AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS ABROAD AID CIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP99-00498R000100150096-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 20, 2007
Sequence Number:
96
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 22, 1978
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP99-00498R000100150096-3.pdf | 85.6 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2007/06/20: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100150096-3
THE TECH.(MIT)
22 September 1978
Amenirkmam arafessionals abroa
By Elaine Douglass
According to Director Stans-
field Turner, the CIA depends
heavily on Americans who travel
abroad. professionally as sources
of information. about foreign
countries. This includes university
professors and researchers.
Turner discussed the use of un-
iversity and other professionals in
a May 1978 letter to the President
of Harvard University. Derek C.
Bok. Harvard -made. the letter.
? public in July, - -
In addition to--expanding the:
-CIA's eyes and ears. the.use of
professionals to gather intel-
ligence abroad eliminates the
problem for the CIA. of develop..
ing credible disguises, or "cover,
for regular-CiA agents.
Moreover, scientists can gain ac
cess, often penetrating access, in-
countries where other categories
of visitors are restricted in travel,
or barred altogether.
The Tech recently- discussed-
these issues with Associate
Professor of Earth Sciences Peter.
Molnar. Molnar, who is currently.
supervising field work in
Afghanistan, indicated he would
not cooperate in any CIA intel-
ligence gathering. He agreed,
however, that consideration of his
field work could serve as a
hypothetical example of how
scientists might be useful to the.
CIA. -
Molnar heads a - project- that
collects seismological data in.
-Afghanistan, and he-"and-
members of his research group.
have been stationed in areas of--
that country close to the Soviet-
Union..
A reputedly left-Wing coup in:-
.Afghanistan in April has
:
generated 'fears among some US'
government officials that.
Afghanistan might come under
the sway of the USSR, and has
heightened US interest in
Afghanistan. .
Members of Molnar's group
have enjoyed relatively free access
to Afghanistan, which they ar-
ranged in part through French
scientists. .
In response.- to a ' question.
Molnar. commented that he could
imagine his project as an example
of one that could be used for CIA
intelligence gathering, but he said
it would be less than ideal for that
purpose because-the MIT scien-
tific project is likely.-to be viewed
with some suspicion.. by Afghan
officials. "Sincwe are
seismologists, th?Afghan govern-
inent may think.we-are recording
Russian underground nuclear
tests," Molnar-said. "and for in-
telligence gathering it would be
better for the CIA-to rely on peo.
ple who are a, little less obvious.
than we are:'
Molnar stated that members of
his expedition might be in a. posi-
tion to gather-: intelligence.. In'
response to various hypothetical
intelligence - missions,. posed byF j
77rr Frch. Molnar agreed that the-
MIT scientists might.be. able to.-
gauge the degree of support for
the new government in the
countryside. Scientists might, for
example, be able to discover if the
local people were -armed, and
whether they would be receptive-
to offers of arms from outside the
country which they might use to
.oppose the new government- or
harass it in outlying provinces...
. Molnar said that he has never
been approached by the CIA-in
connection with the Afghan- field
work. He once was approached,
however, in connection with a
visit to MIT by Soviet scientists..
"After I received visits from S.
A. Fedotov and P. 1. Tokarev of--.
the Institute-of Vulcanology- in
Petropavlovsk in January. 1977, a
guy from the CIA called me."
"I- met with him as a scientific-#'
experiment;" _Molnar said, "I It
wanted `tii?see what a CrA agent l
would say. The agent wanted to'
know if -the Russians had said
anything about an electric!
generator in the Garm region of
Tadjikistan."
"I Was somewhat -relieved;'.
Molnar continued. "that I knew
nothing about the generator. and
-1. did not have.' to compromise
myself either by concealing infor
mation.=or by serving as a spy:'
Molnar'-said he discussed his
- contact with. the. CIA with a
senior colleague well informed on
China.- The.colleague was dis-
mayed. Molnar recalled; -and
asked Molnar, "Don't you know
-that if you are debriefed by the
CIA you'll never get permission
from the Chinese government to
do work in China?"
STAT
Approved For Release 2007/06/20: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100150096-3