIA daes, 'all in all, an. ??
411eicaller4.- job of gathering endi;enalyzing4,--_,Th_C
'toes have ihortconaings and 'does ?rnake misi
Tb.ut-it: Could be that ;seine of the.3
problemare .thafleaders- are not-asking thwrigki.1
' and congressional studies,
a number of exeinles'ef.majOr-international3
; events in Which- the intelligence 'community clearly'
rS:.nbtrniet the needa'nf.thk ixakce.p.-4k,T.-.sofn9f1
?
n.
cialajnOW;bay they had no warning that the Sovieki
President Nikolai V. Podgorny was abant-,i to; be I
'kicked out of Office: "That was no small step; it was
a major: event, one. White House offickalLeak..ir,
"They ,didn't.give
? ? '?:-.:',rb-P..;Pert:Pr, Adnilirietration was criticizing the
situation the Soviet Union and
. .
F.tresosnting a new strategic arms proposal without
--. administration.; policies? officials:say .the. informa--
ion
would have-been-helpful.: e
? .'`If we knew- there wasan -upheaval -going_ On
thepaxty.,-,it:might-have- told us something :
? about the-dissident: situation," the White Hous:e--of:
ficiarsaid.;71t is the. type of information that would..:
'? -have been:ii-ieful-to-have:! -The White House
. . . .
..:,.receivela-CIA:hriefingen the Podgomy ouster on
June--.28'4Weeksi:nfter it-had.--occurred.,-;c.;2:;:4;
ZarMarch,. 19Th The.admini-stratior-
:-ceivettnewl-Paper reports: On March 8 that the-Oott---4-
per-ric.h:Shab&provireie of Zaire [formerly the
? Bel-
gi Congol-washeiiiiiruiaded by:Ain:known forces--;
Then,:moree_than.48?houraelapeed before-President
Carter_waS giyeriSPecificinformation about the in-:::
?
"
? "Wei-didn't:7 knOW7:-Whit-lwaalliaperting,_':::;:.the.:
White- HOUsaofficial..-Said.:,- .7W a,- had ino:--idea.:;-whal
they wor what they wanted.. We didn't know if -
-'there were or Russiani:-:inVolved.-:-.;,:-:. We
needed-people-on the-ground we could phone orre-.
twork:of :pinata:eta.. And, there-
? Was noadvance warning
queetion.of Cuban invo1vemeiit orceinse,_
Was-?key::::At-zthe tithe, the administration was ag-
tively pursuing improved relations with _
? ---1-1:-,:thiria;November,- 1976: Bush;:the director of
the- _CIA--614:_the time, strongly defends:the agency'e7
:7TECO2diblitleveri he-eoncecleS that-the rise to power-
? . Hun Itio;feng7 in mainland- China Was art event
that the-agency ,should have been: able-t&preclict.::::
?,.,-.;-!!That.-is-- one-area-1w which-our intelligence Tra%
been Tess thailViwanted," Rash. Said recently; 'We
was-nat.-fingered. bk`our intelligence-sources... We'
oknew- somethingrabouthie.backizrotinkjant all:
sthat much4And-;Iii-ost impoktantaielyias-not...cited
Tai the riext4iltelkjeader of Chin P.4.---74.iallet-*ida
complaint- against-US mtel1in?
