SOVIET HARASSMENT OF AMERICANS REFLECTS NEW FLOWERING OF ARROGANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000300030021-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 20, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

PRTICLL -- EAREfroved For Release 20( 3=c;C 99-00498R000300~3Q021, , ..
ON PAGE! 20 AUGUST 1978
Soviet Hc'r assment Of Amlk=.ricans.
'f`Arr'ogc*nce
Re'Tf lects. New owering u
Adm. Stanfield Turner, U.S. director of central intelligence, pointed out
several signs of continuing Soviet pressure against the United States in an
exclusive interview with editors of The Son Diego Union..-
Turner's comments focused on the latest incidents of Soviet harassment'
of American reporters and businessmen in Moscow, the discovery of a'
XG3 tunnel into the American Embassy and harsh prison sentences given
in the Iother trials of dissidents. He called the harassment of Americans an
apparent rssaoesa to the U.S. arrest of two Russians caught spying in this-
country:
The CIA dirty-tor also expressed concern about what or who may be._;
behind- what 3n described as continuing efforts to undercut America's'
intelligence gathering. sorvices. Ho- inducted .former CIA agent Philip'
Aghe's threat to-reveal the identities of as many overseas CIA agents as-
he can, saying that such a disclosure would jeopardise thslives of these-.
'
agents, as well as seriously "damage U.S. ability to collect needed
intelligence data. The interview follows:
Question: Admiral, why is the So-
viet Union harassing American busi-
nessmen and newspaper people in
Moscow?- .
Answer:- The- Soviets have taken
these unconscionable actions appar-
ently in retaliation for the perfectly
proper arrest of two Soviet spies who
were caught in the process of spying
in this country.
Q: '.Vbat is the.!realtionship of
what's happening there to detente as.
a whole?
A: I think you have to recognize
that detente has never meant that
there is no competition between our
countries. It has tried to dampen the
military element of that competition
there are bound to be ups and downs
in the relationships over periods of
time. I don't view this particular
l A: I think that it is very difficult to
speculate on what the legal process-
es in the Soviet Union might do or
carefully controlled, as ycontrasted
sentencing or bncnaransxy, nor
instance, as having been terribly
perhaps the fact that he-was brought "1 don't really believe there's a way to
to trial was a rejoinder to the public speculate inc very informed manner as to
criticism; they were showing that whether they (the Soviets) will be tougher I
they were not going to let the public I or less cooperative."
criticism completely control their
internal domestic activities as they
see.them. can's, quite properly, but I'd like to
Q: Do you think the Russians will Iay? before you the question fora
good investigative reporter. What is
be more tough as the Soviet leader- going on here? We've got Agee pub..
pears?
series of events as a major impact. - question. And I don't really believe..,' -A J on detente. . . there's a way to speculate in a very
Q: Is the- KGB- being more arro . will be. tougher or less cooperative.
gant or more open?. Brezhnev clearly has been one of the ' fishing a very smooth, ekpensive but
A: When we discover a tunnel that leading exponents of detente and of free distribution publication strictly
the KGB has dug into the United SALT, so one has to. be concerned against the CIA. We've got a world
States Embassy in' Moscow and they ? whether with the loss of his influence youth festival in Havana with Agee
file the .protest with us; . they're. there will be as much emphasis on on the forum and others who have
damned arrogant.. - those. = been brought down for that purpose.
We've got other activities in this
..Q: What should the United States . Q: Phillip Agee, the renegade CIA- country directly pointed at undercut-
res nse be? agent, recently announced his inten- - ting our intelligence activities. They
AF That's a question for the Secre- tions of exposing every CIA agent are not cheap; somebody's behind d
taro of State and the President. abroad. How much of a danger do - this, somebody's funding this and
7 ' you regard this as being? ' -moving it. I think it's insidious, but
Q: Do you think the trials of A: A very serious one and one that within the limits of the law I have no
dissidents are going to result in I can do very little about. It like to authority to-go out and try to either
harsher sentences because of the see you do something about it. I'm find out who's doing it or to curb it.
worldwide attention than otherwise not allowed to investigate Ameri-
would have been the case?
COISl I1'I`
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300030021-6
Q: In your reports to the State
Department and to the President, I
assume you warned of this danger
that you are talking about. Is there
anything our government can do in a
formal way to draw attention to this
problem?
A: Rather little, in view of the fact
that Agee is unwilling to come back
to this country and come under our
legal jurisdiction. Even then there
are severe inhibitions on what we
can do without some questions'
whether he has broken the law or
whether. he has not. We have been
attempting in many ways-over the
last year or so to tighten our overall
security procedures; the trial of
Frank Snepp for violating his secre-
cy agreement with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency was in part to indi-
cate our government's strong con-
cern with these. unauthorized
releases.
