ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DCI, SPEECH TO THE SAN FRANCISCO PRESS CLUB: ADDRESS & Q&A

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 11, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director, Central Intelligence
San Francisco Press Club: Address & Q&A
San Francisco, California
Monday, August 11, 1980
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[Introduction.]
DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER: It's always a treat to be
with the press, to have a chance to exchange ideas with you, be-
cause I happen to believe that our two professions, media and
intelligence, have a great deal in common. We have in common
the fact that both of our tasks are to find the facts and to
interpret them to what's going on in the world; you, obviously,
primarily, for the American public; we, primarily for the Ameri-
can government.
Beyond that, we have in common a recognition of the
great importance to each of us of protecting our sources, our
sources of intelligence, your sources of information. I admire
newsmen who have been w i I I i ng to go to jail rather than to dis-
close their sources. I can assure that we take very considerable
risks, if necessary, to protect ours.
We have in common, besides that, the great understanding
of the value of an exclusive. For you, it is an important edge
over your competitors. For us, it may be an important edge for
the President of the United States when competing or negotiating
with others who do not share the same good base of information
that he has.
'There's also another way in which we have great simi-
larities or interests in common. We must hope to possess some
fundamental protections in the law if we're going to continue
to be effective for our country. For you, probably the most
fundamental protection is that of the First Amendment of the
Constitution. For us, it is the ability to keep our reasonable
amount of secrecy, without which we simply cannot function. It
is here, of course, that sometimes our interests appear to col-
lide. It may seem too much to you that we are ready and eager
to dispense with the privileges of the First Amendment. Nothing
could be further from the truth. In fact, we are proceeding today
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with very great caution in seeking new legislation that will help
us with some of the very severe problems we have of maintaining
our necessary degree of secrecy. We recognize that it's vital
that in so doing, we not endanger, in any way, the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and the other freedoms set forth
in our Constitution. But at the same time, we recognize that
in the 1980s, the United States faces problems around the world
that underscore the importance of having good intelligence.
I say that because I happen to bel ieve that the decade
of the 1980s is going to be more precarious for this country than
were the decades of the '60s and the '70s; first, because in the
'80s, we will face, for the first time, a Soviet leadership that
does not feel militarily inferior to the United States. This is
a perception, regardless of whether it is a fact, and there is
very little that even the Congress or the Pentagon can do to
change that perception perceptibly in the better part of the
decade ahead of us. And so that means that our diplomacy, our
foreign policy has got to be structured on the basis of a per-
ception by the Soviets of something like military parity with
us .
What means I don't know specifically. But I do know
that it means you can't just count on bullying or intimidating
the Soviets. You've got to treat the relationship between this
country and the Soviet Union in a different way under this cir-
cumstance. It is a new challenge to us.
A second reason the decade of the '80s will be dif-
ferent and more challenging is that I do not believe that the
free countries of the developed world can expect the same con-
tinued high rate of economic growth we have become accustomed to
in the past several decades. One reason is that, traditionally,
economic growth in the developed countries has been tied to the
rate and the growth of energy supply. We in the Central Intel-
ligence Agency believe that the developed countries of the Free
World will be lucky if they sustain a rate of growth of total
energy supply -- natural gas, oil, coal, nuclear, thermal, solar,
whatever it may be -- a total supply increase of 1 to 2% for the
better part of this decade. And that may be optimistic. Thus
the rate of energy increase will not sustain rates of gross
national product growth of 4, 5 or 6%.
Beyond that, we forecast that in 1980, the OPEC countries
will cream off the top of international trade something like $127
billion. Oh, it's just a big number. Let me compare it, though,
to 1978, in which the same number was $3 billion. What has hap-
pened is that when they increased the price of oil 3 1/2 times
in 1974, the OPEC countries generated a great surplus. That
surplus by 1978 was worn down to $3 billion by two devices. One,
they bought more from us. But, two, we just ate into the rest
of it by inflation. It's now going to be $127 billion because
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within the last 15 months the price of energy, the price of oil,
rather, has gone up by 125%. And I would suggest to you that
there are clear signs that OPEC is not going to let us eat the
$127 billion away by inflation in the future. We have a dif-
ferent challenge ahead of us.