.,7*.;;.?Arigola:Septernbi; :1977: ;Whil
4inmentwasmaking-a:clandeetine',effort,;t4. aife-c-4
the,outcome-of"the- civil waur.AngoIa, former-1
"aides WSeCietair, Of State Henr-y-Kissingei, Say;
e that they were operating without knit-M.0g* of two]
Limportaxitevents:Alai Was Plaiiint?iika,iznajorireili-LI
Ltary involvernentand South Africii-Wa:s pIannink?-
:whoIe-oramzed- intervention
7 picked tip -;.thiC,Cuh.4-oli'inie-iiili..;:rj0
hal we :*ay underestimated The nuniSera,"-;Onetof A
the-former Aides said.: -"We _thought the _MPLA fthe
side supported by the -Soviet Union and Cuba}-:waji
ft.goitiiid own 'the -7the-helP 4)f.about-.1:
15,000. Cuban. troops;411.-e
.Jn additionto supporting'. the losing side, the
-; United States was closelyidentified with the Soirtli.?-
',:.-African.lintervention7-precisely-the
identification
;:Kissinger had wanted to avoid._Two. former intel1i4;,t
-:-gence officials -Confirmed :;:that while US:- int40
gence ?cya.S --secretly --working with -the- South -Afri0
..,cans on Angola, the Americans we;e caughtby sur;;-;::-1
i.prise by the-large-scale South.Afri can intervention-':
If ive. hid known; we -Might have gone to .South;!
Africa and :said,- 'What :tire7Otri,doing here? 'Thial
.changes everything,7,26ne source said. ::"Our
'..?-sgence was really -yeti good '-duri*ie,Agola?excefrtP.,,
f,for.;thoie
co*WinuA
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Cyprils,-July,- 1974:-tlii3190.0.caffnliateliFI41@a2-aD71..0"4/'.:21daQIHERP1Pai(WOMICIOANgggigc1664-; I
`. ly'was caught by sUrprise by the areek-led thilitetiy1. :.,however; have told News4a3i.that. they believe that!
.- -cup that almost-sthrted:a war between NATO..alr.;:,., r. Kissinger, through his personal 'shuttle diplomacy,
-lies Greet and Turkey... Intelligence clearly failed ;.1 ., was -Warned of the possibility of the boycott, but did ,
' ? to,prOvide-warning of the coup," the Pike commit,;....not act on his information or pass it along to intelli-; i
, tee .-report-.-said...-?"lAnd:_..it- performed IndifferentlY:- :.-genc.e. The fact.that decision makers were not shar--i
( ..once.' the. Crisis had,..beiiinft:,-._.--:Z-:;:e..!"---1-.- :-,,,'''.''-:'.-:',..:;t:,:, '.: ing,inforrnation with intelligence also was cited as
' ,.....;.:.,..::Although therer.,'wereittany'Sigr?S that It',COW ;.. a significant problem by the Pike committee.-
v4 possible, CIA.--repOrti.contintiallY'.dovinplayed; -v.,...'.-,! There has been one other major Problem: inter-
the chances of its happening.-::- .-!..V.:',..-1'.;---.':.,,:, ..., ? ..t:.-:-.i.q k-agency - rivalry.- In some .of '.the --- examples. cited',
?:.- -.
The CIA postinartenCof ? that event; parts-,ofTi '.iJ above, the fact thet military intelligence could rotl
-which appeared: in,..the.-'1Pike report, concluded: or would not cooperate with the CIA or the State:
Many reports w.e.r..P'.?00.:technical to be understood j P*partMent led to fragmented or contradictory ep,.:
:by ?lay-nnalysts.-.-:-.--As in -past .crises, ? most of th.e? . .
customers complained -.Ofthevolume of. ..--.'. '.-report-4 :-.:Porting...Bush offered one graphic- example of thel
.., .
ing as -Well as its frequent -redundancy. Many alsol qrivelry. when he was_ director. - - - --..-.. _ ,. , ., , _
complained of toe .little analysis of. the facts, tool 'I.7;,."::',-Iri' the "-winter of 1975-76, when Kissinger vas.
few assessments of-thesignificance of .reported det.;', trying tonegotiate a strategic arms treaty with the f
velopments.".....:,:-1.4-_,-;;.:,-'-: :.-.7,;z-I''.,-T f: . - %.:: - 1. ?'?':'??:! -'. Soviet Union, the military said the Soviets'
---,'-?;. Portugal,:si-April;s7-1974:i'The'Tike 'cOnamittee'.1 f-Backfire bomber was a major threat to U,S.-securi-i
study of .the left-wing Coup .showed that.not.only.1 i_ty and wanted strict limits placed on it in any mu
did the intelligence community fail "to predict. the.'i clear arms control agreement.-I.Cissinger was negei!