Q: Could you outline the damage
caused by unauthorized release of
CIA secrets? ' - : ?
A: The long term damage to our
country is that people who are will-
ing to work with us and support us
overseas, individuals or foreign gov-
ernment agencies, are losing their
sense of confidence that a relation-
ship with us can be kept confidential.
Therefore, to some extent our sourc-?
es of vital information can be dried
up by this process. Some of the
factual data released is also.injuri-
ous. We've had specific complaints
from people whose. interests were
gored by these releases.
Q: Frank Snepp maintains that he
decided to write his book only after .
be could find no one within the CIA
management who was willing to
hear his complaints on the American
withdrawal from Vietnam or to even
admit that there.. were mistakes
made by the CIA.. What is your
assessment of this?
A: Snepp's allegation. is basically
untrue. He had opportunities to get a
hearing. He did get some hearing
before he left, he raised some com-
plaints. They weren't that -well.
founded, in the agency's view at the
time. On top of that, we have _a an Intelligence Oversight Board- to.
which he could.have gone with his
complaint, or he could have gone to
.Congress. He came to see me per-
sonally and I gave. him my assur-
ance that I wanted to find out what
was-wrong. He lied to me in saying
that he was going to give me his
book to review before he published
it. sh
Q: Snepp maintains that literally
thousands of pacification program
employees were left behind - men
whose very lives may have depend-
ed on their getting out of Vietnam
with the Americans. Could you com-
ment?
A: I have not really probed into
the details of how the CIA performed
back then, but my view was that it
was not.sll done as perfectly as it
could be. But it was not a case of
gross. negligence, as Snepp alleges.
There were a lot of mistakes made
in Vietnam by the military, by the
CIA, by others, but I think Snepp did
not. have a big enough view of.the
problem when he was there and has
foq "sed his criticism on a small part
ofd . - .
Q: Getting back to the long term
threat to intelligence.. gathering
.posed-by the" release of names of
agents and contacts overseas, could .
you tell me how you're dealing with
? it and wbat,'in your view, the future
is for the safety of your contacts and
your agents overseas?
A: We're being as scrupulous as
we can in protecting their identities
and- refusing to respond to media'
inquiries -about them. Sometimes
this is very, difficult because you're
taking a brickbat that you don't
deserve, but you've got to. It runs
into difficult legal issues when you
prosecute a case that might disclose
some other activities orsome other
agents that were not even the prima-
ry subject of the case. That's one
reason, incidentally, that it was very'
helpful to take Snepp to court on a
non-criminal charge, not a violation
of secrecy - on a contractual issue,
we didn't have to reveal a lot of
secret information in order to prove
that'there was other secret informa-
tion released.. :
Q: The handling of the Snepp case
has troubled a lot of journalists and
journalism professional groups in
that it's being interpreted as a gag
against writing. of any sort about
governmental- service. Could you
deal with that problem?
A: Mr. Snepp had signed an agree-
ment as a condition of his employ-
ment with us. It's a voluntary thing.
If you don't want to sign one, you
don't have to, but you don't have to
work for us either. And all it re-
stricts him. on in the future is his
handling of information gained dur-
ing his period of service with us. If
he wants to go out and write about
what's going on in the Department of
Labor since he left us, there's no
control over that. In point of fact,
there's no control over what he
writes in his book. It's only that he
must submit it to us for -prior
clearance. If we say he should take
something out and he insists not,
then we. have to go through legal
procedures in which we get an in-
junction and the courts decide
whether or not we're correct. We
have no arbitrary authority to pre-
vent him from printing anything.
Q: What is your view of Soviet
military intentions at this point, vis
a vis are they going to be satisfied
with arms parity or are they just
interested in superiority across the
board? Also, are you satisfied that
the CIA has adequate sources of
.information so that the view that you
give the President about the Soviet
Union's military. position is accu-
rate?
-A: No intelligence officer ever.