'Thirdly, I would suggest that in the 1980s the mechan-
isms for handling military, political, economic problems are going
to work in different ways than they have in the past. For instance,
our NATO and our Japanese allies are very sound politically, very
prosperous economically, and they clearly want to have a larger
voice in the councils of our alliances. For instance, the lesser
developed countries of the world that produce raw materials are
going to be much more intent in the '80s on producing what is
in their best interests, what suits their economies, their needs,
not just ours. This does not mean that our alliances need be
weaker. This does not mean that there need always be strained
relations with the lesser developed countries. But I do believe
it means that we are going to have to change our patterns of
diplomacy. We're going to have to be more astute, more fore-
sighted, and, in turn, to me that means we're going to have to
have better information, better intelligence upon which to base
the decisions in foreign policy for this country.
This brings me back to the issue of the First Amendment.
Can we do that? Can we have better intelligence, better secret
intelligence, and still respect the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that we've been talking about? I believe so. But I believe,
first, it's going to require some changes in the way we in the
intelligence community go about our business. Beyond that, I
think it's going to take some new legislative support to enable
us to function effectively within respect for all the constitu-
tional provisions.
Let me start by describing a few of the changes we have
already made in how we go about doing our business because of
this outlook. First, if we're working in some foreign country
to trace the flow of narcotics, and we're on to a foreign nar-
cotics trafficker, suddenly we find that he or she has perhaps
an illegal, or even a legal association with some American citi-
zen, we have to drop the case, because we may intrude on the
privacy of an American, or we may confuse the intelligence
apparatus of our country with the law-making apparatus.
Secondly, an actual case that came across our path a
short time ago was that of a rebellion in a lesser developed
country, one in which we had a very particular interest. We
were having considerable difficulty keeping track with the course
of this rebellion and what was happening. Suddenly, we realized
that the best information we were receiving were ham radio trans-
missions of an American missionary reporting what was going on
in his area. Well, we asked ourselves and our lawyers "Was this
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an electronic surveillance of an American citizen?" We debated
it, debated it, and finally came up with the answer that as long
as he was using a ham band and method of transmission, gee, that
really gets to be a semi-public matter. It was not. But if he
shifted his style or his technique or his frequency in an effort
to be private -- and that was a good possibility, because his
neck was out in making these transmissions -- we would then con-
sider that he wanted privacy, and we would have had to drop off
of the circuit and lose that bit of information.
Now the obvious result of rules and procedures like
these are that the speed and flexibility with which we can re-
spond to crisis situations is reduced somewhat. You know, very
often fundamental issues of constitutional law are debated between
my legal staff and that of the Attorney General in the midsts of
an operational crisis. I want to hasten to assure you that the
Attorney General's people have been very cooperative with us in
coming to quick resolutions of these issues so we could proceed
with our business. But you can imagine it does have some dampen-
ing effect, some flowing down of the process on us.
In most instances, we can adapt reasonably well to these
circumstances. However, because the issues are often very com-
plex, because my people in the field are generally not lawyers,
it can have an effect of inducing over-caution by our people
in the field. The more complex the legal standards with which
they must comply, the more the chance is that the intelligence
officer's initiative will be dulled. Today, our operators in
the field are almost forced to drop any operation which could
involve an American citizen. This, in turn, can reduce our
flexibility in crisis situations which might involve the lives
or the property of American citizens.
And yet let me add that I personally feel that these
costs that I have described of insuring the rights of the Ameri-
can citizen under the Constitution are bearable and are worth it
to us as a nation. There is, however, another cost, a cost that
has arisen out of recent years of focus by the American public
on the intelligence process which are neither bearable nor are
worth it to our country. This is the cost of the reduction in
our ability to keep our secrets. Today, there's a lot of talk
about unleashing the CIA. That's not what we need, and that is
not what we want; that's not what we're asking the Congress to
legislate for us. What we do seek, what we do need is to be
able to protect our legitimate secrets better, secrets of how
we collect our information, our sources; secrets of what informa-
tion we have. Our effectiveness is very highly dependent upon
our ability to keep secrets. In four specific areas, we need
legislative help in order to better be able to control our
secrets.
Unfortunately, much of the publicity on these requests
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for legislation has misunderstood their intent. I would like to
take a minute on each just to describe to you what we are asking
for and why.
The first concerns covert action. As you know, that's
not really an intelligence function. It's the effort by the
United States to influence the course of events in a foreign
country without the origin of that influence being identifiable.