- - :- -, ?...
.coup, it had failed 02:n63-f-completely even to alert.] Ptieting- only to. limit the :deployment -of the :plane
decision-makers that There ,a problem ...The,
....:i
...? ?
' ..,?):';':!-:"-.1`"The'Air Force intelligence leaked a'report that i
study said .tbeDefense?Intelligence-Agency;clearlyi :::.:Ithe' CIA assessments of the Backfire bomber 'were,
-failed 1 to detect thOiria_pue.1:- strengtliIOf.Jeftewingl '':;;'-iviong and weak," Bush said. "The thrust of the re4
.?,,..:militaryleaders though there i'ere Public signs ?I?..' port was rather malicious and untrue, as far as Fnii
their, rise to power and of their split with the righCel! concerned. What was untrue was that it said the!
.1.,-..,Winglgovernenent....-..1-_,:..-,.;.7....,..f....:: ,..- ? ?-,:e;-.:.-..e.. .-!.., --..,,t, .' CIA was instructed by Kissinger to come up withi,
'There were plenty of signs," a fornier.r.n. euther'.,r.-' estimates that the Backfire bomber could flyless;
z:i,.:? or the intelligence community said. "..'.An article:: :i,:-? far than really could; The analysts:were-highly!
.-.
:..:by a professor really had more information on the...? :i; competent; professional engineering types If any.
?6:situation. than ?we received from our sources ?. e one .suggested to. them, 'Here's 'your,answer; nowl
,, .
'i.:?'. One .problem. was that nobody was paying any at. -..come up with it,,' they'd blow the whistle on ther.a.".1
..
'.Efei.itien to Portugal, it was on the :back burati....X-41? :''- ''-':.,.* ? F ": 'I- -: ? \ ; ? ? . .. - .i . - '? :- =''.!-:?". 1
..
r .,.7'-';'Another case of interagency rivalry occurred i
It could have been a.-disaster." : ..,? .,';i..','!'- ; . .-17.,:'-'-'-'7??;:C':, ' ' ' ' ' ? -
' . --' ' - ''''''''' last year;- after President Ford gave the CIA direc.41
? ,,c.:-;..:'.--..-. Mideast, Oct. 3; 197,3: In his interview with Da4-: .: ? --
?
.- ? ?
, tor:. budgetary' control over-the entire intelligence
?...,,vid FrOst,.Nixon described how he found out about T "community.. A .
.1 '. former top CIA` official . said:. that..!
';:. the outbreak of the :Wait "I was going to Key Bis- :.fighting over the new budget system became Po 'ins
at the time -. :- .. and I got the intelligence ? - ? *fl
reaeriorte . from the CIA that day. And the intelligence. ',Con' from' each other:. The official Paid ? that - sineel
tense' that the agencies were withholding informa-4
-,.,. report said that, an armed attack is possible, but.. :thenew. administration took over, that problem heal
iJunlikely. ?The next morning .I got .a telephone c,sall.:: ,
; abated. - ...,? :-...- :.-: N ' .... -...:: -. .:'. ' '-. ::' , ''.;. e,-.-;f-.;?-11:!:
from Washington that Egypt had attacked.: :.!,:,.!..??; .:-',..: : Ultimately, intelligence gathered by all- ageni
Colby, the CIA director at the time, said there is.--:. .',:'cies-la. . for: the use of the President. At the White,
zr
no other way. to describe it It Vii4.9*blunder!..en. :;::Hoiiiie;:. senior *officials say - they ?much. prefer ? the
intelligence failure. 'We blew it :: ,:Y=f;',.;,- ',.....'::. ....., ::.,;? _-?,7.: daily intelligence analysis of the Brasil State De;;'
The Pike committee concluded that. the 'entire,: ',partroent intelligence unit, the bureau of intellid
..';intelligence . System,. had malfunctioned.