-feels that he's got enough informa-
tion I would answer your question,
though ..in saying yes, .I think' we
have a very good- concept of the
Soviet military strength in almost all
fields. Clearly, we always would like
to have more detail in the area
where it is obviously most difficult
- intentions. It's a lot easier to
count missiles than it is to know
what the purpose in their thinking is
for having them. I think the basisc
intention of the Soviet Union is to
compete with the United States:
.When you look at the assets that
they have to do that they don't have
the ecomomic wherewithal,. they
'don't have the political entree and
acumen that we do, so they have
resorted . to competing in an area
where they have almost unlimited
potential over time, and that's the
military.; Whether that means that
they. are determined to be so far
ahead of us that they could possibly
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP99-00498ROO0300030021-6
take us on in a military conflict is a Q: Admiral, is there a kind of congressional committee, as I
different question. I don't , think battle in the administration over recall.
that's very likely. I think they hope who will run the overall intelligence
they can achieve their objectives by programs in. the United States, the
less than military means. But I think - CIA, the DIA or any number of other
that as long as they feel they need military intelligence agencies?
the leverage 'of military strength, A: There's no battle. The Presi-
they are going to continue trying to dent on Jan. 25 of this year in a new
use it, and how far they will go in executive order laid out exactly how
matching or exceeding our military it was to be done and I've seen no
capabilities will very largely depend resistance to it since he signed that.
on the resolve and the military re- The President decreed that I would
sponse of the Western nations. . be in charge of all the budgets of the
national intelligence activities. I
Q.: Do you think they are. driving
for superiority?
would also be in charge of what we
call tasking all of the national intelli-
tellin
ene assets
them what i
-
g
,
n
A: I don't really want to answer g
that question that starkly because it formation they are to collect. Buthe
is easy to be misunderstood. I think did- not put me in charge of the
they are driving for a strong enough interpretation; the analysis of the
military position and rte information collected. We want com-enough p p-- peting analysis but we don't want a
tion around the world of their mill- '
lot of competition -three ice
A: No, that isn't it. He didn't know
I went to see Senator Clark on a
related matter. I was directed by the
National Security Council to go see
Senator Clark because we were lay-
ing out for the President all the
alternatives he had. One of them
could have involved the Clark
amendment. We needed a first hand
interpretation of what the amend-
meant before we decided on
ment
the alternative to present to the
President. On the Katangan situa-
tion, I was daily supplying the Presi-
dent with written briefings which
included Katanga. I believe that the
record will show that there was no
conflict between my briefings to him
and what he was saying in the public
forum. . .
tary strength that they will gain, '._ "going to the same place to do the
politcal advantage from it. '. They - same thing, or two expensive collet- Q: Several weeks ago one of your .
have over the last ten years gotten tion systems that overlap. unneces? predecessors, Mr. Colby, said in a
tremendous "mileage out: of a sarily speech, that he felt that became of
smaller, less capable force because n. the tremendous poverty in Mexico
they were coming from nowhere and and the doubling of population there
challenging us: Q: Criticism of U.S. intelligence in the next 20 gr so years, that
support arose over the Cuban role in-- Mexico represents a potentially tre-
Q: What's happening in Cambodia. the Katangan invasion of Zaire. One ' ,. . mendous threat to the security of
today? _ was that CIA intelligence, was our country. How do you feel about
A: Cambodia is a pawn here be. faulty; two, was' that CIA intelli- that?
tween the aspirations of the Viet- gence was misused; and three, was A: I hadn't heard that Bill had put
namese to be the dominant power in that you and the President don't talk' it in those terms, but it's very indica-
Indochina and the position of the to each other often enough. Are any tive of one of the changes, the chai-
Chinese not wanting to see an expan-' - of these correct? lenges that we face in the intelli-
sion of Vietnamese authority in that A: I talk to the President once a gence organizations of our country
area. Cambodians have a. very week at least. That is, I have a today. We have to deal not only with
strange political regime that's very -scheduled appointment with him Soviet missile threat, we- have to
repressive and is -causing problems once a week, and I think that's often deal with population, immigration,
on both of its borders to the west-in enough, plus such ad hoc things as natural resources exchange prob-
Thailand and to the east in Vietnam. Cabinet meetings-, - lems between us and a country as
I think its part of the overall settling close to us as Mexico. Clearly, the
of the political relationships in that - - Q: But he' didn't know, for exam- . illegal immigration problem be-
area. . pie, that you were testifying in a tweenus and Me.xico is a
Diego, are much closer to than most-.
of us -And we have. to hope thatwe -
can work out ways such that wititthe
growing, affluence of- the. Mexican
economy..througlr? its oil and-gas
finds that. they will be able to char-
nel those- resources into ways that
:' :.will prevent this immigration from
be very alert to working with the {
Mexicans to solve these problems
amicably and I think that President
Carter has particularly made an .
effort to work closely with President
Lopez Portillo.
Q: Who's in charge of rooster-
intelligence program along the Mex-
ican-American borders, the CIA or
"I think they (Russia) are driving far a: the r BI - :. :
strong enough. military position and A: The CIA conducts counter-intet-
enough perception around the world of ligence outside the United States, the
their military strength that they -'.ill 'gain FBI inside the United States. -:_
political advantage from it." )
portant _ one that you- here in Shn