About three years ago, covert action was simply a dirty word, and
some people were trying to legislate covert action out of our
capabilities. In recent months, a year, I've seen the American
public and the American press more and more ask the question,
"Isn't there something we can do to exert our power, our influence
in a foreign country short of military action?" Yes, there is.
It has limitations. But covert action does have a proper place
in our diplomatic portfolio.
Now in 1974, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment.
It requires that each time the President approves a covert action,
I must then notify up to eight committees of the United States
Congress about this. Now I assure you that it's very difficult
to recruit volunteers to undertake a highly risky covert action
operation if I have to admit to them that I'm going up on Capitol
Hill to tell some 200 people about it.
[Laughter.]
It's nothing against the Congress. It's that I don't
want to tell 200 people at the CIA if they don't really need to
know.
Now I understand and appreciate the reasons the Con-
gress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment in 1974. It was an
initial effort to put some controls on this area of our activity.
It may have been very necessary; it may have been very desirable
then. Since then we have instituted a very rigorous set of over-
sight procedures both within the executive and the congressional
branches of our government. One of these procedures is two com-
mittees of the Congress dedicated exclusively to intelligence
oversight. What we are asking for in legislative relief here is
to notify only those two committees of our covert action; not to
escape congressional oversight and scrutiny of the covert action
process, and, in point of fact, not even to substantially reduce
the number of committees that know. Because on the two intelli-
gence committees, there are representatives of the other six
committees. So if they have a legitimate jurisdictional need to
know about a covert action activity, there will be members of
their committees who can so inform them.
We think this is an important step, however, in bring-
ing covert action back into the realm of the feasible.
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The second area we want re l ief in is from the Freedom of
Information Act. The problem here is much more one of perceptions
than of fact. It is a perception of our foreign sources, of the
foreign intelligence agencies with whom we cooperate, because they
are not persuaded today their identities and the information they
give to us will or can necessarily be kept secret under the Free-
dom of Information Act requirement.
Now in point of fact, it can. We do not need, under
the law, to release information about our sources through the
Freedom of Information Act process. But that right is constantly
being challenged in the courts. And our agents keep wondering
will you keep on winning those court cases. And as long as they
perceive that there is a risk to them from the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act if they work with us, our operations will continue to be
hampered.
Now we do not ask for a blanket exemption from this
act. What we ask for is an exemption for information pertaining
to our sources of collecting intelligence. We want to be able
to assure 'those sources that they are specifically exempt. This,
of course, is an area of intelligence work that should be better
understood by you of the media than by any other audience with
whom I make this plea.
The third area is a problem of very serious personal
concern to me. It concerns the deliberate, callous disclosure
of the identities of our people and our sources overseas. It's
unreasonable, in my opinion, to ask Americans to work for the
CIA abroad, especially in the lawless climate that exists today
where our people's lives are frequently on the line by the very
nature of the work that they do, if we cannot at least protect
their identities from our enemies.
[Applause.]
Yet we are in a position today where people like Philip
Agee, whose avowed purpose is to destroy the Central Intelligence
Agency, can do these things with impunity. You'll all recall
the case of Richard Welch, our chief of station in Athens in
1975, who was murdered shortly after the disclosure of his iden-
tity. You are all well aware that five weeks ago in Jamaica one
of Agee's cohorts, Louis Wolf, went on television, showed the
pictures of 15 employees of the American Embassy, gave their
names, their telephone numbers, their addresses, their license
plate numbers. Two nights later the home of one of them was
bombed and machine-gunned. Two nights after that there was an
abortive attack on still another one.
It makes no sense for me to call for better intelligence,
on the one hand, and then not take steps to provide elemental pro-
tection to those who are going to collect that intelligence for
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our country. There is, of course, the obvious risks to the of-
ficer and his family. Beyond that there is the sacrifice to his
career when he is exposed. We, the nation, have lost a great
investment in this individual. The replacement of compromised
officers sometimes takes us years to effect.
In addition, once an officer's identity is disclosed,
our adversaries are much more capable of analyzing hs past asso-
ciations and his places of employment and uncovering still further
the officers of the CIA.