_ . 7ily.lassivie; ';. aence-?andresearch, to that of the CIA and the De-
'.--??''ainounts of data had': proven* indigestible. to; anit?:,.. ; tense IntelligenceAgency. "1NR' gives 1.1fi the best:
."-lysts," the panel' said. 'Analysts, reluctant; to raise .? i?
/analysis,".one White House official said. "it's' more"
;'?.'-falee alarm andlulled by anti-Arab biases, ignored:::
. l',Insigatful.:-They focus on five or six items of irttel.i
-7,clear warnings.' ....? ? - ...---. - ---...--/ :- ?.' ?:',-'-' -?:''..:.:::::'''..--F'!: :test ;; '.,ii.C.-What it means,' where it's going."........? "?:?. '.:ii
.Arab Oil Boycott; October.; 19'3 The intelli--.. i:l'i':.' The 'man who heads that unit, Harold :H:
igence community.failed.to warn decision-makers of, ,';stt-ueder,wh
' ?
o was a National Security Council of;
?-:'!:..the boycott.; and then after the* boycott was `.!---)."-1 .;:,1-ficiat.under Henry Kissinger, said the solution is
?!Posed,' did. not. accurately forecast its; impact,: ac-, '.' not' any plan for reorganization currently. under'
cording to officials inside and outside the cernmuni-,' '-;;?diectiesion..- $aunderp said the intelligence comrou7-7
..-ty....."There was no specific warning that the boycott-, ..., pity: and the policy makers must communicate bet.
twas . about to take place," Herbert Hetils,luth in re
.i..,.;.!er, :The intelligence community does its work in '
.?-i. current director , of public information; d Le"' ?,:i. vacuum,. just gathering facts, and not considering
i, sponse to a question from .Newsday.. !"They dic!.rief..',. ...what the decision-makers need. And the decision.
-have that information." .,. 'rt. : ',????';.-.1.--':----:::---...-.'s ...--?'-'-: i-,makers:never define what it is they want,"..
il.'---.'-::'' And . Sen. Adlai Stevenson III'. (b-.111); 'wh?86. ''Saundera said. "The challenge is to bring the two -
isiibcommittee ie doing a detailed study' Of the boY
'.1.:t9gpthFr. Get' the community :more ? conscious'. ofj
ticott, said 'economic analysis was disappointing. 1. policy 'and the ? deciaien-makers asking the. righti
.,-,.:"The -intelligence' did'not . deal With the economic.: . . ? 4
questions. --? : .. ? ? ' -? ?-? - ? ' ' ? - ??- '
consequences," Stevenson said 'There "There were private 1..:?? . . ,-? ; ?-?
f- ;sources that were making a much betterI.' _An : than the CIA: the oil companies and even-the Interyie
? , r CIA-Director.'-
10-1 Economist magazine.'''
? tO "1'4 4 ???? ? .k..nti ? ';',`
A nnrnvpri Fnr RPiPASP 7nr7try-vol ? rIA-Rnp99-nn498Rono3nnunno4-4
AA-77,-.LE AphRpipbed For ReleastL4P70,4611s,: J3DieMbff498R000300040004-4
ON PAGE 16 May 1977
cat4.4'
CARTER'S ENTELL1Ga3CE CHIEF
?;,...E.S UP WORLD'S TROUBLE SPOTS
Interview With Adm. Stansfield Turner,
Director, central Intelligence Agency
On the eve of President Carter's departure on his
first overseas mission?a summit conference with
Allied leaders in London?Admiral Turner took the
editors of U.S, News & World Report on a verbal
tour of danger areas around the globe.
Q Admiral Turner, do you agree with the view expressed
by some high officials in recent years that the Soviet Union is
an ascending power and the U.S. is declining?
