INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PROCESS FALLIBLE, NOT FOR FAINTHEARTED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200030034-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 2, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/04/06: CIA-RDP99-00498R0002
PORTLAND OREGONIAN
2 August 1982
Intelligence anaEysi
faiUbie, not for fainthearted
By JACK STEPHENSUN
PREDICTING the future is the life-
blood of an intelligence agency. The vi-
tal fluid takes the form of intelligence
estimates. Although the real-life James
Bonds and the modern-day Mata Haris
receive the glamour and the notoriety, it
is the intelligence estimators who deter-
mine the real value of an intelligence
organization to its government.
Peering into the future is great fun,
for, after all, we do spend the rest of
our lives there. But committing what
we see to written predictions and then
standing by them is not for the faint-
hearted. How does an intelligence ana-
lyst sort from the subtle, shifting shades
of gray to form a vision of the future?
Analysts arrive at the best estimates the
old-fashioned way; they earn them
through research.
The grist for the analyst's mill takes
many forms. There is a massive amount
of open literature that forms the base of
any estimate. But piled onto it are the
more esoteric and potentially more in-
sightful sources: defector reports; pho-
tographs from on the land, from in the
air and beyond into space; communica-
tion intercepts; and even environmental
pollution. Add to this the gleanings
from the espionage network - reports
from agents-in-place and purloined doc-
uments and hardware - and the ana-
lyst has the ingredients to make an esti-
mate.
But there is no precise recipe for this
process. The analyst applies his or her
special knowledge and insights devel-
oped over the years. What degree of
validity can be assigned to the various
reports? How reliable are the sources?
Is the evidence conflicting or support-
ing? What shrewd questions can be
raised that' might give a better inter-
pretation of the information?
The analyst will surely subject first-
draft estimates to the critical eve of
professional colleagues. Outside experts
may be called in. Finally, the analyst
must defend the vision of the future
before a panel of other experts often
including representatives from the vari-
ous intelligence-related agencies in the
government.
The official estimates that result
from this process range from the highly
classified to those available to the pub-
lic. Classified estimates are sometimes
edited so that they too can become-
pub-lic property. In other instances, reports
are leaked to the public for many rea-
sons, some for believed good intentions,
others for more base motives.
How accurate have these estimates
into the future been? What grade should
the analysts receive on their report
cards? Let's look at one example that
came into the public domain.
At an April 1977 press conference,
President Carter cited a classified Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency estimate on
world oil supplies that predicted severe
shortages by 1985. In particular, ' the
Russian oil industry was estimated to be
in trouble, with production peaking as
early as 1978 and Russia becoming a net
oil importer by 1985. The furor over the
president's comment caused the ad-
ministration to declassify and release
within three days the~.eport. Criti-
cism of the report was instantaneous.
The next month the gloomy CIA es-
timate was reinforced by a report enti-
tled, "Energy: Global Prospects for
In my opinion
STAT
that claimed oil production in Russia,
would rise until 1985, level off until the
1990s and then rise again.
As we stand today, almost awash
with oil, many may be confused over
what to believe about the future of So-
viet oil. The majority seems to favor the
new CIA estimate.
As noted, written predictions are not
for the faint of heart nor .are they sure
things. Yet they are vitally important...
Perhaps more disturbing than the
cloudy view of the future is the tender-i
cy of the present administration to be-
come more secretive. The closing of
several federal statistical offices is an'
example. Public debate based on avail-`
able information was good for the CIA'
forecast on oil. It should .be continuedl
whenever possible:
There must always' lie secret'esti-
mates, especially those that 'are either .
tactical in nature or contain information
that would identify sources. But on the.
strategic scale, topics such as energy
resources, crop. estimates, economic'
conditions, socio-political issues and.-
even military force levels would benefit
from criticism by knowledgeable. dd
zens.
Somewhere within the intelligence
community there must have been an
analyst who perceived the potential .for'.
conflict over the Falkland Islands be-
tween Great Britain and-Argentina.-But what analyst would have been listened
to on that issue when-Israel was with-
drawing from the Sinai and at the same
time attacking terrorists. in Lebanon,
the Soviets were embroiled in Afghani-
stan, Poland was suffering, Central
America was in foment' and the entire
world was speculating on who. would
succeed Soviet President Leonid I.
Brezhnev?
And that is the problem - identify-
ing those who do, indeed, see clearly
and accurately into the future. A hall-
mark of the American scientific re- )
search effort has been its openness and
subjection to review. If it is correct that
the best intelligence estimates are
earned by careful research, then as,
much as possible should be open to re-
view by an informed audience. Our offi-
cial forecasters might end up with bet-
ter report cards.
Jack Stephenson is a resident of St.
filers and a former anaivsr for the
Central Lnre?Ii. a cnceeAgency. .
1985-2000." This study was done by 35
business, government and academic
leaders from 15 non-communist coun-
tries. It stated that world oil shortages
could begin as early as 1981.
The CIA was still standing by its_.
forecast in August 1979. CIA Director
Stansfield Turner continued the warn-
ing during congressional testimony in
April 1980, predicting a vicious struggle
over the remaining oil supplies.
But by mid-1981, the CIA had re-
vised its estimate because Soviet oil pro-
duction, which had been predicted to
peak in 1978, had instead continued to
climb. The new forecast stated that pro-
duction would continue at current levels
for one or two years and then begin to
decline. One of the CIA's severe oil crit-
ics, Professor Marshall Goldman of
Wellesley, College, then said he agreed
with the CIA.
Another oil expert, Arthur Meyer-
hoff, writing in the November-Decem-
ber 1981 issue of American Scientist,
declared that the CIA was more nearly
correct than any agency except for the
Soviet Ministry of Oil Industry, which
had predicted a turndown in oil produc-
tion, possibly by 1982.
The Defeise Intelligence Agency,
however, has a different crystal ball. In
September 1981, it released an estimate