Given the impetus of this recent Jamaican incident, there
seems to be a good prospect that we will get some relief legisla-
tion through this session of the Congress. I hope so. It's been
controversial, and it will continue to be so. I've watched the
legislative history over the last six months. The debate in the
Senate has raged from one extreme to the other. Early in the game,
one senator stood up and said it was just not possible to punish
private citizens who had no direct and authorized access to this
classified information that was being disclosed. Recently another
senator stood up and said that somem risk to our civil rights were
acceptable because, quote, "it is not possible to have an ongoing
intelligence capability and a totality of civil rights protection."
The consensus legislation that is now drafted is somewhere
in between. It is very narrowly crafted so as not to infringe the
fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press that we all stand
for. The legislation, as drafted, would first apply to persons
who have had authorized access to classified information and then
disclose it. But it would also apply to anyone who discloses pro-
tected intelligence identities if he or she does so as part of
a deliberate effort to impair or impede the foreign intelligence
activities of our country. That is a very big requirement.
Lastly, we need legislative relief in an area that is
known as "gray mail," a situation in which a defendant or his
attorney will demand that the government produce all matter of
perhaps irrelevant classified information in the course of a pro-
secution. Unfortunately, there've been cases when such disclosure
was of greater damage to the United States than would have been a
withdrawal of the prosecution, and we have had to withdraw. A gray
mail bill has been proposed by the Attorney General and passed by
the United States Senate. Hopefully it will pass the House within
the month.
In brief, this bill would enable the government to pre-
vent the unncecessary disclosure of classified information during
discovery or trial by allowing the prosecution to obtain pre-trial
rulings on issues of relevance and by providing the court with al-
ternatives to dropping the case in the event that the government
still decides that it could not, for reasons of national security,
adduce this necessary classified information. The alternatives,
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for instance, might include the judge as stipulating that certain
facts are true, or dismissing a particular count, or excluding the
testimony of a particular witness. All in all, we simply ask
for some way in which to provide the classified information to
the court in a manner that will not lead to its disclosure if
that's going to be of great harm to the United States, yet, at
the same time, protect the rights of the accused.
Let me sum up by saying that we, you in the media, we in
the intelligence profession, as Americans face a dilemma together.
But it's one that particularly touches on your responsibilities
within our national framework. On the one night, we're all striv-
ing for an open society, one in which the government processes
are as open as possible. On the other hand, we all recognize the
necessity for an essentially secret intelligence service in order
to prevent our country from being surprised and threatened from
without. The issue is, can the ideals and the necessary co-
x ist?
I believe they can. I believe they must. The issue is
not one of leashing or unleasing the Central Intelligence Agency.
The issue is whether we can equip our intelligence agencies with
both the legal and the practical tools to do their jobs effective-
ly in a changing world environment and, at the same time, require
them to adhere to the l ega l , to the ethical standards that our
country desires.
I believe this can be done. I believe we can achieve
both objectives. On the one hand, the institution of rigorous
oversight procedures of both the executive and congressional
branches of our government over the past three years has, I
believe, proved that the American citizen can insure and feel
comfortable that the intelligence activities of our country
are conforming with national policy and that they will be ac-
countable to the people through their elected representatives.
On the other hand, with the growing understanding and support of
the American public, and with the passage by the Congress of the
legal remedies I have described to you, I believe that we can con-
tinue to be the most effective intelligence service in the world.
We are moving surely, steadily in the right direction.
But we are not yet there. I ask you who are in apfession not at
all dissimilar from ours -- I ask you for your understanding and
your support, not just support for enactment of the legislative
remedies that I've mentioned, but your support for the maintenance
by this country of a strong intelligence capability so that we can
learn about, interpret and or see events in foreign countries, be-
cause I believe we will very much need to do that throughout this
precarious decade of the 1980s that lies ahead of us.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
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CHAIR: Admiral Turner, I find it difficult to believe
that this could be put more eloquently than you did this afternoon.
Thank you very much.
We have a lot of questions. If we don't get around to
your question, it's not because the Admiral does not want to
answer it. It's just that I think we have a lot of questions.
And if we don't get around to yours, don't fret about it.
Admiral, what is your estimate of the percentage of women
employed by the CIA compared to men, and how active are you in train-
ing women for assignments out of the clerical category? What is the
entry [words inaudible] the agency for the job assignments and what
type of career role is available?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Women are about 45% of the agency, but
they are not nearly that high a percentage of the professional corps.