A The Soviets have their strengths, and they have their
weaknesses. Their weaknesses are in economics and politics.
I don't see the Soviet economy climbing *to outdistance us.
Our lead is so great that they cannot hope to overtake us
unless our percentage of growth every year were to be a lot
smaller than theirs. And that is not happening. So, in terms of
raw economic power, we are not a declining power.
As for ideology, the Russians may think it is a strength for
them, but I am sure we would all agree that their ideology is
hamstringing them in many ways. After all, what's left of
pure Marxism? Where is it practiced or believed in? You
have a different brand of Communism in every country in
Europe?and a different brand in Yugoslavia, a different
brand in China. Even in the Soviet Union, they don't hold to
it very carefully. So?no, I don't think the Soviets are on the
ascendancy ideologically:
Q And militarily?
A They have a strong military position. One of the reasons
they are putting such emphasis on their military strength is
that they are trying to convert military power into political
advantage. They have no other strengths that they can
exploit in Africa and elsewhere. Military is all that they have.
0. Is the U.S. falling behind Russia in military power?
A In my view, we still have the edge in the strategic
? nuclear field as a result of our preponderance of warheads
and the accuracy of our missiles. However, the trends are
moving in the other direction because of the substantial
effort the Soviets are putting into strategic weapons. If that
continues, they could close the warhead gap and outdistance
us in what is known as throw weight.
The complex equation as to when those trends might give
the Soviets a militarily superior position is very difficult to
state?given the fact that you're balancing numbers of war-
heads, accuracies and throw weight in the same mix.
Q Are the Soviets near the point where they could knock
out our land-based missile force with a first-strike attack, as
some strategists claim?
A I don't see a first strike as being anything like a rational
calculation in the years immediately ahead by either side.
What concerns me is the image that is created and the
impact this could have on world opinion if there is a
perceived imbalance in favor of the Soviets in strategic
nuclear power. ? ?
So I think that, first,, we must understand the nuclear
strategic equation as best we can. And, second, the United
?
---.7,7.;,--;--7.'_?1.?-zey...p.t?-g.,)-7---fi
. .
Before joining CIA in Feb-u- '
ary, Stansfield Turner, 53. ...
? had a long Navy career that ,
1
? included the presidency of,-'
'-the Naval War College and .
, command of Allied forces in :
-: Southern Europe. - He at-
tended. the Naval Academy
with -President Carter, and
later was a Rhodes Scholar.
States must not let it get out of balance in fact or in
perception. I don't think that the people of this country are
going to let the Soviets outdistance us in a dangerous way.
But we've got to be vigilant as to that.
0. We've heard a great deal lately about Russia's massive
civil-defense program. Is there any danger that this will give
them a decisive strategic advantage over us?
A Certainly not at the present time. I don't believe that
the Soviets are near the point in civil defense where they
could think that they could absorb a nuclear blow from us
with reasonable loss---,that is, a loss they would be willing to
accept.
It doesn't seem to me that the damage to the three
ingredients that civil defense protects?leadership, popula-
tion and productive capacity?could be estimated by the
Soviets to be small enough to make it an acceptable risk for
them to initiate a nuclear war with deliberateness.
Q What truth is there to the report that the Russians have
made a breakthrough in developing a beam that could
destroy all of our missiles?
A The question of Soviet development of a charged-
particle-beam weapon has been the subject of intensive r
analysis for a number of years. All the results of these studies
have been made available to high-level U.S. Government-
officials on a continuing basis. The Central Intelligence
Agency does not believe the Soviet Union has achieved a
breakthrough which could lead to a charged-particle-beam
weapon capable of neutralizing ballistic missiles. This ques-
tion is obviously of concern to the 'U.S. Government, and is y
continually under review by all members of the intelligence
community.
0. Aside from the idea of a first strike, are the Soviets I
thinking and planning in terms of actually fighting a nuclear
war rather than just deterring one?