We have a very strenuous equal opportunity program, upward mobility
program for all minorities within the agency. I do have to say to
you in all candor that we have severe limitations on us as to how
rapidly we can make this move.
Much as in the military, in our profession, with some
exceptions, it's difficult to bring people in laterally. You
don't start a spy at the top. And therefore, we are dependent
upon our strenuous efforts over the last few years of bringing
more minorities in at the bottom and do everything we can to
accelerate their upward movement, because we can't, with a few
exceptions, as I say, bring them in from other professions.
You come into the Central Intelligence Agency because
you have excel led in something. I'm often asked by fathers and
mothers "What should my son or daughter study at college in order
to qualify?" And I say have him or her study what he is she is
best at and likes and enjoys. We employ almost every academic
profession on the campuses, everything from psychiatry to English
majors to political science, to economics, and so on. So do well
at what you're good at and l i k e and enjoy and show that you are
above the norm, and we'll be very interested in you. We're
particularly interested in young people who go out from college
and have a few years of experience in the business world some-
place and then realize that they'd like to do something even more
exciting and challenging.
Q: Has your policy regarding recruiting news people
for the CIA changed since the American Society of Newspaper
Editors' convention this spring?
DIRECTOR TURNER: No. Our policy is that we will not
engage a member of the American media in the process of col l ect-
ting intelligence information, and we have not so engaged members
of the American media since early 1976. At the same time, I would
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not deny to you as members of the media your right to volunteer to
support us in any way that you feel appropriate.
Q: If Russia is an enemy, why does the United States'
policy favor SALT II? Why do we continue to aid Russia with
grain shipments, truck and fertilizer plants, and all sorts of
technology, all on easy credit?
DIRECTOR TURNER: The questioner raises an interesting
point I'd like to stress, and that is that it's important that
the intelligence agencies of your government stay clear of taking
sides on what are known as policy issues such as these, because
if we advocate SALT or we advocate trade or no trade with the
Soviet Union, we then are suspect when we produce intelligence
that maybe reinforces that position. So we try to call the shots
as we see them on SALT without advocating it or opposing it.
I testified in great detail before the Senate of the
United States on just how well I could do may part of SALT II,
which would be checking on the Soviets, telling what they were
doing, if they were possibly trying to cheat. Similarly, on
the question of trade with the Soviet Union, it is our input;
that is, to tell how important it would be to the Soviets to get
a computer of this capacity, what is their computer status at
this point, or is this kind of a production capacity, and what
are they getting from other countries; does it make a difference;
if they are turned down by the United States, can they just walk
nextdoor and obtain it? We make those inputs regularly; we
don't pass value judgments on it.
Q: Admiral, what are the CIA options in Iran if the
Prime Minister elects not to free the American hostages?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Well, I would be candid with you that
the options in Iran are very limited. You've watched all the forms
of pressure that we've tried to apply, the attempts at a rescue
effort, and we unfortunately have not bee successful. It is my
personal feeling that there are half a dozen or slightly more
separate power centers in Iran. There's Khomeini himself. There
is his personal entourage. There's the President, Bani-Sadr.
There's a newly elected Majlis, or Parliament. There's about
to be a Prime Minister. There's the Islamic Republican Party
headed by Ayatollah Beheshti. And where the hostages are is
as a pawn between these various power groups, each of them try-
ing to use the hostage issue to further its power position within
the country. Unfortunately, I don't in the near term foresee a
coalescence of enough power by any several of these groups to
resolve the issue.
Q: Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti had an NSA re-
port in April saying Billy Carter is about to receive money from
Libya. Was he unduly cautious in withholding that report....?
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DIRECTOR TURNER: When I came to your good city, I went
down to Pier 39. I had dinner at a Chinese restaurant. When I
pulled out my fortune, it said "You will win prizes in contests
testing your ability to answer questions."
[Laughter and applause.]
If I answer a question about an ongoing Senate and
Justice Department investigation, I'll win the prize.
[Laughter.]
Q: The position of Director of Central Intelligence
in theory should coordinate all U. S. intelligence functions.
The non-CIA organizations still have specific autonomy. Do
you see any change toward true centralization?
DIRECTOR TURNER: In 1978, President Carter signed an
order giving me two special authorities to do the coordination
better. One was the control over the budget of a l l of the in-
telligence activities, whether housed in the Department of State,
the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the FBI, or
wherever.
The second was the authority to pack the collection
elements the satellites, the listening posts, the human agents
-- to tell what they were going to do. Now it's very important
for the country that we do have close coordination in this area
of collecting intelligence. It is either very expensive for
technical equipment or it is very risky for human agents. And
therefore, the President has stressed my authority to coordinate
and control that. I think it is working quite well.
On the other end, the other half of intelligence is
doing something with, analyzing, interpreting the information
that is gathered by all of these sources. And here we want auto-
nomy of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence Research, and other analytic organizations
within the community, because no two individuals will interpret
the same information precisely the same. And we must have com-
peting and differing views come forward, lest a mental block by
any one of us becomes the accepted wisdom and it happens to be
wrong.
So we are, I think, on a good course today of tighter
integration effected by the President's Executive Order on the
collection side, and a continued emphasis on diversity and com-
petitive analysis on that side.
Q: Admiral Turner, [words inaudible] a curious comment
on the possibility that Russia will in some manner or other take
over 8% of Saudi Arabia during the period between November, 1980
and January, 1981, during our [words inaudible]....
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DIRECTOR TURNER: You're asking me for a crystal ball
look into the future. I don't think that is the probability for
a period of time. We are, of course, very concerned at the possi-
bility of the Soviets establishing a stronger position nextdoor
in Iran, where the situation, as I've described to you earlier,
continues to deteriorate with all these power centers. And that
in itself would be a very serious thing for the United States.
It's a reason why we hope there is going to be a resolution
somehow of the hostage issue so we can go back to a more normal
and supportive relationship with Iran.
Q: Admiral Turner, usually -- this is about -- it is
about quarter to 2:00. Usually by this time a hasty retreat
has been beaten by many people to the door. But I haven't seen
one person get up and leave yet. And you better not.
[Laughter.]
The CIA played a significant and effective role in
the replacement of the government in Chile seven years ago.
Do we, or can we have assurances that they are doing their
best to undermine the present regime in Iran?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Now that I know you're all volunteers
to stay here....
[Laughter.]
We have talked a fair amount about the covert action
capabilities, the need for relief from the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
to make them more effective. I do not talk in public about
specific operational activities. But I assure you we do have
a covert action apparatus that is available on call of the Pre-
sident, and with oversight of the Congress.
Q: Time -- time is going apace. [Words inaudible.]
Did the White House suggest more cabinet level media involvement
in events like the [words inaudible]?
DIRECTOR TURNER: I have felt since taking over this
job 3 1/2 years ago that I had an obligation to the American
public, particularly in view of the intense amount of criticism
that took place between 1974-'77, '78, past activities of the
CIA. And I felt that there was an opportunity to let the Ameri-
can public know more about what we do and what we do not do.
So I've made a practice of periodic speaking engagements, some-
times with the media, as here, on some college campuses, like
Stanford a few years ago, sometimes to groups of businessmen
or civic groups. I've found it valuable to us, getting a feel
for what people are thinking about us, what their concerns are
about the world. I think that change in public attitude towards
intelligence and the CIA in the last several years is very heart-
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warming to us. It makes us feel much more a part of the overall
governmental process of our country and feel much more support
from the public.
We have tried over these past several years through
our release of unclassified information to the public to do
more also to support you directly. We now find that when we
produce a classified piece of intelligence, we look at it and
ask ourselves "Is it of value to the American public if we
remove from it information that has to be kept exclusive or
information that's related to our sources?" And if it is,
today we publish it. We try to help the public realize the
return on their investment in us.
And all that may, on the one hand, of course, may seem
to be contrary to what I've been saying to you largely today, that
we're trying to again establish our barriers of secrecy. But it
really is not, because if we have too many secrets, if we keep
things in -the classified category that could be released to the
public, it's like somebody said, if everything is secret, nothing
is secret.
5o we're trying, on the one hand, to share more with
you in forums like this. On the other hand, we're trying to take
that part of our profession which must be kept as secret as you
must keep your sources and put a tighter ring around it. It is
essential that we do that. It is the greatest threat to our
intelligence capabilities in this country today. But it is also,
I think, very worthwhile for us to be here, to share more with
you, and I've really enjoyed this and appreciate it.....
[Applause.]
Thank you very much.
[End of speech and QBA.]
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