A The difference that I note between them and us is this:
The Soviets in their planning start with cold war and think
the process through all the way to a strategic nuclear war?
and even to postwar recovery. We, on the other hand, tend
to think from cold war to deterrence. There's less emphasis
in our thinking on what happens after the nuclear weapons .
start going off, because the idea is so abhorrent.
It's a different psychological attitude. Maybe it comes from
the fact that the Russians are from a country that's been
attacked and overrun a number of times in their memory. So
they have more .of an -inclination to think through the
implications of someone attacking them. .
0. Are they more inclined to contemplate resorting ,to
nuclear war to achieve their political objectives? .?
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A I'think not. I think they have shown a rational, sensible
approach to the nuclear-weapons problem?a willingness,
for example, to negotiate SALT-type agreements.
a In your opinion, where do the Soviets pose the greatest
threat to the United States today?
A Well, you have to break that down between where our
greatest interest is and where their greatest opportunity is.
We have a vital national interest in Western Europe?in
maintaining the NATO fabric whole and strong. The Soviet
Union is trying hard to build up enough military power in
Europe to give the impression that they can dominate that
area. With an intimidating force on their side, they want to
fracture the NATO Alliance from within by undermining the
resolve of the NATO Allies. That is a serious threat?but not
the most urgent.
The Soviets are pressing hardest at the moment in Africa.
So, in that sense, Africa is the most urgent threat. But clearly
Africa is not as vital a national interest to m as is Europe.
O. What is the Soviet objective in Africa?
A I think that, all over the world, the basically imperialis-
tic thrust of the Soviet Union is one of opportunism. They are
very adroit in the sense of pushing their opportunities
wherever they develop, but not pushing them to the point
where it involves a major commitment of Soviet resources or
prestige if they fail.
,They've found that NATO has stymied their imperialistic
expansionism in Western Europe. And so they're Probing
each opportunity that comes up anywhere to get a foothold
or friendship.
Somalia is an example of how this works. The Soviets start
with a fishing fleet calling in at a Somali port. Then they offer
aid to the Somali Army. The Army stages a coup, and a
general takes over as President of the country. Then the
Global Dangers Facing U.S.
?
Admiral Turner's Assessment
Soviets in Africa: This is the "most urgent threat"
posed by Russia, but the Soviets have been -only
moderately successful" there.
Western Europe; Russia is "stalemated in
Europe" and therefore is trying "to leapfrog out to
gain influence in other areas of the world."
Post-Tito Yugoslavia; "The most fragile point in
the European scene today," where Soviets will
"look for an opportunity and probe without
getting themselves overcommitted."
Revolt: in Eastern Europe: Even though there is a
"stirring of thought behind the Iron Curtain ... I
don't see a real possibility of a major fracturing of
the Soviet bloc."
Indian Ocean: Russia has no vital interest there.
The only purpose of her naval presence there is
"gunboat diplomacy."
U.S.-Soviet balance: Russians emphasize military
power because "they have no other strengths that
they can exploit." The Soviets lag in economic
'power and -ideological appeal.
First-strike threat: Neither superpower can
rationally contemplate first-strike nuclear attack
"in the years immediately ahead."
? 2 it
Soviets build the fishing port into a naval base?and on and
on in gradual steps.
? They look constantly for an opportunity for that first
step?a fishing agreement or a trade agreement?and then
they just keep pushing, but without committing themselves
in a major way.
0. How successful has the Soviet Union been with this
strategy?
A Only moderately successful. They've established three
toe holds that seem to be useful to them in Africa. They've
had a toe hold in Guinea for six years or so, and seem to be
hanging on there. They've had one for a short time in
Angola, and they're doing all right there. There's no major
Soviet presence, but the Angolans are still co-operating with
them. And the Soviets have had a fairly strong position in
Somalia for seven or eight years, and it seems to be holding.
They're beginning to explore other opportunities?for
example, in Southern and Eastern Africa with the visit of
President Podgorny.
On the other hand, the Russians have failed in Egypt.
They've lost a major position there. Outside Africa, they
failed some years ago in Indonesia. Their relations with Syria
are not as warm as they were several years ago. So they are
not always adroit enough to do this well. Basically they lack
the economic foundation to be an imperialistic power.
? What about Ethiopia? Are the Russians establishing
another toe hold in Africa at the expense of the United
States?
A There is no doubt that Soviet ties with Ethiopia's
present leftist regime are close. At the same time, however,
the apparent Soviet gains in Ethiopia may lead to a deterio-
ration in its formerly close relations with Somalia.
? Are the Russians using Cubans in black Africa as a
Soviet tool, or are the Cubans there for their own ends?
A I think it's a fine line. The Cubans are anxious to
establish themselves as a leader in the "third world." The
1979 conference of nonaligned nations will be held in
Havana. Thus the Cubans are anxious to raise their world
image in Africa and elsewhere in the third world. However, I
don't think that they could afford economically to indulge in
these activities without considerable support from the Soviet
Union. The Russians, by operating with a surrogate, get an
opportunity to establish an African foothold without neces-
sarily committing themselves too much.
0. Admiral Turner, why are we so worried about the
Indian Ocean, considering the relative weakness of Soviet
naval strength there? , .
A I wouldn't say their naval strength is relatively weak
there. At the same time, I wouldn't say that the Soviet naval
presence is formidable compared with ours, which is some-
What smaller. The difference is not overwhelming.
The asymmetry that impresses me is that the United States
as well as Western Europe and japan have a vital interest in
the Indian Ocean?in the oil route which is vital to our
future prosperity and security?while the Soviet Union does
not have a vital interest there.
O. In that case, why do the Russians maintain a naval force
there?
A I think their presence in the Inclian Ocean is symptom-
atic of their desire to leapfrog out to gain influence in other
areas of the world while they're stalemated in Europe.
Now, you can talk about their continuing naval presence in
the Mediterranean as a counter to the U.S. position in the
Mediterranean. You can talk about their continuing naval
presence in the Norwegian Sea and the Sea of Japan as
legitimate defensive concerns close to their homeland. But
you can only look at a continuing Soviet presence off West
Africa and in the Indian Ocean as gunboat diplomacy. I don't
say that this is malicious or bad,.but I am saying it's indicative
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of a change in strategy, dictated by the fact that they are
blocked on land.
0. Do you see any danger that the Russians will be able to
break the stalemate in Europe to their advantage?
A No, at this point I don't, although I recognize that some
of our allies are facing difficult political and economic
problems today.
"INTERNAL PROBLEMS FOR SOVIETS"-
0. What about the situation in Eastern Europe? How
dangerous is it for the Soviets?
.A It varies from country to country. Since Helsinki, there
has been a stirring of thought behind the Iron Curtain. Yet,
basically, one has the feeling that the dictatorial controls in
those countries will be exercised ruthlessly as requirements
dictate. There could be internal problems for the Soviets?as
there have been in Hungary and Poland and Czechoslovakia.
But I don't see a real possibility of a major fracturing of the -
Soviet bloc.
0. Do you expect the Soviets to make a grab for Yugoslavia
after Tito's death?
A I think that Yugoslavia is the most fragile point in the
European scene today. I would think that the Soviets would
look for an opportunity and probe without getting them-
selves overcommitted.
0. Do you anticipate a Russian military move to force
Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc?
A That would be a very definite commitment by the
Soviets, and it would be taken only as a last resort. They
would try a lot of other things first before they contemplated
that.
0. Turning to Russia's other flank?in the Far East: Are
the Soviets and Chinese likely to patch up their quarrel in
the near future?
A That is always a possibility when you are dealing with
countries that operate on such an expedient basis as the
Soviets did in their relations with Nazi Germany before
World War II. But I don't see it on the immediate horizon.
Even if it happened, I doubt if it would be anything more
than an expedient. The fissure between these two countries
is quite deep.
0. President Carter proposes to withdraw U.S. ground
forces from South Korea. Will that affect China's relations
with Russia or its attitude toward this country?
A Of course, it would have an effect on Chinese attitudes
that decision were made and executed. How important it
would be will be largely dependent on how and when a
withdrawal takes place?if it does?and what changes occur
on the world scene in the interim. It's pretty difficult to
speculate in the abstract until some policy decision is made
here as to how and when it's going to take place?if it does.
0. Will such a withdrawal be seen as an American retreat
from Asia by Japan and other U.S. allies?
A Again, it depends on how it's done and whether the
preparatory steps can persuade those countries that it's not a
retreat from Asia. Those Who are looking to us for a security
function out there would be bound to think of it as some-
thing of a retreat. But the status quo is not always the right.
ansu;er. Any time you change something, it's going to be
approved by some and disapproved by others.
0. One further point about the Soviet Union: What is your
reading of Brezhnev's health? Is he about finished, as recent
reports suggest?
A. My reading of Brezhnev's health is that it's a sine curve
that goes up and down. Sometimes he wears himself out a bit
;0%
or he has a particular problem, but I don't see this as a curve
that's constantly declining and has a terminal date that can
be anticipated. It's not such that we have to it here and plan,
"Well, in 12 months or 21 months we're bound to have
somebody new."
Q Are there any signs of a power struggle for the succes-
sion in the Kremlin?
A No, I don't read the signs that way at this point.
0. Would a leadership change have any significant effect
on Soviet-American relations?
A Yes, it's bound to. With a new Administration here .in
Washington beginning to establish an understanding with
the Brezhnev Administration in Moscow, we would have to
start over and feel out a new Administration over there.
There would bound to be some slowdown in the develop-
ment of enough understanding to proceed with things like
SALT.
0. Turning to your own situation at the CIA, Admiral, are
you handicapped in countering Soviet and Cuban activities
in Africa by restrictions on covert operations?
A No, I've not found them a handicap at this point. There
are no new limitations on our covert operations other than
specific prohibitions on assassinations. I would not permit
that kind of activity anyway. The point now is that there
must .be presidential approval before any covert action is
undertaken, and Congress must be informed in a timely
manner.
"WE CAN'T ABANDON COVERT ACTION"-
0. Are covert operations?dirty tricks of that sort?really
necessary?
A We can't abandon covert action. However, in today's
atmosphere, there is less likelihood that we would want to
use this capability for covert action. But I can envisage
circumstances in which the country might demand some
covert action.
O. What circumstances?
A For instance, let's say a terrorist group appears with a
nuclear weapon and threatens one of our cities and says, "If
you don't give us some money or release some prisoners or
do something, we will blow up Washington, D.C."
I think the'country would be incensed if we did not have a
covert-action Capability to try to counter that?to go in and
get the weapon or defuse it.
So, although we don't exercise it today, I think we must
retain some capability for covert actions that range from
small paramilitary operations to other actions that will influ-
ence events.
Q There have been recent allegations that you have .de-
classified reports on energy to support the President's policy
decisions. Does this represent a new CIA policy of using
intelligence to support White House programs?
A That is definitely not the case. This study was started
over a year ago?before even the election. The President did
not know of it until a few days before he mentioned it in a
press conference. ,
Let me say, though, that I believe that the intelligence
community should make more information available to the
public on an unclassified basis. The public is paying for our
work and deserves to benefit from it within the necessary
limits of secrecy. Moreover, a well-informed public is the
greatest strength of our nation.
I also believe that declassifying as much information as
possible is a good way to provide better protection for those
secrets we must hold. Excessive classification simply breeds
disrespect for and abuse of all classified data. I intend to
continue to declassify and publish information of value and
interest to our people.
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